Congressional Record: January 14, 2003 (Senate)
Page S289-S305
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. CORZINE (for himself, Mr. Jeffords, Mrs. Boxer, Mrs.
Clinton, and Mr. Lautenberg):
S. 157. A bill to help protect the public against the threat of
chemical attacks; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I rise today to reintroduce an important
piece of legislation that I worked on in the 107th Congress, the
Chemical Security Act. I am proud to be joined by Senators Jeffords,
Boxer, Clinton, and Lautenberg in reintroducing this bill. Senators
Jeffords, Boxer, and Clinton were all strong allies in the 107th
Congress, and I thank them for their continuing support. And I am
pleased to have Senator Lautenberg as a cosponsor. He has a long
history of working to protect communities from all types of chemical
threats. I particularly want to thank Senator Jeffords for his hard
work on this legislation in the 107th Congress. As Chairman of the
Environment and Public Works committee, he provided critical leadership
in bringing this bill through the committee successfully. I thank him
and his staff for their hard work and look forward to continuing to
work with them on this important issue.
I'll describe what the bill does in a minute. But first I want to
briefly explain why I think this legislation is so important.
September 11 shocked us into the realization that our assets can be
turned against us by terrorists. If you are a New Jersey Senator, you
don't have to think about that idea for too long before you realize
that chemical plants and other facilities that have hazardous chemicals
would be high on a terrorists' list. The fact is, that we have a lot of
those types of facilities in my State, and because we're such a densely
populated State, chemical releases from these facilities pose grave
risks. In fact, according to EPA data, there are eight plants in my
State where a worst-case release of toxic chemicals could threaten more
than a million people.
But this is not a parochial issue. The same EPA data shows that there
are 110 plants nationwide where such a release could threaten more than
a million people. These plants are located in 22 States. And there are
44 States that have at least one facility where such a release could
threaten more than 100,000 people.
I want to be clear that I am stating these facts here today in an
effort to advance a measure that would protect workers and communities,
not in an attempt to vilify our nations' chemical companies. Indeed,
these companies are a key part of our industrial fabric, providing jobs
and producing products essential to our lives. This is certainly true
of my home State of New Jersey, as I have already indicated.
But when you look at the numbers, as I have laid them out here today,
you realize that we have a problem to deal with. I'm certainly not
unique in recognizing this issue, EPA, the Justice Department, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commissions, industry groups, and public safety
groups all agree. In addition, the White House Strategy for Homeland
Security recognizes the chemical and hazardous materials sector as an
infrastructure protection priority. Governor Ridge amplified this point
in his testimony before the Senate Environment Public Works committee
on July 10 of last year. He said that:
The fact is, we have a very diversified economy and our
enemies look at some of our economic assets as targets. And
clearly, the chemical facilities are one of them. We know
that there have been reports validated about security
deficiencies at dozens and dozens of those.
I want to pick up on that last point that Governor Ridge made about
security deficiencies, because it speaks to why I am putting this bill
forward.
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Some companies have taken actions and are continuing to work to
implement security measures in light of the post-September 11
environments. Others, however, are not. That's one crucial reason why a
Federal program is needed. We need to be able to assure our
constituents that this major vulnerability is being addressed in a
swift and effective manner. We also want to assure them that certain
minimum standards are being met throughout the country.
We already do that to address certain infrastructure vulnerabilities.
Most notably, we require nuclear power plants to meet extensive
security standards as a condition of their operating licenses. I think
we ought to tighten those standards, but the fact is that we have no
standards at all for our chemical facilities.
Before I go into specifics, I want to outline the general
organizational scheme of the bill. In my view, addressing the risk to
communities from a terrorist-caused release of hazardous chemicals
requires two fundamental components. The first is improving security,
so that the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack is lowered. The
second is reducing hazards so that the impact of a successful attack is
minimized.
This requires two fundamentally different types of expertise and
skills. That's why the bill involves both the EPA and the Department of
Homeland Security. EPA has the chemical hazard expertise, and the
Department of Homeland Security has the security expertise. EPA has a
lead role in most of the bill, because it already has relationships
with chemical facilities through its existing accident prevention
programs.
As to the specifics of the bill, I think it is a common-sense
approach to dealing with the issue. I want to note that this bill is
nearly identical to the version of the bill that was reported out of
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee last July by a 19-0
vote. Two minor technical changes have been made to clarify the intent
of the legislation, but it is otherwise exactly the same as the
committee-reported bill that was acted on unanimously by the EPW
committee last year.
The heart of the bill is section 4. This section requires EPA and the
Department of Homeland Security to identify "high priority" chemical
facilities and then require those facilities to assess vulnerabilities
and hazards, and then develop and implement a plan to improve security
and use safer technologies.
Section 4(a)(1) establishes the priority setting process, by which
the EPA Administrator, in consultation the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, as well as States and local government entities,
is directed to identify high priority chemical facilities, based on
factors identified in section 4(a)(2). These factors include the
severity of harm that could be caused by a chemical release, proximity
to population centers, threats to national security or critical
infrastructure, threshold quantities of substances of concern that pose
a serious threat, and such other safety or security factors that the
Administrator considers appropriate.
Because of the way the bill is structured, this means that EPA and
the Department of Homeland Security are directed to start with the
facilities that are subject to EPA's Risk Management Program
requirements. This program applies to approximately 15,000 facilities
in the United States that use, produce or store large quantities of
hazardous chemicals. By applying the factors I mentioned, the priority
setting process is meant to shorten this list of 15,000 facilities
considerably. But the bill leaves it up to the Administration to
determine exactly how many facilities within this universe ought to be
covered by the bill.
So that's step one, setting priorities, and that has to be done
within one year of enactment.
At this point, I want to mention the first of the clarifying
technical changes that I have made to the bill. It was never the
intent, nor I believe the effect, of the bill to include propane
retailers as potentially regulated entities under this bill. But there
was some confusion about the point after the bill was marked up last
July. So last fall, I worked with the National Propane Gas Association
on language that eliminates this confusion, and it is included in this
bill. So I again want to make clear that the same propane retailers who
are not subject to the EPA Risk Management Program requirements will
not be "high priority" facilities under this bill, and therefore will
not be subject to its requirements.
In addition to identifying high priority facilities within the first
year, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security must also promulgate
regulations to require the high priority facilities to take the
following steps: conduct a vulnerability and hazard assessment within
one year after the regulations are promulgated; prepare and implement a
response plan that addresses those vulnerabilities within 18 months
after the regulations are promulgated.
I want to say more about the assessments and response plans, because
these requirements are really the core of the amendment.
First, the amendment requires chemical facilities to work with local
law enforcement and first responders, such as firefighters, in
developing the assessments and plans. The second of the clarifying
technical changes that I referred to in the opening part of my
statement is simply to make clear the firefighters are among the first
responders that the bill is referring to.
September 11 showed us how brave and important these our first
responders are. Every day, they are willing to risk their lives to
respond to terrorist attacks if they need to. So it makes sense that
they ought to be a part of the process of developing vulnerability
assessments and response plans, as this bill would require.
The same goes for employees of the high priority chemical facilities.
They're on the front lines, which means two things. First, they are
most at risk in case of a terrorist attack on their plants. Second,
because they work in the plants every day, they will have ideas about
how to secure the facilities and reduce hazards. So employees are part
of the process as well.
As to the assessments and plans themselves, the requirements in the
bill are fairly general. There are a variety of vulnerability
assessment tools that have already been developed by groups such as
Sandia laboratories and the Center for Chemical Process Safety. I would
expect that EPA and DHS would take advantage of existing methodologies
such as these, but the bill leaves it up to the experts to decide what
types of approaches make the most sense. And that probably won't be the
same for everyone, I'm not advocating a one-size-fits-all approach
here. But I do want to be sure that all of the high priority chemical
facilities do a credible vulnerability assessment.
The response plan requirements are also fairly general. Each facility
is required to prepare prevention, preparedness and response plan that
incorporates the results of the assessments. The plan must include
actions and procedures, including safer design and maintenance, to
eliminate or significantly lessen the potential consequences of a
release.
What this means in simple terms is that each facility has to develop
a plan and take steps to reduce both the likelihood of a successful
attack and to the harm that would occur if an attack were successful.
In other words, they have to look at traditional security measures,
such as fences, alarms, and guards. But they also have to look at
whether they can make the plant safer. In other words, can less
hazardous chemicals be used? Can containment technology such as fans or
scrubbers be improved or employed to contain chemicals that may be
released? Chemical facilities ought to evaluate the full range of
options, look at the tradeoffs among them, and go forward with the best
mix of security and technology options.
Facilities are then required to send their assessments and plans to
the EPA. EPA and DHS must review those assessments and plans, and
certify compliance with the regulations. Any deficiencies identified by
EPA and DHS can be remedies by issuance of an order. But the order can
only be issued after a deliberate process that includes notification,
compliance assistance, and an opportunity for a hearing.
The certification process is there to ensure the public that
facilities are complying the law. Those certifications will be the only
information
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from the assessments and plans that is publicly available. The bill
exempts all other information produced under the bill, most
importantly, the assessments and plans themselves, from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act. I don't take FOIA exemptions
lightly. I believe strongly that, in general, the public has a right to
information collected by the government. But I think it's pretty
obvious that in the case of the information that would be submitted to
the government under this bill, the vulnerability assessments and
response plans, we simply can't allow the security details in these
plans to be publicly available. But I think it does make sense that
people who live near a chemical plant be able to find out from EPA and
the DHS whether or not that plant has complied with the law.
The bill goes even beyond FOIA exemptions to protect the assessments
and plans. To ensure that the assessments and plans are properly
safeguarded, the bill includes a requirement for EPA and Homeland
Security to develop protocols to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
those documents. And it attaches penalties to unauthorized disclosure.
That's the essence of the bill.
First, identify "high priority" chemical facilities.
Second, require those facilities to assess vulnerabilities and
hazards, and then develop and implement a plan to improve security and
implement safer technologies.
Third, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security review the
assessments and plans, and they have the authority to require changes
if deficiencies are identified.
Fourth, assessments and plans are protected from unauthorized
disclosure through a FOIA exemption and penalties that apply to
unauthorized disclosure.
The bill also includes an early compliance section that is designed
to address concerns that the bill might slow ongoing voluntary security
efforts. This provision enables companies to submit assessments and
plans prior to promulgation of the regulations and have them judged by
the standards in the Act. So companies don't have to wait for the
regulations to come out to continue work or to submit plans.
In conclusion, I think this is a balanced bill that puts common-sense
requirements in place to deal with a significant problem. I think the
bill has moved a long way from the introduced bill. It has accommodated
many of the concerns that industry raised about the bill I introduced
in the 107th Congress. It reflects intensive bipartisan negotiations,
and I think it's a good bill.
At the same time, I recognize that some of my colleagues have
continuing concerns about the legislation. Last fall, I worked with
Senators Inhofe, Breaux, Landrieu and Lincoln on these issues. I want
them to know that I remain open-minded and committed to working with
them, the rest of my colleagues and the Administration to resolve these
issues so we can move quickly to protect Americans from the threat of
attack on chemical facilities. And I want to extend the same commitment
not only to the environmental and labor organizations that have
supported the bill in the past, but also to the various industry groups
that have worked on this bill. It's vital that we all find common
ground quickly, and I stand ready to work with all interested parties.
I want to close by expressing both my sense of urgency about this
issue and my optimism that we will be able to move legislation quickly.
Last fall, Governor Ridge and Administrator Whitman wrote to the
Washington Post expressing their support for bipartisan legislation to
deal with the chemical security threat. I ask unanimous consent that
that letter be printed in the Record.
I believe the letter was sincere, but the Administration has not yet
engaged the Congress on this issue. I urge President Bush to provide
leadership to ensure that his Administration works with us as the
process moves forward.
I am also encouraged that Senator Inhofe has identified chemical
security as a legislative priority as he assumes the Chairmanship of
the Environment and Public Works committee. I congratulate him on his
new post, and again express my willingness to work with him on this
important issue.
With that, I yield the floor and urge my colleagues to support this
important legislation.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Oct. 6, 2002]
A Security Requirement
The Bush administration is committed to reducing the
vulnerability of America's chemical facilities to terrorist
attack and is working to enact bipartisan legislation that
would require such facilities to address their
vulnerabilities [news story, Oct. 3].
We applaud voluntary efforts some in the industry have
undertaken, but we believe that every one of the 15,000
chemical facilities nationwide that contain large quantities
of hazardous chemicals must be required to take the steps the
industry leaders are taking at their facilities; performing
comprehensive vulnerability assessments and then acting to
reduce those vulnerabilities.
Voluntary efforts alone are not sufficient to provide the
level of assurance Americans deserve. We will continue to
work with Congress to advance this important homeland
security goal.
____
S. 157
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Chemical Security Act of
2003".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that--
(1) the chemical industry is a crucial part of the critical
infrastructure of the United States--
(A) in its own right; and
(B) because that industry supplies resources essential to
the functioning of other critical infrastructures;
(2) the possibility of terrorist and criminal attacks on
chemical sources (such as industrial facilities) poses a
serious threat to public health, safety, and welfare,
critical infrastructure, national security, and the
environment;
(3) the possibility of theft of dangerous chemicals from
chemical sources for use in terrorist attacks poses a further
threat to public health, safety, and welfare, critical
infrastructure, national security, and the environment; and
(4) there are significant opportunities to prevent theft
from, and criminal attack on, chemical sources and reduce the
harm that such acts would produce by--
(A)(i) reducing usage and storage of chemicals by changing
production methods and processes; and
(ii) employing inherently safer technologies in the
manufacture, transport, and use of chemicals;
(B) enhancing secondary containment and other existing
mitigation measures; and
(C) improving security.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Administrator.--The term "Administrator" means the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
(2) Chemical source.--The term "chemical source" means a
stationary source (as defined in section 112(r)(2) of the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(2))) that contains a
substance of concern.
(3) Covered substance of concern.--The term "covered
substance of concern" means a substance of concern that, in
combination with a chemical source and other factors, is
designated as a high priority category by the Administrator
under section 4(a)(1).
(4) Employee.--The term "employee" means--
(A) a duly recognized collective bargaining representative
at a chemical source; or
(B) in the absence of such a representative, other
appropriate personnel.
(5) First responder.--The term "first responder" includes
a firefighter.
(6) Head of the office.--The term "head of the Office"
means the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(7) Safer design and maintenance.--The term "safer design
and maintenance" includes, with respect to a chemical source
that is within a high priority category designated under
section 4(a)(1), implementation, to the extent practicable,
of the practices of--
(A) preventing or reducing the vulnerability of the
chemical source to a release of a covered substance of
concern through use of inherently safer technology;
(B) reducing any vulnerability of the chemical source to a
release of a covered substance of concern through use of
well-maintained secondary containment, control, or mitigation
equipment;
(C) reducing any vulnerability of the chemical source to a
release of a covered substance of concern by implementing
security measures; and
(D) reducing the potential consequences of any
vulnerability of the chemical source to a release of a
covered substance of concern through the use of buffer zones
between the chemical source and surrounding populations
(including buffer zones between the chemical source and
residences, schools, hospitals, senior centers, shopping
centers and malls,
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sports and entertainment arenas, public roads and
transportation routes, and other population centers).
(8) Security measure.--
(A) In general.--The term "security measure" means an
action carried out to increase the security of a chemical
source.
(B) Inclusions.--The term "security measure", with
respect to a chemical source, includes--
(i) employee training and background checks;
(ii) the limitation and prevention of access to controls of
the chemical source;
(iii) protection of the perimeter of the chemical source;
(iv) the installation and operation of an intrusion
detection sensor; and
(v) a measure to increase computer or computer network
security.
(9) Substance of concern.--
(A) In general.--The term "substance of concern" means--
(i) any regulated substance (as defined in section 112(r)
of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r))); and
(ii) any substance designated by the Administrator under
section 4(a).
(B) Exclusion.--The term "substance of concern" does not
include liquefied petroleum gas that is used as fuel or held
for sale as fuel at a retail facility as described in section
112(r)(4)(B) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(4)(B)).
(10) Unauthorized release.--The term "unauthorized
release" means--
(A) a release from a chemical source into the environment
of a covered substance of concern that is caused, in whole or
in part, by a criminal act;
(B) a release into the environment of a covered substance
of concern that has been removed from a chemical source, in
whole or in part, by a criminal act; and
(C) a release or removal from a chemical source of a
covered substance of concern that is unauthorized by the
owner or operator of the chemical source.
(11) Use of inherently safer technology.--
(A) In general.--The term "use of inherently safer
technology", with respect to a chemical source, means use of
a technology, product, raw material, or practice that, as
compared with the technologies, products, raw materials, or
practices currently in use--
(i) reduces or eliminates the possibility of a release of a
substance of concern from the chemical source prior to
secondary containment, control, or mitigation; and
(ii) reduces or eliminates the threats to public health and
the environment associated with a release or potential
release of a substance of concern from the chemical source.
(B) Inclusions.--The term "use of inherently safer
technology" includes input substitution, catalyst or carrier
substitution, process redesign (including reuse or recycling
of a substance of concern), product reformulation, procedure
simplification, and technology modification so as to--
(i) use less hazardous substances or benign substances;
(ii) use a smaller quantity of covered substances of
concern;
(iii) reduce hazardous pressures or temperatures;
(iv) reduce the possibility and potential consequences of
equipment failure and human error;
(v) improve inventory control and chemical use efficiency;
and
(vi) reduce or eliminate storage, transportation, handling,
disposal, and discharge of substances of concern.
SEC. 4. DESIGNATION OF AND REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH PRIORITY
CATEGORIES.
(a) Designation and Regulation of High Priority Categories
by the Administrator.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in consultation
with the head of the Office and State and local agencies
responsible for planning for and responding to unauthorized
releases and providing emergency health care, shall
promulgate regulations to designate certain combinations of
chemical sources and substances of concern as high priority
categories based on the severity of the threat posed by an
unauthorized release from the chemical sources.
(2) Factors to be considered.--In designating high priority
categories under paragraph (1), the Administrator, in
consultation with the head of the Office, shall consider--
(A) the severity of the harm that could be caused by an
unauthorized release;
(B) the proximity to population centers;
(C) the threats to national security;
(D) the threats to critical infrastructure;
(E) threshold quantities of substances of concern that pose
a serious threat; and
(F) such other safety or security factors as the
Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office,
determines to be appropriate.
(3) Requirements for high priority categories.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in consultation
with the head of the Office, the United States Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, and State and local
agencies described in paragraph (1), shall promulgate
regulations to require each owner and each operator of a
chemical source that is within a high priority category
designated under paragraph (1), in consultation with local
law enforcement, first responders, and employees, to--
(i) conduct an assessment of the vulnerability of the
chemical source to a terrorist attack or other unauthorized
release;
(ii) using appropriate hazard assessment techniques,
identify hazards that may result from an unauthorized release
of a covered substance of concern; and
(iii) prepare a prevention, preparedness, and response plan
that incorporates the results of those vulnerability and
hazard assessments.
(B) Actions and procedures.--A prevention, preparedness,
and response plan required under subparagraph (A)(iii) shall
include actions and procedures, including safer design and
maintenance of the chemical source, to eliminate or
significantly lessen the potential consequences of an
unauthorized release of a covered substance of concern.
(C) Threat information.--To the maximum extent permitted by
applicable authorities and the interests of national
security, the head of the Office, in consultation with the
Administrator, shall provide owners and operators of chemical
sources with threat information relevant to the assessments
and plans required under subsection (b).
(4) Review and revisions.--Not later than 5 years after the
date of promulgation of regulations under each of paragraphs
(1) and (3), the Administrator, in consultation with the head
of the Office, shall review the regulations and make any
necessary revisions.
(5) Addition of substances of concern.--For the purpose of
designating high priority categories under paragraph (1) or
any subsequent revision of the regulations promulgated under
paragraph (1), the Administrator, in consultation with the
head of the Office, may designate additional substances that
pose a serious threat as substances of concern.
(b) Certification.--
(1) Vulnerability and hazard assessments.--Not later than 1
year after the date of promulgation of regulations under
subsection (a)(3), each owner and each operator of a chemical
source that is within a high priority category designated
under subsection (a)(1) shall--
(A) certify to the Administrator that the chemical source
has conducted assessments in accordance with the regulations;
and
(B) submit to the Administrator written copies of the
assessments.
(2) Prevention, preparedness, and response plans.--Not
later than 18 months after the date of promulgation of
regulations under subsection (a)(3), the owner or operator
shall--
(A) certify to the Administrator that the chemical source
has completed a prevention, preparedness, and response plan
that incorporates the results of the assessments and complies
with the regulations; and
(B) submit to the Administrator a written copy of the plan.
(3) 5-year review.--Not later than 5 years after each of
the date of submission of a copy of an assessment under
paragraph (1) and a plan under paragraph (2), and not less
often than every 3 years thereafter, the owner or operator of
the chemical source covered by the assessment or plan, in
coordination with local law enforcement and first responders,
shall--
(A) review the adequacy of the assessment or plan, as the
case may be; and
(B)(i) certify to the Administrator that the chemical
source has completed the review; and
(ii) as appropriate, submit to the Administrator any
changes to the assessment or plan.
(4) Protection of information.--
(A) Disclosure exemption.--Except with respect to
certifications specified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of
this subsection and section 5(a), all information provided to
the Administrator under this subsection, and all information
derived from that information, shall be exempt from
disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code.
(B) Development of protocols.--
(i) In general.--The Administrator, in consultation with
the head of the Office, shall develop such protocols as are
necessary to protect the copies of the assessments and plans
required to be submitted under this subsection (including the
information contained in those assessments and plans) from
unauthorized disclosure.
(ii) Requirements.--The protocols developed under clause
(i) shall ensure that--
(I) each copy of an assessment or plan, and all information
contained in or derived from the assessment or plan, is
maintained in a secure location;
(II) except as provided in subparagraph (C), only
individuals designated by the Administrator may have access
to the copies of the assessments and plans; and
(III) no copy of an assessment or plan or any portion of an
assessment or plan, and no information contained in or
derived from an assessment or plan, shall be available to any
person other than an individual designated by the
Administrator.
(iii) Deadline.--As soon as practicable, but not later than
1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Administrator shall complete the development of protocols
under clause (i) so as to ensure that the protocols are in
place before the date on which the Administrator receives any
assessment or plan under this subsection.
(C) Federal officers and employees.--An individual referred
to in subparagraph (B)(ii)
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who is an officer or employee of the United States may
discuss with a State or local official the contents of an
assessment or plan described in that subparagraph.
SEC. 5. ENFORCEMENT.
(a) Review of Plans.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator, in consultation with
the head of the Office, shall review each assessment and plan
submitted under section 4(b) to determine the compliance of
the chemical source covered by the assessment or plan with
regulations promulgated under paragraphs (1) and (3) of
section 4(a).
(2) Certification of compliance.--
(A) In general.--The Administrator shall certify in writing
each determination of the Administrator under paragraph (1).
(B) Inclusions.--A certification of the Administrator shall
include a checklist indicating consideration by a chemical
source of the use of 4 elements of safer design and
maintenance described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of
section 3(6).
(C) Early compliance.--
(i) In general.--The Administrator, in consultation with
the head of the Office, shall--
(I) before the date of publication of proposed regulations
under section 4(a)(3), review each assessment or plan
submitted to the Administrator under section 4(b); and
(II) before the date of promulgation of final regulations
under section 4(a)(3), determine whether each such assessment
or plan meets the consultation, planning, and assessment
requirements applicable to high priority categories under
section 4(a)(3).
(ii) Affirmative determination.--If the Administrator, in
consultation with the head of the Office, makes an
affirmative determination under clause (i)(II), the
Administrator shall certify compliance of an assessment or
plan described in that clause without requiring any revision
of the assessment or plan.
(D) Schedule for review and certification.--
(i) In general.--The Administrator, after taking into
consideration the factors described in section 4(a)(2), shall
establish a schedule for the review and certification of
assessments and plans submitted under section 4(b).
(ii) Deadline for completion.--Not later than 3 years after
the deadlines for the submission of assessments and plans
under paragraph (1) or (2), respectively, of section 4(b),
the Administrator shall complete the review and certification
of all assessments and plans submitted under those sections.
(b) Compliance Assistance.--
(1) Definition of determination.--In this subsection, the
term "determination" means a determination by the
Administrator that, with respect to an assessment or plan
described in section 4(b)--
(A) the assessment or plan does not comply with regulations
promulgated under paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 4(a); or
(B)(i) a threat exists beyond the scope of the submitted
plan; or
(ii) current implementation of the plan is insufficient to
address--
(I) the results of an assessment of a source; or
(II) a threat described in clause (i).
(2) Determination by administrator.--If the Administrator,
after consultation with the head of the Office, makes a
determination, the Administrator shall--
(A) notify the chemical source of the determination; and
(B) provide such advice and technical assistance, in
coordination with the head of the Office and the United
States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, as is
appropriate--
(i) to bring the assessment or plan of a chemical source
described in section 4(b) into compliance; or
(ii) to address any threat described in clause (i) or (ii)
of paragraph (1)(B).
(c) Compliance Orders.--
(1) In general.--If, after the date that is 30 days after
the later of the date on which the Administrator first
provides assistance, or a chemical source receives notice,
under subsection (b)(2)(B), a chemical source has not brought
an assessment or plan for which the assistance is provided
into compliance with regulations promulgated under paragraphs
(1) and (3) of section 4(a), or the chemical source has not
complied with an entry or information request under section
6, the Administrator may issue an order directing compliance
by the chemical source.
(2) Notice and opportunity for hearing.--An order under
paragraph (1) may be issued only after notice and opportunity
for a hearing.
(d) Abatement Action.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding a certification under
section 5(a)(2), if the head of the Office, in consultation
with local law enforcement officials and first responders,
determines that a threat of a terrorist attack exists that is
beyond the scope of a submitted prevention, preparedness, and
response plan of 1 or more chemical sources, or current
implementation of the plan is insufficient to address the
results of an assessment of a source or a threat described in
subsection (b)(1)(B)(i), the head of the Office shall notify
each chemical source of the elevated threat.
(2) Insufficient response.--If the head of the Office
determines that a chemical source has not taken appropriate
action in response to a notification under paragraph (1), the
head of the Office shall notify the chemical source, the
Administrator, and the Attorney General that actions taken by
the chemical source in response to the notification are
insufficient.
(3) Relief.--
(A) In general.--On receipt of a notification under
paragraph (2), the Administrator or the Attorney General may
secure such relief as is necessary to abate a threat
described in paragraph (1), including such orders as are
necessary to protect public health or welfare.
(B) Jurisdiction.--The district court of the United States
for the district in which a threat described in paragraph (1)
occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the
Administrator or Attorney General requests under subparagraph
(A).
SEC. 6. RECORDKEEPING AND ENTRY.
(a) Records Maintenance.--A chemical source that is
required to certify to the Administrator assessments and
plans under section 4 shall maintain on the premises of the
chemical source a current copy of those assessments and
plans.
(b) Right of Entry.--In carrying out this Act, the
Administrator (or an authorized representative of the
Administrator), on presentation of credentials--
(1) shall have a right of entry to, on, or through any
premises of an owner or operator of a chemical source
described in subsection (a) or any premises in which any
records required to be maintained under subsection (a) are
located; and
(2) may at reasonable times have access to, and may copy,
any records, reports, or other information described in
subsection (a).
(c) Information Requests.--In carrying out this Act, the
Administrator may require any chemical source to provide such
information as is necessary to--
(1) enforce this Act; and
(2) promulgate or enforce regulations under this Act.
SEC. 7. PENALTIES.
(a) Civil Penalties.--Any owner or operator of a chemical
source that violates, or fails to comply with, any order
issued may, in an action brought in United States district
court, be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000
for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure
to comply continues.
(b) Criminal Penalties.--Any owner or operator of a
chemical source that knowingly violates, or fails to comply
with, any order issued shall--
(1) in the case of a first violation or failure to comply,
be fined not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day
of violation, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both; and
(2) in the case of a subsequent violation or failure to
comply, be fined not more than $50,000 per day of violation,
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
(c) Administrative Penalties.--
(1) Penalty orders.--If the amount of a civil penalty
determined under subsection (a) does not exceed $125,000, the
penalty may be assessed in an order issued by the
Administrator.
(2) Notice and hearing.--Before issuing an order described
in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall provide to the
person against which the penalty is to be assessed--
(A) written notice of the proposed order; and
(B) the opportunity to request, not later than 30 days
after the date on which the notice is received by the person,
a hearing on the proposed order.
SEC. 8. NO EFFECT ON REQUIREMENTS UNDER OTHER LAW.
Nothing in this Act affects any duty or other requirement
imposed under any other Federal or State law.
SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are
necessary to carry out this Act.
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