OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRED THOMPSON
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
HEARING ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY
May 7, 1997
For centuries, governments have been preoccupied with keeping secrets. Information is power and those that have access to it are powerful. Our democratic nation, however, is founded on the principle that the people are sovereign and must be trusted with the power of information if they are to make informed choices. So open was our system that even information that ought to have been kept secret was for many years routinely made available. For example, the press was filled with news of troop movements during the Civil War, giving much information to the other side.The 20th century brought change to this openness, especially as the United States began to play a-larger role in world politics. In 1917, during the First World War, Congress passed the Espionage Act. Shortly after passage of that Act, the Bolsheviks overthrew the RussianGovernment and established the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, fear of Communist subversion ran deep, and the Espionage Act was used to target domestic groups feared to be subversive. A domestic national security apparatus sprang up.We all know that once a bureaucracy is created, it is awfully hard to kill off.
The Second World War thrust the United States into the forefront of world nations. During the war, it was obviously crucial to prevent sensitive information from getting into the hands of the enemy. Unlike during the Civil War, elaborate systems were put in place to guard against espionage and other means by which the Axis powers could uncover military plans, industrial production schedules, scientific experiments, and any other information that could help the enemy.
Again, bureaucracies being what they are, the national security apparatus designed to keep information secret only expanded after the war, rather than being reduced. We were facing a bipolar world, with one preeminent enemy, the Soviet Union. Perhaps more importantly, we had entered the nuclear age. Fifty years ago, in 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act,establishing our nation's foreign intelligence system.
The system for classifying information took its current form in 1951 through an executive order issued by President Truman in the exercise of the President's constitutional authority as commander-in-chief. There has never been a statutory basis for the national security classification system, except for nuclear secrets, which are subject to standards established by Congress in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Since President Truman, five successive executive orders have modified the formal secrecy standards used by the executive branch, and since 1978-only 19 yearsago--there have been three different executive orders issued revising the security system. I understand that the Clinton Administration is now considering modifications to its own 1993 executive order.
The world today is very different than it was in 1947 or 1951. The Cold War has ended. The Soviet Union has collapsed. The principles of democracy and openness have prevailed. In the wake of the Cold War, we have entered a period of rapid globalization. Foreign trade among all nations is surging. And from the Atomic Age we have moved to the Information Age. Computers store vast amounts of information and our communications systems make that information immediately available around the world. No longer is simple information the key to political and economic dominance. Today, dominance depends on the ability to analyze information and pull out what is important from what is not. And improved analysis comes not from suppressing information, but from making it widely available and subject to wide scrutiny.
I do not mean to imply that the post-Cold War world is no longer a dangerous place. Along with open trade in legitimate goods comes smuggling of drugs and nuclear materials. Terrorist groups groups link up with transnational criminal organizations and rogue nations to attack American interests and world stability. Some nations continue to engage ours as a potential enemy, economically and politically, if not militarily. A strong U.S. presence throughout the world is needed to combat these forces of international lawlessness. To support these vital interests, our nation must continue to rely on military and intelligence services that are second to none, and sensitive national security information must be kept secret.
At present, however, our national security apparatus is pervasive. It covers information within almost every agency of the government. In restricting access to and use of information, it functions no differently than any other form of government regulation. It imposes huge costs and burdens not just on government personnel but on private enterprises doing business with the government. According to the Information Security Oversight Off ice, the total annual cost ofefforts to preserve the security of sensitive national security information exceeds five billion dollars. Of course, these costs are borne by the taxpayer.
To review the entire system of government secrecy, Congress established the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy in 1994. Earlier this year, the Commission issued its final report, which reflects the consensus of the 12 commissioners. The report is carefully and thoughtfully written. It reflects the great care the commissioners took to balance the competing concerns of protecting national secrets within an open society.
Two points made in the report bear a brief comment, because they are so fundamental. First, as I already mentioned, we need to recognize that any secrecy system functions as a type of regulation and imposes costs on our society. As in other regulatory schemes, it is important that the benefits outweigh the costs. Congress needs to be a party to the weighing of the benefits and costs of the secrecy system, rather than relying solely on the executive to handle this decisionmaking process.
Second, the report notes the lack of accountability in the current system. No one has to stand up and take credit or blame for deciding that certain information ought to be secret. Documents do not reflect the name of the classifying official. This lack of accountability allows people to take the easy way out, which in this case leads to the classification of a great deal of information that is not truly sensitive. Part of the reason for the lack of accountability is the fact that the system has, with some exceptions, been operated pursuant to executive order rather than statute.
The Report makes some interesting recommendations that bear careful consideration. I understand that legislation is being introduced today in the Senate to reflect many of the statutory recommendations made by the Commission, and the Committee will want to give this legislation careful consideration, as it will no doubt raise many questions about standards, processes, and costs. The Committee expects to hold further hearings on this legislation.
The Committee is honored to have several distinguished witnesses today to discuss the work of the Commission and its recommendations. I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses and to working with them and others to improve the current system. It is time to construct a better system for protecting genuinely sensitive information at reduced cost while reducing the over-classification of information that is not truly sensitive.