105th Congress Rept. 105-135
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
_______
June 18, 1997.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[excerpts]
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 1775]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 1775) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
[...]
Committee Findings and Recommendations
The Committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 1998 budget, carrying out its annual responsibility
to prepare an authorization based on close examination of
intelligence programs and proposed expenditures. The review
continued to reflect the Committee's belief that intelligence
activities must be examined by function as well as by program,
thus, was structured across program lines and intelligence
disciplines and themes. The Committee held seven full Committee
budget-related hearings and two Subcommittee budget hearings on
the following issues: Intelligence Requirements; Airborne
Reconnaissance; Technical Intelligence; Overhead Collection;
Human Intelligence; Covert Action; Analysis and Production;
Counterintelligence; and Personnel and Legislative Issues. The
Committee also held full Committee briefings on subjects such
as the Future Imagery Architecture, Unconventional SIGNINT
Capabilities, and some selected sensitive DoD collection
platforms. There were, in addition, over 100 staff briefings on
programs, specific activities and budget requests.
The Committee continued to place heavy emphasis on
understanding and addressing the future needs of the
Intelligence Community, and the several distinct roles that it
plays in national security. At the national level, the goal of
intelligence is to make the national-level policy maker and
decision maker aware of impending events so that appropriate
actions are taken, especially those than might avoid or contain
conflict. At the other end of the spectrum, intelligence is now
incorporated into the very fiber of tactical military
operational activities, whether forces are being utilized to
conduct humanitarian missions or are engaged in full-scale
conflict. To serve national security objectives, the
Intelligence Community must act throughout the spectrum. Too
often, however, the Intelligence Community has not maintained a
balance between the diverse strategic and tactical demands it
now faces and will face in the future. Specifically, in recent
years, the Community has emphasized fleeting current
intelligence issues, often at the expense of keeping a watchful
eye on those areas that are likely to be tomorrow crises. The
Committee believes that a balance must be reached and
maintained.
The value and necessity of intelligent are such now that
intelligence plays much more than a support role. Whether a
decision maker is planning policy or responding to a fast-
breaking situation, intelligence is now regularly a part of the
debate, often a prerequisite. Whether that response involves
law enforcement, diplomacy or military forces, or even if the
issue involves our nation's commercial or trade interests,
intelligence data are the bedrock on which such a response is
built. Moreover, in an era that is leading to the
"digitization" of the armed forces, intelligence will be as
much a part of operations as firing a weapon.
Techology enhances intelligence capabilities as well as
provides new intelligence challenges. As suggested previously,
information technology has created new areas of opportunity in
intelligence operations. It also greatly facilitates
intelligence exploitation, analysis and dissemination. But, the
fact that access to and understanding of various technologies
are expanding on a world-wide basis, is creating an era in
which the United States may not enjoy the exclusive
technological edge that it once had. It also is clear that in-
depth knowledge and usage of technology no longer applies
exclusively to governments, but is present in organizations and
individuals as well, some who would do harm to the U.S. or its
interests. Consequently, although intelligence opportunities
are enhanced, so too are the threats to our own technology-
based infrastructures. Our ability to protect U.S. systems,
detect attempts to affect those systems and respond to such
threats, also rely on an active, strong intelligence
capability.
Likewise, our national security is affected by a broader
set of issues, that, heretofore, have not been so readily
identified with our global interests. These issues range from
economics to environmental concerns, and to the mass migration
of people. Developments in these areas greatly expand the
universe of problems with which the Community must grapple--
problems than demand a world-wide view and a highly flexible
set of resource.
The types of threats that face our nation demand that the
Intelligence Community be ever vigilant on both the strategic
and tactical levels. Countering the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and the
activities ofinternational organized crime, by definition, call
for the types of intelligence collection, analysis and reporting that
emphasize the need to produce the hardest information--intentions, for
example--and that substantiates the need for a dynamic intelligence
capability. In short, in the world we face today and tomorrow, the
United States must have its "eyes and ears" more than ever before to
protect its freedom--politically, economically and militarily.
With these points in mind, the Committee review was guided
by two key questions. First, what programs are properly
structured and sufficiently prepared for future needs and
requirements, such that we can feel confident about our
preparedness? And, second, what are our unmet needs?
Unfortunately, the Committee review suggested a paucity of
areas where the Intelligence Community is well situated for the
future and an overabundance of unmet needs. Clearly, there are
specific areas within specific programs where the Intelligence
Community is functioning well and is ready for the future. But,
by and large, the Committee finds several large areas of
concern. Principal among these are:
The Community's very limited analytical capabilities
to meet the myriad challenges ahead, especially to be
more strategic and predictive in viewpoint;
the uncertain commitment and capability to collect
"human intelligence" on a world-wide basis, through
espionage;
the growing capabilities of other nations and groups
to deny information, especially from our overhead
sensors, by employing "denial and deception"
techniques, and the Community's slow realization and
limited ability to recognize and overcome these
efforts; and
the ever-growing demand for detailed, actionable
intelligence to law enforcement to support
prosecutions, while still protecting intelligence
sources and methods.
Therefore, the Committee encourages the Director of Central
Intelligence to work rapidly toward alleviating these concerns
during this period when the nation is less at risk, in the
physical sense, than during the Cold War. This Committee is
prepared to assist in this effort. To that end, the Committee
examined the Community's most immediate unmet needs, and has
begun a process to address them. The basis for many of the
Committee's decisions was formulated not only from examining
these needs, but also from a set of themes that are important
to establishing the type of Community that is vital to our
future national security. These themes are basically included
within the first five Areas of Special Interest of this report,
and will be used to help focus the Committee's activities in
the future.
Areas of Special Interest
shortfalls in all-source analysis
The Committee is concerned that the Intelligence Community
(IC) lacks the analytic depth, breadth and expertise to monitor
political, military, and economic developments worldwide while
maintaining in-depth expertise on critical countries and
issues. Problems associated with analytic shortfalls include: a
largely inexperienced workforce; lack of foreign language
skills and limited in-country familiarity among all-source
analysts; and a predominant focus on current intelligence that
is eroding the IC's ability to conduct comprehensive strategic
analysis.
The Committee believes that the IC must make a concerted
effort to enhance both substantive and linguistic expertise
among its analytic corps. Moreover, the IC must maintain a
basic level of knowledge about trends and developments
worldwide, while maintaining the capability to warn of
impending crises and "surge" resources during such crises. In
addition, the IC must find ways to augment its analytic
capability during crises without diminishing the ability to
monitor other areas of the world.
The Committee is very concerned with the fact that over the
past several years, the IC has shifted analytic production to
focus on short-term, event-driven analysis. While such a shift
provides strong analytic coverage of day-to-day events, it
comes at the expense of basic research and analysis. Not only
does basic research and analysis provide the foundation for
short-term, event-driven analysis, it also is critical to
producing in-depth, long-term/strategic analysis of issues that
will pose challenges to U.S. national security in the future.
The Committee believes that the ability to process and
analyze all-source information is crucial to the quality and
utility of all-source analytic products. Unfortunately, the
IC's ability to do thorough, truly all-source analysis may be
hampered by the difficulties associated with prioritizing,
processing, and analyzing the vast amounts of open source data
available to analysts. Another area of concern in this regard
is the ability of the IC's all-source analysts truly to have
access to all sources of information. Bureaucratic barriers
have been erected that have prevented access by all-source
analysts to information from other departments, from other
agencies within the IC and, in some cases, from other offices
within the same agency. The Committee will continue to monitor
initiatives to improve the IC's ability to collect, process,
and analyze open source information, and of the ability of IC
all-source analysts to gain sufficient access to all sources of
information.
Given the fact that resources for the IC are unlikely to
increase significantly in the future, the Committee believes
that the IC must find other ways to address shortfalls in
analytic depth and breadth. The IC must examine the importance
of all-source analysis relative to the importance of collection
and support activities. The Committee is particularly concerned
about the imbalance between collection and "downstream"
processing of intelligence. Expending resources to collect
intelligence that is not being analyzed is simply a waste of
money.
In order to enhance analytic expertise, the IC must improve
training and better target its recruitment efforts. In
addition, the IC must identify ways to fill analytic gaps and
surge analytic resources without creating gaps elsewhere in the
process. For the past several years, the Committee has strongly
urged the IC to develop a "civilian" reserve capability that
would tap into the expertise of former IC employees, non-IC
experts, and linguists. Certain elements within the IC already
have taken steps to augment analytic capabilities; the IC as a
whole must do the same. In the fiscal year 1998 intelligence
authorization bill, the Committee again has provided funds for
the establishment of a pilot civilian reserve program. The
Committee will closely scrutinize progress made in this area.
Several new initiatives already are underway that will help
the IC to maintain a worldwide information "base" and to
augment existing analytic efforts. The Committee supports
efforts to create "knowledge databases," including the
nascent World Basic Information Library (WBIL). Such efforts
will help to ensure that the IC retains a baseline of knowledge
on countries that often receive little attention until a crisis
arises. The Committee also supports the Joint Reserve
Intelligence Program (JRIP), a cost-effective program that
utilizes the substantive and linguistic expertise of military
reservists to augment the IC's analytic efforts.
The Committee strongly believes that the IC must restore
its capability to conduct long-term predictive analysis and
warning. Core groups of analysts should be dedicated to doing
research-oriented projects aimed at assessing strategic issues.
In addition, the IC must educate its customers about the
importance of long-term analysis. If the focus on near-term
analysis is maintained at the expense of long-term analysis and
research, the ability of policymakers and military commanders
to deal effectively with future crises will be severely
diminished. The main function of the IC is to provide its
customers with predictive analysis and warning; if the IC loses
the capability to do so, it will fail to meet its most basic
mission.
"downstream" intelligence activities
For the past several years, the Committee has expressed
concern about the imbalance between intelligence collection and
related "downstream" intelligence activities. The Committee
is disturbed by the fact that the IC continues to spend
billions on high-tech collection platforms without allocating
adequate resources to those who review the raw product, analyze
it, and put it before policymakers and military commanders in a
useable format. This is not to say that there should be no
funding for new collection systems (see the Areas of Special
Interest item on Technical Investments), and this year's
authorization provides for such investments. But to do so
without also planning investment for processing, exploitation,
analysis and dissemination, serves to diminish the purpose and utility
of the collection.
The emphasis on collection at the expense of downstream
activities permeates the IC at all levels and in most
collection disciplines. The Defense Science Board, for one, has
noted the fact that collection platforms have performed
extremely well in Bosnia but that the "warfighter" has been
overwhelmed by the amount of collected raw data, much of which
remains unprocessed. In the Committee's analysis and production
budget hearing, witnesses testified that the IC is "binning"
(i.e., not exploiting) much of the broad-area search imagery
that is collected. In addition, hard target analytic depth
studies by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) conclude
that the IC is "awash" in unexploited open source
information. Finally, program managers consistently budget for
satellite and launch requirements for new overhead collection
systems, but largely ignore the need for funding sufficient
ground processing capabilities.
The Committee's fiscal year 1998 budget authorization
emphasizes, among other things, the need to address processing,
analysis and dissemination activities. For example, the
Committee authorizes funds to create an open source
requirements management system, enhance Measurement and
Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) processing and exploitation,
and advance the acquisition and fielding of analytic tools.
These efforts, which are important first steps for addressing
the collection-downstream imbalance, are only a small part of
the solution.
The Committee believes that the IC no longer needs, nor can
it afford, to continue pouring vast amounts of money into
expensive, high-tech collection platforms if the collected data
is not exploited. Put simply, collecting information that is
not processed and analyzed is simply a waste of taxpayer
dollars. In the future, the Committee expects to see greater
effort and resources placed on downstream activities and a more
rational approach to collection activities. Requirements must
be clearly and precisely articulated and collection decisions
must be coordinated across the collection "stovepipes." The
Committee urges the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), in
concern with IC managers, to address the collection-downstream
imbalance in future budget submissions.
Clandestine HUMINT Funding
The Committee is concerned about the apparently ad hoc
nature of annual funding for clandestine Human Intelligence
(HUMINT). We believe that such funding should, instead, reflect
a periodically adjusted and refined projection of the long-term
needs of analysts and consumers for the product of clandestine
HUMINT collection. To tie the funding of clandestine HUMINT to
these long-term needs, the Committee recommends that the DCI
establish an interagency task force to assess long-term
collection needs and from that assessment, define the role of
the clandestine service in the future and the funding profile
necessary to build and sustain its capabilities.
Present funding of clandestine HUMINT
The Committee is aware of three attempts by analysts in
recent years to quantify the importance of the types of
intelligence collection: A survey of the January 1993 National
Intelligence Daily (NID), the 1994 Strategic Intelligence
Review (SIR) process, and the 1995 Comprehensive Capabilities
Review (CCR). In all three studies, clandestine HUMINT made a
surprisingly strong showing, considering the small part of the
intelligence budget that it consumes. In the NID survey, CIA/DO
reporting was the dominant source cited for covertly acquired
intelligence. In the 1994 SIR process, HUMINT was, in
aggregate, the most important source of intelligence for the
376 intelligence needs evaluated. In the CCR, clandestine
HUMINT and SIGINT were found to be roughly of the same value in
pursuing the various top-tier issues of Presidential Decision
Directive 35. Uncounted in any of these studies, and adding
enormously to the value of clandestine HUMINT, is its
contribution to clandestine technical operations and in
compromising foreign cryptographic materials.
The importance of the clandestine service in the future has
not been lost on those looking at the future of the IC as a
whole. Studies undertaken in the last two years by the "Aspin-
Brown" Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, and this
Committee have all emphasized that the intelligence targets of
the future will be such that clandestine HUMINT will be even
more important than it is today. The likely rapid spread of
encryption technologies and the move towards declassifying
imagery capabilities will only accelerate the reliance on
clandestine human sources to crack the hardest targets.
Yet, the cost of clandestine HUMINT remains a single digit
percentage of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget
and has dropped in real dollar terms. As our actions in the
authorization for the CIAP demonstrate, this Committee
questions whether the annual funding requests for clandestine
HUMINT collection are sufficiently grounded in the long-term
needs of policymakers and in the operational requisites for
satisfying those requirements. We have, for example, made
recommendations for augmenting support for clandestine HUMINT
collection that we understand will be necessary for collecting
in the new environments of the post-Cold War. Underlying these
recommendations, and others, is a concern that funding for the
clandestine service enable it to begin to develop operational
capabilities and techniques now that it will need to deploy in
the future in order to meet the evolving needs of policymakers
in changing technical and political environments.
Budgeting for the future
To achieve a less ad hoc and more forward-looking budget
request for clandestine HUMINT collection, we recommend that
the DCI appoint a task force to project the needs of
policymakers for clandestine HUMINT collection over the next
two decades and report its findings to, inter alia, this
Committee. Because of the evolving needs of policymakers since
the end of the Cold War, the advance of information
technologies, and the explosion of open source information,
this Committee believes that the all-source analyst is in the
best position to predict what information gaps may exist in the future
and which gaps cannot be filled except by clandestine HUMINT
collection. Accordingly, we recommend the task force be chaired by the
Chairman of the NIC with the Deputy Director of Intelligence of the CIA
and the Deputy Director for Intelligence Production of the DIA as Vice-
Chairs.
With these findings in hand, the DDO, as the National
HUMINT Collection Manager, should be in the best position to
predict what capabilities, techniques, and operational profiles
in the clandestine service will best fulfill the needs
identified by the all-source analysts. On these bases, the DDO
should prepare a long-term fiscal program and strategic plan--
perhaps building on the DO's internally prepared strategic plan
of 1995--in consultation with the DS&T, the Defense HUMINT
Service, and other operational partners in the Intelligence
Community. This program and strategic plan, as validated by the
DCI and shared with the CIA Comptroller and this Committee,
should then become the program of record for clandestine HUMINT
within the Intelligence Community and a major premise for the
annual funding request for clandestine HUMINT collection.
technical investments
The impact of technology--including both commercial and
government investments--on the IC has had a dramatic effect in
almost all intelligence activities and operations, and the
potential for future effects is even greater. The Committee has
taken a position in previous authorization bills that
technology, and more appropriately, the application of new
technologies, are becoming key to the enhancement of all
intelligence activities, whether in the form of analytic tool
development or technical collection support to clandestine
operations. Indeed, the Committee believes the world-wide
proliferation of technologies presents new opportunities--and
challenges--for intelligence collection operations. Moreover,
with the Department of Defense's move toward a "digitized"
force, the IC must become more adept at not only collecting,
analyzing and reporting tactical information, but must do so
within a time frame and in a digital form that is usable to the
military. The use of advanced, and in many cases, commercial,
technologies is the key to doing this.
One of the more substantial areas that can benefit from
modern technologies is overhead collection. Although heavily
influenced by leading-edge technologies already, those who
manage current and future overhead collection programs must
deal with new, again, often commercial, technologies that are
rapidly developed, made readily available and, in equally rapid
fashion, are eclipsed and outdated by even more modern
technologies. Those who remain comfortable with unjustifiably
long development and procurement times will fail.
It should also be noted that the current broad base of
technological development expands the commercial availability
of many of these evolving technologies. For example,
technologies used in overhead imagery, once the sole purview of
the Intelligence and Defense communities of the U.S. and only a
handful of other nations, are now either verging on, or are
already being employed by commercial entities worldwide.
Moreover, there are several areas where such technologies
are having a definite impact on overhead collection. Technology
is allowing for the development of smaller and less costly
satellites, which some believe will match, if not surpass,
current capabilities. The effective use of these technologies
will require increased innovation by the intelligence program
managers to ensure that the nation maintains a technological
edge over potential foes. At the same time, the availability,
and indeed the proliferation of such technologies should allow
for streamlined acquisition and significant cost savings.
The worldwide development and availability of new
technologies, combined with the continuous increase in
knowledge and understanding of U.S. collection systems and
their capabilities, also will affect how the IC collects
information and on what "targets" remain viable. The
Committee believes the Community must invest in new and
sometimes unanticipated collection areas/techniques to remain
viable.
In this year's authorization, the Committee is continuing
its support for more flexible systems that address the future
challenges technology is forcing on the Community. These
investments include promoting smaller systems and ensuring that
larger systems are technologically and financially justifiable.
This also includes investments in a variety of research and
development programs, and the Committee hopes the
Administration will bring forward its own new ideas in the
future. The Committee acknowledges the successes of past
overhead collection programs and hopes that the initial steps
shown in new efforts such as the Future Imagery Architecture
signal recognition of the need for new and innovative
approaches to address the challenges of the future.
a corporate and flexible community
For the past several years, the Committee has emphasized
the need for the IC to be more flexible and function as a
"corporate" whole. In today's complex world, the IC must have
the capability to address many issues simultaneously anywhere
in the world. With fewer resources and a more diverse set of
challenges, the IC must be able to work across programmatic and
"stovepipe" boundaries and be flexible enough to ensure that
resources can be shifted or augmented throughout the IC when
necessary.
The Committee is encouraged by progress toward improving
coordination across IC agencies and across collection and
analytic disciplines. The DCI's Hard Target working groups have
proven that a coherent, multidisciplinary, coordinated approach
to collection is an excellent way to identify and address
collection gaps. The Committee strongly urges the DCI to
consider applying such a "cross-INT" approach to the process
of determining collection and production strategies for lower-
tier countries.
The Committee is less satisfied with the IC's progress in
addressing "surge" issues. The Committee believes there are
several problems associated with the current method of surging
resources. First, when resources are shifted to cover a crisis,
collection and analytic gaps may be created elsewhere. Second,
it is exceedingly difficult for analysts and some collectors--
particularly HUMINT-- to became instant experts on an area in
which they have little experience or background. The Committee
believes that although the IC should maintain global coverage,
agencies do not need in-house expertise on all topics.
Intelligence agencies must, however, be able to determine where
expertise resides within the IC and be able to tap that
expertise, wherever it exists, when the need arises. In
addition, as discussed elsewhere in this report, the IC must
consider creating a civilian intelligence reserve capability to
augment existing analytic and linguistic expertise.
The Committee strongly encourages the IC to continue and
expand efforts to work across traditional bureaucratic
boundaries and to implement measures to enhance flexibility.
The Committee believes that such efforts are absolutely
essential if the IC is to succeed in dealing with increasingly
complex and diverse threats to U.S. national interests.
quadrennial defense review of intelligence
The Committee is concerned on several accounts about the
handling of intelligence in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has
promulgated a set of new operational concepts known as Joint
Vision 2010. As the QDR report and the CJCS's congressional
testimony stress, information superiority or "dominant
battlefield awareness" is the underpinning for the CJCS's
concepts. The QDR, however, made almost no changes in the
Department's plans for intelligence, the notable exception
being the reduction of the planned procurement of Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft.
This recommendation prompted the National Defense Panel (NDP)
to suggest that the Department's investment decisions were not
fully in keeping with its emphasis on improving intelligence
and surveillance support. The other intelligence issues that
the QDR raised were deferred to the normal internal summer
budget review process.
The QDR was focused, to a large extent, on finding ways to
enhance the Department's investment budget. It has been
reported that DoD intends to increase the amount of procurement
funding steadily over the future years defense play (FYDP),
until the level reaches approximately $68 billion in 2003, an
increase of over $25 billion over the fiscal year 1997 dollar
levels. Yet, intelligence spending is to remain essentially
flat. Again, this does not seem to be in synchronization with
the Chairman's "dominant battlefield awareness" vision.
The Secretary of Defense recently announced the creation of
a special task force to find ways to reduce the costs of the
Department's infrastructure and support systems, with an
emphasis on defense agencies. Since defense agencies make up
the overwhelming majority of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program, if the task force generates substantial savings, much
of these could come from the intelligence budget. Given the
need to "rebuild" our intelligence resources to ensure that
they can meet future needs, especially within Defense, the
Committee believes that such a step could well be disastrous in
terms of our military's abilities to engage in whatever
situation there might be. The Committee will observe carefully
the direction of this effort, with an eye toward examining the
long-term effects on the Community and weighing them against
the short term gains.
Finally, the Committee is very much aware that the
aggregate intelligence budget generally increased at a quicker
pace than the overall national defense budget during the high-
growth period of the 1980s, and that it declined more modestly
than the overall defense budget in the years since.
Intelligence has clearly received some preferential budgetary
consideration, reflecting an appreciation that intelligence
plays an increasingly important role in military effectiveness.
Therefore, it seems, given the CJCS's focus on information
dominance and the increased role of intelligence in military
operations, that intelligence programs should continue to be
specifically and staunchly supported as the Administration
carries out its renewed and appropriate commitment to increase
funding for modernization. Therefore, again, the Committee will
closely watch these budgeting developments.
intelligence system interoperability
The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request included
significant funding for Command, Control, Communications,
Computer and Intelligence (C4I) support, system development and
interoperability, and for establishing a virtual intelligence
analysis environment. The systems included the following
programs:
1. The Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture
(JIVA);
2. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
(JDISS);
3. The All Source Analysis System (ASAS);
4. The Joint Maritime Communications Information
System (JMCIS);
5. The Combat Intelligence System (CIS);
6. The Intelligence Analysis System (IAS);
7. The JDISS--Special Operations Command Research,
Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES).
The Committee supports the Department's efforts to provide
an interoperable intelligence dissemination architecture and a
"virtual" analytic environment with which analysts world-wide
can collaborate. The Committee believes, however, that the
various projects reflected in the President's request do not
have the necessary direction and control to require the sharing
of developments and to ensure that duplication of effort is
minimized. This is easily determined by a thorough review of
the various budget request documents.
Further, the Committee believes that these systems, can be
broken down into the basic components of (1) a high powered
workstation with communications; (2) an operating environment
that, by direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
must be Defense Intelligence Infrastructure (DII) Common
Operating Environment (COE) compliant; and (3) a set of
applications software. Although a common stated goal of the
above systems is to provide support to analysts and operators,
the program managers of these separate systems rarely, if ever,
work together to achieve the common goals by sharing ideas and
developments.
The Committee is convinced there is a need to establish a
management structure and focal point within the Department that
would include representation from each of the service and
agency system program offices. The mission of this organization
would be to provide oversight, integration and development of
collaborative applications for the associated C4I systems. The
function of this organization would not be to dictate specific
service/agency hardware solutions or unique software
applications, but to provide for the development of common
applications, act as a conduit for sharing analytical ideas and
processes, and to ensure world-wide interoperability via
standards. The Committee does not support the concept of
centralizing funding for these efforts, since these systems are
the responsibilities of the various services and agencies. The
Committee would however, support the ability of such a
coordinating organization to be an approval authority for
expending service/agency funds. The Committee believes both the
JDISS program office and, particularly, the Joint Reserve
Intelligence Program have been at the forefront of C41 system
collaboration, and would be good candidates to be chartered
with this integration.
Therefore the Committee is fencing 50 percent of all
authorized and appropriated fiscal year 1998 funding for the
above systems, until the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
provides to the defense and intelligence authorizing committees
a plan for creating a management structure and focal point
within the Department with a charter encompassing the goals
outlined above.
FBIS Reorganization
The Committee supports the further establishment and
maintenance of a strong open source capability within the IC. A
comprehensive open source collection, translation, and analytic
effort is crucial to the IC's ability to maintain global
coverage and to understand developments both in "lower" and
"higher" tier countries. Not only do open sources provide
insight into open societies, careful scrutiny of "closed
society" media (e.g., Iran, North Korea) can also reveal
valuable information on trends, new developments, and
leadership plans and intentions.
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) re-
engineering strategy calls for using more modern and
commercially available technologies as FBIS's operational
linchpin and to transition from traditional large-scale, static
collection and processing centers toward a more agile and less
expensive architecture. The Committee applauds CIA's efforts to
adapt FBIS's infrastructure and operating practices to
incorporate new technologies and to meet intelligence
requirements more efficiently. The Committee has several
concerns, however, about the current FBIS re-engineering plan.
First, the Committee is concerned that important resource
allocation decisions are being made without fully taking into
consideration "customer" requirements; there currently is no
formal, direct open source requirements system that can be
tapped to help translate requirements into rational resource
allocation decisions. In addition, it is unclear to many FBIS
customers what regions of the world will be affected by
significant decreases in collection, translation an analytical
activities. The Committee believes that open source customers
must be kept fully informed of what changes in services they
will see as a result of the re-engineering. The Committee also
believes that open source collection should be driven by the
direct input of major customers, particularly the all-source
analysts who best understand where their information gaps lie.
It should be noted that the Committee will closely
scrutinize any fiscal year 1997 FBIS reprogramming request to
determine whether the request fits into the overall
reengineering strategy. The Committee requests that it be kept
fully and currently informed of the plans and implementation of
the re-engineering effort. In addition, the Committee requests
that the DCI submit a report on the FBIS re-engineering plan to
the intelligence oversight Committees by 1 September 1997. The
report should include the following information:
What is the timeline for implementing the re-
engineering plan?
What is the mechanism for reviewing the progress and
effects of the re-engineering plan?
For what countries/regions/issues will FBIS reduce
its coverage (collection, translation, analysis)?
What countries/regions/issues will FBIS no longer
cover?
How will the "new way" of doing business be managed
(i.e., telecommuting employees, regional hubs, etc.)?
What disruptions in service are anticipated? and
How will FBIS work with "customers" to ensure their
requirements are being met?
[...]
declassification
The Committee has authorized additional resources in the
fiscal year 1998 budget for CIA classification management,
including declassification activities in support of Executive
Order 12958. It should be noted, however, that the Committee is
highly skeptical that the true costs of declassification have
been determined accurately. It is possible that additional
resources for declassification may be required to ensure that
it is accomplished without compromise of intelligence sources
and methods. In addition, the Committee is very concerned about
the criteria and techniques used in the process of
declassifying intelligence documents. Over the next year, the
Committee will study carefully a range of declassification and
collateral intelligence sharing activities across the NFIP to
determine what resources are needed for these efforts and
whether current declassification and intelligence sharing
activities adequately protect sources and methods.
Specifically, the Committee will examine the
declassification programs of various intelligence agencies,
including issues relating to personnel qualifications,
contractor support and training in declassification
methodologies. As part of this review, the Committee will
examine the implementation of bulk declassification
techniques--that may be used in lieu of page-by-page review--
and consider the applicability of both methods for
declassifying documents with differing classification levels.
In addition, the Committee will review specific
declassification case histories to assess the performance of
the "risk management" approach to declassification.
Furthermore, the review will examine the process and progress
of Community-wide efforts to declassify archival records. Any
lessons learned from problems and successes related to current
declassification activities should be used to redirect present
day information handling and storage policies and make future
declassification efforts less problematic.
The Committee also will examine the Community's processes
for sharing intelligence with military consumers and allied
partners. The Committee also believes that in the area of
intelligence information management, there is a need for improved
security controls and audit capabilities. Likewise, the Committee will
examine issues relating to risk management, personnel training and
qualifications, accountability, and record keeping.
Finally, the Committee will focus in detail on the GULFLINK
case. The recent GULFLINK damage assessment report concluded
that the declassification process associated with Gulf War
intelligence documents resulted in serious damage to
intelligence sources and methods. Those working on
declassifying Gulf War intelligence documents were directed to
declassify an enormous amount of documents in a relatively
short amount of time. Furthermore, the Department of Defense
directed those declassifying these documents to err on the side
of declassification and post documents on the GULFLINK Internet
site unless instructed otherwise on a case-by-case basis, by
officials at the highest levels of the Department of Defense.
Clearly, the reported damage done to intelligence sources and
methods in the case of GULFLINK are directly due to these
declassification criteria. The Committee will closely examine
the declassification processes and requirements used in the
GULFLINK project to ensure that such mistakes are not made in
future declassification projects.
[...]
Section 403--Protection of CIA facilities
Section 403 expands the law enforcement jurisdiction of the
CIA special police 500 feet beyond the confines of Agency
facilities, and also onto the Federal Highway Administration
("FHWA") property immediately adjacent to the CIA
Headquarters Compound, subject to certain limits on the
exercise of that law enforcement authority.
This expanded authority is required to enable the CIA to
respond effectively to an increasing threat of terrorist attack
against Agency personnel and facilities. Under existing law,
CIA special police officers lack authority to investigate
suspicious activity near but outside the boundaries of CIA
facilities.
Currently, the CIA special police must call the local
police to respond to a suspicious vehicle near a CIA facility.
Local police response time varies, however. A delay could
result in Agency personnel having little or no warning of the
detonation of a bomb. This provision seeks to protect the CIA's
rank and file employees from potential harm.
With the authority provided under this section, the CIA
special police could immediately investigate a threatening
situation if presented with reasonable grounds to believe a
threat to the CIA's employees or property existed. Such
investigation would at least allow the CIA special police to
decide if a sufficient threat existed to justify evacuation of
CIA personnel. The CIA special police could also seek to
question and identify an individual in the 500-foot zone or on
the FHWA property they reasonably believed, based on specific
and articulable facts, was surveilling an Agency facility as a
precursor to a terrorist attack.
Although the main rationale for the broader authority is to
enable more effective response to terrorist threats, the
authority would not be limited solely to countering such
threats. The provision also would enable a special police
officer to investigate (and, if allowable by law, detain)
individuals or activities within the 500 foot zone, consistent
with the law enforcement authorities of other federal police
officers. The section does not change the special police
officers' authority under current law to approach and, on a
consensual basis, question and seek identification from
individuals in the 500-foot zone or on the FHWA property.
Section 403 does not, however, provide a statutory basis to
patrol within the 500 foot zone. The Committee understands that
CIA special police officers currently conduct such external
perimeter patrols of the CIA Headquarters property pursuant to
the authority granted the Director of Central Intelligence
under Section 5 of the CIA Act of 1949. That statute does not
authorize follow-up by the officers should the need arise. The
Committee appreciates the need to continue such external
perimeter patrols, but also understands the need to follow-up
or investigate any potential criminal activity that likely
threatens the CIA, its employees, or property. The Committee,
however, in no way, envisions a general grant of police
authority in the 500 foot zone of protection created by this
legislation, but does intend that CIA special police officers
can function as federal police within that 500 foot zone, with
all attendant authorities, capabilities, immunities, and
liabilities, when the need arises, for the limited purpose of
protecting CIA employees and property. Any detentions or
arrests executed by the special police shall only be for a
limited duration (i.e., only long enough to turn the suspects
over to the appropriate state, local, or federal law
enforcement authorities).
There would be several limits on the new authority. First,
it is restricted to the open areas within 500 feet of a CIA
facility, and to the FHWA property immediately adjacent to the
CIA Headquarters Compound.
Second, the authority can be exercised only where the CIA
special police officer identifies specific and articulable
facts giving the officer reason to believe that the exercise of
such functions is necessary to protect the security of CIA
installations, property, or employees. Thus, special police
officers would not be authorized to issue traffic tickets in
the 500-foot zone, or on the FHWA property. Also, once the
special police officer does begin to investigate suspected
criminal activity, the special police officer's actions must
conform with the well-established legal standards in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967), and its progeny, as to investigative
stops of private citizens.
Third, the new authority would not preclude or limit in any
way the authority of any federal, state, or local law
enforcement agency or of any other federal police orfederal
protective service. The CIA will seek agreements with such other
agencies and/or services as to the exercise of the new authority,
including the statutory violations the CIA special police would plan to
act on in the 500-foot zone or on the FHWA property. With regard to the
FHWA property, the Agency's intent is to execute a formal agreement
with the FHWA that addressed not only the statutory violations issue
but also the broader range of operational, administrative, and
transactional matters that would be presented by the new authority and
interagency relationship.
Finally, the Agency rules and regulations, including those
enforced by criminal penalties, that apply within the CIA
facilities are not extended into the 500-foot zone or to the
FHWA property. This means, for example, as with current law,
that individuals in the 500-foot zone outside CIA facilities
would not be barred from having cameras or taking pictures of
CIA facilities.
[...]
security personnel at agency installations
Sec. 15. (a)(1) The Director may authorize Agency personnel
within the United States to perform the same functions as
special policemen of the General Services Administration
perform under the first section of the Act entitled "An Act to
authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of the
Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint special
policemen for duty upon Federal property under the jurisdiction
of the Federal Works Agency, and for other purposes" (40
U.S.C. 318), with the powers set forth in that section, except
that such personnel shall perform such functions and exercise
such [powers only within Agency installations, and the rules
and regulations enforced by such personnel shall be rules and
regulations promulgated by the Director.] powers--
(A) within the Agency Headquarters Compound and the
property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway
Administration located immediately adjacent to such
Compound and in the streets, sidewalks, and the open
areas within the zone beginning at the outside boundary
of such Compound and property and extending outward 500
feet; and
(B) within any other Agency installation and in the
streets, sidewalks, and open areas within the zone
beginning at the outside boundary of any such
installation and extending outward 500 feet.
(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers under
paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances where
such personnel can identify specific and articulable facts
giving such personnel reason to believe that their performance
of such functions and exercise of such powers is reasonable to
protect against physical attack or threats of attack upon the
Agency installations, property, or employees.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
preclude, or limit in any way, the authority of any Federal,
State, or local law enforcement agency or of any other Federal
police or Federal protective service.
(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel
shall be the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director
and shall only be applicable to the areas referred to in
paragraph (1).
(5) On December 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the
Director shall submit a report to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that
describes in detail the exercise of the authority granted by
this subsection, and the underlying facts supporting the
exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal year.
The Director shall make such report available to the Inspector
General of the Agency.
[...]