House Debate on Intelligence Budget Disclosure
[Congressional Record: July 9, 1997 (House)] [Page H4948-H4985] INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998 [...] Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Conyers Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. The CHAIRMAN. Was the amendment printed in the Congressional Record? Mr. CONYERS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it was. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment. The Clerk read as follows: Amendment offered by Mr. Conyers: Page 10, after line 15, insert the following new section: SEC. 306. ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF INTELLIGENCE EXPENDITURES FOR THE CURRENT AND SUCCEEDING FISCAL YEARS. At the time of submission of the budget of the United States Government submitted for fiscal year 1999 under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, and for each fiscal year thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a separate, unclassified statement of the appropriations and proposed appropriations for the current fiscal year, and the amount of appropriations requested for the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, for national and tactical intelligence activities, including activities carried out under the budget of the Department of Defense to collect, analyze, produce, disseminate, or support the collection of intelligence. Mr. CONYERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan? There was no objection. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, in order to assist Members planning, which we are trying to do, I ask unanimous consent that debate on the Conyers amendment and all amendments thereto be limited to 40 minutes, equally divided. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida? Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I support a limitation for this reason: This is precisely the same amendment that was offered a year ago, and it received 176 votes. Although we have a lot of speakers, I think the lateness of the hour and the fact that this bill has been brought under the 5-minute rule requires that we accede to the chairman's request. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] each will control 20 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers]. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. This amendment is precisely the same one that was voted on last year that makes this modest proposal, that the aggregate amounts of all intelligence agencies be revealed in the President's budget and in the final appropriation for intelligence. It is a simple compilation, and I know some people did know this, of 14 different intelligence agencies in the military budget. It has been examined with great care by the Commission on the Role and Capabilities in the Intelligence Community, chaired by the Secretary, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, by Warren Rudman, and even the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] served with some distinction on this committee. They recommend this. The Council on Foreign Relations recommends this. In last year's Senate bill, this provision was included. I apologize, it is not radical, it is not revolutionary, it is embarrassingly modest, the aggregate figure of 14 intelligence agencies. The President of the United States has indicated that he would accede to this request. The ranking member of the Committee on National Security has supported us year after year, so we are only doing what other allies of ours do on this subject. England reveals their aggregate figure, Canada reveals their aggregate figure, Germany reveals their aggregate figure, Australia reveals their aggregate figure. We are moving in the same way that the Framers of the Constitution moved in 1790 and 1793 when they made public disclosure of their aggregate sum even though British spying and counterespionage was at a very intense level. I urge that Members support the measure. I would like to point out for those who will be spared this argument of why you do not go up to the green room and look at the intelligence figures. First of all, there are 14 of them. This is why only four Members have done this. Second, you are then bound by the House rules of secrecy and who knows what you can or cannot say. What we are saying is that for two reasons, we need this amendment very badly. One is that we must not undermine the legitimacy of the need for secrecy where it does exist. Secondly, unless we reveal the aggregate budget, we will not gain the support of the American people. For those reasons, I urge that we please support this amendment when it comes to a vote. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer a modest but long overdue proposal. My amendment would simply declassify the aggregate amount of the intelligence budget. Specifically, it would require the President to provide an unclassified statement of the bottom-line number of the current appropriated amount and the amount being requested. It would not disclose any operations. It would not reveal any agency budgets. It would simply provide the American [[Page H4971]] taxpayers with information they are clearly entitled to. The amendment is modeled after my bill, H.R. 753, the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act, a bill with 83 Democratic and Republican cosponsors. That bill, and the amendment I am offering today, seek to implement a key recommendation of a congressionally-mandated Commission on Intelligence Reform. The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community was chaired by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Republican Senator Warren Rudman. Dr. Brown, who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Senator Rudman, who served on the Intelligence Committee, both endorsed the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act in a letter. Even a former Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner, wrote me a letter supporting my bill. I am submitting all these materials for the Record. I would also like to point out that the gentleman from Florida who is the current chairman of the House Intelligence Committee sat on the Brown-Rudman Commission when it recommended disclosure of the intelligence budget. When the Commission's report came out, the White House publicly declared that ``The President is persuaded that disclosure of the annual budget for intelligence should be made public, and that this can be done without any harm to intelligence activities.'' So my amendment is really a mainstream proposal, with the support of Republicans and Democrats in and out of government. During my service as chairman of the Government Operations Committee, I became intimately familiar with mounds of classified information and with secrecy policy. I became convinced that too much secrecy is not only counterproductive to our democracy, but it also undermines the credibility of our legitimate secrets. Another congressionally-mandated study, the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy made some of the same observations. This Commission was chaired by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and the gentleman from Texas who served as the chair of the House Intelligence Committee last year. It observed in its report that ``Secrecy exists to protect national security, not government officials and not agencies.'' It also noted that the expansion of the national security bureaucracy has far outpaced oversight by the public and the Congress. It's time to stop blurring legitimate secrecy that serves our national defense with arbitrary secrecy that is used to avoid the debate on the balanced budget. You will likely hear some of my colleagues today say that once we disclose the aggregate figure on the intelligence budget, we'll be starting down a slippery slope. This is absurd. The Defense Appropriations Committee in 1994 accidentally disclosed not only the total figure, but even an agency by agency breakdown. Three years later we're still waiting to hear how that harmed our national security. You will also likely hear some say today that it is currently within the President's power to disclose the intelligence budget, and if he wants to he can. Talk about debating the chicken and the egg. That is precisely what this amendment would do anyway: require the President to submit an unclassified statement of the current appropriated amount and the current requested amount. Finally, as a member of the Judiciary Committee, I would like to mention that the Constitution wanted all arms of the government to be fiscally accountable. Article I, section 9, clause 7 states that ``No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.'' I think if the Framers could disclose the aggregate figure of their secret expenditures after the Revolutionary War, then we sure can disclose such a sum after the cold war. I urge a ``yes'' vote on the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I include the following: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Budget Accountability Act of 1997''. SEC. 2. PURPOSE. It is the purpose of this Act to require the publication of the aggregate intelligence budget figure to provide a more thorough accounting of Government expenditures as required by article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution. SEC. 3. FINDINGS. The Congress finds that-- (1) article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution states that ``No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.''; (2) during the Cold War the United States did not provide to the American people a ``regular Statement and Account of the . . . Expenditures'' for intelligence activities; (3) the failure to provide to the American people a statement of the total amount of expenditures on intelligence activities prevents them from participating in an informed, democratic decision concerning the appropriate level for such expenditures; and (4) the Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community recommended the disclosure of ``the total amount of money appropriated for intelligence activities during the current fiscal year and the total amount being requested for the next fiscal year''. SEC. 4. ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF INTELLIGENCE EXPENDITURES FOR THE PRECEDING FISCAL YEAR. Section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: ``(31) a separate, unclassified statement of the appropriations and proposed appropriations for the current fiscal year, and the amount of appropriations requested for the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, for national and tactical intelligence activities, including activities carried out under the budget of the Department of Defense to collect, analyze, produce, disseminate, or support the collection of intelligence.''. ____ Original Cosponsors Pete Stark, Lynn Rivers, Luis Gutierrez, Maurice Hinchey, Sam Farr, David Bonior, Earl Blumenauer, George Miller (CA), Bob Filner, Peter DeFazio, Louise Slaughter, Ron Dellums, Nancy Pelosi, Jerrold Nadler, Jim Oberstar, Cynthia McKinney, Mel Watt (NC), Sidney Yates, Nita Lowey, John Olver, Anna Eshoo, Ed Pastor, Nydia Velazquez. Additional Cosponsors Norm Dicks, Barney Frank (MA), Bennie Thompson, Eleanor- Holmes Norton, Earl Pomeroy, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Bernie Sanders, Bobby Rush, Jim McGovern, Sander Levin, Lee Hamilton, Bill Luther, John Lewis (GA), Adam Smith (WA), Martin Meehan, Danny Davis (IL), Floyd Flake, Lane Evans, Elizabeth Furse, David Minge, Xavier Becerra, John Tierney, George Brown (CA), Neil Abercrombie, Chaka Fattah, Ron Kind, Debbie Stabenow, Maxine Waters, Diana DeGette, Carolyn Maloney (NY), Tom Allen, Vic Fazio, Ron Paul, Henry Gonzalez, Lucille Roybal-Allard, Tom Barrett (WI), Major Owens, Ted Strickland, William Delahunt, Rod Blagojevich, Carrie Meek, Jim Clyburn, Lynn Woolsey, Dennis Kucinich, William Coyne, Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ellen Tauscher, Chris Shays, Darlene Hooley, Esteban Torres, James Traficant, Charles Rangel, Robert Underwood, John Spratt, David Skaggs, James Maloney (CT), Donna Christian-Green, Joe Kennedy (MA), Alcee Hastings (FL), Julian Dixon (CA), Sam Gejdenson (CT). ____ House of Representatives, Washington, DC, March 31, 1997. Support Fiscal Accountability: Cosponsor H.R. 753--The Intelligence Budget Accountability Act Dear Colleague: I recently re-introduced the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act. This bill will make public the total appropriations for the current fiscal year and the total amount being requested for the new fiscal year. The intelligence budget includes funding for the CIA, the National Security Agency and other intelligence services. It also includes funding for the intelligence function of agencies such as the DEA and the FBI. If Congress is going to honestly deal with balancing the budget, it only makes sense that it at least acknowledge the tens of billions of dollars it spends on intelligence every year. Keeping the intelligence budget secret is unnecessary after the demise of the cold war, unfair to American taxpayers, and inconsistent with the accountability requirements of the Constitution. The Constitution clearly states that ``No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.'' Half a century and hundreds of billions of dollars later, it is time that we begin meeting our obligation to inform the public how their tax dollars are spent. Official public disclosure of the intelligence budget is long overdue. Last year's Congressionally mandated report to President Clinton by the Brown-Aspin Commission entitled ``Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence'' recommended opening up the spy budget. It proposed that ``at the beginning of each congressional budget cycle, the President or a designee disclose the total amount of money appropriated for intelligence activities for the current fiscal year . . . and the total amount being requested for the next fiscal year.'' The Senate Intelligence Committee unsuccessfully sought to implement this recommendation during last year's intelligence authorization process. A copy of the bill is on the reverse. If you would like to co-sponsor or if you need more information please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Carl LeVan of my staff at 5-5126. Sincerely, John Conyers, Jr., Member of Congress. [[Page H4972]] ____ Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, April 30, 1997. Former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner Supports Making the Intelligence Budget Total Public Dear Colleague: We are writing to bring a letter (on the reverse) to your attention from Admiral Stansfield Turner, the former Director of Central Intelligence, and to urge your support for the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act of 1997. This legislation would declassify the aggregate figure--just the bottom line number--of the intelligence budget for the current fiscal year and the amount requested for the next fiscal year. The intelligence budget includes spending for the CIA and a dozen other agencies with an intelligence function. This figure has been classified by the executive branch since the birth of the modern national security establishment in 1947. We believe, like Admiral Turner, that this multibillion dollar budget can be made public without harm to the national security of the United States. We hope you will join the growing bipartisan list of members who have decided to co-sponsor H.R. 753. If you have any questions, or would like to co-sponsor, please do not hesitate to call Mr. Carl LeVan in the office of Rep. Conyers at 5-5126. Sincerely, John Conyers, Jr. Lee Hamilton. Bill Luther. Members of Congress. ____ Stansfield Turner, February 7, 1997. Hon. John Conyers, Jr., House of Representatives, Russell House Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Representative Conyers: I am pleased that you are again introducing legislation to require the open publication of the aggregate intelligence budget figure. It has been my opinion since shortly after becoming the Director of Central Intelligence in 1977 that there would be no harm to the country's security in releasing such a figure. I agree fully with the emphasis in the legislation on the importance of all government agencies being accountable to the public. While total accountability may not be feasible in the case of intelligence budget, just one aggregate figure certainly is. I wish you every success. Yours, Adm. Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy (retired). ____ House of Representatives, April 8, 1997. Common Sense Budget Accountability--H.R. 753, the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act Dear Colleague: I am writing to urge your support of H.R. 753, the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act and to bring a letter (on the reverse) from Taxpayers for Common $ense to your attention. This important legislation, introduced by Representative Conyers and twenty other Members of Congress, would simply declassify the aggregate figure of the intelligence budget. The intelligence budget, which is widely believed to be over $30 billion a year, has been classified for fifty years. Now that the Cold War is over and the war on the deficit has begun, it is time for a fair accounting of our expenses. As Taxpayers for Common $ense point out in their letter, ``the intelligence agencies, just like all other federal agencies, should be accountable to those who pay their bills--the taxpayers.'' Unaccountable spending has been a demonstrated problem in the past with the intelligence agencies. For example, we learned in 1994 that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which handles spy satellites, was building a luxurious $300 million complex with an extra fourteen acres. Then the public found out that the NRO had accumulated $4 billion in unspent funds, half of which it had simply lost track of. An unclassified bottom line number of the intelligence spending would help end the excessive secrecy that makes this kind of budget banditry possible. Certainly if we are serious about balancing the budget, we should know at least in a general way where billions of dollars are spent. Our nation needs to be secure from foreign threats, but our budget process also must maintain a sense of integrity. An official acknowledgment of how much we spend on intelligence would help provide that integrity. H.R. 753 meets this criteria by requiring the current requested and appropriated amounts be unclassified. If you have any questions or would like to cosponsor, please contact Tim Bromelkamp in the office of Representative Minge at 5-2331 or Carl LeVan in the office of Representative Conyers at 5-5126. Sincerely, David Minge, Member of Congress. ____ Taxpayers for Common $ense, Washington, DC, March 17, 1997. Taxpayers ``Need to Know'' Where the Intelligence Budget Goes-- Cosponsor Conyers Bill Dear Representative: Taxpayers for Common $ense urge you to cosponsor H.R. 753, the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act. Sponsored by Rep. John Conyers, this bill would require that the aggregate intelligence budget figure be disclosed to the public. The intelligence agencies, just like all other federal agencies, should be accountable to those who pay their bills--the taxpayers. Disclosing the intelligence agencies' aggregate budget figure does not threaten national security. In 1996, the Congressionally-mandated Brown-Aspin Commission declared that classifying the aggregate budget figure is not a matter of national security and the figure should be disclosed to the public. Both President Clinton and the Senate Intelligence Committee supported the Commission's conclusion. The Conyers bill would simply require that the total amounts requested and currently appropriated for intelligence activities should be unclassified. The intelligence agencies should not be allowed to keep their multi-billion-dollar budget a secret. At a time when all federal programs are under increased scrutiny and must meticulously account for their spending, it is only fair that the overall level of spending on intelligence be available to the taxpayers. Taxpayers should know the amount spent on intelligence in order to make informed choices regarding the allocation of government funds. In the military, secrets are shared only with those who ``need to know.'' Taxpayers for Common $ense urges that this same standard be applied to the intelligence budget. Taxpayers pay the intelligence budget, and their support and trust is ultimately the strength of the intelligence services. We urge you to defend the taxpayers' ``need to know'' where their money goes by supporting the Conyers bill. Sincerely, Jill Lancelot, Legislative Director. ____ Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, May 22, 1997. Hon. Harold Brown, Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC Hon. Warren Rudman, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison, Washington, DC Dear Dr. Brown and Senator Rudman: Last year the Commission on the Rules and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which you cochaired, submitted its report to the President and the Congress as mandated by the Fiscal Year 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act. One of the Commission's recommendations was the disclosure of the aggregate figure of the intelligence budget. The Intelligence Budget Accountability Act, which we all strongly support, would implement this key recommendation. The intelligence budget has been classified by the Executive branch since 1947. The Church Committee, the Pike Committee and the Rockefeller Commission in the 1970's all suggested some level of disclosure. Your Commission specifically proposed that ``at the beginning of each congressional budget cycle, the President or a designee disclose the total amount of money appropriated for intelligence activities for the current fiscal year and the total amount being requested for the next fiscal year.'' H.R. 753, a bipartisan bill with 80 cosponsors, is modeled after this recommendation and seeks to implement it precisely as proposed in the Report. We believe that secrecy is important to effective intelligence, but it needs to be compatible with a democratic form of government. As the Commission pointed out, intelligence agencies need to be responsible ``not only to the President, but to the elected representatives of the people, and, ultimately to the people themselves. They are funded by the American taxpayers.'' We agree with this observation and would like to hear your opinion of the proposed legislation which is enclosed. Sincerely, John Conyers, Jr. Ronald V. Dellums. Lee Hamilton. Christopher Shays. Members of Congress. ____ Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, June 2, 1997 Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Hon. Ronald V. Dellums, Hon. Lee Hamilton, Hon. Christopher Shays, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Gentlemen: In response to your letter of May 22, I continue to subscribe to the statement that you quote from the report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, recommending disclosure of the total amount of money appropriated for intelligence activities during the current fiscal year and the total amount being requested for the next fiscal year. H.R. 753 appears to meet this criterion and therefore I believe it would accomplish the purpose of the Commission's recommendations. It is important, in my judgment, that no breakdown of the total into its components be made public. Senator Rudman joins me in this response. Sincerely, Harold Brown. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], [[Page H4973]] the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, a gentleman who is well versed on this issue. (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, with some but not a great deal of reluctance, I rise to oppose the amendment of my good friend from Michigan. Traditionally, the aggregate amount of funds spent to support our intelligence agencies has not been disseminated publicly. It is a classified amount. However, it is not unavailable to this House. There are six committees in Congress that have access to that number, three in the House, three in the other body: The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on National Security. Those committees are set up to receive this information, they are cleared for top secret, and they have the ability to absorb it and to do with it whatever is necessary in our democratic process. The classified records are available to be looked at. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] objects to that because you are then bound by an oath of secrecy. Well, then do not go look at it, but you have got six committees in this Congress to get that information. Why do we keep it secret? It is a mistake to think that the intelligence budgets of these agencies is a static thing. There are bumps. Sometimes it goes up, sometimes it goes down. What does that signify? It means we may be working on an expensive new weapons system, and that information ought not to be made available to those who wish us harm. There is no urgency, there is no need for this to be made public other than to tell the rest of the world or give them a hint as to what we are doing and perhaps even why we are doing it. The amount of money is overseen by six congressional committees bipartisanly. It is available to anybody who has a burning need to know by going and reviewing the classified annex. And so there is no need to violate what has traditionally been the case; that is, keep the aggregate amount confidential, keep it classified so that our adversaries, and believe me there are some out there, do not have an idea or a clue as to what we are working on. With good wishes to my friend from Michigan, I just think his amendment is wrong and I hope it is defeated. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds, because the amicable nature of the ranking member and the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary is very close, and I respect his learned judgment. But this time he is up against the Secretary of Defense, the former Secretary of the CIA. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] was on this committee as well, the Committee on Foreign Relations in the other body, the framers of the Constitution and 176 of his colleagues. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], the distinguished ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, absent a clear national security interest, information should not be classified. In fact, Executive Order 12,958, which governs classification, prohibits classifying information unless to do so is required to protect national security. I do not think anybody can stand up here tonight and say that disclosing the number, disclosing this number, is going to do anything to harm national security. I do not believe a case can be made that the aggregate budget figure for intelligence meets that standard. The arguments that are made in favor of keeping the budget secret have little to do with the number in question and more to do with the potential damage that could occur if more information were released. {time} 1745 Some people are afraid that public release of the intelligence budget will lead to drastic cuts in intelligence spending. Not only is that an improper reason for classification, but I firmly believe we can defend the overall amount, as we just did, we spent on intelligence as well as we will defend the overall amount we spend on defense. Releasing the aggregate budget total changes business as usual, and some people are understandably uncomfortable with changing the practices of 50 years. But this is not a radical proposition. It is an idea that has been endorsed by two panels of experienced and knowledgeable experts serving on the Aspen Brown Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations. The overall intelligence budget figure is a significant piece of information by which the American people can judge the operations of their Government. I believe we should tell the American people about how we are spending their hard-earned money. We tell them what the overall number for defense is; I do not see how we can then argue that we cannot tell them what the overall number for intelligence is, and frankly I think it would do a lot to clear up much of the confusion that we have heard today on the floor about what this number is because, as I said earlier, the number that we have heard is inaccurate, significantly inaccurate. So I rise in strong support of the Conyers amendment. I remember our colleague, Congressman Glickman, who was chairman when we were in the majority, was the first chairman of this committee to strongly endorse this. I think it is time to do it, and I hope we can do it today on a bipartisan basis. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis], subcommittee chairman. Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LEWIS of California. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois. Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. I just want to say to my friend, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], who surprises me that he is for disclosing this amount of money, the truth is, of course, the aggregate figures do not tell us anything. They give us a rough idea, but the next step is who is getting what? If we want to know the aggregate, we want to know who is spending it and for what purpose. What is the National Reconnaissance Office spending? What is the CIA spending? What is the DIA spending? And we want to break it down so it means something. That is the next step. The aggregate figure does not really inform us. But the gentleman and I know it is the opening wedge in a total lay it on the table strategy, what agency is spending how much money, for what systems, and for what covert activity and for what satellites, and what are we spending overseas? And it never ends. And so that is why it ought to remain secret, in my opinion. Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I must say following the remarks of both the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] I cannot help but be a bit disconcerted by that disconnect, for I am quite surprised at the position of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] as well. In the short time, 4 years, that it has been my privilege to serve on this committee, I have become very, very impressed by the fact that America is pretty good at what they do. A combination of my service on the defense subcommittee of Appropriations and this committee tells me that America is more than just leading the world, we are the strength for the future of peace in the world, in no small part because of the work done by many of these agencies. But there is little doubt that those who suggest that the gross number means almost nothing, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that underlying that is the balance. And it is not the people here in this room who necessarily want to know what may be all of the spending of some of our subagencies involved. It is the people who would be our enemies who would like to have that information. Excellent work being done by the FBI as well as other agencies relative to controlling the impact of drugs in our society, a tremendous war developing there that will be very important to the future of our youth. Absolutely no question that the impact that we are beginning to have upon potential terrorists is very important as related to this work. There are those who love to see what our satellites are all about, exactly what they mean and what we are spending. Indeed it is very important that we recognize that it is the people who largely wish America ill who like to have those kinds of details, and because of that I am supporting the [[Page H4974]] chairman's position. I certainly would urge the ranking member to reconsider his position, for America's future is involved in the work that we are about in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], the frequently talked about ranking member. Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my friend from California, Mr. Lewis, and my friend, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Hyde, who has served on this committee with great distinction, I still go back to Executive Order 12958 which governs classification. It prohibits classifying information unless to do so is required to protect national security. Now I do not see how anybody can make a case that this number has anything to do with national security. It is the amount of money we spend on intelligence, but by disclosing it I do not see how we in any way endanger national security, and therefore we cannot classify it. It is almost an open and shut case, and that is why I think the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] is correct in calling for this to be disclosed. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds because some may be surprised at the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] but I am not surprised at the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde). Mr. Hyde said it makes hardly any difference what the aggregate amount would be. He is worried about what comes after that. Well, we are not legislating about after that, and he is quite right. It does not make any difference. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I think this is, as the gentleman from Michigan has said, a debate we have had many times, and I tend to believe that not much has changed and the previous wisdom we have had that it is correct, that the matter should remain classified. I realize that the gentleman has quoted the Aspen Brown report, and in fact I did dissent from the vote on that. That was a consensus report. I argued for the position of keeping the matter classified. In that particular group of people, it was not seen that way. Not all of those people have had the same experience that those of us on the Senate committee have had, and there is a legitimate disagreement about this. The other point I think is very important is that no good deed seems to go unpunished, no matter what we do around here. I would point out, and I am reading from the committee report, the committee has authorized additional resources in the fiscal year 1998 budget for CIA classification management, including declassification activities in support of Executive Order 12958. Now I know that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] has a cutting amendment we are going to hear, and I know the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] had a cutting amendment. Well yes, we did put more money in this bill to get to the declassification question, and I certainly believe as part of the declassification question we ought to be examining the issue that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] has raised. I think it is a very fair debate to ask and we should do it in a comprehensive way. So I am totally prepared to say that as part of the initiative of the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] a very valued member on our committee, to deal with declassification, that this should be part of that study. I just do not want at this point to create an initiative to go forward and say, well, we suddenly made a decision that really is of interest in the Beltway, but not for the American people to suddenly declassify this matter. It will be of interest to those who have interests that are inimicable to the United States of America. They would dearly love to have this information. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] is right, it is a slippery slope. Now I realize that there are some Members who serve on other committees who would love to know what a percentage of the NRO budget is so they can get their hand on a number and say, surely the interests of my committee match this and surely, therefore, we could take a little bit here and put a little bit there. But as the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] has said, under 602(b) we are still in line, and I think that is extremely important. So my colleagues can rest assured that there is not really any opportunity here, there is no pork here, this is all proper. The other thing I have got to point out on this besides the slippery slope and the fact that there is not a clamor across this country to have this information, I hardly ever at a town meeting get asked, gee, exactly how much money is being spent on intelligence? Sometimes I get asked exactly what is intelligence doing, and there is this perception that it is all CIA, and as the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] has properly said earlier in this debate today, it is much, much more. The CIA is indeed a very minor part of it. I am very happy to say it is a minor part of it. I do not think I ought to say specifically what that minor part is though. The other thing I have got to point out here, the President of the United States in fact can go ahead and release information. He has that ability. The President does not do that. The President has made the choice to keep the matter classified. Before we go off and do something like this, I think it should be properly studied and have the proper input from our folks in the other part of Government, our sister branch of Government. After all, he is charged with the national security. It is a matter of the Constitution, it is a matter of his specific charge, and he can declassify when he chooses with a stroke of his pen. Every President since Harry Truman has decided to send us the bill with the number classified. I suspect there is a reason for that, and I suspect that we probably ought to take the President and his people into consideration before we go off in a new direction. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs]. Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the time. Our distinguished friend from Illinois has really conceded the point. This proposal will not hurt national security. What will it do? It will enhance our responsibility to the American public for them to have as much information as possible about their government. And I think it is irrelevant whether we get asked at town meetings about this. I happen to, actually. And what does the American public learn? They have a sense of proportion: How much of our resources are we putting to this purpose? They have, I would concede, no particular need to know the details of particular sub-agencies. But it is a legitimate matter for them to have a sense in this large sense what their government is about in the intelligence field relative to other things that they spend their tax money for. Really all that we have by way of argument against this proposal is the slippery slope argument. What does that really mean? It means that we do not trust future Congresses to exercise judgment about what will and what will not protect the national security of this country. I think that is a highly rude position to take relative to our successors in these jobs. They will be able to figure this out. They will know whether or not further disclosures make any sense. I do not think that they will err in that judgment, and we can trust them to do so. On the other hand, the default position always ought to be if this information is not going to damage national security, let us make it available to the public. The real national security issue here is the strength of the democracy and the willingness of the American people to trust a government that is leveling with them whenever it possibly can. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a brief question? The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Colorado has expired. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Colorado if the gentleman will yield. Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the gentleman is exactly on the point that if it does no damage then there is no reason to keep it hidden. That is a very valid point. But it is a [[Page H4975]] point that applies to several other pieces of information, which is exactly why the committee has provided at the gentleman's request, which I totally agree with, conceded to, applauded in committee, that we provide for a study on declassification. Does the gentleman believe that this should be outside of the study of the declassification that we have provided for, committed funds for and I hope we will have the funds when we get through with this process to proceed with the study. Mr. SKAGGS. If I can reclaim enough time to respond, I believe, as the gentleman knows, that funding is for looking at past classified information, things that have been sitting in the archives that need additional staffing in order to be able to be reviewed for declassification purposes. That is the real thrust of the funding that we put in the bill for declassification. {time} 1800 Mr. GOSS. Again, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I believe that the question of declassification includes the question of classification, because I think there is great abuse there, as the gentleman has heard me say. I believe this is comprehensive and should be treated as such. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. John Tierney]. Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the efforts of my colleague, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers], and I voice my support for this amendment. Let me just say that I do not think any of us are not mindful of the comments that are made by our colleagues on the other side of this issue, but the fact of the matter is that the American public are the people that have a burning need to know at least what the aggregate number is in this situation. The time has come and it is long overdue for us to be able to have a debate with real numbers down here about real issues. We are in the midst of a debate right now in this country and in this House about the amount of money that we are going to be spending on programs, and in fact, with spending constraints on a number of programs, we are told the money just is not there. The budget these days is a zero sum game. The fact of the matter is that if this is the case, we should have a disclosure so the American public can see what proportion of our budget we are spending on so- called intelligence matters. It ought to be known how many millions or billions of dollars in relation to the rest of our budget is being spent in this area at a time when we have schools that are in need of repair, when we have cities and communities that are in need of development, when we have infrastructure needs that are going unmet, roads, bridges, and airports left unbuilt, the restraint of growth and missing opportunities for job creation, when we have a debate over insuring half of our children and not insuring the other half, and when we continue to fail to debate the idea of having insurance available for all Americans. The Constitution requires that we have a statement and account of receipts and expenditures for all the money. I think it is an absolute disgrace that we hide here behind secrecy and say that we cannot even tell the American public what the aggregate number is on so-called intelligence matters. In fact, my colleague from across the aisle indicated that the President may well have authority to release these numbers. In fact, I would agree with the gentleman that he does; that in 1996 he said he favored doing just that. Now we see him waiting for us to move, and they are over there with others saying we are going to wait for him to move. The American public wants somebody to move off the dime and tell us what those numbers are. He ought to do it, and if he is not going to do it we ought to do it, because simply there is no reason in the world to say that security is involved. Mr. Chairman, we need to move on this matter. The public has a burning need to know. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds. Mr. Chairman, the argument that the President can do it and has not done it but he approves of it is not a reason for us not to go ahead and do it. If the gentleman does not object if the President declassifies, then why do not we do it? We were only 30 votes away last year from doing it. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California, Mrs. Ellen Tauscher. Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan for yielding time to me. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Conyers amendment. In this post-cold-war era it is as important as ever that our Nation maintain an efficient, effective, and trustworthy intelligence apparatus. With national and economic security threats around the world, we must collect accurate information about the activities of countries and organizations that jeopardize our stability. At the same time, at the end of the cold war we are now provided with the opportunity to be more forthcoming about the money and the resources we spend on intelligence gathering. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has already taken steps to make more public the activities of our intelligence agencies. The fact that the general level of intelligence spending is a poorly kept secret only strengthens the argument that it should be publicly disclosed. As we attempt to balance the Federal budget, we are forced to make decisions about spending priorities. It is important that the American people know how much of their money proportionally is being spent to support the intelligence community, just as they need to know about how much money is spent on Medicare, transportation, and the arts. I intend to vote for the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1998. I believe it properly funds the important intelligence-related activities of the United States. But I also believe that the American public deserves to know the aggregate amount we are authorizing for these activities. The Conyers amendment is a commonsense proposal that places no threat to our national security. I encourage my colleagues to support this amendment. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to my colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]. Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the Conyers amendment, which is intended to force the disclosure of the aggregate total of the intelligence community's budget. I think primarily I oppose it for basic reasons of common sense, that it does not make any sense to disclose this number and let people who would be our enemies know what it is. But as Chairman Goss has noted, there are several reasons to oppose it. For example, one could argue that disclosure of the aggregate number is the first step on a slippery slope toward total disclosure of very highly sensitive security information. Chairman Goss has also made a very persuasive argument that the President already possesses the necessary legal authority, we have heard that discussed, to unilaterally disclose this information without seeking any approval of Congress. But I would like to particularly address the assertion by some that disclosure is required by the statement and account clause of the Constitution; that is, article I, section 9, clause 7. Professor Robert F. Turner of the University of Virginia School of Law testified before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on the issue of, and this is his quote, ``Secret funding and the `statement and account' clause'' in February 1994. Professor Turner made a number of legal and historical observations on the statement and account clause which are quite pertinent to today's debate. He said, ``The Founding Fathers did not view `secrecy' as being incompatible with democratic government. One of the first measures adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was a secrecy rule--without which James Madison said there would have been no Constitution. ``Perhaps the first `covert action' in which the United States was involved was a 1776 decision by France to secretly transfer 200,000 pounds worth of [[Page H4976]] arms and ammunitions to the colonies for use in their struggle against King George. The offer was reported by secret messenger to Benjamin Franklin, chairman of the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress, and Robert Morris, the only members of the 5-man committee then in town. Given the sensitivity of the matter, they concluded--and here I quote--that `it is our indispensable duty to keep it secret even from Congress.' ``They set forth several reasons for this decision, including this one--and again I quote--`We find by fatal experience that Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets.' ``It should not come as a surprise to learn that the first Congress in 1790 appropriated a substantial contingent account for the President to use in making foreign affairs and intelligence expenditures, and that Congress expressly exempted the President from any requirement to inform either Congress or the public how those funds were expended. This was the start of a long tradition of 'secret' expenditures.'' I believe that Professor Turner has demonstrated in his work that the Founding Fathers did endorse the use of certain secret funds to support the new Nation's intelligence and foreign policy activities. I think Benjamin Franklin would agree that the disclosure of the aggregate funding amount for the intelligence community would indeed be penny- wise and pound-foolish. I am going to ask at the appropriate time, though I realize it is not now since we are in the time for the amendments, to put Professor Turner's prepared statement on secret funding into the Record and when that time comes in the full House I will do so. I again urge the defeat of the Conyers amendment. I ask that the Members of this body vote down the Conyers amendment. It is a dangerous precedent. We should not adopt it. We do have times and places for secrecy, and the intelligence community is one of those places where it is absolutely imperative. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi]. (Ms. PELOSI asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.) Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. As a member of the Committee on Intelligence, I rise in support of the Conyers amendment. This amendment at heart is about accountability and the public's right to know. The amendment supports the underlying belief that the government of this country is and should be accountable to the people of the country. In today's world there is no rational reason why the American public should be denied information about how much the United States Government is spending on intelligence activities. President Clinton recognized this fact when in April of 1996 he said that the bottom line for intelligence spending should be published. John Deutch, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said that same month, ``Disclosure of the annual amount appropriated for intelligence purposes will inform the public and will not in itself harm intelligence activities.'' The continued classification of the total amount spent annually on intelligence activity is not only unnecessary, but it is also ridiculous. U.S. intelligence spending is considered by many to be one of Washington's worst-kept secrets. Estimates of intelligence spending appear with some regularity in the press. By continuing to refuse to release the amount publicly, Congress is only serving to fuel suspicions that the government is hiding something. Those who support openness and accountability in government should support this effort to make our government accountable in one of the last bastions of secrecy, a secrecy that in today's world is unwarranted. In a democratic society citizens have a right to know what their tax dollars support. In fact, inside the Beltway an estimate of intelligence spending is widely reported, but ordinary citizens are oddly denied this information. I urge my colleagues to support openness and to support the Conyers amendment. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 45 seconds. Mr. Chairman, this just in: The reason maybe Chairman Goss' people do not ever ask him about it, about this financing of the intelligence, is that they do not know that we are not being told. They may not even know that he is being told. For my dear friend, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum], again, with whom we have had great discussions about American history, in 1770 and 1773, in those 2 years the intelligence budgets were in the aggregate disclosed. If Members need a more recent time, check in 1994, when the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations inadvertently released the whole blooming thing and nothing happened. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Adam Smith]. Mr. ADAM SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise in support of the Conyers amendment to disclose the aggregate budget of the Committee on Intelligence to the full public. I think the important thing to remember is the presumption should always be in favor of disclosure. As I listened to the arguments against, I do not hear anything to rebut that presumption. I think the American public wants to know as much as possible about what we do back here. Part of the reason why this institution has the confidence problem it has with this country is they figure we are keeping stuff from them, that we do not trust them to know what is going on back here, and they feel left out of the process. There should be a strong presumption in letting them into as much of the process as is humanly possible. If there is some special reason here why that cannot be done, fine. We can explain it and keep it secret. But no special reason has been offered during the course of this debate not to release the aggregate figure that we spend on intelligence in this country. There have been some camel's nose under the tent arguments about how in the future we might authorize the release of something that would cause a problem, but that is not good enough. That does not rebut the presumption that this body should have to disclose whatever possible to the public. I urge support of the amendment. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am privileged to yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California [Mr. Sherman]. Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have an extraordinary event in the world. The entire world has virtually acquiesced to having one superpower. That has never happened in history. It has occurred because the world knows that for the most part our decisions are based on values and on respect for democracy. Democracy begins at home. A revelation of the amount that we are spending on security is one of the building blocks of the consensus that our power relies upon. Otherwise, it will only be a matter of time, if we do not respect our values, before the rest of the world questions whether there should be one superpower. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. Farr]. (Mr. FARR of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Conyers amendment to declassify the size of the Intelligence Budget There is simply no reason to keep the size of the Intelligence budget hidden. Former CIA Directors, including John Deutch and Bob Gates, say that it would not harm National Security. This amendment would not reveal what we spend on individual programs, only on intelligence as a whole. Other countries, like Israel and Britain, already disclose their spending on intelligence. It simply serves no purpose to keep the size of the intelligence budget a secret. At a time when the rest of the Federal Budget is being cut, slashed, and squeezed, the American people ought to know how much of their tax dollars are going to intelligence programs. By maintaining needless secrecy, we do nothing for American intelligence while keeping secrets from the American people. Let's bring some sunshine to Government and some honesty to the American people support the Conyers amendment. [[Page H4977]] Mr. Chairman, It is unnecessary after the end of the cold war to keep the budget secret. Keeping general information like the budget classified undermines the credibility of other information which really needs to be secret. If we really are serious about balancing the budget, how can we sign a secret, multi-billion dollar blank check every year, with such a minimal public discussion? Since almost all intelligence spending is hidden in the defense budget, the American people are not only kept in the dark about intelligence spending, they are misled about the real amount of defense spending through false line-items in the defense budget. We need budget integrity. Porter Goss, the current Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee was a member of the Brown-Aspin (later the Brown-Rudman) Commission that recommended disclosure of the aggregate figure of the intelligence budget. Why should his position change? The intelligence budget is the worst-kept secret in Washington anyway. Each year it is disclosed dozens of times in the press with no harm done to ``national security.'' Keeping this budget officially secret while watching it discussed openly in the press adds to a cynicism that the American public has about its government. No-one wants to foster a pessimism that discourages participation in our democracy. ``The President is persuaded that disclosure of the annual total budget for intelligence activities should be made public and that this can be done without any harm to intelligence activities.'' With an open intelligence budget, the Director of Central Intelligence and others would be able to better justify the funding it receives from Congress. (A counter-argument might be, for example, that the CIA will not be able to publicly defend its budget because may of its successes are secret.) Only a handful of Members of Congress actually go look at the intelligence budget (as they are permitted to do). Declassifying the new budget request and the current fiscal year's appropriated amount for purposes of comparison would contribute to a more informed debate. Releasing the intelligence budget would help make it conform to the ideals for the framers of the Constitution. The Constitution states: ``No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.'' In 1994, Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearings disclosed almost a complete breakdown of the categories of intelligence spending, which added up to $28 billion. Three years later, we're still waiting to hear how this disclosure harmed ``national security. Similarly, the Brown-Aspin Commission Report recommended disclosure only of the aggregate intelligence budget and no further detail, then inadvertently specified the CIA's budget at $3.1 billion in a graph. (See attached article.) The Washington Post reported that the National Reconnaissance Office, the intelligence agency which manages spy satellites reported a surplus of $3.8 billion that has accumulated over the years from unspent money and bad accounting practices! This is partly the result of a lack of open discussion about intelligence spending. (See attached article.) While HUD, the Department of Commerce and [insert your favorite agency] are fighting for their life, isn't it only fair that the American people at least know how many of their tax dollars are going to intelligence?. Taxpayers for Common Sense writes: ``At a time when all federal programs are under increased scrutiny and must meticulously account for their spending, it is only fair that the overall level of spending on intelligence be available of the taxpayers. Taxpayers should know the amount spend on intelligence in order to make informed choices regarding the allocation of government funds.'' Other democracies such as Israel, Britain, Australia and Canada disclose their intelligence budgets. (FYI: Israel spends less than a billion shekels on the Mossad and the Shin Bet combined.) Larry Combest, the former Chairman of the Hose Intelligence Committee and last year's lone opponent of budget disclosure, was the vice-chair (with Senator Moynihan) of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. While Commission's report, released in March of this year, did not deal directly with the intelligence budget, it noted: ``Secrecy exists to protect national security, not government officials and agencies'' (page xxiii). ``[E]xpansion of the Government's national security bureaucracy since the end of World War II and the closed environment in which it has operated have outpaced attempts by Congress and the public to oversee that bureaucracy's activities'' (page 49). There are twelve ranking members who are so-sponsors of H.R. 753, ranging the ideological spectrum, including: Representatives John Conyers, Norm Dicks, John Spratt, Lee Hamilton, George Brown, Ron Dellums, Lane Evans, Sam Gejdenson, Henry Gonzalez, George Miller, Jim Oberstar, and Charles Rangel. {time} 1815 Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. May I point out that the arguments, the more we go over them each year, the more it becomes clear that there is very little objection to revealing the aggregate budget for the 14 intelligence agencies in our system. It is a practice that is followed by at least four of our allies that I know with no harm. It is like trying to get us to agree to a secret that is already open. Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington. Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman for his initiative. To my friend who says this is a slippery slope, we can say what the number is and say, out of that we fund the CIA, the DIA, the NSA, NIMA, right down the line. We do not have to tell them what that second amount is. I think it would do a lot to help the American people understand how many different entities are funded by this budget and how much of it is in the Department of Defense. We have heard all kinds of misstatements here today on the floor. I think we look kind of foolish. Numbers are in the New York Times. They are not that far off. They are wrong but they are not that far off. In my judgment, it is time for us to let the American people know. I think the gentleman deserves to be commended for his initiative. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. The fact of the matter is that for us to say to the American people that they really do not need to know this or that nobody is asking me about it so we will keep it from them is the shallowest kind of presentation to make. We need to know the aggregate amount. I am confident for one that this body will not proceed down a slippery slope. I do not think this body, no matter what we do on this measure today, will further want to break this thing down. I am not certain that I would support any further disclosure than the revelation of the aggregate amount. Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I certainly agree with the gentleman. I would oppose going to the individual amounts, but I think the aggregate will help us with the American people. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a point that in the time for general leave, I am going to ask to have the Turner statement with regard to constitutionality inserted right after my remarks during this debate. I know this is not the formal place, but we seem to need to put a place marker in there. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. Mr. Chairman, I include the following for the Record: Secret Funding and the ``Statement and Account'' Clause: Constitutional and Policy Implications of Public Disclosure of an Aggregate Budget for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities (Prepared statement of Prof. Robert F. Turner) Introduction Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here this afternoon to provide testimony on the constitutional implications of authorizing and appropriating funds for intelligence operations without making the aggregate amount of those funds public. It is a particular pleasure to see you again, Mr. Chairman, whom I have not seen since our work together nearly a decade ago in getting the U.S. Institute of Peace off the ground. I am also pleased to join my old friend Dr. Lou Fisher--who has done landmark scholarship in these areas--and to have a chance to listen to Dr. George Carver, whose work has influenced my own thinking for more than two decades. I understand that the Committee is considering a proposal that has been around in one form or other for many years to make public the aggregate sum of money appropriated for [[Page H4978]] the various agencies of the Intelligence Community--money which has for nearly half a century been concealed, if public accounts are to be believed,\1\ largely within the budget of the Department of Defense. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Footnotes at the end of article. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This practice was authorized by Public Law 81-110, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, section 5 of which authorizes the Agency to ``receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget [now OMB]'' for the performance of authorized functions, and also authorizes ``any other Government agency . . . to transfer to . . . the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations.''\2\ It is perhaps worth noting that this process was agreed to in 1949 by voice vote in the Senate and by a vote of 348 to 4 in the House--with only a single Member of either House speaking in opposition.\3\ Members of this Committee will know the current mechanics of this process far better than I do, but it is my understanding that the precise amounts authorized and appropriated for the Intelligence Community are normally known only to the two intelligence committees and select members of the appropriations committees. I am working from the understanding that all fund provided to the Intelligence Community from the federal treasury have, in fact, been appropriated by law and that the process itself is not contrary to any statute. Thus, the issue I am prepared to address is not whether Congress has agreed to the current funding process; but rather, whether that congressionally established process complies with the requirements of the Constitution. I do not have a sense that the large majority of Americans are upset at the realization that our government keeps many facts concerning intelligence agencies and their work secret--indeed, I suspect a scientific poll would reveal that most Americans would share my own personal preference that such matters ought not to be made public if there is any reasonable likelihood their disclosure will compromise sensitive sources or methods or in any other manner undermine our security or benefit our nation's enemies.\4\ This expectation is predicated upon the assumption that the current practice is consistent with the Constitution; for, if the question were worded ``should the Constitution be obeyed,'' the answer would presumably also be a strong affirmative. So it seems to me that, in deciding whether to change the status quo, the Committee has a two-stage process to undertake: First, you need to ascertain whether the Constitution requires the publication of the aggregate annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities (or perhaps even a more detailed accounting of those appropriations); and, if the answer is yes, you need to make those figures public. If the answer to the constitutional question is no, it would seem wise to undertake a thorough policy review to decide whether such figures should nevertheless be made public--and, if so under what constraints or guidelines. While I understand that my role here this afternoon is to help you answer the first question, with your permission I will also comment briefly upon the broader policy issues. The Constitutional Issues Article 1, Section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution provides: No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. Many respected individuals and groups have concluded on the basis of this language that it is unconstitutional for the Congress not to publish at least the aggregate sum of appropriations for the Intelligence Community.\5\ I shall address that issue, but with your permission I would propose to first place the issue in the context of the Founding Fathers' attitude toward secrecy in the areas of foreign intercourse and intelligence. I believe there is a great deal of misunderstanding on this point that may confuse this important debate. Secrecy, Democracy, and the Early American Experience There seems to be a common assumption that the Founding Fathers viewed secrecy in government as a terrible evil, a practice quite incompatible with democratic theory. While it is true that they believed that an informed public was essential to democratic government,\6\ they were practical men who recognized that intelligence and national security matters often had to be kept secret--not only from the American people, but even from their elected representatives in Congress. The Committee of Secret Correspondence The obvious inability of legislative bodies to manage the details of foreign intercourse led the Continental Congress to establish a ``Committee of Secret Correspondence'' on 29 November 1775.\7\ Two weeks later, the Committee dispatched Thomas Story as a secret messenger to France, Holland, and England, with instructions to make contact with a network of unofficial ``secret agents'' serving the United States in foreign capitals--people like Silas Deane in France and Arthur Lee in England. After meeting with Lee, Story returned to America and gave this report to the Committee, as recorded in a memorandum dated 1 October 1776 found among the Committee's official papers: ``On my leaving London, Arthur Lee, Esq., requested me to inform the Committee of [Secret] Correspondence that he had had several conferences with the French Ambassador, who had communicated the same to the French court; that in consequence thereof the Duke de Vergennes had sent a gentleman to Mr. Lee, who informed him that the French Court could not think of entering into a war with England, but that they would assist America by sending from Holland this fall two hundred thousand pounds sterling worth of arms and ammunition to St. Eustatius, Martinico, or Cape Francois. That application was to be made to the Governours or Commandants of those places by inquiring for Monsieur Hortalez, and that on persons properly authorized applying, the above articles would be delivered to them.'' \8\ This may arguably have been the very first ``covert operation'' to which the United States was a party, and the secret offer of K200,000 worth of arms was welcome news in America. But it was also recognized as highly sensitive news, and for that reason Benjamin Franklin and the members of the small committee he chaired agreed without dissent that it could not be shared with their colleagues in the Congress. Their memorandum explains: ``The above intelligence was communicated to the subscribers [Franklin and Robert Morris], being the only two members of the Committee of Secret Correspondence now in the city, and our considering the nature and importance of it, we agree in opinion that it is our indispensable duty to keep it secret even from Congress, for the following reasons: ``First, Should it get to the ears of our enemies at New- York, they would undoubtedly take measures to intercept the supplies, and thereby deprive us not only of those succours, but of others expected by the same route. ``Second, as the Court of France have taken measures to negotiate this loan of succour in the most cautious and secret manner, should we divulge it immediately, we may not only lose the present benefit, but also render that Court cautious of any further connection with such unguarded people, and prevent their granting other loans and assistance that we stand in need of, and have directed Mr. Deane to ask of them. For it appears from our intelligence they are not disposed to enter into an immediate war with Britain, although disposed to support us in our contest with them. We therefore think it our duty to cultivate their favourable disposition towards us, draw from them all the support we can, and in the end their private aid must assist to establish peace, or inevitably draw them in as parties to the war. ``Third, We find by fatal experience that Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets. . . . [Emphasis added.]'' \9\ The memorandum contained the written endorsements of Richard Henry Lee and William Hooper, to whom it had been shown some days later, with the notation that Lee ``concur[red] heartily'' and Hooper ``sincerely approve[d]'' of its contents.\10\ john jay and federalist no. 64 One of the criticisms of American government under the Articles of Confederation was that all functions of government were entrusted to the Congress, which tended to micromanage military and diplomatic affairs and could not keep secrets. Robert R. Livingston agreed to serve as ``Secretary of the United States of America for the Department of Foreign Affairs'' in February 1782, but by the end of the year he had submitted his resignation in frustration. Nearly two years passed before John Jay was chosen his successor as the ``agent'' of Congress in diplomatic intercourse; and he, too, was quickly frustrated by such things as the demand of Congress to receive every proposal submitted by the Spanish Charge during treaty negotiations.\11\ Jay was particularly frustrated by the demands by Congress--which, in the absence of any ``executive'' organ of government, had exclusive control over war, treaties, and other aspects of the nation's foreign intercourse--for access to confidential information and diplomatic letter. Professor Henry Wriston, in his classic 1929 study, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations, explains: It is interesting, in connection with the submission of Lafayette's letters to Congress, to observe that Jay regarded this as a serious limitation upon the value of the correspondence. Congress never could keep any matter strictly confidential; someone always babbled. ``The circumstances must undoubtedly be of a great restraint on those public and private characters from whom you would otherwise obtain useful hints and information. I for my part have long experienced the inconvenience of it, and in some instances very sensibly.'' [Emphasis added.] \12\ These frustrations were widely shared, and Jay went on to play a key role both in explaining the Constitution as a co- author of the Federalist Papers and in interpreting it as the nation's first Chief Justice. He took on the issues of secrecy and intelligence squarely in Federalist essay number 64, explaining the benefits of entrusting matters requiring secrecy to the Executive while requiring the approval of two- thirds of the Senate before the President could ratify a completed treaty: [[Page H4979]] There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives, and there doubtless are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the president, but who would not confide in that of the senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The convention have done well therefore in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the president must in forming them act by the advice and consent of the senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest.\13\ Jay added, with an allusion to the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation: ``So often and so essentially have we heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and dispatch, that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective if no attention had been paid to those objects.'' \14\ washington, the senate, and congressional leaks Further contemporary insight into the Founding Fathers' perception that Congress could not keep secrets is found in an informal note made by our first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson. Beginning during his service in this capacity, Jefferson made various ``notes''--what he called ``passing transactions''--to assist his memory. These he later combined into three volumes which we today know as The Anas. The following entry is instructive: April 9th, 1792. The President had wished to redeem our captives at Algiers, and to make peace with them on paying an annual tribute. The Senate were willing to approve this, but unwilling to have the lower House applied to previously to furnish the money; they wished the President to take the money from the treasury, or open a loan for it. . . . They said . . . that if the particular sum was voted by the Representatives, it would not be a secret. The President had no confidence in the secresy of the Senate, and did not choose to take money from the treasury or to borrow. But he agreed he would enter into provisional treaties with the Algerines, not to be binding on us till ratified here. [Emphasis added.] \15\ Mr. Chairman, this is an important, if largely forgotten, part of our history. However, in the interest of time, I will mention but one further example of the Founding Fathers' recognition of the value of secrecy: and what example could be more fitting than the Constitutional Convention itself. the federal convention of 1787 On 29 May 1787, the fourth day of deliberation,\16\ the Constitutional Convention adopted a series of rules as part of the Standing Orders of the House. Rules three through five provided: That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the sitting of the House without the leave of the House. That members only be permitted to inspect the journal. That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published, or communicated without leave.\17\ The great constitutional historian Clinton Rossiter has described this ``so-called secrecy rule'' as ``the most critical decision of a procedural nature the Convention was ever to make,'' and notes that ``in later years, Madison insisted that `no Constitution would ever have been adopted by the convention if the debates had been public.' '' \18\ Indeed, at his insistence, Madison's own important Notes on the convention were not published until 1840, four years after his death and more than half a century after the convention had ended.\19\ Because the debates of the convention were held in secret, and Madison's Notes were thus not available to the people when they ratified the Constitution, such influential contemporary records as the Federalist Papers and state ratification convention debates probably deserve greater weight in interpreting the document as it was understood by the sovereign American people when it was ratified. Nevertheless, Madison's Notes do provide important details about the give-and-take that produced the constitutional text, and they are certainly worthy of study. The entire debate on this issue occupies approximately one page of the hundreds of pages devoted by Madison to the convention proceedings. It occurred only three days before the end of the debate, seemingly as an afterthought, on Friday, 14 September 1787: Col. [George] Mason moved a clause requiring ``that an Account of the public expenditures should be annually published'' Mr. Gerry 2<SUP>ded</SUP> the motion. Mr. Gov<SUP>r</SUP>. Morris urged that this w<SUP>d</SUP>. be impossible in many cases. Mr. King remarked, that the term expenditures went to every minute shilling. This would be impracticable. Cong<SUP>s</SUP>. might indeed make a monthly publication, but it would be in such general statements as wou<SUP>d</SUP> afford no satisfactory information. Mr. Madison proposed to strike out ``annually'' from the motion & insert ``from time to time,'' which would enjoin the duty of frequent publications and leave enough to the discretion of the Legislature. Require too much and the difficulty will beget a habit of doing nothing. The articles of Confederation require halfyearly publications on this subject. A punctual compliance being often impossible, the practice has ceased altogether. Mr. Wilson 2<SUP>ded</SUP> & supported the motion. Many operations of finance cannot be properly published at certain times. Mr. Pinkney was in favor of the motion. Mr. Fitzimmons. It is absolutely impossible to publish expenditures in the full extent of the term. Mr. Sherman thought ``from time to time'' the best rule to be given. ``Annual'' was struck out--& those words--inserted nem: con: The motion of Col: Mason so amended was then agreed to nem: con: and added after--``appropriations by law'' as follows-- ``And a regular statement and account of the receipts & expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.'' \20\ It is perhaps worth noting that the issue of ``secrecy'' had arisen earlier that same day with respect to publishing the journal of each House of Congress,\21\ and the statements by Gouverneur Morris (annual publication would be ``impossible in many cases''), Madison (on the need for legislative discretion), James Wilson (``Many operations of finance cannot be properly published at certain times'')--and others who supported Madison's amendment--may have been made with this concern in mind. That the need to protect certain secret expenditures was, in fact, a primary underlying rationale for the decision to give Congress discretion as to what expenditures could be made public, and when, becomes clearer from a reading of the debates in the state ratification conventions--especially in the Virginia Convention, where both Mason and Madison were present to revisit the original debate. Colonel Mason took a second bite at the apple during the Virginia Convention, arguing on 17 June 1788 that ``the loose expression of `publication from time to time,' was applicable to any time. It was equally applicable to monthly and septennial periods.'' \22\ He then explained: The reason urged in favor of this ambiguous expression, was, that there might be some mattes which might require secrecy. In matters relative to military operations, and foreign negotiations, secrecy was necessary sometimes. But he did not conceive that the receipts and expenditures of the public money ought ever to be concealed. The people, he affirmed, had a right to know the expenditures of their money. But that this expression was so loose, it might be concealed forever from them, and might afford opportunities of misapplying the public money, and sheltering those who did it. He concluded it to be as exceptionable as any clause in so few words could be. [Emphasis added.] \23\ As had been the case in Philadelphia, Mason lost this debate. But, by raising the issue again, this time in public debate, he made a useful contribution to our understanding of the ``original intent'' behind this clause. We now know that the reason Congress was given this discretion was to protect ``matters which might require secrecy,'' that Mason acknowledged that secrecy was sometimes necessary in military and diplomatic matters, and that--even after he warned that this ``ambiguous'' language might allow Congress to keep some secret expenditures ``concealed forever''--Mason's colleagues at the Virginia convention were not persuaded to strengthen the clause and deny Congress this discretion. the early practice of confidential expenditures Of particular value in trying to understand the original constitutional scheme are the acts of the First Congress, elected in early 1789. Two-thirds of its twenty-two senators and fifty-nine representatives had either been members of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 or of state ratifying conventions, and only seven of them had opposed ratification. Therefore, their actions are entitled to special weight. As Chief Justice Marshall observed in 1821, in trying to determine the intent of the Founding Fathers ``[g]reat weight has always been attached, and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous exposition.'' \24\ It is therefore noteworthy that the First Congress appropriated a ``contingent fund'' of $40,000--a considerable sum at the time \25\--for the President to use for special diplomatic agents and other sensitive foreign affairs needs. The statute expressly provided: ``The President shall account specifically for all such expenditures of the said money as in his judgment may be made public, and also for the amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable not to specify.'' \26\ Note the language here--the President was not required to account to Congress ``under injunction of secrecy'' for sensitive expenditures, he was required simply to inform Congress of the sums expended so that the fund could be replenished as necessary. Congress was not to be told the details, as the Founding Fathers had learned first hand the harm that could be done by ``leaks.'' It is perhaps worth noting that the contingent account was not only replenished, within three years it was increased to the level of one million dollars--much of it reportedly was used for such expenditures as bribing foreign officials and ransoming hostages.\27\ In this era of Boland Amendments and massive appropriations bills packed with ``conditions'' it may be difficult to realize that the Founding Fathers envisioned something quite different; but it is important, from time to time, to remind ourselves of the original plan. In an 1804 letter to Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, President Thomas Jefferson summarized the practice during the nation's first fifteen years: [[Page H4980]] ``The Constitution has made the Executive the organ for managing our intercourse with foreign nations. . . . The Executive being thus charged with the foreign intercourse, no law has undertaken to prescribe its specific duties. . . . [I]t has been the uniform opinion and practice that the whole foreign fund was placed by the Legislature on the footing of a contingent fund, in which they undertake no specifications, but leave the whole to the discretion of the president.'' \28\ When Jefferson used his contingent account to fund a paramilitary army of Greek and Arab mercenaries to invade Tripoli and pressure its Bey to surrender American hostages, no one seems to have complained that Congress was not informed in advance of the operation.\29\ Jefferson's successor, James Madison--a man of some familiarity with the meaning of the Constitution and its ``Statement and Account'' clause--found that he needed additional funds to underwrite a covert action to gain control over disputed territory between Georgia and Spanish Florida in 1811, so he asked Congress to enact a ``secret appropriation'' of $100,000 for that purpose. The need for secrecy having passed, the secret appropriation was discretely made public years later, in 1818.\30\ The modern practice arguably dates back to 1941,\31\ but official congressional sanction was provided by the Central Intelligence Act of 1949.\32\ Over the years a variety of efforts have been made to change the practice, without success.\33\ The political forces behind the current effort are considerable--but so much of the rhetoric is premised upon the need to ``obey the Constitution'' that it is difficult to gave the sentiment on policy grounds alone. In reality, these constitutional concerns are ill founded. The record behind Article 1, Section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution--whether viewed on the basis of ``original intent'' or with the gloss of historic practice--clearly establishes that Congress is not required to publish either an aggregate figure of the money it makes available to the Intelligence Community or a more detailed accounting at this time. All of these sums, I gather, have been taken from the Treasury ``in consequence of appropriations made by law''-- and most apparently have been identified already in broad terms to the public as appropriations for purposes of national security or national defense. James Mason, to be sure, objected to the argument that the need for ``secrecy'' required that Congress be left with discretion in this area; but in both the federal and state conventions he made his case and failed to carry the day. The First Congress appropriated a contingent fund for which the President did not even have to disclose his expenditures to Congress; and Madison himself--the ``father'' of our Constitution and the author of the successful amendment to the ``Statement and Account'' clause--sought and received a ``secret appropriation'' that was not revealed to the public for many years. the view from the federal judiciary Any remaining doubts which might exist should be put to rest by a review of the handling of this issue by federal courts. The issue came before the Supreme Court in United States v. Richardson,\34\ but the Court found it unnecessary to reach the merits because the Complainant lacked standing. However, in the course of his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger reasoned in a footnote: ``Although we need not reach or decide precisely what is meant by `a regular Statement and Account,' it is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest. . . . While the available evidence is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively conclusive, historical analysis of the genesis of cl. 7 suggests that it was intended to permit some degree of secrecy of governmental operations. . . . ``Not controlling, but surely not unimportant, are nearly two centuries of acceptance of a reading of cl. 7 as vesting in Congress plenary power to spell out the details of precisely when and with what specificity Executive agencies must report the expenditures of appropriated funds and to exempt certain secret activities from comprehensive public reporting.'' [Emphasis added.] \35\ Even more significant is the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeal's 1980 decision in Halperin v. Central Intelligence Agency,\36\ a very useful case for which we are indebted to Mr. Stern's predecessor at the ACLU, my litigious friend Morton Halperin. Following the Supreme Court's holding in Richardson, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court's summary judgment in favor of the CIA. But it went further, addressing the case on the merits, and holding in the alternative that ``Congress and the President have discretion, not reviewable by the courts, to require secrecy for expenditures of the type involved in this case.'' \37\ The Halperin court engaged in a detailed review of Madison's Notes and the state convention debates, concluding that: ``Madison's language strongly indicates that he believed that the Statement and Account Clause, following his amendment, would allow government authorities ample discretion to withhold some expenditure items which require secrecy.'' \38\ While noting George Mason's argument that ``he did not conceive that the receipts and expenditures of the public money ought ever to be concealed,'' \39\ the court concluded: ``But the Statement and Account Clause, as adopted and ratified, incorporates the view not of Mason, but rather of his opponents, who desired discretionary secrecy for the expenditures as well as the related operations. . . . ``Viewed as a whole, the debates in the Constitutional Convention and the Virginia ratifying convention convey a very strong impression that the Framers of the Statement and Account Clause intended it to allow discretion to Congress and the President to preserve secrecy for expenditures related to military operations and foreign negotiations. Opponents of the `from time to time' provision, it is clear, spoke of precisely this effect from its enactment. We have no record of any statements from supporters of the Statement and Account Clause indicating an intent to require disclosure of such expenditures.''\40\ Since the Supreme Court elected not to address the issue on the merits in Richardson, the Halperin case remains the authoritative judicial interpretation on this subject. opinion of the attorney general Finally, Mr. Chairman, although I have not seen it, I understand that Attorney General Griffin Bell was asked by President Carter to consider this issue in depth and to prepare an opinion for the President. He concluding that the current Intelligence Community funding practices are not in conflict with the Constitution.\41\ issue of policy Mr. Chairman, I believe that the text of the Constitution, the clear intentions of the Founding Fathers, and more than two centuries of consistent practice, support the conclusion that the current practice of concealing appropriations for intelligence activities in the budgets of other agencies is constitutional. As I have indicated, that conclusion has the support of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and, I am informed, of the Office of the Attorney General. I believe you may rest comfortably on this point, and the only reasons for departing from traditional disclosure practice would be of a policy nature. At this time I would like to turn briefly to some of those considerations. a presumption of disclosure Perhaps first of all, in a free society there ought to be a presumption in favor of openness and the diffusion of knowledge and information. This may reflect my parochial prejudices as a product of Mr. Jefferson's University, but I am reminded both of his caution against trying to remain ``ignorant and free,'' \42\ and more directly his statement that the University of Virginia would be ``based on the illimitable freedom of the human mind,'' and would not be ``afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it.'' \43\ overcoming the presumption Having said that, I would argue that the most compelling arguments to overcome that presumption of openness are those legitimately based upon the security of the nation. As John Jay noted in Federalist No. 3, ``Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first.'' \44\ Similarly, the Supreme Court noted in Haig v. Agee that ``it is `obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.'' \45\ comity and deference to the president In addition, I urge you to recognize that the management of intelligence matters was recognized by the Founding Fathers to be at the core of the President's responsibilities; and, toward this end, I would urge you not to decide to disclose these figures if the President asks that they be kept confidential. To do otherwise would depart from two centuries of precedent. I don't know the preferences of the current Administration on this issue, but I urge you to give them the weight that comity among the branches would warrant. balancing the interests Ultimately, if the President does not object, I would suggest that you apply a balancing test in reaching your decision. You are entertaining a motion to depart from a practice dating back in some respects to the earliest days of our country, and in others to the creation of the agencies you are charged with overseeing. The proponents of change ought to be expected to justify a departure from these well- established practices--and their constitutional arguments are unpersuasive. Ask yourselves first, what real benefit to the American people or our system of government will likely result from disclosing the aggregate intelligence budget. How meaningful will this one figure be to our citizens? Presumably the sums are already disclosed under the broad ``National Defense'' budgetary category. Will any identifiable good be served by publicly identifying a portion of that larger sum as being earmarked for ``intelligence and intelligence-related activities?'' Would the result of these efforts not be, to borrow from the argument Rufus King made in objecting to a mandatory annual statements, ``such general statements as would afford no satisfactory information.'' \46\ an aggregate figure will not satisfy the critics You can be certain that releasing a single, aggregate figure will not satisfy those who are demanding meaningful information [[Page H4981]] about the Intelligence Community. In 1974 a student note in the New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, for example, concluded that ``Not only may the Constitution mandate the reporting of CIA expenditures to Congress as a whole, but it may even require publication of the CIA budget.'' \47\ Similarly, a 1975 note in the Yale Law Journal argued that ``Even a lump-sum appropriation and disclosure would prevent both Congress and the public from fixing or analyzing internal priorities within the CIA; it would also be impossible to determine if there has been waste, corruption, or spending prohibited by statute or by the Constitution.'' \48\ The observation would seem sound, and once you start releasing details it will probably become more difficult to draw any bright lines. Ultimately, the very existence of a separate intelligence committee may be called into doubt as your colleagues and the critics demand more and more details and become frustrated with your inexplicably selective cooperation. exposing your budget to ``shark'' attacks It strikes me that the most likely result of such a disclosure from the standpoint of the American taxpayer is that this large chunk of money will become highly vulnerable to attack as the budgetary belt is tightened. While Americans may overwhelmingly favor having an effective intelligence service and a strong defense establishment, when it comes down to your being pressured to cut jobs and benefits programs in your districts or taking a few million here and there from this gross ``intelligence'' account--money which will have little clearly identifiable short-term benefits to constituent groups--the intelligence budget is going to be placed at risk. And then, I suspect, you are going to be asked to ``justify'' such a large budget--and you are either going to have to start ``telling secrets'' or you will face amendments to cut your aggregate budget by 2% here and 3% there so the money can go for health care, education, and other special interests that have far more extensive and effective PR operations than do the agencies you are charged with overseeing. I don't think any of us want to have the CIA or NSA ``propagandizing'' the American voters to pressure Congress for adequate funding; and because of that handicap I suggest that you have a special responsibility to the American people not to allow their intelligence services to be compromised in order to appease more politically powerful special interest groups. Candidly, I don't see much in the way of identifiable benefits from disclosing the current aggregate Intelligence Community budget. Perhaps they are there--but the burden of proof ought to be placed upon those who are advocating the change. intelligence community budget figures ought eventually to be made public This is not to say, however, that these figures ought to remain perpetual secrets. On the contrary, I can think of no reason why the sums made available to the Central Intelligence Agency and other components of the Intelligence Community in the 1940s, 1950, and 1960s ought not be made public at this time (if that has not already been done). I don't know whether the delay ought to be three decades, two decades, or even less--but I would be inclined to defer to the judgment of the President and the DCI in making such a policy decision. lives and freedom are at stake Finally, if you can identify genuine benefits to the American people of disclosing this information, you need to ask what harm might reasonably be foreseen to result from such a change--and to weight any such harm against the perceived benefits. Perhaps I am in the minority today, but I believe that when the security of the nation may be at stake we ought to act with a presumption of caution and secrecy. The fact that the rest of the world follows that practice is not proof of its wisdom--but it should give us justification to pause, at least briefly, before moving off in a radically new direction. Some experts have argued what has been called the ``conspicuous bump theory''--suggesting that a foreign intelligence service might be able to confirm the existence of an expensive new program or technology by spotting a change in the CIA or Intelligence Community budget. Former DCI William Colby--a man of great wisdom and integrity, who has decades of relevant experience on which to judge--has suggested that the introduction of the U-2 program produced just such a ``bump'' in our budget.\49\ I am not privy to the future plans of the Intelligence Community or the current details of its budget, and I can certainly not identify any particular development that might be compromised by publishing an aggregate figure--but I can certainly conceive of such a development. Indeed, I can conceive of a decision of such a development. Indeed, I can conceive of a decision by the United States to curtail intelligence spending dramatically--requiring the termination of programs in many Third World countries--and I can project that public release of figures showing a dramatic drop in funding might well lead a potentially hostile foreign leader to conclude that he no longer needed to abide by his NPT commitments because the Americans no longer had adequate resources to keep good track of his activities. the intelligence ``jig-saw puzzle'' The business of intelligence gathering is in many respects much like putting together a jig-saw puzzle. If you are looking at the United States, you certainly want to subscribe to the Congressional Record and Aviation Week & Space Technology, and also to attend scientific conferences and carefully review the latest Statistical Abstract and some of the thousands of other government publications that might reveal some of the many pieces to the puzzle. When you see areas where you are missing key pieces, perhaps you pay off a secretary, seduce a file clerk, break in to a hotel room while an international conference is in session to rifle a briefcase or two, and perhaps eavesdrop on a few million telephone calls. Much of your efforts are fruitless, but more and more of the puzzle falls into place as each week goes by. The ones that remain ``critically important'' are the ones you do not have. That makes the counter-intelligence function a difficult one; because, without knowing what pieces of the puzzle one's adversaries have already acquired, it is virtually impossible to identify any size piece as being ``vital'' to U.S. security interests. And yet, quite possibly, almost any single piece of the puzzle could be the critical part that allows our enemies to break an important code and do us harm. Thus, the tradition has developed that the intelligence business ought, even in a democracy, be cloaked in a web of secrecy. Over the years, this Committee and your Senate counterpart have taken testimony from a number of former DCIs and other experts asking what specific harm they could identify that would result from disclosing the aggregate intelligence budget. Many, if not most, of them, I gather, have said they could not point to clearly identifiable harm. Others have urged you not to make the figures public. I wonder if it might have been useful to ask them another question. Ask them how much they would pay to have the annual aggregate intelligence budget figures for countries like the former Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, or North Korea. Would these figures be of interest to them? Might the trends in these figures over a decade or more be helpful to them? If they say ``no,'' then I would be less concerned. Conclusion Mr. Chairman, let me close with the observation that this is an important issue. Other than making us feel good--a byproduct, perhaps, of the strange but all too prevalent belief that keeping secrets from our nation's enemies is somehow ``un-American,'' ``dirty,'' or even ``evil''--I don't believe that publishing the aggregate intelligence budget is going to benefit very many Americans. It may make a few super hawks feel relieved that we are throwing enough money at the problem,\50\ I suspect Oliver Stone and others who believe that the United States is an evil force in the world may buy a few extra cases of Malox, and some of your constituents may even accept the allegation that you will have somehow ``saved the Constitution'' \51\ by passing such a disclosure requirement. But most Americans simply don't know enough about the Intelligence business, about how this money is actually being spent, to be able to evaluate a figure presumably in the tens of billions of dollars. The most likely consequence of publishing an unsupported aggregate figure is that it will become a sitting duck for colleagues seeking accounts to cut in order to satisfy the demands of special interest constituent groups without further adding to the deficit. You will then be forced to choose between further breaking down the intelligence budget--and then being asked, at minimum, to provide public justification for any future increases--or watching the very important sum of money you are charged with overseeing ripped apart as some of your colleagues go on a feeding frenzy. Members of Congress who do not understand the important business of intelligence--and, equally importantly, who know that this large account can't be publicly defended without disclosing details that its champions will not wish to reveal to our nation's enemies--are likely to argue that their pet ``pork'' project can easily be funded by just taking a few hundred thousand dollars from this vast ``intelligence'' account--charging the DCI with finding a little more ``fat'' to trim from his presumably bloated bureaucracy. It could give a whole new meaning to the term ``graymail''--defend your budget on the merits in public by compromising secrets, or watch large chunks of it vanish before your eyes. The Intelligence Community could easily suffer the fate of the prized sausage the fabled German butcher is said to have left displayed unguarded on his counter while he swept out one afternoon. He returned to find that a tiny slice had been taken while he was away; but, noting its small size, he concluded it really didn't matter all that much. An hours later, when he returned from his storeroom, he found another piece was gone. This continued for several days. Each missing slice, after all, was quite modest in size and could hardly be said to have destroyed the value of the whole. Little by little, the prized sausage vanished. Pretty soon, only a small piece of string was left--and that wasn't worth fighting for either. In a very real sense, the Intelligence Community budget is as defenseless as the sausage in the fable. We don't want the CIA ``propagandizing'' the public to pressure Congress for additional funds, and we know they can't discuss the important details of their work without harming their effectiveness even if they wanted to do so. They provide [[Page H4982]] ``services'' to Americans of incalculable value, by helping to keep the world peaceful and identifying threats to our security sufficiently early that we can address them without having to expend the lives of our young men and women in uniform. Thanks to our Intelligence Community, we learned about the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, and about dangerous nuclear weapons and ballistic missile threats from North Korea three decades later. Each of you could probably add numerous other examples, because you have been entrusted with special access to information that must be denied to the rest of us. But, when the sharks come, you will be precluded by your promise of secrecy from mentioning those examples in public debate. How can you possibly expect to convince your colleagues not to earmark a couple of hundred thousand dollars for a new public building to honor the beloved Tip O'Neil, a few million dollars for a powerful committee chairman's favorite hospital--perhaps to fund some promising AIDS research--or perhaps to pay for the unanticipated earthquake relief needs in Los Angeles? It would not surprise me if some of your constituents would vote to shut down the entire Intelligence Community if the money saved could rescue one small child trapped in a well, to ease the suffering on a pediatric cancer ward, or to take a real ``bite'' out of crime. After all, the Cold War is over--and many Americans couldn't find North Korea on a map without great effort. One of the nice things about being outside the policy process is that most Americans don't have to worry about long-term strategic solvency or the risks that lurk around the corner in an increasingly complex and not yet safe world. They elected you to represent them in deciding how to allocate the nation's limited resources, and in this regard I would remind you of the famous 1774 speech to the Electors of Bristol, in which Edmund Burke observed: ``Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.'' Because of your membership on this important Committee, you have a special duty--not only to the constituents in your individual districts, but to all of the American people--to oversee and pass judgment upon the work of the Intelligence Community. This system has worked well, in general, by having your colleagues rely upon you to make recommendations based upon the special information to which you are given access. Most of your colleagues hesitate to second-guess your judgments, because they know they lack your expertise. Simply gratuitously tossing out an aggregate budget sum--a figure presumably in the tens of billions of dollars--may well break some of the mystique that has helped guard these critically important funds from the sharks in the past. As I have said, the potential consequences are great. Imagine the lives that might have been saved had we been able to prevent the Pearl Harbor surprise attack. Consider what might have happened had we not learned of the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. How many more Americans might have died in the gulf during Operation Desert Storm had it not been for the information we were able to gain from our overhead platforms? Information provided by the American Intelligence Community reportedly helped to convince the International Atomic Energy Agency that North Korea was violating its treaty commitments under the NPT--and that may allow us to avoid a nuclear confrontation in East Asia that could either engulf U.S. forces in South Korea or, in the alternative, provoke Japan to become a nuclear weapons State and undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As we meet here today, American intelligence assets are presumably monitoring the efforts by Libya to build new poison gas facilities that could fuel further terrorism and undermine our interests and the cause of peace in the coming years. Mr. Chairman, the job which you and your colleagues on this Committee have accepted is not an easy one. Today, the American people are still rejoicing at the end of the Cold War. They are turning inward, looking for ``peace dividends.'' But you have a greater responsibility than simply pandering to their short-term desires. You must decide what national resources ought to be allocated to the intelligence functions, and then you must try to protect those funds in a very competitive budget process. If you err, and the nation is left unprotected, American soldiers may well pay with their lives for your frugality. The stakes in this game are high: they are measured in human lives and individual freedom. In this regard, you may wish to keep in mind that the American people are not very forgiving when their elected representatives fail in their duty to protect the nation's security--even when their actions are initially fully in accord with the public opinion polls. Few of the isolationists who tied President Roosevelt's hands in the 1930s in the name of ``peace'' and ``neutrality'' survived the elections following Pearl Harbor, an event which itself might have been prevented by a serious national intelligence collection effort.\52\ In the backlash to Watergate and Vietnam two decades ago, the American public turned against the Intelligence Community--egged on, I would add, by irresponsible charges from the Hill that the CIA had become a ``rogue elephant.'' \53\ Our elected representatives responded by cutting back on funding and reducing intelligence assets in several areas--in particular we reduced money for HUMINT in such ``unimportant'' areas as El Salvador. I need not emphasize that by 1981 that cutback had proven to be a costly mistake--both in terms of undermining our efforts to assist a neighbor resist an externally-supported Leninist insurgency and our campaign for important human rights objectives. When Iranian militants seized American hostages in Tehran in 1979, the American people wanted quick action. Support for the CIA shot up dramatically in the polls. Some of the reductions that had been made in the mid-seventies seemed hard to explain, and the voters turned out an administration in Washington that had, for the most part, been very much in tune with the neo-isolationist sentiments of the Nation prior to the ``wake up call'' from the Ayatollah Khomeini The Cold War is now over, but, if anything, the world is a far more complex reality than was the case when Moscow held the strings to many of its problem children. The existence of radical regimes like those in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, the Sudan--to name a few--combined with the growth of ultra nationalism in Eastern Europe, the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and our own obvious vulnerability to international terrorism, make it more important than ever for us to have a strong and effective Intelligence Community. Human lives are at stake in the decisions you make--not only those of our soldiers, but also those of secretaries and office workers who may find themselves in situations like the World Trade Center bombing. You invited me here to address the rather technical question of whether the Constitution requires the publication of an aggregate budget figure for the Intelligence Community. My answer is that it clearly does not--a view consistent with more than two centuries of established practice, and one shared by the federal judiciary and at least the Carter Administration's Justice Department. In contrast, it is worth noting that in 1977, when your colleagues in the Senate studied this issue and concluded that the aggregate budget should be released, they relied upon three law review articles (all written in the wake of Watergate and the emotions of the Church and Pike Committee investigations) in concluding that ``the legal commentators outside the government who have studied this clause and publicly commented have concluded that it requires disclosure of at least an aggregate figure for intelligence activities.'' \54\ What they did not disclose--and what most of the Senators quite probably did not realize--is that each of the three law review articles were nothing more than ``Notes'' written by law students.\55\ The Constitution clearly does not require you to release current aggregate appropriation figures for the intelligence community at this time. Whether to do so is entirely within the discretion of the Congress. That leaves you with the policy question of whether to publish such a figure for other reasons. For the reasons already stated, I urge you to consider the pros and cons of that issue very carefully before making a decision. I honestly believe it would prove to be a tragic mistake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my statement. footnotes \1\ Perhaps the most detailed public account I have seen to date is TIM WEINER, BLANK CHECK: THE PENTAGON'S BLACK BUDGET (1990). \2\ 50 U.S.C.A. Sec. 403 f (a). \3\ Douglas P. Elliott, Cloak and Ledger: Is CIA Funding Constitutional?, 2 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 717, 731-32 (1975). \4\ I have not had time to search to see if such polls have been taken, but I recall that during the height of the Gulf War the polls showed overwhelming support for the restrictions placed by the military upon the press. \5\ The ``Church Committee' concluded ``that publication of the aggregate figure for national intelligence would begin to satisfy the Constitutional requirement and would not damage the national security.'' Quoted in, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON WHETHER DISCLOSURE OF FUNDS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 2 (95th Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Rep't 95-274 (1977). The ``Rockefeller Commission'' identified this as an issue warranting congressional consideration. COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 81 (1975). There have also been several ``Notes,'' written by law students, reaching this conclusion. See, e.g., Fiscal Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency: Can Accountability and Confidentiality Coexist?, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POLITICS 493 (1974); The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution, 84 YALE L. J. 608 (1975); and Douglas P. Elliott, Cloak and Ledger: Is CIA Funding Constitutional?, 2 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 717 (1975). \6\ Presumably every school child is familiar with Jefferson's famous maxim that, ``If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be.'' 14 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 384 (Mem ed. 1903). Only slightly less popular is Madison's warning that ``A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.'' 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1910). \7\ 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 392 (1904-14). \8\ ``Verbal statement of Thomas Story to the Committee,'' 2 P. FORCE, AMERICAN ARCHIVES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES, Fifth Series, 818-19 (1837-53). For reasons of readability, I have departed from the practice of italicizing most of the proper nouns followed in the original. \9\ Id. at 819. [[Page H4983]] \10\ Id. \11\ An excellent discussion of this period is contained in HENRY MERRITT WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 18-22 (1929). \12\ Id. at 23. The internal quotation is cited to a letter from Jay to Thomas Jefferson (then Minister to Paris) dated 24 April 1787. \13\ The FEDERALIST, No. 64 at 434-35 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961) (J. Jay) (emphasis added). Jay's contribution to understanding the Constitution in this essay can not be understated. Discussing Jay's subsequent role in explaining the meaning of the Constitution--and, specifically, this essay--University of Washington Professor Arthur Bestor (hardly a champion of strong executive power) has observed: ``In this contribution to the Federalist Jay was of course examining the completed Constitution, not offering suggestions to those about to frame it. As an interpretation of the original intent of the document. Jay's essay is of the highest importance. His diplomatic experience commencing with his appointment as minister to Spain in 1779; followed by his participation, as one of the commissioners, in the negotiation of peace with Great Britain; and continuing, from 1784 on, with his service as Secretary of the United States for the department of Foreign Affairs--fitted him better than anyone else to judge the intended effect of the new Constitution both on the actual process of negotiation and on the character of the relationship that would have to be maintained between executive and legislative authorities.'' Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs, 4 SEATON HALL L. REV. 527, 532-33 (1974). Professor Gordon Baldwin concludes: ``John Jay, an experienced attorney and diplomat, suggested that intelligence gathering arrangements are within the sole power of the President. In his view, they are a purely executive function linked to the treaty negotiation process, and the information so gained need not be reported to Congress.'' Gordon Baldwin, Congressional Power to Demand Disclosure of Foreign Intelligence Agreements, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1, 17 (1976). \14\ Federalist No. 64. \15\ The Complete Anas of Thomas Jefferson 72-73 (Franklin B. Sawvel, ed. 1903). This document also appears in 1 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 191 (Paul Ford, ed., 1892). \16\ The Convention was to begin on the second Monday in May (14 May), but a quorum did not arrive until the 25th. \17\ 1 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 15 (1966). \18\ Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention 167 (1966). \19\ Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 17, at xv. \20\ James Madison, 2 ``The Journal of the Constitutional Convention,'' in 4 The Writings of James Madison 456-57 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1903). With only minor changes in punctuation and typography, this same debate appears in 2 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 618-19 (1966). \21\ 4 Writings of James Madison 449-50; 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 613. \22\ 3 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 326. \23\ Id. \24\ Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821). \25\ Not being privy to the budgetary figures for the Central Intelligence Agency I can not say with certainty, but I suspect this 1790 appropriation provided the President with a larger portion of the federal budget than is today allocated to the CIA. \26\ Act of 1 July 1790, 1 Stat. 129 (1790). \27\ Ed Sayle, The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1 International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9 (1986). \28\ 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 5, 9, 10 (Mem. ed. 1904). For a discussion of Jefferson's theory that the ``executive power'' clause of Article II, section 1, had vested in the President the entire business of external intercourse save for the expressed grants to Congress and the Senate (such as the power of the Senate to approve nominations and treaties, and the veto given Congress over a decision to initiate an offensive ``war'')--a view shared by Washington, Hamilton, Jay, Marshall, and others--see ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 47-107 (1991). \29\ I discuss this incident in some detail in a forthcoming book. \30\ 3 Stat. 471 (1818). \31\ President Roosevelt appointed ``Wild Bill'' Donovan as ``Coordinator of Information''--which led directly to the OSS and CIA--on 18 June of that year, and funding for the Manhattan Project apparently began around 9 October. See TIM WEINER, BLANK CHECK: THE PENTAGON'S BLACK BUDGET 19, 113 (1990). \32\ 63 Stat 208, Pub. L. 81-110, codified at 50 U.S.C.A. Sec. 403 et seq. \33\ The most noteworthy of these, perhaps, was the effort by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to change the practice in 1977. While a majority of the committee voted for that end, the dispute was apparently so heated that no one brought the measure to the floor. \34\ 418 U.S. 166 (1974). \35\ 418 U.S. at 178 n.11. \36\ 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Another useful case from the same circuit is Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d. 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in which the court rejected on standing grounds a similar challenge brought by a Member of Congress, and in the process concluded with respect to the ``regular Statement and Account'' clause: ``This clause is not self-defining and Congress has plenary power to give meaning to the provision. . . . Since Congressional power is plenary with respect to the definition of the appropriations process and reporting requirements, the legislature is free to establish exceptions to this general framework, as has been done with respect to the CIA.'' Id. at 194-95. \37\ 629 F.2d at 162. \38\ Id. at 155. \39\ Id. \40\ Id. at 156. \41\ Letter from President Carter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, quoted in SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON WHETHER DISCLOSURE OF FUNDS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST at 6. \42\ Quoted supra, note 6. \43\ 15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 303 (Mem. ed. 1903). \44\ Federalist No. 3 at 13-14 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). \45\ 453 U.S. 280 (1981). \46\ See supra, text accompanying note 20. \47\ Fiscal Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency: Can Accountability and Confidentiality Coexist?, 7 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Politics 493, 521 (1974). \48\ The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution, 84 YALE L. J. 608, 633 n.137 (1975). Keep in mind that the Church Committee said ``publication of the aggregate figure . . . would begin to satisfy the Constitutional requirement . . . [emphasis added].'' See supra, note 5. \49\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Whether Disclosure of Funds for the Intelligence Activities of the United States is In the Public Interest 8. \50\ Without further details, no one will be able to make an intelligent judgment about the wisdom of the expenditures contained in the aggregate figure; and I predict that if you do release such a figure you will be forced to break it down further (at least by agency or category) within a few years. \51\ If your primary interest is in upholding the Constitution, I can suggest any of a number of measures Congress might take toward that end--such as repealing the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which even Senator George Mitchell admits is unconstitutional, or repealing some of the hundreds of new ``legislative vetoes'' that have been enacted after the 1983 Supreme Court decision (INS. v. Chadha) declaring such measures to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution: Restoring the Rule of Law in U.S. Foreign Policy (1991). \52\ See, e.g., 95 Cong. Rec. 1948 (1949) (remarks by Sen. Tydings), cited in Douglas P. Elliott, Cloak and Ledger: Is CIA Funding Constitutional?, 2 Hast. Const. L.Q. 717, 729 (1975). \53\ To be sure, the Intelligence Community engaged in activities that most of us today would consider improper--but even Senator Church ultimately acknowledged that the ``rogue elephant'' metaphor he coined was inaccurate and the Community has been following instructions from the nation's elected political leaders. \54\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Whether Disclosure of Funds for the Intelligence Activities of the United States Is in the Public Interest at 4 n.6. \55\ The student Notes in question are cited supra, note 5. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the situations where there is a lot of misinformation, a lot of perception, a lot of misperception frankly. There clearly is a slippery slope here, because the gentleman from Michigan's amendment talks about the annual statement of the total amount for intelligence expenditures. The problem with that is that if we give a number and we say these are intelligence expenditures, then we have to start defining what is intelligence. It is not exactly what other people think it is going to be. We will have to start paring out different programs and different functions to determine what we mean. Are you talking about the amount we spend on national security? That should surely be a big number. It is required in the Constitution. That is something the Federal Government does. Are we talking about the intelligence function in national security? And if so, what does that number mean and what specifically does it include and what does it leave out? What is intelligence? Is the State Department gathering of information or reading Le Figaro, is that part of intelligence? Is that open source intelligence or not? You have to start making further descriptions and definitions. That is the slippery slope. Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington. Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think this bill is intelligence. We are the ones that just authorized it. So that is pretty much what it is. Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I quite agree. The gentlewoman from California said one of the worst kept secrets in Washington is the intelligence budget. One of the worst kept secrets in Washington is, what is the intelligence part of the intelligence budget? What is the intelligence part of the defense budget? Some have said that we are hiding something from Americans. We are not trying to hide anything from Americans. We are trying to keep some secrets from our enemies. That is true. We are trying to do that. But I would point out to those who say we are trying to hide something from Americans, we have a representative form of government. This is democracy at its finest in the world. Those of us here represent those of us abroad in our land. Those of us on the committee are charged with the responsibility of oversight. It was not always such good oversight. It is very good oversight now, and we are accountable. I would say we are hiding nothing from the Americans because there is no American that I would look at right in the eye and say, we are spending the money as wisely and as well as we can and as appropriately as we can. Fifteen men and women, good and true, making that decision about what our intelligence needs are at this time, I have no problem with that. I think that is entirely reasonable. When I go beyond that and start talking about specifics, I start removing some of the confusion the enemy seize out there. I think confusion to [[Page H4984]] our enemies is not a bad thing. It is somewhat Biblical, in fact. I think it has worked very well over in the past. I do not see the game. If it is accountability, the accountability is there. We already have it. The final point of the gentlewoman from California, the President is somehow waiting for the signal; whoever made that statement, perhaps it was not the gentlewoman from California, let me tell my colleagues that it was President Clinton himself who classified the number when he sent his budget submission to Congress in March. It was not the Congress. We do not have the authority to classify anything. It is the executive branch that classifies things. We are putting money in our bill to examine the question of declassification because we are properly concerned about it. That also in my view means abuse of classification. I know that takes place. So I would suggest the right way to deal with this is to go to the comprehensive study we have called for in our bill, that we have provided for in our bill, authorized funds for and I hope we will get those funds from the appropriators, and I believe we are and that we proceed in an orderly way. That way we protect national security. We provide for accountability. And we give the President and his people the opportunity to chime in on the debate. Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Conyers amendment. Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Conyers amendment to H.R. 1775, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997. There is no reason for the intelligence budget to be classified information. How can we justify a multibillion--or is it more--blank check every year without adequate oversight and minimum public discussion? If this Congress is serious about balancing the budget, we should not throw money into an unaccountable hole. Since almost all of the intelligence spending is hidden within the defense budget, we are misled about the real amount of intelligence spending through false line items in the defense budget. We must have budget integrity. The intelligence budget is routinely reported by the media without compromising national security. When the Government keeps this open secret clandestinely hidden, the American public grows increasingly cynical about their Government. I believe that our intelligence community could better justify the funding they receive from Congress with a disclosed budget. In the same vein, the intelligence community could help to balance the budget by submitting their funding to the same scrutiny faced by domestic priorities. This amendment is about accountability and the public's right to know. There is no reason to keep this information from a full and open debate. I urge my colleagues to support the Conyers amendment. Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Conyers amendment to declassify the size of our Nation's intelligence budget. It makes no sense to keep the size of our intelligence budget a secret. It would not threaten our national security. Several former Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency and the bipartisan Brown- Aspin Commission have agreed that disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget would not reduce our Nation's security. In fact, many other countries disclose the amount they spend on intelligence, with no impact on their own nation's security. But what such secrecy does do is keep our own citizens in the dark. At a time when so many programs are being drastically reduced in the name of deficit reduction, the American taxpayer isn't even told how much is being spent on intelligence programs. I am a proud cosponsor of H.R. 753, the Intelligence Budget Accountability Act, which would declassify the aggregate intelligence budget. This is long overdue, and I urge adoption of the Conyers amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act to accomplish this important goal. The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers]. The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it. Recorded Vote Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. A recorded vote was ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 192, noes 237, not voting 5, as follows: [Roll No. 254] AYES--192 Abercrombie Ackerman Allen Andrews Baesler Baldacci Barcia Barrett (WI) Becerra Bentsen Berman Berry Blagojevich Blumenauer Bonior Borski Boswell Boucher Boyd Brown (CA) Brown (FL) Brown (OH) Capps Carson Chabot Chenoweth Christensen Clay Clayton Clement Clyburn Condit Conyers Costello Coyne Crapo Cummings Danner Davis (FL) Davis (IL) DeFazio DeGette Delahunt DeLauro Dellums Deutsch Dicks Dingell Dixon Doggett Dooley Duncan Ensign Eshoo Evans Farr Fattah Fazio Filner Flake Foglietta Ford Fox Frank (MA) Frost Furse Gejdenson Gephardt Gonzalez Goode Goodlatte Gordon Green Gutierrez Hall (TX) Hamilton Harman Hastings (FL) Hefner Hilliard Hinchey Hinojosa Hooley Horn Istook Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Johnson (WI) Johnson, E. B. Kanjorski Kennedy (MA) Kennedy (RI) Kennelly Kildee Kilpatrick Kind (WI) Kleczka Kucinich LaFalce Lampson Lantos Leach Levin Lewis (GA) Lofgren Lowey Luther Maloney (CT) Maloney (NY) Manton Markey Martinez Matsui McCarthy (MO) McCarthy (NY) McDermott McGovern McHale McKinney McNulty Meehan Meek Menendez Metcalf Millender-McDonald Miller (CA) Minge Mink Moakley Moran (VA) Morella Nadler Neal Oberstar Obey Olver Owens Pallone Pascrell Pastor Paul Payne Pelosi Peterson (MN) Petri Pomeroy Poshard Price (NC) Rangel Reyes Riggs Rivers Roemer Rohrabacher Rothman Roybal-Allard Rush Sabo Sanchez Sanders Sawyer Schumer Scott Serrano Shays Sherman Skaggs Slaughter Smith, Adam Snyder Spratt Stabenow Stark Stenholm Stokes Strickland Stupak Tauscher Thompson Thurman Tierney Torres Traficant Turner Velazquez Vento Waters Watt (NC) Waxman Wexler Weygand Woolsey NOES--237 Aderholt Archer Armey Bachus Baker Ballenger Barr Barrett (NE) Bartlett Barton Bateman Bereuter Bilbray Bilirakis Bishop Bliley Blunt Boehlert Boehner Bonilla Bono Brady Bryant Bunning Burr Burton Buyer Callahan Calvert Camp Campbell Canady Cannon Cardin Castle Chambliss Coble Coburn Collins Combest Cook Cooksey Cox Cramer Crane Cubin Cunningham Davis (VA) Deal DeLay Diaz-Balart Dickey Doolittle Doyle Dreier Dunn Ehlers Ehrlich Emerson Engel English Etheridge Everett Ewing Fawell Foley Forbes Fowler Franks (NJ) Frelinghuysen Gallegly Ganske Gekas Gibbons Gilchrest Gillmor Gilman Goodling Goss Graham Granger Greenwood Gutknecht Hall (OH) Hansen Hastert Hastings (WA) Hayworth Hefley Herger Hill Hilleary Hobson Hoekstra Holden Hostettler Houghton Hoyer Hulshof Hunter Hutchinson Hyde Inglis Jefferson Jenkins John Johnson (CT) Johnson, Sam Jones Kaptur Kasich Kelly Kim King (NY) Kingston Klink Klug Knollenberg Kolbe LaHood Largent Latham LaTourette Lazio Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder Lipinski Livingston LoBiondo Lucas Manzullo Mascara McCollum McCrery McDade McHugh McInnis McIntosh McIntyre McKeon Mica Miller (FL) Molinari Mollohan Moran (KS) Murtha Myrick Nethercutt Neumann Ney Northup Norwood Nussle Ortiz Oxley Packard Pappas Parker Paxon Pease Peterson (PA) Pickering Pickett Pitts Pombo Porter Portman Pryce (OH) Quinn Radanovich Rahall Ramstad Redmond Regula Riley Rodriguez Rogan Rogers Ros-Lehtinen Roukema Royce Ryun Salmon Sandlin Sanford Saxton Scarborough Schaefer, Dan Schaffer, Bob Sensenbrenner Sessions Shadegg Shaw Shimkus Shuster Sisisky Skeen Skelton Smith (MI) Smith (NJ) Smith (OR) Smith (TX) Smith, Linda Snowbarger Solomon Souder Spence Stearns Stump Sununu Talent Tanner Tauzin Taylor (MS) Taylor (NC) Thomas Thornberry Thune Tiahrt Upton Visclosky Walsh Wamp Watkins Watts (OK) Weldon (FL) Weldon (PA) Weller White Whitfield Wicker Wise Wolf Wynn Young (AK) Young (FL) [[Page H4985]] NOT VOTING--5 Bass Edwards Schiff Towns Yates {time} 1851 Mr. BOB SMITH of Oregon, Mr. BOB SCHAFFER of Colorado, and Mr. GILMAN changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.'' Mr. MANTON and Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.'' So the amendment was rejected. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.