
[Our corrections to the factual errors in this report are interspersed in the text below. If the Committee would like us to clarify or expand upon any of the points we have made, we would be happy to do so.]

By public law and its own tradition, the Historical Advisory Committee of the Department of State has two principal responsibilities. One is to oversee the preparation and timely publication of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, the series which provides the American people with an honest record of the foreign relations of this country. The other responsibility is to facilitate public access to records that are 25 years or older from the date of issue.

The first of these responsibilities is mandated by the Foreign Relations Statute of 1991, which calls for a complete, accurate, and reliable [NOTE: This is incorrect—the law refers to “thorough, accurate, and reliable”] documentary record of United States foreign policy. This strong language was the result [of] the intense public controversy that surrounded the publication of [two particular] FRUS [ital.] volumes in the early 1990s concerning Iran and Central America, [NOTE: This is incorrect—one of the volumes was published in 1983, and the other in 1989. FYI: Iran was a separate volume covering 1952–1954; the Guatemala coup was covered in a regional volume.] which omitted records relating to covert operations undertaken in those countries during the 1950s. The Historical Advisory Committee recognizes that this mandate of completeness [NOTE: Again, the language of the law refers to “thoroughness”], accuracy, and reliability, which it believes that the Office of the Historian has followed faithfully, makes the compilation of the historical record an exceptionally complex task, as it does the oversight of this responsibility by the committee.

The second statutory obligation is imposed by [is to monitor and advise on the declassification and opening of the Department’s records, which in large measure involves the Department’s implementation of] an Executive Order on classification [and declassification] of government records (E.O. 12958) issued in 1995, [amended by E.O. 13292] which schedules [mandates] the declassification of records over 25 years old—unless valid and significant reasons can be specified for not releasing them. [NOTE: As drafted, the statement is inaccurate; emendations correct the text.] Something of the magnitude of this unprecedented order can be comprehended by noting that some 44 million pages, or 14 percent of the National Archives holdings of classified material, were declassified in bulk—records ranging from the end of World War II to the 1970s. [NOTE: The text of the report is rather unbalanced. While full coverage is given to the *Foreign Relations* series, only these two sentences are devoted to this other important area of the Committee’s responsibilities. During
2007, in fact, the Committee members devoted a significant amount of time to such matters, and engaged on a number of issues with the Department and NARA relating to this aspect of their statutory mandate. For example, we would suggest that the Committee include language that covers the following important topics:

- The Committee continued to monitor progress of the Department’s declassification and transfer of the Department’s paper—and especially electronic—records to NARA, and discussed issues relating to delays in opening these records to the public.

- The Committee received quarterly reports from IPS, which are usually summarized, or at least mentioned, in a qualitative way in the Committee’s annual report.

- The Committee worked closely with the Department’s records managers and the National Archives in a major initiative to identify, through the Department’s TAGS, those electronic records that could be determined to be non-permanent.

- The Committee engaged in extensive discussion with the National Archives relating to its National Declassification Initiative—to expedite reviews by other agencies with equities in Department records—and the limiting of reclassification of formerly open records at NARA. Such discussions included reports from Assistant Archivist Michael Kurtz.

The Historical Advisory Committee is now in its seventeenth year since the time of the landmark statute of 1991. While the committee believes the Office of the Historian has met the standards of completeness, [NOTE: this should be “thoroughness”] accuracy, and reliability imposed by statute, the committee is disappointed to report on a continuing and even growing backlog in meeting the 30-year requirement for the Foreign Relations [ital.] series. [NOTE: This is incorrect—the series is actually moving closer to the 30-year line than at any point in recent decades. A review of the publication schedule for the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations shows that volumes were published, on average, 33 years after the event. By cutting the delay down to 31 to 32 years—by the General Editor’s estimate—we are actually making progress toward reaching the 30-year line, rather than moving away from it.] Although there are many factors contributing to this backlog—among them ever-present concerns with balancing secrecy and the public’s right-to-know, chronic shortages of personnel and resources, [NOTE: We are rather puzzled by the reference to “chronic shortages of personnel and resources.” Since the Office moved several years ago to rebuild the shrunken Foreign Relations divisions—which had plummeted to just three compilers each by the beginning of 2001—the staffing level has been set at six compilers per FRUS division. Moreover, apart from normal attrition and turnover from retirements or a few people taking other jobs, the staffing level for FRUS divisions has been stable over the past several years. For more on this topic, see below.] and even recent presidential directives – the committee
believes that the [Office of the] Historian [NOTE: the report should not contain personal references, nor have previous reports contained personal references] must make a more concerted effort to address this problem of [NOTE: we suggest the following language for this section—meet the statutory 30-year publication deadline for] the FRUS [ital.] series in his decisions relating to the functioning of the Office. Despite past assurances that this problem would be addressed by 2010, the committee is now skeptical that the Office of the Historian will succeed in [it now appears that] meeting the 30-year requirement for the Foreign Relations [ital.] series within the next decade [is unlikely until the completion of the Reagan volumes (2018)]. The focus of the Historical Advisory committee continues to be upon bringing the series into full compliance with the law – that is, with ensuring the series meets the required 30-year timetable while continuing to provide to the American people a complete, [NOTE: Again, the phrasing in the law is “thorough, accurate, and reliable”] accurate, and reliable documentary record.

Publications of the Foreign Relations [ital.] Series


4) 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community (retrospective volume)


This was well below the Office’s stated goal and well below the production level necessary to make progress toward meeting the 30-year timeline. This failure was a considerable disappointment, and does not bring with it much encouragement for the future. [We find this comment a bit surprising, as the Committee has had access to the production charts throughout the year. Yes, 2007 was a slow publication year, largely for reasons outside our control. As indicated in the production charts, however, there is reason for optimism that in 2008 we will hit double digits in publication.]

[On a positive note, during 2007.] The Office of the Historian also published a volume, jointly produced with the History and Records Department of the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entitled, *U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente*. The publication of this volume coincided with a highly successful conference held in October 2007 which featured presentations by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. The Committee applauds such cooperative volumes and encourages the continuation of cooperation with the foreign ministries of Russia and China.

There is no question that these volumes displayed all of the characteristics of the best traditions of the FRUS series: comprehensive, detailed, meticulous, and impressive volumes of historical documentation. The Committee yields to no one in its praise for Series Editor Edward Keefer’s [the Office of the Historian’s] continuing efforts to insure that the series retains its reputation for excellence. [NOTE: We suggest that the Committee avoid using personal references within the body of the report, as this is another departure from all previous Committee reports.]

However, the publication of only two print volumes and only three e-volumes in the FRUS series for calendar year 2007 is very disappointing, one of the lowest publishing yields in recent years. [NOTE: This statement is inaccurate. The lowest publishing yields during the last 5 years were in 2003 (3 volumes) and 2004 (3 volumes). These volumes were print publications, not e-pubs.] The Committee is especially disappointed that only two printed volumes were published, since it continues to regard the printed volumes as the essential part of the series. [We share the Committee’s affection for, and devotion to, print volumes, and concur in their symbolic importance. However, we disagree with the idea that electronic volumes are in some way “second-class citizens.” The decision to begin producing some volumes in electronic-only format was thoroughly discussed with, and received the concurrence of, the Committee, several years ago. There is an ebb and flow from year to year in the balance of publications between print and electronic volumes. It therefore should not be a matter of concern that in 2007 the majority of volumes published were electronic publications. For example, in 2006, seven out of the 10 volumes published were print volumes. (Nonetheless, to further reduce any differentiation between print and e-volumes, at The Historian’s recent suggestion, and with the concurrence of the Deputy Historian and the General Editor, we are going to begin producing e-volumes in the same style and format as print volumes. Then, if end-of-year money becomes available, we could, in such circumstances, consider shifting an e-volume to the print category.)]

The Office of the Historian’s own annual report for 2007 is much more optimistic about its publishing record since it includes four [4] print volumes [that were ready for publication in 2007, but were delayed at the printer (a GPO contractor) by binding material shortages—something that was completely out of the Office’s control—and were published before the report was submitted to Congress], which have been published in the first three [3] months of 2008. Because it includes these volumes, the decline in publishing [from the Office’s previous year’s report] is only one [1] volume, and it [the Office] is able to claim that the 19 volumes produced over its two [2] year reporting period [(March 2006–March 2008)] is the most the Office has ever produced.
Yet even with this optimistic presentation, the report notes that the new timeline will likely be a 31 or 32 year deadline by 2012, a conclusion which the Historical Advisory Committee regards with great skepticism and fears is a “slippery slope” toward [to] a 35 or 40 year deadline. [Two points to note here: 1) In drafting the 2006 Department report, the General Editor decided that it made more sense to report to Congress on the events that had occurred from reporting cycle to reporting cycle. He repeated this approach in his draft of the 2007 report. Hence the way the volumes were counted. 2) Again, as noted above, even a 31- or 32-year deadline—as indicated in the Office’s 2007 report—marks progress in the right direction, breaking a decades-long pattern in which the series had been stuck fast at the 33-year mark. In addition, we do not believe that the experience of one year in which there were unprecedented problems at the printer’s factory provides sufficient evidence to point to a “slippery slope” towards a 35- or 40-year line.]

Last year the Committee reported that “it is reasonable” to be optimistic that the series would be in compliance with the law by the end of 2010. We no longer have any reason to be optimistic, and are frankly very pessimistic. It seems clear that unless there is an unexpected [NOTE: Use of the word “unexpected” seems surprising, as the Committee has engaged with the Office on its current effort to streamline the process and accelerate the pace of completion of volumes and of publication.] improvement in the publication schedule, the Department of State will remain significantly out of compliance with the law well into the second decade of the 21st century.

In its own annual report, the Office of the Historian lists five major factors that have obstructed the ability of the Office to meet the 30-year deadline: 1) Obtaining and maintaining resources, 2) Declassification and procedural problems with Intelligence related files, 3) Declassification problems with Agencies, 4) Nixon presidential tapes and Carter Library problems, and 5) Proofreading and printing contracts. The Committee recognizes that all of these have played some role in the continuing delays in publication. [NOTE: The phrase “some role” is inaccurate, since all five factors (particularly items 2 and 4—specifically, the decisions by the High Level Panel and completion and corrections to the transcripts for the Nixon presidential tapes) contributed to serious delays in the series during 2007, as reflected in the minutes of the 2007 meetings and in informal discussions held with the Committee at each quarterly meeting during 2007.] In previous years we have been particularly critical of other agencies, especially the Department of Defense and the CIA, for their delays in the declassification of materials. However, it is clear that both agencies have made substantial efforts to improve their performance, and the Office has noted in its report the increasing cooperation it has received from both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. Only the Treasury Department remained a problem, and that may improve [, since Treasury has decided that, with one minor exception, Treasury documents more than 25 years old may be declassified without referral to Treasury for declassification review] with the Treasury decision to allow reviewers of the Department of State and National Security Council staff to declassify its documents that are older than 25 years.
The Historical Advisory Committee finds it very hard to believe that the Office of the Historian will, as they write in the report, publish “12 or more volumes” per year over the next three years, and finish the Carter Administration series by 2012. This is a production schedule of 36 volumes over three years, something that has never been achieved in the history of the series. There are a number of reasons for our skepticism, some of which the Historian’s Office own report makes clear. Despite the much-needed expansion of the staff of the office, [NOTE: Since 2001, the Office has expanded exponentially, including the number of compilers, to a level never before achieved, even during the mid-1970s, which was the previously highest level of Office staffing. See additional information below.] and the excellent training of compilers [provided by the Office (again, we believe it would be best to avoid personal references; FYI—training is conducted by several people at different managerial levels.)] that the Series Editor Edward Keefer provides and is renown for, the twin problems of retaining skilled researchers and replacing those who leave the office with highly qualified personnel have become more serious. [The facts do not support the statement that these “twin problems” exist. And they do not support the statement that the situation is “serious.” The facts speak for themselves: In 2006, one compiler left the Office to return to his long-time dream of a job in academia. He was quickly replaced by a very skilled researcher. In 2007, one compiler left to also return to academia, and a second left to take a job as a command historian in the military—at a higher grade level and with responsibility for an entire program. In the latter two cases, both individuals also had family concerns that led them to leave Washington. This does not constitute a “chronic shortage,” or a problem of retention, or a problem of replacement. The fact is that the Office had no difficulty replacing either of these compilers, or, in fact, any staff member who has left over the years, with highly skilled researchers. Indeed, the Office continues to be a highly sought after place for new Ph.D.s to seek employment. For example, our recent advertisement for a single, 1-year contract position elicited nearly 150 applications from skilled researchers, including one prize-winning historian. This summer, we will be bringing on two new Ph.D.s, each of whom has been described by his advisor as the best graduate student he has ever had. (FYI: Those advisors are Richard Immerman and Mel Leffler.) And the new joint historian is a tenured full professor, with five books to his credit, along with multiple articles. {Just FYI, in 2008, one compiler left the Office for an analyst position in INR, and another left to take a position at higher pay at the CIA. In both cases, we anticipate no difficulty in replacing them with highly skilled researchers.}] The Office’s report notes that there are now considerable delays in obtaining necessary top secret clearances. Clearances for contract historians, which are undertaken by the Office of Personnel Management, a subcontractor of the Department of Defense, often take more than a year to obtain. Without a top secret clearance, and, when necessary, the additional clearances which [that] can only be obtained after a top secret clearance is granted, the-[“some of the” is more accurate] historians [do you mean “historians” or “compilers”?—in either case, only two compilers will be in that situation. Moreover, it is more accurate to say “cannot do part of their job.”] cannot do their job.
As noted, the statement that people without full clearances cannot do their job is only partially correct, particularly as applied to those who work on FRUS. Those compilers who have only a SECRET-level clearance can do extensive research in Department cable traffic on the SAS system, and in the P-reels. And they can do relevant research in unclassified files. What they cannot do is access files at the TS level. For that reason, we have devised two alternative solutions to the problem of compilers whose full TS takes longer to receive than we would prefer: 1) we link a compiler (from outside the FRUS divisions) who does have a TS, and can do the TS-level research, with one who does not, and have them collaborate on the volume; or 2) we have the division chief do the TS-level research for the volume. Even if a TS takes close to a year, by the time the compilation stage is reached, most people in such a situation are likely to have received their TS by that point. We believe that this is a reasonable way to approach the government-wide dilemma of contractor clearances, the processing of which is totally out of the Office’s control. From the Committee’s point of view, this makes it all the more important to retain those qualified and productive researchers who already have received such clearances.

Among our strongest recommendations to the Historian [NOTE: again, the Committee should avoid personal references. The report is to the Secretary of State, not to The Historian.] is that the Office conduct mandatory exit interviews to determine the principal reasons behind the departure of skilled researchers. [Senior management in the Office knows exactly why those compilers who have left have done so—and probably knows significantly more about their reasons for doing so in most cases than do the members of the Committee. Moreover, as the Executive Director of the Bureau of Public Affairs made clear to the Committee during its December 2007 executive session, internal Office management does not fall under the purview of the Committee. The law itself is clear, and the Department’s lawyers, and its Federal Advisory Committee Office, concur in this view. The Bureau’s Front Office also agrees that the Committee has no role in, and should stay out of, internal Office operations. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dean reiterated this point to Bob McMahon when he called her several weeks ago, and has told us that Bob assured her that the Committee did not want to get involved in internal management issues and “office politics.” She is concerned that this draft report contradicts the assurances she received from Bob, on behalf of the Committee.] and that the Historian should make a concerted effort to retain skilled and experienced researchers who already have necessary top secret clearances. We recognize that there are a variety of legitimate personal and professional reasons why a skilled researcher would depart the office. However, we believe the Historian should ascertain these reasons, and if they indicate any serious problems or morale issues within the Office, the Historian should try to correct these and improve the working environment for these talented professionals. [We have no wish to get into a debate about possible misconceptions and misperceptions about the Office’s “environment,” but would simply repeat that such matters do not fall within the scope of the Committee’s responsibilities and have no place in its annual report.]
We also recommend that the [Office of ] Historian establish a fixed program for the completion of the compiling – not the declassification or publication – of volumes on a 25 year deadline, so as to allow for five years for declassification, editing, proofreading, and publication. [The basic problem with this proposal is that we cannot require agencies to provide access to their files for the purpose of conducting Foreign Relations research until the records are at least 26 years old. That is set forth clearly in the FRUS law itself and has been incorporated into several of the access agreements we have with other agencies. Even without considering the logistical problems, this proposal, therefore, would confront virtually insurmountable legal constraints.] With its expanded [NOTE: While we do not disagree that the staff has expanded, the use of the word here actually contradicts several points about the size of the staff, made earlier and subsequently in this report, with which we take issue, as noted.] staff, the Committee believes that the [Office of the] Historian can now present a detailed and realistic plan for the achievement of the compilation of volumes at the 25 year mark. Compilation is largely within the Office’s ability to control, and it should become a key priority. If this means that additional resources and personnel are necessary, or that shifting of resources within the Office to the FRUS [ital.] series and away from other projects is required, the Committee strongly recommends that the [Office of the] Historian either request additional resources or undertake such a shift in resources. [Again, in the current international and budgetary environments, even the support of the Committee is not likely to get any more resources for the Office from the Department’s financial experts. HO is already one of the largest policy-related offices in the entire Department of State, and as we have noted from our discussions with our PDAS, it is very hard to justify any request for additional resources, when offices that are much smaller are crying for help. That said, the Office has undertaken an aggressive program to obtain additional resources on its own from outside the Department. As in the past, such efforts have been successful --at times, to an extraordinary extent. For example, just this week, DNI is in the process of transferring $451,000 to the Office for the preparation of two classified studies. These projects, as well as similar reimbursable projects in the past 4 years, also permit us to devote additional resources and personnel to the FRUS effort, even beyond the normal full complement of staff allotted to it.]

[Moreover, the unspoken assumption here (and elsewhere in the report) seems to be that we should shift resources—and people with TS clearances—from Policy Studies and Special Projects to FRUS compilation. Again, this is an internal management issue, and outside the purview of the Committee, but for once, let us address this point and hopefully put it to rest. We believe that the drafters are not aware of all the relevant facts.]

[First, if we did not have sufficient people with full clearances to do the classified research required to justify the “subsidies” we are getting from outside (and inside) the Department, we could not get such additional funding, and the FRUS staff itself would decline as well. Second, the basic thrust of this section on “shifting resources”—as well as of the earlier comments on a supposed “shortage”}
of people with TS clearances being devoted to \textit{FRUS} compilation—is factually incorrect.]

[While we cannot predict the future, including prospective budget levels and future Department-mandated staff levels, for now, we have sufficient staff with the proper skills to do the job, and we believe that we are allocating those staff members appropriately. For example, long before this draft was received, The Historian had already decided to supplement the \textit{FRUS} divisions with additional part-time help from other sources. As of early summer, when we expect to have one more new compiler and the joint historian come on board—counting regular \textit{FRUS} division members (with TS clearances), and those from other divisions (with TS clearances) who compile full- or part-time—we will have the equivalent of 18 $\frac{1}{2}$ full-time compilers with TS clearances. That is more than at any time in the history of the Office, going all the way back to 1861. (Plus, there will be 2 additional people with SECRET-level clearances working as compilers as well.) {Historical note: throughout most of the 20th century, the \textit{FRUS} staff had been the smallest component of the Office staff, often dwarfed by the number of people who worked on policy studies or the current documents compilations.]}

[Moreover, we believe that the allocation of staff with TS clearances among the divisions is appropriate. Of all those working on \textit{FRUS} compilations, those with TS clearances will constitute 90 percent of the (full-time equivalent) staff working on compiling. This compares with a staff TS clearance level of 71 percent for Declassification and Publishing, and only 67 percent for the Policy Studies and Special Projects staffs. It is clear that we will have the tools to do the job. We will outline our new plan for streamlining and expediting research and compilation for the Committee at its next session.] The only way that the 30-year deadline can even be approached is by an aggressive plan undertaken by the Historian [Office] [NOTE: Once again, the Committee should avoid any personal references. This requires an Office-wide initiative.] to make this a top priority of the Office [NOTE: We strongly disagree with the Committee’s implication concerning the Office’s sense of the priority that should be given to the series. Ever since 2001, the \textit{Foreign Relations} series staff has been the top priority in the allocation of Office resources. That includes not only the current balance of staff between \textit{FRUS} and non-\textit{FRUS} related projects, but also during the period of expansion early in this century, when the Office filled \textit{FRUS} compiling vacancies long before filling vacancies in the other divisions. Since 2003, 11 new compilers have been hired on a contract basis with money generated from—or as a result of—special projects, and 7 contract historians were hired to work on the declassification and editing of the series. Therefore, a total of 18 historians originally came to the Office through funding outside our regular Office allotment, without which they could not have been hired. Many of those have since moved into permanent Civil Service positions.] and a 25 year deadline for compiling would be a major step in this direction. [NOTE: Because of the legal restrictions on access noted above, we believe that streamlining the process, especially those aspects of it over which we have full control, is the only reasonable
solution to the problem of accelerating publication of the series.] The Committee will fully support him in such actions.

At the same time the Committee wishes to commend the Historian’s Office on the effective steps it has taken to address the declassification issues which have proved an obstacle to timely publication in the past. We recognize that this progress has required the devotion of considerable attention and substantial human resources by the office, and we understand that the office will continue to have to devote this attention and these resources to declassification. We do not believe it would make sense to shift resources from declassification to compiling.

Carter and Reagan Materials

The Committee acknowledges that delays [beyond the Office’s control] have affected the Office’s [its] ability to work with [conduct research in] the materials of the Carter Administration. In particular, a security incident this past summer at the Carter Library – not associated with FRUS [ital.] research - led to the closure of [classified] files to all researchers, including those from the Historian’s Office, for almost five [5] months. Nevertheless, the Committee as a whole remains concerned the compiling of the volumes for the Carter years is well behind schedule, and likely to lead to serious [further] delays in the production of these volumes.

We note as well that the Office has now presented a plan for the Reagan period, which, if the 30 year deadline were to be followed, would require the full publication of the records of these years by 2018, only ten [10] years from now. However, after hearing from officials with the National Archives, the Committee has serious concerns about the funding and support for the research that the Office will have to undertake at the Reagan Library. The officials from the Archives seemed to suggest that financial subsidies will be necessary for Reagan material to be processed to allow for anything even approximating the 30-year deadline, while it was clear that the Historian’s Office does not envision being able to provide any such funding. [That is correct, although these are only preliminary projections. Perhaps helping to get NARA to see that reality is something the Committee can strategize about.] In addition, the Committee is concerned that despite a collection of 8.5 million classified pages in the Reagan Library, compared with the Nixon years’ 2.5 million pages, the Office plans substantially fewer volumes of the FRUS [ital.] series. While this may be both intellectually and practically justified, the Committee wants to assess this at future meetings during 2008. The Committee takes seriously its mandate for a full and complete record of American foreign policy, and it remains concerned as to whether the Office’s approach [preliminary plan] will allow this.
Cooperation with the CIA and Department of Defense-[NOTE: The Department of Defense is not mentioned in this paragraph. Perhaps the term “other agencies” should be used.]

Although the Committee is pessimistic about the Office of the Historian’s plan to meet the 30-year deadline, [NOTE: Since the Committee has covered this in all of the preceding paragraphs, why repeat this comment here?] we must also report other [The Committee is pleased to report on] favorable developments regarding declassification [for the Foreign Relations manuscripts at the Central Intelligence Agency.] The Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] has [virtually] eliminated its backlog of overdue reviews of volumes [that do not require a High Level Panel decision (see below)]. The working relationship between the CIA and the Office is vastly improved, and we commend all who played a role in accomplishing this change. We will continue to monitor this, but we are hopeful that the relationship will continue to improve. [NOTE: The Committee should consider taking note that recent turnover in the CIA’s reviewing personnel, and training of new CIA personnel, have also contributed to delays in the CIA’s review and return of Foreign Relations manuscripts.] We also look forward to the publication in the near future of the two retrospective volumes dealing with Iran and the Congo that will further reestablish the credibility of the FRUS [ital.] series.

We are also pleased with improvements in the functioning of the High Level panel to declassify sensitive documentation. This panel, composed of senior officials from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the National Security Council, has been working more efficiently, allowing the U.S. Government to acknowledge [, for publication in FRUS.] 39 major covert operations or other sensitive intelligence activities [since its inception nearly 10 years ago]. We applaud the Office’s initiative in now bringing covert policy issues to the panel’s attention at the beginning of the declassification process rather than at the end.

[NOTE: On the other hand, the Committee should note and express its concern with the continued protracted pace of the High Level Panel process. At virtually every Committee meeting during 2007 and before, the Deputy Historian alerted the Committee to this ongoing problem, which affects roughly half of all Foreign Relations manuscripts and contributes appreciably to the delays in meeting the 30-year line (delays amounting to many months, if not years). The Committee members are well aware of this situation, as they have reviewed the progress of individual manuscripts and have also questioned the CIA concerning the possibilities of removing roadblocks. In essence, because the process is largely out of the Office’s control, this is the price we pay for the successful acknowledgement of so many historically-important covert actions. However, since the report is focusing on delays in the series, this information should be included.]

We have expressed concern in the past with the reluctance of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to allow the Office of the Historian access
to its records. We note that the PFIAB has agreed in principle to reconsider its decision not to allow access, but that a draft memorandum has yet to be signed. The Committee repeats its view that the records of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board need to become accessible to the staff of the Office of the Historian and be made available for inclusion in appropriate volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States [ital.].

The Committee has continued to be pleased with the presentation of works-in-progress by the members of the Office. The discussions held in the past year, especially about volumes that will deal with Carter years, have been particularly helpful. The Committee plans to continue these seminars as a regular part of its meetings.

Conclusion

The publication of the Foreign Relations [ital.] series stands as a symbol of commitment to openness and accountability. It is recognized as such throughout the world. The Historical Advisory Committee believes the series is at a critical turning point [juncture]. The momentum it had acquired in recent years, largely from the increase in staff and resources, has now stalled. Rather than reinvigorating its commitment to reaching the 30 year deadline, the Historian now seems content to muster the reasons for why that deadline cannot be met, [With all due respect, the drafters appear to be imputing motives to The Historian for which there is no basis in fact. The Historian did not “muster reasons” for why the 30-year deadline cannot be met in our annual report to Congress—he is required by law to provide the specific reasons why the Department has not met that target. Providing the reasons as required by law, does not imply resignation and acceptance of failure, nor any sense of contentment whatsoever. We do not believe that there is any basis in fact for this spurious allegation. Moreover, attributing these “mustered reasons” solely to The Historian is also factually incorrect. The language in our report to Congress providing the reasons for why the Department has not met the 30-year line was drafted this year (as in previous years) by the General Editor. Both The Historian and the Deputy Historian concur in the General Editor’s words. On this matter, there is no daylight between us.] and why the Office should be allowed to slip to 31, 32, or some other delay. [Again, as noted above, reaching the 31- or 32-year line, as of 2007, is not slipping—it is actually forward progress. As we noted above, since the publication of the Eisenhower volumes, the Office has published Foreign Relations volumes at an average of 33 years after the events.] The Committee sees this as unacceptable, and we cannot stand by while the clear intent of the congressional statute is undermined. [Nobody in this Office—neither The Historian, nor the Deputy Historian, nor the General Editor—is trying to undermine the intent of the statute, and frankly, this comment is demeaning, not only to senior Office management and the Department, but also to the Committee.] If the Historian needs additional personnel or resources to reach the 30 year deadline, we will support his request
wholeheartedly. But the committee insists on a practical plan for attaining that deadline, and a plan which indicates the careful management by the Historian of the personnel and resources of the Office, and an adequate supply of those personnel and resources to the production of the FRUS \textit{series} by the Office. \textbf{We believe that our comments, along with the supporting facts set forth above, make it clear that we are, in fact, carefully managing personnel and resources to have the greatest possible positive impact on the FRUS effort, and that adequate resources are, in fact, being devoted to the series. We do not know where the drafters got some of their information, but clearly they have been misinformed.} We certainly encourage creative thinking in meeting the 30 year deadline, and acknowledge that this will probably include fewer print volumes and more electronic volumes, thus retaining the symbolism of the traditional series while breaking through into a new dimension of publication to cover the range, diversity, and complexity of United States foreign relations in the 1970s and beyond. But the Committee will remain insistent that the Historian make every conceivable effort to advance the production and publication of the volumes of the FRUS \textit{series} to meet the congressionally mandated 30 year deadline, while continuing to meet the statutory requirement that the series provide the American people with a complete \textit{NOTE: the language of the law is “thorough”}, accurate, and reliable documentary account of America’s foreign policy.

This report was drafted by Thomas A. Schwartz, who deserves full credit for its analytical thrust and direct addressing of critical issues. It carries with it the full concurrence and endorsement by all members of the committee. \textbf{NOTE: This again is a departure from past practice. If this is a Committee product, there is no need to identify a drafter.}

\textbf{A final comment: All members of senior Office management, and, in fact, all members of the Office management team, fully appreciate the importance of the \textit{Foreign Relations} series and are committed to producing the best possible volumes in the quickest time possible. Nonetheless, in the eyes of the Department, the Office has several other historical missions to perform as well. Yes, FRUS is the most important part of our mission. And that is why it claims over two-thirds of our staff and the overwhelming amount of our financial resources. But it is not our only mission, and to be frank, if we did not perform the other missions that the Department also expects us to carry out—and to do so at the same high level of quality that we devote to FRUS—we would then see the Office’s staff and resources diminish rapidly, which would inevitably have a negative impact on the series.}

\textbf{We urge the Committee to focus this report, and its quarterly meetings, on the production of the series itself—as set forth in the law—rather than on internal Office management issues, which fall outside the purview of the Committee. As it is currently presented, the draft reads more like an attack on The Historian, rather than as a statement of the collaborative effort between the Office and the Committee to advance the series, as called for in the statute. We welcome constructive criticism within the area of the Committee’s responsibilities. However, as currently drafted, much of this report is neither historically, nor factually, accurate. We urge the}
Committee to focus on the facts, as it revises its draft report, to carefully examine the records of the Committee’s activities during calendar year 2007, and to recast the report to better reflect the spirit and letter of the statute.]

Wm. Roger Louis
Chairman, Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

Committee Members:
Carol Anderson
Margaret Hedgstrom [FYI: Margaret’s last name is spelled incorrectly.]
Robert McMahon
Edward Rhodes
Thomas Schwartz
Katherine Sibley
Peter Spiro
Thomas Zeiler