111th Congress
2d Session SENATE Report
111-200
_______________________________________________________________________
Calendar No. 413
REDUCING OVER-CLASSIFICATION ACT
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
to accompany
H.R. 553
TO REQUIRE THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY TO
PREVENT THE OVER-CLASSIFICATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND OTHER
INFORMATION AND TO PROMOTE THE SHARING OF UNCLASSIFIED HOMELAND
SECURITY AND OTHER INFORMATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
May 27 (legislative day, May 26), 2010.--Ordered to be printed
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JON TESTER, Montana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Kevin J. Landy, Chief Counsel
Christian J. Beckner, Professional Staff Member
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
John K. Grant, Minority Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Calendar No. 413
111th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 111-200
======================================================================
REDUCING OVER-CLASSIFICATION ACT
_______
May 27 (legislative day, May 26), 2010.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Lieberman, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 553]
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (H.R. 553) to require
the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a strategy to
prevent the over-classification of homeland security and other
information and to promote the sharing of unclassified homeland
security and other information, and for other purposes, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose and Summary.............................................1
II. Background and Need for Legislation.............................2
III. Legislative History.............................................4
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation..................4
V. Regulatory Impact and Evaluation................................8
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.......................8
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported..........10
I. Purpose and Summary
The purpose of H.R. 553, as amended by the Committee, is to
prevent federal departments and agencies from unnecessarily
classifying information or classifying information at a higher
and more restricted level than is warranted, and by doing so to
promote information sharing across departments and agencies and
with State, local, tribal and private sector counterparts, as
appropriate.
II. Background and Need for Legislation
U.S. government policies and procedures related to
classification are intended to protect information, the
unauthorized disclosure of which could cause damage to the
national security of the United States. These policies and
procedures have been prescribed primarily by a series of
Executive Orders, beginning with E.O. 8381, issued in 1940, and
updated most recently with E.O. 13526, issued in December 2009.
E.O. 13526 and its predecessors describe the types of
information that should be classified, establish procedures for
access to classified information, and provide guidelines and
requirements for the implementation of classification systems,
including declassification procedures.
The classification system that developed during the Cold
War was focused primarily on protecting sensitive information
from the Soviet Union and other traditional nation-state
adversaries. But since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989,
threats to U.S. national security have increasingly come from
non-state actors, including terrorist groups, organized
criminal networks, and drug trafficking organizations.
Efforts to counter Cold War nation-state threats were
handled primarily by the U.S. military and by federal
Departments and agencies responsible for diplomacy,
intelligence, and law enforcement. Efforts to counter post-Cold
War threats involve a broader group of participants, including
State, local and tribal governments and law enforcement
agencies, as well as private sector entities.
The changing threats to U.S. national security have
required our nation's current classification system to take
into account factors unknown to its Cold War predecessors.
Without doubt, the primary consideration for those making
classification decisions must remain whether unauthorized
disclosure would damage national security, consistent with the
framework established in E.O. 13526 and prior executive orders.
But decisions also need to factor in the potential benefits to
national security that could result from sharing particular
information with the broader group of participants in the
national security system. In other words, today's classifiers
must weigh not only the harm flowing from unauthorized
disclosure, but also the detriment caused by denying critical
non-federal actors access to information that could assist
their efforts to combat terrorism and other non-state national
security threats.
Today's classification system, however, provides
insufficient guidance and support to individuals who are making
classification decisions, and often leads them to err on the
side of over-classifying information. This Act is intended to
create a framework by which individuals within the Executive
Branch can make more balanced and informed classification
decisions, in a way that will strengthen efforts by the United
States to address both state-based and non-state threats to
national security.
Over-classification of information is particularly
problematic with respect to the threat of terrorist attacks
against the United States. In its examination of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission found that
existing classification policies and procedures nurtured over-
classification and excessive compartmentalization of
information among agencies in several respects: (1) Each
agency's incentive structure opposed sharing, with clear risks
but few rewards for information sharing; (2) no agencies had to
pay the substantial long-term costs of over-classifying
information; (3) there were no punishments for not sharing
information; and (4) agencies cultivated a ``need-to-know''
culture of information protection rather than promoting a
``need-to-share'' culture of integration.\1\
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\1\Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States, Official Government Edition, Page 417. 2004.
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Recent terrorist plots and attacks against the United
States have highlighted the important role of state, local and
tribal law enforcement agencies, as well as entities in the
private sector, in detecting, preventing and responding to
terrorist attacks. In 2005, for example, police officers in
Torrance, California investigating a string of gas station
robberies uncovered a terrorist plot to attack military
facilities and synagogues in southern California. In 2007, a
plot to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey was disrupted in part due
to an electronics store employee who contacted local police
about a suspicious videotape that one of the conspirators had
taken to the store to get converted to DVD format.
The current classification system, however, limits the
federal government's ability to share information about
potential threats with state, local and tribal governments and
law enforcement agencies, and with the private sector. Very few
officials in state, local and tribal governments and law
enforcement agencies have security clearances, and as a result,
they often face significant limits to their ability to work as
partners with the federal government in terrorism prevention
efforts and to receive information about threats that enable
them to better protect their communities from the threat of
terrorist attacks. In testimony before the House Committee on
Homeland Security in 2007, numerous state and local government
officials and senior law enforcement officers spoke of the ways
in which the classification system inhibited their ability to
work in partnership with the federal government on homeland
security and terrorism prevention activities.\2\
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\2\See House Committee on Homeland Security print of hearings on
Over-classification and Pseudo-Classification. Available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg11035279/pdf/CHRG-
110hhrg11035279.pdf.
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LEGISLATION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE ACTION
The concerns articulated in these House Committee on
Homeland Security hearings led Representative Jane Harman, with
13 co-sponsors, to introduce the Reducing Over-Classification
Act, first in the 110th Congress and then again this Congress.
The House bill--H.R. 553 this Congress--focused on reducing the
over-classification of information at the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and enhancing understanding of the
classification system by State, local, tribal and private
sector entities by establishing an over-classification
prevention program at DHS.
As amended by this Committee, H.R. 553 would have a broader
scope. It would address the issue of over-classification on a
government-wide basis, recognizing that the Department of
Homeland Security makes only a very small percentage of
original classification decisions each year. The bill would
apply many of the House's provisions government-wide and would
strengthen the responsibilities of the Director of National
Intelligence with respect to information sharing. It would
strengthen the process whereby the Interagency Threat
Assessment Coordination Group can request that intelligence
reports be produced at a lower level of classification. And it
would establish new government-wide employee incentives,
oversight provisions, and training requirements.
The Committee wishes to emphasize that none of the
provisions in this Act is intended to supplant the Executive
Branch's long-standing authority to determine what information
should be appropriately classified within the framework
established in Executive Order 13526 and its predecessors.\3\
Indeed, the Committee believes that the provisions of the Act
complement and do not conflict with Executive Order 13526, and
that both the Order and the Act will promote the goals of
increased transparency, information sharing, and security. H.R.
553 is merely intended to ensure that this existing framework
appropriately considers the information requirements of
entities that are playing a critical role in the nation's
efforts to combat terrorism and address other non-traditional
threats to national security.
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\3\The Committee believes that Executive Order 13526 meets the
definition of a ``subsequent corresponding executive order'' to
Executive Order 12958 (as modified by Executive Order 13292) as defined
in the Act.
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III. Legislative History
In the 110th Congress, the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 4806, sponsored by Representative Jane Harman and thirteen
co-sponsors, by voice vote. Representative Harman reintroduced
the bill in the 111th Congress, on January 15, 2009, as H.R.
553. The House passed the bill by a voice vote on February 3,
2009. The bill was received in the Senate on February 4, 2009,
and referred to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee.
The Committee considered the bill on November 4, 2009.
Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Minority Member Collins offered
an amendment in the nature of the substitute, which made
significant changes to the bill by adding new provisions to
expand the bill's scope to cover all executive branch agencies,
not just at the Department of Homeland Security, by
strengthening the responsibilities of the Director of National
Intelligence with respect to information sharing; by
strengthening the process whereby the Interagency Threat
Assessment Coordination Group can request that intelligence
reports be produced at a lower level of classification; and by
establishing new government-wide employee incentives, oversight
provisions, and training requirements.
The Committee adopted the substitute and then voted to
report the bill, as amended, both by voice vote. Senators
Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Pryor, Landrieu, Burris,
Collins, and Bennett were present for both votes.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
This section states that that this measure may be cited as
the ``Reducing Over-Classification Act.''
Section 2. Findings
This section outlines a series of Congressional findings,
including: (1) The 9/11 Commission concluded that there is a
need to prevent over-classification of information by the
Federal Government; (2) The 9/11 Commission and others have
observed that the over-classification of information interferes
with accurate, actionable, and timely information sharing; (3)
Over-classification of information causes considerable
confusion about what information may be shared with whom, and
negatively affects the dissemination of information within the
Federal Government and with State, local, and tribal entities,
and the private sector; and (4) Excessive government secrecy
stands in the way of a safer and more secure homeland.
Section 3. Classified Information Advisory Officer
This section modifies subsection (d) of section 201 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) to designate a
Classified Information Advisory Officer in the Department of
Homeland Security to assist State, local, tribal, and private
sector entities that have responsibility for the security of
critical infrastructure, in matters related to classified
materials. This Officer will be responsible for developing and
disseminating training programs and materials to educate these
entities on procedures for challenging improper classification
and applying for security clearances. This Officer will also
assist State, local and tribal entities with developing plans
and policies for the use of classified information, including
ways to communicate those plans and policies to non-cleared
personnel without disclosing classified information. The
Officer will also advise the Department of Homeland Security's
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis on policies and
procedures to facilitate information sharing. The Committee
intends that this Officer would serve as both a valuable
resource for information and an advocate for these non-federal
entities. This office is not intended to process or facilitate
individual security clearance applications.
Section 3 of the Act includes references to ``State, local,
tribal and private sector entities with responsibility [or
``that have responsibility''] related to the security of
critical infrastructure.'' In these sections, the language
``responsibility related to the security of critical
infrastructure'' is only intended to modify the term ``private
sector entity'' (or entities) and does not modify State, local
or tribal entities.
Section 4. Promotion of appropriate access to information
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA) of 2004 established a Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) charged with, among other duties, breaking down barriers
to information sharing. IRTPA provides the DNI with access to
all national intelligence.\4\ This section modifies subsection
(b) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-1) to reinforce the authority of the Director of
National Intelligence to have maximum access to all information
within the intelligence community, including intelligence
reports and operational data, and require that the DNI then
ensure maximum access to all such information, consistent with
the protection of intelligence sources and methods, to
appropriately-cleared individuals in federal, State, local and
tribal governments. It also requires that the DNI establish a
mechanism to provide individuals from such entities with access
to this information (for example, through the establishment or
enhancement of information technology systems and networks).
This mechanism is not intended to supplant the existing
classification challenge procedures but rather to provide an
alternative to the challenge process when it has been exhausted
or when exigent circumstances require swift action.
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\4\50 U.S.C. Sec. 403-1(b).
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Section 5. Intelligence information sharing
This section of the Act includes three distinct provisions
intended to improve the sharing of intelligence information
with State, local and tribal governments and law enforcement
agencies.
a. Standardized formats for intelligence products
This provision modifies paragraph (1) of section 102A(g) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 4031(g)) to
require the Director of National Intelligence to establish
guidance to standardize formats for classified and unclassified
finished intelligence products created by elements of the
intelligence community for purposes of promoting the sharing of
intelligence products.
The formatting of intelligence products can vary depending
on which entity within the Intelligence Community created it.
Variations in formatting can make it difficult for intelligence
products to be easily entered into electronic databases and
therefore sorted, searched, and electronically disseminated.
The Act requires the DNI to develop guidance to standardize the
formats for intelligence products in order to better facilitate
information sharing.
b. Portion marking of intelligence products
This provision also directs the DNI to promulgate guidance
to require the increased use of portion markings, by which
individual sections of a product are marked with their
classification level, allowing them to be easily redacted when
necessary and thereby allowing sections of the product to be
disseminated at a lower classification level when appropriate.
It seeks to address a common situation in which intelligence
products that contain unclassified information as well as
information classified at varied levels end up classified at
the highest level, unnecessarily restricting less sensitive
information within it to broader audiences for whom such
information could be useful.
c. Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group dissemination
process
This section gives a new role to the Interagency Threat
Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG), an entity created by
Congress in 2007. The ITACG, which is housed at the National
Counterterrorism Center, is composed of state, local, and
tribal law enforcement and homeland security officers detailed
to the group for the purpose of ``integrating, analyzing, and
assisting in the dissemination of federally-coordinated
information.''\5\
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\5\Section 521 of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act, Public Law 110-53.
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Section 5 of the bill requires the head of each federal
Department or agency with classification authority, or his or
her designee, to share an intelligence product with ITACG if he
or she determines that it could benefit a state, local, or
tribal government, law enforcement agency, or private sector
entity. The ITACG can then recommend that the DHS
Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis produce a product
at the lowest possible classification level that can be
provided to appropriate entities. The Committee believes that
the ITACG can thus use its understanding of the needs of State,
local, and tribal first responders to help direct useful
intelligence into the hands of those who most need it. The
Under Secretary retains the authority to determine whether or
not a useful product can be produced at a lower classification
level without risking the disclosure of sources and methods or
other sensitive information.
The section also directs the ITACG to report to
Congressional committees on the intelligence products shared by
the heads of each federal Department or agency with
classification authority that could benefit State, local and
tribal law enforcement. The report must describe each
recommendation made to the ITACG, each recommendation carried
out by the Under Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis and
each recommendation not carried out.
Section 6. Promotion of accurate classification of intelligence
The section directs Departments and agencies, when making
personnel decisions, to consider whether employees are
classifying information properly. In his responses to questions
from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Admiral
Dennis Blair, then-nominee for the position of Director of
National Intelligence, noted that ``there are many penalties
for those who disclose classified information and few rewards
for those who take the additional effort to write at lower
levels of classification.''\6\ In an effort to counterbalance
the apparent incentives to over-classify information, the Act
requires that the consistent and proper classification of
information be a consideration in awarding personnel
incentives.
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\6\Responses of Admiral Dennis C. Blair to Additional Prehearing
Questions, p. 54. January 2009. Available at http://
intelligence.senate.gov/090122/blairresponses.pdf.
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The section also requires Inspectors General each year
through 2014 to assess whether their agencies are appropriately
following and administering applicable classification policies,
procedures, rules, and regulations. This provision is intended
to supplement, not supplant, the National Archives and Records
Administration's (NARA's) role as the lead agency for the
oversight of the security classification process.
The Committee recognizes the substantial workload already
shouldered by the Inspectors General and emphasizes that these
evaluations do not necessarily need to examine entire
departments and agencies but can be spot-checks of particular
offices or components with classification authorities.
Section 7. Classification training program
This section requires annual training for each employee or
contractor who has classification authority or is responsible
for analysis, dissemination, preparation, production,
receiving, publishing or otherwise communicating written
classified information. It requires that this training instruct
on the proper use of classification markings, including portion
marking. This section makes this training a prerequisite for
obtaining and renewing classification authority. The Committee
expects that, to the greatest extent possible, this new
training will be integrated into existing classification
training or other appropriate and pre-existing programs.
V. Regulatory Impact and Evaluation
Pursuant to the requirement of paragraph 11(b)(1) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has
considered the regulatory impact of this bill. CBO states that
the bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, March 26, 2010.
Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 553, the Reducing
Over-Classification Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason
Wheelock.
Sincerely,
Douglas W. Elmendorf,
Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 553--Reducing Over-Classification Act
Summary: H.R. 553 would make several changes to current law
designed to promote the sharing of homeland security
information with state, local, tribal, and private-sector
entities. CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost
$22 million over the 2011-2015 period, assuming the
appropriation of the estimated amounts.
Enacting this legislation would not affect direct spending
or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would not
apply.
H.R. 553 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of H.R. 553 is shown in the following table.
The costs of this legislation fall within budget functions 050
(national defense) and 800 (general government).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
------------------------------------------------------------
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011-2015
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CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Classified Information Advisory Officer:
Estimated Authorization Level.................. 2 2 2 2 2 10
Estimated Outlays.............................. 1 2 2 2 2 9
Inspectors General Evaluations:
Estimated Authorization Level.................. 3 3 3 3 1 13
Estimated Outlays.............................. 3 3 3 3 1 13
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorization Level.............. 5 5 5 5 3 23
Estimated Outlays.......................... 4 5 5 5 3 22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes the
legislation will be enacted near the beginning of fiscal year
2011, that the estimated amounts will be provided annually near
the start each fiscal year, and that outlays will follow
historical patterns for similar and existing programs.
Classified Information Advisory Officer
Section 3 would establish the position of Classified
Information Advisory Officer within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). The new position would be tasked with
developing a program to train the personnel of state, local,
tribal, and private-sector entities in the appropriate use of
classified information. The training program also would cover
the procedures that such entities can use to challenge the
classification designation of certain information and the means
by which their employees may apply for security clearances.
DHS operates a similar outreach program dealing with cyber
security. Based on the amounts requested for that program for
2011, CBO estimates that implementing this section would cost
$9 million over the 2011-2015 period, assuming appropriation of
the necessary amounts.
Inspectors General evaluations
Section 6 of the bill would require that at least annually
until December 31, 2014, the inspectors general of those
federal departments or agencies of the United States that
originate classified information conduct an evaluation of their
agencies' implementation of the applicable classification
guidelines. According to information from the Information
Security Oversight Office, this provision could require up to
50 evaluations annually.
Under Executive Order 13526, signed by the President on
December 29, 2009, agencies that originate or handle classified
information are required to establish and maintain self-
inspection programs. Integrating the requirements of the bill
with the programs established pursuant to Executive Order 13526
could help to reduce the costs of complying with the
requirements of this provision. However, since this provision
also would require that the inspectors general report on each
evaluation conducted, implementing it would most likely require
additional staff across the federal government. Based on the
number of federal entities that originate classified
information, and after adjusting for the potential that some
inspectors general represent multiple federal entities, CBO
estimates that implementing this provision would cost $13
million over the 2011-2015 period, assuming appropriation of
the necessary amounts.
Unclassified intelligence products for state, local, and tribal
governments
Section 5 would require the Interagency Threat Assessment
and Coordination Group (ITACG), when it determines that certain
nonfederal entities could benefit from an intelligence product,
to recommend that DHS provide a version of that product,
classified at the lowest level possible, to such entities. In
addition, this section also would require DHS to report
annually on the instances in which ITACG recommended the
creation of an intelligence product and the DHS response to
such recommendation.
Although the bill would create a new mechanism for ITACG to
make recommendations to DHS on intelligence products that would
benefit nonfederal entities, the ITACG currently works with DHS
to produce intelligence products, such as the Roll Call
Release, which is distributed to ``street level'' law
enforcement officers. In addition, DHS is currently tasked with
providing homeland security and terrorism information to
nonfederal entities. For that purpose, DHS has installed the
Homeland Secure Data Network--which allows DHS to share
classified information with state and local governments--at 33
intelligence fusion centers nationwide. Based on those factors
and input from the staff of the Program Manager of the
Information Sharing Environment at DHS, CBO estimates that the
cost of implementing this provision would not be significant in
any year and would be primarily related to the reporting
requirements imposed by the bill.
Pay-As-You-Go considerations: None.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 553
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state,
local, or tribal governments.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Jason Wheelock; Impact
on state, local, and tribal governments: Melissa Merrell;
Impact on the private sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause x(x) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as
reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic
and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in
roman):
HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) * * *
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection;
Access to Information
* * * * * * *
Sec. 210F. Classified Information Advisory Officer
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection;
Access to Information
SECTION 201. [6 U.S.C. 121] INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION.
* * * * * * *
(d) Responsibilities of Secretary Relating to Intelligence
and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.--The
responsibilities of the Secretary relating to intelligence and
analysis and infrastructure protection shall be as follows:
* * * * * * *
(26) To identify and designate, acting through the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, a
Classified Information Advisory Officer to assist
State, local, tribal and private sector entities that
have responsibility for the security of critical
infrastructure, in matters related to classified
materials, as described in Section 210F.
* * * * * * *
SECTION 210D. [6 U.S.C. 124K] INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT AND
COORDINATION GROUP.
* * * * * * *
(c) Responsibilities of Program Manager.--The program
manager, in consultation with the Information Sharing Council,
shall--
(1) monitor and assess the efficacy of the ITACG;
[and]
(2) not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007, and at least annually
thereafter, submit to the Secretary, the Attorney
General, the Director of National Intelligence, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives a report on the progress
of the ITACG; and
(3) in each report required by paragraph (2)
submitted after the date of enactment of the Reducing
Over-Classification Act, include a description of the
progress made by the head of each Federal department
and agency to share information with the ITACG pursuant
to section 102A(g)(3)(A) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(g)(3)(A)).
* * * * * * *
SECTION 210F. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ADVISORY OFFICER.
(a) Requirements To Establish.--The Secretary, acting
through the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis,
shall identify and designate within the Department a Classified
Information Advisory Officer, as described in this section.
(b) Responsibilities.--The responsibilities of the
Classified Information Advisory Officer shall be as follows:
(1) To develop and disseminate educational materials
and to develop and administer training programs to
assist State, local, tribal and private sector entities
with responsibility related to the security of critical
infrastructure--
(A) in developing plans and policies to
respond to requests related to classified
information without communicating such
information to individuals who lack appropriate
security clearances;
(B) regarding the appropriate procedures for
challenging classification designations of
information received by personnel of such
entities; and
(C) on the means by which such personnel may
apply for security clearances.
(2) To inform the Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis on policies and procedures that could
facilitate the sharing of classified information with
such personnel, as appropriate.
* * * * * * *
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
SECTION 102A. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
* * * * * * *
(b) Access to Intelligence.--
(1) Unless otherwise directed by the President, the
Director of National Intelligence shall have access to
all national intelligence and intelligence related to
the national security which is collected by any Federal
department, agency, or other entity, except as
otherwise provided by law or, as appropriate, under
guidelines agreed upon by the Attorney General and the
Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall--
(A) consistent with paragraph (1), have
access to all intelligence information,
including intelligence reports, operational
data, and other associated information,
produced by any element of the intelligence
community; and
(B) consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, as determined
by the Director--
(i) ensure maximum access to the
intelligence information referenced in
subparagraph (A) for an employee of a
department, agency, or other entity of
the Federal Government or of a State,
local or tribal government who has an
appropriate security clearance; and
(ii) provide a mechanism within the
Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for the Director to direct
access to the information referenced in
subparagraph (A) for an employee
referred to in clause (i).
* * * * * * *
(g) Intelligence Information Sharing.--
(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall have
principal authority to ensure maximum availability of
and access to intelligence information within the
intelligence community consistent with national
security requirements. The Director of National
Intelligence shall--
* * * * * * *
(E) develop an enterprise architecture for
the intelligence community and ensure that
elements of the intelligence community comply
with such architecture; [and]
(F) have procurement approval authority over
all enterprise architecture-related information
technology items funded in the National
Intelligence Program; and
(G) in accordance with Executive Order No.
12958, as amended by Executive Order No. 13292
(68 Fed. Reg. 15315; relating to classification
of national security information) (or any
subsequent corresponding executive order), and
parts 2001 and 2004 of title 32, Code of
Federal Regulations (or any subsequent
corresponding regulation), establish--
(i) guidance to standardize, in
appropriate cases, the formats for
classified and unclassified
intelligence products created by
elements of the intelligence community
for purposes of promoting the sharing
of intelligence products; and
(ii) policies and procedures
requiring the increased use, in
appropriate cases, and including
portion markings, of the classification
of portions of information within one
intelligence product.
(2) The President shall ensure that the Director of
National Intelligence has all necessary support and
authorities to fully and effectively implement
paragraph (1).
(3)(A) If the head of a Federal department or agency
determines that an intelligence product which includes
homeland security information, as defined in section
892(f) of the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act
(6 U.S.C. 482(f)), or terrorism information, as defined
in section 1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(a)),
could likely benefit a State, local, or tribal
government, a law enforcement agency, or a private
sector entity with responsibility for the security of
critical infrastructure, such head shall share that
intelligence product with the Interagency Threat
Assessment and Coordination Group established in
Section 210D(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 124k(a)).
(B) If the Interagency Threat Assessment and
Coordination Group determines that an intelligence
product referred to in subparagraph (A), or any other
intelligence product that such Group has access to,
could likely benefit a State, local or tribal
government, a law enforcement agency, or a private
sector entity, the Group shall recommend to the Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security that the Under
Secretary produce an intelligence product that is
unclassified or that is classified at the lowest
possible level--
(i) based on the intelligence product
referred to in subparagraph (a), in a manner
consistent with the guidance established under
paragraph (1)(G)(i); and
(ii) provide such product to the appropriate
entity or agency.
(C)(i) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland
Security of the House of Representatives an annual
report on activities carried out under this paragraph.
Each report shall include a description of--
(I) each recommendation made to the Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis under
subparagraph (B);
(II) each such recommendation that was
carried out by the Under Secretary; and
(III) each such recommendation that was not
carried out by the Under Secretary.
(ii) The initial report required under clause (i)
shall be submitted not later than 270 days after the
date of the enactment of the Reducing Over-
Classification Act and no reports shall be required
under clause (i) after December 31, 2014.
(4) Except as otherwise directed by the President or
with the specific written agreement of the head of the
department or agency in question, a Federal agency
shall not be considered to have met any obligation to
provide any information, report, assessment or other
material (including unevaluated intelligence
information) to that department or agency solely by
virtue of having provided that information, report,
assessment or other material to the Director of
National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism
Center.
(5) Not later than February 1 of each year, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
President and to the Congress an annual report that
identifies any statute, regulation, policy or practice
that the Director believes impedes the ability of the
Director to fully and effectively implement paragraph
(1).
* * * * * * *
