ACCESS TO JUSTICE?: DOES DOJ’S OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION NEEDED TO CONDUCT PROPER OVERSIGHT?

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

Serial No. 113–96

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

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ACCESS TO JUSTICE?: DOES DOJ’S OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION NEEDED TO CONDUCT PROPER OVERSIGHT?

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:13 a.m., in room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Bob Goodlatte (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.


Staff Present: (Majority) Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff & General Counsel; Branden Ritchie, Deputy Chief of Staff & Chief Counsel; Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & General Counsel; Stephanie Gadbois, Counsel; Kelsey Deterding, Clerk; (Minority) Perry Apelbaum, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel; Danielle Brown, Parliamentarian; and Aaron Hiller, Counsel.

Mr. Goodlatte. Good morning. The Judiciary Committee will come to order. And, without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of the Committee at any time.

We welcome everyone to this morning’s oversight hearing entitled, “Access to Justice? Does DOJ's Office of Inspector General Have Access to Information Needed to Conduct Proper Oversight?” And I will begin by recognizing myself for an opening statement.

On August 5, 2014, 47 of 72 statutory U.S. inspectors general signed a letter to Congress in protest of constraints that have recently been imposed on access to agency records—constraints that impeded efforts to perform oversight work in critical areas. The conduct of meaningful oversight by any Office of Inspector General depends on complete and timely access to all agency materials and data. As such, section 6(a)(1) of the Inspector General Act expressly provides for such access.

Restricting or delaying an inspector general’s access to key materials in turn deprives Congress and the American people of timely information with which to evaluate an agency’s performance. Limiting access, except in very narrow instances, is at odds with the
necessary independence of inspectors general and is contrary to congressional intent.

This hearing will examine whether agency components at the Department of Justice have undermined the OIG’s independence by withholding, filtering, or delaying the production of essential records based on a novel interpretation of the Inspector General Act as well as restrictive readings of other statutes.

In each of the three instances of interference we will hear about today, a review of agency correspondence with the OIG evinces a mindset that views DOJ leadership of the arbiter of what information the Office of Inspector General receives. It reveals an agency that believes the OIG must ask for and receive permission to review Department of Justice data and material and that sanctions OIG investigations as necessary to advance its own supervisory responsibilities alone.

The mission of DOJ’s Office of Inspector General is to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in DOJ programs and personnel and to promote economy and efficiency in those programs. Efforts to reduce transparency, such as those described by the inspectors general in the August 5th letter, leave agencies vulnerable to mismanagement and misconduct and will not be condoned.

Although not every inspector general who signed the letter has experienced barriers to access, each one signed in support of the principle that an inspector general must have complete, unfiltered, and timely access to all information and materials available to the agency that relate to that inspector general’s oversight activities without unreasonable administrative burdens.

I welcome our witness today, the Honorable Michael Horowitz, Inspector General of the United States Department of Justice. I am pleased to have him here to describe the challenges he has faced and share his valuable insights so that we may evaluate for ourselves whether the executive branch is executing the Inspector General Act as Congress has intended and whether additional action is needed to restore congressional intent.

And now it is my pleasure to recognize the Ranking Member of the Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, for his opening statement.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte and Members of the Committee. I thank you for convening a hearing on this critical topic. We have an obligation to preserve the continued independence and effectiveness of the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of Justice.

Inspector General Horowitz, we welcome you here before the House Judiciary Committee today.

I suspect that the membership of this Committee is virtually unanimous in recognizing the need for vigorous oversight of the Department of Justice. No matter which party controls the executive branch, a strong and independent Office of Inspector General is key to protecting civil liberties, reining in executive overreach, safeguarding taxpayer dollars, and preserving the public trust.

I have the privilege of having voted for the original Inspector General Act of 1978, both in the House Committee on Government Operations, then under the leadership of Jack Brooks of Texas, and
subsequently on the House floor. It is my suspicion that I may be the only one that has done those things on this Committee.

I have reviewed the 1978 Committee report accompanying the passage of the Inspector General Act, House Report 95-584. It was our intention then and remains our intention today that “each inspector general is to have access to all records, documents, et cetera, available to his or her agency which relate to programs and operations with respect to which the office has responsibilities.” Simply put, the inspector general is to have complete and direct access—emphasized—to all of the information he or she deems necessary to conduct thorough and impartial investigations.

Recent legal analysis by the FBI’s Office of General Counsel unfortunately suggests otherwise. They reason that the Inspector General Act actually prohibits the FBI from sharing certain sensitive or confidential materials, including but not limited to grand jury information, Title III wiretap information, and consumer credit information.

Members of the Committee, I find this analysis wholly unpersuasive. Nothing in the Inspector General Act authorizes the Department or its component agencies to refuse even these materials to the inspector general. Again borrowing from the 1978 report, the act was designed to assign to each inspector general primary responsibility for auditing and investigative activities relating to programs and operations of his or her agency. That is a direct quotation.

It is difficult to imagine how the Inspector General of the Department of Justice might conduct those auditing and investigative responsibilities without full access to relevant court documents, intelligence reports, or financial records. It is also difficult to imagine how the Inspector General might conduct effective oversight of the Department of Justice if the materials it requires can only be obtained with the permission of department attorneys.

To be clear, the current leadership of the Department of Justice has taken extraordinary steps to make sure that the Inspector General has eventually received access to the material he seeks in each of the cases before us today. Attorney General Eric Holder and Deputy Attorney General James Cole are not the problem. They have both intervened personally on multiple occasions to overcome the FBI’s objections and to compel production of the materials in question.

I commend them for that leadership, but I do not know who will hold these posts in future Administrations. And we should not be willing to entrust this key oversight matter to men and women who may feel differently about the effectiveness of the Office of the Inspector General.

In May of this year, Deputy Attorney General Cole asked the Office of Legal Counsel to issue a formal opinion resolving this dispute. I hope that Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Karl Thompson and his team will adhere to the plain text of the statute and to our obvious intent and grant the Inspector General unfettered access to every document in the Department’s possession.

And if the Office of Legal Counsel finds enough ambiguity in the law to place any limit on the Inspector General’s access to informa-
tion, then the House Judiciary should be the first to act to correct their mistaken impression.

Inspector General Horowitz, we welcome and we look forward to your testimony today and to your assistance if a legislative response is indeed required.

And I thank the Chairman and yield back.

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman.

And the Chair understands that the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, would like to make a brief statement——

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. GOODLATTE [continuing]. Welcoming the Inspector General.

Mr. JORDAN. I thank the Chairman.

I am just looking, Mr. Horowitz, I am looking at the letter that you signed along with a whole bunch of other inspector generals from August 5 of this year. The first paragraph talks about serious limitations on access to records; second paragraph talks about the Department of Justice recently faced restrictions on their access to certain records.

I was just going to say, welcome to the club. It is noticeable that four of the six Republican Members here are also from the Oversight Committee, and I know we have a hearing tomorrow on this very issue. But we have been frustrated from the kind of response we have gotten from the Internal Revenue Service and, frankly, from the Department of Justice. So we share in your frustration, and we want to commend you for the work you have done. I have always been impressed with your service to the public and the work that you have done.

But this is critical, and so I just wanted to say, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. And I want to thank Mr. Horowitz for his work and for being here today.

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman.

Without objection, all other Members' opening statements will be made a part of the record.

We thank our only witness, Inspector General Horowitz, for joining us today.

And, Mr. Horowitz, if you would please rise, I will begin by swearing you in.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you very much.

Let the record reflect that the Inspector General responded in the affirmative.

On April 16, 2012, Mr. Michael Horowitz was sworn in as Inspector General for the United States Department of Justice. As Inspector General, Mr. Horowitz oversees a nationwide workforce of more than 400 special agents, auditors, inspectors, attorneys, and support staff.

The Inspector General has enjoyed a long career in both the public and private sectors. Mr. Horowitz previously worked as an assistant United States attorney for the Southern District of New York from 1991 to 1999. After this, he served in the Criminal Division at Main Justice, first as Deputy Assistant Attorney General and next as Chief of Staff. Mr. Horowitz has also spent time working in the private sector, most recently as a partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft.
He earned his juris doctor magna cum laude from Harvard Law School and his bachelor of arts from Brandeis University.

Mr. Horowitz, we appreciate your presence today and look forward to your testimony. Your written statement will be entered into the record in its entirety, and we ask that you summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less. Thank you, and welcome.

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Horowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Conyers, Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today.

Access by inspectors general to information and agency files goes to the heart of our mission to provide independent and nonpartisan oversight. That is why 47 inspectors general signed a letter last month to Congress expressing their concerns about this issue. I want to thank the Members of Congress for their bipartisan support in response to that letter.

The IG Act adopted by Congress in 1978 is crystal-clear. Section 6(a) expressly provides that inspectors general must be given complete, timely, and unfiltered access to all agency records. However, since 2010, the FBI and some other department components have not read section 6(a) of the IG Act in that manner and, therefore, refused requests during our reviews for relevant grand jury, wiretap, and credit information in their files. As a result, a number of our reviews were significantly impeded.

In response to these legal objections, the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General granted us permission to access the records by making a finding that our reviews were of assistance to them. They also stated their intention to do so in all future audits and reviews. And we appreciate of course, their commitment to do that.

However, there are several significant concerns with this process. First and foremost, the process is inconsistent with the clear mandate of section 6(a) of the IG Act. The Attorney General should not have to order department components to provide us with access to records that Congress has made clear we are entitled to review.

Second, requiring the OIG to obtain permission from department leadership seriously compromises our independence. The OIG should be deciding which documents it needs access to, not the leadership of the agency that is being overseen.

Third, while current department leadership has supported our ability to access records, agency leadership changes over time, and our access to records should not turn on the views of the Department's leadership.

Further, we understand that other department components that exercise oversight over department programs and personnel, such as the Office of Professional Responsibility, continue to be given access to these same materials without objection. This disparate treatment is unjustifiable and results in the Department being less willing to provide materials to the OIG, presumably because the OIG is statutorily independent while the OPR is not.
This disparate treatment once again highlights OPR’s lack of independence from the Department’s leadership, which can only be addressed by granting the statutorily independent OIG with jurisdiction to investigate all alleged misconduct at the Department. Indeed, the independent, nonpartisan Project on Government Oversight made the same recommendation in a report earlier this year, and bipartisan legislation has been introduced in the Senate to do just that.

This past May, the Department’s leadership asked the Office of Legal Counsel to issue an opinion addressing the legal objections raised by the FBI. Attached to my written statement is a summary of the OIG’s legal views regarding these issues.

It is imperative that the OLC issue its decision promptly, because the existing practice at the Department seriously impairs our independence. Moreover, in the absence of a resolution, our struggle to access information in a timely manner continues to seriously delay our work.

It also has a substantial impact on the morale of the OIG’s auditors, analysts, agents, and lawyers, who work extraordinarily hard every day. Far too often, they face challenges getting timely access to information, including even with routine requests. For example, in two ongoing audits, we had trouble getting organizational charts in a timely manner.

We remain hopeful that OLC will issue an opinion promptly that concludes the OIG is entitled to independent access to the records and information pursuant to the IG Act. However, should an OLC opinion interpret the IG Act in a manner that results in limits on our ability to access information pursuant to the IG Act, we will request a prompt legislative remedy.

For the past 25 years, my office has demonstrated that effective and independent oversight saves taxpayers money and improves the Department’s operations. Actions that limit, condition, or delay access to information have substantial consequences for our work and lead to incomplete, inaccurate, or significantly delayed findings or recommendations.

I cannot emphasize enough how critical it is to get these pending access issues resolved promptly. And, hopefully, OLC will shortly issue a legal opinion finding that section 6(a) of the IG Act means what it says.

This concludes my prepared statement, and I would be pleased to answer any questions that the Committee may have.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Horowitz.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Horowitz follows:]

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*See Appendix for supplemental material submitted with this statement.*
Statement of Michael E. Horowitz
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice

before the

U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary

concerning

"Access to Justice?: Does DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General Have Access to Information Needed to Conduct Proper Oversight?"

September 9, 2014
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Conyers, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to testify about the issues that the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has faced in obtaining access to documents and materials needed for its audits and reviews. This is an issue of utmost importance, as evidenced by the 47 Inspectors General who signed a letter last month to the Congress strongly endorsing the principle of unimpaired Inspector General access to agency records. I want to thank the Members of Congress for their bipartisan support in response to our letter. I also want to acknowledge the provision included by the Senate Committee on Appropriations in the Department’s fiscal year 2015 appropriations bill, S. 2437, which prohibits the Department from using appropriated funds to deny the OIG timely access to information.

Access by Inspectors General to information in agency files goes to the heart of our mission to provide independent and non-partisan oversight. It is very clear to me – just as it is to the Inspectors General community – that the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act) entitles Inspectors General to access all documents and records within the agency’s possession. Each of us firmly believes that Congress meant what it said in Section 6(a) of the IG Act: that Inspectors General must be given complete, timely, and unfiltered access to agency records.

However, as reflected in the recent Inspectors General letter and in my prior testimony before Congress, since 2010 and 2011, the FBI and some other Department components have not read Section 6(a) of the IG Act as giving my Office access to all records in their possession and therefore have refused our requests for various types of Department records. As a result, a number of our reviews have been significantly impeded. For example, the report we issued last week examining the Department’s use of the federal material witness statute in international terrorism investigations experienced significant delays resulting from the FBI’s objections to providing us with access to both grand jury and Title III electronic surveillance material. Additionally, in connection with our report last month on the FBI’s use of national security letters, the FBI had previously objected to providing us with access to information it had collected using Section 1681u of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. We experienced similar objections from Department components that resulted in significant delays in gaining access to important information in other reviews as well, including during the review that culminated in our 2012 report on ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious.

In response to each of these objections to providing us with access to information, the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General granted us permission to access the records we sought by making the finding that our reviews were of assistance to them. They also have stated to us, as well as publicly, that it is their intent to continue to grant us permission to access records in future audits and reviews. We appreciate their support and commitment to continue to issue to Department components whatever orders are necessary to ensure that we can access agency records in order to perform our oversight responsibilities. However,
as I have publicly testified previously, I have several significant concerns with this process.

First and foremost, this process is inconsistent with the clear mandate of Section 6(a) of the IG Act. The Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General should not have to order Department components to provide us with access to records that the Congress has already made it clear in the IG Act that we are entitled to review. Second, requiring the OIG to have to obtain the permission of Department leadership in order to review agency records compromises our independence. The IG Act expressly provides that an independent Inspector General should decide whether documents are relevant to an OIG’s work; however, the current process at the Department instead places that decision and authority in the leadership of the agency that is being subjected to our oversight. Third, the need for the OIG to elevate matters such as these to the Department’s leadership results in delays to our audits and reviews, consumes an inordinate amount of OIG staff time and my time, as well as time from the Attorney General’s and Deputy Attorney General’s busy schedules. Finally, while current Department leadership has supported our ability to access the records we have requested, agency leadership changes over time and an independent Inspector General’s access to records surely should not depend on whether future occupants of these leadership positions support such access.

Moreover, the process that the OIG is being required to follow is inconsistent with how the Department treats other DOJ components that exercise oversight over Department programs and personnel, but that are not statutorily independent like the OIG and have not been granted an express statutory right of access by Congress like the OIG. For example, to our knowledge, the Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) continues to be given access to grand jury and wiretap information without objection, and no questions have been raised about providing OPR with the information it needs to investigate alleged misconduct by Department attorneys, which the IG Act grants OPR the exclusive jurisdiction to handle. This disparate treatment – requiring the OIG to obtain permission from Department leadership to gain access to these records, but not requiring OPR to do the same – is unjustifiable, and results in the Department being less willing to provide materials to the OIG, presumably because the OIG is statutorily independent, while OPR is not. Such a distinction subverts the very purpose of that statutory independence, and fails to take into account the clear access language in Section 6(a) of the IG Act. The disparate treatment, however, does highlight once again OPR’s lack of independence from the Department’s leadership. This lack of independent oversight of alleged attorney misconduct at the Department can only be addressed by granting the statutorily-independent OIG with jurisdiction to investigate all alleged misconduct at the Department, including by Department attorneys, as we have advocated for many years. Indeed, the independent, non-partisan Project on Government Oversight (POGO) made the same recommendation in a report issued in March of this year. Bipartisan legislation introduced in the Senate at the same time, the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2014 (S.2127), would do just that.
This past May, the Department’s leadership asked the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to issue an opinion addressing the legal objections raised by the FBI to the OIG gaining access to certain records. We did not then believe, nor have we ever believed, that a legal opinion from OLC was necessary to decide such a straightforward legal matter regarding the meaning of Section 6(f) of the IG Act. However, we did not object to the Department’s decision to seek an OLC opinion, in part because we hoped that OLC would quickly provide the assurance that our Office is indeed entitled to access all agency records that the OIG deems necessary for its audits and reviews. We have attached to my written statement the legal views of the OIG regarding these issues, which summarizes the views we previously shared with the Department.

We also have emphasized to the Department’s leadership the importance of a prompt OLC opinion, given that the existing practice, even though it has enabled us to get materials through an order of the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, seriously impairs our independence for the reasons I just described. It remains critical that OLC issue its opinion promptly.

Meanwhile, in the absence of a resolution of this dispute, our struggles to access information relevant to our reviews in a timely manner continue to cause delays to our work and consume resources. They also have a substantial impact on the morale of the auditors, analysts, agents, and lawyers who work extraordinarily hard every day to do the difficult oversight work that is expected of them. Far too often, they face challenges getting timely access to information from some Department components. Indeed, even routine requests can sometimes become a challenge. For example, in two ongoing audits, we even had trouble getting organizational charts in a timely manner.

We remain hopeful that this matter will be resolved promptly with a legal opinion concluding that the IG Act entitles the OIG to independent access to the records and information that we seek. Indeed, a contrary opinion, which interpreted the IG Act in a manner that resulted in limitations on the OIG’s access to documents, would be unprecedented and would be contrary to over 20 years of policy, practice, and experience within the Department. As we discuss in our attached legal summary, for the OIG’s first 22 years of existence, until the FBI raised legal objections in 2010 and 2011, the OIG received without controversy or question grand jury, Title III, and FCRA information in connection with reviews in which the information was relevant, including from the FBI. Should an OLC legal opinion interpret the IG Act in a manner that results in limits on our ability to access information pursuant to the IG Act, we will request a prompt legislative remedy, which the Department has said it will work with us on.

For the past 25 years, my Office has demonstrated that effective and independent oversight saves taxpayers money and improves the Department’s operations. Actions that limit, condition, or delay access to information have substantial consequences for our work and lead to incomplete, inaccurate, or significantly delayed findings or recommendations. In order to avoid these consequences, the pending access issues need to be resolved promptly, hopefully
through a legal opinion from OLC finding that Section 6(a) of the IG Act means what it says, namely that the OIG is entitled “to have access to all records . . . or other material available to the” Department, which must be construed as timely, complete, and independent access to information in the Department’s possession.

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. Goodlatte. I will begin the questioning.

The only explicit limitation on an inspector general’s authority to conduct audits and investigations within its jurisdiction resides in section 8(e) of the Inspector General Act. Section 8(e) is an extraordinary exemption that provides the Attorney General with the authority in carefully circumscribed circumstances to prohibit the Office of Inspector General from carrying out an audit or investigation.

To invoke section 8(e), the Attorney General must explain the reason for his decision in writing and make a determination that a limitation on an IG’s exercise of authority is necessary to prevent the disclosure of certain specifically described categories of information or to prevent significant impairment to national interests.

My question to you is, has Attorney General Holder at any time during your tenure used this formal procedure to limit your office’s access to material essential to a review?

Mr. Horowitz. He has not. And that is one of the arguments we have put forward, which is that is the mechanism Congress set up to limit our access if there are sensitive matters. That is the provision that should be used, not simply a standing objection to our access.

Mr. Goodlatte. In your experience, prior to your troubling experiences with the three reviews that you cite in your testimony, had any Department of Justice component ever asserted the right to make unilateral determinations about what requested documents were relevant to an Office of Inspector General review?

Mr. Horowitz. To my understanding from speaking to my predecessors and others in the agency, that had not happened before 2010.

Mr. Goodlatte. How valuable is your authority to access grand jury or other sensitive material to your ability to execute rigorous oversight of national security matters?

Mr. Horowitz. It is critical, Mr. Chairman. These are the tools of the trade for the FBI, other law enforcement agencies. If we can’t access every piece of information in their files when we are doing oversight of the FBI’s use of these tools in its handling of various national security tools, we won’t know the full answer to what is going on.

Mr. Goodlatte. And according to your office, the FBI’s withholding of the grand jury information is unsupported in law and contrary to both the Inspector General Act and exceptions to the general rule of grand jury secrecy.

Would you outline the three reasons why the Office of Inspector General is entitled to access grand jury material that the FBI claimed was privileged?

Mr. Horowitz. Certainly.

First and foremost, section 6(a) of the act could not be clearer, as Congressman Conyers just outlined in his opening statement. It is crystal-clear. That is the primary reason.

But, secondarily, under the grand jury rules, prior to 2010, we had regularly obtained grand jury material because we have attorneys for the government working for us. I am an attorney; we have a number of attorneys working on our staff. That would be the other exception.
And then, third, in the national security area, there is an additional exception in the grand jury rules that had before 2010 been used to get us grand jury material.

So there are at least three reasons why we should be getting this material.

Mr. Goodlatte. You testified earlier that at no time has the Attorney General complied with section 8(e) and given you a statement in writing as to why material would not be provided.

Have you had the opportunity to have any verbal discussion with either he or the Director of the FBI as to why they are choosing not to make this material available to you?

Mr. Horowitz. I have. I have raised my concerns with both of them. And the response from the Department has been most recently to send the matter to the Office of Legal Counsel to evaluate the two—the FBI’s competing legal argument. And that is where the matter currently lies and has for several months now.

And it is very important that that opinion be issued. I think it should be clear that we are entitled to it, but if there is going to be a contrary ruling, we want to know it sooner rather than later so that we can fix the problem and work with Congress to fix the problem.

Mr. Goodlatte. Have there been any previous opinions put forward by the Office of Legal Counsel with regard to this issue.

Mr. Horowitz. There have. And that, again, is one of our points, which is, in 1984, prior to our existence, which we came into existence in 1988, OLC issued a legal opinion finding that the Office of Professional Responsibility was entitled to access grand jury information.

We are at a loss to understand why that same opinion wouldn’t apply to us, given we have the same oversight responsibilities. And on top of that, unlike with OPR, Congress, again, as Congressman Conyers quite clearly laid out, found that we should be getting these materials and put a provision in law that says that.

Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you very much.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan for his questions.

Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte. You have anticipated some of the questions I was going to ask, and I thank you for raising them yourself.

Just so that we are clear, Mr. Horowitz, am I correct in characterizing our discussion about the correct reading of the Inspector General Act as nonpartisan in nature?

Mr. Horowitz. Correct.

Mr. Conyers. All right.

We have in our possession several letters, written over the course of late 2011, from Attorney General Eric Holder and Deputy Attorney James Cole. In each of these letters, over the objection of the FBI’s general counsel, the Department grants you access to sensitive material.

As recently as last Thursday, in his response to your office’s report on a material witness statute, Deputy Attorney General Cole again pledged, quote, to provide your office with access to all materials necessary to complete our reviews consistent with existing law.
Are these fair descriptions of the role of the Department leadership in this debate?

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yes. As I mentioned earlier, the Department’s leadership has made clear they will continue to issue orders giving us access. And so our issue isn’t with getting the documents; it is, frankly, the process that is laid out compromises our independence.

Mr. CONYERS. Have the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General been helpful to you?

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yes. In getting us these orders, they have been helpful—in issuing these orders, they have been helpful to us getting the access.

Mr. CONYERS. Now, as the only Member of the Committee that voted for the 1978 act, I agree wholeheartedly with your testimony. Congress meant what it said in section 6(a) of the act. Inspectors General must be given complete, timely, and unfiltered access to agency records.

In your opinion, why did the general counsel of the FBI feel compelled to arrive at a different interpretation of the same statute?

Mr. HOROWITZ. I would be speculating, frankly, as to what the motivation was. But I think it is clear, as you have indicated from looking at the opinion—and you have that; it is attached to my statement—that the IG Act, I think, trumps the arguments quite clearly.

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I hope the Office of Legal Counsel issues a strong opinion giving your office unequivocal access to the material and information that you require. And this Committee is going to be watching that very carefully.

I thank the Chairman and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, the Chairman of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, for 5 minutes.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Horowitz, thank you for your courage. For inspectors general to write a letter appealing to us over the people who appointed them but will not let them do their job and to have more than half of all the IGs do so is clearly unprecedented. And I commend you for your courage.

I have no doubt that this Administration will attempt retribution against all of you. That is their pattern. You won’t say it, but I will. This is an Administration that believes justice delayed is justice given. They have delayed at every step.

So although the distinguished Ranking Member is absolutely willing to say all the right things, he made one error. The fact is, there should be no commending of a man who sat in your chair, the Attorney General of the United States, and told us he wore two hats, one being a political hat, because the FBI does not operate in a vacuum. That information can be made available to you over the objections of everybody who works for him, and the policies that are in place are his choice.

Now, I am going to ask you just a few quick questions, because you and I will be together tomorrow next-door. One of them is: Is there any basis, not just with your shop but with any of the 74 inspectors general, any of the 12,000 men and women, is there any
basis to see that IGs have not been good stewards of confidential information over the many years since the act was enacted?

Mr. Horowitz. We absolutely have been. We have handled in my office some of the most sensitive matters, including the Hanssen matter, including the Katrina Leung matter, including the 9/11 review that we did—we handled those documents entirely appropriately and consistently with the law.

Mr. Issa. And isn’t it a practice of the very organizations you see, both on the FISA side and, quite frankly, across the Department of Justice—FBI and all the other agencies, ATF—isn’t, in fact, one of the most important tools the clandestine nature of discovery? Isn’t, in fact, a good FBI investigation often done in a way in which the target of that investigation is not aware that they are a target until after a substantial amount of information has been gathered?

Mr. Horowitz. That is correct.

Mr. Issa. So the very requirement for you to ask for access, doesn’t that essentially negate the ability for you to look through such information as you need, and perhaps extraneous information, so as to not have the target always know you are coming and potentially thwart your investigation?

Mr. Horowitz. It is. And I would note that in those earlier reviews, for example, in the Hanssen matter, we had direct access to the information. We didn’t even have to go through the process that we are now going through that is creating all the problems that we are facing.

Mr. Issa. And I guess one of the—I always say “last question,” and I don’t really mean it, as you know. But an additional question is: If in fact the target knows and if your statutory limit is in fact only against current employees of the Department you are involved in, doesn’t any delay cause the likelihood that both political and nonpolitical appointees will move on, either through retirement or transfers?

Mr. Horowitz. We face that problem frequently, I have learned in the last 2 years, that individuals under review or investigation retire, move on to another job before we are able to complete our work. There are an innumerable number of issues that result from the delays that we face that are problematic.

Mr. Issa. And just hypothetically, let’s say that Congress is interested and sends you a letter because we are concerned that the people doing the Lois Lerner/IRS targeting investigation are in fact tainted in some way, either because of their conduct or some other matter, and you agree to look into it, isn’t that a classic example where it has to be done timely or irreparable harm to the process occurs?

Mr. Horowitz. There are so many reviews that we do that it is imperative that we be able to do them timely. And we are not able to do that right now in a number of our ongoing reviews.

Mr. Issa. Well, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, I want to take a moment just to say that one of the few areas of specific legislative jurisdiction of the Oversight Committee is, in fact, the inspector generals. And it is my intention to conclude tomorrow’s hearing and take draft legislation, which has been done on a bipartisan basis over the last several years, working with the inspector generals and with their oversight groups, and offer that legislation.
And I hope both of you and your staffs will look at it ahead of time, give us your input. Because I think today’s hearing here tells us that we must, as a body, restate some principles and make some reforms in the IG Act to make it clear for the next President and the next Administration that we really meant what that legislation said.

And I would yield to the Ranking Member.

Mr. Conyers. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, can I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be given 1 additional minute?

Mr. Goodlatte. Without objection. And I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. Conyers. And I thank you very much, my friend. But I do not think that I am in error in commending either the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General. Because since 2010, when the FBI first advanced this argument, the leadership of the Department of Justice has bent over backwards to make certain that the Office of the Inspector General has access to every last shred of evidence it requires. Attorney General Holder, Deputy Attorney General Cole have intervened personally at least a half-dozen times.

And I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman. And I would just ask Mr. Horowitz to comment on whether those interventions, in fact, represent the kind of timely and unobstructed activity, particularly when the Ranking Member said six times. Isn’t once enough to show leadership and six times a pattern of obstruction that you are not able to overcome?

Mr. Horowitz. I would say while the problem with the process, as I laid out, is significant in terms of our independence, it also delays our reviews, because we have to keep going up the chain to get to the leadership. And that is the continuing problem we face, which is why the leadership has made the decision to send it to the Office of Legal Counsel. We need that decision promptly. That is what we need to hear right away.

Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes.

Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the witness for being here and helping us ferret through what are important issues.

And I certainly hope that we are not on another chain of condemnation of the Obama administration, that we are actually trying to get to the facts that will help the oversight of this Congress and, as well, work with the IGs at various agencies. I understand the DOJ, EPA, and Peace Corps—certainly, Peace Corps shocks me, because they are humanitarians around the world, and we hope there is nothing that they are doing except sending great Americans forward to be of help.

But let me start by saying, have you had an absolute bar to being able to address issues that have come to your attention? Meaning that there has been an absolute dropping of the iron gate, the steel gate, the concrete wall. What have you faced in trying to do the work of the IG, the Inspector General?
Mr. Horowitz. Yeah, the issue hasn't been roadblocks to our undertaking reviews. The issue has been getting the information to timely complete them. That has been the big problem.

Ms. Jackson Lee. And, you know, that is a distinction, to be very honest with you.

Mr. Horowitz. Correct.

Ms. Jackson Lee. I want to help you find a system that works. But as you well know and as I as a practicing lawyer previously, I will use the term “discovery.” And many times, particularly if we are in litigation against one of the big guys, there are several ways we can interpret discovery: one, that they are, in essence, roadblocking, or that the documents, whether it is a governmental entity, which of course, you know, we have immunity issues, but it is down in the bowels somewhere.

So my question to you is: Is this, you know, an issue of getting a system that works? Because they are in the bowels—remember, we have gone tech, but 5 years ago, 10 years ago, or as many of us started in the United States Congress, for example, we were all paper. And we packed up papers at the end of the session, we boxed them up, we thought we were labeling them, and they were somewhere in a distant—in distant mind.

Can you discern that we are speaking of what every American understands, “I filed it away somewhere, but where is it?” Would you?

Mr. Horowitz. It is a great point, Congresswoman. In fact, I would have to say, in many respects, we feel like civil litigants, where we are opposite the party that is going through documents and having lawyers look through documents.

For example, at the FBI now, the process in place because of their legal position, that they are not sure what we are entitled to legally, they send all of their documents—all of our requests now go through their Office of General Counsel.

Ms. Jackson Lee. And do you say they are sending them in good intent?

Mr. Horowitz. They are sending it there because of their legal position. The result, though, is we have lawyers—like civil litigants, we are sitting waiting for their discovery reviews. We end up sometimes getting documents from them and then learning from witnesses documents weren’t produced.

That is the problem with this situation that has been set up, and it has to be resolved. And it should be resolved in a way that gets us access immediately, frankly. There is really no reason for this process to even be undertaken.

Ms. Jackson Lee. But let me get you to—not put words in your mouth, but this is not seen by the IG—because I am going to get to the point of a solution—this is not seen in the IG as a malicious intent. Is this a malicious intent?

Mr. Horowitz. No, I am not here to suggest a malicious intent. But the consequence of the legal argument put forward and the time it has taken is that our reviews go through these processes. And we asked for organizational charts——

Ms. Jackson Lee. And this has gone over a series of Administrations. I don’t know how long you have been here, but this has been
ongoing. Whether it has been President Bush’s administration or—there is a system in place. Is that my understanding?

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, on the IG’s side, my understanding is this began in 2010. I started in 2012, but the FBI raised its objection in 2010.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And this is on the FBI end of it.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But you see no malicious intent. So the question is—we are holding a hearing here, and I want the hearing intent to be a resolution, not a condemnation.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And so I think it is important for us to look—certainly, as you well know, we are not litigants, but litigants each have individual rights. I would have the right to protect my client, and, therefore, in discovery, I am going to make sure that I am giving precisely what is asked and not something that is just raiding, and you on the other side will be doing the same if you are representing a client.

In this instance, we want transparent government. But, as well, the FBI or the EPA or those producing documents should, in fact, be adhering to the law. If the law is presently or a structure is presently in place that came in in 2010, let’s see how we can work it better. But FBI has a right to counsel, EPA has a right to counsel, and you have a right to transparency.

Am I arguing or making the point that you are now saying, that you need some system that allows these documents to come forward?

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yeah, and what I am suggesting is the mindset has to change. In our earlier reviews, for example, the Robert Hanssen matter, very sensitive matter, we had direct access to FBI information. No one tried to interpose lawyers in that regard.

We are part of the Department of Justice. We should have and Congress set up a system in the IG Act, as Congressman Conyers laid out, that says we are there to oversee them. If we are going to oversee the FBI, their lawyers should not be going through and deciding and filtering what documents we get and how fast we get them.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, you have just given us a framework to be able to address. And you are from the DOJ. We don’t have the inspectors from EPA. We don’t know what their issues are, or the Peace Corps. And, as I said, I think of them as twinkle toes, to a certain extent, in terms of the work they do. But what I would say to you is that this is a workable—you are presenting facts.

And I want to be clear, as I end my query, that—and I know there is a series of sections that you come under and offered sections going forward. As I end, could you precisely just give, is that your suggestion, to move that lawyer structure? Or could you work with a lawyer structure that will then have a direction that their job is to be fair and cooperative with the IG? Because if you remove them totally, could you work with that?

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. The Inspector General can answer the question.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Thank you.
Yes, I think the lawyers need to be removed from the process for routine requests. There may be issues that arise that require legal opinion. Right now, what is going on is every request goes that route.

We should be able to get direct access to information. If a witness, the whistleblower, or a witness at the FBI wants to come to us with information, with documents, they ought to be able to do that directly. We shouldn't have to go make a request to the legal counsel, have them go look through the documents, and get them eventually, hopefully, but then we often, as I said, learn from other witnesses that there are more materials out there that are relevant to our review.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to have this query. I think that we can solve a transparent approach——

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. Without the condemnation that I hope is not coming forward in this hearing. I thank the witness. I thank the Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio——

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Chairman.

Mr. GOODLATTE.—Mr. Jordan, for 5 minutes.

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Horowitz, I just want to make sure I understood your last statement. Every single request that you are—information you are trying to get access to now goes through the Department of Justice’s legal counsel?

Mr. HOROWITZ. I am sorry, the FBI Office of General Counsel.

Mr. JORDAN. Their general counsel——

Mr. HOROWITZ. The FBI set up that process.

Mr. JORDAN. The FBI has.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct.

Mr. JORDAN. And you are saying that is not political?

Mr. HOROWITZ. I am just—the Office of General Counsel is not a political appointee. They——

Mr. JORDAN. I understand that, but——

Mr. HOROWITZ [continuing]. Send it through their Office of General Counsel and——

Mr. JORDAN. And that just happened—how long ago did that practice start?

Mr. HOROWITZ. Within the last 2 years, 2 to 3 years. It may have been——

Mr. JORDAN. So since you came?

Mr. HOROWITZ [continuing]. Just before I got—it may have been just before I came.

Mr. JORDAN. Okay.

I mean, I am concerned about all your work, but I am particularly concerned about one issue that has been a focus of the Oversight Committee and some other Committees, and that is the targeting by the Internal Revenue Service of people exercising their First Amendment rights and, frankly, have been very disappointed in the criminal investigation of the Justice Department for a number of reasons.
Fifteen months ago, then-FBI Director Mueller sat right in the chair you are sitting in, was asked three questions: Who is the lead agent, how many agents have been assigned to the case, and have you interviewed any of the victims? This is 1 month into the investigation, when it has been the major news story in the country, and his answers were: I don’t know, I don’t know, I don’t know. Didn’t exactly inspire confidence at that point.

And then, since then, there has been early this year the leak by someone at Justice that no one is going to be prosecuted. There has been the President’s now-famous comment, “no corruption, not a smidgen.” And, of course, the lead agent, Ms. Bosserman, has maxed out contributions to the President’s campaign and yet she is the lead agent—or, excuse me, not agent, but lawyer on the case.

So, in the second paragraph of this letter you signed, I think with 46 other inspector generals, it says this: “The Department of Justice faced restrictions on their access to certain records available to their agencies that were needed to perform their oversight work in critical areas.”

So I want to know, what were those critical areas? Were you denied access to oversight work in critical areas? Was any of those critical areas related to the situation at the Internal Revenue Service and the criminal investigation that is going on there? Any inquiries in that subject matter that you were denied access to?

Mr. Horowitz. No, that is not an area that I was referring to——

Mr. Jordan. Anything related to that at all? I know we have asked you to look into certain things. We have asked you specifically, I think, to look into the fact that Ms. Bosserman was selected to sort of head up this investigation. So you were not denied—you didn’t face any restriction or denied access to any information regarding that?

Mr. Horowitz. We have not faced any document restrictions with regard to that matter.

Mr. Jordan. So, changing gears a little bit then, one of the other issues that we were very nervous about, brought to our attention a few months ago, was the fact that the Internal Revenue Service gave 21 disks of information to the FBI regarding the targeting issue. That information was given to the FBI in 2010, 1.1 million pages. Some of that information contained 6103 confidential taxpayer information, donor information.

Are you aware of that issue, Mr. Horowitz?

Mr. Horowitz. I am, from the news stories and various letters.

Mr. Jordan. Has your office looked into that at all just in any type of elementary way or examined any of that information at all?

Mr. Horowitz. We try not to talk about matters that are non-public in our office and what we might look at or we might not be looking at.

Mr. Jordan. Well, let me ask you this way. Are you concerned about the fact that the Justice Department, specifically the FBI, had confidential taxpayer information and they had it for 4 years?

Mr. Horowitz. Yes, I have noted that information and taken note of it.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.
Last question, then. Just to be clear, though, none of the access you were denied, information you were denied in your oversight work dealt with the Internal Revenue Service?

Mr. HOROWITZ. That is correct.

Mr. JORDAN. Okay.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz, for 5 minutes.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the Chairman and thank the Inspector General. I appreciate his work and his efforts.

And I had the pleasure to interact with you on several different occasions. And you play a vital role in our system of checks and balances, and we wish you nothing but success and want to make sure that your efforts are unimpeded.

And so I want to ask you some questions, though, about Operation Fast and Furious. Part of the indication from the Attorney General was that he could not answer questions, would not provide more information to the public, in part because the Inspector General was doing a review.

How do you summarize your ability to access information regarding Fast and Furious?

Mr. HOROWITZ. We had difficulty—and this occurred just before I arrived, and, of course, then I picked up the investigation—

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Right.

Mr. HOROWITZ [continuing]. But we had difficulty just before I arrived in gaining access to the grand jury information, because, as you know, Fast and Furious raised a number of prosecutive issues, as well as Title III information. As our report made public, there were numbers of wiretaps. We had difficulty obtaining both of those in a timely fashion because of the objections raised by components to providing it to us, because they did not read section 6(a) of the act as giving us authority to look at that information.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So what percentage of the information could you actually see?

Mr. HOROWITZ. I am not sure I could put a number on it, frankly, because I wasn't here at the time, I wasn't the IG at the time that these requests were going on. But I do know there was a fair amount of information that was potentially grand jury information.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And your interpretation is you should be able to—talk specifically about grand jury information and then also about—

Mr. HOROWITZ. So I think it is quite clear, in the first instance, that section 6(a) in the IG Act means we should have unfiltered, timely access to all records. The agency doesn’t get to pick and choose. So that would be the first basis.

The second is we have always gotten grand jury information up till 2010 from the FBI and other department components either through the IG Act or through one of the exceptions in the grand jury law, which has an exception for attorneys for the government. I am an attorney, we are attorneys for the government, I work for the Department of Justice. That should be, I think, self-evident, but that apparently has not been how it has been interpreted by the FBI.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. And how many people report to you in your group? How many IGs are you overseeing?

Mr. HOROWITZ. My office has over 400 employees.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And so the process now, they are having to go and ask permission? From who is it that they are—specific to the FBI, who are they having to ask permission from?

Mr. HOROWITZ. So what happens now is we send our requests—because we don't have unfiltered access, we now have this review going on between our requests and us getting the documents. We make a request. The FBI, the Office of General Counsel, looks at it. And if it has an objection, it raises an objection, and then we start this process going.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And what are the so-called objections? What are their excuses as objections?

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, we have had the grand jury objection. We have had objection to wiretap information, to Fair Credit Reporting Act Information. We also had during the course of our review an objection raised to personally identifiable information, for which there was no basis for an objection, but it took months before it got sufficiently elevated and the FBI withdrew its objection and we got the materials.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Now, at one point, there was an objection about an organizational chart? Can you tell——

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct.

Mr. CHAFFETZ [continuing]. Me about that?

Mr. HOROWITZ. In two of our reviews, that has come up.

One of the audits, an FBI-related matter relating to cyber, our review on cyber, the witness we were speaking with was prepared to hand us the organizational chart that we asked for, but we were told he couldn't do that because it had to go through this process at the Office of General Counsel to review it, and so we were delayed for weeks. I actually had to send an email to the General Counsel saying, I don't understand how this can be the case.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. A simple organizational chart.

Mr. HOROWITZ. A simple organizational chart.

In addition, recently, with the DEA, we requested an organizational chart. We got an organizational chart with names whited out. We then went back and said, well, we need the names, because one of the purposes is to see who we need to interview. And we then got a makeshift, unofficial organizational chart with names. I had to elevate that to the Administrator in order to get the organizational chart we were looking for.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I am so glad we are holding this hearing, glad we are doing so in the Oversight and Government Reform Committee tomorrow, as well. This is outrageous. The Inspector General should have unfettered access to all the information they want. And when it has gotten to the point where they can't even see an organizational chart, it has reached the level of absurdity that must be addressed immediately.

I appreciate the bipartisan notion on this, and I yield back. Thank you.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Would the gentleman yield.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. GOODLATTE. The gentleman’s point is well taken, because not only does the organizational chart give an indication of who they need to talk to, it also gives an indication of who should be held accountable. And accountability is, I think, a very serious issue in any government, but it is certainly an issue with this government. At this time, it is my pleasure to recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Holding, for his questions for 5 minutes.

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In a limitation that is unique to DOJ, the Department’s OIG does not have authority to investigate all allegations of misconduct within the agency. So, while the OIG may review alleged misconduct by nonlawyers at DOJ, under section 8(e) of the IG Act, it does not have the same jurisdiction over alleged misconduct by DOJ attorneys when they are acting, you know, as lawyers in the Department.

If you could explain for us, you know, how this distinction came about and kind of how the process works.

Mr. HOROWITZ. This is really a historical anomaly. It is because of the fact that OPR existed before we did in 1988, and when our office was created in 1988 by Congress, they decided at that time to keep OPR in existence and have this jurisdictional limitation so that all matters went to OPR, the argument being that for many years OPR had experience doing these matters and so they should have authority.

We are 25 years later now. We have been given authority over misconduct by all the other parts of the Justice Department. We have exercised that appropriately, effectively, and, most importantly, independently. It is time for us to have authority over all misconduct. There is no reason that agents’ alleged misconduct should be reviewed by the OIG but attorneys get to go to a non-statutorily independent body for their conduct to be reviewed.

Mr. HOLDING. So are you advocating, I guess, for—if you are advocating for that, would OPR continue to have any role at DOJ, or are you saying it is past its usefulness?

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think that would obviously be a decision Congress would need to make, but in the past when Congress has created these situations, they have kept in place, for example, the FBI’s OPR. And what has happened now is we have right of first refusal. So we take the most sensitive cases, the cases where there needs to be independent review, where there is criminal conduct alleged, where there are high-level officials involved, and OPR for DEA, FBI, the Marshals Service, et cetera, handled the other matters.

That could stay as the process, or Congress could decide that we should have all attorney misconduct, no matter who or what it is alleged to have done.

Mr. HOLDING. Right.

In addition to OPR, there is the DOJ’s National Security Division Oversight Section, as well. And as you have put forward in your testimony, they are provided access to the information that the OIG has had trouble accessing, you know, despite the language of the statute.
So what is your understanding as to why DOJ leadership is more forthcoming with these documents and materials to these other entities as opposed to OIG?

Mr. Horowitz. Our presumption is because we are independent and they are not. And so there appears to have been a conclusion that there indeed does need to be a finding that our reviews are of assistance to the leadership. It is self-evident for the other entities—OPR, NSD—because they are working for the leadership. We are statutorily independent; Congress set it up that way. And, therefore, it would appear the decision has been made that somehow we need to go through this process so that it is clear our reviews are being overseen or are being of help to the leadership. And, of course, that is entirely inconsistent with what Congress has set up in the IG Act.

Mr. Holding. All right. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gohmert, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Inspector General. Appreciate your being here, and we appreciate your candor and your efforts at trying to get records.

We had the Attorney General testifying here early during his tenure as Attorney General, and there was a reference about how close he was to—that he made—about how close he was to the Inspector General at the time. That caused me concern, because I had hoped that there was more independence from an inspector general. Nobody is supposed to be an inspector general and be big buddies with the Attorney General, although he has called me his buddy. I take that as a term of endearment, even though he said it, “You don’t want to go there, buddy.”

But we never intended for you to have trouble, have any impediment to getting documents.

And just so you are aware, Mr. Horowitz, for almost all of this Administration, I have been seeking the documents that the Justice Department gave to the defendants in the Holy Land Foundation who were convicted of supporting terrorism. This Attorney General has used such lines as, you know, classification issues, things like that when, actually, it is very clear, if you give documents from the Justice Department to terrorists, who are convicted, then it is probably okay to give them to Congress, and yet still, the most that I have been able to get after all these years is a notice that I can go online and check out some Web sites that have some of the documents that were admitted.

So I share your pain in trying to get information from this Administration that should have been a slam dunk. Very easy. Just give me disks, give me the papers, whatever. I have been through boxes, I have been through, you know, masses of CDs as a judge and a lawyer.

So what do you think we can do? Just the top thing that this Congress could do—well, put it this way, the House could do to make your job easier and make your position more effective?

Mr. Horowitz. I think, frankly, the——

Mr. Gohmert. The number one.
Mr. Horowitz. Given where this is at OLC right now, I think having comments by the Ranking Member about the intent of Congress and pressing for an answer to the question by Congress on does section 6(a) of the IG Act that Congress passed mean what it says. That is the number one issue we are waiting to get an answer to right now.

Mr. Gohmert. All right. Well——

Mr. Conyers. Gentleman yield?

Mr. Gohmert. Yes.

Mr. Conyers. I just wanted to invite you to join with me in this endeavor, because I think you are interested in and have learned a lot about it.

Mr. Gohmert. Well, and would certainly be willing if—I would think that a sense of the House might be what we should try to pass as quickly as possible to make clear about our bipartisan belief in the importance of inspector general, and I very much appreciate the Ranking Member, the former Chairman, understanding that this should be a bipartisan issue because we change majorities, the White House changes, but we have got to make sure inspectors general can get the information they need. So I very much appreciate the Ranking Member——

Mr. Conyers. Thank you. I look forward to working with you.

Mr. Gohmert. Mr. Horowitz, you don’t have to come back here for a hearing to seek individual assistance in your job. Any of us that can help—I know all of us, I know the Chairman, any of us would be willing to assist in any way. You let us know what we can do. It is critical for any democratic republic, as this is supposed to be, to function efficiently if an inspector general cannot get direct access to the information he needs. So thank you for being here today.

Mr. Horowitz. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. Goodlatte. Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold, for his questions for 5 minutes.

Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a Member of this Committee and the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, I am acutely aware of the benefits that the inspector general community throughout government provide to the citizens of this country. You are the first line of watch dogs right there with the whistle blowers that combat waste, fraud, and abuse in the government.

The idea behind inspector generals were they worked within the agency, but they were independent. So they understood how the agency worked. They felt like there would be less reluctance of the agencies to share information with the IG for internal investigations and the like.

But the stuff we have been talking about and hearing about today has taken this into politics, and that is where I think the trouble is. Again, one of the advantages of the IG is they are within the organization so ostensibly nonpartisan. I mean, that is the intent, and, you know, rather than having Congress subpoena a bunch of documents and do an investigation ourselves where poli-
tics get infused in it, a lot of stuff can be taken care of by the IGs within the agencies.

But this situation seems politicized. Would it be—is that the sense that you get? Thereis a political element to this?

Mr. Horowitz. You know, from our standpoint, what we have seen is simply, in lots of different reviews, objections being raised. No one has said to us that it is being done maliciously or for other reasons. I will let others decide, you know, how this all came about and why.

Mr. Farenthold. Well, it has certainly been my experience in trying to pry information out of this Administration that delay, stonewall, and, quite frankly, when dealing with the IRS, outright lie seems to be the rule of the day, and eventually, you know, some of these—you all got some of the documents that you all were after, but this was only after the leadership in the DOJ determined that they were positive, and, again, this points to politicism of it. And I guess I don’t have another question. I just want to express publicly and on the record my dismay at the dismantling of what I think has been one of the most effective oversight and reform tools within the government, the inspector general, as being coopted, and, in my opinion, politicized and misused. It is a horrible indictment of an Administration that early on said they wanted to be the most transparent Administration in history, and, clearly, that has not been the case, and this is just another example of it, and I struggle not to be numbed by it. It is like we have another scandal that comes out every 2 weeks, any one of which would have had folks’ head exploding not that many years ago, and it is disheartening, and I am going to yield back the remainder of my time. Thank you.

Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman.

Recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As coming back in, we get a lot of things going on, but I am glad you are here, and, I mean, it is really good.

Serving on Oversight and as well as Judiciary, the importance of what you do is really amazing to the government. I wish we actually had more work in this way.

And I think, you know, from my folks in the district of Georgia, we were just basically stunned to learn that you don’t have access to information that, frankly, I as an attorney, but others as well, believe you are entitled to.

Leading up to the letter, leading up to the issues, based on your experience is, it particular people? Is it some body? Is it just an agency culture under this, you know, environment and this agency leader? What do you think led up to the necessity for them to write this letter and say, you know, we don’t think you are getting the access that you need?

Mr. Horowitz. Yeah. This all began a couple years before I became IG, but there had been a series of reports that we issued and reviews that we issued that were critical of some of the handling of some matters. This followed shortly thereafter. And what happens once this begins, is we start to see this among other components and in more regular reviews, and the road blocks become
more regular, and that is the problem with not resolving it and dealing with it promptly.

Mr. COLLINS. Well, and I think, just one, it gives the impression if you are—you know, especially the government-to-government kind of—if you are roadblocking yourself, it is like there is something—and, frankly, it just leaves the opinion you are hiding something, and that is just the way it looks.

Your view of the department’s use of material witness statute, which was published this past Thursday, reports that the FBI conducted a page-by-page preproduction review of all documents requested by the OIG and said it redacted anything it considered to be grand jury material. As a result, the review states, Documents were not useful, and the review came to standstill. While the Deputy Attorney General ultimately granted you access to certain documents under the foreign intelligence exception of the Federal Rules Criminal Procedure, this avenue was not without its delays.

How long did the OIG have to wait for the grand jury material in all?

Mr. HOROWITZ. It took us almost a year, from start to finish, to get the material we asked for in terms of completeness of the process.

Mr. COLLINS. And there was really, at this point, no reason for that year’s delay?

Mr. HOROWITZ. There was no reason.

Mr. COLLINS. Okay.

Mr. HOROWITZ. From our standpoint, certainly.

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. So, basically, again, we are stopping, hiding, whatever you want to call it something—because—because, frankly, if you are going to stick with a story, it is like I have told my kids: If you are going to lie once, you—or start telling stories once, then you are going to have to tell the story the whole way through.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Right.

Mr. COLLINS. And now, they are coming back and now giving you the information when they first said they couldn’t.

Mr. HOROWITZ. Right. And—and I will add, on top of the delay to our review, you have a whole bunch of lawyers at—in the FBI, who have a lot of things on their plates, spending time going through page by page documents we should be getting. You have my auditors and teams, lawyers, et cetera, being put on hold, not being able to complete the work. So there is waste along with it. It is not only the delay. There’s this wasted resources that are going on.

Mr. COLLINS. I understand, and I think that is another whole issue is we got to deal with is wasted resources when we are in an environment where we are trying to find every, you know, penny we can to properly use taxpayer dollars.

Also, according to that report, while they are waiting for a DOJ attorney to produce the grand jury material, the FBI was busy redacting several other categories of information from documents it was providing to you.

What information was that, and what was their rational?

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, the FBI would come to us with a list of areas that it had concerns about producing, and so we ended up having to negotiate and discuss with them a whole variety of cat-
categories beyond that before we could get what we thought was complete, but, again, since they are controlling the process and we are not getting direct access, we are relying on their interpretation of these statutes and what is relevant and not relevant.

Mr. Collins. And, again, not you know, to disparage in a large sense, but in the sense, we are looking at an investigation here that is coming internally as something that should be worked together on and not pitting, you know, us against them or—this is just an honest, truthful mentality. What are we doing? We just got back off a working period in which we were—I was in three town halls that is the biggest thing that I hear from most of our folks is they just—they don't trust the government anymore, and I made many discussions about this. They would come up and they would say, you know, what can we do? We have got to restore trust, and part of this trust factor is going to our own inspector general process, going to our own internal checklist and making sure that we are not, for just the sake of what I call busy work, doing that.

You know, and the letter was courageous. I mean, I think there is a lot of things that could be happening. In my short amount of time here real quickly, other than the hearings and bringing this—and I appreciate the Chairman for doing this, what action do you hope Congress will take in response to what has been brought forth today and what we have talked about?

Mr. Horowitz. I think the kind of the statements and message that has been put forward by the Ranking Member today, who talked about what happened back in 1978, but other statements, for example, in 1988 and in the 1993 reform, as to the—our office, what was meant by “accessed information”? Did Congress intend us, when it gave us authority in the early '90's, to oversee the FBI and the DEA, that we should actually be able to look at all the records in their files like grand jury and Title III information. The answer has to be yes; otherwise, giving us that authority would be largely meaningless.

Mr. Collins. Well, I think you summed it up very well, and I thank the Chairman for bringing this and the Ranking Member to be a part of this, because if you don't have access, then basically we are telling the American people we are doing something we are not doing, and has got to step to this trust issue. Americans demand more. We have got to be accountable and transparent to that.

I thank you for what you do.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. Goodlatte. Chair thanks the gentleman.

The Chair has one additional follow-up question, and then I will check with the Ranking Member, see if he has any additional questions he would like to ask.

The FBI has argued that based on its interpretation of section 6(b)(2) of the Inspector General Act, it has the authority to refuse your requests—Office of Inspector General requests for documents so long as it deems its refusal to be, quote, “reasonable.”

Will you explain the basis for this conclusion by the FBI and your opinion as to whether there is any merit to that position?

Mr. Horowitz. Yeah. Frankly, I don't think it has any merit. I think Congress quite clearly put in place in section 8(e) of the act the process that is to be followed if there are sensitive documents
that shouldn't be disclosed to the IG or the IG shouldn't be able to disclose publicly. That leaves that power with the Attorney General, not with anybody else in the organization, and so we disagree entirely with that.

Mr. GOODLATTE. And where does that phrase “reasonable” emanate from? Do you know.

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think that is their interpretation of the IG act.

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I have no additional questions.

I want to thank again the Inspector General for his very thorough and complete testimony today.

Mr. GOODLATTE. And I want to join you in thanking Mr. Horowitz for his testimony, and we will work together in a bipartisan way to make sure that anything the Congress can do to bolster your ability to conduct neutral investigations into how our government, under any leadership, operates. I think it is important to set the precedent correctly, as we did in 1978, and if we need to reinforce that today, we will do so.

So I thank the gentleman, and this concludes today's hearing. And we thank the Inspector General for joining us.

Without objecting, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witness or additional materials for the record.

And this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
The OIG’s Legal Views Regarding Access to Information

Historical Background

The legal issues currently pending before OLC concern the scope of the OIG’s right during its audits and reviews to obtain access to documents and materials available to the DOJ that were obtained pursuant to a grand jury proceeding, the federal wiretap statute, and Section 1681u of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (FCRA).

As discussed in detail below, the legal position adopted by the FBI in 2011, which raised objections to the OIG’s ability to access certain records in the FBI’s possession, was contrary to the plain language of the IG Act, the FBI’s own prior practice, precedent throughout the Department, prior OLC opinions, prior judicial opinions, and the plain language of the relevant laws. It also was inconsistent with the actions of prior Attorneys General who expanded the OIG’s jurisdiction and authority to ensure independent oversight of the Department’s law enforcement components, including the FBI and DEA. Specifically, in 1994, Attorney General Reno issued an order expanding the OIG jurisdiction to include investigating misconduct of Department law enforcement agents, other than those employed by the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft authorized the OIG to investigate allegations of misconduct involving FBI and DEA employees. Congress subsequently codified these expansions of the OIG’s jurisdiction. In deciding to have independent oversight of the Department’s law enforcement components, Congress and Attorneys General Reno and Ashcroft surely intended that the OIG would have access to records, such as grand jury and wiretap information, which are regularly a part of law enforcement’s work.

Not surprisingly, given this history and the plain language of the IG Act, the OIG’s ability to access these categories of information had not even been controversial within the Department prior to 2010 and 2011, when the FBI first raised its objections in connection with OIG reviews assessing the FBI’s use of national security letters, the ATF’s investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious, and the Department’s use of the material witness statute. These legal objections stood in sharp contrast to the established practice by the FBI and throughout the Department for over 20 years, during which time the OIG received grand jury, Title III, or FCRA information in at least 10 major reviews and investigations. This included several instances where we received the information directly from the FBI in response to document requests, including our 2010 review of the FBI’s investigations of domestic advocacy groups, our 2010 review of the FBI’s use of “exigent letters,” and our 2007 and 2008 reviews of the FBI’s use of national security letters. We also obtained, without any pre-screening by the FBI or...
the Department, broad access to FBI investigative files in some of our most sensitive reviews and investigations, such as our 2003 review of the FBI’s performance in deterring, detecting, and investigating the espionage activities of Robert Philip Hanssen and our 2006 review of the FBI’s handling and oversight of FBI asset Katherine Leung. Notably, in several of these matters, senior lawyers at the FBI and the Department, including U.S. Attorneys, participated in the decisions to provide these categories of information to the OIG.

Ironically, while the OIG is the only Department entity with a standalone statutory mandate to conduct independent oversight of Department programs and personnel, and the only Department entity with an express statutory right of access to records for these purposes, we are also the only Department oversight entity whose legal authority to access these materials for oversight purposes has been questioned. We understand that two other DOJ entities that conduct oversight of Department programs and personnel – the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and the DOJ National Security Division’s (NSD) Oversight Section – have been and continue to be provided access to the three categories of information for purposes of oversight. In their oversight capacities, the activities of OPR and NSD are indistinguishable from the OIG, except for our statutory independence and their lack of statutory independence. Yet the OPR’s and NSD’s legal access to information have not been similarly questioned. This disparate treatment is inexplicable, particularly in light of the fact that the OIG is the only one of these three entities which is independent from the Department and to which Congress has granted explicit statutory authority to access documents and materials.

OIG Legal Position

The following summarizes the legal views that I provided to the Department recently, which mirror the legal views my Office has advocated to the Department since the FBI first raised its objections in 2011. As described in detail below, my view is that the OIG is entitled to receive grand jury, Title III, and FCRA information for its oversight reviews and investigations pursuant to the IG Act, unless and until the Attorney General finds it necessary to invoke the process to prevent such access that is described in Section 2E of the IG Act.

A. The IG Act Provides a Comprehensive Statutory Scheme Authorizing Inspector General Access to Information

The IG Act is an explicit statement of Congress’s desire to create and maintain independent and objective oversight organizations inside of certain federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, without agency interference. Crucial to this independent and objective oversight is having prompt and complete access to documents and information relating to the programs they oversee. Recognizing this, Section 6(a) of the IG Act authorizes Inspectors General “to have access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material available to the applicable establishment which relate to programs and operations with respect to which that Inspector General has responsibilities under this Act.” The Act also authorizes the IGs to request necessary information or
assistance from "any Federal, State, or local governmental agency or unit thereof," including the particular establishments the Inspectors General oversee. Together, these two statutory provisions operate to ensure that the Inspectors General are able to access the information necessary to fulfill their oversight responsibilities.

In the law creating the DOI OIG, Congress inserted an exception to the general access authority granted to Inspectors General. Section 8E of the IG Act provides the Attorney General the authority, under specified circumstances and using a specific procedure, to prohibit the OIG from carrying out or completing an audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena. This authority may only be exercised by the Attorney General, and only with respect to specific kinds of sensitive information. The Attorney General must specifically determine that the prohibition on the Inspector General's exercise of authority is necessary to prevent the disclosure of certain specifically described categories of information, or to prevent the significant impairment to the national interests of the United States. These provisions represent an acknowledgement of the fact that the Department often handles highly sensitive criminal and national security information, the premature disclosure of which could pose a threat to the national interests.

Together, these provisions – the affirmative and explicit authority to access documents and materials contained in Section 6, and the carefully circumscribed exception to that authority Congress included in Section 8E – demonstrate that the IG Act, as amended, provides a detailed and comprehensive statutory scheme that fully delineates the OIG's authority to access information available to the Department. Congress could not have been any clearer.

B. The OIG Also Is Entitled To Access the Information on Other Grounds.

While the IG Act explicitly authorizes the OIG's access to grand jury, Title III, and FCRA information, the OIG also is entitled to access each of these categories of information on independent grounds.


The OIG may receive direct access to grand jury information pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(A)(i), which provides that disclosure of grand jury information may be made to "an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney's duty."

An OLC opinion issued in 1984 concluded that OPI attorneys qualify for access under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i), not requiring a court order or other Department authorization, because they are part of the supervisory chain conducting oversight of the conduct of Department attorneys before the grand jury. The OIG is, similarly, part of the supervisory chain conducting oversight of the conduct of law enforcement officials, fulfilling a supervisory function directed at maintaining the highest standards of conduct by Department employees. The Inspector General is currently and has historically been an attorney (with one early exception), and the
OIG employs attorneys to perform the oversight work that would require access to
grand jury material. Similarly, while there is no requirement that the head of OPR
must be an attorney, the position has always been held by one, and OPR employs
attorneys to perform its work. The OIG, therefore, stands in the same legal shoes
as OPR for these purposes.

Moreover, the only two federal judges who have ruled on the issue of OIG
access to grand jury material in connection with a non-criminal OIG review
concluded that the OIG was entitled to access the information. In so doing, the
District Judges adopted the legal position that was being advocated by the
Department itself, which relied on the reasoning of OLC's 1994 opinion regarding
OPR access to grand jury material. Specifically, the District Judges ruled that
disclosure of grand jury material to the OIG is permissible because it constitutes
disclosure to "an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such
attorney's duty" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(A)(i).\(^1\)

2. The OIG is Also Entitled to Receive Title III Information Because
OIG Personnel Are "Investigative or Law Enforcement Officers" and
Disclosure Is Appropriate for the Proper Performance of the
Inspector General's Official Duties.

Title III itself, as already interpreted by the OLC, provides a basis in addition
to the IG Act for the OIG to obtain access to Title III materials. Section 2517 governs
an investigative or law enforcement officer's disclosure and use of Title III
information and provides in relevant part:

Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of
any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived
therefrom, may disclose such contents to another investigative or law
enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate
for the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making
or receiving the disclosure.

That OIG investigators qualify as an "investigative or law enforcement
officer" for purposes of Title III is not in doubt. They qualify as such under the
plain text of these provisions pursuant to their official law enforcement duties under
the IG Act. Moreover, the OLC itself has already determined that OIG agents
qualify as such, having issued an opinion in 1990 concluding that OIG agents
qualify as "investigative officers" authorized to disclose or receive Title III
information. See Whether Agents of the Department of Justice Officer of the
Inspector General are "Investigative or Law Enforcement Officers" Within the

Nevertheless, the FBI cited to a separate OLC opinion issued in 2000, which
construed the meaning of "official duties" narrowly in the context of dissemination

\(^1\) These rulings, and the Department's memos supporting their conclusion, are attached.
of Title III material outside of the Department to the intelligence community, whose employees the OLC found were not “investigative or law enforcement officers” for purposes of Title III. See Sharing Title III Electronic Surveillance Material With The Intelligence Community, 24 Op. O.L.C. 261 (2000). The 2000 OLC decision concluded that disclosure was appropriate when the official duties were “related to the prevention, investigation, or prosecution of criminal conduct.” In each of the OIG reviews where the FBI refused to produce Title III information, the OIG’s review team included OIG law enforcement agents. Moreover, unlike many of the official duties of the intelligence community employees at issue in the 2000 decision, the work of OIG law enforcement agents to oversea Department law enforcement agencies like the FBI is always and inherently “related to the prevention, investigation, or prosecution of criminal conduct.” In light of the plain text of Sections 2510(7) – as well as the express authorization contained within the IG Act – the pending matters are clearly different from the factual circumstances found in the 2000 OLC opinion.

Further, providing documents to the OIG in the context of a duly authorized review would be “appropriately to the proper performance of the official duties of the official making . . . the disclosure,” particularly in light of that official’s duty to cooperate fully with the OIG’s investigations and reviews. This would constitute a second, independent basis for meeting the second requirement of Section 2517(1).

3. The OIG also is Permitted to Receive FCRA Information Under the FCRA Statute.

In Section 1681u of FCRA, Congress provided the FBI with authority to use national security letters to obtain limited credit report information and consumer identifying information in counternelligence investigations. In so doing, Congress also limited the dissemination of information collected under this new authority, and created an exception to that limitation, as follows: “The Federal Bureau of Investigation may not disseminate information obtained pursuant to this section outside of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, except to other Federal agencies as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counternelligence investigation . . . .”

The FBI cited this provision in objecting in 2011 to providing FCRA information to the OIG, which is outside the FBI. However, the FBI’s reading of this provision is inconsistent with Congressional intent, the Department’s reading of the statute, and the FBI’s own actions in regularly sharing FCRA information with Department employees who are outside the FBI. The Congressional intent in limiting the dissemination of such information was to ensure that information collected under the FBI’s newly expanded NSL authority was not improperly reported or shared with other agencies. In short, its purpose was to protect privacy and civil liberties of the individuals whose credit information had been obtained.

Further, in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Patriot Reauthorization Act), Congress directed the OIG to “perform an audit of the effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal use, of national security letters issued by the Department of Justice.” This same section of the Act defined
national security letters to include requests made pursuant to Section 1681u. Fulfilling the Congressional mandates of the Patriot Reauthorization Act thus clearly required the OIG to have access to information the Department obtained through national security letters, including Section 1681u credit report information. Yet, that Act contained no provision granting the OIG access to Section 1681u information. Thus, Congress surely believed the OIG already was entitled to access FCRA information in order to audit its dissemination.

Further, the Department’s and the FBI’s past practice is consistent with this reading of Section 1681u(f). In our national security letter reviews prior to 2011, the FBI provided to the OIG, without objection, full access to FCRA information as well as to all other information it obtained through its use of national security letters. There was no suggestion by anyone at the Department or the FBI that Section 1681u limited such access. In those reviews, issued in 2007 and 2008, we found that FBI personnel did not fully understand the statutory requirements of FCRA and had in certain cases requested or received information they were not entitled to receive pursuant to Section 1681u. Then, during our third national security letters follow up review (a report we issued just last month), which evaluated the FBI’s progress in addressing the recommendations in our prior reports, including its handling of FCRA information, the FBI raised this new legal objection even though we asked for the exact same type of information that the FBI previously had readily provided to us.

Additionally, the FBI has routinely provided, and the Department has routinely allowed, exactly these kinds of FBI disseminations of FCRA information to the NSD’s Oversight Section in furtherance of NSD’s oversight reviews of the FBI – oversight that was implemented in response to the OIG findings about the FBI’s misuses of national security letter reports and related matters. These NSD reviews, which are patterned after the OIG’s reviews, examine whether the FBI is using national security letters in accordance with applicable laws and policies. The FBI provides the NSD with access to FCRA information in its field office files on a quarterly basis. We agree that this practice is lawful as to NSD, even though NSD is outside the FBI, and we see no need to invoke additional legal justifications to provide the OIG with information that is routinely provided to NSD for an identical purpose of conducting oversight of the FBI.

Concluded

In summary, the OIG is entitled to all three categories of information pursuant to the IG Act, which is a comprehensive statutory scheme that explicitly delineates the scope of the OIG’s authority to access information and the exceptions to such access. In addition, each of the specific laws at issue independently supports OIG access to the information.
May 13, 2014

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
United States Senate
135 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Grassley:

I write in response to your correspondence dated March 28, 2014, requesting communications and documents between the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the Department of Justice (Department) regarding the OIG’s attempts to gain access to certain Department records pursuant to the Inspector General Act in connection with several recent OIG reviews.

We have enclosed 12 documents with this correspondence that are responsive to your request in that they describe the substantive legal issues, and provide much of the background and history and the positions taken on these access issues by the OIG, the Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The 12 documents enclosed with this correspondence include the following:

- Summary of the OIG’s Position Regarding Access to Documents and Materials Gathered by the FBI, which was created by the OIG in October 2011.
- Letter from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to FBI General Counsel Andrew Weissmann and OIG Acting Inspector General Cynthia Schmid, dated November 18, 2011, regarding access to credit reports obtained pursuant to Section 1681u of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) related to the OIG’s review of the FBI’s use of national security letters (NSLs).
- Letter from Attorney General Eric H. Holder to OIG Acting Inspector General Cynthia Schmid, dated November 18, 2011, regarding access to grand jury material related to the OIG’s review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious.
• Letter from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to FBI General Counsel Andrew Weissmann and OIG Acting Inspector General Cynthia Schmeder, dated December 5, 2011, regarding access to Title III documents related to the OIG’s review of the Department’s use of the material witness warrant statute, 18 U.S.C § 3144.

• Memorandum from OIG Acting Inspector General Cynthia Schmeder to Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole, dated December 6, 2011, regarding access to credit reports obtained pursuant to Section 1681a of FCRA related to the OIG’s review of the FBI’s use of national security letters (NSLs).

• Memorandum from OIG Acting Inspector General Cynthia Schmeder to Attorney General Eric H. Holder, dated December 16, 2011, regarding access to grand jury material related to the OIG’s review of ATF’s investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious.

• Memorandum from OIG Acting Inspector General Cynthia Schmeder to Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole, dated December 16, 2011, regarding access to Title III documents related to the OIG’s review of the Department’s use of the material witness warrant statute, 18 U.S.C § 3144.

• Letter from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to OIG Acting Inspector General Cynthia Schmeder, dated January 4, 2012, informing the OIG that the Department asked the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to provide a formal opinion regarding the OIG’s access to grand jury material, information obtained pursuant to Section 1681a of FCRA, and information obtained pursuant to Title III.

• Letter from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to OIG Acting Inspector General Cynthia Schmeder, dated March 16, 2012, regarding the OIG’s request that the Department withdraw the request for an opinion from OLC.

• Letter from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to OIG Acting Inspector General Cynthia Schmeder, dated April 11, 2012, authorizing the Criminal Division to disclose Title III information to the OIG related to the OIG’s review of the ATF investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious.
Two of the 12 documents responsive to your request are classified:

- Letter from FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni to OIG Assistant Inspector General for Oversight and Review Carol Ochou, dated March 4, 2011, providing the FBI’s view of dissemination restrictions for documents in FBI investigative files.

- Memorandum from FBI General Counsel Andrew Weissmann and Special Assistant to the General Counsel Catherine Bruno to Inspector General Michael Horowitz, dated February 29, 2013 [sic], regarding legal restrictions on dissemination of FBI information to the OIG for OIG criminal investigations.

We are providing a redacted version of these two documents with this unclassified letter. If you would like to review these documents in classified form, the Department has requested that arrangements be made to review them in the OIG offices. We will work with your staff to make such arrangements at a convenient time.

Consistent with our usual practice when we are asked to produce documents that were created by the Department or a Department component, or that involved a communication by the OIG with the Department or a Department component, the OIG provided the above-referenced 12 documents and other documents that we believe are responsive to your request to the Department for its review. The Department has informed us that it is asserting the delispective process privilege and/or the attorney-client privilege over the other responsive documents, and therefore they are not included in this production.

Thank you for your continued support for the work of our Office. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me or my Chief of Staff, Jay Lerner, at (202) 514-3435.

Sincerely,

Michael E. Horowitz
Inspector General

Enclosures
Summary of the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General's Position Regarding Access to Documents and Materials Gathered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Introduction

In November 2009, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated a review of the Department's use of the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144. Pursuant to our responsibilities under Section 1001 of the Patriot Act, a significant part of our review is to assess whether Department officials violated the civil rights and civil liberties of individuals detained as material witnesses in national security cases in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. In addition, the review will provide an overview of the types and trends of the Department's uses of the statute over time; assess the Department's controls over the use of material witness warrants; and address issues such as the length and costs of detention, conditions of confinement, access to counsel, and the benefit to the Department's enforcement of criminal law derived from the use of the statute.

In the course of our investigation, we learned that most of the material witnesses in the investigations related to the September 11 attacks were detained for testimony before a grand jury. At our request, between February and September 2010 the Department of Justice National Security Division and three U.S. Attorneys' offices (SDNY, NDII, EDVA) provided us with grand jury information concerning material witnesses pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 66(g)(3)(D), which permits disclosure of grand jury matters involving foreign intelligence information to any federal law enforcement official to assist in the performance of that official's duties. We also sought a wide range of materials from other Department components, including the U.S. Marshals Service, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). All of the Department's components provided us with full access to the material we sought, with the notable exception of the FBI.

In August 2010, we requested files from the FBI relating to the first of 13 material witnesses. In October 2010, representatives of the FBI's Office of General Counsel informed us that the FBI believed grand jury secrecy rules prohibited the FBI from providing grand jury material to the OIG. The FBI took the position that it was required to withhold from the OIG all of the grand jury material it gathered in the course of these investigations. The FBI has also asserted that, in addition to grand jury information, it can refuse the OIG access to other categories of information in this and other reviews, including Title III materials, federal taxpayer information, child victim, child witness, or federal juvenile court information, patient medical information, credit reports, FBI information, foreign government or international organization information, information subject to non-disclosure agreements, memoranda of
understanding or court order; attorney client information; and human source identity information. The information we have requested is critical to our review. Among other things, we are examining the Department's controls over the use of material witness warrants, the benefit to the Department from the use of the statute, and allegations of civil rights and civil liberties abuses in the Department's post-9/11 use of the statute in the national security context. The requested grand jury information is necessary for our assessment of these issues.

The FBI has also asserted that page-by-page preproduction review of all case files and e-mails requested by the OIG in the material witness review is necessary to ensure that grand jury and any other information the FBI asserts must legally be withheld from the OIG is redacted. These preproduction reviews have caused substantial delays to OIG reviews and have undermined the OIG's independence by giving the entity we are reviewing unilateral control over what information the OIG receives, and what it does not.

The FBI's position with respect to production of grand jury material to the OIG is a change from its longstanding practice. It is also markedly different from the practices adopted by other components of the Department of Justice. The OIG routinely has been provided full and prompt access to grand jury and other sensitive materials in its reviews involving Department components in high profile and sensitive matters, such as our review of the President's Surveillance Program and the investigation into the removal of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006. Those reviews would have been substantially delayed, if not thwarted, had the Department employed the FBI's new approach.

In many respects, the material witness warrant review is no different from other recent OIG reviews conducted in connection with our civil rights and civil liberties oversight responsibilities under the Patriot Act in which Department components granted the OIG access to grand jury and other sensitive materials. For example, in our review of the FBI's use of "exigent letters" to obtain telephone records, at our request the Department of Justice Criminal Division and the FBI provided us grand jury materials in two th
ongoing sensitive leaks involving investigations involving information classified at the TS/SCI level. The grand jury materials were essential to our findings that FBI personnel had improperly sought reporters’ toll records in contravention of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Department of Justice policy.2

Similarly, in our review of the FBI’s investigations pertaining to certain domestic advocacy groups, the OIG assessed allegations that the FBI had improperly targeted domestic advocacy groups for investigation based upon their exercise of First Amendment rights. In the course of this review, the FBI provided OIG investigators access to grand jury information in the investigations we examined. This information was necessary to the OIG’s review as it informed our judgment about the FBI’s predication for and decision to extend certain investigations. The lack of access to this information would have critically impaired our ability to reach any conclusions about the FBI’s investigative decisions and, consequently, our ability to address concerns that the FBI’s conduct in these criminal investigations may have violated civil rights and civil liberties.3

When the OIG has obtained grand jury material, the OIG has carefully adhered to the legal prohibitions on disclosure of such information. We routinely conduct extensive pre-publication reviews with affected components in the Department. The OIG has ensured that sensitive information — whether it be law enforcement sensitive, classified, or information that would identify the subjects or direction of a grand jury investigation — is removed or redacted from our public reports. In all of our reviews and investigations, the OIG has scrupulously protected sensitive information and has taken great pains to prevent any unauthorized disclosure of classified, grand jury, or otherwise sensitive information.

For the reasons discussed below, the OIG is entitled to access to the material the FBI is withholding. First, the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (Inspector General Act or the Act), provides the OIG with the authority to obtain access to all of the documents and materials we seek. Second, in the same way that attorneys performing an oversight function in the Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) are “attorneys for the government” under the legal exceptions to grand jury secrecy rules, the OIG attorneys conducting the material witness review are attorneys for the government entitled to receive grand jury material because they perform the same oversight function. Third, the OIG also qualifies for disclosure of the grand jury material requested in the material witness review under

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2 We describe this issue in our report, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of Judicial Letters and Other Informal Requests for Telephone Records, (January 2019).

3 Our findings are described in our report, A Review of the FBI’s Investigations of Certain Domestic Advocacy Groups (September 2018).
amendments to the grand jury secrecy rules designed to enhance sharing of information relating to terrorism investigations.

I. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT

The FBI's refusal to provide prompt and full access to the materials we requested on the basis of grand jury secrecy rules and other statutes and Department policies stands in direct conflict with the Inspector General Act. The Act provides the OIG with access to all documents and materials available to the Department, including the FBI. No other rule or statute should be interpreted, and no policy should be written, in a manner that impedes the Inspector General's statutory mandate to conduct independent oversight of Department programs. See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (A court “must read [two allegedly conflicting] statutes to give effect to each if [it] can do so while preserving their sense and purpose.”)

A. The Inspector General Act Grants the OIG Full and Prompt Access to any Documents and Materials Available to the DOJ, Including the FBI, that Relate to the OIG’s Oversight Responsibilities

The Inspector General Act is an explicit statement of Congress's desire to create and maintain independent and objective oversight organizations inside of certain federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, without agency interference. Crucial to the inspectors General (IGs) independent and objective oversight is having prompt and complete access to documents and information relating to the programs they oversee. Recognizing this, the Inspector General Act authorizes IGs "to have access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material available to the applicable establishment which relate to programs and operations with respect to which that Inspector General has responsibilities under this Act." 5 U.S.C. App. § 6(a)(1). The Act also authorizes the IGs to "request necessary information or assistance" from "any Federal, State, or local governmental agency or unit thereof," including the particular establishments the IGs oversee. Id. § 6(a)(3); id. § 12(a) (defining the term "Federal agency" to include the establishments overseen by the Inspectors General). Together, these two statutory provisions operate to ensure that the Inspectors General are able to access the information necessary to fulfill their oversight responsibilities.

The only explicit limitation on IGs’ right of access to information contained in the Inspector General Act concerns all agencies’ obligation to provide “information or assistance” to the Inspectors General. However, this limitation does not apply to IGs’ absolute right of access to documents from their particular agency. This circumscribed limitation provides that all federal
Agencies shall furnish information or assistance to a requesting IG "insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the Federal agency from which the information is requested," 5 U.S.C. § 6(b)(1) (emphasis added).* Another provision of the Inspector General Act grants the Inspectors General discretion to report instances of noncooperation to the head of the relevant agency, whether that noncooperation impedes the IG's authority to obtain documents or "information and assistance." Under that section, when an IG believes "information or assistance" is "unreasonably refused or not provided, the Inspector General shall report the circumstances to the head of the establishment involved without delay." 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6(b)(3) The FBI contends this reporting provision of the Act is a further limitation on the agencies' obligation to provide documents and "information and assistance" to the Inspectors General. The FBI has argued that the provision implicitly recognizes that requests for both documents and "information and assistance" can be "unreasonably refused."

The IG's reliance on this reporting section as limiting an IG's right of access documents in the custody of the agency it oversees is misplaced. This provision of the Act is entirely consistent with the right of full and prompt access to documents and materials and does not create a limitation, explicit or implicit, on the authorities provided elsewhere in the Act. By granting the Inspectors General the discretion to decide that some instances of noncooperation by an agency do not rise to the level of a reportable incident, the provision accounts for the practical reality that many instances where

* The legislative history is silent on the reasons for conditioning agencies' furnishing of "information or assistance" to all IGs on practicability or statutory restriction, but imposing no such limitation on an agency's absolute requirement to provide its documents to its own IG. However, there are possible explanations for the distinction. For example, providing access to documents and materials maintained in agency systems and files is simple, inexpensive, and an understandable precondition to the fair, objective, and successful exercise of the IG's oversight responsibilities. Accordingly, the Act's unconditional language authorizing IGs to have access to the documents and materials of the agency it oversees is understandable and sensible. In contrast, agencies may not always be able to fulfill requests for "information or assistance" immediately, even from their agency's IG. A request of one agency from another agency's IG may require more careful scrutiny because it would entail information being transmitted outside of the requested agency. In addition, busy agency schedules must be accommodated when fulfilling a request for an interview; subject matter experts may not be immediately available to interpret documents or may have left the agency's employment; responses to investigations often require revisions and approvals; and examinations, explanations, and written analyses of existing documents and materials can take significant amounts of time. Despite the OIG's historical success at reaching reasonable compromises with components of the DOI responding to requests for "information or assistance," the OIG readily acknowledges the circumstances could arise where a component's delay, difficulty, or even refusal in responding to a request for "information or assistance" would be reasonable. These considerations are not applicable, however, to IGs' access to documents and materials of the agency it oversees, and therefore, that provision of the Act authorizes access in abinitium terms.
Inspectors General are not granted access to documents or materials, or are not provided "information or assistance" in response to a request, do not merit a report to agency management. 

To summarize, the Inspector General Act provides the Inspectors General a right of full and prompt access to documents and materials in the custody of the agency they oversee, a right to request "information or assistance" from any agency that is modestly limited, and an obligation to report instances of agency noncooperation to the agency head when, in the judgment of the Inspector General, such noncooperation is unreasonable. Accordingly, the Act provides Inspectors General unconditional authority to gather documents and records in the custody of the agency they oversee, an authority necessary to obtain the basic information to conduct independent and objective reviews and investigations.

B. The Only Limitations on the OIG’s Authority to Conduct Audits and Investigations within Its Jurisdiction in Section 8B of the Inspector General Act, and that Limitation Must Be Invoked by the Attorney General

In the law creating the DOJ OIG, Congress inserted an exception to the normal authority granted to Inspectors General. In a section captioned "Special provisions concerning the Department of Justice," the IG Act provides the Attorney General the authority, under specified circumstances and using a specific procedure, to prohibit the OIG from carrying out or completing an audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoenas. See 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 8B. This authority may only be exercised by the Attorney General, 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 8B(a)(1)-(2), and only with respect to specific kinds of sensitive information. Id. § 8B(a)(1). The Attorney General must specifically determine that the prohibition on the Inspector General’s exercise of authority is necessary to prevent the disclosure of certain specifically described categories of information, or to prevent the significant impairment to the national interests of the United States. Id. § 8B(a)(2). The Attorney General’s decision must be conducted in writing, must state the reasons for the decision, and the Inspector General must report the decision to Congress within thirty days. Id. § 8B(a)(3). These provisions represent an acknowledgment of the fact that the Department of Justice often handles highly sensitive criminal and national security information, the premature disclosure of which could pose a threat to the national interests.

For example, IG document requests can be very broad, particularly before IG investigators have learned the details of the program under review. In such instances, formal requests are often informally and communally reviewed after discussions with the agency under review, and a report to the agency head is unnecessary. Similarly, an agency’s failure to provide the Inspector General with access to a document is often inadvertent or such a minor inconvenience that the Inspector General could reasonably view the noncooperation as de minimis.
These enacting procedures confirm that the special provisions of Section 23 represent an extraordinary departure from the baseline rule that the Inspectors General shall have unconditional access to documents and materials, and broad authority to initiate and conduct independent and objective oversight investigations. These procedures also confirm that only the Attorney General, and not the FBI, has the power to prohibit the OIG’s access to relevant documents and materials available to the Department.

II. GRAND JURY SECRECY RULES

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the general rule of secrecy applicable to grand jury information and various exceptions to that general rule. One of the exceptions allows disclosure of grand jury information to “an attorney for the government.” This exception provides a basis, additional to and independent of the Inspector General Act, for disclosing the requested grand jury materials to the OIG. The OIG’s reliance on the “attorney for the government” exception to obtain access to grand jury material is supported by an Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion and a federal court decision. OIG access to grand jury material under this exception is consistent with the broad authority granted to the OIG under the Inspector General Act, and it avoids an oversight gap so that Department employees cannot use grand jury secrecy rules to shield from review their adherence to Department policies, Attorney General Guidelines, and the Constitution. The “attorney for the government” exception allows for automatic disclosure of grand jury materials and is, therefore, particularly well suited to ensure that the OIG’s ability to access documents and materials, and to access them promptly, is commensurate with that of the Department and the FBI.

A. OIG Attorneys Are “Attorneys for the Government”

In an unpublished opinion issued subsequent to United States v. Salis Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 419 (1983) (a Supreme Court opinion narrowly construing the term “attorney for the government” as used in the exception to the general rule of grand jury secrecy), the OLC determined that, even in light of the Court’s decision, the Rule was broad enough to encompass Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) attorneys exercising their oversight authority with regard to Department attorneys.

In Salis, Civil Division attorneys pursuing a civil fraud case sought automatic access to grand jury materials generated in a parallel criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court interpreted the exception that provides for

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* Rule 6(e)(2)(A)(iii) provides: “Disclosure of a grand jury matter—other than the grand jury’s deliberations or any grand jury’s vote—may be made to: (i) an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney’s duty . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(A)(iii).
automatic disclosure of grand jury materials to "attorney[s] for the government" for use in their official duties, as limited to government attorneys working on the criminal matter to which the material pertains. See, 463 U.S. at 427. The Court held that all other disclosures must be "judicially supervised rather than automatic," id. at 435, because allowing disclosure other than to the prosecutors and their assistants would unacceptably undermine the effectiveness of grand jury proceedings by: (1) creating an incentive to use the grand jury’s investigative powers improperly to elicit evidence for use in a civil case; (2) increasing the risk that release of grand jury material could potentially undermine full and candid witness testimony; and (3) by circumventing limits on the government’s powers of discovery and investigation in cases otherwise outside the grand jury process. See id. at 432-33.

In its unpublished opinion, OLC concluded that the three concerns the Supreme Court expressed in Sells were not present when OPR attorneys conduct their oversight function of the conduct of Department attorneys in grand jury proceedings. OLC concluded that as a delegate of the Attorney General for purposes of overseeing and advising with respect to the ethical conduct of department attorneys and reporting its findings and recommendations to the Attorney General, OPR is part of the prosecution team’s supervisory chain. Thus, OPR attorneys may receive automatic access to grand jury information under the supervisory component inherent in the "attorney for the government" exception.

OG attorneys should be allowed automatic access to grand jury material in the performance of their oversight duties because OIG and OPR perform the identical functions within the scope of their respective jurisdictions. Like OPR attorneys conducting oversight of Department attorneys in their use of the grand jury to perform their litigating function, OIG attorneys are part of the supervisory chain conducting oversight of the conduct of law enforcement officials assisting the grand jury. Both the OIG and OPR are under the general supervision of the Attorney General, compare 28 C.F.R. 0.59(a) (OIG) with 28 C.F.R. 0.39. Just like OPR, the Inspector General must "report expeditiously to the Attorney General whenever the Inspector General has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law," 5 U.S.C. App. 3, §§ 4(b) & 5(b)(2). OIG attorneys make findings and recommendations to the Attorney General regarding the conduct of law enforcement officials assisting the grand jury, and the Attorney General then imposes any discipline or implements reform. Therefore, for purposes of the "attorney of the government" exception, the OIG is in the same position as OPR, both with respect to its oversight function and its relationship to the Attorney General.

More to the point, whatever formal differences exist in the relative structures of the OIG and OPR, the two offices are functionally indistinguishable for purposes of access to grand jury materials for all of their oversight purposes. The risks to the secrecy of the underlying grand jury
proceedings from disclosure to the OIG, if any, are no different from those created by automatic disclosure to OPR. OPR’s oversight of the conduct of Department attorneys is an after-the-fact examination of what happened during the grand jury process, just as is OIG’s oversight of law enforcement agents’ conduct. OIG review of law enforcement conduct in such circumstances is not undertaken to affect the outcome of a civil proceeding related to the target of an underlying criminal investigation. Therefore, disclosure of grand jury materials to the OIG runs no risk of creating an incentive to misuse the grand jury process in order to improperly elicit evidence for use in a separate administrative or criminal misconduct proceeding against the target of the grand jury’s investigation. Similarly, because our review is of law enforcement conduct and not of lay witnesses who are called to testify, the willingness of those witnesses to testify should not be implicated. OIG oversight also ensures that the Department’s law enforcement officials who testify before the grand jury do so fully and candidly, and that Department employees do not ignore their legal obligations to the grand jury.

Moreover, the OIG’s inherent supervisory role with regard to Department employees who assist the grand jury was recognized by a federal court overseeing proceedings relating to the death of Bureau of Prisons inmate Kenneth Michael Trentadue. The district court granted the government’s motion for access to grand jury materials, finding that the OIG’s investigation of alleged misconduct “is supervisory in nature with respect to the ethical conduct of Department employees.” The court stated that “disclosure of grand jury materials to the OIG constitutes disclosure to an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney’s duty[.]” In re Matter Occurring Before the Grand Jury Impaneled July 16, 1996, Misc. #39, W.D. Okla. (June 4, 1998).

Accordingly, there is no principled basis upon which to deny OIG attorneys the same access as OPR is allowed to review grand jury materials necessary to carry out its oversight function. Both OPR and OIG attorneys require access to grand jury materials to fulfill a supervisory function directed at maintaining the highest standards of conduct for Department employees who assist the grand jury. As such, OIG attorneys should also be able to obtain automatic access to matters that pertain to law enforcement conduct in matters related to the grand jury within the jurisdiction of the OIG.

B. The OIG is entitled to Receive Grand Jury Materials Involving Foreign Intelligence Information

Another exception to the general rule of grand jury secrecy allows an attorney for the government to disclose “any grand jury matter involving foreign intelligence, counterintelligence . . . or foreign intelligence information . . . to any federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official to assist the official receiving the
information in the performance of that official's duties." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(D). This exception was added in 2001 as part of the USA PATRIOT Act and was designed to enable greater sharing of information among law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community to enhance the government's effort to combat terrorism.\textsuperscript{7}

This exception encompasses the OIG's request for the grand jury materials at issue in its material witness warrant review. The grand jury procedures pursuant to which the materials were collected were all investigations of international terrorist activity conducted in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. All of the grand jury information gathered in them is thus necessarily "related to," "gathered . . . to protect against," or "relates to the ability of the United States to protect against," among other things, "international terrorist activities." See 50 U.S.C. § 401a and Rule 6(e)(3)(B)(D). All of the grand jury materials gathered in those investigations thus constitutes foreign intelligence, counter intelligence, or foreign intelligence information (collectively, Foreign Intelligence Information).

In addition, OIG officials qualify as law enforcement officials within the meaning of the rule by virtue of the Inspector General's authority to conduct criminal investigations, apply for search warrants, make arrests, and investigate violations of civil rights and civil liberties. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 5(a)(1); USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. 107-56, § 1001, 115 Stat. 272, 391 (2001). Also, the OIG's oversight activities constitute law enforcement duties for purposes of the foreign intelligence exception because they directly affect the design and implementation of the Department's law enforcement programs.

The OIG has discussed the access issues with Department leadership and sought their assistance in resolving the dispute with the FBI. Although the Department's consideration of all these issues is ongoing, in July 2011, the Department concluded that, at a minimum, the foreign intelligence exception authorizes an "attorney for the government" to disclose grand jury information to the OIG for use in connection with OIG's law enforcement duties, such as the material witness warrant review, to the extent that the attorney for the government determines that the grand jury information in question involves foreign intelligence. Since then, an "attorney for the government" in the Department's National Security Division (a Department component under review in the Material Witness Warrant review), has been conducting a page-by-page review of the materials withheld by the FBI to determine whether they qualify as Foreign Intelligence Information under the exception before providing them to the OIG. In addition, the FBI has continued its own page-by-page review of some of the requested files to identify and redact grand jury and other categories of information, before the National Security Division attorney...

performs yet another review for the purpose of sending the material back to the FBI for the removal of grand jury foreign intelligence information redactions.

The Department’s confirmation that the foreign intelligence exception is one basis for authorizing the OIG to obtain access to grand jury information was helpful. However, the page-by-page review of the material being conducted by the FBI and National Security Division to implement that decision is unnecessary. In our view, such page-by-page review is not necessary here because all of the grand jury material we have sought to date in the material witness review was collected in investigations of international terrorist activity conducted in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and thus necessarily falls within the very broad definitions of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or foreign intelligence information. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a and Rule 6(e)(3)(D). Therefore, the exception allows the OIG to receive all of the grand jury information from those investigations. 8

Although the Department’s determination that the OIG is entitled to access to the requested grand jury information in the material witness review under the foreign intelligence exception is helpful, that decision does not resolve the access issue. First, it does not address access to grand jury material that does not involve foreign intelligence information. Second, the Department’s preliminary decision under the foreign intelligence exception does not address access to grand jury material in other OIG reviews. And third, the decision has been construed by the National Security Division and the FBI to require page-by-page review of the information, thereby undermining the independence and timeliness of the OIG’s review as described above. Accordingly, a full decision confirming the OIG’s right of access to grand jury and other information under the Inspector General Act and the “attorney for the government” exception is still necessary to enable the OIG effectively to carry out its oversight mission.

III. CONCLUSION

The objective and independent oversight mandated by the Inspector General Act depends on the fundamental principle that the Inspectors General should have access to the same documents and materials as the establishments they oversee. This principle explains why the Inspector General Act grants the IG’s access to the documents and materials that are available to their establishments. It explains why OIG investigators are routinely granted

8 As noted above, such page-by-page reviews are also improper because they are contrary to the provisions of the Inspector General Act granting the OIG broad access to any document or material that is available to the agency overseen, undermines the independence of the Inspector General by granting a component under review unilateral authority to determine what materials the Inspector General receives, and result in unacceptable delays in the production of materials necessary for the OIG to conduct its oversight.
access to TS/SCI materials when reviewing TS/SCI programs. It explains why
OIG investigators are routinely read into some of the government's most highly
classified and tightly compartmented programs, such as the President's
Surveillance Program and the programs involved in the Robert Hansen matter.
And it explains why any instance of unreasonable denial of access to
documentary materials under the Inspector General Act must be reported to
the head of the agency, and why the Attorney General's decision to preclude an
OIG audit, investigation, or subpoena must be reported to Congress.

The FBI's withholding of grand jury and other information is
unlawful in law and contrary to the Inspector General Act and exceptions
to the general rule of grand jury secrecy. The OIG is entitled to access under
the Inspector General Act. Moreover, the OIG qualifies for two exceptions to
the general rule of grand jury secrecy. See supra note 26 and 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 4;
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(D), 6(e)(3)(B). It is true, of course, that under Section
43 of the Inspector General Act, the Attorney General could deny the OIG
access to the documents at issue, as many of the documents constitute
sensitive information within the scope of that Section. See 5 U.S.C. App. 3 §
42. But the Attorney General has not done so, and until he makes the written
determination required in Section 82(e)(2) and sets out the reasons for his
decision, the OIG is entitled to prompt and full access to the materials.

Denying the OIG access to the materials it is seeking would also
represent an unnecessary and problematic departure from a working
relationship that has proven highly successful for years. Since its inception,
the OIG has routinely received highly sensitive materials, including strictly
compartmented counterterrorism and counterintelligence information,
classified information owned by other agencies, and grand jury information,
and it has always handled this information without incident. The OIG has
always conducted careful sensitivity reviews with all concerned individuals and
categories, both inside and outside the Department, prior to any publication of
sensitive information, and it has been entirely reasonable and cooperative in its
negotiations over such publications. The OIG's access to sensitive materials
has never created a security vulnerability or harmed the nation's interests; far
from it, the OIG's access to sensitive information has markedly advanced the
nation's interests by enabling the independent and objective oversight
mandated by Congress.

Simply put, there is no reason, legal or otherwise, to depart from the
time-tested approach of allowing the OIG full and prompt access to documents
and using a thorough prepublication sensitivity review to safeguard against
unauthorized disclosure of the information therein. Access to grand jury and
other sensitive materials is essential to the OIG's work, perhaps never more so
than when the OIG is overseeing such important national security matters as
the Department's use of material witness warrants and the FBI's use of its
Patriot Act authorities. But whatever the subject matter, the authorities and
mandates of the Inspector General are clear, and neither grand jury secrecy rules nor any other statutory or internal policy restrictions should be read in a manner that frustrates or precludes the OIG's ability to fulfill its mission.
Office of the Inspector General

November 16, 2011

Andrew Waterman
General Counsel
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC 20235

Cynthia Schnedar
Acting Inspector General
Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr. Waterman and Ms. Schnedar:

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is conducting a review regarding the sufficiency and use, including any hypoglycemic, of medical security letters (MSLs) issued by the Department. In the course of this review, the FBI has determined and withheld from disclosure twelve records exempted pursuant to section 1003(b) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1803. An explanation below. I have determined that disclosing these records to the OIG is consistent with its order to provide such records. An appeal because such disclosure is necessary to my internal decision-making regarding the approval or conduct of future foreign intelligence investigations.

Section 1003(b) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides that the FBI may classify a record as intelligence information that would result in the hampering of an ongoing investigation. Upon such a request, the FBI may provide the "name and address of the person at whose place of business, residence, or other facility the information is sought, a description of the information sought, and the date on which the information was sought.

The FBI has found that classifying this information as classified is necessary to the OIG's examination of the FBI's actions regarding the approval or conduct of future foreign intelligence investigations.

The FBI may not disclose information obtained pursuant to this section outside of the FBI, except to other Federal agencies as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign intelligence investigation, or where the information concerns a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or
appropriate investigative techniques within the military department concerned as
may be necessary for the conduct of a joint foreign counterintelligence investigation.


After consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel, I have determined that the FBI is
authorised under this provision to disclose the entire report. However, it is submitted to the
Office of Legal Counsel for review in accordance with the policies and procedures set forth
in the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memorandum of July 15, 1990. In my view, this decision is
consistent with the Office of Legal Counsel’s interpretation of the provisions of this
legislation. As Deputy Attorney General, I have noted that the FBI has consulted with the
Office of Legal Counsel and has determined that the FBI is entitled to disclose the
information contained in the report to the public. I have not been presented with any
information that would indicate the need to withhold any part of this report. Therefore,
I have determined that the FBI is entitled to disclose the entire report.

Sincerely,


James M. Cole
Deputy Attorney General
November 18, 2011

Ms. Cynthia Schneider
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: Inspector General's Request for Grand Jury Material
Obtained in Certain ATP Criminal Investigations

Dear Ms. Schneider:

The Acting Inspector General of the Department of Justice has requested that the
Attorney General authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and other Department
components to disclose to the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") grand jury material
related to its review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF")
investigations known as Operation Fast and Furious and Operation Wide Receiver, as well as the
ATF investigation of alleged criminal conduct by Jean-Baptiste Klugy. As explained below, I
have determined that disclosing the grand jury information in question to the OIG in connection
with this review is permissible under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
because I have determined that such disclosure is necessary to assist me in performing my duty
to ensure federal criminal law.

Rule 6(e)(2)(A)(ii) authorizes the disclosure of grand jury information to "any
government personnel . . . that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in
performing that attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law." As Attorney General and head
of the Department of Justice, I am an "attorney for the government" under Rule 6(e)(2)(A)(ii)
and the review supervised by the Department's lawyers, policies, and practices relating to the
enforcement of federal criminal law. My performance of my "duty to enforce federal criminal law"
includes exercising this supervisory authority.

I have determined that providing the OIG with access to the grand jury information in
question in connection with its review of these investigations is necessary to assist me in
discharging these criminal law enforcement supervisory responsibilities. I fully expect that the
Acting Inspector General's request to me upon completion of the OIG review will provide
information that will directly assist me in evaluating the circumstances surrounding Operation
Ms. Cynthia Schneider  
Page 2  

After a thorough review of the facts surrounding the investigation and for a report of OIG's findings. Subsequent to that referral, I determined that the OIG expanded its review to include Operation Wide Receiver and the Kingpin investigation because they may have involved similar investigative strategy and practices.

Obtaining a complete understanding of the conduct of these investigations is necessary to my discharge of my criminal law enforcement responsibilities, and I believe that to do a thorough review of these investigations, it is necessary that the OIG have access to any relevant grand jury materials, and therefore I authorize the FBI (and other Department components) to disclose grand jury materials relating to these investigations to the OIG. In making this decision, I have determined that providing the OIG access to the grand jury material at issue will not impair the Department's conduct of these ongoing investigations and associated prosecutions.

I note that under Rule 6(g)(3)(B), a person to whom information is disclosed under Rule 6(g)(3)(D) may use that information only to assist an attorney for the government in performing that attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. Thus, only OIG personnel with direct responsibility for completing the review and report that I have requested may review and use the grand jury information disclosed to them. This is the only purpose for which this review may take place. Moreover, the Inspector General should promptly provide me, in writing, a list of the names of the persons within her Office who will have access to the Rule 6(g) material in connection with this OIG review. Once I receive that information, the Department, on my behalf, will promptly inform the court that impounded the grand jury or judicial the names of all persons to whom a disclosure has been made, as Rule 6(g) requires. That notice will also certify, as required by Rule 6(g)(3)(B), that the OIG personnel working on the review have been advised of their obligation of secrecy under Rule 6(g).

Sincerely,

Eric H. Holder, Jr.  
Attorney General
Office of the Deputy Attorney General

December 5, 2011

Ms. Andrew Weismann
General Counsel
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC 20535

Ms. Cecilia Schmelter
Acting Inspector General
Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Ms. Weismann and Ms. Schmelter:

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is conducting a review regarding the Department’s use of the multipurpose warrants recently enacted, 18 U.S.C. § 3183. In the course of this review, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has identified and withheld three disclosure-sensitive documents: standard warrant executed pursuant to the Federal Wiretap Act, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2516-2522 (hereinafter “Title II”). As explained below, I have determined that disclosing this information to the OIG would

Section 3517 governs an investigation or law enforcement officer’s disclosure and one of Title III information. It provides in relevant part:

Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire or oral, radio, or electronic communication, as defined in Title II, may disclose such information or law enforcement officer to the extent that such

18 U.S.C. § 2518(10). Section 2517 defines “Investigative or law enforcement officer” as

any officer of the United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offenses.”
Mr. Andrew Witenstein and Ms. Cynthia Behringer

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After consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"), I have determined that the FBI is authorized under section 5017 to disclose the information in question to the CEO in connection with its current review. OLC has previously concluded that QJZ agents qualify as "investigative officers" authorized to disclose or receive Title III information. See United States ex rel. U.S. v. Information on One of a Number of Accounts of a Corporate Client, 718 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1983). QJZ agents may therefore obtain and use Title III information as "appropriate in the proper performance of the official duties of the investigator or law enforcement officer disclosing or receiving the information." The caching of "official duties" has been construed narrowly, as under a parallel provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2), to punish disclosure by a law enforcement official who retained the information in the performance of disclosure duties of the office. See United States v. Kennedy, 914 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1990). Consistent with this interpretation, it is my view that QJZ agents, as authorized investigative officers, may receive and use Title III information in connection with the performance of their investigative or law enforcement duties.

In this case, the FBI has informed me that the Title III information in question is necessary to be completed of a thorough review of the Department's use of the material without warrant statute. This review is expected to address, among other things, allegations of misconduct by law enforcement agents that potentially result in violations of this law. Obtaining access to and use of Title III information in this case is therefore strictly limited to the performance of the investigative or law enforcement duties, and disclosure is appropriate for this purpose. I note that only QJZ personnel with direct responsibility for completing this review and report may use the information obtained.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

James M. Cole
Deputy Attorney General
December 8, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM:  CYNTHIA A. SCHNEIDER, Acting Inspector General

SUBJECT: Inspector General Access to Department Documents Obtained Pursuant to FCRA Section 1681a

Thank you for your letter dated November 18, 2011. As you noted, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is conducting a review of the use of national security letters by the Department of Justice (Department). In connection with that review, on October 28, 2011, the OIG requested access to certain Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office files containing national security letters and return information, including credit report information the FBI obtained pursuant to Section 1681a of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. Section 1681a. When the OIG's team arrived at the FBI's San Francisco office on November 14 for a field review of the requested files, the FBI informed the OIG for the first time that it was withholding from the OIG credit report information in 13 files based on the provision of the FCRA that limits dissemination of such information outside the FBI, Section 1681a(b).1

Although I appreciate the decision in your letter instructing the FBI to provide the credit report information to the OIG, I am writing to express my concern about the basis for your decision. We were particularly troubled by two aspects of your letter.

First, you invoked the exception to the limitation on dissemination in Section 1681a(b), which authorizes the FBI to disseminate return information "to other Federal agencies as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a

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1 Section 1681a(f) of the FCRA provides: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation may not disseminate information obtained pursuant to this section outside of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, except to other Federal agencies as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation, an investigation of a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to appropriate investigative authorities within the military department concerned as may be necessary for the conduct of a joint foreign counterintelligence investigation."
foreign counterintelligence investigation." Your letter states that this exception includes dissemination to the Department, and that you have decided the material can be disclosed to the OIG because disclosure is "necessary to the Deputy Attorney General's informed decision-making regarding the approval or conduct of future foreign intelligence investigations." However, the Department is not an "other Federal agency" with respect to the FBI; to the contrary, the FBI is a part of the Department, as is the OIG. Moreover, the FBI has routinely provided and the Department has allowed the National Security Division (NSD) to have access to such information without first seeking a case-by-case determination from the Deputy Attorney General that such disclosure is "necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign intelligence investigation." As we describe below, NSD regularly obtains such access for oversight as well as operational purposes.

Second, the letter states that your decision that the OIG should have access to the Section 1681a credit report information obtained by the FBI pursuant to national security letters "bears only upon the propriety of disclosure for purposes of OIG's current review." Thus, your letter appears not to consider disclosure of FCRA Section 1681a credit report information to the OIG in any of its other reviews or investigations unless the Department consents in advance to the disclosure based upon a determination that the OIG's access is necessary for the exercise of the Deputy Attorney General's supervisory responsibility in foreign intelligence investigations.

The OIG continues to maintain that under Section 3(a)(1) of the Inspector General Act (the Act), 5 U.S.C. App. 3, it is authorized to have access to all documents available to the Department and its components. The OIG believes that a process that allows the OIG access to documents only with advance permission from the Department on a case-by-case basis is contrary to this and other provisions of the Act. Moreover, such a process is contrary to the policy and practice of the Department and its components, including the FBI, since the inception of the OIG and the expansion of our jurisdiction in 2001 to include oversight over the FBI.

Significantly, the Act provides that once the Inspector General (OIG) decides to initiate a review, only the Attorney General (AG) may prohibit the IG from carrying out or completing the review, and only in certain carefully enumerated instances, in writing, and with notice to Congress. See Inspector General Act, Section 8(e). In short, the Act mandates that the IG receive access to Department documents unless the AG invokes the section 8(e) process to prohibit such access, not that the IG receives access only when the Department consents to it.

Moreover, the statutory limitation on the FBI's dissemination of information it receives pursuant to FCRA Section 1681n does not preclude the OIG from obtaining access to it. Section 1681n provided the FBI with new
authority to use national security letters to obtain limited credit report information and consumer identifying information in counterintelligence investigations. The limitation on dissemination contained in Section 106(b) was designed to ensure that information collected under this expanded authority was not improperly expanded or shared with other agencies. The purpose of the limitation on dissemination to protect privacy and civil liberties of the individuals whose credit information was obtained. \(^8\) In view of the consistent congressional interest in reining use of this and other expanded authorities under the USA PATRIOT Act, it makes no sense to read into the dissemination limiting language of Section 106(b) a statutory bar to the Department’s own ID having access for purposes of oversight. Indeed, such a reading is strained, and inconsistent with the language and intent of the FCRA.

Our reading of the statute is consistent with subsequent congressional action and past practice in the Department. As you know, our current review of the Department’s use of national security letters is a follow-up review to two previous congressionally mandated reviews. In the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Patriot Reauthorization Act), Congress directed the OIG to “perform an audit of the effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal use, of national security letters issued by the Department of Justice.” Pub. L. 109-177, Section 119 (2006). This same section of the Act defined national security letters to include requests made pursuant to Section 106(b). It also listed among specific items to be addressed in the audit the manner in which information obtained through national security letters was “collected, retained, analyzed, and disseminated by the Department,” including any direct access to such information (such as access to “raw data”) provided to any other department, agency, or instrumentality of Federal, State, local or tribal governments or any private sector entity.” (emphasis added).

Pursuant to the mandates of the Patriot Reauthorization Act clearly required the OIG to have access to the “raw data” the Department obtained through national security letters — including Section 106(b) credit report information — under the Patriot Reauthorization Act contained no provision granting the OIG access to Section 106(b) information. This shows that in 2005, Congress believed the OIG already had access to Section 106(b) information in order to

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\(^8\) See, e.g., House Conference Report 104-497, p. 30 (1996) ("In addition, FBI presently has authority to use the National Security Letter mechanism to obtain two types of records: financial institution records under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 3404(d)(4), and telephone subscriber and toll billing information under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2707. Expansion of this extraordinary authority is not taken lightly by the Congress, but the Congress has concluded that in this instance the need to gain, the threat for use is sufficiently serious, and, given the safeguards built into to the legislation, the threat to privacy is sustained.")
mit such dissemination. Accordingly, Section 1881a(a) should not be read as limiting the Department of Justice Inspector General's access to such information.

The Department's past practice is also consistent with our reading of Section 1881a(a). In our prior national security letter reviews and during our first site visit to the ongoing review, the FBI provided the OIG full access to Section 1881a credit report information as well as to all other information it obtained through the use of national security letters, without suggesting that PCRA Section 1881a limited such access. Our past reviews resulted in findings that the FBI had used national security letters (including what the FBI called "originate letters") in violation of applicable national security letters statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, and internal FBI policies. With respect to Section 1881a specifically, we found that FBI personnel did not fully understand the statutory requirements of the PCRA and had in certain cases requested or received information they were not entitled to receive pursuant to Section 1881a.

In response to our findings, the FBI and other Department components instituted corrective actions, including implementation by the NSD of oversight reviews patterned after the OIG's review that examine whether the FBI is using national security letters in accordance with applicable laws and policies. The FBI has since consistently provided the Oversight Section of NSD with access to Section 1881a credit report information to field office files on a quarterly basis, without first seeking a case-by-case determination from the Deputy Attorney General that such disclosure is "necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign intelligence investigation." We see no need to invoke the exception to the dissemination limitations of Section 1881a to allow the OIG access to the credit report information when the Oversight Section of NSD routinely obtains it without reference to the exception for the identical purpose of conducting oversight of the FBI. Indeed, especially in light of our prior national security letter and "originate letter" reviews, it would be remarkable if the Department were – at the FBI's request – restricted the OIG's access to Section 1881a material to only those reviews to which the Department consented.

In sum, the process contemplated by the November 19 memorandum – that the OIG may obtain access to Department documents related to an OIG review only after receiving advance consent from the Department on a case-by-case basis – is directly contrary to the broad authority and access granted to the IG in the Act, is not required by the terms of Section 1881a, is contrary to the purpose of the dissemination limitations contained in the statute, as well as the intent of Congress demonstrated by its subsequent legislation, and is a disturbing break from the long-standing policy and practice within the Department.
I appreciate the sentiment that you expressed at our meeting about this subject on November 18 that the goal of the Department was to ensure that the CIO is able to have access, consistent with the law, to the material it needs to conduct its oversight mission. I request that you reconsider your basis for allowing the CIO to have access to PCRA Section 1881a information. Consistent with the law for the reasons described herein, I ask that you issue a memorandum to the FBI informing it that the CIO can have access to PCRA Section 1881a information for its oversight reviews and investigations unless and until the AG finds it necessary to invoke the Section 85 process to prevent such access.
December 16, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM:   CYNTHIA A. SCHNEDAR
       ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Inspector General Access to Grand Jury Materials

Thank you for your letter of November 18, 2011, stating that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is authorized to receive grand jury material in its review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) firearms trafficking investigation known as Operation Fast and Furious, and other investigations with similar objectives, methods, and strategies. Your letter stated that you have determined that disclosing the grand jury material to the OIG is permissible under Rule 6(f)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because you have determined that such disclosure is necessary to assist you, an attorney for the government, in performing your duty to enforce federal criminal law.

I appreciate your decision that the OIG may have access to grand jury information for the purpose of completing this review. While it remains our position that we are entitled to this information, I am writing to express my disagreement with the rationale for your decision as to why we should be allowed this access. We were particularly concerned by the following aspects of your letter.

First, your letter incorrectly stated that I requested you to authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other Department components to disclose grand jury information to the OIG for our review. We do not believe Department components must seek authorization from the Attorney General to disclose grand jury information to the OIG for our use in conducting our investigations and reviews. Thus, while we notified Department officials that we were seeking certain grand jury information in Fast and Furious, that conversation was simply to provide notification and was not a request for the Department’s authorization for us to receive such materials. Indeed, prior to reaching your letter, we had already obtained grand jury information from the FBI relevant to the ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious, and the U.S. Attorney's
Office for the District of Arizona had notified us that it would provide grand jury information to us for this review. This was consistent with a longstanding policy and practice within the Department and its components, including the FBI, to provide grand jury information to the OIG upon our request for use in oversight reviews, without first obtaining consent to do so from the Attorney General.

I also am concerned that in providing authorization for the disclosure of grand jury information to the OIG, your letter appears to envision that it is necessary for the OIG to obtain authorization from the Attorney General, on a case-by-case basis, prior to obtaining access to grand jury material from the Department’s components. A requirement that the OIG must first seek permission from the Attorney General to obtain material necessary for our review, however, undermines the OIG’s independence and is inconsistent with the Inspector General Act.

As we have discussed with you and the Deputy Attorney General, the OIG believes that Section 616(b) of the Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 3, entitles us to have access to all documents available to the Department and its components. Significantly, Section 616 of the Act provides that only the Attorney General may prohibit the Inspector General from carrying out or completing a review, and may do so only in certain carefully circumscribed instances, in writing, and with notice to Congress. In short, the Act mandates that the OIG receive access to Department documents unless the Attorney General invokes the Section 616 process to prohibit such access. The Act does not limit the OIG’s access to Department documents to only those circumstances when the Attorney General consents to it.

In addition, while we agree that Rule 602 provides authority for the OIG to obtain access to grand jury information independent from the Inspector General Act, I am troubled that your letter relied on Rule 602 to grant the OIG access to grand jury material in Operation Fast and Furious. That provision authorizes the disclosure of grand jury information to “any government personnel . . . that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law.” Your letter stated that the provision applied to the OIG’s access

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1 As we have discussed with you, in contrast to its previous practice, the FBI in the Fast and Furious episode, the FBI departed from its longstanding practice of providing the OIG with access to grand jury and some other categories of information and refused to disclose such information in connection with the OIG’s pending investigation of the Department’s use of the material witness warrant statutes, 18 U.S.C. Section 3146. As you know, in that review, the OIG requested and was denied access to the Department’s information to direct the FBI to provide the OIG with what we believe the FBI is required to allow us to provide to us. We have shown how grand jury information from the FBI is used in our material witness warrant review pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 506(b).
in grand jury information in the Fast and Furious review because you referred
the matter to the OIG for investigation. Youreasoned that the OIG’s access to
grand jury information is necessary for you to exercise your supervisory
authority over the Department’s enforcement of federal criminal law.

Conditioning the OIG’s access to grand jury information upon your
determination that access is necessary for the exercise of the Attorney
General’s supervisory responsibilities again is inconsistent with the Inspector
General Act. Moreover, it is unnecessary under Rule 6(e). Attorneys for the
OIG may receive direct access to grand jury information pursuant to Rule
6(e)(2)(A)(ii), which provides that disclosure of grand jury information may be
made to “an attorney for the government for use in performing that attorney’s
duty.”

The Department has routinely provided attorneys in the Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR) access to grand jury information to enable
them to conduct oversight investigations of alleged misconduct by Department
attorneys in the performance of their litigation functions. Such access has
been allowed pursuant to Rule 6(e)(2)(A)(ii), and it has not required a case-by-
case determination of need for the Attorney General’s exercise of supervisory
authority. Indeed, an Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion issued in 1984
concluded that OPR attorneys qualify for automatic access under Rule
6(e)(2)(A)(ii) because they are part of the supervisory chain conducting oversight
of the conduct of Department attorneys before the grand jury. See
Memorandum of OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert B. Shaw, Jr.,
Disclosure of Grand Jury Material to the Office of Professional Responsibility,
January 3, 1984. OIG attorneys are similarly part of the supervisory chain
conducting oversight of the conduct of law enforcement officials, fulfilling a
supervisory function directed at maintaining the highest standards of conduct
by Department employees. OIG attorneys therefore should receive the same
automatic access to grand jury information for use in oversight reviews as OPR
attorneys do pursuant to Rule 6(e)(2)(A)(ii).

In sum, the premise of your November 18 letter — that the OIG may
obtain access to grand jury material relevant to an OIG review only after the
Attorney General or other Department official determines on a case-by-case
basis that such access is necessary to assist an attorney for the government in
performing your duty to enforce federal criminal law — is contrary to the broad
authority and access granted to the Inspector General in the Inspector General
Act. It also belies the long-standing policy and practice of Department
components providing grand jury material to the OIG without obtaining the
consent of Department leadership. Moreover, Rule 6(e)(2)(A)(ii) provides
authority for the OIG to obtain access to grand jury information independent
from the Inspector General Act, just as OPR is allowed automatic access
pursuant to that rule.
I appreciate the sentiment that the Deputy Attorney General expressed at our meeting with him about this issue on November 19 that the goal of the Department was to ensure that the OIG is able to have access, consistent with the law, to the materials it needs to conduct its oversight mission. I request that you reconsider your basis for allowing the OIG to have access to grand jury information. Consistent with the law for the reasons described here, I ask that you make clear that the OIG can have access to grand jury information for its oversight reviews and investigations pursuant to the Inspector General Act and Rule 6(d)(3)(A)(ii) unless and until the Attorney General finds it necessary to invoke the Section 650 process to prevent such access.
December 10, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL.

FROM:

CYNTHIA A. SCHNEIDER
ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Inspector General Access to Department Documents
Relating to Title III Electronic Surveillance


In your letter, you cite an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued in 1980 concluding that OIG agents qualify as "investigative officers" authorized to obtain and use Title III information as appropriate to the proper performance of their official duties. You state that you have determined that disclosing Title III information to the OIG for the material witness warrant review is permissible because it is necessary to the OIG's performance of its investigative or law enforcement duties. You also state that disclosure in this circumstance is appropriate because "the Title III information is necessary to [the OIG's] completion of a thorough review of the Department's use of the material witness warrant statute."

Although I appreciate your decision that the FBI is authorized to disclose the Title III material it has been withholding in response to our request for it, I do not agree with the rationale contained in your letter that it is necessary for the OIG to obtain authorization from Department leadership, on a case-by-case basis, prior to obtaining access to Title III material from the Department's components. As we have previously discussed with you, we believe a requirement that the OIG must first seek permission from the Department to obtain material necessary for its reviews undermines the OIG's independence and is contrary to the access provisions of the Inspector General Act (the Act). See 5 U.S.C. App. 3.

As I noted in my letter to you dated December 6, 2011, regarding the OIG's authority to obtain credit report information gathered pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, the OIG believes that Section 63a(1) of the Act entitles us to
access to all documents available to the Department and its components, unless the Attorney General himself formally, in writing and with notice to Congress, exercises his authority pursuant to section 8E of the Act to prohibit the OIG from completing or carrying out a review in circumstances specifically enumerated in Section 8E.

Title III itself provides a basis independent of the Act for the OIG to obtain access to Title III materials. As you note, the 1980 OLC opinion interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3517(f) to include OIG agents as investigative officers authorized under Title III to receive such information for the performance of their investigative or law enforcement duties. However, you also cite a 2000 OLC opinion regarding dissemination of Title III material as narrowly construing the term “official duties” to limit disclosure to law enforcement officials to situations when it is “related to the law enforcement duties” of the receiving officer. Because the 2000 OLC opinion arose in the context of dissemination of Title III material outside of the Department to the intelligence community, we do not believe it precludes the OIG or other officials within the Department from obtaining Title III material to conduct supervision or oversight of law enforcement.

In sum, we believe the OIG is authorized to receive Title III materials under both the Inspector General Act and Title III. Indeed, the OIG has historically received such information from Department components, including the FBI, in recognition that the OIG’s function includes ensuring that existing law enforcement personnel are conducting investigations in compliance with applicable laws and policies. Moreover, it is common sense that our role of conducting oversight of law enforcement activities must encompass access to the materials and information derived from the techniques employed by law enforcement officers.

Accordingly, I ask that you reconsider the basis for allowing the OIG to have access to Title III information in our material witness warrant review. Consistent with the law as described in this memorandum, I request that you determine that the FBI and other Department components should provide the OIG access to Title III materials for its oversight reviews and investigations in all such matters, unless the Attorney General invokes Section 8E of the Act to prevent such access.
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

January 4, 2012

Cynthia Schaefer
Acting Inspector General
Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Ms. Schaefer:


As you know, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), the entity within the Executive Branch responsible for providing authoritative legal advice about these types of matters, has been considering the issues raised by your requests. OLC's established practice is to refrain from reaching any final conclusions until it has satisfied and resolved all views of all affected parties, including OIG, a process that I understand is currently underway. OLC has advised me that at this time, however, they are not persuaded that the Inspector General Act provides authority to access documents notwithstanding the restrictions on their use or dissemination contained in the statutes referenced above.

I have consulted with OLC at length about ways that, consistent with applicable law, the Department can ensure that OIG continues to have access to the materials it needs for its essential work. Within the limits of the law, the Attorney General and I have endeavored to find solutions that provide OIG with immediate access to documents necessary for its thorough and effective review of specific matters. Wherever you have raised concerns with us about a specific withholding of documents that you need, we have sought ways to provide you access. We understand that, as you confirmed at our meeting on December 19, 2011, OIG currently has access to the information that it needs for its ongoing reviews. In the meantime, as we explained at our December meeting, where possible under existing law, we will continue to work with OLC to develop Department-wide policies that would ensure that documents are made available to OIG without the need for case-by-case determinations.
Ms. Cynthia Schneider
January 4, 2013
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To obtain a definitive answer to these legal questions, I have shared your letters with
OLC and asked that OLC provide a formal opinion regarding the construction of Section 606(f)(1)
of the Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 3, and the OIG’s access to grand jury materials,
information obtained pursuant to Section 1681a of PCRA, and information obtained pursuant to
Title III. Please continue to work with OLC to ensure that they have the benefit of your views
and perspective on these issues. If, after OLC has considered its opinion, you believe the existing
suites do not provide your office with access on terms that allow it to perform its oversight
mission, legislative action may be necessary. I look forward to working with you if such action
is ultimately required.

Sincerely,

James M. Cole
Deputy Attorney General
March 16, 2012

Ms. Cyndi Seidler
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
100 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Ms. Seidler:

As I explained in our recent discussions and in my letter of January 4, 2012, I am committed to ensuring that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has access to the information it needs to perform effectively its oversight mission. Toward that end, the Attorney General and I have worked over the past several months to make certain that OIG has the materials necessary to conduct its ongoing reviews. We have also indicated that we are committed to developing Department-wide policies to make documents available to your office without the need for case-by-case determinations.

Your office responded that, although you were grateful for our efforts, you believed that the approach we proposed was inconsistent with Section 6003 of the Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 3, and the specific statutory provisions at issue. To resolve the legal questions presented, I sought for an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), an entity within the Executive Branch that resolves such disputes.

Both your office and the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) have requested that the Department withhold the request for an opinion from OLC because OIG and CIGIE have indicated to me that they are satisfied with the terms of access currently being provided. You have also indicated that OIG has received all material responsive to its pending requests and no longer believes there is a need to resolve the legal questions presented. From our discussions, I understand that OIG now believes that the best course is to proceed with developing Department-wide policies encouraging its access to information. Those policies would seek to facilitate your reviews by providing presumptive access to certain categories of information to the extent permitted by the terms of the specific statutory provisions at issue. We will work to maximize your ability to obtain information, but you understand that access to some categories of information may be legally permissible on these terms only in certain circumstances, and access to other categories of information may not be possible at all.

In light of the foregoing, I intend to inform OIG that a formal opinion is no longer needed on the legal issues that have been raised. It has been noted that OLC has already provided informal legal advice upon which the Attorney General and I have relied as a basis for exercising
Ms. Cynthia Schneider
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that OIG has had access to information in specific reviews. I encourage you to contact OLC to
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provide your legal views concerning prospective access by OIG to the type of information at
least in those reviews—specifically, grand jury material, financial information received pursuant
to Section 606 of the False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3051 (FCA), and information

Please let us know if you disagree with any of the foregoing. If I do not hear from you
within a week, I will withdraw the request for an opinion from OLC.

Sincerely,

James M. Cole
Deputy Attorney General
Ms. Cynthia Schreuder
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

April 11, 2012

The Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") is conducting a review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") investigations known as Operation Fast and Furious and Operation White Star, as well as the ATF investigation of alleged criminal conduct by Jean-Baptiste Kigali. In the course of this review, the OIG has sought pertinent information from various Department components. The Criminal Division has identified certain information obtained pursuant to the Federal Wiretap Act, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2532 (hereinafter "Title III"), as responsive to the OIG's request. The Criminal Division has advised me of the nature of this Title III information and has asked if it may disclose that information to the OIG. As explained below, I have authorized the Criminal Division to disclose this information to the OIG on my behalf, for the OIG's use in connection with its ongoing review.

Section 2517 governs an investigative or law enforcement officer's disclosure and use of Title III information. It provides in relevant part:

Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom may use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties.

18 U.S.C. § 2517(2). As Deputy Attorney General, I am a "law enforcement officer" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2), and my official duties as such include supervisory responsibility for the Department's criminal law enforcement program, policies, and practices. Pursuant to section 2517(2), I may therefore "use" Title III information by disclosing it in a manner that enables me to perform appropriately my law enforcement duties, which include these supervisory responsibilities.

After consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel, I have determined that providing the OIG with access to the Title III information is in the interest of the Department's overall law enforcement supervisory responsibilities. Indeed, I fully expect that both the OIG's investigation and its subsequent report will provide information that will directly assist me in supervising the
Ms. Cynthia Selwood
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Department's criminal law enforcement programs, policies, and practices. I therefore authorize the Criminal Division and other Department components to provide the OIG with responsive FBI III information for its use in connection with this review. In making this decision, and because it will not result in privileged materials being disclosed outside the Department, I have determined that providing the OIG with access to this information will not impair the Department's conduct of the ongoing investigations and associated prosecutions. I note that only OIG personnel with express responsibility for completing this review and subsequent report may use the information disclosed.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

James M. Cole
Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Unclassified with Restrictions

Office of the General Counsel
Washington, D.C. 20530
March 4, 2011

Carol F. Cole
Assistant Inspector General
Oversight and Review Division
Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
1425 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 13100
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Ms. Cole:

You have asked for an explanation of the dissemination restrictions that exist on
documents that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") may have in its investigative files.
You have raised concerns that if such dissemination restrictions are observed by the FBI in
connection with requests from the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), OIG’s oversight
ability will be impaired. While we appreciate your concerns, restrictions on dissemination affect
a relatively small number of documents relating to a small number of OIG audits, investigations,
or reviews. Nevertheless, the FBI is eager to understand the OIG’s argument that the statutory
limitations cited below do not apply to dissemination from the FBI to OIG. (1)

In prior discussions, the OIG has noted that section 6(a)(2) of the Inspector General Act
of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 6 (hereafter "IG Act") authorizes the OIG to have access to "all
records, reports,... documents, papers,... or other material available to the applicable
establishment which relate to programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector
General has responsibilities under this Act." Section 6(a)(3) further authorizes the OIG "to
request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and
responsibilities provided by this Act for any Federal... agency or unit thereof." (2)

Although Section 6(a)(1) grants broad access, section 6(a)(3) makes clear that access is not
without limits. Section 6(a)(3) provides that, "[t]he request of an Inspector General for
information or assistance under subsection (4)(C), the head of any Federal agency involved shall
transmit to the Inspector General, and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or
regulation of the Federal agency from which the information is requested, furnish to such
Inspector General... such information or assistance." (emphasis added). Although Section
6(a)(3) applies by its terms only to requests pursuant to Section 6(a)(3), Section 6(a)(2) also
recognizes that section 6(a)(1) is not abrogated: "Whenever information or assistance requested
under subsection (4)(C) or (4)(D) is, in the judgment of an Inspector General, unreasonable,
refused, or not provided, the Inspector General shall report the circumstances to the head of the
establishment involved without delay." (emphasis added). Thus, the statute implicitly
The dissemination restrictions discussed below do not apply to requests from the OIG that are made as part of criminal investigations that are being conducted jointly by the OIG and the FBI. (U)

A. Grand Jury Information (U)

The disclosure of federal grand jury material is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) and implementing guidelines promulgated by DOJ. Rule 6(e)’s restrictions on dissemination vary depending on the nature of the information being sought and the nature of the information being sought. If the OIG requests materials that contain information protected by Rule 6(e), and if the requirements described below are not met, the information may not be produced to the OIG. (U)

"Rule 6(e) does not cover all information developed during the course of a grand jury investigation, but only information that would reveal the strategy or direction of the investigation, the nature of the evidence produced before the grand jury, the views expressed by members of the grand jury, or anything else that actually occurred before the grand jury." See U.S. v. Booker, Federal Grand Jury Practice, Office of Legal Education, October 2004 at § 3.4 (citing United States v. Smith, 522 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 1997)). Moreover, the question whether a specific document is or is not 6(e) material may depend on the quantity of Grand Jury information contained within the federal circuit in which the grand jury is sitting. See id. at § 3.4 through 3.10. Requests for grand jury investigative files—i.e., dockets of which will necessarily disclose the substance of evidence that was collected by and produced to the grand jury—may pose different legal concerns than those related to production of materials that have independent significance (e.g., bank records, telephone records). (U)

1. Criminal Investigations (U)

Rule 6(e)(3)(A) and (B) provides that an attorney for the government may disclose Grand Jury material to any other government personnel necessary to assist in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law and the information disclosed is to be used only for those purposes. Disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3)(A) is permitted only when necessary to assist in...
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Section 2.2 - Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Foreign Intelligence Information (C)

Our prior submission to the Office of Legal Counsel has fully explained our view of the scope of our ability to produce material in the OIG pursuant to Rule 60(2)(C) and that discussion will not be repeated here. (U)

Section 2.3 - Threat Information (C)

Rule 60(2)(C) does not permit the disclosure of Grand Jury material involving a threat of attack or other grave threat to national security, or a threat of death or serious personal injury to an individual. Such disclosures may be made to any foreign power or to its agents, to any federal officer or agency, for the purpose of preventing a threat from materializing or responding to such a threat. There is no requirement that the threat be imminent or specific. It is highly unlikely that the provision will ever be triggered unless responding to an OIG request for documents.

Section 2.5 - Title III Materials (C)

The disclosure and use of information intercepted under the authority of the Federal Wiretap Act, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (Title III or T-III), is controlled by 18 U.S.C. § 2517. The authority to disclose or use T-III material depends on the nature of the investigation being conducted by the entity seeking the information and the nature of the information being sought. Unless one of the exceptions below is satisfied, the T-III information may not be produced. (U)
1. Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Foreign Intelligence Information (U)

Section 2517 of Title 18, United States Code, permits the disclosure of T-III-derived information that is foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, or foreign intelligence information to any other Federal law enforcement or national security official to assist the official in the performance of his or her official duty. As with grand jury material, it is OGC's position that a priori determination must be made that the T-III information is foreign intelligence, counterintelligence or foreign intelligence information. Such information can be shared with the OIG under this provision only when the OIG is acting in a law enforcement capacity. If either condition is not met (i.e., a particular piece of information is not foreign intelligence, counterintelligence or foreign intelligence information or the OIG is not functioning as a law enforcement official) then T-III information may not be provided. (U)

2. These Information (U)

18 U.S.C. § 2517 (U) permits the disclosure of T-III-derived information to any Federal government official, to the extent that such information reveals a threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or of an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, terrorism or insurrectionary activities, or clandestine intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power, for the purpose of preventing or responding to such threat. In order for information to be disseminated under this provision, the individual or entity receiving the information must use it to respond to the threat, and not for other purposes. As both the similar provisions in Rule 6(e), it is highly unlikely that an OIG request will satisfy this provision. Nevertheless, if the provision is satisfied, such T-III information may be produced to the OIG. (U)

In terms of production logistics, the vast majority of FBI investigative files do not include Title III information because Title III surveillance was not utilized during the investigation. In addition, the FBI rarely issued a policy restricting the manner in which Title III information is included in FBI files. Thus, in the majority of cases, the FBI does not anticipate that it will need to search requested documents for Title III information. (U)

C. Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) (U)

The dissemination of federal taxpayer information is governed by 26 U.S.C. § 6103. Section 6103 applies to taxpayer information that is obtained from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or from another agency that originally received the information from the IRS. The IRS can obtain § 6103 information only for one of three purposes: (1) for use in a tax-enforcement investigation; (2) to locate a taxpayer; or (3) for use in a tax-enforcement investigation. 26 U.S.C. § 6103. Information obtained for purposes may not be used by any person or disseminated to other agencies or subdivisions of agencies for any other purpose. 26 U.S.C. § 6103.

*Section 5 of IRS Publication 1625 discusses sharing TMI between the FBI and the IRS. Section 5.4 states, "However, in most cases, the disseminating agency does not permit agencies to share with other agencies in exchange for data..."*
§ 6.03 states that the return information obtained by the Department of Justice may only be disclosed to officers or employees who are "personally and directly engaged in, and solely for their use in, any proceeding before a Federal grand jury or Federal or state court." 28 U.S.C. § 6103(c)(2). Accordingly, FBI may not be produced to the OIG unless they are relevant to a criminal investigation being conducted by the OIG. (U)

In terms of production logistics, by longstanding FBI policy, FBI must be retained in a restricted subclass. Accordingly, the unauthorized production of the file will not be searched for FBI, except upon specific indication that FBI policy was not followed in the particular case at issue. (U)

D. Child Victims, Child Witnesses or Federal Juvenile Court Information (U)

The identity of child victims or child witnesses are restricted by the Child Victims and Witnesses Information Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c), which provides that DOJ employees may disclose information that contains "the name or any other information concerning the child" only to "persons who, by reason of their participation in the proceeding, have reason to know such information." Accordingly, the names of child victims and child witnesses identified may not be produced to the OIG. (U)

Information derived from court records prepared for the ongoing criminal trial proceedings before a juvenile delinquency court is covered by the Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5036. These court records may be disclosed only in response to an inquiry from a law enforcement agency when the request for information is "related to the investigation of a crime." 18 U.S.C. § 5036(b)(3). Then, only if the OIG is conducting a criminal investigation as to which the federal juvenile court records are relevant may such records be produced to the OIG. (U)

From a production logistics perspective, few FBI files include the name of child victims, witnesses, or juvenile delinquents. When FBI investigative files are requested, the FBI will determine whether or not there is any specific reason to support that a requested file contains such material. If not, the file will not be reviewed to search for such information. (U)

E. Patient Medical Information (U)

The FBI's ability to re-disclose medical information that identifies an individual as the recipient of medical services or diagnosis may be limited depending upon the type of information, how the information was obtained, and for what purpose it was obtained. Information obtained by patient consent or court order may have limitations regarding the purpose for which the information will be used. Other legal authorities, such as Reasonable Cause (111311) and 18 U.S.C. § 3405(a), may also limit re-disclosure of the information about subsequent disclosure of the information." It notes that, "Without specifically authorized by (specific) Reasonable Cause, agencies are not permitted to allow access to FBI to agents, representatives, or contractors." (U)
specific approvals being obtained. Psychotherapy notes and substance abuse patient medical records in particular have very stringent confidentiality protections. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2; 42 C.F.R. Chapter I, subchapter A, Part 2; 45 CFR § 164.503(b). Thus, if the OIG requests materials that consist individually-identifiable patient medical information, the Office of General Counsel must be consulted prior to producing such materials. (U)

From a production logistics perspective, few FBI files outside of the health care fraud classification include such information. When FBI Investigative files are requested, the FBI will determine whether or not there is any specific reason to suspect that a requested file contains such information. If not, the file will not be reviewed to search for such information. (U)

F. Credit Reports (U)

The Fair Credit Reporting Act governs the dissemination of credit reports and information from credit reports. Because the statutory scheme is quite complicated, if the OIG requests materials that include credit reports or information from credit reports, we are recommending that the Office of the General Counsel be consulted prior to production. (U)

G. FISA Information (U)
From a production logistics perspective, FBI files outside of the national security area will not contain FISA information and most FBI national security files do not include the use of FISA surveillance authority. Moreover, under 31 CFR 20.107a, any FISA information is unlikely to be present in FBI investigative files. When FBI investigative files are requested, the FBI will determine whether or not there is any specific reason to suspect that a requested file contains any FISA information. If not, the file will not be reviewed to search for such information. (U)

H. Foreign Government or International Organization Information (U)

If a foreign government has imposed restrictions on the dissemination of information it provides to the FBI and the information has not been declassified within DOD, that information should not be produced to the OGC absent permission from the entity that provided the information to the FBI. (U)

From a production logistics perspective, FBI files outside of the national security area will include such information. When FBI investigative files are requested, the FBI will determine whether or not there is any specific reason to suspect that a requested file contains information provided by a foreign government that has imposed restrictions on the dissemination of the information. If not, the file will not be reviewed to search for such information. (U)

I. Information Subject to Non-Disclosure Agreements, Memoranda of Understanding or Court Order (U)

A non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) may, depending on its terms, impose restrictions on the FBI's sharing information with entities outside the FBI, including the OGC. Because each NDA or MOU will vary in its terms, an analysis of the ability to share information will vary on the particular terms and conditions of the agreement. Thus, if the requested materials were obtained pursuant to an NDA or an MOU that, on its face, appears to restrict the disclosure of the information outside the FBI, we are recommending that OGC be consulted prior to disclosure. (U)
A court order may, depending on its terms, impose constraints on the FBI sharing information with entities outside the FBI, including the OIG. The FBI’s ability to share information will turn on the particular terms and conditions of the order. Thus, if the requested materials are governed by a court order that appears, on its face, to restrict the disclosure of the information outside the FBI, we are recommending coordination with OGC prior to production. 

From a production logistics perspective, few FBI files will include such information. When FBI investigative files are requested, the FBI will determine whether or not there is any specificity reason to suspect that a requested file contains such information. If not, the file will not be reviewed to search for such information. 

J. Attorney-Client Information

The FBI’s attorney-client information falls into the two general categories: “official capacity” and “individual capacity” information. “Individual capacity” attorney-client information is subject to the standards set forth in 28 C.F.R. §§68.15 and 50.16 and 28 U.S.C. § 531. In cases, the attorney or the employee enter into a “traditional attorney-client relationship” and the information relating to the representation is covered by attorney-client confidentiality rules. The information subject to the privilege includes communications between the attorney and the employee, as well as “confidential information about a client from any source.” See Individual Capacity Manual at 54 (citing Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6 and 1.8DC), which have been adopted in some form in “most jurisdictions”. 

The attorney-client relationship commences with the request for representation and applies to communications made for the purpose of securing representation. Id. at 58. The obligation to safeguard privileged or other confidential client information remains “in perpetuity” and the information must therefore be protected not only while the case is active but also after its disposition. Id. at 55. In the event the OIG requests information from the FBI relating to a matter in which an FBI attorney has handled a request for individual representation or has represented an individual in his or her individual capacity, the FBI attorney handling the matter must be consulted and all attorney-client privileged information must be withheld. 

From a production logistics perspective, individual representations are included in a file classification that is requests from any underlying investigative file. Attorney-client materials should, therefore, not be included in investigative files. When FBI investigative files are requested, the FBI will determine whether or not there is any specific reason to suspect that the requested materials include individual capacity attorney-client materials. If not, requested materials will not be reviewed to search for such information. 

K. Other U.S. Government Information

There are many circumstances through which the FBI comes into possession of information that originates with another government entity (hereinafter “third party information”). In addition, certain statutes restrict the dissemination of information regarding
employee of certain U.S. government entities (50 U.S.C. § 403a). Such information should not be disclosed to the OIG. (U)

From a production logistics perspective, few FBI files outside the national security era will include such information. When FBI investigative files are requested, the FBI will determine whether or not there is any specific reason to suspect that a requested file contains information provided by another government agency or the name of an employee that cannot be disclosed. If so, the file will not be reviewed to search for such information. (U)

1. Source Information (U)

If the OIG requests access to or documents from an FBI source file, the request must be approved by the relevant FBI SAC or his or her designee. See Attorney General Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Source Information at 1D-4.a. Moreover, the FBI Confidential Human Source Policy Manual requires that the disclosure be documented in the source's own file. See Confidential Human Source Policy Manual ¶C07-0004-DX (Revised September 5, 2007). (U)

The OIG may have access to source reporting that is contained in FBI investigative files without such approval. During civil litigation and in response to FOIA requests, the FBI withholds such information from disclosure if it would tend to identify the informant. Because the OIG is part of the Department, there is no reason to suspect that it will attempt to piece together disparate pieces of information in order to identify an FBI informant. Thus, if the information at issue is available generally to FBI employees who have access to ACS, it can also be produced to the OIG. (U)

As noted above, we believe these dissemination restrictions will affect only a small number of OIG document requests. Nonetheless, we are working to enhance our capacity to gather and review requested documents so that we can continue to provide the OIG with the information it needs to carry out its oversight responsibilities. Moreover, as we discussed, I am eager to understand the OIG's position regarding the applicability of the above-discussed restrictions on the dissemination of FBI information. (U)

Very truly yours,

[Signature]
Valeria Capraro
General Counsel
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MEMORANDUM

Tel: Michael Horowitz, Inspector General
Pnt: Andrew Weisman, General Counsel, FBI CAG
Re: Legal restrictions on dissemination of FBI information to the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for OIG criminal investigations
Date: February 29, 2013

L (U) Background

(1) The Memorandum is provided as a follow-up to our meeting on February 22, 2013, in which we discussed OIG access to FBI information. The FBI understands that the OIG, by virtue of its statute and mission, is generally entitled to broad access to information that is within the possession of the FBI. 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6(q). Section 6(q)(1) of the Inspector General Act states that, "[T]he inspector general, . . . is authorized . . . to have access to all records, reports, audit, review, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material available to the applicable establishment which relate to programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under the Act." 16. In the fall of 2011, the OIG issued a memorandum to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) regarding the level of access to certain categories of information that ODAG components were providing to the OIG. Upon ODAG's request, the FBI provided ODAG with a memorandum describing the categories of information that the FBI determined may be subject to legal restrictions on dissemination to the DOJ OIG. See Memorandum from P. Kelley, Acting General Counsel, FBI, to ODAG (October 5, 2011) (carricated "October 2011 Memorandum") (Attachment A).

(2) This memorandum specifically addresses the scope of OIG access to those previously-identified categories of FBI information when the OIG is conducting a criminal investigation. Even when the OIG is conducting a criminal investigation, it cannot conduct an administrative misconduct investigation, audit, inspection, or program review without the OIG being notified and providing written notice to the FBI. Under those circumstances, the FBI can provide the requested information to the OIG. However, in most instances, the FBI cannot provide the requested information to the OIG. A memorandum from the FBI to the OIG (July 10, 2012) (carricated "July 2012 Memorandum") (Attachment B) provides guidelines for deciding whether or not to provide the requested information.

(3) In this memorandum, we first address the categories of information identified in the FBI's October 2011 Memorandum where, if requested in connection with an OIG criminal case, there are no restrictions on dissemination. We then address those categories of information identified in the FBI's October 2011 Memorandum where, even when the OIG is conducting a criminal case, the restrictions on dissemination may apply.
II. Categories of Information Not Subject to Restrictions on Dissemination where the OIG is Pursuing a Criminal Case

A. Title III Information

Section 2511(1)(c) of Title II generally prohibits a person from disclosing what that person knows to be material collected from a wiretap ("Title III information"). Section 2517(3), however, provides the disclosure of Title III information to "one investigative or law enforcement officer ... to another investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure." 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3). Section 2517(7) allows for an investigative or law enforcement officer to make use of Title III information "to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties." Therefore, where the OIG is pursuing a criminal case, there is no restriction on dissemination of Title III information from the FBI to the OIG.

B. Federal Juvenile Court Records

The Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5036(a)(3) states that "Throughout and upon the completion of the juvenile delinquency proceeding, the records shall be safeguarded from disclosure to unauthorized persons. The records shall be released to the extent necessary to meet the following circumstances: ... (5) requests from law enforcement agencies where the request for information is related to the investigation of a crime or a position within that agency." (Emphasis added). Thus, the OIG may have access to such information as part of its criminal investigatory function to which the records are relevant.

C. Bank Secrecy Act Information

Information obtained pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) (31 U.S.C. § 5311 et. al.) from the Financial Criminal Enforcement Network (FINCEN) is prohibited from disclosure except in compliance with applicable memorandum of understanding between the FBI and FINCEN. However, FINCEN's Office of General Counsel has stated to the FBI Office of General Counsel that such information may be shared with the OIG where the OIG is conducting a criminal case. Therefore, the FBI may provide information from FINCEN that is protected by the BSA to the OIG for its criminal cases.

D. Source Identifying Information

The Attorney General Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Source ("AGO-CHS") generally prohibit the disclosure of "the identity of any Confidential Human Source or information that the source has provided that would have a tendency to identify the Source," though there are exceptions, one of which is applicable. Specifically, OIG personnel may disclose appropriate information to "other law enforcement, intelligence, intelligence, diplomatic, and military officials who need to know the identity to perform their official duties, subject to prior approval of the FBI-SAC or his or her designee." Thus, pursuant to the AGO-
A. (U) Grand Jury Information

(U) Rule 6(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure generally prohibits government officials from disclosing information about any matter occurring before grand jury. The rule, however, contains three exceptions which may apply to the OIG's access in criminal cases.

i. (U) Disclosure to assist attorney in performing duty to enforce criminal law

(U) An individual otherwise restricted from disclosing grand jury information may provide such information to "any government personnel ... that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(b)(3)(B). This exception does not authorize the FBI to provide the OIG with all 6(c) information from FBI records, however. After the OIG requests 6(c) information during the course of a criminal investigation, the OIG must seek appropriate authorization—either from the prosecutor assigned to the case in which the 6(c) information was obtained, or from the Attorney General as part of his general supervisory authority. Disclosure based on this exception also requires court notification. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(b)(3)(B).

ii. (U) Disclosure to assist attorney in performing intelligence-related duties

(U) "An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury matter involving foreign intelligence, counterintelligence ... to any federal law enforcement ... official to assist that official receiving the information in the performance of that official's duties." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(b)(3)(C). When the OIG seeks to avail itself of this exception, the determination that the grand jury matter involves foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information must still be made by an attorney for the government. Disclosure based on this exception also requires court notification. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(b)(3)(B).

iii. (U) Disclosure with leave of court

(U) In addition to second granted by a government attorney, Rule 6(c) allows the court that empanelled the grand jury to authorize disclosure of grand jury material. "This court may authorize disclosure ... pursuant to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(b)(3)(D). This exception, too, would require the OIG to obtain such specific permission before the FBI would be authorized to release the information.

*(U) This problem is consistent with the problem OIG provided to the FBI in April 2012. See Notes of Mng. between FBI and OIG (Sept. 11, 2013) (Attachment C).*
(U) Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6103, prohibits a federal employee from disclosing federal tax return or return information (FTI) obtained directly from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), or from another agency that originally received the information from the IRS, except in limited circumstances. One permissible circumstance is that FBI employees may share such tax information with other “official and employees of any Federal agency who are personally and directly engaged in an investigation directly relating to tax liability.” See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(f). Standing alone, the fact that the OIG is concluding a criminal investigation is not sufficient to permit the FBI to categorically provide the OIG access to such tax information. In order to obtain the information, the OIG would need to establish that the FBI employee receiving the information is personally and directly engaged in the investigation for which the records were initially and appropriately obtained. This information is also subject to strict handling controls, so it can easily be identified and is, generally speaking, already segregated from non-FTI material.

C. (U) Individual-Capacity Attorney-Client Information

(U) Most often FBI attorneys’ attorney-client relationship and corresponding privilege rest on behalf of the organization. We understand that sharing such “official-capacity” attorney-client information with the DOJ OIG does not constitute a waiver of attorney-client privileges. Such information is therefore not restricted from dissemination to the OIG for its criminal cases (though the OIG is restricted from disclosing the information outside the Department of Justice without prior consultation).

(U) In some cases, however, such as when an individual FBI employee is used for official advice, an FBI attorney’s attorney-client relationship and corresponding privilege does extend to an individual FBI employee. Such “individual-capacity” attorney-client information is subject to the standards set forth in 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.15 and 50.16 and 28 U.S.C. § 517. The attorney and the employee enter into a “traditional attorney-client relationship” and the information relating to the representation is covered by attorney-client confidentiality rules. See, generally, Individual Capacity Representation of Federal Employees in Civil and Criminal Proceedings: Process, Procedures, Ethical Considerations, and Professional Responsibility Concerns, Constitutional & Specialized Torts Staff, Civil Division, Office of the General Counsel, Civil Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Branch (July 2010) at page 2 (hereinafter “Individual Capacity Manual”). The information subject to the privilege includes communications between the attorney and the employee, as well as “confidential information about a client from any source.” See Individual Capacity Manual at 34.

(U) The scope of the protection for individual-capacity attorney-client information is broad. The attorney-client relationship encompasses the request for representation and applies to communications made for the purpose of securing representation. Id. at 30. The obligation to safeguard privileged or other confidential client information remains “in perpetuity” and the information must therefore be protected not only while the case is active but also after its disposition. Id. at 35. Because these protections exist whether the OIG is conducting a criminal
or non-criminal investigation, where the OIG requests information from the FBI related to a matter in which the FBI attorney has handled a request for individual representation or has represented an individual in his or her individual capacity, the FBI attorney handling the matter must be consulted and all individual capacity attorney-client privileged information must be withheld.

D. Child Victims or Child Witness Information

(1) The release of information concerning the identity of child victims or child witnesses is prohibited by the Child Victims and Witnesses Information Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3509. Government employees may only disclose documents containing information about a child victim or witness as described in the statute to individuals who have a need to know such information "by reason of their participation in the proceeding" in which the documents arise. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(e)(1)(A) (B). Therefore, release to the OIG should be limited to those who have a need to know the information in the performance of official duties related to the particular investigation or prosecution in which the child is a victim or witness. Alternatively, the relevant court may order disclosure if "disclosure is necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child." 18 U.S.C. § 3509(e)(4).

Accordingly, the OIG is not entitled to access such information unless the FBI is investigating a different criminal matter. The FBI may only provide such information to the OIG for its criminal cases where the OIG employee to whom such information would be released meets the statutory requirement for access or has obtained a court order permitting disclosure.

E. Patient Medical Information

(1) Executive Order 13181 seeks to protect the derivative use of protected health information obtained from the provider by all federal agencies including federal law enforcement personnel. Executive Order 13181 provides that "law enforcement may not use protected health information concerning an individual that is discovered during the course of health care oversight activities for unrelated civil, administrative, or criminal investigations of non-health care oversight matters." The Deputy Attorney General (DAG) must approve any use of such information to pursue a non-health-care oversight investigation. 28 U.S.C. § 506. The DAG may only grant such approval if disclosure is in the interest of the public and would outweigh the potential injury to the patient. Id.

Accordingly, the FBI may provide such information to the OIG for its criminal cases after the DAG has approved the disclosure.

(2) Information obtained by patient consent, court order or subpoena, has certain limitations regarding the purpose for which the information will be used. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1368(b)(2) provides that "[p]ersonal information about an individual that is obtained under this section may not be used in, or disclosed to any person for use in, any administrative, civil, or criminal action or investigation directed against the individual who is the subject of the information unless the action or investigation is one of, and is directly related to, the receipt of health care or payment for health care or services involving a fraudulent claim related to health ..." In addition, health records obtained pursuant to a court order for oversight purposes can be used against that patient upon a finding by the court of "good cause" such that the need for disclosure outweighs the potential for injury to the patient and the doctor-patient relationship. Thus, where the OIG seeks
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information for use in criminal cases that are directly related to receipt of health care or payment for health care, or action involving a fraudulent claim related to health, the FBI may provide the information. Otherwise, the OIG may obtain permission from the court to use the information in its criminal cases.

(U) As discussed at more length in our October 5, 2011 Memorandum to ODAG (Attachment A), psychotherapy notes and substance abuse patient medical records also have very stringent protections on confidentiality. See also 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.3, 2.13, 2.22 and 42 C.F.R. Chapter 1, subchapter A, Part 7, 45 C.F.R. 164-209(b). In some instances, however, such information may also be disclosed pursuant to a court order for OIG criminal cases. See e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 2.10(b)(2).

(U) In sum, if the OIG requests materials for its criminal cases that contain individually identifiable patient medical information, the disclosure of such information must comport with these statutory restrictions.

F. (U) Credit Information Obtained for Counterintelligence Purposes

(U) Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the FBI may obtain names of financial institutions with which the consumer maintains or has maintained an account or consumer identifying information for counterintelligence purposes. See 15 U.S.C. §1681a(a) & (b). The FBI, however, "may not disseminate information obtained pursuant to this section outside of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, except to other Federal agencies as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation or, where the information concerns a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to appropriate investigative authorities within the military department concerned or as may be necessary for the conduct of a joint foreign counterintelligence investigation." 15 U.S.C. §1681a(f). Where the Deputy Attorney General determines that OIG access in a particular case is necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation, the FBI may provide such access. We are aware of at least one instance where ODAG made such a determination with respect to a non-criminal OIG matter (See Ltr. from DAG Cole to Acting IG Schmidt (undated) at Attachment D). Thus, in an OIG criminal investigation the OIG may seek access to such information from ODAG if the statutory required basis can be established.

G. (U) ESA Information

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL

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UNCLASSIFIED WITH REDACTIONS
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL.

I. (U) FISA-acquired electronic surveillance and physical search provisions

II. (U) FISA-acquired tangible things of a United States Person

III. (U) Intelligence Community Information

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
SECRETARY FORM
(7) While the statutory definition of "agency" may be broad enough to encompass the entirety of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), see 5 U.S.C. § 1000(1), such a reading in the context of Section 4.10(i) would mean
that, whenever the FBI receives classified intelligence information from another U.S. government agency, the
information would effectively be deemed to have been "made available" to every component of DOJ, to include the
DOJ, the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshal's Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, among others. Such a presumption does not comport with the ordinary opacification within the
government's intelligence information-sharing environment.

8
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
--SECRET--
93
I. Foreign Government or International Organization Information

II. Information Subject to Memoranda of Understanding or Non-Disclosure

(U) The FBI often obtains information or access to databases through Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or non-disclosure agreements (NDA) with other federal, state, or local agencies, from foreign governments, and from private parties. These MOUs or NDAs may, depending on their terms, impose restrictions on the FBI sharing information with entities outside the FBI, including the OIG. If such information was provided to the FBI in a manner that precludes dissemination to the OIG for its criminal cases, the FBI could work with the entity that provided the information to the FBI to reach agreement on providing the information to the OIG. In addition, going forward, the FBI can include in its MOUs explicit language permitting sharing with the DOJ OIG.

K. Information Restricted by Court Order

(U) The FBI occasionally comes into possession of information that is subject to a court order restricting dissemination to certain individuals or entities. The terms of the court order may not permit FBI dissemination to the OIG for a criminal investigation without prior authorization. In such cases, the FBI could request that the court grant access to the OIG for use in a criminal investigation.

III. Conclusion

(U) Even when the OIG is exercising its criminal investigative authority (rather than pursuing an administrative misconduct investigation, audit, inspection, or program review) some legal restrictions limit the FBI's ability to release information to the OIG. In most instances, however, the FBI can produce the requested information to the OIG for use in its criminal cases after the FBI or the OIG has followed the appropriate process for obtaining access. We look forward to working with your office to put into place procedures that will provide timely and complete OIG.
access to FBI information for all OIG nations, while maintaining appropriate controls to ensure compliance with legal restrictions on dissemination for certain categories of information, as described above.
ATTACHMENT 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

IN RE MATTERS OCCURRING
BEFORE THE GRAND JURY
IMPANELED JULY 16, 1996

MOTION FOR ORDER PERMITTING DISCLOSURE
OF MATTERS OCCURRING BEFORE THE GRAND JURY

The United States of America moves this Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(c)(3)(A)(ii), for an order authorizing the disclosure of certain matters
occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02, to attorneys, investigators, and supervisory personnel

In support of this motion, the United States represents as follows:

1. The OIG is conducting an investigation concerning the conduct of a Federal
   Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent, including a review of certain conduct by the Special
   Agent in appearances before Grand Jury No. 96-02.

2. The OIG has jurisdiction to investigate allegations of professional misconduct
   by Department of Justice employees, including, under certain circumstances which are applicable
   here, FBI employees.

3. To perform its supervisory and oversight duties of evaluating the propriety of
   the Special Agent's conduct before the grand jury and to report its findings to the appropriate
   authorizes, the OIG requires access to certain transcripts of proceedings and exhibits before
   Grand Jury No. 96-02. Disclosure of such matters is proper pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
   6(c)(3)(A)(ii).
4. Disclosure to the OIG of the requested grand jury materials may be the only visible method to enable the OIG to perform its oversight duty to ensure that the integrity of proceedings and conduct before the grand jury is preserved.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above and for such further reasons as are set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the United States requests that this Court issue an order authorizing disclosure of certain matters occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02 to attorneys, investigators, and supervisory personnel of the OIG.

Respectfully submitted,

BILL LAND LEE
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

KEVIN FORD
Trial Attorney, Criminal Section
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
601 D St., NW, RM. 5532
Washington, D.C. 20530
202-514-4164
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
ORDER PERMITTING DISCLOSURE
OF MATTERS OCCURRING BEFORE THE GRAND JURY

The United States has received a request from the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG), Department of Justice, for access to transcripts of certain proceedings and other materials
occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02 of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma. The OIG is investigating allegations of misconduct involving a Special
Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which in part involve purported misconduct
before Grand Jury No. 96-02.

Under Department of Justice regulations, the OIG is responsible for reviewing
allegations of misconduct against Department employees, including FBI employees when so
directed by the Deputy Attorney General. The Deputy Attorney General has directed the OIG to
investigate allegations of misconduct made against FBI employees in connection with matters that
include their conduct in proceedings before Grand Jury No. 96-02.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(d)(3)(A)(i), a court order authorizing disclosure of
grand jury materials to the OIG may not be necessary as a prerequisite to OIG personnel gaining
access to grand jury material pertinent to matters that it is reviewing. Instead, because the OIG is
exercising supervisory and oversight functions with respect to the conduct of investigators who
appear before the grand jury, disclosure of the pertinent grand jury materials to the OIG would be
proper pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(d)(3)(A)(i), which permits disclosure to "an attorney for the
government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty[,] without the need for a court
order. If there has been misconduct before a grand jury, a review of grand jury materials by the
OIG is essential to ensure the integrity of the grand jury proceedings.

Nevertheless, in the face of some of the broad language in United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983), that "disclosure to attorneys other than prosecutors [must] be judicially supervised rather than automated," Id., the United States believes that the most cautious and prudent procedure would be to obtain a court order authorizing disclosure pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i). The Sells opinion recognizes that disclosure of grand jury materials can be made to persons who are not necessarily "prosecutors," such as a "supervisor" and members of the "prosecution team," id. at 429, n.14, but who are nevertheless indispensable to an effective criminal law enforcement effort. To perform properly their oversight role, supervisors must be able to review grand jury materials for the purpose of determining whether prosecutors or investigators have engaged in misconduct before the grand jury.

Otherwise, the alleged misconduct, if it existed, could go unchecked, thereby subverting the workings of the criminal justice system. For this reason, it is appropriate for the OIG, as a delegate of the Attorney General for purposes of overseeing and advising with respect to the ethical conduct of Department of Justice employees, to review grand jury materials and make recommendations to the Attorney General or other supervisor regarding conduct in particular cases.

In addition, the order as sought here does not implicate the policy concerns addressed by the Court in Sells. The grand jury material sought by the OIG is not being obtained in furtherance of any civil investigation of the subjects of the grand jury inquiry, but rather to review certain conduct of a Department employee before and in relation to the grand jury proceedings. Without this disclosure, there may be no way for administrative action to be taken against Department employees who commit misconduct in the grand jury.

For the foregoing reasons, the United States urges the Court to enter an order authorizing disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury that are relevant to the OIG's investigation of misconduct to personnel of the OIG. Such personnel will be advised of their
responsibilities to protect grand jury materials in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(B).

Respectfully submitted,

BILL LAND LEE
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

KEVIN FORDER
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
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601 D St., N.W., Rm. 5532
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(202) 307-3600
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

IN THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS: MISC. NO. 95-02

AFFIDAVIT OF INSPECTOR GENERAL MICHAEL R. BRUMWICH

I, Michael R. Bromwich, do hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am Inspector General of the Department of Justice, and I am an attorney authorized to practice law on behalf of the Department. The Office of the Inspector General is responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct made against Department of Justice employees, including employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation when so directed by the Deputy Attorney General. On October 5, 1997, the Deputy Attorney General directed the OIG to investigate allegations of misconduct made against FBI and other Department employees for their conduct following the death of Kenneth Trentadue.

2. The OIG has received allegations that an FBI Special Agent may have testified falsely before the grand jury that was investigating the death of Kenneth Trentadue. Obtaining grand jury materials relating to the conduct of the FBI Special Agent before the grand jury is essential if the OIG is to properly evaluate the merits of the allegation.

3. The OIG and the Office of Professional Responsibility, two of the Department entities responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct against Department employees, have received grand jury materials in other matters pursuant to their responsibilities to investigate misconduct. In 1984, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion
on behalf of the Department stating that the limitations set by the Supreme Court in *United States v. Salis Engineering, Inc.*, 463 U.S. 418 (1983), did not apply to disclosure to Department ethics offices in the conduct of their official duties. On the basis of that opinion, the OIG and OPM have, in appropriate cases, sought access to grand jury materials in investigations of misconduct before the grand jury. In all matters within my knowledge in which requests for disclosure have been submitted to them, the courts have granted access to the materials.

4. Personnel of the OIG are aware of their responsibility to safeguard grand jury material pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) and will conduct themselves accordingly.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

June 3, 1998

Michael E. Brown
Inspector General
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

IN RE MATTERS OCCURRING
BEFORE THE GRAND JURY
IMpaneled JULY 16, 1996
MISCELLANEOUS #39

ORDER

Upon the Motion of the United States Attorney for the Western District of
Oklahoma for the issuance of an Order pursuant to Rule 6(c)(3)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Motion and Memorandum
of Points and Authorities, the Court finds that the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) investigation of alleged misconduct before the grand jury is supervisory in nature
with respect to ethical conduct of Department employees, including a Special Agent of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Accordingly, disclosure of grand jury materials to the OIG
constitutes disclosure to "an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that appropriate personnel in the Office of
the Inspector General may be granted access to matters occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02 in
connection with an OIG investigation of alleged misconduct by an FBI Special Agent in
proceedings before that grand jury.

DAVID L. RUSSELL
Chief United States District Judge
The United States of America moves this Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(A)(i), for an order authorizing the disclosure of matters occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02, to attorneys, investigators, and supervisory personnel of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice.

In support of this motion, the United States represents as follows:

1. The OIG is conducting an investigation concerning the conduct of employees of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) following the death of Kenneth Michael Trentadue, who was an inmate in the custody of the BOP at the time of his death. The OIG investigation includes a review of the conduct of BOP and FBI employees in appearances before Grand Jury No. 96-02.

2. The OIG has jurisdiction to investigate allegations of misconduct by Department of Justice employees, including BOP employees and, under certain circumstances that are applicable here, FBI employees.

3. To perform the OIG’s supervisory and oversight duties of evaluating the conduct of the BOP and FBI employees in their testimony before the grand jury and in interviews to law enforcement.
enforcement officers and to report the OIG's findings to the appropriate authorities, the OIG requires access to the transcripts of proceedings and exhibits before Grand Jury No. 96-02. Disclosure of such matters is proper pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i).

4. On June 4, 1998, this Court granted the OIG's request for access to a limited portion of the grand jury materials in order to facilitate the investigation of possible misconduct by an FBI Special Agent. Since that time, the OIG has obtained evidence that has broadened its inquiry -- evidence that BOP employees may have committed misconduct by testifying falsely in the grand jury or in interviews to law enforcement agents. Accordingly, the original basis for this Court's granting the OIG access to a portion of the grand jury record -- facilitating an investigation into allegations of grand jury misconduct -- now supports this Court's granting the OIG access to all testimony and exhibits before the grand jury. Such disclosure will permit the OIG to investigate thoroughly allegations against the BOP employees. In addition, the OIG needs access to all grand jury testimony and exhibits because the OIG has been unable to obtain all of the documents to which the OIG believes it is entitled pursuant to the Court's previous order.

5. The OIG has presented a compelling basis for concluding that disclosure to the OIG of the requested grand jury materials may be the only viable method to enable the OIG to perform its responsibility to ensure that the integrity of proceedings and conduct before the grand jury are properly overseen and
protected.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above and for such further reasons as are set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the United States requests that this Court issue an order authorizing disclosure of all matters occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02 to certain attorneys, investigators, and supervisory personnel of the OIG.

Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]

John M. West
Acting Chief, Criminal Section
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
601 D St., NW, Rm. 5532
Washington, D.C. 20530
202-514-3904
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
ORDER PERMITTING DISCLOSURE
OF MATTERS OCCURRING BEFORE THE GRAND JURY

The United States has received a request from the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG), Department of Justice, for access to
transcripts of proceedings and other materials occurring before
Grand Jury No. 96-02 of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma. The OIG is investigating
allegations of misconduct involving employees of the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
which in part involve purported misconduct before Grand Jury No.
96-02.

Under Department of Justice regulations, the OIG is
responsible for reviewing allegations of misconduct against
Department employees, including BOP employees and, when so
directed by the Deputy Attorney General, FBI employees. The
Deputy Attorney General has directed the OIG to investigate
allegations of misconduct made against FBI employees in
connection with matters that include their conduct in proceedings
before Grand Jury No. 96-02.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i), a court order
authorizing disclosure of grand jury materials to the OIG may not
be necessary as a prerequisite to OIG personnel gaining access to
grand jury material pertinent to matters that it is reviewing.
Instead, because the OIG is exercising supervisory and oversight functions with respect to the conduct of Department employees who appear before the grand jury, disclosure of the pertinent grand jury materials to the OIG would be proper pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i), which permits disclosure to "an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty[.]," without the need for a court order. If there has been misconduct before a grand jury, a review of grand jury materials by the OIG is essential to ensure the integrity of the grand jury proceedings.

Nevertheless, in the face of some of the broad language in United States v. Geils Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983), that "disclosure to attorneys other than prosecutors [must] be judicially supervised rather than automatic[,]" Id., the United States believes that the most cautious and prudent procedure is to obtain a court order authorizing disclosure pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i). The Geils opinion recognizes that disclosure of grand jury materials can be made to persons who are not necessarily "prosecutors," such as a "supervisor" and members of the "prosecution team," Id. at 429, n.11, but who are nevertheless indispensable to an effective criminal law enforcement effort. To perform properly their oversight role, supervisors must be able to review grand jury materials for the purpose of determining whether prosecutors, investigators, or other witnesses have engaged in misconduct before the grand jury. Otherwise, the alleged misconduct, if it existed, could go unchecked, thereby subverting the workings of the criminal
justice system. For this reason, it is appropriate for the OIG, as a delegate of the Attorney General for purposes of overseeing and advising with respect to the ethical conduct of Department of Justice employees, to review grand jury materials and make recommendations to the Attorney General or other supervisor regarding conduct in particular cases.

In addition, the order sought here does not implicate the policy concerns addressed by the Court in *Sellers*. The grand jury material sought by the OIG is not being obtained in furtherance of any civil investigation of the subjects of the grand jury inquiry, but rather to review certain conduct of Department employees before and in relation to the grand jury proceedings. Without this disclosure, there may be no way for administrative action to be taken against Department employees who commit misconduct in the grand jury.

The United States, on behalf of the OIG, previously moved the Court to grant the OIG access to a limited portion of the grand jury materials in order to facilitate the OIG's investigation of possible grand jury misconduct by an FBI Special Agent. Based on the reasoning set forth above, the Court granted the United States' request on June 4, 1998. However, the OIG believes that it has not obtained access to all the relevant documents pertaining to misconduct by the FBI agent. Accordingly, the OIG needs complete access to the FBI documents and files in order to ensure that all relevant documents have been disclosed.
In addition, the OIG has obtained evidence that has broadened its inquiry -- evidence that BOP employees may have committed misconduct by testifying falsely in the grand jury or in interviews to law enforcement agents. Accordingly, the original basis for this Court's granting the OIG access to a portion of the grand jury record -- facilitating an investigation into allegations of grand jury misconduct -- now supports this Court's granting the OIG access to all testimony and exhibits before the grand jury. Such disclosure will permit the OIG to investigate thoroughly allegations against the BOP employees. In addition, the OIG needs access to all grand jury testimony and exhibits because the OIG has been unable to obtain all of the documents to which the OIG believes it is entitled pursuant to the Court’s previous order.

For the foregoing reasons, the United States urges the Court to enter an order authorizing disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury to OIG personnel. Such personnel will be advised of their responsibilities to protect grand jury materials in accordance with Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(B).

Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]

John W. Warden
Acting Chief, Criminal Section
Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
600 12th St., NW, Rm. 5532
Washington, D.C. 20530
202-514-3164
ABJIDAVITY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, MICHAEL R. BROWNEICH

I, Michael R. Bromwich, do hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am Inspector General of the Department of Justice.

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct made against Department of Justice employees, including employees of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and, when so directed by the Deputy Attorney General, employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

On October 3, 1997, the Deputy Attorney General directed the OIG to investigate allegations of misconduct made against FBI and BOP employees for their conduct following the death of Kenneth Trentadue. The OIG investigative team consists of attorneys and investigators.

2. The OIG has obtained evidence indicating that several BOP employees made false statements during interviews with the OIG, or to other law enforcement investigators, concerning matters that we believe would have also been the subject of
questioning in the grand jury. Consequently, the OIG has
broadened its inquiry to determine whether these individuals
committed perjury before the grand jury. By obtaining grand jury
materials relevant to these issues, the OIG will be in a position
to (1) determine whether employees testified falsely before the
grand jury, and (2) evaluate the full extent of employee false
statements to investigative agencies at various stages of the
inquiry. Providing the OIG with the grand jury testimony will
complete the OIG's access to the universe of relevant information
and afford the OIG the opportunity for a full and complete
assessment of employee misconduct. Such an evaluation requires
reviewing the employees' grand jury transcripts, the transcripts
of other witnesses who may have testified about relevant issues,
and documents that pertain to these issues.

3. Access to the complete grand jury record is also needed
in order to implement this Court's previous order. On June 4,
1996, this Court granted a request made by the United States on
behalf of the OIG to obtain access to a limited portion of the
grand jury materials in order to investigate possible misconduct
by an FBI Special Agent during grand jury proceedings. Over two
months after the Court's order and after repeated requests to the
FBI for relevant documents, the OIG finally received a document
that bears heavily on the question of whether the Special Agent
committed misconduct. Because the OIG has only been provided limited access to grand jury materials, the OIG investigators have not been able to review the complete and unredacted FBI files to find pertinent evidence but instead must rely on the FBI's interpretation of what should be disclosed under the Court's order. To date, this system has not resulted in the timely disclosure of relevant documents. Accordingly, I believe that the only means to ensure that the OIG obtains all documents relevant to the issue of possible misconduct by FBI employees is for the OIG to have unfettered and unfiltered access to all of the grand jury materials and the FBI records.

4. The OIG and the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), two of the Department entities responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct against Department employees, have received grand jury material in other matters pursuant to their responsibilities to investigate misconduct. In 1984, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion on behalf of the Department stating that the limitations set by the Supreme Court in United States v. Salle Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983), did not apply to disclosure to Department ethics offices in the conduct of their official duties. On the basis of that opinion, the OIG and OPR have, in appropriate cases, sought access to grand jury materials in
investigations of misconduct before the grand jury. In all
matters within my knowledge in which requests for disclosure have
been submitted to them, the courts have granted access to the
materials.

4. Personnel of the OIG are aware of their responsibility
to safeguard grand jury material pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e) and will conduct themselves accordingly.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
ture and correct.

November 23, 1998

Michael R. Bromwich
Inspector General
ORDER

Upon the Motion of the United States for the issuance of an Order pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Court finds that the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) investigation of alleged misconduct before the grand jury is supervisory in nature with respect to ethical conduct of Department employees. Accordingly, disclosure of grand jury materials to the OIG constitutes disclosure to "an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty[.]") Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i).

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that appropriate personnel in the OIG may be granted access to matters occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02 in connection with an OIG investigation of alleged misconduct by Department of Justice employees in proceedings before that grand jury.

[Signature]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

IN MATTERS OCCURRING
BEFORE THE GRAND JURY
IMpaneled JULY 16, 1996

MOTION FOR ORDER PERMITTING DISCLOSURE
OF MATTERS OCCURRING BEFORE THE GRAND JURY

The United States of America moves this Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e)(3)(A)(i), for an order authorizing the disclosure of certain matters occurring before
Grand Jury No. 96-02, to certain personnel of the Department of Justice (Department).

In support of this motion, the United States represents as follows:

1. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice has conducted an
   investigation concerning the conduct of employees of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the Federal
   Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding events surrounding the death of Kenneth Michael Trevasche,
   who was an inmate in the custody of the BOP at the time of his death. The OIG investigation
   includes a review of the conduct of BOP and FBI employees in appearance before Grand Jury
   No. 96-02.

2. In order to facilitate this investigation, this Court, by Orders dated June 4, 1998 and
   December 8, 1998, granted OIG attorneys, investigators, and supervisory access to matters occurring
   before Grand Jury No. 96-02 (Orders attached as Exhibit 1). The Court reasoned that the OIG’s
   investigation is “supervisory in nature with respect to ethical conduct of Department employees,”
   and that accordingly, disclosure to the OIG constituted a disclosure to “an attorney for the
   government for use in the performance of such attorney’s duty” under Federal Rule of Criminal
3. The OIG will soon complete a report containing its findings. This report will necessarily rely upon and contain excerpts from certain grand jury material. It will also contain recommendations that certain Department of Justice (Department) employees be punished for their actions in connection with the Tweeniades matter, including for their testimony before the grand jury.

4. The OIG does not have the power to impose such action against non-OIG employees. Therefore, in order for the OIG's recommendations to be considered and for any ensuing action to be imposed, the OIG's report and the pertinent underlying grand jury material must be shared with others in the Department. Accordingly, the OIG requests this Court extend its earlier orders to permit such disclosure. Disclosure of this grand jury material to these Department personnel is proper pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(X).

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above and for such further reasons as are set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Affidavit of Acting Inspector General Robert L. Ashbaugh, the United States requests this Court issue an order authorizing disclosure of the OIG's report and the pertinent underlying grand jury material to those Department personnel necessary for the OIG's recommendations to be carried out.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL O. WEBBER, JR.
United States Attorney

[Signature]
KIRBY B. MILLER
Assistant United States Attorney
210 W. Park Ave., Suite 400
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

IN RE MATTERS OCCURRING
BEFORE THE GRAND JURY
IMpaneled JULY 16, 1996

} ) MISCELLANEOUS #39

O R D E R

Upon the Motion of the United States Attorney for the Western District of
Oklahoma for the issuance of an Order pursuant to Rule 6(e)(2)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Motion and Memorandum
of Points and Authorities, the Court finds that the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) investigation of alleged misconduct before the grand jury is supervisory in nature
with respect to ethical conduct of Department employees, including a Special Agent of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Accordingly, disclosure of grand jury materials to the OIG
constitutes disclosure to "an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that appropriate personnel in the Office of
the Inspector General may be granted access to matters occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02 in
connection with an OIG investigation of alleged misconduct by an FBI Special Agent in
proceedings before that grand jury.

DAVID E. RUSSELL
United States District Judge

[Signature]
Upon the Motion of the United States Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma for the issuance of an Order pursuant to Rule 6(e)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Court finds that by orders dated June 4, 1998 and December 8, 1998, this Court granted the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") access to grand jury material for the purpose of conducting a supervisory investigation of alleged misconduct by Department of Justice (Department) personnel before the grand jury. The OIG is finalizing a report of that investigation, which will necessarily contain excerpts from the grand jury material and which will also contain recommendations that certain Department employees be sanctioned. In order for the Department to consider the OIG’s recommendations and to impose any resulting sanctions, appropriate Department personnel must have access to the OIG report and the underlying grand jury material. Because in taking such actions, these Department personnel would be engaged in a supervisory function, disclosure of grand jury materials to them constitutes disclosure to "an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty." Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(1)(A)(i).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that appropriate personnel in the United States Department of Justice may be granted access to matters occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02 in connection with instituting and carrying out any action against Department personnel that may result from the OIG's report.

DAVID L. RUSSELL
Chief United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
ORDER PERMITTING DISCLOSURE
OF MATTERS OCCURRING BEFORE THE GRAND JURY

By orders dated June 4, 1996 and December 8, 1996, this Court granted attorneys,
investigators, and supervisors employed by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the United
States Department of Justice access to matters occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02. The purpose
of the disclosure was to enable the OIG to conduct an investigation into the conduct of certain
employees of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding
events surrounding the death of Kenneth Michael Trentadue, who was an inmate in the custody of
the BOP at the time of his death. The OIG investigation includes a review of the conduct of BOP
and FBI employees in appearances before Grand Jury No. 96-02. In granting the OIG's request for
access to the grand jury materials, the Court reasoned that the OIG's investigation is "supervisory
in nature with respect to ethical conduct of Department employees," and that accordingly, disclosure
to the OIG constitutes a disclosure to "an attorney for the government for use in the performance of
such attorney's duty" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(A)(i).

The OIG's investigation is now complete and the OIG will soon finalize a report containing
its findings. This report will necessarily rely upon and contain excerpts from grand jury material.
The report will also contain recommendations that certain Department of Justice (Department) employees be punished for their actions in connection with the Treadstone matter, including for their testimony before the grand jury.

The OIG does not have the authority to take action against non-OIG employees. Therefore, in order for the OIG's recommendations to receive proper consideration and for any ensuing action to be taken, the report and the underlying grand jury material must be shared with the appropriate Department personnel. Accordingly, the OIG requests this Court extend its earlier orders to permit such disclosure.

As was the case with respect to the earlier orders permitting OIG access, a court order authorizing disclosure of grand jury materials to those Department personnel who can take action based on the OIG's report may not be required. Instead, because these individuals would be given access in connection with the exercise of a supervisory function regarding the conduct of Department personnel who appeared before the grand jury, disclosure of the pertinent grand jury materials to them would be proper pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii), which permits disclosure to "an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty," without the need for a court order. Permitting the appropriate Department personnel access to the OIG's report and the pertinent underlying grand jury material is essential to ensuring that any grand jury misconduct that may have occurred is appropriately punished.

As was the case with allowing access to the OIG, however, the broad statement in United
States v. Sellers Engineering Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983), that "disclosure to attorneys other than prosecutors [must] be judicially supervised rather than automatic," id., leads the United States to believe that the most cautious and prudent procedure is to obtain a court order authorizing disclosure pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i). Accordingly, the United States seeks an extension of this Court's June 4, and December 8, 1998 orders to allow the OIG report and the pertinent underlying grand jury material to be shared with those Department personnel necessary for the OIG's recommendations to be carried out.

The Supreme Court recognized that disclosure of grand jury materials can be made to persons who are not necessarily "prosecutors," such as a "supervisor" and members of the "prosecution team," id. at 429, n.11, but who are nevertheless indispensable to an effective criminal law enforcement effort. To perform properly their oversight role, supervisors must be able to review grand jury materials for the purpose of determining whether government personnel have engaged in misconduct before the grand jury. Otherwise, the alleged misconduct, if it existed, could go unchekced, thereby subverting the workings of the criminal justice system.

For this reason, this Court found it appropriate for the OIG to review the matters occurring before Grand Jury No. 96-02, and make recommendations based on that review. For the same reason, it is appropriate that Department personnel necessary to carry out those recommendations have access to the fruits of the OIG's labor. Indeed, without this additional limited disclosure, the original purpose of allowing the OIG access to the grand jury material would be largely frustrated.
An investigation would have been conducted, but any appropriate sanctions could not be imposed.

For the foregoing reasons, the United States urges the Court to enter an order authorizing disclosure of OIG's report and the pertinent underlying grand jury material to those Department personnel necessary to institute and carry out any appropriate sanctions against the Department employees whose conduct is the subject of the report. Such personnel will be advised of their responsibilities to protect grand jury materials in accordance with Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(d)(3)(A)(i).

Respectfully submitted,

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In re Matters Occurring
Before the Grand Jury
Impaneled July 16, 1996

Miscellaneous # 39

Affidavit of Acting Inspector General, Robert L. Ashbaugh

I, Robert Ashbaugh, do hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am Acting Inspector General of the United States Department of Justice. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct made against Department of Justice employees, including employees of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and, when so directed by the Deputy Attorney General, employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). On October 3, 1997, the Deputy Attorney General directed the OIG to investigate allegations of misconduct made against FBI and BOP employees for their conduct regarding the events surrounding the death of Kenneth Trentadue.

2. The OIG's investigation has been completed and the OIG will soon finalize a report of its findings. This report will necessarily contain excerpts from grand jury material. The report will also contain recommendations that certain Department of Justice (Department) employees be punished for their conduct related to the Trentadue matter, including for their testimony before the grand jury.

3. The OIG has no power to take action against non-OIG employees. Such authority lies with other Department personnel. Accordingly, in order for the OIG's recommendations to be given proper consideration and for any ensuing sanctions to be imposed, the OIG's report and the underlying grand jury materials must be shared with the appropriate Department personnel. Without this additional limited disclosure, the original purpose of allowing the OIG access to the
grand jury material would be largely frustrated. An investigation would have been conducted,
but any appropriate sanctions could not be imposed.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

November 28, 1999

Robert L. Ashborough
Acting Inspector General
Material submitted by the Honorable Spencer Bachus, a Representative in Congress from the State of Alabama

**The New York Times**  
http://nyti.ms/1iA2stQW

**U.S.**

**Program Benefiting Some Immigrants Extends Visa Wait for Others**

By JULIA PRESTON  
FEB 6, 2014

Many thousands of Americans seeking green cards for foreign spouses or other immediate relatives have been separated from them for a year or more because of swelling bureaucratic delays at a federal immigration agency in recent months.

The long waits came when the agency, Citizenship and Immigration Services, shifted attention and resources to a program President Obama started in 2012 to give deportation deferrals to young undocumented immigrants, according to administration officials and official data.

The trouble that American citizens have faced gaining permanent resident visas for their families raises questions about the agency’s priorities and its readiness to handle what could become a far bigger task. After Speaker John A. Boehner of Ohio said on Thursday that the House was not likely to act on an immigration overhaul this year, immigrant advocates are turning up their pressure on Mr. Obama to expand the deferral program to include many more of the 11.7 million immigrants in the country illegally.

Andrew Bachert is one citizen caught in the slowdown. After he moved back to this country in August for work, he thought he and his wife, who is Australian, would be settled by now in a new home in New York State, shoveling snow and adjusting to the winter chill. Instead his wife, Debra Bachert, is stranded, along with the couple’s two teenagers and two dogs, in a hastily rented house in Adelaide, where the temperature rose in January to 115 degrees.
At issue ends, Mr. Bachert, 48, spent Halloween and Thanksgiving without his wife and children, and he opened his Christmas presents for them himself — on a Skype call so at least they could see what he had gotten for them.

"I'm sitting over here on my own, and it's unbearably hard," Mr. Bachert said. At the current pace, Mrs. Bachert will probably not travel to the United States before August.

Until recently, an American could obtain a green card for a spouse, child or parent — probably the easiest document in the immigration system — in five months or less. But over the past year, waits for approvals of those resident visas stretched to 15 months, and more than 500,000 applications became stuck in the pipeline, playing havoc with international moves and children’s schools and keeping families apart.

"U.S. citizens petitioning for green cards for immediate relatives are a high, if not the highest, priority in the way Congress set up the immigration system," said Gregory Chen, director of advocacy for the American Immigration Lawyers Association, the national bar association. "This is a problem that needs to be fixed quickly."

Many Americans are awaiting visas for spouses they recently wed, including Mukul Varma, 31, a naturalized citizen who works as a software consultant near Chicago. On a trip to India to visit relatives, he fell in love with Neetika Gupta, 26, also a software engineer. They married in India in May.

"To be honest with you," Mr. Varma said, "because I was a U.S. citizen I thought it would not be an issue to get a visa for my wife. I didn't put any thought into it."

In mid-January Mr. Varma flew back to India to see his bride for the first time in nine months. He applied for her green card soon after the wedding, and since then it has not advanced. Their plans to start their life together in this country are in disarray.

"First it was surprise," Mr. Varma said. "Then dismay. Then it just becomes very discouraging. You feel helpless. You feel as if you did things the right way and you are penalized for it."
Christopher S. Bentley, a Citizenship and Immigration Services spokesman, said the agency had seen "a temporary increase in processing times" for the citizens' green card applications because of the deferrals program and "the standard ebb and flow" of visas.

Last year, officials said, the agency detected the problem and tried to speed up the green cards by spreading them out to three processing centers. In November, the agency reported it had reduced waits to 10 months, calling that a "significant step forward." Officials said they hoped to reduce waits to five months, but not before this summer.

Because there are no annual limits on green cards for citizens' immediate relatives, there are no systemic backlogs. But initial approvals are centralized at the immigration agency in the United States. After that step, generally the longest, the visas must also pass through the State Department and foreign consulates. The law prohibits foreigners who want to become residents from entering as tourists while their documents are in process.

After Mr. Obama announced the deferral program, known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, in 2012, he gave Citizenship and Immigration Services only two months to get it running. Agency officials scrambled. As of last week, 521,815 youths had received deferrals, with the agency handling more than 2,000 applications a day.

The agency drew rare praise from immigrants and advocates for the efficiency of the program, which is highly popular among Latinos. It has been widely regarded as a successful dress rehearsal for a larger legalization.

But soon after the deferrals were underway, Americans with green card applications felt the impact.

"You end up seeing a steep decline in approvals for people like me who followed the law," said Forrest Nabora, 47, a political science professor at the University of Alaska in Anchorage, who filed in July for a green card for his wife, Zdenka, who is Czech.

An immigration service center near Kansas City assigned to handle both the green card applications and many of the deferrals was rapidly
overwhelmed, officials said. But although the agency is financed by fees and does not depend on congressional appropriations, no new employees were brought on at that center, because of “unanticipated hiring difficulties,” officials said, without elaborating.

For some families, prolonged separations have been especially hard on children. Jessica Velstra, 32, applied in March for a green card for her husband of eight years, Andre, 41, who is Dutch. But he is still in the Netherlands, and she is rooming with relatives in New Jersey, unable to make plans.

Their older daughter, who is 4, refuses to speak to her father on the phone in Dutch, her first language, and bursts out crying when she sees a photo of him.

“My husband has done nothing wrong,” Ms. Velstra said. “But they can do whatever they want because they have your spouse basically hostage.”

Mr. Bachert was so certain he would see his family soon when he left Australia last summer that his children, both American citizens, did not go to the airport to see him off. He had little doubt his wife would qualify: They have been married for 17 years, and she had a green card once before, when Mr. Bachert, who works with electric utilities, had an earlier job in the United States. But the document expired, and she could not renew it when they were living in Australia.

Some lawyers urged Mrs. Bachert to come as a tourist to join her husband. After deliberating for two sleepless weeks, she said, she decided she would rather hide her time apart than lie to American customs officials about her intentions to remain in the United States.

Mr. Bachert, who will eventually work in upstate New York but is camped out in a temporary apartment near his company’s headquarters in Hartford, said his lowest moment had been a frantic phone call from his wife. Their son was in a hospital heading for emergency surgery after shattering his forearm and wrist in a bicycle fall. Two months later, Mr. Bachert shuddered to recall the episode, although his son’s bones have healed. “No parent,” he said, “should be separated from their family in periods such as that.”
Will DREAM be a nightmare?

There is little disagreement that our current system of immigration is outdated and cumbersome. For example, we have arbitrary caps and categories, lengthy backlogs on visas and citizenship applications, and a process that remains difficult to navigate without legal assistance.

These structural and administrative failures create an incentive for illegal immigration. It is telling that many immigrants find that paying extravagant amounts of money to dangerous human smugglers is preferable to America's legal system of immigration.

Unfortunately, the number of immigrants, especially children, seeking the promise of illegal immigration is becoming an increasing problem, thanks in part to President Obama's refusal to enforce immigration laws with respect to “young people who were brought to the United States as young children.”

After legislators failed to enact the DREAM Act in the 112th Congress, President Obama initiated the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program in 2012. He did not believe an executive order or White House memorandum was sufficient. He is, instead, working with Congress to come up with a comprehensive immigration reform bill. The Obama Administration's proposed a bill that would provide a pathway to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants who meet certain requirements.

President Obama's bill includes a provision to end DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and lawfully admitted immigrants). The administration has been working on legislation that would allow children of undocumented immigrants to obtain legal status if they meet certain requirements. The bill also includes a pathway to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants who entered the United States as children and are now adults.

Americans should reject the false choice that Congress must either pass comprehensive immigration reform or do nothing at all. Smaller, incremental efforts, such as a DAPA-like bill, are necessary to address the needs of unauthorized immigrants in a more humane and effective manner. The DAPA program, as it currently stands, is a step in the right direction.

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