Congressional Record: June 21, 2000 (Senate)
Page S5563-S5580




                          AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED

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      FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS
                        APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001
               KYL (AND DOMENICI) AMENDMENT NO. 3558

  Mr. McCONNELL (for Mr. Kyl (for himself and Mr. Domenici)) proposed
two amendments to the bill S. 2522, supra; as follows:

       At an appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

     SEC.   . IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY REFORMS AT THE DEPARTMENT
                   OF ENERGY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) On March 18, 1999, President Clinton asked the
     President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to
     undertake an inquiry and issue a report on "the security
     threat at the Department of Energy's weapons labs and the
     adequacy of the measures that have been taken to address
     it.''
       (2) In June 1999, the PFIAB issued a report titled
     "Science at its Best, Security at its Worst,'' which
     concluded the Department of Energy "represents the best of
     America's scientific talent and achievement, but it has been
     responsible for the worst security record on secrecy that the
     members of this panel have ever encountered.''
       (3) The PFIAB report stated, "Organizational disarray,
     managerial neglect, and a culture of arrogance--both at DOE
     headquarters and the labs themselves--conspired to create an
     espionage scandal waiting to happen.''
       (4) The PFIAB report further stated, "The Department of
     Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is
     incapable of reforming itself. * * * Reorganization is
     clearly warranted to resolve the many specific problems with
     security and counterintelligence in the weapons laboratories,
     but also to address the lack of accountability that has
     become endemic throughout the entire Department. * * * real
     and lasting security and counterintelligence reform at the
     weapons labs is simply unworkable within DOE's current
     structure and culture;''
       (5) The PFIAB report stated, "Specifically, we recommend
     that the Congress pass and the President sign legislation
     that: Creates a new, semi-autonomous Agency * * * [to]
     oversee all nuclear weapons-related matters previously housed
     in DOE.''
       (6) The bipartisan Select Committee on U.S. National
     Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's
     Republic of China of the House of Representatives released
     an unclassified report on May 25, 1999 which concluded
     that "The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen
     design information on the United States' most advanced
     thermonuclear weapons. These thefts of nuclear secrets
     from our national weapons laboratories enabled the PRC to
     design, develop, and successfully test modern strategic
     nuclear weapons sooner than would otherwise have been
     possible. The stolen U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC
     design information on thermonuclear weapons on a par with
     our own.''
       (7) The report of the Select Committee further concluded
     that, "Despite repeated PRC thefts of the most sophisticated
     U.S. nuclear weapons technology, security at our national
     nuclear weapons laboratories does not meet even minimal
     standards.''
       (8) In response to the findings of the Select Committee on
     U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with
     the People's Republic of China of the House of
     Representatives and the President's Foreign Intelligence
     Advisory Board, Senators Kyl, Domenici, and Murkowski offered
     Amendment 446 to the Fiscal Year 2000 Intelligence
     Authorization Act calling for the creation of a semi-
     autonomous agency to manage all United States nuclear weapons
     programs, which was passed by the Senate on July 21, 1999, by
     a vote of 96 to 1. This amendment called for the semi-
     autonomous agency to be organized with clear lines of
     authority and accountability to replace the previous
     structure with confused, overlapping reporting channels and
     diffused responsibility that led to earlier security
     failures.
       (9) The provisions of Amendment 446 were incorporated in
     the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization Conference Report,
     which was approved by the House of Representatives on
     September 15, 1999, by a vote of 375 to 45, and the Senate on
     September 22, 1999, by a vote of 93 to 5.
       (10) President Clinton signed the National Defense
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) on
     October 5, 1999.
       (11) Notwithstanding his signing into law the legislation
     creating the National Nuclear Security Administration headed
     by a new

[[Page S5574]]

     Under Secretary, on October 5, 1999, President Clinton issued
     a statement which said, "Until further notice, the Secretary
     of Energy shall perform all duties and functions of the Under
     Secretary for Nuclear Security. The Secretary is instructed
     to guide and direct all personnel of the National Nuclear
     Security Administration. . . .''
       (12) On May 3, 2000 the nomination of General John Gordon
     to head the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
     was received by the Senate from the President. On June 14,
     2000, General John Gordon was confirmed by the Senate by a
     vote of 97 to 0.
       (13) The Secretary of Energy has failed to fully implement
     the law signed by the President on October 5, 1999. For
     example, Section 3213 of the National Defense Authorization
     Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) sates that, with
     the exception of the Secretary of Energy, NNSA employees,
     "shall not be responsible to, or subject to the authority,
     direction, or control of, any officer, employee, or agent of
     the Department of Energy.'' Yet page 16 of the Department of
     Energy's Implementation Plan for the National Nuclear
     Security Administration released on January 1, 2000, states
     that in order to manage the performance of non-weapons
     related work at NNSA facilities such as the three national
     labs, "non-NNSA officers or employees of the Department
     retain the authority to direct NNSA employees and contractor
     employees with regard to the accomplishment of such work.''
       (14) On May 26, 1999, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson
     stated, "American's can be reassured: Our nation's nuclear
     secrets are, today, safe and secure.''
       (15) In response to a question from Senator Fitzgerald at a
     joint hearing of the Committees on Energy and Natural
     Resources, and Governmental Affairs of the Senate on October
     19, 1999, that "So if there's a problem, God forbid, with
     security at our Nation's labs while we have not fulfilled or
     appointed somebody as Under Secretary in this new agency
     within an agency, you would be willing to assume full
     responsibility. . . .'' Secretary Richardson testified that,
     "I would assume full responsibility.''
       (16) The recent security lapses at Los Alamos National
     Laboratory demonstrates that security and counterintelligence
     measures continue to be significantly deficient at United
     States nuclear facilities.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate
     that--
       (1) The national security of the United States has been
     significantly harmed due to weak and ineffective security and
     counterintelligence measures at America's nuclear facilities.
       (2) The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
     2000, if implemented, will improve security and
     counterintelligence measures at United States nuclear
     facilities by establishing clear lines of authority and
     accountability to enable lasting reforms to be put in place.
       (3) The President and the Secretary of Energy should
     faithfully implement the provisions of Public Law 106-65,
     which established the National Nuclear Security
     Administration.
       (4) The Secretary of Energy should permit the Administrator
     of the National Nuclear Security Administration to manage all
     aspects of United States nuclear weapons programs without
     interference.
       (5) The Secretary of Energy should drop efforts to "dual-
     hat'' officers or employees of the Department of Energy to
     serve concurrently in positions within the National Nuclear
     Security Administration and the Department of Energy. Such
     efforts to extensively "dual-hat'' officials are contrary to
     the intent of Congress when it passed Public Law 106-65.
       (6) The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
     Administration shall take all appropriate steps to ensure
     that the protection of sensitive and classified information
     becomes the highest priority of the National Nuclear Security
     Administration.
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