WHITE HOUSE PROCEDURES FOR SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 16, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-28
__________
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSISGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
TOM LANTOS, California TOM DAVIS, Virginia
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
DIANE E. WATSON, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DARRELL E. ISSA, California
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
Columbia BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota BILL SALI, Idaho
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ------ ------
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
PETER WELCH, Vermont
Phil Schiliro, Chief of Staff
Phil Barnett, Staff Director
Earley Green, Chief Clerk
David Marin, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 16, 2007................................... 1
Statement of:
Knodell, James, Director, Office of Security, Executive
Office of the President, the White House; and William
Leonard, Director, Information Security Oversight Office,
National Archives and Records Administration............... 43
Knodell, James........................................... 43
Leonard, William......................................... 44
Wilson, Valerie Plame, former employee, Central Intelligence
Agency..................................................... 17
Zaid, Mark, esquire; and Victoria Toensing, esquire.......... 72
Toensing, Victoria....................................... 74
Zaid, Mark............................................... 72
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Davis, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Virginia, prepared statement of......................... 15
Leonard, William, Director, Information Security Oversight
Office, National Archives and Records Administration,
prepared statement of...................................... 46
Toensing, Victoria, esquire, prepared statement of........... 77
Waxman, Chairman Henry A., a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, prepared statement of............. 4
WHITE HOUSE PROCEDURES FOR SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
----------
FRIDAY, MARCH 16, 2007
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry A. Waxman
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Waxman, Cummings, Kucinich,
Watson, Yarmuth, Van Hollen, Sarbanes, Davis of Virginia, and
Westmoreland.
Staff present: Phil Schiliro, chief of staff; Phil Barnett,
staff director and chief counsel; Kristin Amerling, general
counsel; Karen Lightfoot, communications director and senior
policy advisor; David Rapallo, chief investigative counsel;
Roger Sherman, deputy chief counsel; Theo Chuang, deputy chief
investigative counsel; Michael Gordon, senior investigative
counsel; Susanne Sachsman, counsel; Molly Gulland, assistant
communications director; Earley Green, chief clerk; Teresa
Coufal, deputy clerk; Caren Auchman, press assistant; Zhongrui
``JR'' Deng, chief information officer; Bonney Kapp, fellow;
David Marin, minority staff director; Larry Halloran, minority
deputy staff director; Jennifer Safavian, minority chief
counsel for oversight and investigations; Anne Marie Turner and
Steve Castor, minority counsels; Christopher Bright, minority
professional staff member; Nick Palarino, minority senior
investigator and policy advisor; Patrick Lyden, minority
parliamentarian and member services coordinator; Brian
McNicoll, minority communications director; and Benjamin
Chance, minority clerk.
Chairman Waxman. The meeting of the committee will come to
order. Today the committee is holding a hearing to examine how
the White House handles highly classified information.
In June and July 2003, one of the Nation's most carefully
guarded secrets, the identity of a covert CIA agent, Valerie
Plame Wilson, was repeatedly revealed by White House officials
to members of the media.
This was an extraordinarily serious breach of our national
security. President George W. Bush's father, the former
President Bush said, ``I have nothing but contempt and anger
for those who exposed the names of our sources. They are, in my
view, the most insidious of traitors.''
Today we'll be asking three questions. One, how did such a
serious violation of our national security occur? Two, did the
White House take the appropriate investigative and disciplinary
steps after the breach occurred? And three, what changes in
White House procedures are necessary to prevent future
violations of our national security from occurring?
For more than 3 years Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald
has been investigating the leak for its criminal implications.
By definition, Mr. Fitzgerald's investigation had an extremely
narrow criminal focus. It did not answer the broader policy
questions raised by the release of Mrs. Wilson's identity. Nor
did it seek to ascribe responsibility outside of the narrow
confines of the criminal law.
As the chief investigative committee in the House of
Representatives, our role is fundamentally different than Mr.
Fitzgerald's. It is not our job to determine criminal
culpability. But it is our job to understand what went wrong
and to insist on accountability, and to make recommendations to
avoid future abuses. We begin that process today.
This hearing is being conducted in open session. This is
appropriate, but it is also challenging. Mrs. Wilson was a
covert employee of the CIA. We cannot discuss all of the
details of her CIA employment in open session. I have met
personally with General Hayden, the head of the CIA, to discuss
what I can and cannot say about Mrs. Wilson's service. And I
want to thank him for his cooperation and help in guiding us
along these lines.
My staff has also worked with the Agency to assure these
remarks do not contain classified information.
I have been advised by the CIA that even now after all that
has happened, I cannot disclose the full nature, scope, and
character of Mrs. Wilson's service to our Nation without
causing serious damage to our national security interests.
But General Hayden and the CIA have cleared these following
comments for today's hearing.
During her employment at the CIA, Mrs. Wilson was
undercover.
Her employment status with the CIA was classified
information, prohibited by disclosure under Executive Order
12958.
At the time of the publication of Robert Novak's column on
July 14, 2003, Mrs. Wilson's CIA employment status was covert.
This was classified information.
Mrs. Wilson served in senior management positions at the
CIA in which she oversaw the work for other CIA employees and
she attained the level of GS-14, step 6 under the Federal pay
scale. Mrs. Wilson worked on some of the most sensitive and
highly secretive matters handled by the CIA. Mrs. Wilson served
at various times overseas for the CIA.
Without discussing the specifics of Mrs. Wilson's
classified work, it is accurate to say that she worked on the
prevention of the development and use of weapons of mass
destruction against the United States.
In her various positions at the CIA, Mrs. Wilson faced
significant risks to her personal safety and her life. She took
on serious risks on behalf of our country. Mrs. Wilson's work
in many situations had consequences for the security of her
colleagues, and maintaining her cover was critical to
protecting the safety of both colleagues and others.
The disclosure of Mrs. Wilson's employment with the CIA had
several serious effects. First, it terminated her covert job
opportunities with the CIA. Second, it placed her professional
contacts at greater risk. And third, it undermined the trust
and confidence with which future CIA employees and sources hold
the United States. This disclosure of Mrs. Wilson's classified
employment status with the CIA was so detrimental that the CIA
filed a crimes report with the Department of Justice.
As I mentioned, Mrs. Wilson's work was so sensitive that
even now, she is still prohibited from discussing many details
of her work in public because of the continuing risks to CIA
officials and assets in the field and in the CIA's ongoing
work.
Some have suggested that Mrs. Wilson did not have a
sensitive position with the CIA or a position of unusual risk.
As a CIA employee, Mrs. Wilson has taken a life-long oath to
protect classified information even after her CIA employment
has ended. As a result, she cannot respond to most of the
statements made about her.
I want to make clear, however, that any characterization
that minimizes the personal risk of Mrs. Wilson that she
accepted in her assignments is flatly wrong. There should be no
confusion on this point. Mrs. Wilson has provided great service
to our Nation and has fulfilled her obligation to protect
classified information admirably and with confidence and she
will uphold it again today.
That concludes the characterizations that the CIA is
permitting us to make today. To these comments, I want to add a
personal note. For many in politics, praising the troops and
those who defend our freedom is second nature. Sometimes it is
done in sincerity and sometimes it is done with cynicism, but
almost always we don't really know who the people are. We don't
know they're out there, we don't know who those people are that
are out there. They are our abstract heroes, whether they are
serving in the armed services or whether they're serving in the
CIA.
Two weeks ago this committee met some real heroes face-to-
face when we went to visit Walter Reed. Every Member was
appalled at what we learned. Our treatment of the troops didn't
match our rhetoric. Fortunately, Mrs. Wilson hasn't suffered
physical harm and faces much more favorable circumstances now
than some of the soldiers that we met last week. But she too
has been one of those people fighting to protect our freedom,
and she, like thousands of others, was serving our country
bravely and anonymously. She didn't ask that her identity be
revealed but it was, repeatedly. And that was an inexcusable
breach of the responsibilities our country owes to her.
Once again our actions did not match our rhetoric. I want
to thank Mrs. Wilson for the tremendous service she gave to our
country and recognize the remarkable personal sacrifices that
she and countless others have made to protect our national
security.
You and your colleagues perform truly heroic work and what
happened to you not only should never have happened, but we
should all work to make sure it never happens again. Thank you
very much.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Henry A. Waxman
follows:]
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Chairman Waxman. I want to yield to Mr. Davis, the ranking
member of our committee. And in doing so, I want to thank him
for his cooperation in this hearing. This has been a
complicated hearing. It is much more complicated than most of
our hearings. We had to decide what we could and what we
couldn't say, what we could and couldn't ask, whether it would
be an open session or closed session, etc. And I want to thank
Mr. Davis for the tremendous cooperation he has given and I do
recognize him at this point.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you, Chairman Waxman. I want
to first start by congratulating you on your passage of
important reform legislation this week. We adopted bipartisan
bills crafted in this committee to strengthen the Freedom of
Information Act, disclose donors to Presidential libraries,
expand access to Presidential records and to fortify most of
all protections. Given those accomplishments, it is ironic that
we in Sunshine Week of the annual observance of open
government--with a more partisan hearing on how to best keep
secrets.
Let me state at the outset that the outing of Mrs. Wilson's
identity was wrong, and we have every right to look at this and
investigate it. But I have to confess, I'm not sure what we're
trying to accomplish today, given all the limitations that the
chairman has just described that have been put on us by the
CIA.
I ostensibly called to examine White House procedures for
handling and protecting classified information. The hearing's
lead witness never worked at the White House. If she knows
about security practices there, she can't say much about them
in a public forum. We do know that she worked at the CIA. That
now well-known fact raises some very different questions about
how critical and difficult it is to protect the identity of
individuals with covert status.
But, again, those are questions we probably can't say much
about in a public forum without violating the various security
safeguards the majority claims to be worried about at the White
House. Under these circumstances, perhaps a hypothetical case
is the best way to describe the futility of trying to enforce
the Intelligence Identities Protection Act in this decidedly
nonjudicial venue.
Let's say, for example, a committee staff is told to
identify a CIA witness for a hearing on security practices. He
or she calls the Agency and asks to speak with official A.
Official A is not in so the call is routed to official B, who
identifies him or herself by name and title and answers the
staffer's question. Thinking official B would be a fine
witness, the staff then calls the Congressional Research
Service or a friend at another committee to find out more about
official B, but official B happens to be a covert agent. In
passing the name, title and CIA affiliation around, has the
staff member violated the law against disclosure? Probably not.
But you would have to be looking through a pretty thick
political prism to see an intentional unauthorized disclosure
in that context, and that happened.
In the case of Mrs. Wilson, the majority stresses the fact
the disclosure of her status triggered a crimes report by the
CIA and the Justice Department. Allegations against White House
officials and reporters were thoroughly vetted, but after
spending 6 months and millions of dollars, the special counsel
charged no one with violations of the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act. The lack of prosecution under the act show
those disclosures probably occurred in a similarly
nonintentional context, lacking the requisite knowledge of
covert status or the intention to disclose that status without
authorization.
No process can be adopted to protect classified information
that no one knows is classified, just as no one can be
prosecuted for unauthorized disclosure of information that no
one ever said was protected. So this looks to me more like a
CIA problem than a White House problem. If the Agency doesn't
take sufficient precautions to protect the identity of those
who engage in covert work, no one else can do it for them.
The same law meant to protect secret identities also
requires an annual report to Congress on the steps taken to
protect the highly sensitive information. But we're told few if
any such reports exist from the CIA. Who knows what information
needs to be protected and how they are told. Is there a list
officials can check against? Do CIA briefers know when material
given to executive branch officials references a covert agent,
or are they cautioned not to repeat the name? How is it made
known, and to whom, when the 5-year protection period for
formerly covert agents has elapsed?
Those are the questions that need to be asked about the
safeguards and classified information, but we won't hear from
the CIA today because this is an open forum.
Given all that, I suspect we're going to probably waste
some time talking about things we can't talk about. And that is
unfortunate. Unfortunate an individual possibly still in a
covert status was publicly identified, unfortunate executive
branch officials got anywhere near this media maelstrom rather
than focus on more serious problems. That is a disappointment
to me. And unfortunate that this has become so politicized.
On this side, we're not here to defend or attack anyone. In
an open session, we hope to shed some sunshine on the workings
of government. I have to say, I am not sure that's going to
happen today, but I thank our witnesses for trying. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Davis follows:]
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Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Davis.
Our first witness is Mrs. Valerie Plame Wilson. She is a
former covert CIA employee whose service to this country
included work involving the prevention of the development and
use of weapons of mass destruction against our Nation. Her
employment status was publicly disclosed in July 2003,
effectively terminating her covert job opportunities within the
CIA.
Mrs. Wilson, it is the practice of this committee that all
witnesses are administered an oath, and I would like to ask you
to stand and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Chairman Waxman. The record will reflect the fact that the
witness answered in the affirmative. Before we begin the
questioning period, I wanted to underscore to members of the
committee that while it is important that Mrs. Wilson have the
opportunity to provide testimony that will help us understand
the significance of the disclosure of her CIA employment
status, we should not be seeking classified information from
Mrs. Wilson in this open forum, and we need to respect that she
may in some cases have to decline to respond on the grounds of
doing so would risk disclosure of sensitive information.
Mrs. Wilson, we're pleased to have you here. Thank you very
much for coming to our committee today. And I want to recognize
you for an opening statement. There is a button on the base of
the mic. Be sure to press it in and pull it closely enough to
you so you can be heard.
STATEMENT OF VALERIE PLAME WILSON, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members
of the committee. My name is Valerie Plame Wilson and I am
honored to be invited to testify under oath before the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on the critical
issue of safeguarding classified information.
I am grateful for this opportunity to set the record
straight. I have served the United States loyally and to the
best of my ability as a covert operations officer for the
Central Intelligence Agency. I worked on behalf of the national
security of our country, on behalf of the people of the United
States, until my name and true affiliation were exposed in the
national media on July 14, 2003, after a leak by administration
officials.
Today I can tell this committee even more. In the run-up to
the war with Iraq, I worked in the Counterproliferation
Division of the CIA, still as a covert officer whose
affiliation with the CIA was classified. I was to discover
solid intelligence for senior policymakers on Iraq's presumed
weapons of mass destruction programs. While I helped to manage
and run secret worldwide operations against this WMD target
from CIA headquarters in Washington, I also traveled to foreign
countries on secret missions to find vital intelligence.
I loved my career because I love my country. I was proud of
the serious responsibilities entrusted to me as a CIA covert
operations officer, and I was dedicated to this work. It was
not common knowledge on the Georgetown cocktail circuit that
everyone knew where I worked. But all of my efforts on behalf
of the national security of the United States, all of my
training, all of the value of my years of service were abruptly
ended when my name and identity were exposed irresponsibly.
In the course of the trial of Vice President Cheney's
former chief of staff, Scooter Libby, I was shocked by the
evidence that emerged. My name and identity were carelessly and
recklessly abused by senior government officials in both the
White House and the State Department. All of them understood
that I worked for the CIA, and having signed oaths to protect
national security secrets, they should have been diligent in
protecting me and every CIA officer.
The CIA goes to great lengths to protect all of its
employees, providing at significant taxpayer's expense
painstakingly devised covers for its most sensitive staffers.
The harm that is done when a CIA cover is blown is grave, but I
can't provide details beyond that in this public hearing. But
the concept is obvious. Not only have breaches of national
security endangered CIA officers, it has jeopardized and even
destroyed entire networks of foreign agents who, in turn, risk
their own lives and those of their families to provide the
United States with needed intelligence. Lives are literally at
stake.
Every single one of my former CIA colleagues, from my
fellow covert officers to analysts to technical operations
officers to even the secretaries, understand the
vulnerabilities of our officers and recognize that the travesty
of what happened to me could happen to them. We in the CIA
always know that we might be exposed and threatened by foreign
enemies. It was a terrible irony that administration officials
were the ones who destroyed my cover. Furthermore, testimony in
the criminal trial of Vice President Cheney's former chief of
staff, who has now been convicted of serious crimes, indicates
that my exposure arose from purely political motives.
Within the CIA it is essential that all intelligence be
evaluated on the basis of its merits and actual credibility.
National security depends upon it. The trade craft of
intelligence is not a product of speculation. I feel
passionately as an intelligence professional about the creeping
insidious politicizing of our intelligence process. All
intelligence professionals are dedicated to the idea that they
would rather be fired on the spot than distort the facts to fit
a political view, any political view or any ideology.
As our intelligence agencies go through reorganizations and
experience the painful aspects of change and our country faces
profound challenges, injecting partisanship or ideology into
the equation makes effective and accurate intelligence that
much more difficult to develop. Politics and ideology must be
stripped completely from our intelligence services or the
consequences will be even more severe than they have been and
our country placed in even greater danger.
It is imperative for any President to be able to make
decisions based on intelligence that is unbiased. The Libby
trial and the events leading to the Iraq War highlight the
urgent need to restore the highest professional standards of
intelligence collection and analysis and the protection of our
officers and operations.
The Congress has a constitutional duty to defend our
national security and that includes safeguarding our
intelligence. That is why I am grateful for this opportunity to
appear before this committee today and to assist in its
important work.
Thank you. And I welcome any questions.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mrs. Wilson. We'll
now proceed with 10 minutes on each side managed by the Chair
and the ranking member of the committee. For our first round, I
want to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr.
Yarmuth, to begin the questioning.
Mr. Yarmuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
here today, Mrs. Wilson. Our country owes you a great debt of
gratitude for your service, and I think you are continuing that
service today by appearing.
I would like to start by asking you about July 14, 2003,
the day that Robert Novak wrote the column in the Chicago Sun
Times, identifying you as an Agency operative on weapons of
mass destruction.
But before I get to that, I want to ask you about the day
before, July 13. My understanding is that on that date, you
were covert. Is that correct? On July 13?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I was a covert officer, correct.
Mr. Yarmuth. Without destroying--or disclosing classified
information, what does covert mean?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I'm not a lawyer. But my understanding
is that the CIA is taking affirmative steps to ensure that
there are no links between the operations officer and the
Central Intelligence Agency. I mean, that is simple.
Mr. Yarmuth. And as you said and my understanding is that
your work was classified for purposes of many regulations in
the laws, and we're talking about your work was classified on
that day, July 13.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. That's correct.
Mr. Yarmuth. Did the July 14 column destroy your covert
position and your classified status?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, it did. I could no longer perform
the work for which I had been highly trained. I could no longer
travel overseas or do the work for which--my career which I
loved. It was done.
Mr. Yarmuth. And this may be a simplistic question, but the
information that was disclosed in Robert Novak's column, is it
correct to say that is information that you would not have
disclosed yourself?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. That is correct.
Mr. Yarmuth. How did you react when you learned that your
identity had been disclosed?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I found out very early in the morning
when my husband came in and dropped the newspaper on the bed
and said, ``He did it.'' And I quickly turned and read the
article, and I felt like I had been hit in the gut. It was over
in an instant, and I immediately thought of my family's safety,
the agents and networks that I had worked with, and everything
goes through your mind in an instant.
Mr. Yarmuth. What effect did the leak have on you
professionally?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Professionally? Well, I could no longer
do the work which I had been trained to do. There was--after
that, there is no way that you can serve overseas in a covert
capacity. And so that career path was terminated.
Mr. Yarmuth. Did the leak make you feel that your entire
career had been thrown out the window essentially, it had been
wasted at all?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Not wasted, but certainly terminated
prematurely.
Mr. Yarmuth. You talked a little bit about your concern
about the effect of the leak on your professional contacts. Did
you have any contact with those people who weren't--expressed
their concern about the effect on their professional career?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No, I did not. But I do know the Agency
did a damage assessment. They did not share it with me. But I
know that it certainly puts the people and the contacts I had
all in jeopardy, even if they were completely innocent in
nature.
Mr. Yarmuth. And what effect do you think it had at the
broadest level? I'm talking about for future CIA employees and
future sources.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I think it was--it had a very negative
effect. If our government cannot even protect my identity,
future foreign agents who might consider working with the
Central Intelligence Agency and providing needed intelligence
would think twice. Well, they can't even protect one of their
own. How are they going to protect me? As well as the Agency is
working very hard to attract highly talented young people into
its ranks, because we do have profound challenges facing our
country today. And I can't think that helped those efforts.
Mr. Yarmuth. I can't see the clock, Mr. Chairman. I don't
know whether my time has expired or not.
Chairman Waxman. You have 9 seconds.
Mr. Yarmuth. Well, I will yield back the balance of my
seconds to you, Chairman. Thank you. Thank you, Mrs. Wilson.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you Mr. Yarmuth.
The Chair would now like to yield time to Mr. Hodes, the
gentleman from New Hampshire.
Mr. Hodes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mrs. Wilson, thank you
for coming today. What happened to you is deadly serious. You
were the victim of a national security breach. If this was a
law enforcement context, something I am familiar with, it would
be equivalent to disclosing the identity of an undercover
police officer who has put his life on the line and the lives
of all those who helped that officer.
Our job on this committee is to find out how the breach
happened. Now, I would like to show you a chart that we
prepared on the committee. You will see it up on the screens,
and we're putting it up here on paper. That chart is a graphic
depiction of all the ways that your classified CIA employment
was disclosed to White House officials and then to the press.
Every colored block on that chart is an individual, and every
arrow shows a disclosure of classified information. That
classified information was your CIA employment status. And the
arrows are based on the testimony in Mr. Libby's criminal case
and press reports. This chart shows over 20 different
disclosures about your employment.
Let me ask you, looking at this chart, are you surprised
that so many people had access to the classified information
about your CIA employment?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, I am, Congressman. And I am also
surprised at how carelessly they used it.
Mr. Hodes. What was your expectation about how the
government would handle the classified information about your
work and status?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. My expectation, Congressman, was that--
as of all CIA operations officers, every officer serving
undercover, that senior government officials would protect our
identity. We all take oaths to protect classified information
and national security. So----
Mr. Hodes. Prior to the time that you learned that your
status had been disclosed, you never authorized anyone to
disclose your status, did you?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Absolutely not.
Mr. Hodes. And no one ever approached you and asked for
permission to disclose any classified information about you?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No.
Mr. Hodes. Vice President Cheney never approached you and
asked if he had your permission to disclose your status, did
he?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No.
Mr. Hodes. Karl Rove never approached you and asked whether
he had your permission to disclose your status, did he?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No.
Mr. Hodes. Now, this isn't even a complete picture because
as you can see on this chart, we don't know, for example, who
told Karl Rove your status. There is a black box up there, and
it says unknown. And there are two arrows from that. One
pointing to Vice President Cheney and one pointing to Karl
Rove. So that is an unanswered question right now.
Now, I can imagine that you have followed the proceedings
and the press pretty closely over the past few years, have you
not?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Hodes. Do you have any theories about who told Karl
Rove about your status?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No, I do not. There was much evidence
introduced in the Libby trial that provides quite a bit, but I
have no--it would just be guesses.
Mr. Hodes. Well, that is what this committee's
investigation is all about, following all the links in the
chain from their sources to their destination. Now, it has been
reported that Mr. Rove had a discussion with Chris Matthews
about you, and the report was that Mr. Rove told Mr. Matthews,
Valerie Plame is fair game. Do you recall that?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, I do.
Mr. Hodes. I'd like to ask you to forget for a moment that
he was talking about you. Imagine that he was talking about
another undercover agent working on sensitive issues, and that
undercover agent, that undercover agent's life was on the line.
Do you have a reaction to that?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Absolutely. This happened to me, but I
would like to think I would feel just as passionately if it had
happened to any of my former colleagues at the CIA.
Mr. Hodes. One final question. Is there any circumstance
that you can think of that would justify leaking the name of an
undercover agent?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No, Congressman.
Mr. Hodes. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Hodes.
Before we yield our time, we have a long list of people
that seem to have either intentionally or advertently passed on
your status and your name as a CIA agent, and that included the
President, Vice President, Scooter Libby, Karl Rove, Ari
Fleisher, just to name a few.
Did any of those people, the President, the Vice President,
Karl Rove, Scooter Libby, Ari Fleisher, did any of them ever
call you and apologize to you?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No, Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. None of them ever called you to express
regrets?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Plame.
It's clear that administration officials knew you worked
for the CIA, but did they know that your status was that of a
covert agent?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I have no way of knowing, but I can say
I worked for the Counterproliferation Division of the
Directorate of Operations. And while not all, many of the
employees of that division are, in fact, in covert status.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. But you don't have--I think one of
the issues here was not that you worked for the CIA, because
that was obviously widely known in the administration, but for
the crime to have been committed, they had to have known you
were covert, and you don't have any direct linkage that they
knew you were covert at that point.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Again, Congressman. I am not a lawyer,
but as I said----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. You don't have any direct knowledge.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No. But as I said in my opening
comments, the fact that they knew that I worked for the CIA,
that alone should have increased their level of diligence.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Look, we all agree that everybody
needs to protect national security and protect the identities
of undercover and covert agents. But should the CIA have done
more to adequately protect people as well and say these covert
agents shouldn't be outed? Did the CIA have a responsibility
here as well?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I think that Congress might think about
reviewing the Intelligence Identities Protection Act and seeing
what went wrong and where it needs to be perhaps rewritten.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I mean,--look, the CIA is supposed
to report to Congress each year on the steps taken to protect
this highly sensitive information. And I am told few, if any,
reports are even filed. So I think there is a responsibility
from the CIA, and I think what is missing and I think from--at
least from a criminal perspective, not from a policy but from a
criminal perspective, that the special prosecutor in this case
looked at that and found that the people who may have been
saying this didn't know that you were covert, and you didn't
have any evidence to the contrary?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. That, I think, is a question better put
to the special prosecutor, Congressman.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Shouldn't the CIA have made sure
that anyone who knew your name and your work be told of your
status? Would that have been helpful in this case? That would
have made it very clear if anyone leaked it at that point they
were violating the law at least.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. The CIA does go to great lengths to
create and protect all kinds of covers for its officers. There
is a lot of money and a lot of time and a lot of energy that
goes into that. And the onus also--the burden falls on the
officer himself or herself to live that cover, but it is not a
perfect world.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. The Intelligence Identities
Protection Act makes it a crime to knowingly disclose the
identity of a covert agent, which has a specific definition
under the act. Did anyone ever tell you that you were so
designated?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I'm not a lawyer.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. That's why I asked if they told you.
I'm not asking for your interpretation.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No. But I was covert. I did travel
overseas on secret missions within the last 5 years.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I'm not arguing with that. What I am
asking is, for purposes of the act--and maybe this just never
occurred to you or anybody else at the time, but did anybody
say that you were so designated under the act, or was this just
after it came to fact?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No. No one told me that.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. How about after the disclosure?
After the disclosure did anyone then say, gee, you were
designated under the act. This should not have happened. Did
anyone in the CIA tell you at that point?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. Since the disclosure of your
identity, have you been offered other positions within the CIA?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes. I went on to other jobs with
commensurate responsibility.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. No demotion or anything? You didn't
experience any demotion?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Did anyone at the CIA tell you your
career path was damaged by the disclosure?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Now, you were a senior manager, a
GS-14, step 6, eligible for a GS-15 at the time. Did anyone
ever tell you that you could not advance in a normal career
path after this exposure?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. It was very clear that I could not
advance as a covert operations officer.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. And would that then--your upward
career path in terms of getting a GS-15 then was impaired in
your opinion?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No. But that was the career for which I
had been trained, for which I wanted to do. My husband and I,
after our children were born, discussed going overseas again
when they were a little bit older, and all of that came to an
abrupt end, obviously.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Do you know if any of the CIA
colleagues--like Robert Grimere who testified at the Libby
trial, that he told administration officials that you were
involved in sending your husband to Niger--do you know if he
ever told any of these officials that you were involved?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I have no idea other than what he
testified.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. When you introduced yourself and
your husband to the group of IC analysts at the February 19,
2002 meeting at CIA headquarters, did you tell anybody present
then you were undercover?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No, I did not. I was in CIA
headquarters. I introduced them and left the meeting,
Congressman.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. Would they have known that you
were--would they have had any reason to have known you were
undercover or----
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I believe that they would have assumed
such.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. We're limited in what we can ask. So
we're trying to stay in the confines that the CIA has----
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I understand.
Let me just ask, try to put some of the speculation to rest
and give you an opportunity to answer. In January 2004, Vanity
Fair published an article, not always known for great accuracy,
touching on your role in the Niger uranium affair. It said--
this is what they said: In early May, Wilson and Plame attended
a conference sponsored by the Senate Democratic Policy
Committee at which Wilson spoke about Iraq--one of the other
panelists was New York Times journalist Nicholas Kristof--over
breakfast the next morning. It was Kristof and his wife Wilson
told about his trip to Niger and said Kristof could write about
it but not name him. Is that account accurate?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I think it is. I had nothing--I was not
speaking to Mr. Kristof, and I think my husband did say that he
had undertaken this trip but not to be named as a source.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. Just to be clear, the article
says that your husband met for breakfast with Kristof and his
wife. Just to be clear, were you at the breakfast?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Briefly. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. On June 13, Kristof wrote a
column about the Niger uranium matter. He wrote that he was
piecing the story from two people directly involved and two
others who were briefed on it. Do you know if you were one of
those people that he was referring to?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I can't imagine that I would be. I did
not speak to him about it.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. What about your husband? Would
he have been one of the sources?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I think he was speaking to Mr. Kristof
at that point.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. OK. Was any of that information
classified to your knowledge?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I yield back at this point.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cummings for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Wilson, first of all, let me thank you for your
service. Mrs. Wilson, even today your work for the CIA is so
highly classified that we're not permitted to discuss the
details. But we can clarify one crucial point, whether you
worked under cover for the CIA. You said that your position was
covert, but I have heard others say that you were not covert.
In fact, one of the witnesses who will testify a little bit
later, Victoria Toensing, is making that same argument.
In an op-ed that appeared in the Washington Post on
February 18, she says it quite bluntly, she says, ``Plame was
not covert. She worked at CIA headquarters and had not been
stationed abroad within 5 years.'' I know there are
restrictions on what you can say today, but is Ms. Toensing's
statement correct?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Congressman, thank you for the
opportunity. I know I am here under oath, and I am here to say
that I was a covert officer of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Just like a general is a general whether he is in the field in
Iraq or Afghanistan, when he comes back to the Pentagon, he is
still a general. In the same way, covert operations officers
who are serving in the field, when they rotate back for a
temporary assignment in Washington, they too are still covert.
Mr. Cummings. Is it possible that Ms. Toensing had more
information than you do about your work or had access to secret
documents that you don't?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I would find that highly unlikely,
Congressman, because much of that information about my career
is still classified.
Mr. Cummings. On Wednesday night, I know Mr. Waxman, our
Chair, and Congressman Reyes, the chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee, spoke personally with General Hayden,
the head of the CIA. And Chairman Waxman told me that General
Hayden said clearly and directly, ``Mrs. Wilson was covert.''
There was no doubt about it.
And by the way, the CIA has authorized us to be able to say
that. In addition, I understand that Chairman Waxman sent his
opening statement over to the CIA to be cleared and to make
sure that it was accurate. In it he said, ``Mrs. Wilson was a
covert employee of the CIA.'' ``Mrs. Wilson was under cover.''
The CIA cleared these statements. I emphasize all of this
because I know that there are people who are still trying to
suggest that what seems absolutely clear isn't really true and
that you weren't covert. And I think one of the things we need
to do in this hearing is make sure there isn't any ambiguity on
this point.
Just three more questions. Did you hold this covert status
at the time of the leak, did you? The covert status at the time
of the leak?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, I did, Congressman. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. No. 2, the Identities Protection Act refers
to travel outside the United States within the last 5 years.
Let me ask you this question. Again, we don't want classified
information, dates, locations or any other details. During the
past 5 years, Ms. Plame, from today, did you conduct secret
missions overseas?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, I did, Congressman.
Mr. Cummings. Finally, so as to be clear for the record,
you were a covert CIA employee and within the past 5 years from
today, you went on secret missions outside the United States;
is that correct?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Cummings. I want to thank you, and I hope this
committee now has cleared up the issue of covert, whether Ms.
Plame was a covert agent. And I yield back.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much Mr. Cummings. Mr.
Westmoreland.
Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am glad
Mr. Cummings asked those questions because I was going to ask
them, too.
Mrs. Wilson, I want to thank you for your service to our
country. If I seem a little nervous, I have never questioned a
spy before, and so----
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I have never testified before.
Mr. Westmoreland. I'm sorry?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I have never testified under oath
before.
Mr. Westmoreland. And I was here during the steroid
hearings too, and I don't think any of those baseball stars got
this kind of media attention that you are getting today.
But when the chairman had his opening statements, he used
three different terms: covert, undercover and classified. Were
you one of those in particular? Or all of them? Or three
different terms to categorize, I guess, your service to the
country?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. For those of us that were undercover in
the CIA, we tended to use covert or undercover interchangeably.
I am not--we typically would not say of ourselves we were in a
classified position. You are kind of undercover or covert
employee.
Mr. Westmoreland. Now, did you just discuss this among
yourself if you were classified or covert? Because I am
assuming that you couldn't discuss it with anybody outside the
Agency. So was it kind of like y'all sat around the break room
and said, I am covert or I am classified? Or if I was going to
tell somebody, what I would tell somebody?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes. Within your colleagues, either
within the field or at headquarters here in Washington, if you
were working on a project, sometimes you did need to know, are
you under cover or are you overt? Let me know. And then you
know how to treat them accordingly in the sense of how careful
to be and your association and so forth.
Mr. Westmoreland. Right. So your fellow CIA employees would
have known that you were covert or classified or whatever.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Oh, absolutely, absolutely.
Mr. Westmoreland. Did you ever tell anyone that you worked
for the CIA or was that commonly known that you worked for the
CIA or did you tell them that you were something else?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No, Congressman. I could count on one
hand the number of people who knew where my true employer was
the day that I was--my name was and true affiliation was
exposed in July 2003.
Mr. Westmoreland. OK. And I'm assuming one of those was
your husband.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. That's--yes, he did know.
Mr. Westmoreland. Did he know if you were covert or
classified or----
Mrs. Plame Wilson. He did understand. As a former
Ambassador and having held security clearances and worked with
many Agency employees, he understood that world to a certain
point, and he certainly understood that I was undercover, and
he protected that diligently.
Mr. Westmoreland. OK. And this is the one last--are we
going to have another round of questions, Mr. Waxman, do you
think? Or----
Chairman Waxman. Well, we do have other panels. I guess if
Members wish them.
Mr. Westmoreland. I mean, I'm just trying----
Chairman Waxman. You have a minute and 48 seconds.
Mr. Westmoreland. OK. Ms. Plame, on October 5, 2003, being
interviewed on Meet the Press, your husband stated that my wife
will not allow herself to be photographed. In response to the
picture you took for Vanity Fair, your husband was quoted in
the Washington Post, the picture should not be able to identify
her and are not supposed to. She is still employed by the CIA
and has obligations to her employer. So I guess this was after
the incident where everybody knew that you worked for the CIA,
that this was done?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, Congressman. At the time that
picture came out, my covert status was long gone. And I will
say this: Having lived most of my life very much under the
radar, my learning curve was steep, and it was more trouble
than it was worth.
Mr. Westmoreland. But when the photograph was actually
taken in Vanity Fair, nobody that was not--that was not public
knowledge? I mean, all of this was not out then?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Oh, Congressman, the picture came out in
late 2003. My covert status was blown.
Mr. Westmoreland. OK. If your status was either covert or
classified and if you did, in fact, meet with the Senate
Democratic Policy Committee, Mr. Kristof, did you view as part
of your covert or classified work to meet with political groups
and a columnist from The New York Times to discuss matters
within your purview at the CIA? And, you know, I don't know if
you saw the list of things that we could or could not ask you.
Did this Democratic Policy Committee and the columnist from the
New York Times have these same rules that they could or could
not ask you? Or did you volunteer other information?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Congressman, I attended that conference
simply as a spouse of my husband, who was invited to speak. He
had been invited to speak because he had quite a bit of
experience on Iraq, having served the first President Bush as
the Charg D'Affairs at our Embassy in Baghdad during the first
Gulf war and negotiated the release of the hostages with Saddam
Hussein and so forth. And he was asked to attend in that
capacity. I had no discussions other than purely social in
nature.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Westmoreland. Your time has
expired. Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mrs. Wilson, and thank
you for your service to our country. Briefly, I want to pick up
on my colleague Mr. Hodes's question. When you look at this
chart and you see the extraordinary efforts that were made to
disclose your identity, and most of this information came out
of the Libby trial, what were you thinking when you saw the
effort? This wasn't just a leak, was it, in your estimation--
was this simply just a leak of an ID?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Quite a bit of evidence came out in the
course of the Libby trial, and I really was deeply dismayed
because it just showed a recklessness and a political path that
is very, very unfortunate.
Mr. Kucinich. In your judgment, when you look at the chart,
does it show a fairly organized approach to disclose your
identity?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Well, it certainly is wide-reaching.
Mr. Kucinich. Because, Mr. Chairman, you know, do leaks
occur of agents' identities? It does happen?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I'm sorry, Congressman?
Mr. Kucinich. Have there been in the past leaks of an
agent's identity?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. None that I am aware of by their very
own government.
Mr. Kucinich. And you have never in your experience as an
agent seen this kind of a coordinated effort by one's own
government, in this case our government, to disclose the
identity of an agent?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No, Congressman. I am not aware of any.
Mr. Kucinich. To what extent does the agency go to to
protect the identities of its agents?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Significant effort. And, again,
taxpayers' money, particularly in this day and age of Google
and Internet. The efforts have to be even more vigilant and
ever more creative, because it is extremely easy to find out a
lot of information about someone if you really want to. So we
are constant--the CIA constantly needs to be one step ahead to
protect their operations officers.
Mr. Kucinich. So when there is an extraordinary effort made
to disclose the identity of an agent, it is destructive of the
Agency and it is destructive of the taxpayers' investment in
the Central Intelligence Agency; is that correct?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Absolutely.
Mr. Kucinich. And one of the things that keeps running
through my mind is why, why did this happen to you? Was it an
unintentional mistake or is it part of a larger pattern? In
recent weeks we've learned that U.S. attorneys in all parts of
the country were fired despite exemplary service, and several
of these attorneys testified to Congress that they were being
pressured to pursue cases against Democratic officials. Others
believe that they were fired because they were pursuing cases
against Republican officials. Have you followed this issue?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, I have, Congressman.
Mr. Kucinich. And when I think of what's happened to these
attorneys, I can't help but think of your case, because these
could be isolated instances, but they seem to be part of a
larger pattern. Do you know what happened, for example, with
the former Treasury Secretary, Mr. O'Neill, when he wrote his
book The Price of Loyalty?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, I am aware of that.
Mr. Kucinich. And then after Secretary O'Neill wrote that
the Bush administration was planning to overthrow Saddam
Hussein in a much earlier timeframe than anyone knew, Secretary
O'Neill was falsely accused of leaking classified information.
Did you know that Secretary O'Neill was investigated by the
Treasury Department for a groundless accusation?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I believe I have read that. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. Now another instance, General Shinseki warned
that the United States would need several hundred thousand
troops in Iraq. Ms. Wilson, do you remember what happened to
General Shinseki?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, I do, Congressman. He was
dismissed.
Mr. Kucinich. I will also remind you of the case of Richard
Foster, the government's chief Medicare actuary. He was
actually told he would be fired if he told Congress the truth
about how much the administration's proposed drug benefit would
cost. Were you aware of that, Ms. Wilson?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, I was.
Mr. Kucinich. Now, again, these could all be isolated
instances, but they seem to be part of a larger pattern. And I
am struck by what your husband, Joe Wilson, was quoted as
saying in the book Hubris.
Now according to the book, Joe Wilson was upset and said he
regarded the leak as a warning to others. ``Stories like this
are not intended to intimidate me, since I have already told my
story. But it is pretty clearly intended to intimidate others
who might come forward. You need only look at the stories of
intelligence analysts who say they've been pressured. They may
have kids in college who may be vulnerable to these types of
smears.'' Is this what you think was going on here?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. When you look at--and I can speak only
to the realm of intelligence, and you have the politicizing of
that. Certainly Vice President Cheney's unprecedented number of
visits to CIA headquarters in the run-up to the war might be
one example.
Mr. Kucinich. That's exactly the point. What happens when
someone is working at the Agency level that people are working
at when the Vice President visits, the Vice President of the
United States comes over and starts looking over their
shoulder. Is that intimidating?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, it is.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Kucinich, your time has expired.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much.
Chairman Waxman. Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this
hearing. It shows our determination to bring out into the open
the malfeasance in office. I am an ambassador. I have gone
through the training. I have been blindfolded, put on a C-130,
taken to a site, taken into a room with my colleagues, just
like Galactica 3,000, handed a red folder ``highly classified''
with a general standing over my shoulder, ``Read it and give it
back to me.'' Any information that came out of that folder and
was made public had to come from two sources, the general or
myself. I was the only woman in the room.
The men, if their wives asked them said, I could tell you
but I would have to kill you. So I am very sensitive to how it
works. And I am furious that your classified information was
exposed. And Robert Novak of all people.
Now, I am going to ask you some questions. They might
appear repetitive. But you are sworn, and I want this for the
record. Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald found that at the
time of Robert Novak's July 14, 2003 column, your employment
status was classified and that your affiliation with the CIA
was not common knowledge outside the Intelligence Community.
The CIA has confirmed to this committee that at the time of Mr.
Novak's article, your employment status was covert and that
information was classified.
But some people are still trying to minimize your service
by suggesting you really weren't at risk and that your position
was not classified because you worked at a desk job at the CIA
headquarters at Langley, Virginia.
Let me give you an actual example.
Representative Roy Blunt said on the television program
Face the Nation, you know, this was a job that the Ambassador's
wife had that she went to every day. It was a desk job. I think
many people in Washington understood that her employment was at
the CIA and she went to that office every day.
Mrs. Wilson, is it fair to say that based on your service
for our government, you are well versed in the rules governing
the handling of classified information?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Absolutely, Congresswoman. And I would
like to just add that when operations officers, when they are
posted in the field or back at headquarters, we are given
training to understand--surveillance detection training so that
we understand very carefully that we are not being followed and
that we feel very comfortable that our status can be protected.
Ms. Watson. That is the reason why I started off with my
own scenario.
Is it your understanding that the Executive order governing
the safeguarding of classified information prohibits the
disclosure of classified information to persons who are not
authorized to receive this information?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes. Correct.
Ms. Watson. ``Yes'' is the answer?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, Congresswoman.
Ms. Watson. And is it your understanding that when an
employee at the CIA is undercover, that individual's employment
status at the CIA is considered classified information?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, it is.
Ms. Watson. Are you aware of any desk job exception to the
rules prohibiting the release of--release on information on the
employment status of a CIA employee?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No, Congresswoman.
Ms. Watson. So I think your testimony underscores the
efforts to minimize the significance of the disclosure of your
employment status or, in effect, minimizing the importance of
the classified information, rules designed to protect our
national security. And I am infuriated to continue to hear,
``She just had a desk job,'' because I understand, I have been
there, I have had the training, and I want to thank you
sincerely for the work that you have done in regards to the
protection of Homeland Security and showing the love for this
country.
Thank you very much.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Ms. Watson.
Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. First of all, I want to thank you,
Ms. Plame, for coming before this committee and helping us with
our work, and for your service to our country. I have to say
this hearing has been a long time in coming. The chairman and I
and the members of this committee have signed five or six
requests over the last 4 years to try to get you before us and
to get to the bottom of this.
What has happened to you needs to be taken in a wider
context, however. The two issues, two of the major issues here
are, one, the process by which Congress receives information
relative to national security. And as you know, your outing, if
you will, or the disclosure of your covert status was, I think,
a deliberate attempt to discount the statements of your husband
with respect to the supposed attempts by Saddam Hussein to
purchase uranium or plutonium through Niger. And, evidently
from this chart, there were 20 occasions in which people
deliberately, I think, attempted to destroy your credibility
and also to destroy your effectiveness within the organization,
within the CIA.
And I know you have been very careful with your words. Once
or twice might be a careless disclosure. Five or six times
might be reckless, but 20 times--I will say it, 20 times is a
deliberate attempt to destroy your status as a covert agent.
And the only other major case in which we have had the
outing of CIA agents, such as the Supreme Court in Haig v.
Agee, said ``It is obvious and inarguable that no governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.''
And going to those couple of issues, first of all, the
integrity of the process by which we get our information was
affected greatly, I think, in the terms of other agents may
have been very disheartened and troubled by what happened to
you. And in an effort to discount your husband's credibility,
the question was raised, and it has been continually raised, of
whether you were involved in the decision by the CIA to
actually send your husband, Ambassador Joseph Wilson, to Niger
in February 2002 to obtain information on the allegations that
Iraq sought uranium from Niger--they sort of said, ``Oh, her.
His wife sent him,'' like my wife sends me out to put out the
trash, you know--tried to discount the import of that. At least
I admit it.
Now I want to ask you, the suggestion that you were
involved in sending your husband seemed to drive the leaks in
an effort to discount his credibility. I want to ask you now
under oath, did you make the decision to send Ambassador Wilson
to Niger?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. No. I did not recommend him. I did not
suggest him. There was no nepotism involved. I didn't have the
authority. And, Congressman, if you will allow me briefly to
just lay out the sequence of events.
Mr. Lynch. That was my next question, if you would. I sort
of doubted this. If I was going to send my wife somewhere, it
wouldn't be Niger. But--nobody goes to Niger.
But, please, if you could lay out, walk us through
everything you did that may have been related around the time
of the decision to send Ambassador Wilson to Niger.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Thank you, Congressman. I am delighted
as well that I am under oath as I reply to you.
In February 2002, a young junior officer who worked for me
came to me very concerned, very upset. She had just received a
telephone call on her desk from someone, I don't know who, in
the Office of the Vice President, asking about this report of
this alleged sale of yellow cake uranium from Niger to Iraq.
She came to me, and as she was telling me this, what had
just happened, someone passed by. Another officer heard this.
He knew that Joe had already--my husband had already gone on
some CIA missions previously to deal with other nuclear
matters. And he suggested well, why don't we send Joe?
He knew that Joe had many years of experience on the
African continent. He also knew that he had served, and served
well and heroically, in the Baghdad Embassy, the Embassy in
Baghdad during the first Gulf war.
And I will be honest, I was somewhat ambivalent. At the
time, we had 2-year-old twins at home, and all I could envision
was me by myself at bedtime with a couple of 2-year-olds. So I
wasn't--I wasn't overjoyed with this idea.
Nevertheless, we went to my branch chief, our supervisor.
My colleague suggested this idea, and my supervisor turned to
me and said, ``Well, when you go home this evening, would you
be willing to speak to your husband, ask him to come in to
headquarters next week and we will discuss the options? See if
this--what we could do.'' Of course. And as I was leaving, he
asked me to draft a quick e-mail to the chief of our
Counterproliferation Division letting him know that this was--
might happen. I said, ``Of course.''
And it was that e-mail, Congressman, that was taken out of
context, a portion of which you see in the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence report of July 2004 that makes it
seem as though I had suggested or recommended him.
Mr. Lynch. If I could followup because--just 30 seconds.
Chairman Waxman. Without objection.
Mr. Lynch. And I want to go back to that Senate
Intelligence Committee hearing.
There were three Republican Senators who included a more
definitive statement, it said, ``The plan to send the former
Ambassador to Niger was suggested by the former Ambassador's
wife, a CIA employee.''
What is your reaction to that statement in the Senate
report about the genesis of your husband's trip to Niger in
2002?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Congressman, it is incorrect. It has
been borne out in the testimony during the Libby trial. And I
can tell you that it just doesn't square with the facts. Those
additional views were written exclusively by three Republican
Senators.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Yarmuth.
Mr. Yarmuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield
my time to Mr. Van Hollen.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Van Hollen is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you very much, Mr. Yarmuth and Mr.
Chairman.
Ms. Plame, thank you for your service to our country and
your testimony here today.
Just to remind us all of the larger context in which this
happened and the lead-up to the war, we remember many
statements from the President of the United States, the Vice
President of the United States, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, others, about mushroom clouds and invoking the image that
Saddam Hussein was going to be obtaining nuclear weapons and
using them in terrorist attacks.
So when Ambassador Wilson wrote his article in the New York
Times that began with this statement, ``Did the Bush
administration manipulate intelligence about Saddam Hussein's
weapons program to justify invasion of Iraq,'' and answered
that question in the following sentence, ``Based on my
experience with the administration, in the months leading up to
the war, I have little choice but to conclude some of the
intelligence relating to Iraq's nuclear intelligence program
was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat. That posed a direct
threat to the administration's credibility.'' And clearly they
understood the danger of that because it undercut one of the
main underpinnings and justifications the administration gave
for the war.
And we see from the chart here that the White House did
spring into action and begin to try and discredit your husband,
and that is how you were drawn into this web.
Mr. McClellan, then-White House spokesman, said, ``On
behalf of the administration, on behalf of the President, if
any one in this administration was involved in it,'' meaning
the leaks and the dissemination of information, ``they would no
longer be in this administration.''
Do you believe there continue to be people, individuals in
this administration, who were involved in leaking information
about you?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, Congressman. As we know, again,
from the evidence that was introduced at the trial of the Vice
President's former chief of staff, for one, Karl Rove clearly
was involved in the leaking of my name, and he still carries a
security clearance to this date, despite the President's words
to the contrary that he would immediately dismiss anyone who
had anything to do with this.
Mr. Van Hollen. And the CIA spokesman made a statement, and
other intelligence officers have made the statements that we
have today, that the failure to hold people accountable for
leaking this kind of information sends a very terrible message
to others in the intelligence field.
Do you think the failure of the President to fire the
people in his administration who were involved with this
message sends a chilling message to those in the intelligence
agencies, that the White House is not willing to stand up
behind those people who are putting their lives at danger every
day?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes. I believe it undermines the
President's words.
Mr. Van Hollen. Let me ask you this. And I would just say
on the record, with the statements that were made at trial with
respect to Karl Rove's involvement, I would just state the
testimony given by Mr. Cooper of Time Magazine, who said that
he was told by Karl Rove, ``Don't go too far out on Wilson.''
That Mr. Wilson's wife worked at the, ``Agency.'' And at the
conclusion of the conversation, according to Mr. Cooper, Mr.
Rove said, ``I have already said too much.''
Can you think of any reason that Mr. Rove would make that
statement if he did not know that he was engaged in wrongdoing?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Congressman, I cannot--I cannot begin to
speculate on Mr. Rove's intent. I just know what his words were
and the effects.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you.
Let me followup briefly on Mr. Lynch's line of questioning
regarding the Senate report and who really had Ambassador
Wilson sent to Niger and who was the instigator of that.
The unclassified Senate report asserts that the
Counterproliferation Division report officer told the committee
staff that the former Ambassador's wife, you, offered up his
name. Are you familiar with that statement in the
unclassified----
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, I am.
Mr. Van Hollen. Now, we don't want to reveal, and we don't
want you to reveal any classified information or anyone's
identity, but have you talked with that CPD reports officer who
was interviewed by the Senate committee?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, Congressman. And I can tell you
that he came to me almost with tears in his eyes. He said his
words had been twisted and distorted. He wrote a memo, and he
asked his supervisor to allow him to be reinterviewed by the
committee. And the memo went nowhere, and his request to be
reinterviewed so that the record could be set straight was
denied.
Mr. Van Hollen. Just so I understand, Mr. Chairman, if I
could.
So there is a memo written by the CPD officer upon whose
alleged testimony in the Senate report that contradicts the
conclusions in that report.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Mr. Van Hollen. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that this
committee should ask for that memo. It bears directly on the
credibility of the Senate report on this very, very important
issue that they have attempted to use to discredit Ambassador
Wilson's mission.
Chairman Waxman. I think the gentleman makes an excellent
point, and we will insist on getting that memo.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Hodes, you are next.
Mr. Hodes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I reserve my time. I
yield back.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Sarbanes.
Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Wilson, thanks for being here today. I know this can't
be easy for you.
If you put this affair in context, what has happened with
you, with all of the other abuses, frankly, Mr. Chairman, that
we have been investigating over the last 7 weeks--and I thank
you for the diligence of your inquiry and fairness of your
inquiry into a number of the things that have occurred--it
paints a picture of an administration of bullies, in my view.
The things that--in order to achieve whatever the ends they are
seeking, any means can be justified and that people can just be
pushed around.
We saw it when we had testimony of people in the White
House who bullied the scientific community by altering
testimony on global warming. We have seen it in terms of the
investigations you have done, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the
treatment of our Civil Service. Now we see it in context of our
Intelligence Community.
And to me what you have experienced is really the result of
the syndrome that has developed in this administration which
reflects the arrogance of power run amok.
I have just a couple of questions that I wanted to ask you
in that vein.
First of all, I gather you believe that the outing of your
status, the blowing of your covert status, was as a result of
some of the statements that your husband was making and the
challenges that he was bringing; is that right?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes. I believe that was one of the
consequences.
Mr. Sarbanes. OK. But at the point that they were prepared
to surrender your covert status to the public, I mean, what was
to be gained by that? I mean, can you--was it to apply further
leverage? I mean, really it was sort of after the fact at that
point, right?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. My thinking, Congressman, is that by
continuing to assert falsely that I somehow suggested him or
recommended him for this mission, it would undercut the
credibility of what he was saying. And that is--that is what I
think has happened. And it just got a little out of hand.
Mr. Sarbanes. It strikes me as petulant behavior on their
part.
Second, there is a suggestion being made that your status
could have been divulged sort of accidentally. But you have
described efforts, structural efforts, that are designed to
make sure that this doesn't happen accidentally. And so could
you comment on that?
I mean, it seems to me that in order for your status to
have been disclosed, somebody had to want that to happen. In
other words, the way things were set up, it is highly unlikely
that your status would be disclosed by accident. It had to be
as a result of an orchestrated effort that somebody wanted to
put it out there.
Can you talk about sort of structurally, whether that is
the case?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I can't speak to intent, but I can speak
to simply what the actions that we can observe, and that,
again, they all knew that I worked in the CIA. They might not
have known what my status was. But that alone, the fact that I
worked at the CIA, should have put up a red flag that they
acted in a much more protective way of my identity and true
employer.
Mr. Sarbanes. And then last, again, I'm trying to get--
because this is more than--it's more than a story about Valerie
Plame Wilson and what happened to you, as devastating as it has
been to your life over these last period of months. It's about
our Intelligence Community. And you spoke yourself to how this
kind of conduct can affect the integrity and effectiveness of
our intelligence apparatus.
Can you comment on the chilling effect, if you will, on
what the message it sends to people, to those, for example, who
would be sent on a mission to collect intelligence about a
subject that the White House might already have a very strong
opinion about. How would it affect the way that agent, the way
that person would check that information and get that
information back up the chain?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Intelligence collection is certainly
more an art than a science, but if there is any taint of bias,
then it undermines its usefulness. The primary customer of our
intelligence is, of course, the President of the United States.
And if the President of the United States thinks somehow--or
doesn't believe that his intelligence that he receives on his
desk, he or she receives on his desk every morning, is free of
ideology, politics, a certain viewpoint, how then can that
President make the most important decisions of all about the
security of our country? I mean, that is--I do feel
passionately about that. You have to get the politics out of
our intelligence process.
Mr. Sarbanes. I appreciate that. I appreciate the passion
that you brought to your job. And you represent hundreds of
thousands of people that go to work and try to make a
difference for this country and I think are being bullied by
this administration. You won't get the policy from them that
you deserve. But I want you to know that everyone here
appreciates your service.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Waxman. We have gone back and forth, and, rather
than a second round, Mr. Davis and I have agreed that we will
have 5 minutes wrap-up on each side; 5 minutes will be
controlled by the chairman and the ranking member.
And I would yield 5 minutes to Mr. Davis at this point.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I yield to Mr. Westmoreland such
time as he would consume.
Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I hate it that we are not going to stay here
to get all of our questions answered by Ms. Wilson, because I
have so many to ask, because there is so many conflicting
reports. And I think that with something of this importance,
that we should have made a little more time for it.
But Ms. Wilson, the Counterproliferation Division of the
CIA, that seems like a pretty important place where a bunch of
smart people would work and keep good records. Would that--
would I be OK in thinking that?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Westmoreland. But in the Senate Intel report that I
have that says some CPD officials could not recall how the
Office decided to contact the former Ambassador, was this a
voluntary lack of memory or were there no notes kept on it? Is
it--how could they forget how they came about a name that they
were fixing to send to a foreign country to check on the
intelligence of Iraq getting material to build nuclear bombs?
That seems a little bit far-fetched to me.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Congressman, please remember that in
this period in the run-up to the war, we in the
Counterproliferation Division of the CIA were working flat-out
as hard as we could to try to find good, solid intelligence for
our senior policymakers on these presumed programs.
My role in this was to go home that night without revealing
any classified information, of course, and ask my husband would
he be willing to come into CIA headquarters the following week
and talk to the people there. At that meeting, I introduced him
and I left, because I did have a hundred and one other things I
needed to do.
Mr. Westmoreland. But what I'm trying to say is do you
think there would not have been a paper trail of how his name
came about, who would have--who would have mentioned it first
or--I mean, to me that is a pretty important assignment to give
somebody; and, you know, maybe somebody would want to say
``Hey, that was my idea. That was my guy that I was sending
over there,'' and want to take credit for it. But it seems like
everybody is running from it.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Congressman, I believe one of the pieces
of evidence that was introduced in the Libby trial was an INR
memo of that meeting where it states, in fact, my husband was
not particularly looking forward to--he didn't think it was
necessary. There had been, I believe, at least two other
reports, one by a three-star general and one by the Ambassador
there on the ground who said there wasn't really much of this
allegation. And the INR folks that attended the meeting also
said well, we are not sure that this is really necessary.
But it was ultimately decided that he would go, use his
contacts, which were extensive in the government, to see if
there was anything more to this. It was a serious question
asked by the Office of the Vice President and it deserved a
serious answer.
Mr. Westmoreland. Are you familiar with a Charles Grimere
that was the former Iraq mission manager for the CIA?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I know of him, sir, yes.
Mr. Westmoreland. He testified in the Libby trial that all
he had heard is that you were working for this
Counterproliferation Division, and it could have been a number
of things that different people, I guess, look at this, some
covert, some classified, some undercover, some different names.
Is that true that there are different classifications of
people that work at this Counterproliferation Division?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. What I would say that's most accurate is
most of the employees at the Counterproliferation Division are
undercover of some sort.
Mr. Westmoreland. But he did work for the CIA so he should
have known that you were undercover or classified or----
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I am saying that the fact was that most
people in the Counterproliferation Division were undercover. I
can't speak to what he should have or should have not known--
were probably cognizant of that, yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. And you mentioned taking politics out of
intelligence. And your husband--would you say he was a Democrat
or a Republican?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Although my husband comes from a
Republican family with deep roots in California, I would say he
is a Democrat now, Congressman.
Mr. Westmoreland. OK. And just to kind of keep score, not
that you would put yourself in any political category, would
you say you are a Democrat or a Republican?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Congressman, I am not sure that is----
Mr. Westmoreland. I know. But I gave a list of questions I
couldn't ask you, and that wasn't one of them, so I didn't know
if you would be willing to----
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, Congressman. I am a Democrat.
Mr. Westmoreland. You are a Democrat.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, I am.
Mr. Westmoreland. So the Vice President, who is a
Republican, who evidently thought from his CIA briefing that he
had gotten 1 day, felt like that this needed to be looked at
further, the report that Niger was selling this yellow cake
uranium to Iraq, that he would get some further intel on it.
They called the Counterproliferation--or at least somebody in
the CIA--and then we had a Democrat or at least supposedly
someone who may be affiliated on the Democratic side--represent
her, or present or supposedly present or at least vouch for her
husband who was--who had come from a good Republican family
that had lost his way and became a Democrat.
But my point is, in his piece titled, ``What I Didn't Find
in Africa,'' he disputes the Bush administration's claims of
there was no evidence that Niger was selling it. But you,
coming from an intelligence background, you don't just depend
on one report from one country or one source to base all your
intelligence on, do you? Wouldn't you gather it from a bunch of
different sources and then kind of put it together and look at
it and not just one from----
Mrs. Plame Wilson. That is correct, Congressman.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Do you have a last question that you want to ask?
Mr. Westmoreland. No.
I guess, Mr. Chairman, my last comment would be to you that
I still think it is a shame that--we have Ms. Wilson here and
all of the press came and all of these good people came to
witness all of this, and it's been quite a spectacle--that we
wouldn't get to ask all of the questions that we had.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I think what is clear here is, first
of all, it is a terrible thing that any CIA operative would be
outed. But what is difficult, I think, what we haven't been
able to establish is who knew who was undercover and who was in
a covert status. And I think we would have to look at that. But
if there is no evidence here that the people that were outing
this and pursuing this, had knowledge of the covert status--And
so I just wanted to make that point.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Thank you, Congressman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
I want to yield to Ms. Norton for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. And thank you, Ms. Wilson,
as others have thanked you for your extraordinary service to
our country.
I am trying to understand the effect of the Executive
order, because there is an Executive order that is Executive
Order 12958. It is an Executive order, a Presidential Executive
order, that indicates what authorized--what the requirements
are to prevent unauthorized disclosures.
And in summary, they are background checks, official need
to know. I am particularly interested in the official need to
know.
And I ask you to look at the middle chart, the middle part
of the chart on there where the White House and other
officials, State Department officials, are listed.
Can you think of any reason that any of those officials
would have had a reason to know your identity, in particular,
as a covert agent?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Congresswoman, there was no need to know
my specific identity other than I was a CIA officer, according
to that chart. None whatsoever.
Ms. Norton. Could I ask you whether there is any difference
in your review between disclosing the identity of a covert
agent and disclosing classified information, what if any
difference would there be?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I think damage in either case could be
equally devastating. It would simply depend on what the
classified information was. But certainly revealing an
operative's true identity is devastating. In my case, I was
working on trying to find the Iraq weapons of mass destruction
programs and what they were up to.
Ms. Norton. I suppose we could all think of classified
information involving our country that would have a devastating
effect on all of us.
Disclosing the name of a classified agent might have a
devastating effect on more than that agent's career; is that
not the case?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Absolutely, Congresswoman.
The ripple effects go outward in quite wide circles. There
are all of the contacts through the years as either innocent or
in a professional manner. The agents, the networks. Much is
taken out.
Ms. Norton. Are there circumstances under which disclosing
the identity of a covert agent could result in the death of
that agent, and hasn't that occurred before in our country's
history?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, it has.
Ms. Norton. If, in fact, an official of any kind did not
have an official reason to know your status, in your view would
that be a violation of the Executive order which lists official
need to know as a reason for having classified information?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, Congresswoman. I would think so.
Ms. Norton. So you think it would be.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. It would be a violation.
Ms. Norton. One of my colleagues questioned you regarding
the accusation that over and over again was repeated in the
press, and, for that matter, by a number of public officials,
that it was you who was responsible for your husband's being
selected to go on the controversial trip at issue.
As I understand it, that person has indeed said that he was
not the person who indicated that you had been responsible for
the selection of your husband to go to Niger.
If that is the case, would you say that it would be
inappropriate for us or others to rely on the information that
a CIA official had said that you were responsible for the
selection of your husband to go to Niger?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. That is incorrect. A senior Agency
officer said she had nothing to do with his trip. And I would
just like to add that certainly I had no political agenda at
the time of my husband's trip. Joe had no political agenda. We
were both looking to serve our country.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I understand that the CIA
official to which I refer has in fact said that in writing, and
I ask that you try to get the memorandum of that official that
would make it clear that he or she was not responsible for this
information.
Chairman Waxman. We will try to get that information and
hold it for the record.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me clarify one thing. You noted
that when you learned about this, your husband picked up the
paper and said, ``He did it.'' Do you remember your testimony
today? ``He did it.'' Was he referring to Novak? Was he
referring to the administration? And did you know this was
percolating?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Yes, sir. He was referring to Mr. Novak.
We had indications in the week prior that Mr. Novak knew my
identity and my true employer. And I, of course, alerted my
superiors at the Agency, and I was told don't worry, we will
take care of it. And it was much to our surprise that we read
about this July 14th.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Do you know if your superiors at the
Agency did anything at that point to stop the outing of a CIA
agent? It would seem to me they would have picked up the phone
to say this is a serious matter, this is a crime. Do you have
any idea?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Absolutely. This is what I believe and
this is what I read, that then-spokesman Mr. Harlow spoke
directly to Mr. Novak and said something along the lines of,
``Don't go with this. Don't do this.'' I don't know exactly
what he said. But he clearly communicated the message that Mr.
Novak should not publish my name.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. And you don't know if he said this
could be a violation of law, she is a covert operator or
anything like that.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. I have no idea.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. One of the long-term concerns
outside of the--I mean, the outing of an agent is very serious
business which I think has been underscored by both sides. But
if no one knows that you're covert, it's hard at that point to
show any violation of law and the like. But if you have notice,
that's a different issue.
And so you did the appropriate thing in notifying your
superiors that this was percolating, and they were not able to
stop it. Is that your testimony?
Mrs. Plame Wilson. That is correct.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Mrs. Wilson, you can be a Democrat, you
can be a Republican. No one asks our servicemen or CIA
operatives what they believe in in terms of their politics to
go out and serve their country. They are not acting as
Democrats or Republicans. They and you were acting as
Americans.
Facts are not Republican or Democratic. Your husband
revealed the falsehood of the reason the President gave to go
to war against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. And the reason he gave,
even in his State of the Union address, was that the weapon of
mass destruction that Saddam Hussein had, or would soon have,
is a nuclear bomb. That was very sobering, but it was false.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Uh-huh.
Chairman Waxman. And when your husband wrote the article,
that went right to the heart of this claim.
So one could see why they wouldn't like what your husband
wrote. But they made you collateral damage. Your career was
ended. Your life may have been in jeopardy. And they didn't
seem to care, even to this point, because you said they haven't
even called to apologize.
Now, whether they knew it and intentionally gave out this
information about your status is the reason for this
investigation. If they knew it then, that you were a covert
undercover agent, and they disclosed that fact, that is a big
deal. That is a serious jeopardizing of our national security.
If they didn't know you were an undercover covert agent,
then I have to wonder in my mind what was their thinking. That
this guy couldn't be right because his wife had something to do
with the mission? Boy, is that sort of silly.
Either way, I don't think it speaks well for all of those
people in the White House to have gone out of their way to let
the press know this information which was the only, I guess,
the only thing they had to say.
The President has finally acknowledged the statement that
your husband pointed out was factually incorrect. The President
has acknowledged it was factually incorrect. The Secretary of
State said the CIA didn't tell her, but it turned out that her
chief deputy did get informed, Mr. Hadley, that the statement
was not correct; that they were putting it into the State of
the Union address, the most vetted speech a President ever
makes. They acknowledged the validity of your husband's
statement. And what do we have for you? Well, just collateral
damage.
I find that troubling that in the zeal for their political
positioning, that there are a lot of collateral damage around,
including a war that didn't have to be fought.
I want to thank you very much for your presence here. I
think it has been helpful, and we are going to continue this
investigation.
Ms. Watson. A question to the Chair.
Chairman Waxman. Yes.
Ms. Watson. The first, I think, most of us knew about
Valerie Plame as being an undercover agent was through Robert
Novak's July 14, 2003 column. Is it possible, as we continue
our oversight function, to have Mr. Novak under oath come in
and testify to the fact that he did print that information?
Chairman Waxman. Well, I think we know that he did print
that information and that we know now she was a covert agent. I
have many--I will give it some thought. But I want to
underscore that we need an investigation. This is not about
Scooter Libby, and it's not just about Valerie Plame Wilson. It
is about the integrity of our national security and whether it
is being jeopardized.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I think if you do that, we--you need
to involve the CIA, because there is no evidence here that
anyone out there had any idea that she was an undercover agent,
that she was a covert agent at this point.
Chairman Waxman. You may well be right. But the CIA did.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. And, in fact, she did the
appropriate thing in going to her superiors when she found out
that she was about to be outed.
I would have thought at that point, if the CIA felt one of
their operatives were going to be outed, they would have gone
to great lengths to try to kill the story and let them know
what the law was.
Chairman Waxman. That is a very good point, and I think we
need to get----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. In the President's speech--and I
have to say this--in the President's speech when he mentioned
the uranium, those words were cleared by the CIA. It may not
have been in accordance with what Mr. Wilson found, but Ms.
Plame's boss approved that. And I think the record should
reflect that.
Chairman Waxman. Before I call on anybody else.
Yes, Mr. Hodes.
Mr. Hodes. Just very briefly. The suggestion about what we
don't know cannot be finally determined until we pursue the
investigation that we need to pursue and find out what the
people on this chart knew and when they knew it, who the
unknown person or persons are, and we need an investigation.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. We had a special prosecutor who did
this, Mr. Hodes. The special prosecutor looked at this and
spent 2 years on this.
Chairman Waxman. This is a hearing to get information from
witnesses, not to debate, although it is inevitable. But let
us, I think, move on with our hearing.
I thank all of the Members for their participation. I wish
we had all of the Members here to participate, but all of those
Members were invited and had adequate notice, but this is a
Friday.
Thank you so much for being here.
Mrs. Plame Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. We are going to recess for 4 or 5 minutes
just so we can settle down and get the next witnesses up and
take care of whatever pressing matters that need to be attended
to.
[Recess.]
Chairman Waxman. The committee will come back to order.
I am pleased to welcome our next two witnesses. Dr. James
Knodell is the security officer for the Executive Office of the
President. According to GAO, this position is, ``responsible
for formulating and directing the execution of security policy,
reviewing and evaluating Executive Office of the President
security programs, and conducting security indoctrinations and
debriefings for agencies of the Executive Office of the
President.''
Mr. Bill Leonard is the Director of the Information
Security Oversight Office at the National Archives and Records
Administration. This office is charged with developing security
classification policies for classifying, declassifying, and
safeguarding security information generated in government and
industry, and evaluating the effectiveness of the security
classification programs developed by government and industry.
And I want to welcome both of you to our hearing today.
Your prepared statements are going to be in the record in
its entirety, and we are going to ask you to keep your oral
presentation to around 5 minutes or try to keep it under 5
minutes.
It is the practice of this committee to swear in all
witnesses, so if you will please rise.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Waxman. The record will indicate that the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Knodell, why don't we start with you?
STATEMENTS OF JAMES KNODELL, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE; AND WILLIAM
LEONARD, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE,
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
STATEMENT OF JAMES KNODELL
Mr. Knodell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is James Knodell. I am the Chief Security Officer
for the Office of Security and Emergency Preparedness, Office
of Administration, Executive Office of the President.
The Office of Security and Emergency Preparedness is
commonly referred to as OSEP, which provides personnel security
and physical security and emergency preparedness for the
Executive Office of the President and Office of the Vice
President.
OSEP works closely with the U.S. Secret Service, National
Security Council, and the White House Military Office as well
as EOP managers and all personnel assigned to the EOP to ensure
their security measures are well coordinated and that required
controls are consistently and fully implemented.
OSEP provides a variety of services that ensure the proper
protection of EOP resources including information, people, and
facilities. These services include prescreening candidates for
employment based on security guidelines, monitoring the
background investigation process, briefing employees on
requirements and guidelines for the handling and storage of
classified material.
In reference to the committee's request that I provide
information on White House procedures for safeguarding
classified information, OSEP follows guidelines set forth in
various Executive orders that deal with classified information.
For example, Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified
Information, dated August 2, 1985, established a uniform
Federal personnel security program for employees who will be
considered for initial or continued access to classified
information.
Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security
Information, dated April 17, 1995, prescribes a uniform system
for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national
security information.
OSEP staff members brief all new EOP employees on the
responsibilities for handling and securing classified
information consistent with these Executive orders.
Additionally, mandatory annual refresher security briefings are
provided to those EOP employees holding security clearances. In
the event that an EOP employee fails to follow applicable
guidelines resulting in a security violation, a member of the
EOP office to which the individual's assigned should report the
matter to OSEP.
OSEP then refers the matter and it follows procedures
consistent with the guidelines in Executive Order 12968 to
ensure that a determination is made to whether the person
should continue to hold a security clearance and if the
incident involves a risk to classified information controlled
by an organization outside the EOP, that organization is
notified.
Mr. Chairman, I am not able to discuss individual cases or
investigations. I would be happy to answer questions related to
the procedures for handling classified information or
corresponding to the unauthorized release of classified
information.
Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Leonard.
STATEMENT OF J. WILLIAM LEONARD
Mr. Leonard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman, Mr. Davis, and members of the committee, I
wish to thank you for inviting me to testify here today.
I direct the Information Security Oversight Office [ISOO].
Under Executive Order 12958, as amended, we have substantial
responsibilities with respect to the classification,
safeguarding, and declassification of information by agencies
within the executive branch. Included is the responsibility to
develop and promulgate a directive implementing the order.
It is the order that sets forth the basic framework and
legal authority by which executive branch agencies may classify
national security information. Pursuant to his constitutional
authority and through the order, the President has authorized a
limited number of officials to apply classification to certain
national security-related information.
In delegating classification authority, the President has
established clear parameters for its use and certain burdens
that must be satisfied.
Specifically, every act of classifying information must be
traceable back to its origin as an explicit decision by a
responsible official who has been expressly delegated original
classification authority. In addition, the original
classification authority must be able to identify or describe
the damage to national security that could reasonably be
expected if the information was subject to unauthorized
disclosure. Furthermore, the information must be owned by,
produced by or for, or under the control of the U.S.
Government. And, finally, it must fall into one or more of the
categories of information specifically provided for in the
order.
The President has also spelled out in the order some very
clear prohibitions and limitations with respect to the use of
classification. Specifically, for example, in no case can
information be classified in order to conceal violations of
law, inefficiency, or administrative error.
It is the responsibility of officials delegated original
classification authority to establish at the time of the
original decision the level of classification as well as the
duration of classification.
The order and directive go on to establish requirements for
access to classified information, such as the need for a
favorable access eligibility determination by an agency, as
well as the execution of an approved nondisclosure agreement.
The order and directive also promulgates minimum standards
for the safeguarding of classified information, including such
issues as storage, reproduction, transmission and destruction.
We also establish actions to be taken in the event of a
loss, possible compromise, or unauthorized disclosure of
classified information. This includes the prompt reporting and
investigation of such instances in order to implement
appropriate corrective actions and to ascertain the degree of
damage to national security.
While I stated earlier it is the responsibility of the
original classification authority to determine the duration of
classification, a fundamental principle of the order is that
classified information shall be declassified as soon as it no
longer meets the standards for classification.
In addition, while the order presumes that information that
continues to meet the standards for classification requires
continued protection, it provides for exceptional cases in
which the need to protect such information may be outweighed by
the public's interest in disclosure of the information.
In such circumstances, an agency head or designated
official may, as an exercise of discretion, declassify the
information.
In addition to the above, information can be declassified
in one of three ways: first, by implementing the instructions
set forth in a classification or declassification guide;
second, by following a view by an authorized official, or
third, automatically, without benefit of review.
Finally, the order establishes specific responsibility for
agencies in establishing an effective classification management
program.
Again, I want to thank you for inviting me here today, Mr.
Chairman. I would be happy to answer your questions and any
questions any members the committee might have.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leonard follows:]
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8579.012
Chairman Waxman. The Chair will recognize himself to start
off the questions.
Mr. Knodell, you are the one charged at the White House for
safeguarding classified information; isn't that correct?
Mr. Knodell. That is correct.
Chairman Waxman. And in doing so, you have an Executive
Order 12958 that implements the regulations for the protection
of this information. I want to ask you about that and, of
course, we are looking at the context of Mrs. Wilson's identity
being disclosed.
Federal regulations require that any person who has
knowledge of the loss or compromise of classified information
has an obligation to report to the White House Security
Officer.
I want to read to you 5CFS section 1212.30. ``Any White
House employee who has knowledge of the loss or possible
compromise of classified information should report the
circumstances to the EOP security officer.'' Is that accurate,
Mr. Knodell?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, it is.
Chairman Waxman. And the White House officials who know
about the disclosure of classified information have an
obligation to report what they know to you.
Mr. Knodell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Leonard, you are one of the Nation's
experts on protection of classified information. Do Federal
officials who learn of the possible breach of classified
information have an obligation to report it to the security
officer at the White House?
Mr. Leonard. Any individual that becomes aware of a
security violation, especially one in which may involve an
unauthorized disclosure, has the obligation to promptly report
that matter to the designated official to receive that.
Chairman Waxman. That's whether it was intentionally
disclosed or unintentionally disclosed?
Mr. Leonard. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Knodell, I want to ask you about
whether the White House officials complied with this
requirement after the disclosure of Mrs. Wilson's identity. Let
me start with the former White House Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer, Mr. Fleischer's conversations with Walter Pincus of
the Washington Post and David Gregory of NBC News about Ms.
Wilson's identity. These conversations took place in July 2003.
Almost immediately it was clear that Ms. Wilson's identity was
classified information.
Mr. Knodell, the regulations require Mr. Fleischer to
report what he knew about this disclosure to you. Did he do
that?
Mr. Knodell. Mr. Chairman, I thought the agreement here for
me today was I would not discuss specific investigations.
Chairman Waxman. As I understood it, we wouldn't discuss
the Libby case. That was a concern, that we were going to
rehash the Libby case. This is the Valerie Plame Wilson case,
and it is a question Congress is exploring to fine out whether
our security laws and regulations are working.
One way to find that out is to find out whether you were
told that there was a violation and the rules were upheld and
followed in the requirement and obligations to report it to
you.
Mr. Knodell. Mr. Chairman, that happened before my tenure
in this current position. I began this position in August 2004.
Chairman Waxman. Well, do you--are you aware of whether the
report was made by Mr. Fleischer to your predecessor?
Mr. Knodell. I'm not, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Are you aware if there's any investigation
that ever took place in the White House about the release of
this classified information?
Mr. Knodell. I am not.
Chairman Waxman. Do you know whether Carl Rove, the
President's senior political adviser, came forward and reported
what he knew about the breach of Ms. Wilson's identity. After
all, we learned that Mr. Rove talked about her identity with at
least two journalists, a Robert Novak and Matthew Cooper of
Time Magazine.
Mr. Knodell. Mr. Chairman, I have no knowledge of any
investigation within my office.
Chairman Waxman. How long have you been in this office?
Mr. Knodell. Since August 2004.
Chairman Waxman. Two and a half years. Were you aware in
the last 2\1/2\ years that this was an issue for which there
was a lot of concern?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I was.
Chairman Waxman. Did you learn that from people in the
White House?
Mr. Knodell. Through the press.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Leonard, the regulations seem clear,
it says that officials like Mr. Rove have an obligation to
report security violations.
Mr. Knodell, wouldn't there have to be a report that would
have been filed in your office?
Mr. Knodell. If we were notified, there would be, sir, yes.
Chairman Waxman. So if you were notified, a report would be
on file. Is that right?
Mr. Knodell. Correct.
Chairman Waxman. You don't know if there's one on file. Is
that correct, you don't even know there's one on file?
Mr. Knodell. There is not one on file.
Chairman Waxman. There is not one on file. You know that
there is no report on file that classified information was
disclosed and that report was about Fleischer or Rove or all
the other names.
Mr. Knodell. Mr. Chairman, not within the Office of
Security and Emergency Preparedness.
Chairman Waxman. Mr. Leonard, just to clarify the point,
isn't there an obligation under the law to have that
information filed by the person who learns that he disclosed
classified information even inadvertently?
Mr. Leonard. Again, Mr. Chairman, the requirement is for
anyone who becomes aware of a violation, the person who may be
involved in committing it or someone who is otherwise aware of
it, to promptly report that to the designated official so that
an appropriate inquiry and investigation can be conducted.
Chairman Waxman. Well, these people may not have known at
the time they disclosed this information to the press but they
certainly learned afterwards. Did they have an obligation even
then to report?
Mr. Leonard. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Again, the purpose of the
notification is to allow for the conduct of an investigation or
an inquiry in order to at the very least determine what the
causes were so as to provide for corrective action to assess
the possibility of damage to national security.
Chairman Waxman. Last question to Mr. Knodell. Was there
any corrective action taken, was any disciplinary action taken
against Mr. Rove for failing to report his knowledge of the
breach of Mrs. Wilson's identity?
Mr. Knodell. No, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. No, no action was taken, or no, you don't
know?
Mr. Knodell. No action was taken.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Knodell, you just found out you
were coming here yesterday, is that correct?
Mr. Knodell. Actually had word of it earlier in the week
but found out definitively yesterday, yes, sir.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Generally committee rules about
advance notice and consultation to protect both the majority
and minority rights, we get notice of these, and requires that
Members be informed in writing of witnesses and the likely
scope of their testimony 3 days prior to a hearing.
We were informed only yesterday of the addition of two
witnesses to today's, which doesn't generally allow us the time
to prepare that we would ordinarily like.
Do you know, was the possibility of a subpoena discussed
with you or with Mr. Fielding in terms of your coming here
today?
Mr. Knodell. I understand that there was talk of a
subpoena.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Just for the record, the minority
was not consulted on that at all.
Chairman Waxman. Would the gentleman yield? As I understand
it, Mr. Knodell was expected to come here and that information
was out there a week prior to today and it was shared with the
minority staff. We found out yesterday that Mr. Knodell was not
going to be permitted to testify. I called the White House
Counsel and suggested that we might have to issue a subpoena
unless Mr. Knodell was made available. I was told the subpoena
would not be necessary. Mr. Knodell is here.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. My understanding was that the
invitation had come but we weren't notified until yesterday he
would appear.
Let me just start. When an agency creates classified
material, let's say the CIA, and then shares it with another
agency, what obligations and responsibilities does the
originator have to convey the classification status to the
recipient?
Mr. Knodell. If it's a document, it will be clearly marked
on that document.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. How about an individual?
Mr. Knodell. They should be told that it's classified
material that's being passed.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. To your knowledge there was no
knowledge at the White House of Mrs. Plame's covert status. Or
can you not comment on that?
Mr. Knodell. I can't comment, I don't have any knowledge of
it.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Leonard, let me just ask this,
does the burden generally fall on the agency that has the
classification or that would have an employee in a covert
status to convey that? How else would another agency know?
Mr. Leonard. With respect to conveying classification
status, the burden or the responsibility--clearly the preferred
way is immediate notice to the recipient of classified
information. That can happen either by markings on a document
if it's written notification, or if it's oral notification, it
would be something along----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. In this case there were briefings;
there were briefings from individuals and names on briefings
but there would not be any documentation, would there, to say
this person is covert or not covert, as a general rule?
Mr. Leonard. When disclosure is oral, normally it would be
preceded by something along the lines what I'm about to tell
you is classified such and such a level. Another way to
disclose or the provide classification guidance is to again
have a written classification that have would provide specifics
as to what's classified at what level or to convey the
substance of a classification guide through the course of
briefings and whatever. And then last, all cleared individuals
have an affirmative responsibility by virtue of signing a
nondisclosure agreement that if there is any question in their
mind as to the true classification of status of information
they are provided, they are obligated to seek clarification
before the disclosure.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Is there an obligation to ask?
Mr. Leonard. If there was uncertainty in the mind of the
recipient by virtue of the nondisclosure agreement.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. The difficulty we have in this
situation is there are a lot of people that work for CIA and
are not under cover or in a covert operation. In fact, they
fill it out on applications publicly. Everybody knows they work
there.
I'm just wondering what is the obligation of a recipient
agency at that point to ask appropriate questions, or should
the obligation be on the CIA affirmatively to protect their
employees. That's really the question here. Because we have
heard no testimony in the first panel that there was any
knowledge on the part of anybody who was passing this
information that Mrs. Plame was in a covert status. Had there
been, I think we would have seen the investigation turn out
differently at this point.
Mr. Leonard. There is an affirmative obligation on the part
of the party who's disclosing the information. If there is
uncertainty in the mind of the recipient, there is likewise an
affirmative responsibility.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me ask you both this, this was a
situation it's clear Mrs. Plame appeared to have handled this
appropriately, but if a newspaper is getting ready to out an
operative or a top secret memo or something and there are
penalties attached, what do you do at that point to let them
know they are violating the law, to let them know that they are
going out with top secret information or in this case outing an
agent? What would be the obligation at that point of the CIA to
go forward and notify the individuals that are suspected of
outing or on the verge of doing this that are exploring this?
Mr. Knodell. I think clearly if they know the classified
information is going to be released it's incumbent upon them--
--
Mr. Davis of Virginia. How would they do it; say don't do
this? Because when you say don't do this to the press----
Mr. Knodell. Because they have the classified information,
they can have them sign a nondisclosure agreement barring them
from----
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Would it be appropriate to say this
is classified information, will hurt national security? They
should do that, shouldn't they?
Mr. Leonard. They do.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. We don't know what the facts were in
this, but I hope to work with Mr. Waxman to get the facts in
this particular case.
Mr. Leonard, would you agree with that?
Mr. Leonard. It's a judgment call, Mr. Davis. There
certainly will be circumstances where it is prudent to
intercede along those lines. There will be other circumstances
where it may not be because they could serve to confirm
something that we don't want to confirm, and quite frankly,
just because something is in the media doesn't mean it's
accurate.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. But if you're the CIA or with an
agency that has that and you know they have the information and
they are going to come out with it, at that point that argument
goes out the window.
Mr. Leonard. Again, it depends upon what the nature.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. If it's true.
Mr. Leonard. Right. It depends on what the nature of the
information. Your example of the identity of a covert officer,
that would be prudent.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I think one of the issues here,
aside from all the political sideshow, is the fact that once
the agency knew one of their operatives, covert operatives were
going to be outed, what steps did they take at that point they
knew a story was pending. Mrs. Plame has testified here under
oath that they knew this story was coming, in fact her husband
said he did it. Obviously there were some conversations. And
exactly what did the CIA do to protect their operative? At that
point the obligation doesn't go to the White House who we
weren't even sure was in that particular chain with the outing
of that story, but what do they or should they have done? I
hope that we can explore that further.
Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank the gentlemen for testifying.
Mr. Knodell, let me--is it Knodell?
Mr. Knodell. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Let me ask you a few questions because in
answering some of the chairman's questions you left me shocked.
I want to make sure I heard you right.
Are you saying with regard to this case; that is, the
outing of Valerie Plame Wilson, there is no report?
Mr. Knodell. Not in my office, there is not.
Mr. Cummings. Are you also saying that there was no
investigation?
Mr. Knodell. Not by my office.
Mr. Cummings. Not by your office. And so I could conclude
then that there were no sanctions, is that correct? No
sanctions within your office?
Is it one of your jobs, part of your job to recommend
sanctions where you find that there has been a breach?
Mr. Knodell. Correct. But there was already an outside
investigation that was taking place, criminal investigation.
That's why we took no action.
Mr. Cummings. Now one of your main objectives for being in
the White House is to make sure that you--make sure that these
kinds of things don't happen, is that right?
Mr. Knodell. Correct.
Mr. Cummings. I would assume if anyone took the job you
took, that one of--and considering what happened before you got
there, that this would be something that would be on the minds
of everybody because, again, this is like bells ringing, alarms
going off. This is the kind of thing that you don't want to do
because this could end up in your lap. Is that right?
Mr. Knodell. In this particular case you're absolutely
right. This started long before my tenure in this position. By
the time I took the position, the criminal investigation was
already under way.
Mr. Cummings. But did you look into it at all, just so that
you could make sure you did your job right and didn't allow
this to happen again?
Mr. Knodell. We didn't want to have collateral
investigations going on at the same time, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So if there is a criminal investigation and
you have--and you're trying to make sure it doesn't happen
again, so you don't even look into it at all. In other words,
you are the guy who is responsible for guarding all this and
making sure that everything goes right. So it sounds to me like
we had a breach on top of a breach. We had one situation where
Mrs. Valerie Plame Wilson's identity and covert status was
disclosed and then within the very office within the White
House there is no report, there is no investigation, and there
are no sanctions?
Mr. Knodell. Sir, again, any reporting would have taken
place prior to my arriving into the office.
Mr. Cummings. Now----
Chairman Waxman. Will the gentleman yield because I just
want to pin this point down.
Do you know whether there was an investigation at the White
House after the leaks came out?
Mr. Knodell. I don't have any knowledge of an investigation
within my office.
Chairman Waxman. Ever.
Mr. Knodell. I do not.
Chairman Waxman. Because the President said he was
investigating this matter, was going to get to the bottom of
it. You're not aware that any investigation took place?
Mr. Knodell. Not within my office.
Chairman Waxman. If there was an investigation, what were
you referring to, Mr. Fitzgerald's investigation?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, the outside investigation.
Chairman Waxman. That didn't start until months and months
later and that had the purpose of only narrowly looking to see
whether there was a criminal law violated. But there was an
obligation for the White House to investigate whether
classified information was being leaked inappropriately, wasn't
there?
Mr. Knodell. If that was the case, yes.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Could I ask for one very quick
question?
Mr. Cummings. I yield.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Would the initiative of a criminal
investigation relieve those who made these disclosures of the
obligation to report to you that by forcing them to disclose
could violate their fifth amendment rights?
Mr. Leonard. Actually, in regards to security violations we
encourage self-reporting. We would encourage them to contact
our office.
Mr. Cummings. Reclaiming my time, if Mr. Rove, for example,
the No. 1 adviser to the President of the United States,
received this information or had anything to do with the
disclosing of a covert agent's identity and now we have a
situation where it appears that the criminal trial is over,
would your agency have anything, I mean your office have
anything to do now or do you just close the books and say it's
over?
Mr. Knodell. I have no indication from the Department of
Justice or any other agency.
Mr. Cummings. Would Mr. Rove have had a duty to report any
kind of breach?
Mr. Knodell. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Even today.
Mr. Knodell. At the time of the occurrence.
Mr. Cummings. I'm sorry?
Mr. Knodell. At the time of the occurrence, when the
violation took place.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you. Before I recognize the next
witness I want to clarify this point, that the investigation by
Mr. Fitzgerald didn't take place for months and months and
months after it was well known that there had been a leak of
the identity of a covert CIA agent.
Now as I understand it, there was an obligation for the
White House to conduct an immediate investigation to find out
whether they needed to suspend security clearances of somebody
who had leaked this information, to maybe take disciplinary
action against an individual who might have been involved;
third, to find out who divulged it.
The White House had that obligation because this was a
matter of important, highest order national security.
Am I stating things correctly, Mr. Leonard?
Mr. Leonard. Mr. Chairman, as you point out, whenever there
is suspected an unauthorized disclosure or compromise, there is
an affirmative responsibility to do an inquiry at the very
least to implement corrective actions so that subsequently
additional and similar violations do not continue to occur and
also to be able to ensure that any potential damage to national
security is assessed. Part of the assessment of corrective
action is also the assessment of the need for sanctions.
Chairman Waxman. Right after the Novak column appeared
there was an outrage that this was disclosing a covert agent.
Not only that, the CIA was so angered by it that they wrote a
letter to the Justice Department demanding an investigation.
And in light of this, which took place immediately after the
information that the leak was disclosed, the White House still
has not initiated an investigation.
Am I correct in that statement, Mr. Knodell?
Mr. Knodell. That's correct, my office has not.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you. Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. Thank you.
Mr. Knodell, are you the Director of the Office of
Security?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Watson. Executive Office of the President?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Watson. The White House.
Mr. Knodell. I work for the Office of Administration, but,
yes.
Ms. Watson. How long have you been on the job?
Mr. Knodell. I started this position in August 2004.
Ms. Watson. 2004, and this is March 2007. I just want to
establish that for the record.
The investigation that was led by Special Counsel Patrick
Fitzgerald revealed that a number of White House officials,
including former Chief of Staff of the Vice President, Lewis
Scooter Libby, Senior Adviser to the President, Carl Rove, and
the White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, discussed and
disclosed information concerning Ms. Wilson's CIA employment
status.
With respect to some of these officials, the Fitzgerald
proceedings, and how they attained the information was
discussed and Mr. Libby, for example, received information
about Ms. Plame's CIA employment from the State Department, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Vice President, and another
aide to the Vice President. What is not publicly known,
however, is how Mr. Carl Rove learned of Ms. Wilson's
employment status.
So, Mr. Knodell, under the requirements governing
classified information, the White House should have conducted
an investigation. Would that be you?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, ma'am, it would be my office.
Ms. Watson. Of the breach regarding Ms. Wilson's CIA
employment status, can you tell us how Mr. Rove learned about
Ms. Wilson's employment status at the CIA?
Mr. Knodell. I cannot.
Ms. Watson. You have been on since when?
Mr. Knodell. August 2004.
Ms. Watson. And you cannot tell us if you investigated how
that information was leaked. Loudly for the record, please.
Mr. Knodell. There was no investigation from the Office of
Security and Emergency Preparedness, that's correct.
Ms. Watson. Isn't that unusual? That's why I wanted you to
establish your position. You are the Director of the Office of
Security and you did no investigation of how this information
was out there?
Mr. Knodell. That's correct.
Ms. Watson. OK. Has there been any investigation by your
office into how Mr. Rove would have obtained the information?
Apparently your answer is no.
Mr. Knodell. That's correct.
Ms. Watson. It seems to me that there is some dereliction
of duty if you are the Director and you are to oversee the
security from the White House and you're telling me there was
no investigation.
Mr. Knodell. That's correct.
Ms. Watson. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to further
investigate why the Director's office, whether it was the
person who preceded him and now he falls into this and he is
the witness here, but I want us to get to the truth as to why
the Office of Security did not do an investigation. This goes
to the core of the security in this country and our operatives
abroad.
I think the reason why the intelligence was so faulty and
we went to war against a sovereign nation was because of the
failure in your office and the CIA to have accurate
information.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this time.
Chairman Waxman. Thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Van Hollen.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
witnesses for their testimony. I think you can hear that the
members of the committee are pretty stunned that no
investigation was undertaken into these breaches.
My question, I just want to understand, is it a matter of
White House security policy that if there is a criminal
investigation into a leak out of the White House that the
security office does not undertake its own investigation or
administrative action?
Mr. Knodell. We would not run a collateral investigation.
Mr. Van Hollen. Let me make sure I understand this. You
have somebody who's accused of leaking, there's a court
proceeding that may go on for years and years and years, the
alleged leaker continues to be in the White House, continues to
be potentially there to leak information, and it's the policy
of the White House to take no action to ask any question of the
alleged leaker to determine whether or not that person's
security clearance at the very least should be revoked.
Mr. Knodell. No, that is not the case.
Mr. Van Hollen. What is the case?
Mr. Knodell. An investigation should be done.
Mr. Van Hollen. An investigation should be done, right?
Mr. Knodell. Correct.
Mr. Van Hollen. But an investigation was not done?
Mr. Knodell. That's correct.
Mr. Van Hollen. Clearly the standard in the criminal
investigation like this one, one of the questions was whether
people had knowledge of whether there was a covert--someone was
a covert operative. But the standard as I understand for your
purposes is simply a question of whether classified information
was disclosed. Isn't that right?
Mr. Knodell. Can you rephrase that for me, please?
Mr. Van Hollen. In other words, as I understand the
regulations, your office has an obligation to undertake an
investigation when classified information has been disclosed.
Mr. Knodell. Correct.
Mr. Van Hollen. There's not as a preliminary matter any
question of whether it was intentional disclosure, you're
supposed to look into any disclosure, isn't that right?
Mr. Knodell. That's right.
Mr. Van Hollen. My question, and I understand a little time
has lapsed, but given what you just testified to, why aren't
you undertaking an investigation today? These are all now
publicly disclosed information, publicly disclosed classified
information by officials in the White House. You have said it
is not the policy to suspend an administration proceeding
pending a criminal investigation. It is very possible that
people, and it looks very likely that people clearly leaked
classified information. Why aren't we taking an investigation
today?
Mr. Knodell. Mr. Congressman, I will take this back, we'll
review this when I get back to the office, I'll review this
with senior management. We need to ensure that all criminal
investigations have been concluded, and we will certainly look
into it.
Mr. Van Hollen. If I can just stop you on that; I
understand the criminal investigation is being concluded but I
understood your testimony a minute ago to say that you would
conduct an administrative investigation even during the pending
criminal investigation.
Mr. Knodell. No, sir.
Mr. Van Hollen. So then it is the policy of the White House
not to undertake any administrative investigation as long as
there are criminal investigations going. Is that written down
somewhere?
Mr. Knodell. D-SKID 6.8, I believe where there will not be
a collateral investigation. I believe. I believe that's the
case.
Mr. Leonard. Can I clarify something, Mr. Congressman?
Clearly when there is a need for an administrative inquiry and
a criminal investigation you have a situation where there are
in fact competing priorities and so at the very least it can be
awkward.
So I'm not too sure we can say that there's a hard fast
rule one way or the other because quite frankly there could be
situations where someone can make a case that an administrative
inquiry while there's a criminal investigation going on can
amount to obstruction of justice. So those types of things have
to be sorted out and there is no clear-cut issue.
From a classification point of view I would submit that the
immediate concern should first and foremost be let's make sure
that we're not going to have any additional security violations
that would result in additional compromises, and that should
not wait.
Mr. Van Hollen. Let me if I may, Mr. Chairman, the GAO has
looked into this issue and it's clear, as I understand, the
rules of the White House are supposed to be similar to the
rules that apply in any agency, is that right, with respect to
how you treat these?
Mr. Knodell. That's right.
Mr. Van Hollen. I know other Federal officials have
routinely lost their security clearances pending investigations
into potential leaks of classified information and without even
the case when criminal charges were not filed.
For example, Sergeant Samuel Provence had a security
clearance revoked after he talked to several media outlets
about the mistreatment of a 16-year-old boy and other abuses by
interrogators at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. He was not indicted
or accused of criminal wrongdoing.
Here's someone who made a statement, a public statement
about abuses at Abu Ghraib and his security clearance was
temporarily suspended, and yet you have clear evidence of top
officials in the White House having disclosed classified
information and no action was taken.
I have to ask you to go back and take a look at whether or
not there's really a prohibition on moving forward. Clearly now
that the criminal investigation is over, it seems one should be
launched even if in fact that did prohibit an investigation
from going forward before.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Van Hollen. That certainly
appears to be a double standard.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. To clarify, my understanding is the
leak occurred on July 13th, and within the month, I don't know
if it was July 14th but certainly in July, we know the CIA made
their referral to the Justice Department. So it was immediately
under investigation by the Justice Department.
Now it took Attorney General Ashcroft several months before
he recused himself and got someone else on board, but there was
an immediate criminal investigation, isn't that correct?
Mr. Knodell. That's my understanding.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. That would change the dimensions in
terms of whether you would do your own investigation.
Mr. Knodell. Correct.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Or leave it to the professionals at
the Justice Department.
Let me just ask, in terms of an individual who may have
inadvertently outed an operative or a memorandum or something
during that time, once the criminal side gets kicked in, at
that point they have the right to allow that to move forward,
protect themselves, and at that point I don't know if it
relieves them of the obligation but they certainly have fifth
amendment rights at that point that could lead them to not go
forward with that, is that correct?
Mr. Leonard. That would be correct.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Before I recognize Mr. Hodes, the
President of the United States made statements when this hit
the press that he was outraged and he was going to be
conducting an investigation and heads would roll. He said if
anybody in the White House disclosed this information about a
covert agent, that person would be fired. Later he modified and
said they would have to be convicted of a crime. But it turns
out that the President didn't even ask anybody to do an
investigation. If he wanted to get the truth all he had to do
was call Carl Rove and Ari Fleischer and Scooter Libby and all
these people into his office and say, hey, how did this
information get out, who did it?
If he thought it was a problem, he could have said you're
not going to get access to other security information. Isn't
that why the White House can do it contemporaneously with ay
criminal investigation, Mr. Leonard?
Mr. Leonard. As I indicated, Mr. Chairman, when you have
those competing priorities or competing interests, it can make
an awkward situation, but those are the types of things that
would have to be worked out.
Chairman Waxman. Sounds like the competing priority was not
to allow his administration and top personnel to be embarrassed
by the truth.
Mr. Hodes.
Mr. Hodes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, you both
agree that the national security of the United States is the
most important thing we have to consider, notwithstanding
competing priorities. Would you both agree to that?
Mr. Leonard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Knodell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hodes. Mr. Knodell, you came in in August 2004 to the
White House, is that correct?
Mr. Knodell. Correct.
Mr. Hodes. You serve how, sir, at the pleasure of the
President?
Mr. Knodell. No, sir, I'm a career employee.
Mr. Hodes. I'm sorry?
Mr. Knodell. Career employee.
Mr. Hodes. Are you an attorney?
Mr. Knodell. I am not.
Mr. Hodes. Who was your predecessor at the White House.
Mr. Knodell. Jeffrey Thompson.
Mr. Hodes. Where is he now?
Mr. Knodell. I don't know. Last I heard, he had moved to
Georgia.
Mr. Hodes. When you came into your position, did Mr.
Thompson brief you on the situation in the White House and what
had or had not occurred with respect to investigations into the
potential breach of classified information?
Mr. Knodell. No, sir.
Mr. Hodes. Let me ask you this, what discussions, if any
have you had with the President of the United States about
initiating an investigation into the now clear, obvious
security breaches that have occurred?
Mr. Knodell. None.
Mr. Hodes. What discussions, if any, have you had with the
Vice President of the United States?
Mr. Knodell. None.
Mr. Hodes. What discussions have any of you had with Carl
Rove?
Mr. Knodell. None.
Mr. Hodes. What discussions, if any, have you had with
anyone about whether or not you should or should not institute
an investigation into the security breaches that are the
subject of this hearing today?
Mr. Knodell. I have had no conversations.
Mr. Hodes. You haven't talked to anybody?
Mr. Knodell. That's correct.
Mr. Hodes. So when you say you're going to go back to the
White House and take it up with senior management, you're
senior management, aren't you?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Hodes. So you're going to go back and talk to yourself
about whether or not you're going to conduct an investigation;
is that what you want this panel to believe?
Mr. Knodell. I report to several people.
Mr. Hodes. Who do you report to, sir?
Mr. Knodell. I report to Tom Dryer.
Mr. Hodes. Who is he?
Mr. Knodell. He is the Deputy Chief Operations Officer.
Mr. Hodes. For what?
Mr. Knodell. For the Office of Administration.
Mr. Hodes. Do you report to anybody else?
Mr. Knodell. He's my direct report.
Mr. Hodes. Who does he report to?
Mr. Knodell. He reports to Sandra Evans.
Mr. Hodes. Who's Sandra Evans?
Mr. Knodell. Operations Officer. I'm sorry, within OA. And
then the COO reports to Mr. Allen Swindeman, he's the Director
of OA.
Mr. Hodes. Does anybody report back to the White House?
Mr. Knodell. Mr. Swindeman is our Director.
Mr. Hodes. He reports to the White House?
Mr. Knodell. He is a political appointee.
Mr. Hodes. Do you agree with me, Mr. Knodell, that the NIE
is a classified document?
Mr. Knodell. Pardon me?
Mr. Hodes. Do you agree that the National Intelligence
Estimate before it is declassified is a classified document?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hodes. Are there procedures for declassifying the
National Intelligence Estimate?
Mr. Knodell. I'm not familiar with specific
declassification for that document.
Mr. Hodes. Mr. Leonard, are their procedures in place for
declassifying the National Intelligence Estimate?
Mr. Leonard. Yes, sir. As with any classified information,
it can become declassified pursuant to the original decisions
as to when it becomes declassified. It can be become
declassified under the authorization of an authorized official
and then it can also become declassified just by the mere
passage of time.
Mr. Hodes. If classified information is revealed without
having been properly declassified, that's considered a leak,
correct, Mr. Leonard?
Mr. Leonard. That's an unauthorized disclosure, yes, sir.
Mr. Hodes. Mr. Knodell, you agree with that, it's
considered a leak if it's not properly declassified?
Mr. Knodell. Yes.
Mr. Hodes. Leaking classified information is a crime, is it
not, Mr. Knodell?
Mr. Knodell. Yes.
Mr. Hodes. And if two or more persons agree to leak
classified information and one of those persons takes
affirmative steps to do something pursuant to that agreement,
that could be considered a criminal conspiracy, is that
correct?
Mr. Knodell. It could be, certainly.
Mr. Hodes. Now it's my understanding that Mr. Libby
testified that he was specifically authorized in advance to
disclose key judgments of the classified National Intelligence
Estimate to reporter Judy Miller because Vice President Cheney
believed it important to do so. Mr. Libby also testified that
the Vice President told him that the President had given the
authorization to disclose portions of the National Intelligence
Estimate.
In your experience, gentlemen, in government, have you ever
seen such selective declassification before?
Mr. Leonard. I'm not aware of any similar type of action
such as that, no, sir.
Mr. Hodes. Do you know of any legal basis for there to be
selective declassification to a few reporters of the National
Intelligence Estimate? And I want to tell you on the date that
was supposedly disclosed by Mr. Libby, July 8th, in the
following 10 days administration officials told folks that the
NIE was still classified, and it was formally declassified on
July 18th.
Can you explain to this panel how if Mr. Libby had
authority from the President or the Vice President to
declassify the NIE on July 8th, the administration continued to
claim that it was classified for 10 days and then apparently
declassified it again on July 18th.
Mr. Leonard. I don't have any firsthand knowledge to
address any of that, sir.
Mr. Knodell. Nor do I.
Mr. Hodes. Does it raise any questions for you?
Mr. Leonard. The provisions of the Executive order, as I
had indicated, clearly provides for instances where classified
information can be declassified even when it otherwise meets
the standards for continued classification. And then ultimately
the exercise of classification and declassification authority
is the President's absolute authority. It's not derived from
any law or regulation or Executive order, it's his Article II
constitutional authority to be used absolutely.
Mr. Hodes. Assuming that to be the case, is it your
testimony that the President could choose to selectively
declassify the National Intelligence Estimate and give
directions that it could be declassified to be used with three
reporters but then still retain--and that document is still
classified?
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired, but we
do want an answer.
Mr. Leonard. Sir, it's my testimony that it is the
President's absolute authority when it comes to the
classification and declassification of information.
Chairman Waxman. Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Knodell, I'm looking at your title,
Director, Office of Security. I'm trying to establish whether
you have any authority. Do you regard yourself as having any
independent or independent authority apart from others who
report directly to the President of the United States? Do you
have any ability to initiate investigations or other action on
your own?
Mr. Knodell. I would coordinate that through our legal
counsel within the Office of Administration and the Director of
the Office of Administration.
Ms. Norton. You are testifying that you would not initiate
any action on your own without in fact reporting up through
some chain of command. This is not in any way an independent
office, and you essentially are someone who makes
recommendation to somebody else about investigations?
Mr. Knodell. In essence, yes.
Ms. Norton. You have to get a sign-off from someone to do
an investigation?
Mr. Knodell. Not initially, no. Not initially. We can start
an investigation. We start security violations if security
violations come in.
Ms. Norton. Without reporting it, that's what you're doing?
Mr. Knodell. I would report it once we started the
investigation.
Ms. Norton. You could be stopped from doing that?
Mr. Knodell. That's never been the case in the past.
Ms. Norton. You haven't apparently done such, at least in
respect to this controversy?
Let me ask you a question about what we do know. We do know
that Mr. Rove spoke to two reporters, and we know who they
were, Robert Novak and Matthew Cooper. We do know that he
denied he had spoken with any employers--excuse me, with any
reporters. Indeed he claimed he wasn't involved at all.
I'm going to ask that a video clip be rolled from a press
conference, White House press conference, involving the
spokesman Scott McClellan addressing the Press Corps.
[Video shown.]
Ms. Norton. Mr. Knodell, can you explain why Mr. Rove still
has a security clearance today, or does he?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, he does.
Ms. Norton. Given the admissions that apparently are clear,
why does he have that security clearance today?
Mr. Knodell. It's my understanding that the criminal
investigation didn't find any criminal wrongdoing.
Ms. Norton. I'm very disturbed by what went back and forth
on criminal and administrative responsibilities here because
you seem to testify that even if a matter that could risk the
security of the United States or of a covert agent is involved,
that the administrative process ought to stand back until a
process with a much higher level or standard of proof is
required has finished its course.
Wouldn't that risk security not to even begin an
investigation to see whether there is anything that can be
begun to protect whatever might be the security breach quite
apart from whether there's been a criminal violation?
Mr. Knodell. I think as a result of the criminal
investigation it clearly didn't show, that I have seen in the
press, I have not seen the criminal investigative reports, that
there was no criminal wrongdoing.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Knodell, my question is: Does the security
of the United States depend upon the outcome of a criminal
proceeding or is there not in your office a duty to proceed as
far as you can to protect security using the administrative or
civil process?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, ma'am, absolutely. It's not that we're
just not protecting the White House complex and the classified
materials.
Ms. Norton. I can't hear you.
Mr. Knodell. We are protecting the classified----
Ms. Norton. Even without an investigation, so that you
might even plug the leak while the U.S. Attorney is trying to
find out using his processes who done it?
Mr. Knodell, I'm suggesting that at your level you could
plug leaks even while the criminal process is under way and
under investigation. And I want you to look at the very same
set of employees. If I could have up the White House----
Chairman Waxman. Ms. Norton, your time has expired. Members
have said they want a second round. We do have another panel
waiting to testify. I don't want to deny Members opportunities
to ask questions. What I would like my colleagues to do is I
will recognize Members for a second round. Could we limit to 3-
minute second rounds? Does anybody find a problem with that?
So then we'll do that. Members will now be recognized for
further questioning. And, Mr. Cummings, I'm going to start with
you if you have further questions.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We up
here, Mr. Knodell, we have an obligation to try to make sure
that we uphold the laws of this country and try to make sure
those laws are enforced, and protecting the identity of a
covert agent is very important to us, and I hope you understand
that, and protecting classified information. We're trying to
help you do your job.
During Ms. Wilson's testimony the ranking member, Mr.
Davis, kept making a point that a key issue in whether Mr. Rove
and other White House officials knew Ms. Wilson was a covert
agent. I do agree that this is relevant. If the White House
knowingly disclosed a covert agent, that would obviously be a
very serious matter. My understanding is that the regulations
do not prohibit only intentional disclosures, they also
prohibit negligent disclosures.
Mr. Leonard, is my understanding accurate that the
Executive order governing the handling of classified
information prohibits knowing, willful or negligent disclosures
of classified information, is that right?
Mr. Leonard. Yes, sir, that's absolutely right. Regardless
of the intent, the damage is still the same. Again, the first
objective would be to make sure we don't have recurrences, and
if just people are ignorant we would like to brief them and
what have you, and then if there is intent or culpability, that
can be taken up by means of sanctions.
Mr. Cummings. By the way, Mr. Knodell, has there been any
briefing as referred to by Mr. Leonard with regard to Mr. Rove
or anybody else in the White House since this happened, since
this disclosure took place?
Mr. Knodell. A briefing in regards to?
Mr. Cummings. He just said one of the things you want to do
is brief people about the rules and regulations so it doesn't
happen again. Did you brief anybody?
Mr. Knodell. Congressman, yes, we do. We supply an
indoctrination security briefing for people when they first
come on board and then their first anniversary date and every
year after we have annual refreshing briefs.
Mr. Cummings. Did you use this as an example, by the way?
This is like out there, I mean it's here.
Mr. Knodell. No, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You didn't say, look, this is what happened
and we don't want this to happen again. You never did that?
Mr. Knodell. No, sir.
Mr. Leonard. I can tell you, Mr. Congressman, in November,
December 2005, maybe even a little bit of 2006, there were a
series of special briefings for all cleared personnel in the
Executive Office of the President, mandatory briefings for
senior management on down, and these types of issues were in
fact covered during the course of those briefings, and this was
publicly--the public was made aware of these.
Mr. Cummings. So even if Carl Rove or any other White House
official did not know that Ms. Wilson's employment status was
classified, the disclosure of such information to an individual
not authorized to receive it could have been a violation of the
Executive order, and that is an Executive order of the
President of the United States, is that right?
Mr. Knodell. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. So basically the President set up some rules
and then he said I'm going to make sure that if anybody
violated these rules, they're going to have major problems and
they're going to have to go, and then the next thing you know
there is apparently a violation but no action, is that right?
Mr. Knodell. Other than the criminal proceedings, no action
from my office.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. I'm sorry we don't have clips of the
President making statements about how he was going to do an
investigation and heads would roll, but I guess we will have to
leave that to the Daily Show for their presentation.
Ms. Watson, I'm going to call on you next if you have
additional questions.
Ms. Watson. Yes. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Knodell, this oversight hearing is called the ``White
House Procedures for Safeguarding Classified Information.''
Mr. Knodell. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Watson. In the first round I asked you what your
position was. You clearly said that you have not held any
investigation and your role is the Director of Office of
Security. Have you or do you feel that you have carried out
your duties?
Chairman Waxman. Could I ask the gentlelady not to ask a
harsh question of Mr. Knodell? He's here and I think he's been
asked some tough questions, but let's try to keep them a little
bit less personal.
Ms. Watson. I just want to know, I want to have some
clarity as to what the responsibility of your position in your
office is. There's a gap for me that you have this position but
there's been no investigation.
Mr. Knodell. Congresswoman, like I said, and I say with all
due respect, the reason we did not initiate an investigation is
because there was a criminal proceeding that was already
underway. There was already an investigation underway.
Ms. Watson. But the criminal procedure is over.
Mr. Knodell. I have not been notified that it is officially
over.
Ms. Watson. Thank you. I have no other questions, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Ms. Watson. I'm going to
recognize myself because I want to point out that there seems
to be interesting other examples where we've had disclosures of
leaks. This is not the only time questions have arisen about
how the Bush administration White House handles classified
information.
For example, journalist and author Bob Woodward wrote in
the introduction of his 2002 book, Bush at War, that the book
was based in part on, ``contemporaneous notes taken during
National Security Council and other meetings where the most
important decisions were discussed and made,'' and that,
``written record, both classified and unclassified.''
Mr. Woodward also stated war planning and war making
involves secret information. I have used a good deal of it
trying to provide new specific details without harming
sensitive operations or relationships with foreign governments.
This is not a sanitized version, and the sense is if we had
them in the United States, thank God we don't, no doubt would
draw the line at a different, more restrictive place than I
have, end quote.
Mr. Knodell, Mr. Woodward's statements indicate he had
remarkable classified information of the most sensitive
information. Were Mr. Woodward's circumstances unique or were
White House disclosures of classified information to him and to
journalists in the case of Mrs. Wilson part of a broader
pattern of White House disclosures or of classified information
to selected journalists and authors? We see now this is not
unique to get classified information to people.
It's noteworthy the administration--let me ask you to
respond to that. Looks like Mr. Woodward had information that
was classified. He seems to admit it.
Mr. Knodell. I have no knowledge of that.
Chairman Waxman. Well, so when the administration, however,
is concerned that there are questions about the disclosure of
sensitive information by administration critics, there seems to
be different results. For example, January 2004, within 1 day
of former Secretary of Treasury Paul O'Neill's television
interview in which he voiced criticism of the Bush
administration, the administration publicly announced it was
investigating whether Secretary O'Neill had improperly
disclosed confidential information. OK. They didn't like what
he had to say but they're going to immediately investigate him.
On June 20, 2002, an irate Vice President Cheney reportedly
told congressional leaders that the President had deep concerns
about media accounts from just 1 day earlier when it got out
that the National Security Agency on September 10, 2001 had
communication intercepts with cryptic references to possible
attacks the next day. The report cited congressional sources
and congressional leaders. Immediately requested a Justice
Department investigation of the matter.
The administration seems to be inconsistent in their
approach in these cases, and it's troubling. They raise very
serious questions about whether White House policies on
sensitive information is driven by political considerations. If
it's a critic they are going to investigate, they're going to
really stop it. When it comes to people in-house, people they
like, people they trust, well, the investigation hasn't even
started with regard to those people.
I'm not asking a question, but just making this part of the
record.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I think it goes both
ways in terms of selective oversight and selective
investigations. This committee ought to also be looking at the
NIE leaks on the Iraq war, National Intelligence Estimates
which were leaked. It can do damage. The NSA collection and
monitoring of certain phone information, which was leaked,
classified secret information. The East European CIA detention
facilities leaks. The intelligence activities toward Iran
leaks.
We can all be selective on this and we all understand the
partisanship and everything else that goes on with this, which
has been thoroughly vetted and investigated. We do of course
have a responsibility to take a look at what the procedures are
to make sure these things don't occur again. That's really the
purpose of oversight, not as much as to look back but look
forward to make sure these things do not happen again.
Mr. Leonard, let me ask, does the President or the Vice
President have authority to declassify on the spot?
Mr. Leonard. As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Davis, the
President's authority in this area is absolute pursuant to the
Constitution.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. So they can do it on the spot. Can
they declassify for limited purposes?
Mr. Leonard. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Once again the leak to Novak, which
is I think what started this whole thing, is there any evidence
that anyone in the White House had any knowledge that Valerie
Plame was a covert operative? Does anybody have any evidence of
that?
Mr. Leonard. I have no firsthand information.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Do you, Mr. Knodell?
Mr. Knodell. No, I do not.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. In terms of the obligation to
disclose once it became apparent that she was a covert
operative, a criminal investigation was initiated almost
immediately by the CIA, with a referral to the Justice
Department. Is that correct?
Mr. Knodell. That's my understanding, yes.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. That's my understanding as well,
within the month. It might have been a day, I don't know what
that time period was, and I hope the committee can find out.
Once that criminal investigation is underway with the referral
that sends it to Justice, now Mr. Fitzpatrick didn't come in
until the Attorney General recused himself sometime later, but
an investigation was already underway. What does that do to the
obligations to disclose at that point? Does that put employees
in a position of having to decide if they're going to exercise
fifth amendment rights and the like and does the purpose of the
Executive order at that point really become pointless if you
have an investigation this?
You haven't thought that through?
Mr. Leonard. I have, sir, and I would submit that the
Executive order is not pointless at that point in time. Again,
this is an instance where you have competing national
interests. I had over 30 years in the Department of Defense and
there were many times where senior leadership in the Department
of Defense did battle with the Department of Justice, the FBI,
where there were instances where the national security issues
at risk far outweighed whatever criminal investigative
priorities the Bureau or the Justice Department had. These are
things that have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis. This
is one instance where there is no absolutes.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. So we're in some gray areas at this
point?
Mr. Leonard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you very much.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Mr. Van Hollen.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Leonard, let me just note that after this information was first
disclosed in the Novak column on or about July 26, 2003, White
House press spokesman McClellan stated: Let me make it very
clear, that's not the way this White House operates.
Two months later and still before they'd even called for an
investigation by the Justice Department, on September 29, 2003,
Mr. McClellan addressed the White House Press Corps and over 30
times stated that they had no information regarding the
involvement of any White House officials.
I think we understand today why there was no information.
No investigation was done.
You talked about competing national priorities. Clearly in
this 2-month period there weren't competing priorities, were
there? In other words, before the criminal investigation was
authorized there were no competing priorities?
Mr. Leonard. To my knowledge, that's correct.
Mr. Van Hollen. Yet based on your understanding of the
regulations in the statute and the information that was out in
the press, which clearly raised suspicions of unauthorized
disclosure of information, wouldn't that have triggered an
investigation in your view?
Mr. Leonard. Again, in circumstances like that, even if it
was just an inadvertent, out of ignorance disclosure, you would
want to find out why it happened so you could preclude it from
happening again, even if it's by ignorance.
Mr. Van Hollen. Not just that you would want to but you
have an obligation?
Mr. Leonard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Van Hollen. With respect to the pendency of the
criminal proceedings, as I understand your testimony, there is
nothing in the statute or the regulations that prohibits you
from doing this other investigation under the regulations and
revoking a security clearance, isn't that correct?
Mr. Leonard. Concomitantly while there is an investigation
going on? You're absolutely right.
Mr. Van Hollen. You're absolutely free to do that; nothing
prohibits you from undertaking an investigation, an
administrative action?
Mr. Leonard. The directive is very clear that when there is
evidence of potential criminality, that there would be the
requirement to coordinate with legal counsel and the
requirement to coordinate with the Department of Justice with
the expectation that again those issues would be worked out.
Mr. Van Hollen. Worked out in coordination.
Mr. Leonard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Van Hollen. Mr. Knodell, if I could just ask you, do
you know of any, and this doesn't mean you are personally privy
to the conversations, but have you heard of communications
within the White House that bear on the question of whether or
not an investigation of security breaches should have been
conducted?
Mr. Knodell. No, I have not.
Mr. Van Hollen. You don't know, whether it's direct
communications or hearsay, since you have been there. Have you
had any conversations with anybody in the White House about the
disclosures that have been----
Mr. Knodell. No, I have not.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Van Hollen. Mr. Hodes.
Mr. Hodes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Knodell, do
employees sign nondisclosure agreements agreeing not to
disclose classified information in connection with your
briefings of them?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, they do. At the time they they're issued
a clearance they sign a nondisclosure agreement.
Mr. Hodes. Am I correct that those nondisclosure agreements
and security clearances are reviewed every 5 years?
Mr. Knodell. That's correct.
Mr. Hodes. I understand that Mr. Rove came into service in
the White House in 2001, is that correct?
Mr. Knodell. I believe so.
Mr. Hodes. So in 2006 you would have conducted review of
Mr. Rove's security clearance?
Mr. Knodell. We would have initiated a reinvestigation,
that's correct, with the FBI. The FBI conducts our background
investigations.
Mr. Hodes. Are you aware that has in fact happened with Mr.
Rove?
Mr. Knodell. I don't have first-hand knowledge now, but I
could very easily go back and check.
Mr. Hodes. So there would be documents which someone in the
Federal Government has about whether or not Mr. Rove, for
example, ought to still have his security clearance.
Mr. Knodell. Correct.
Mr. Hodes. And do you agree with me that, under the
regulations, whether a person is truthful and complete in their
answers to questions and whether or not they are--the person is
disposed toward candor is an important factor in determining
whether someone continues to have access to classified action?
Mr. Knodell. That is considered in the adjudication
process, yes.
Mr. Hodes. And if someone lied about what they did, that
would be important, wouldn't it?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, it would.
Mr. Hodes. You have now heard and seen on this video Mr.
McClellan say that Mr. Rove told him he had nothing to do with
security leaks, but we know that Mr. Rove did leak classified
information. Does that indicate to you that such a lack of
candor should lead to a reexamination of Mr. Rove's security
clearance?
Mr. Knodell. I clearly don't know the content of their
conversation.
Mr. Hodes. Is it something that--anything you have heard
today or read in the press or read anywhere else raises a
question in your mind as the senior security officer in the
White House about whether or not you ought to go and ask some
questions about it?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, we could do that.
Mr. Hodes. Will you do it?
Mr. Knodell. I will discuss that with senior management.
Mr. Hodes. And will you get back to us and let us know what
senior management and you discuss and what you conclude, sir?
Mr. Knodell. Yes, I will.
Mr. Hodes. Does Mr. Libby still have his security clearance
as of this date?
Mr. Knodell. No, he does not.
Mr. Hodes. When was that removed?
Mr. Knodell. The day he resigned, I believe it was.
Mr. Hodes. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Van Hollen [presiding]. Thank you.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Could I have back the White House chart?
I ask Mr. Knodell to look at the middle row; and I would
like your view, Mr. Knodell, given the Executive order which
you are charged to enforce in 12958, whether you think any of
those officials or any officials in the White House, besides
the President, would meet the standards of the Executive order
which, as you know, are informational if you are conducting an
investigation, if there is an official need to know.
What if you need to verify information concerning security?
Would any of those officials have had a need to know the name
of a covert agent?
Mr. Knodell. I really wouldn't know.
Ms. Norton. You are the man charged with enforcing the
Executive Order 12958 and your answer is what?
Mr. Knodell. I don't know if they would have a need to
know. I don't have enough information.
Ms. Norton. Because that depends on what they say? Isn't
that a matter of regulation and law? I am saying based on their
position.
Mr. Knodell. People do have to have a need to know for
someone with classified information to pass classified
information. They also have to make sure that there is a non-
disclosure agreement.
Ms. Norton. So the need to know the name of a covert agent,
you can think of a circumstance where an official, one of those
officials, would need to know the name of a covert agent, and I
have just given you the basis.
Mr. Knodell. Yes, ma'am. I don't know what the White House
does day to day in their operations and who they're staying in
contact with.
Ms. Norton. So day-to-day operations, that could change;
and how can anyone find out the name of a covert agent, given
changes in day-to-day operations in the White House?
Mr. Knodell. No, ma'am. I don't know if any of those folks
would have a need to know.
Ms. Norton. Let me say frankly you to you, Mr. Knodell, I
don't think you need--I think that--I congratulate you on your
willingness to be here. I know you wouldn't have been here if
the White House hadn't sent you. I am interested in remedy,
because national security is involved in this.
Normally, the notion of the White House investigating
itself is perfectly understandable where there is not a
national security matter involved. But if I may say so, I
really do think, given what you have testified concerning your
office, that you are truly the fall guy here. I say that
because you have testified that you felt a virtual injunction
as an administrative agent without coordinating with your
superiors, all of whom--obviously, the high-level support to
the President of the United States. You clearly don't think you
could do an independent investigation. Do you think that this
investigation should lie with someone more independent than
you?
Chairman Waxman. The gentlelady's time has expired, but if
the gentleman wants to respond.
Mr. Knodell. I am good.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, you gave him the option to
respond.
Chairman Waxman. You don't want to respond to the question?
Mr. Knodell. No.
Chairman Waxman. Well, I want to thank the two of you very
much for being here. You have been very helpful, Mr. Knodell.
You came here on short notice, and it's not been an easy time
for you. However, I guess you sense the frustration of the
members of this committee when we hear of a breach of national
security and we were told the President was going to do an
investigation and the White House has virtually done nothing,
not even to take away the security clearances pending any other
investigation by anyone else. But those are my comments, and I
want to thank both of you for being here.
We have a third panel waiting to come up.
For panel No. 3, the Chair would like to call forward Mr.
Mark Zaid, an attorney with the extent of experience
representing government employees accused of mishandling
classified information; and Ms. Victoria Toensing, an attorney
in private practice and a former Senate staffer.
I want to welcome you both to our hearing today. Your
prepared statements will be in the record in their entirety. I
would like to ask you for your oral presentation to be limited
to 5 minutes.
It is the practice of this committee to ask all witnesses
to take an oath. So if you would please stand and raise your
right hands
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Waxman. The record will reflect the witnesses
answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Zaid, why don't we start with you.
STATEMENTS OF MARK ZAID, ESQUIRE; AND VICTORIA TOENSING,
ESQUIRE
STATEMENT OF MARK ZAID
Mr. Zaid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. It's my pleasure to testify again before this body.
For nearly 15 years, I have been among a handful of
attorneys nationwide who regularly handle civil litigation and
administrative matters involving national security claims. This
includes all aspects of security clearance suspensions,
denials, revocations, statutory and first amendment challenge
to classification decisions, leak investigations and general
employment disputes that may arise within the Intel, military
and law enforcement communities. In the exercise of my legal
responsibilities, I often have authorized access to classified
information.
We've heard of the operative documents that pertain to this
topic, Executive Order 12958, which was amended by 13292, and
also Executive Order 12968. Agencies throughout the Federal
Government have adopted implementing regulations attuned to
their specific situations. But those are the operative
documents that we really rely on.
Section 41 of EO 13292 deals with who actually grants or is
accorded access to classified information. There has to be a
favorable determination of eligibility. There has to be an
executed, approved non-disclosure agreement; and there has to
be a need-to-know determination.
Each of these components is factually based. Indeed,
whether a need to know exists is a question that is asked and
answered by tens of thousands of Federal employees and
contractors thousands of times every day as part of their
routine responsibilities.
However, the underlying premise of that first prong, the
determination of eligibility, deals with a judgment
determination, one of common sense that is often referred to as
the ``whole person concept.''
Unfortunately, the system is anything but uniform. The
process by which clearances or where access is granted very
significantly based on the level of clearance, interim
clearances can be very easily granted with very little effort
by an agency. Most agencies, as we have heard, will go through
a periodic background investigation that usually extends 7 to
15 years for the individual; and periodic reinvestigations will
reoccur between 5 and 10 years, depending on the backlog of the
agency involved and the level of clearance.
To be blunt, we can discuss all day what the regulations
state, what minimal due process might be required or expected
in scenarios touching upon today's hearing topic and what
outcome a reasonable person would apply in any specific case;
and that would be an academically and legally fascinating
discussion, at least for me. But the fact is the recitation of
real-world anecdotal experiences by those who operate in this
field will educate you with very different results.
It is best to characterize any substantive discussion of
security clearances and agencies, and procedures surrounding
such determinations, as arbitrary and fraught with
inconsistencies. Periodically, every agency derives its
authorities from these operative documents. Implementation
varies across the board. With some agencies, the process works
very well. With others, it is particularly broken. Overall, the
system works but with numerous flaws, many of which can be
repaired through legislative oversight or correction, though,
to be sure, it is likely that any such attempt will engender
cries of constitutional overreach by any White House.
Let me use this opportunity to go through a few
observations from cases I have handled over the years.
Whether the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information results in administrative, civil, or criminal
sanctions against an individual is a very fact-based inquiry
for which no general rule truly exists. The suspension of an
individual's security clearance can arise from the receipt of
unsubstantiated anonymous allegations or can occur after a
thorough internal investigation. At what stage suspension
occurs is up to the specific agency.
Moreover, the type of suspension is not deemed to be--this
type of suspension is not deemed to be an adverse personnel
action and therefore does not afford the person the substantive
challenge rights as soon as he is notified of the substantive
challenges that exist.
Again, a very fact-based inquiry for which no general rule
exists.
Some agencies will utilize a security suspension to suspend
the employee's employment altogether, pending conclusion of an
investigation which could take years. This may be paid
administrative leave, this may be unpaid administrative leave,
and if that clearance is reinstated at some point in the future
there is no compensation given to that individual whatsoever.
Again, a very fact-based inquiry for which no general rule
truly exists.
Punishment for an unauthorized disclosure can range from no
action to something as merely administrative as a reprimand,
oral or written, in the file. Could be more serious, such as
the revocation of a clearance or, depending on the factual
circumstances, criminal prosecution.
Again, a very fact-based inquiry.
Significant inconsistencies exist governing agencies'
determination of access to classified info. Significant
inconsistencies exist governing an individual's ability to
challenge a revocation or suspension or denial. Significant
inconsistencies exist as to how agencies' security
investigations are initiated or handled.
Most agencies experience serious and harmful time delays
with respect to security investigations that seriously impact
an employee or contractor's life and, in fact, creates
additional security concerns that did not previously exist.
An appeal of a clearance revocation is usually--or denial--
will take often 6 to 12 months; and if it is the CIA, we may be
talking 2 to 3 years. Investigations into the leaks of
classified information rarely result in either discipline or
prosecution for a variety of reasons, including the failure of
Federal agencies to cooperate with one another.
And the training for authorized holders of classified info
with respect to this need to know differs from the positions
the executive branch will espouse in adverse litigation for
judicial proceedings.
In my testimony, I set forth a few recommendations that the
committee can look into implementing. I will leave that in the
record.
I will just conclude by saying that this is an area that
cries out for vigorous legislative oversight, especially given
recent efforts by the executive branch to expand criminal
penalties governing disclosures of classified information or
unauthorized disclosure to beyond those under any affirmative
obligations which protect such info.
I encourage this committee to remain steadfast in its
vision to ensure accountability, efficiency, and fairness while
combating opposition from the executive branch, no matter which
party may be in power.
I am more than happy to provide an elaboration to any of
those points or anything to this hearing topic or during any
Q&A that is submitted later.
Thank you.
Ms. Watson [presiding]. Thank you.
Now Ms. Victoria Toensing.
STATEMENT OF VICTORIA TOENSING
Ms. Toensing. Madam Chairman, thank you for inviting me to
testify about safeguarding classified information. Since you
also invited Valerie Plame here, I had to assume you also
wanted to consider the protection of covert agents as specified
under the 1982 Intelligence Identities Protection Act, the act
that was the basis for the Special Counsel's investigation.
My first assignment as chief counsel for the Senate
Intelligence Committee for Chairman Barry Goldwater was to get
that law passed. He put me in charge of negotiating with the
parties, particularly with the press who vigorously opposed the
legislation because they claimed it would curtail their ability
to criticize the Intelligence Committee. It would have a
chilling effect, the press argued.
In my prepared statement, I thoroughly discussed the
structure of the act, but I want to now discuss how, because it
is important to the press arguments, how we divided the types
of persons who could be prosecuted into two classes:
journalists and government employees having authorized access
to classified information.
We drafted such a high standard for journalists that it is
almost impossible for a working journalist like Bob Novak in
his column to have violated the law. But we also did not want
government employees to be chilled in reporting wrongdoing or
prosecuted for accidentally saying someone's name without
having the specific knowledge and intent to ``out'' a covert
person.
That caution and respect for the mighty power of the
criminal law leads me to the main point of my testimony.
It was Chairman Goldwater's grave concern in creating the
legislation, the great libertarian, that if Congress was going
to criminalize naming what in those days we referred to as
``undercover personnel,'' then the CIA better fulfill its
responsibility by protecting the cover of those employees.
Chairman Goldwater was most displeased at that time, and he
characterized the CIA's cavalier treatment of protecting its
undercover--and that's how he referred to it before the law--of
protecting their cover. And you see that concern when you study
the law, and you see it in one of the seven findings.
But, more importantly, we created a rare approach in the
criminal statute. Usually in the criminal law, it is only the
conduct of the defendant that is at issue, but, in this law,
Congress required the CIA to take affirmative measures to
conceal the government's relationship to that covert agent. No
one can be prosecuted under that law unless this requirement is
fulfilled by being proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The statute also requires the CIA to report annually,
starting in February 1983, to the House and Senate Intel
Committees on these--whatever their affirmative measures were,
whatever they created to protect the identities of covert
agents.
I think you might all want to check to see whether they
have ever fulfilled that mandate by the law, that legislative
mandate.
But it comes to mind in the course of this 3-year
investigation and listening to even the testimony today, could
the CIA produce immediately--meaning do they already have it
prepared and they can hurry and get it prepared at your
request--a list of all foreign assigned personnel that it has
designated covert under the act? Does the CIA make any list
available like that to people like their spokesperson who has
to get on the telephone with people like Bob Novak and confirm
or deny that somebody works at the CIA?
I have several other questions in my prepared statement,
but I want to go on to my last point, and--by turning to this
particular case where numerous persons were subpoenaed,
repeatedly, some of them, before a grand jury, threatened with
prosecution in a matter that, in my legal experience, had no
criminal basis.
If Valerie Plame were really covert under the law--I am not
saying whatever they say in the halls of the CIA. If she were
really covert under the law, then why didn't Robert Grenier,
the CIA briefer who talked to Scooter Libby and the Vice
President about Wilson's wife working at the CIA, why didn't he
tell them that her identity was covert? Why didn't Richard
Armitage, who said he was the original leaker, of course, to
Bob Novak, but he said, having seen Plame's name in a
Department memo, he had never seen a covert agent's name in 28
years of government practice. So it was a surprise to him. He
didn't know how Plame's identity was--that it wasn't to be
revealed. Neither did Mark Grossman, the Under Secretary.
If the CIA was really being careful and had guidelines for
all of these covert agents, why did they allow Valerie Plame to
contribute $1,000 to Al Gore's campaign and list her CIA cover
business, Brewster, Jennings and Associates, as her employer?
Why did the CIA not ask Joe Wilson to sign a
confidentiality agreement about his mission to Niger? I can
tell you I have to do it. I don't know, Mark, if you do it when
you take a case, but I can't talk to someone for 1 hour without
representation unless I sign a confidentiality agreement, and
then they might permit him to write an op-ed piece in the New
York Times about the trip, an act certain to bring press
attention when his wife's name is in that.
I mean, this tradecraft is just appalling to me who has
spent a good deal of my life in government service having to
deal with classified material and with the CIA in an oversight
capacity.
The CIA never sent its top personnel to Bob Novak, like the
director, and ask him, please, please don't print; don't
publish this name. What they said to him was, ``Well, we would
rather you not do it, but she's not going to have another
foreign assignment,'' so--it was very cavalier.
They certainly knew, the CIA, how to go and send the top
people when they didn't want--in December 2005, when they
didn't want the New York Times to publish the NSA surveillance
program.
I have--there's--why didn't CIA spokesman Bill Harlow who,
according to Wilson's autobiography--and you spoke with Valerie
Plame about it--and he had been alerted that Bob Novak was
sniffing around, why did he confirm for Bob Novak that Valerie
Plame worked at the CIA? Why did Bill Harlow tell Vice
Presidential Staffer Kathy Martin that Wilson's wife worked at
the agency but not warn her, ``Oh, you shouldn't be giving up
this identity?''
Why did the CIA give Plame a job at its headquarters in
Langley when it is mandated by the statute, ``to conceal a
covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United
States.''
And if this was really a violation of the Covert Agent
Identities Bill, why did the CIA send to the Justice Department
a boilerplate, 11-question criminal referral for classified
information violation when its lawyers had to know--or pray
that they knew--that merely being a classified person or the
situation being classified did not fulfill the elements
required by the Agent Identities Protection Act?
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Toensing follows:]
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Chairman Waxman. I want to recognize Mr. Davis to start
off.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you. We didn't start with
going into the covert--taking Ms. Plame at her word----
Ms. Toensing. I am having a hard time hearing you.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. We didn't go into extensively
whether it was covert or not. I asked her whether anybody told
her she was versus what she thought. But the question was--
clearly, there were no crimes committed.
I'm going to ask each of you, can you name a leak case that
you have dealt with that has undergone more scrutiny or
investigation than this one? Mr. Zaid.
Mr. Zaid. Not as much. Certainly nothing as public as this.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Either with grand jury.
Mr. Zaid. There are numerous grand juries, even ones that
are going on right now with leak investigations, and they
haven't received the amount of publicity that this case has.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. They have a special prosecutor on
this and you can look at the hours of testimony. This has
undergone as much scrutiny as any case you are aware of.
Mr. Zaid. Sure.
Ms. Toensing. I used to tell Chairman Goldwater--he'd say,
I want those leakers--in much more crusty language than that--I
want those leakers prosecuted, and I would say, ``It's the rule
of 38. If 38 people knew about it, you are probably not going
to get a prosecution,'' and so usually there is not a
prosecution in the case.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I mean, the thing that strikes me
through all of this is if the CIA fails to take affirmative
steps to protect their own agents, how can you expect the
recipients of information to know that the information is
protected and take appropriate precautions? Mr. Zaid--I'll ask
you both.
Ms. Toensing. I mean, the whole reason that we put that
into the law was because we didn't want employees to be chilled
from reporting wrongdoing, that the person had to know, have
knowledge that the CIA was taking these affirmative measures to
protect the identity and the relationship of that person. So if
nobody is telling anybody, it is like, who knew? How would you
know that something was not to be repeated?
Mr. Davis of Virginia. The majority is pointing the finger
at the White House, but the leak didn't come from the White
House. And, second, there is no evidence--presented here today
at least--that anybody in the White House knew that she was a
covert agent.
Ms. Toensing. Not one person told anybody in the White
House. We have no evidence.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me----
Chairman Waxman. Excuse me. You are saying that
conclusively. Do you know the facts? Or are you just saying
there is no evidence?
Ms. Toensing. I know what facts are out there. If somebody
wants to point to another fact, I will be glad to listen.
Chairman Waxman. So what you have heard, you can reach that
conclusion from. You don't know all of the information.
Ms. Toensing. From the testimony at trial.
Mr. Zaid. I think we have to make a distinction between
criminality and what type of administrative sanctions could
possibly have been imposed. I have no personal information with
respect to this case, other than what everybody else does in
reviewing it with great interest, especially since it's in my
subject matter knowledge.
And Ms. Toensing is absolutely correct with many of her
questions with respect to the Intelligence Identities Act,
which has a very exacting standard. Ms. Plame, as she
indicated, was covert. That is a distinction between possibly
under the Intelligence Identities Act and that classified
information was leaked and then the question then is of a
criminal magnitude versus something less than that. And those
could be any number of penalties.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. But if you don't know she's
undercover, it is hard to put a penalty on somebody.
Mr. Zaid. That would be something like the previous
witness, where his office would have to investigate to see how
the leak came about.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. There is no question this should
never be leaked. We should never ``out'' any undercover
operative. I don't think anyone here can condone that in any
way, shape, or form.
The difficulty I am having, though, is we are focused today
just on the White House. The CIA bears some responsibility.
Ms. Plame's own testimony today talked about they knew the
story was coming, and she did the appropriate thing in
reporting to her superiors that the story was coming, a story
that could end her career. And what did her bosses do? They
obviously didn't persuade Mr. Novak, but the question is, did
they send their A Team up there to talk to Mr. Novak? Did they
let them know that an agent could be outed? That is the
question.
Ms. Toensing, what is contemplated under a statute in a
case like that?
Ms. Toensing. The statute has very high standards. This is
almost impossible for a journalist to be indicted under, just a
regular working journalist, not somebody who has a specific
intent.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. No journalist in their right mind
would do this on purpose.
Ms. Toensing. But an employee would have to be aware that
the agency is taking affirmative measures to protect or conceal
this person's relationship to the United States. If nobody even
told the people who were being briefed--I mean, the State
Department didn't know. Dick Armitage didn't know.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. But the question is, once it gets to
the press level, say someone inadvertently leaked this to the
press, what should the CIA do? And notwithstanding the act,
from a policy perspective, what should the CIA do or be able to
do to protect their operatives and what do you think they
should do in this case?
Ms. Toensing. They didn't do anything in this case. To
anybody looking at it from--as I view it, as I see all of the
facts, I have no reason whatsoever to believe that Ms. Plame
was covert under the statute.
I mean, they can call--I have represented a covert officer.
It is not an agent, actually. The statute uses that term, but
Ms. Plame was a covert officer. I have represented a covert
officer from the CIA; and let me tell you, in the course of my
representation, the New York Times was going to print her name
on its front page. And the New York Times reporter, a wonderful
reporter, Tim Weiner, called me and said the CIA just called
him and told him that they were going to go after him
criminally if they printed her name. No such threat was ever
given to Bob Novak. And good for Tim Weiner. He went ahead and
printed it anyway.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me ask this. So the statute at
this point gives press almost an immunity on those kinds of
issues once they learn about it. Is that your reading of the
law?
Ms. Toensing. Yes.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. What should the CIA have done in
this case if they wanted to protect an operative?
Ms. Toensing. If this is a very big deal to the CIA, they
should have brought in the DCI, at least the Deputy, and come
in with Bob Novak and had a talk and say, ``You cannot print
this name. This would just be terrible. This is national
security.''
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me ask you, from a policy
perspective, notwithstanding where the law is today, that sets
a very high standard for the press. What should we do--in
future cases, what should the CIA do once--if you are going to
have an operative outed, a top-secret memo that could damage
national security, how should that be handled from a policy
perspective?
Mr. Zaid. I wouldn't in any way divert blame from the CIA
in this matter. There are many steps they could have taken, and
Ms. Toensing has identified them, and it wouldn't have been the
first time where a very senior official in the CIA would go to
a member of the press.
I often represent covert officers. I mean, routinely. And I
know the precautions that they try to impose on me, which I
follow to protect them. Because if their identities are
released it does put their lives in jeopardy; and, even more
importantly, because when they are usually back here in the
United States it puts everyone they ever had any contact with
in their lives in jeopardy as well as operations.
I don't know why the CIA didn't do more. That is a good
question. The CIA should be here to explain that.
Again, I would make a distinction between that we not only
look at the criminality of this but we also look at the
administrative disciplines that should have been meted out.
I had a client that was disciplined because he was acting
as a courier with classified information and he left the bag
locked up in his locked car while he went into McDonald's to
get a burger with the car in sight. That was the violation. It
took me a year to get his clearance back.
So the agencies will take it seriously when they wish to.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Davis.
I have questions, but I don't know whether I want to go
into all of the time to ask questions.
But I am stunned, Ms. Toensing, that you would come here
with absolute conclusions she was not a covert agent. The White
House did not leak it. No one seemed to know in advance that
she was a CIA agent. Do you know those facts from your own
first-hand knowledge?
Ms. Toensing. Well, let us take those one by one. As I
said, I was there. I was the chief----
Chairman Waxman. I am not asking for your credentials. I am
asking for how you reached those conclusions.
Ms. Toensing. That's part of her credentials, because I
know what the intent of the act was.
Chairman Waxman. I am not asking what the intent of the act
was. Do you know she was not a covert agent?
Ms. Toensing. She is not a covert agent under the act. You
can call her anything you want to in the halls of the CIA.
Chairman Waxman. General Hayden, the head of the CIA, told
me personally that she was--if I said that she was a covert
agent, it wasn't an incorrect statement.
Ms. Toensing. Does he want to swear that she was a covert
agent under the act?
Chairman Waxman. I am trying to say this as carefully as I
can. He reviewed my statement, and my statement was she was a
covert agent.
Ms. Toensing. He didn't say under the act.
Chairman Waxman. OK. So you're trying to define it exactly
under the act.
Ms. Toensing. That's what----
Chairman Waxman. No, no, no, no, no. I am not giving you--I
am not yielding my time to you.
So that is your interpretation. Do you know that the White
House--no one in the White House leaked this information?
Ms. Toensing. Well, I don't know even know how to deal with
the word ``leak'' here. I know that people in the White House--
--
Chairman Waxman. Well, Karl Rove admitted he leaked it. Do
you think he is not telling us the truth?
Ms. Toensing. Well, the words are important, and I'm not
sure what----
Chairman Waxman. So you want to completely define the words
that are so narrow in meaning that your statements can be
credible but not honest. I am not asking about the statute. I
am not asking about the statute. Evidently, if there were a
criminal violation, the Special Inspector General investigating
this matter might have brought criminal actions. Put that
aside. Karl Rove said he leaked the information. Do you think
he did not?
Ms. Toensing. Let me give you an example.
Chairman Waxman. I want a yes or no. I am asking you a
direct question that could be answered yes or no.
Ms. Toensing. Well, it can't, but I will answer no then and
explain----
Chairman Waxman. Do you have first-hand information that
none of the people at the White House had knowledge that she
was a covert agent?
Ms. Toensing. There has no been no testimony. I can only go
by that.
Chairman Waxman. You stated it so affirmatively and
conclusively that I thought maybe you had access to information
that we didn't have.
Ms. Toensing. I have information to the testimony, and so
because I know what the testimony is, that everybody--and I am
sure that the Special Counsel would have brought in anybody who
had anything to do with it in the trial----
Chairman Waxman. Maybe he would have. We thought the White
House would have investigated the matter, and they didn't.
Mr. Zaid, in your experience with these kinds of cases, do
agencies wait until a criminal investigation is complete before
taking any action or do they sometimes say, while this is
pending, we are going to take away the security clearance?
Mr. Zaid. They do not wait, Mr. Chairman. There is no
requirement that they wait. I could understand in some cases
there could be a need for coordination. But very often, in my
experience, by the time you got into a criminal matter, the
employee or contractor clearance has already been suspended.
Chairman Waxman. And if an agency's goal is to prevent
additional security violations and protect classified
information, doesn't it make sense for the agency to do
something right away rather than wait as long as 3 years?
I mean, this is 3 years now that the same people in the
White House have had classified information given to them, even
though they have already admitted in most cases that they
disclosed that information.
I don't think they should--does it seem right to you that
they would wait until not only the investigation is complete
but all of the prosecution has been handled?
Mr. Zaid. I find it very disconcerting and inconsistent
with what I have seen at other agencies. I have seen far less
of a grave situation or clearance infraction that has been
addressed far more quickly by an agency.
Again, I don't know personally besides what we all know,
most part, publicly from what transpired, but from an
administrative standpoint I am very surprised that something
has not been done. If it were one of my clients, I am sure
something would have been done.
Chairman Waxman. I am not sure if you are familiar with all
of the administrative activities. You are knowledgeable about
the law, whether it's a criminal violation, but, in your
experience, do you know whether agencies will sometimes suspend
people's security clearances while there is an investigation
going on?
Ms. Toensing. Some do and some don't. It would depend on--
as was said by the panel before on a case-by-case basis
because--and here, if I were the lawyer for a person making the
decision whether to do so, I would really want the
decisionmaker to weigh whether it would appear to be
obstruction of justice. If you start calling in witnesses and
you start interviewing the witnesses and you're not part of the
Justice Department----
Chairman Waxman. That would go to an investigation where
you could simply say there is an investigation going on in the
meantime. I think it's more prudent not to allow you to get
more classified information. That's done frequently.
Ms. Toensing. I didn't understand what your question was.
Chairman Waxman. Rather than do a whole investigation that
might put somebody in a situation where they got two
investigations going on and so they're represented in the
investigation-type case, but, in the meantime, we will suspend
your access to classified information.
Ms. Toensing. That sometimes happens. It depends on what
the violation is. It can happen. It cannot happen as Mr.----
Chairman Waxman. It's not unheard of. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I was sitting here listening to this, and it's just
something I think is incredible to me, and I think we are
losing sight of what went on here.
We had an American who simply wanted to serve her country,
who put her life, her life, on the line. And I don't know what
Goldwater--what he was doing, you know. But one thing I do know
is that we had a lady here who lost her job, lost the
opportunity to carry out the things that she apparently wanted
to do, it was her love, while risking her life. And out of all
of this testimony I hope we don't lose sight of that.
There is a reason why we have these rules, these laws and
these Executive orders; and those reasons basically go to
trying to protect people, Americans, who want to go out there
and protect us and try to make sure that they are not harmed.
Were you here, Ms. Toensing, when Ms. Valerie Plame
testified?
Ms. Toensing. Yes, I was.
Mr. Cummings. One of the things that she said--she said two
things that I know will be embedded in the DNA of every cell of
my body until I die. She said, I did not--I expected other
countries to try to reveal my identity, but never did I expect
my own government to do it. And then she said something else
that was very interesting. She said that, as a result of the
disclosure, whole networks of agents have been placed in
jeopardy.
The reason why I say that is because it seems like to me
all of us, as Americans, would want to make sure that we did
every single thing in our power to protect those people who are
going out there trying to protect us.
Going back to the--you know, we have a situation here, too,
where, you know, it wasn't just the law, it was the order,
12958, the President's order. And unlike the criminal statute
which requires an intentional disclosure of classified
information, the administrative rules prohibit not just
intentional disclosures but reckless and negligent ones as
well, isn't that correct?
Ms. Toensing. You are reading from it. I assume that you
read it appropriately.
Can I say a word in reaction to that? I have no problem. I
have no problem with Ms. Plame. I respect the service that she
contributed to this country.
My complaint is two-fold, one against the CIA for not
taking the proper precautions, as they had promised to do so
when this act was passed in the 1980's; and, second, with the
application. Because I am a criminal defense lawyer, but I was
also a prosecutor, and I don't like to see the law abused. I
don't like the application of the criminal law to a situation
that does not have the elements of it. I think that is an abuse
of prosecutorial power.
Mr. Cummings. I was a criminal lawyer, too. And, you know,
I am sure that, consistent with what you just said, you
believed the testimony should be accurate, did you not? That
seems consistent with what you just said, that you would want
anybody's testimony to be accurate. Wouldn't that be correct?
Ms. Toensing. That is correct.
Mr. Cummings. I think you said a little earlier that she
had not been out of the country for 5 years. Didn't you say
that?
Ms. Toensing. No, the statute doesn't say that. It says for
an assignment.
Mr. Cummings. No, what did you say?
Ms. Toensing. I said for an assignment. I didn't testify
about that here today, here yet.
Mr. Cummings. I thought I read it in something that you
said to the press at some point. You didn't say that?
Ms. Toensing. I have always used the term ``under the
statute.''
Mr. Cummings. It says here, Washington Post, February 18th,
just prior to the start of deliberations of the jury in the
Scooter Libby trial, and you said this as follows--it may be
wrong. The Washington Post can check it out--but it says,
``Plame was not covert,'' and you said that, today, ``She
worked at the CIA headquarters and had not been stationed
abroad within 5 years of the date of Novak's column.''
Ms. Toensing. Right. That's the same concept as serving
outside the United States. That was the whole concept that we
had when we passed the law.
The first draft of the law--and I have it in my statement--
was we only applied it to persons who are outside of the United
States. We never applied it to anybody inside the United
States. And then people wanted rotation people covered. The CIA
said, you got to cover rotation people. So we said, how long is
that? They said, 2 to 3 years. We said, OK, we'll change it.
``Or within 3 years of coming back to the United States.''
And then somebody said, oh, but people retire; and so we
said, OK, CIA, how long do you need to protect those sources
that the person had while serving abroad? And they told us 5
years. So that's why we have the 5-year requirement. But it was
always intended, because of the assassinations abroad, to
protect our personnel serving abroad.
Mr. Cummings. I see my time is up. Thank you very much.
Ms. Toensing. Inside the United States.
Chairman Waxman. I wanted to be very clear for the record.
I said earlier General Hayden and the CIA have cleared the
following comments: During her employment at the CIA, Ms.
Wilson was undercover. Her employment status with the CIA was
classified information prohibited from disclosure under the
Executive Order 12958. And at the time of the publication of
Robert Novak's column on July 14, 2003, Ms. Wilson's CIA
employment status was covert. This was classified information.
So I wanted to repeat it. I don't know if I misstated it or
not. But let no one misunderstand it, and I would just use
those words so we can clarify it for the record.
Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to kind of pursue this line of questioning, Ms.
Toensing, as well.
It is reported, again, by the Washington Post on February
18, 2007, that you said, I am going to read it. It was just
read. ``Plame was not covert. She worked at CIA headquarters
and had not been stationed abroad within 5 years of the date of
Novak's column.''
You said you were here, and you heard Ms. Wilson's
testimony. I took notes on her testimony, and I quoted her. She
said she was a covert agent, and that was her statement.
Now it seems to me that your remarks are contrary to that
statement. So do you still maintain that on February 18, 2007,
Ms. Wilson was not a covert CIA agent?
Ms. Toensing. Not under the law. She didn't say she was
under the law. In fact, she said several times that she was not
a lawyer. I know what the law requires----
Ms. Watson. Reclaiming my time.
You said--this is your statement from that date: ``Plame
was not covert.'' And my question directly is, do you still
maintain that on that date she was not a covert CIA officer?
Ms. Toensing. I was trying to answer. Yes, I still maintain
that.
Ms. Watson. Yes or no.
Ms. Toensing. I still maintain it, yes.
Ms. Watson. That she was not a covert agent.
Ms. Toensing. Under the law. Completely.
Ms. Watson. Ms. Plame was sworn.
Ms. Toensing. And I am sworn. I am giving you my legal
interpretation under the law as I know the law, and I helped
draft the law. The person is supposed to reside outside of the
United States.
And let me make one other comment----
Ms. Watson. No. Reclaiming my time--because this is being
timed and Members do have to leave--did you receive any
information directly from the CIA or Ms. Wilson that supports
your assertion that Ms. Wilson was not a covert officer?
Ms. Toensing. I didn't talk to Ms. Wilson or the CIA.
Ms. Watson. And do you have any information about the
nature of Ms. Wilson's employment status that Director Hayden
and Ms. Wilson don't have?
Ms. Toensing. I have no idea--I don't know what he has that
I don't have. You know, vice versa. I can just tell you what is
required under the law. They can call anybody anything they
want to do in the halls, but, under this statute, a criminal
statute which is interpreted very strictly, all of these
elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. That has
been my concern.
Ms. Watson. Your testimony is focusing on the criminal
prohibition in the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. But
I don't see any mention whatsoever of the administrative
restrictions contained in Executive Order 12958, which is what
the invitation letter asks you to address.
As you note in your written statement--and we have copies
of it--there are numerous elements that must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to establish a crime under the IIPA.
In contrast, the administrative rules simply prohibit the
disclosure of classified information to anyone not authorized
to receive it. Unlike the criminal statute, which requires an
intentional disclosure of classified information, the
administrative rules prohibit not just intentional disclosures
but reckless and negligent ones as well. Is that right?
Ms. Toensing. Of course.
Ms. Watson. OK. Therefore, an improper disclosure of
classified information violates the Executive order, even
though it does not violate the criminal statute; is that right?
Ms. Toensing. I am just----
Ms. Watson. Is that right?
Ms. Toensing. I wasn't invited here to talk about----
Ms. Watson. Excuse me. Reclaiming my time. Reclaiming my
time. Is that right? Yes or no.
Ms. Toensing. Would you repeat it, please?
Ms. Watson. I will. Therefore, an improper disclosure of
classified information violates the Executive order, even
though it does not violate the criminal statute. Yes or no.
Ms. Toensing. I take no issue with that. Yeah, that is
right.
Chairman Waxman. Thank you, Ms. Watson. Your time has
expired.
Mr. Van Hollen.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank both
of our witnesses here today.
Ms. Toensing, let me ask you, getting back to the overall
context in which this all happened, wouldn't you agree that the
reason the White House official disclosed this information,
leaked it quietly to the press, was in an effort to discredit
somehow Ambassador Wilson as a result of the article he wrote
in the New York Times?
Ms. Toensing. I have no idea why they gave out that
information. I do know that there was this allusion by Joe
Wilson that he was sent on the trip by the Vice President's
office. So it made sense to me, if you are sitting in the Vice
President's office, to say, ``We didn't send him. We didn't
know what this is all about.'' And in the inquiry, as I
understand it, and you may have different facts, the response
was his wife sent him. And guess who did that? The INR
statement at the State Department.
Mr. Van Hollen. Do you know why Mr. Rove, after disclosing
some of this information to Mr. Cooper at Time Magazine, would
have concluded by saying I have already said too much?
Ms. Toensing. I have no idea.
Mr. Van Hollen. It seems to me that kind of statement--of
course, we can't all read Mr. Rove's mind, but an ordinary
interpretation of that may be to conclude that he already
provided him information that he knew he shouldn't be
providing.
Let me just go back to the other statements made by the
White House. We saw the clip here of their spokesman, Scott
McClellan, stating that the White House had not been involved
in the disclosure of Valerie Plame as somebody who worked at
the CIA. Now you agree she worked at the CIA, right?
Ms. Toensing. Yeah. I didn't hear that statement, but
that's OK. If you are going to say he said those words--I
thought he said in giving off classified information, but----
Mr. Van Hollen. My understanding is what they were
essentially saying, they were not involved in the disclosures
that had been made and, clearly, the testimonies that were
involved in the disclosures that had been made.
Let me get back to, as I said, the purpose of the hearing.
Part of the purpose of the hearing was to look at how the White
House safeguards security information. That is the reason we
had the second panel. And did you know before the testimony
today that the White House itself had not undertaken any kind
of investigation internally from the security office?
Ms. Toensing. I didn't know that, but I would have
concurred with that with a massive criminal investigation going
on. If I was a lawyer to the President, I would say don't you
dare do a thing until this criminal investigation and
prosecution is over.
Mr. Van Hollen. It was more than 2 months after this
initially broke that Scott McClellan in another statement said,
we have no information in the White House about any of these
disclosures. Before you made that kind of statement, wouldn't
you undertake some kind of investigation?
Ms. Toensing. Well, I am not here to answer for Scott
McClellan.
Mr. Van Hollen. There is one issue that has to do with once
the criminal investigation was started, but a long period of
time went by when no administrative action was taken, and, as I
understand your response to the question by Ms. Watson, you
would agree that kind of sort of investigation goes on
routinely when there has been a disclosure of classified
information, does it not?
Ms. Toensing. It can, and it cannot. I mean, I certainly
wouldn't have done it in the brouhaha that occurred within a
week of Bob Novak's publication.
By the way, Bob Novak was not the first person to say she
was covert. That was David Corn who printed that she was
covert. Bob Novak called her an operative.
Mr. Van Hollen. This is a period of 2 months when there was
lots of questions, everyone was trying to find out what was
going on. The CIA had said that this was an unauthorized
disclosure. The President of the United States said, ``this is
a very serious matter, and our administration takes it
seriously.''
Do you agree this was a serious matter?
Ms. Toensing. Well, I think an outing, if somebody's career
is being affected, is, of course, a serious matter. The issue
is whether it was--the outing was done intentionally under the
criminal law. That is what I have written about always.
Mr. Van Hollen. I understand. I understand your point under
the criminal law.
The other question, though, is why people didn't take
action under the non-criminal law as part of safeguarding
secrets at the White House. And I understand your focus is on
the other issue, but I have to say it is stunning that the
White House would tell us they had no information about this 2
months after the first disclosures and we hear today that they
never conducted any investigation. I mean----
Ms. Toensing. I would agree with you that it was a bad
situation that happened. But I say shame on the CIA, that the
briefer did not tell anybody at the White House that----
Chairman Waxman. How do you know that? How do you know?
Ms. Toensing. He testified to that at the Scooter Libby
trial.
Chairman Waxman. Who was that briefer?
Ms. Toensing. Grenier. Robert Grenier.
Chairman Waxman. And he was the briefer from the CIA?
Ms. Toensing. He said, I talked about Valerie Plame. I
talked about the wife with Scooter Libby and the Vice
President, but I didn't tell them that--this was on cross-
examination. He admitted that he had not said that her status
was either classified or covert.
Mr. Van Hollen. If I could, Mr. Chairman. Do you think
White House officials have any obligation at all to put aside
the legal obligation as stewards of our national security when
they find out that someone works for the Central Intelligence
Agency? Do you think they have any obligation to citizens of
this country to find out, before telling the President about
it, whether that disclosure would compromise sensitive
information? Do you think--as just citizens of this country,
wouldn't you want that to be the standard?
Ms. Toensing. I think the Press Secretary should always
tell what is accurate. The Press Secretary should always tell
what is accurate. I have no problem with that.
Mr. Van Hollen. Before somebody goes around saying this
person works for the CIA in a cavalier manner--obviously,
intentional manner to try to spread this information, don't you
think they have an obligation to the citizens of this country
to make--we are talking about the Iraq war, decisions for going
to war, whether or not Saddam Hussein was trying to get nuclear
weapons material. Before they disclosed the identity of
somebody who works in the nuclear nonproliferation area of the
CIA, don't you think they have some obligation for--and to
demonstrate the good judgment to find out if that would
disclose sensitive information? That is my question.
Ms. Toensing. Well, it could be, but I don't particularly
think that a red flag would go off. Because those of us who
work in government all the time know people who work at the CIA
and talk with people who are at the CIA, so you wouldn't
necessarily say----
Mr. Van Hollen. We don't all of us go around trying to use
that information with reporters for the purpose of discrediting
somebody.
Ms. Toensing. Let me say--do you want me to tell you my
experience? Because, as Mark has represented, people who are
covert--and I have asked them since all of this occurred, well,
would you ever have a desk job at being covert at Langley? And
they laugh at me. You know--I don't know. I have never been
covert. I have represented people, and this is what they tell
me.
Chairman Waxman. The gentleman's time has expired.
I want to thank both of you.
Mr. Zaid, I had other questions for you. Let me ask you one
quick one.
If you had clients like Fleischer and Martin and Libby and
Cheney and Rove, let's say they were worried because they
disclosed information that they shouldn't have disclosed,
wouldn't you tell them that they were treated a lot better than
most people who disclosed classified information?
Mr. Zaid. They are treated a lot better than many of my
clients, some of whom who have testified before you like
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, who did lose his security
clearance and his job at the Defense Intelligence Agency for
incurring $67 in cellular phone bills and a couple of other
petty issues like stealing pens from the U.S. Embassy when he
was 14 years old 30 years ago. So, yes, I would say there is
quite a number of people who have fared a great deal better
than many of my clients. But if they want to hire me--I
represent Republicans and Democrats--I don't have any problem.
Chairman Waxman. As you should.
Ms. Toensing. Me, too.
Chairman Waxman. Their double standard doesn't make any
difference. You are counsel, and everything is entitled to
representation.
I want to thank you both for being here. Ms. Toensing, I
have the pleasure to say we are pleased to accommodate the
request of the minority to have you as a witness. Some of the
statements you have made, without any doubt with great
authority, I understand may not be accurate, so we are going to
check the information and we are going to hold the record open
to put in other things that might contradict some of what you
had to say.
The only thing I will say is that when we heard from Mrs.
Wilson and we have heard from Fitzgerald and I talked
personally to General Hayden, they have a different view as to
what is a protected agent than you do; and your knowledge is
knowledge is based on writing the law 30 years ago.
Ms. Toensing. Don't date me that far. It was 25.
Chairman Waxman. Well, we will check that fact out, also.
But if I am incorrect, my apologies.
The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
follows:]
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