Congressional Record: June 21, 2000 (Senate)
Page S5563-S5580AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED ______ FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001 KYL (AND DOMENICI) AMENDMENT NO. 3558 Mr. McCONNELL (for Mr. Kyl (for himself and Mr. Domenici)) proposed two amendments to the bill S. 2522, supra; as follows: At an appropriate place in the bill, insert the following: SEC. . IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY REFORMS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. (a) Findings.--Congress finds that-- (1) On March 18, 1999, President Clinton asked the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to undertake an inquiry and issue a report on "the security threat at the Department of Energy's weapons labs and the adequacy of the measures that have been taken to address it.'' (2) In June 1999, the PFIAB issued a report titled "Science at its Best, Security at its Worst,'' which concluded the Department of Energy "represents the best of America's scientific talent and achievement, but it has been responsible for the worst security record on secrecy that the members of this panel have ever encountered.'' (3) The PFIAB report stated, "Organizational disarray, managerial neglect, and a culture of arrogance--both at DOE headquarters and the labs themselves--conspired to create an espionage scandal waiting to happen.'' (4) The PFIAB report further stated, "The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself. * * * Reorganization is clearly warranted to resolve the many specific problems with security and counterintelligence in the weapons laboratories, but also to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic throughout the entire Department. * * * real and lasting security and counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply unworkable within DOE's current structure and culture;'' (5) The PFIAB report stated, "Specifically, we recommend that the Congress pass and the President sign legislation that: Creates a new, semi-autonomous Agency * * * [to] oversee all nuclear weapons-related matters previously housed in DOE.'' (6) The bipartisan Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China of the House of Representatives released an unclassified report on May 25, 1999 which concluded that "The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons. These thefts of nuclear secrets from our national weapons laboratories enabled the PRC to design, develop, and successfully test modern strategic nuclear weapons sooner than would otherwise have been possible. The stolen U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on thermonuclear weapons on a par with our own.'' (7) The report of the Select Committee further concluded that, "Despite repeated PRC thefts of the most sophisticated U.S. nuclear weapons technology, security at our national nuclear weapons laboratories does not meet even minimal standards.'' (8) In response to the findings of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China of the House of Representatives and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Senators Kyl, Domenici, and Murkowski offered Amendment 446 to the Fiscal Year 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act calling for the creation of a semi- autonomous agency to manage all United States nuclear weapons programs, which was passed by the Senate on July 21, 1999, by a vote of 96 to 1. This amendment called for the semi- autonomous agency to be organized with clear lines of authority and accountability to replace the previous structure with confused, overlapping reporting channels and diffused responsibility that led to earlier security failures. (9) The provisions of Amendment 446 were incorporated in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization Conference Report, which was approved by the House of Representatives on September 15, 1999, by a vote of 375 to 45, and the Senate on September 22, 1999, by a vote of 93 to 5. (10) President Clinton signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) on October 5, 1999. (11) Notwithstanding his signing into law the legislation creating the National Nuclear Security Administration headed by a new [[Page S5574]] Under Secretary, on October 5, 1999, President Clinton issued a statement which said, "Until further notice, the Secretary of Energy shall perform all duties and functions of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security. The Secretary is instructed to guide and direct all personnel of the National Nuclear Security Administration. . . .'' (12) On May 3, 2000 the nomination of General John Gordon to head the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was received by the Senate from the President. On June 14, 2000, General John Gordon was confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 97 to 0. (13) The Secretary of Energy has failed to fully implement the law signed by the President on October 5, 1999. For example, Section 3213 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) sates that, with the exception of the Secretary of Energy, NNSA employees, "shall not be responsible to, or subject to the authority, direction, or control of, any officer, employee, or agent of the Department of Energy.'' Yet page 16 of the Department of Energy's Implementation Plan for the National Nuclear Security Administration released on January 1, 2000, states that in order to manage the performance of non-weapons related work at NNSA facilities such as the three national labs, "non-NNSA officers or employees of the Department retain the authority to direct NNSA employees and contractor employees with regard to the accomplishment of such work.'' (14) On May 26, 1999, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson stated, "American's can be reassured: Our nation's nuclear secrets are, today, safe and secure.'' (15) In response to a question from Senator Fitzgerald at a joint hearing of the Committees on Energy and Natural Resources, and Governmental Affairs of the Senate on October 19, 1999, that "So if there's a problem, God forbid, with security at our Nation's labs while we have not fulfilled or appointed somebody as Under Secretary in this new agency within an agency, you would be willing to assume full responsibility. . . .'' Secretary Richardson testified that, "I would assume full responsibility.'' (16) The recent security lapses at Los Alamos National Laboratory demonstrates that security and counterintelligence measures continue to be significantly deficient at United States nuclear facilities. (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate that-- (1) The national security of the United States has been significantly harmed due to weak and ineffective security and counterintelligence measures at America's nuclear facilities. (2) The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, if implemented, will improve security and counterintelligence measures at United States nuclear facilities by establishing clear lines of authority and accountability to enable lasting reforms to be put in place. (3) The President and the Secretary of Energy should faithfully implement the provisions of Public Law 106-65, which established the National Nuclear Security Administration. (4) The Secretary of Energy should permit the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration to manage all aspects of United States nuclear weapons programs without interference. (5) The Secretary of Energy should drop efforts to "dual- hat'' officers or employees of the Department of Energy to serve concurrently in positions within the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Energy. Such efforts to extensively "dual-hat'' officials are contrary to the intent of Congress when it passed Public Law 106-65. (6) The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the protection of sensitive and classified information becomes the highest priority of the National Nuclear Security Administration. ______