[Congressional Record: June 19, 1997 (Senate)]
[Page S5963-S5978]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
now proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 87, S. 858, the
intelligence authorization bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 858) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the United States Government, the Community Management
Account and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System, and for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate
consideration of the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
privileges of the floor be granted to the following members of our
staff. We have a list of them: Alfred Cumming, Melvin Dubee, Peter
Flory, Lorenzo Goco, Joan Grimson, Andy Johnson, Taylor Lawrence, Ken
Myers, Suzanne Spaulding, Christopher Straub, Christopher Williams,
Peter Dorn, Bill Duhnke, Emil Francona, Art Grant, Patricia Hanback,
Ken Johnson, Don Mitchell, Randy Schieber, Don Stone, Linda Taylor, and
James Wolfe.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, the intelligence authorization bill is
before the Senate at this time.
This bill was unanimously voted out of the Intelligence Committee on
June 4. It was then referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee and
was favorably reported without amendment yesterday.
This bill will authorize appropriations for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. I am pleased to
report to the Senate today that I have worked very closely with Senator
Kerrey, the vice chairman of the committee, in drafting this bill. We
have crafted, Mr. President, what we believe is a bipartisan bill that
received the full support of all Republican and all Democratic members
of the Intelligence Committee.
I am proud that the actions we have taken with this legislation are
comprehensive and that we have taken some bold steps to implement four
priorities to posture the intelligence community for the future.
Mr. President, it is extremely fortuitous that we are bringing the
intelligence authorization bill to the floor this week when we have
seen a great intelligence success recently. It is not often that the
dedicated men and women of our intelligence agencies enjoy public
recognition for their work. They understand that. But yesterday, all
Americans were gratified to learn of the successful apprehension of Mir
Aimal Kansi and his transport to the United States to stand trial for
the brutal murder of two CIA employees and the wounding of three others
outside the CIA headquarters several years back.
I am extremely proud of our intelligence community in their work
here. The Kansi arrest was the result of over 4 years--4 years--of
painstaking and dedicated investigative and intelligence work by the
CIA, the FBI, and others.
Together with my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee, I was
briefed on the details of this successful mission yesterday. While I
cannot comment on the operation itself, I can share with my colleagues,
as Senator Kerrey would, and the American people, that it was conducted
with great professionalism and personal courage.
[[Page S5964]]
The success of this operation should serve as a warning to others,
those who in the past have attacked Americans and those who might be
contemplating such actions, that America will take action to bring the
alleged perpetrators to justice wherever they are and whatever the
cost.
To the families of those who died and to those who were wounded, we
know that this arrest cannot return your loved ones or heal your
wounds. We hope, however, that you derive consolation from seeing the
accused killer brought to this country for trial.
The legislation before us today is made up of words and numbers on
paper. As yesterday's events remind us, the work of our intelligence
and law enforcement professionals takes place in the real world, in
flesh and blood.
While the cold war is, indeed, over, there are still many forces in
the world today that threaten our national security and our citizens
and require the constant vigilance of our intelligence community. That
is why we have authorized a significant level of funding for the
continued operation of the intelligence community's activities.
I believe it would be inappropriate, Mr. President, to reveal this
exact level of funding, not because we do not want the American people
to know how much is invested in intelligence activities for their
protection, but, rather, we want to protect the level of our
investments from foreign intelligence services and leaders of rogue
states who would analyze trends in these investments to help guide
their decisions about when to strike with terrorism or aggression
against their neighbors, perhaps our own citizens.
I now would like to take a few minutes to summarize the major
priorities and the actions we have taken with this legislation.
We have had to face some tough choices, as all of us have in the
Senate, in the allocation of resources to meet the critical priorities
that have been set for the intelligence community.
In setting the authorization level for intelligence, we have looked
across the combined request for intelligence that is broken up into
three major categories, and they are the National Foreign Intelligence
Program of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Joint Military
Intelligence Program of the Secretary of Defense, and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities Program of the military services.
The Intelligence Authorization Act includes authorization for each of
these categories. With this legislation, Mr. President, we continue to
lay the groundwork for the intelligence community of the 21st century,
one that is retooled and I believe that is right-sized.
In putting together this authorization, the committee identified nine
key areas that will contribute to this effort. We drafted an
authorization bill that will better focus, we believe, the intelligence
community's resources on these areas. I call the first five areas the
five C's: counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics,
counterintelligence, and covert action. In each of these areas our bill
includes additional resources to aggressively tackle these difficult
missions in the world.
We also examined four other areas with a view toward long-term
investments that would place our intelligence agencies on a stronger
footing as we enter the 21st century. These included: A stronger
commitment to advanced research and development to maintain our
technological edge; improvement in the tools and skills of our
clandestine service personnel; new approaches to infiltrating and
assessing hard-target countries; and enhancements to our analytical and
information warfare capabilities.
We have put forward a balanced recommendation for the authorization
of a Joint Military Intelligence Program that, among other things,
includes sensor and engine upgrades for our airborne intelligence fleet
of RC-135's; it continues the modernization of our manned
reconnaissance capabilities; and pushes forward with the new technology
of unmanned aerial vehicles.
We have also taken some bold legislative initiatives in this bill.
One area on which the Intelligence Committee focused was the need to
ensure that classification of information is used effectively to
protect sensitive sources and methods or other vital national security
interests but does not prevent the flow of information to Congress or,
where appropriate, to the American people.
The committee has concluded that a higher priority is needed for the
review and for the declassification of intelligence so that families
concerned about the murder of a loved one overseas receive vital
information consistent with national security concerns. The Committee
on Intelligence recently heard from the families of several marines who
were murdered in a terrorist attack in Zona Rosa, El Salvador, in 1985.
A common refrain in their testimony before the committee was concern
about how little information they received from their Government
regarding the attack and its perpetrators.
It was from network television, for example, that at least one family
first learned of the attack and death of their brother or son. It was
also from television broadcasts that several families learned years
later that the likely mastermind of the attack had been brought into
this country through the U.S. official channels. The committee has
pressed the executive branch to provide these families with as much
information as possible, but 12 years is a long time to wait.
The committee believes, however, that it is the national interests of
the United States to provide information regarding the murder or
kidnapping of Americans abroad to their families consistent with
intelligence operations.
Moreover, given the difficulty inherent in identifying all relevant
information that might be held by different elements of the Government
and the likely resistance to providing information that is currently
classified, the committee believes this important responsibility must
ultimately be vested in a Cabinet-level official.
Therefore, the committee has adopted a provision in this bill
requiring the Secretary of State to ensure that all appropriate actions
are taken within the Government to promptly identify relevant
information pertaining to incidents of violence against Americans
overseas.
Mr. President, the Secretary is then required to make the information
available to families to the maximum extent possible without seriously
jeopardizing sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other
national security interests.
This provision, along with others contained in this bill, will
enhance the intelligence community's working relationship with the
American public that it serves.
I strongly urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998.
Mr. President, I also want to remind my colleagues that a lot, if not
most, of this bill is classified. But we have some security officers
from the Intelligence Committee that are available here today, off the
floor, to go into any aspect of the legislation that they think is
pertinent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Nebraska.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to join my chairman, the
distinguished Senator from Alabama, in offering this year's
intelligence authorization bill. It is designed to focus the national
intelligence agencies of the United States on today's and tomorrow's
threats. The bill is the product of the open, bipartisan process that
has long been the hallmark of the Select Committee on Intelligence. It
was voted unanimously out of the committee and in accordance with
Senate Resolution 400, the founding document of the Intelligence
Committee, the bill was reviewed by the Committee on Armed Services.
Before I discuss the bill, I want to say a word about the bipartisan
process which created this legislation under Chairman Shelby's
leadership. Unlike many other topics which we consider here each day,
there is no Republican agenda or Democratic agenda with regard to
intelligence, or at least none apparent to me.
Intelligence is simply the best informed estimate of the truth about
something. It knows no party. Every member of our committee seeks the
most effective and most efficient methods for the collection,
processing, analysis, production, and dissemination of
[[Page S5965]]
intelligence. Every member of our committee seeks intelligence
collection and operations to be conducted in accordance with American
law and American values. We certainly often disagree on which approach
to take in a particular situation, but our disagreements are not based
on party agendas. We are simply seeking the best performance for the
intelligence community and the best outcome for our country. So the
chairman and I were united in purpose as we approached this
legislation, we came to closure on our disagreements, and we are united
in recommending it to the full Senate.
Most of the intelligence authorization is contained in a classified
annex which we cannot discuss in open session but which is available to
Members in S-407. The schedule of authorizations in that annex comprise
the National Foreign Intelligence Program of the United States,
together with the Intelligence Committee's markup of the Joint Military
Intelligence Program and recommendations to the Armed Services
Committee on Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. The total
amount allocated for these programs is not something I can report in
open session, and I understand that fact will be the subject of an
amendment. But I can say while it is a good value, it is a substantial
amount of money.
Before we discuss any amendment which may be introduced in that
regard, I want to respond to the concerns of Members who may doubt the
need for significant investment in intelligence at this stage of our
history.
The best intelligence is simply a necessity for the protection of our
people and for the leadership of a nation with America's power and
America's responsibilities. Intelligence illuminates policy. Much is
made of the strategic crossroads the Nation finds itself at, the need
to develop fresh strategies for the new century. You can't make good
strategy without good intelligence. Intelligence is also the essential
American advantage in war. Victory in battle comes, and will come in
the future, from the convergence of three things we saw in the gulf
war: American courage and precise American weapons linked to precise
American intelligence. The ability to avoid conflict, to gain victory
or attain our objectives without risking American lives, is also
founded on the inside knowledge gained from intelligence. I can assure
my colleagues: intelligence gives America a huge advantage in
policymaking, in defense, and in the international aspects of law
enforcement.
This year's authorization bill addresses today's and tomorrow's
threats. We have focused on international terrorism, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, and on narcotics trafficking from
foreign countries. We have also stressed counterintelligence and the
need for more advanced research and development. Good science is
essential to keeping and extending our edge in intelligence, and we do
not recommend standing pat in this key area. Our bill also reflects our
understanding that despite the good relations we now enjoy with Russia,
our intelligence agencies need to continue to pay attention to Russian
nuclear warheads which still pose the greatest threat, just in terms of
capability, to our national life and the lives of our citizens.
The bill also has some important legislative provisions, which are
unclassified. The most important, in my view, is the requirement for
the executive branch to make crystal clear to every employee of the
national intelligence community that he or she has the right to
disclose classified information to the appropriate congressional
oversight committee, if the employee believes the information provided
gives evidence of wrongdoing. This provision, like the rest of this
bill, does not have a partisan basis. We simply intend it to preserve
the ability of Congress to perform oversight, which cannot be done
without information. In most circumstances, I hope an employee who felt
the obligation to report something classified to Congress would first
approach his superiors and get their views on how the information
should be presented. But in some circumstances, such as when the
employee suspects his superiors of complicity in the alleged
wrongdoing, the employee should not fear to communicate with the
appropriate committee member or cleared staff. The administration does
not agree, and believes they have greater authority, by virtue of
Executive Order 12356, to control the release of executive branch
classified information to Congress. But, given the guarantees in the
bill for responsible handling of the received classified information by
Congress, I would hope every Member of the Senate would support
Congress' right to be informed.
This legislation also provides subpoena powers for the CIA inspector
general to obtain documentary evidence in support of investigations.
The CIA IG is the only inspector general in any of the major national
security agencies who lacks this power, and its absence has adversely
affected investigations. We have made clear in the bill that subpoena
power will remain strictly in the service of the IG for investigative
purposes, and will not be used by or in behalf of any other element of
the CIA.
The Intelligence Committee in 1989 originated the legislation
creating the CIA inspector general, and in the past year the Audit Team
of the Select Committee on Intelligence conducted a review of the
performance of the IG and his office. The confidence of the oversight
committees and ultimately the public is essential if the IG is to do
his job properly. If I may quote from the report accompanying the bill,
"the [IG] office has increased the level of trust and respect from
within the Agency, the Oversight Committees, and the Intelligence
Community."
Mr. President, the distinguished chairman has described other
highlights of the bill, one of which we learned from the Khamisiya
nerve gas experience and is intended to ensure intelligence better
supports our deployed forces, and another which enables Americans whose
family members are victims of murder or kidnapping overseas to be kept
better informed by their Government. These provisions, like others I
have already described, are the result of investigations or hearings by
the committee and represent, as does the entire bill, the committee's
reasoned view of what is necessary to keep the Nation safe and informed
in today's world.
Finally, I would like to call the Senate's attention to the arrest
and return to the United States, this past Tuesday, of Mir Aimal Kansi
for the murder of two CIA employees and wounding of three others at the
gate to CIA headquarters several years ago. The CIA and FBI pursued
this man to the ends of the Earth, just as former Director James
Woolsey promised at the time of the crime. Mr. President, this is a
great triumph for U.S. intelligence and law enforcement, working in a
harmony which could not have been imagined just a few years ago. All
involved in this mission have my deepest respect and congratulations.
The Kansi case underlines the quality and dedication of the
remarkable people who work for the American people in our intelligence
organizations. They are selfless and patriotic, many of them risk their
safety for the sake of our country, and many more are denied the
gratification of the ego that comes from being able to talk freely
about their professional accomplishments. A lot of our talk here is
meaningless without the commitment of people like these to actually do
something or learn something for America's benefit. The annual
authorization bill debate is a chance to thank them, and I do.
Mr. President, I look forward to the Senate's deliberations on this
bill and I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to support S. 858, the fiscal year
1998 intelligence authorization bill. The legislation comes to the
floor having been reported out of the Select Committee on Intelligence
earlier this month and approved, on referral, by the Armed Services
Committee. As a member of both committees, I believe S. 858 is a
responsible, bipartisan bill which reflects our mutual oversight
concerns and policy priorities. While there may be some areas in which
the two committees disagree, I want to praise Intelligence Committee
Chairman Richard Shelby and Vice Chairman Bob Kerrey for their efforts
in seeking a consensus with the Armed Services Committee on the funding
and legislative provisions contained in the bill.
[[Page S5966]]
Most notably, S. 858 reflects our shared concern that intelligence
community activities must reflect the new, post-cold-war era threats
and challenges to U.S. security. Additionally, there is strong
agreement between the two committees and the administration that
continued emphasis must be given to improving the collection and
distribution of timely intelligence to the warfighter in the cockpit,
in the tank, aboard ship, and in the command post. One of the
overriding lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war was that high
quality tactical intelligence, if provided to the warfighter in a
prompt fashion can save American lives and carry the day on the field
of battle. Improving this qualitative advantage enjoyed by our Armed
Forces must remain a top priority in my view and I am pleased to see it
reflected in S. 858.
Also included in the intelligence authorization bill is a provision I
sponsored asking that the Director of Central Intelligence examine the
full range of threats to the United States from weapons of mass
destruction, not just the threat from ballistic and cruise missile
weapons, which formed the basis of the last intelligence estimate of
this kind in 1995. The intelligence threat assessment required by S.
858 will be submitted to Congress annually beginning February 15 of
next year and provide us with our first comprehensive understanding of
the emerging "nontraditional" threat facing our Nation, including the
ability of terrorist groups and hostile governments to produce and
deliver nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons into the United
States, the probability that such an attack would come from ballistic
missile, cruise missile, or any other means of delivery, and the
vulnerability of the United States to such an attack. One month after
the completion of the intelligence community's threat estimate, the
President is required to submit a report to Congress identifying how
Federal funds are dedicated to defending against this full range of
threats. Linking the probability of a certain type of attack using a
weapon of mass destruction, such as a terrorist chemical attack versus
a Russian ballistic missile attack, with the level of funds being spent
to defend against such a threat will be extremely helpful, in my view,
as the Senate debates national defense spending priorities in the
upcoming years.
In closing, I again want to commend the leadership of the Senate
Intelligence Committee for its willingness to work with the Armed
Services Committee on the numerous issues of mutual concern, and I look
forward to continued cooperation between the two committees as we move
into conference with the House of Representatives on our respective
bills.
[...]
Mr. SHELBY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that immediately
following the disposition of the two amendments that we have been
talking about, that the bill be read a third time, and the Senate
proceed to a vote on passage of S. 858, as amended, if amended.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SHELBY. Also, for the information of all Senators, this now means
that all Members can expect up to three consecutive rollcall votes
beginning around 2:45 this afternoon.
Mr. President, the committee has received the Congressional Budget
Office cost estimate for S. 858. CBO found that the public bill would
not affect direct spending or receipts in 1998; thus, pay-as-you-go
procedures would not apply to it. In addition, the Unfunded Mandates
Reform act [UMRA] excludes from application of the act legislative
provisions that are necessary for the national security. CBO determined
that all of the provisions of this bill either fit within that
exclusion or do not contain intergovernmental mandates as defined by
UMRA.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Congressional Budget
Office cost estimate for Senate bill 858, the intelligence
authorization bill, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 16, 1997.
Hon. Richard C. Shelby,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 858, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Dawn
Sauter.
Sincerely,
June E. O'Neill,
Director.
Enclosure.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
s. 858--intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 1998
Summary: S. 858 would authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 1998 for intelligence activities of the United States
government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
(CIARDS).
[[Page S5970]]
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting
S. 858 would result in additional spending of $91 million
over the 1998-2002 period, assuming appropriation of the
authorized amounts. The unclassified portion of the bill
would not affect direct spending or receipts in 1998; thus
pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply to it. The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from application of the
act legislative provisions that are necessary for the
national security. CBO has determined that all of the
provisions of this bill either fit within that exclusion or
do not contain intergovernmental mandates as defined by UMRA.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary effect of S. 858 is shown in the following table.
CBO was unable to obtain the necessary information to
estimate the costs for the entire bill because parts are
classified at a level above clearances held by CBO employees.
The estimated costs, therefore, reflect only the costs of the
unclassified portion of the bill.
The bill would authorize appropriations of $91 million for
the Community Management Account and $197 million for CIARDS.
The funding for CIARDS would cover retirement costs
attributable to military service and various unfunded
liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered mandatory,
and the authorization under this bill would be the same as
assumed in the CBO baseline.
For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumed that S. 858 will
be enacted by October 1, 1997, and that the full amounts
authorized will be appropriated for fiscal year 1998. Outlays
are estimated according to historical spending patterns for
intelligence programs.
[By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Spending under current law:
Estimated authorization
level \1\................ 102 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays......... 95 46 22 5 0 0
Proposed changes:
Estimated authorization
level.................... 0 91 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays......... 0 50 23 14 5 0
Spending under S. 858:
Estimated authorization
level \1\................ 102 91 0 0 0 0
Estimated outlays......... 95 96 45 19 5 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 1997 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
Note: The costs of this legislation would fall within budget function
050 (national defense).
Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from application of the
act legislative provisions that are necessary for the
national security. CBO has determined that all of the
provisions of this bill either fit within that exclusion or
do not contain intergovernmental mandates as defined by UMRA.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Cost: Dawn Sauter; Impact on
State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Pepper Santalucia;
Impact on the Private Sector: Eric Labs.
Estimate approved by: Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
[...]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from New
Jersey is recognized.
Amendment No. 416
(Purpose: To require an unclassified statement of the aggregate amount
of appropriations for intelligence activities)
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I have an amendment filed at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli], for himself,
Mr. Specter, Mr. Kerrey, and Mr. Bumpers, proposes an
amendment numbered 416.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 14, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:
SEC. 309. REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBMITTAL OF BUDGET INFORMATION ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
(a) Submittal With Annual Budget.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the President shall include in each
budget for a fiscal year submittal under section 1105 of
title 31, United States Code, the following information:
(1) The aggregate amount appropriated during the current
fiscal year on all intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government.
(2) The aggregate amount requested in such budget for the
fiscal year covered by the budget for all intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government.
(b) Form of Submittal.--The President shall submit the
information required under subsection (a) in unclassified
form.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, the Senate is faced with an issue as
old as the Republic itself. It is the continuing debate between the
public's right to know and the Government's need to retain information
only unto itself. It is an old argument, but it is one that has largely
been settled through time.
We have decided as a country that the best source of good judgment in
this Nation remains with the people and that they should be trusted
with the public welfare in having a maximum exposure to the facts and
judgments that govern our society.
Indeed, it was that wisdom which led to the first amendment to the
Constitution itself, and equally significantly as it led to article I,
section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution, which reads:
* * * a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
to time.
For a long time, Mr. President, despite these national ambitions,
this consistency with our greatest national principles, we as a
Congress determined this was not possible because of the dangers of
world war and the continuing struggle in the cold war.
It was the judgment of this Congress that even the total aggregate
amount of expenditures for our intelligence agencies, including the
Central Intelligence Agency, would remain private and not be published
and shared with the people.
The end of the cold war has raised this question anew. Not only for
the intelligence community, but indeed for all of the U.S. Government.
And most of this Government has responded appropriately.
The Defense Department began to share information about programs it
was developing, technologies that it possessed. Weapons hitherto
unknown were shared with the press and the public. And perhaps
predictably that is why since 1980, according to the bipartisan Brown
Commission, defense expenditures of the United States in real terms
have declined by 4 percent.
Accountability by the people themselves led this Congress to adjust
our national priorities to deal with the new emerging security
situation internationally. No doubt, an equal reflection of the fact
the intelligence community retained privacy of its budget is that the
bipartisan Brown Commission found that since 1980 the intelligence
community's budget, in adjusted terms, increased by 80 percent.
Mr. President, what we are facing today in honest debate can no
longer be concluded to be whether or not adversaries of the United
States will gain information about our intentions and abilities of our
intelligence community, because our adversaries have neither the means
to respond nor probably the ability in all cases to understand the
operations of our intelligence community. The only people being
shielded from this information are not adversaries, but the taxpayers
of the United States.
Indeed, general accountings, in estimates, of American intelligence
expenditures appear in all of our major newspapers. Only the exact
aggregate numbers are denied, and not denied to adversaries; they are
denied to the people of this country who need to make informed
judgments as voters, as taxpayers about our national priorities.
So I rise today with an amendment that this Senate has considered
before. It is simply this: To publish, not the details of the CIA
expenditures, not to reveal their programs, to share no numbers and no
estimates on any technology, any element of spending of the
intelligence community but one, the total aggregate amount of money
spent in the U.S. Government for the Central Intelligence Agency.
This one number would allow the American people, as an informed
electorate, to make their judgments on a
[[Page S5971]]
comparative basis about whether or not, as compared to defense, social
programs, foreign assistance, and the intelligence community, this
Congress is making the right judgments.
And yet, it will be argued that our adversaries would have this
information and use it for their own purposes. I understood that
argument when we were concerned that the Russians, the Soviet Union
with all of its capabilities, as our principal adversary would have
this information and could adjust their own intelligence programs to
respond.
There is no Soviet Union; and the cold war has ended. The decline and
change of our national defense expenditures give the best testament to
the fact that this Senate has accepted that fact.
Now we face new adversaries, terrorist organizations, a list of
pariah states from North Korea to Libya, to Iraq and Iran. And so the
question begs itself, what if these nations possessed this one
aggregate number, of what value would it be to them? By most press
estimates, total expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency are
not only more than the intelligence expenditures of each of those
countries, it is more than all those countries combined.
Indeed, the United States, by most published estimates, spends more
on its intelligence community than the gross national product of every
one of these potential adversaries of the United States. And so for
those who will argue that we cannot share this information with the
American people, I ask, what is it North Korea would do with this
information or Libya or Iran? What possible change would they have in
their own programs or their own expenditures? They have not the means
to respond or to change.
I repeat in my argument, Mr. President, as I began. There is only one
people on this Earth that need this information to make important
judgments about their future who are being shielded from it, and it is
the people of the United States.
Mr. President, if this argument seems familiar to Members of the
Senate, it is because it is not new. This Senate voted on this question
in 1991, a sense-of-the-Senate resolution in 1992, and again in 1993.
Indeed, most Members of the Senate who in a matter of moments will
vote on this question have already voted in previous years to share
this information with the American people.
Eighty members of the House of Representatives have cosponsored
legislation to do so.
The Federation of American Scientists have gone to Federal court to
compel its release on constitutional principles.
But perhaps most significantly, the President of the United States
himself, our Commander in Chief, who has the ultimate authority for the
security of the United States, suggested if the Congress would concur,
he would release this information.
This Senate on previous occasions has confirmed for the directorship
for the Central Intelligence Agency Admiral Turner, Mr. Gates, Mr.
Deutch. Each of those CIA Directors themselves have argued that
concealing this information serves no purpose and it should be shared
with the people.
This Congress has disagreed on this issue before. And so a bipartisan
commission, chaired by former Secretary of Defense Brown, and by our
former Senate colleague, Senator Rudman, addressed this question in
their own report. And they urged the public release of this
information.
To my colleagues, when you have voted on this question previously,
when Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, the President of the
United States, and a commission charged for this very purpose argues
that this single individual aggregate amount of spending should be
released, by what possible logic do we continue to shield the American
people from these facts?
But if, Mr. President, in their individual judgment my colleagues are
still convinced that because of the danger of these new pariah states
and the rise of international terrorism, this expenditure must be
concealed from our people, I urge them to consider the fact that we are
also not the first of the allied nations to face this judgment.
The British Parliament has had this debate. And Britain decided its
people should share with this information. The Canadian Parliament, the
Australian Parliament, and perhaps most significant, the Israeli
Knesset--no nation on Earth is faced with the threat of terrorism more
than Israel--but they have decided, in spite of the fact that their
program cannot conceivably have our capabilities nor the relative
advantage versus their adversaries as we face as opposed to our own,
they share this information with the people of Israel.
We remain the exception.
Fifty years since the Second World War when a judgment was made that
for national security, a judgment appropriately made for national
security, that this information was best concealed, we retain this last
relic of the cold war.
Mr. President, this is a national policy to conceal the gross
expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency that has lost its
rationale. It is time for this Senate once again, as it has on three
previous occasions, to vote to allow the sharing of this information
with the American people. But we do so not because we believe it is a
compromise with national security that has become necessary, but
because indeed many of us believe it would enhance our national
security.
Perhaps most significantly in the Brown report was a conclusion that,
in the commission's words, "Most intelligence agencies seem to lack a
resource strategy apart from what is reflected in the President's 6-
year budget projection. Indeed, until the intelligence community
reforms its budget process, it is poorly positioned to implement
strategies."
Efficiency, accountability, proper judgments for national security,
like all other aspects of the governance of the United States, are best
made under the careful scrutiny of the people themselves. National
security is not only the exception, it may be the best rule. It is the
lives of the people of this country themselves--from terrorism and from
a new group of potential adversaries--that we are charged with
protecting. Allow the people of the United States to participate in
this judgment.
I urge my colleagues, once again, as you have done on several
previous occasions, to join with the previous leadership of the Central
Intelligence Agency in concurrence with the commission report that you
commissioned to be done, and allow this single number, this one gross
expenditure of the Central Intelligence Agency's budget, to be released
to the American people.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the Torricelli amendment.
I oppose the public disclosure of the overall level of intelligence
funding as proposed by the amendment offered by the Senator from New
Jersey.
Mr. President, it does not, I repeat, it does not take an act of
Congress to declassify the top line of the intelligence budget as this
amendment would do if adopted. The President of the United States has
always had and has today the authority to disclose this figure and has
always chosen to keep it classified.
Determining classification is the responsibility and is the duty of
the Chief Executive of the United States, the President, who is also,
as we know, the Commander in Chief. Presidents Truman through Clinton
have determined this figure is to remain classified, and I believe we
should not overrule that judgment.
The purpose of maintaining a premier intelligence capability is to
save lives and to prevent and, if we get in them, win wars. The
foundation of an effective intelligence capability, as we all know, is
secrecy. Secrecy protects not only the information that we collect, but
also the brave people that put themselves at risk to do the collection
of it. We are an open and a free society that generally abhors secret
dealings by our Government. But in the case of intelligence collection
and analysis, secrecy, I believe, is absolutely necessary.
Some of my colleagues argue that the American people have a right to
know how much of their money is being spent to defend their Nation's
security through intelligence-gathering operations. I assert today
that, through its elected officials, the public interests are being
effectively served.
[[Page S5972]]
As U.S. Senators, all of us we have been elected to represent the
interests of our constituents and to act on their behalf. Therefore,
the American people do know, in a sense, how much we spend on national
security because their elected representatives know. As on many other
issues, Mr. President, our constituents have a voice, and it speaks
through the Senators and Representatives and the President of the
United States.
Some of my colleagues will argue that disclosing the total budget
amount will instill public confidence and enable the American people to
know what portion of the Federal budget is dedicated to intelligence
activities. It appears there is general agreement that the details of
the intelligence budget should remain classified, however. I believe
that the total budget figure is of no use to anyone but to those who
wish to do us harm.
For example, what do the numbers tell our adversaries or potential
adversaries in the world? In any given year, perhaps, not a great deal.
But while watching the changes in the budget over time, and using
information gathered by their own intelligence activities,
sophisticated analysts can indeed learn a great deal.
Trend analysis, Mr. President, you are familiar with, is a technique
that our own analysts use to make predictions and to reach conclusions.
There are hostile foreign intelligence agencies all over the world that
are focused solely on gathering every bit of information that they can
about our own intelligence-gathering operations and our capabilities.
Their ultimate goal is to exploit weaknesses and to deny access and to
deceive our own intelligence collectors. Denial and deception is
already a serious concern for the intelligence community, and providing
our enemies or potential enemies with any insight as to what we spend
on intelligence will only make it worse, not better.
Others will argue that the total budget figure is already in the
public domain, and we should just acknowledge it. Mr. President, we
never, never confirm or deny classified information that may have been
published somewhere or spoken by someone. Classified information, as
you well know, remains classified even if it wrongly makes it into the
public domain.
We will also, Mr. President, hear from those who say disclosure is
required by the statement and account clause of the Constitution,
article 1, section 9, clause 7. Mr. President, I assert today that the
current practice is fully consistent with the Constitution, and it
carries forward a tradition of secret expenditures dating back more
than 200 years. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court of the United
States observed in the U.S. versus Richardson case, "Historical
analysis of clause 7 suggests that it was intended to permit secrecy in
operations."
Further, Mr. President, the figure is available to all Members of
Congress, the U.S. Senate and, the U.S. House to review.
As I reviewed the debate on this topic, I found a statement by my
colleague from Rhode Island, Senator Chafee, in 1993, with which I
totally agree, and which is appropriate today. Senator Chafee, the
distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, said, disclosing the top line
budget figure would only "frustrate a curious public and politicize
the intelligence budget."
He pointed out further, "What many proponents of disclosure want to
do is to put a bull's-eye on the intelligence budget and hold it up as
a target for public ridicule, recognizing full well that we cannot
engage in a meaningful public debate regarding intelligence programs."
I assure you, Mr. President, once the overall number has been
released, there would be efforts to amend the overall funding for
intelligence in open session. I do not believe it would be good for the
Senate, the House, or the American people. Otherwise, I believe
President Clinton and Presidents before him would have already
declassified the number which they have the right to do.
I yield the floor.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I first thank my colleagues who have
joined me in this effort today, most significantly, Senator Specter of
Pennsylvania, who has led this effort previously and makes this a
genuinely bipartisan effort to share this information with the American
people, Senator Bumpers of Arkansas, who has argued so passionately on
this cause previously, and, of course, the ranking member of the
intelligence committee, Senator Kerrey of Nebraska.
Mr. President, I know that many Government agencies would have liked
the right to keep the information of their expenditures on a
proprietary basis. This logic must have occurred to the Defense
Department. Indeed, it was difficult for the Defense Department, at the
end of the cold war, to begin to share some of the programs, exhibit
some of the technology and the assets it possessed that previously had
remained secret.
This Congress and the leadership of this Government made a judgment
that the people could not make the proper decisions about their elected
representatives and we could not make the proper judgments for them
without complete access to information. I want to remind my colleagues,
we have faced this issue previously in 3 different years since the end
of the cold war, and on each of those occasions this Senate has voted,
even if contained in other legislation, either by law or by a sense of
the Senate, to permit the publishing of this one single number. If we
fail to do so today, it will be a change in the position of this
Senate. It will be an inconsistency by a majority of Senators who
served in this institution in those previous years.
By what logic would we now change our minds? Because it will endanger
an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency? On what basis and by
what theory would anyone be endangered because they knew a total amount
of money spent by the intelligence community? Because an adversary will
change their plans, initiate a new program, compete with the
intelligence community of the United States--when I have demonstrated
that every and each potential adversary of the United States has a
gross national product that is, according to published reports, smaller
than the gross expenditures of the American intelligence communities?
Mr. President, I conclude as I began: There is only one group of
people who have real need of this information upon which to make
decisions, and it is the taxpayers of the United States. This is the
last cloud of secrecy necessitated by war, cold war and struggle, that
should be removed by this Government. My colleagues have decided to do
so before, but we have been frustrated in conference, and our will has
not been done. It can be done now.
I urge an affirmative vote to allow the public release of the
aggregate expenditures of the United States intelligence community, a
single number, published each year. The people of our country can make
a good and accurate judgment.
I want to thank again Senator Specter, Senator Bumpers, and Senator
Kerrey for joining me in this and each of my colleagues who have voted
previously on a majority basis to allow its release.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in the strongest possible opposition
to the Torricelli amendment. My grandmother used to say there are some
things that are better not to know, and that is the case with certain
highly classified information that is important to the national
security of American citizens. One of those things is how much money is
spent on our intelligence activities, information which is very useful
to our opponents, and not particularly useful to the average American
taxpayer.
The public's right to know, as has been pointed out by the
distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee, is adequately
protected by our elected representatives. That is why we have special
provisions of law, Mr. President, that call for certain Members of
Congress only--not every Member of Congress, but only certain Members
of Congress--to be apprised of certain operations and certain details
of our intelligence operations.
For example, in an operation such as that which nabbed the terrorist
Mir Aimal Kansi just last Saturday, it was known to only a handful of
our elected representatives because that is what the law provides. The
American people did not need to know that, and, indeed,
[[Page S5973]]
it would have jeopardized American lives, the people who were involved
in this operation, had there been more widespread knowledge. There is a
reason why this information is not public.
The irony is, Mr. President, that revealing the top-line number, the
aggregate amount we spend on intelligence, would be of very little use
to the average American debating whether or not it is the proper
number, but it means a great deal to clever potential adversaries who
do trend analysis and extrapolation from year to year to see whether or
not there are changes and who try to determine whether or not we have,
therefore, made certain commitments to our intelligence that would be
of interest to. So on the one hand it doesn't help the average American
much. On the other hand, it could easily help opponents a great deal.
Unfortunately, there is no way for us to defend that budget. If the top
line is $10 billion, or $100 billion, or $50 billion, just
hypothetically, whatever number, somebody might say, "I don't think
that is a good number." How do you defend that number without getting
into all of the sensitive, classified information that comprises the
budget? So it is not a good idea.
No other friend or ally of the United States reveals the amount that
it spends on intelligence. It would set a terrible, terrible precedent,
Mr. President, because right after the aggregate budget was revealed,
everybody would realize that, to the average American, that doesn't say
much and so the calls would be very quick for more information. "You
gave us the top line; how about the categories on which it is spent?"
This is a slippery slope, Mr. President. Reveal the first number and
it will be just a matter of minutes before there will be a call to
reveal more information. As a matter of fact, our colleague from New
Jersey, in effect, just did that by saying that "in the area of
defense spending we have determined that we need complete access to
information," to use his quotation. And the defense budget is known.
Yes, the defense budget is known, but there is still much about defense
that is highly classified. That is the way it needs to be.
Another argument of our friend from New Jersey is that there have
been leaks and there is no reason to continue to withhold the
information. Of course, the proper policy when there are leaks is to
find them. They can be very damaging to our national security. The
answer is not to, therefore, let all the information out. The object is
to try to prevent those leaks from causing more harm.
In conclusion, Mr. President, if this is such a good idea, one
wonders why previous Presidents haven't done it. They have the
authority and power to do it, and they have not done it because they
know full well that it is not the right thing to do. I just suggest
that it would be highly, highly dangerous to the national security
interests of the United States, to the lives of Americans who literally
put their lives on the line to work operations that are very dangerous
that the public never hears about, because, obviously, they can't, or
it would compromise the sources and methods by which we obtain
information. It would be very dangerous to these people if our
potential adversaries could soon begin to pick apart the budget and
learn what kind of capabilities we have to use against them.
I urge, in the strongest possible terms, that we vote against the
Torricelli amendment and urge my colleagues, when we have that vote, to
do so.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I yield to my friend from Ohio as much
time as he might need.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise today in strong opposition to the
amendment proposed by my colleague and friend from New Jersey. It is an
amendment that would disclose the total intelligence budget.
Mr. President, intelligence budgets and programs are kept secret for
a good reason: to keep our enemies--and, yes, we still do have
enemies--from knowing how much we are spending on intelligence and, of
course, on what programs. Mr. President, disclosure of the total budget
might well be the first step leading to a demand to disclose individual
agency budgets, as my colleague from Arizona has just stated, and
inevitably to disclose specific programs.
Mr. President, the reality is that a single budget figure with no
additional detail or disclosure of capabilities does not, in my view,
provide a sufficient basis for a meaningful public debate. Therefore, I
think there would be pressure to disclose more. But such a disclosure
would only help our enemies. It would provide them with vital
information on our Nation's resource allocations. It would undermine
our commitment to early warning for our policymakers, as well as our
ability to provide our military the intelligence information that is
essential to making them the best in the world.
President Clinton--as the chairman of the committee has already
pointed out--has the authority to disclose the total budget on his own.
However, he has not done so. President Clinton joins every President
since Harry Truman in making that same policy decision--that it is not
in the best interest of this country to disclose this dollar figure.
Mr. President, the practice of keeping the budget secret is fully
consistent with the Constitution, and it carries forward a tradition of
secret expenditures dating back more than 200 years. The Supreme Court
observed in U.S. versus Richardson that "historical analysis of clause
7 suggests that it was intended to permit secrecy in operations." It
is clear, Mr. President, the Constitution provides for this secrecy.
This intelligence figure is available to all Senators, as is the
entire classified schedule of authorizations and classified annex to
the Intelligence Authorization Act. Members of the Intelligence
Committee, members of the Armed Services Committee, members of the
Appropriations Committees in both the House and the Senate do provide
vigorous oversight of the intelligence community and of its budget.
There is full scrutiny through the people's elected representatives,
while at the same time providing protection for intelligence
operations.
Mr. President, to disclose the budget would break with tradition. I
believe it would help our enemies and it would not provide the public
with any meaningful information. For these reasons, Mr. President, I
urge my colleagues to vote "no" on this amendment.
I believe that little can be gained, but much can be lost over time
by this type of disclosure.
I thank the Chair and my colleague from Alabama.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. TORRICELLI. I yield the remainder of our time to Senator Specter
of Pennsylvania, and I thank him for his leadership.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I support public disclosure of the
overall funding law and would start with the language of the
Constitution, which I believe supports that disclosure:
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.
On the base, that calls for public disclosure. I know some courts
have limited that interpretation to what Congress says. But I believe,
as a constitutional matter, disclosure ought to be made. And beyond
that, as a public policy matter for the Congress, disclosure ought to
be made.
In the 8 years I served on the Senate Intelligence Committee--2 years
as chairman--it seemed to me that much too much is kept secret, and
disclosing the overall amount is not to disclose the programs. We have
seen terrorism as the instrumentally for political purposes, replacing
war. Intelligence is very important to fight terrorism, and I believe
if the American people knew how much money was being spent on
intelligence gathering, the people would want more spent and not less.
Just yesterday, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee took
issue with the way the Central Intelligence Agency is being run, saying
it is not being run effectively. Much too much is being kept secret,
Mr. President. We can protect important sources and methods and means
from being disclosed, but still have a great deal more candor for the
American people about what is going on in intelligence. When we look at
the budget of the CIA or the
[[Page S5974]]
FBI for domestic intelligence, those are items which ought to be
subject to public debate. The public ought to be demanding more. The
public ought to be receiving more. As a very basic first step, it is my
sense--having some familiarity with the Intelligence Committee
operations and overall budget--that the funding level ought to be
disclosed.
I thank the Chair and inquire how much of the 2\1/2\ minutes is left.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 19 seconds remaining.
Mr. SPECTER. I leave that to the sponsor of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I believe I have consumed all of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 10 seconds.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The 10 seconds I have remaining I yield to the
Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I support the amendment offered by Senator
Torricelli to declassify the aggregate intelligence budget. This body
has been on record a number of times over the years as supporting
disclosure of the intelligence budget total. Last year the Intelligence
Authorization Act as reported by the SSCI and adopted by the Senate
required the President to disclose in his annual budget submission to
Congress each year the total amount appropriated for all intelligence
and intelligence-related activities, that is, the total of NFIP, JMIP,
and TIARA, in the current fiscal year and the total amount requested
for the next fiscal year. As has happened on each previous occasion
that the Senate has voted in favor of disclosure, the provision in last
year's bill ultimately was dropped in conference with the House.
The Senate's support for this position dates back at least to the
Church committee, in 1976. The following year the Select Committee on
Intelligence was established and the members of that committee voted in
1977 for public disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget. In the
years since, the Senate has regularly voted to disclose the aggregate
amount of intelligence spending.
Senators will recall that in 1994 we chartered a commission to
conduct a comprehensive review of American intelligence. Part of the
statutory mandate of this commission was to study the issue of budget
disclosure and resolve it once and for all. The Aspin-Brown Commission
unanimously recommended that the total amounts appropriated and
requested be disclosed. Senators Warner and Rudman and other
traditional opponents agreed. In fact, Senator Rudman and former
Defense Secretary Brown would declassify the CIA budget as well in
order to show it is only a fraction of the overall budget.
Public disclosure of total budget amount for intelligence is
symbolically important: it sends a message that intelligence is a
legitimate and open governmental function. It helps to instill public
confidence and enables the American people to know what proportion of
the entire Federal budget is spent on intelligence, as compared with
other functions. Moreover, there is an argument that disclosure is
constitutionally required by the statement and account clause of the
Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 9, clause 7), which provides that "A
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public money shall be published from time to time."
Disclosure of the aggregate budget amount will not harm our national
security. Disclosure of the top-line number is not sufficient to alert
adversaries to deployment of new systems; spending on new systems
doesn't occur in 1 year, it's stretched out over a number of years.
There has been no history of conspicuous spikes in intelligence
spending. It is interesting to note that our major allies disclose
their intelligence budgets. The United Kingdom recently decided to
disclose the total budgets for MI-5 and MI-6.
The reality is that this number is already in the public domain in
approximate terms. The intelligence budget is already widely reported
in the press. A congressional committee released the actual numbers for
all agencies a couple of years ago by mistake. Even efforts to talk
around the budget numbers, by using percentages, for example, instead
of actual numbers, have given industrious reporters and analysts
sufficient information to extrapolate the dollar figures. Knowledge of
the top-line does not give an adversary useful information about
intelligence targets, sources, or methods.
Nor has the de facto disclosure of the budget total taken us down the
so-called slippery slope of more detailed disclosures. In fact, I
believe this disclosure will actually strengthen our ability to protect
vital national secrets by bolstering the credibility of our
classification decisions--officially revealing the budget total tells
the American public that we are using classification to protect vital
national secrets, not to conceal information that might be inconvenient
to defend. And I think it would not be difficult to defend the size of
the intelligence budget, given the complex world we live in today.
For these reasons, Mr. President, I support this amendment and urge
my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 4\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. SHELBY. I will try to be brief.
Mr. President, as former Director Woolsey of the CIA once said, "It
is impossible to conduct a meaningful debate on the effects of such
amendments without explaining the component parts of the intelligence
budget."
Think about that a minute. How much is spent for the CIA? How much is
spent for signals intelligence? How much are we spending on satellites,
and so on?
It is that discussion which creates the likelihood of disclosure of
sensitive intelligence information that would be of benefit to our
adversaries.
Mr. President, there are many opportunities to debate and discuss the
details of the intelligence budget among the Intelligence, Armed
Services, and Appropriations Committees. We all do this. This is not a
topic that goes unexamined by the people's representatives in the
Senate or the House.
Mr. President, the Senate Intelligence Committee was established to
ensure vigorous oversight of our intelligence activities. I believe
myself that the committee faithfully represents the American people.
Our goal is to maintain a robust intelligence capability while ensuring
that our intelligence activities are conducted in accordance with
American values and constitutional principles.
The members of the committee take their responsibilities very
seriously, and I pledge to the American people that we will continue to
represent the best interests of this Nation.
Mr. President, our intelligence capabilities are a critical national
asset and, as chairman of the committee, I will not support an effort
to disclose classified information when there is no compelling argument
to do so. Therefore, I strongly urge my colleagues to oppose the
Torricelli amendment.
I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[...]
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kempthorne). The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the next two
votes be reduced to 10 minutes time limit.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, also, I would like to include in that
consent that there be 2 minutes of debate before each vote, equally
divided, so an explanation can be given of those.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that members of
the Finance Committee be immediately informed of the result of this
vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing no objection, it
is so ordered.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.
Amendment No. 416
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on amendment No. 416,
offered by the Senator from New Jersey. We have 2 minutes for debate.
The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I thank Senator Specter and Senator
Kerrey for joining me in this effort. We asked the Senate to do that
which you have done three times before, that which three previous
Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency have endorsed, that which
the Brown Commission, in a bipartisan review of this issue, has
endorsed--that is to share with the American people and the Members of
this Congress the total aggregate amount spent on intelligence
activities by the U.S. Government. No details, no programs, no internal
facts--one aggregate number, so the people can make their own judgments
whether the direction and the amount of intelligence spending is
appropriate and proper for the U.S. Government. I urge an affirmative
vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I oppose the public disclosure of the
overall level of intelligence funding as proposed by the Torricelli
amendment. It does not take an act of Congress to declassify the top
line of intelligence spending. The President of the United States has
always had the authority to disclose this figure, and has always chosen
to keep it classified. Determining the classification is the
responsibility and, I believe, the duty of the Chief Executive and
Commander in Chief. Presidents Truman through Clinton have determined
that this figure is to remain classified and we should not overrule
that judgment.
I yield the remainder of my time. I ask my colleagues to vote no on
the Torricelli amendment.
Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle]
is necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle] is
absent due to a death in the family.
The result was announced--yeas 43, nays 56, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 108 Leg.]
YEAS--43
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Glenn
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Specter
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
NAYS--56
Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Faircloth
Ford
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NOT VOTING--1
Daschle
The amendment (No. 416) was rejected.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was rejected.
Mr. THOMAS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third and was read the
third time.
Mr. SHELBY. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the agreement, there will now be 2
minutes for debate equally divided.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I yield back the minute that was allotted
to us.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama has yielded back his
time.
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I yield back whatever time is on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the
question is, Shall the bill, as amended, pass? The yeas and nays have
been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle]
is necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle] is
absent due to a death in the family.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 98, nays 1, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 109 Leg.]
YEAS--98
Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
[[Page S5976]]
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
NAYS--1
Harkin
NOT VOTING--1
Daschle
The bill (S. 858), as amended, was passed, as follows:
S. 858
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
"Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998".
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Detail of intelligence community personnel.
Sec. 304. Extension of application of sanctions laws to intelligence
activities.
Sec. 305. Administrative location of the Office of the Director of
Central Intelligence.
Sec. 306. Encouragement of disclosure of certain information to
Congress.
Sec. 307. Provision of information on violent crimes against United
States citizens abroad to victims and victims' families.
Sec. 308. Standards for spelling of foreign names and places and for
use of geographic coordinates.
Sec. 309. Sense of the Senate.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Multiyear leasing authority.
Sec. 402. Subpoena authority for the Inspector General of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Academic degrees in intelligence.
Sec. 502. Funding for infrastructure and quality of life improvements
at Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling stations.
Sec. 503. Misuse of National Reconnaissance Office name, initials, or
seal.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 1998 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(12) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1998,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ____
of the One Hundred Fifth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the Executive Branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
1998 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) Authorization.--There is authorized to be appropriated
for the Community Management Account of the Director of
Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1998 the sum of
$90,580,000.
(2) Availability of certain funds.--Within such amount,
funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and
Development Committee and the Environmental Intelligence and
Applications Program shall remain available until September
30, 1999.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized a total of 278 full-time
personnel as of September 30, 1998. Personnel serving in such
elements may be permanent employees of the Community
Management Account element or personnel detailed from other
elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there is also
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 1998 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a).
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Community Management Account as of September 30, 1998, there
is hereby authorized such additional personnel for such
elements as of that date as is specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations.
(3) Construction.--Authorizations in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations may not be construed to increase
authorizations of appropriations or personnel for the
Community Management Account except to the extent specified
in the applicable paragraph of this subsection.
(d) Reimbursement.--During fiscal year 1998, any officer or
employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces
who is detailed to the staff of an element within the
Community Management Account from another element of the
United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable
basis, except that any such officer, employee, or member may
be detailed on a non-reimbursable basis for a period of less
than one year for the performance of temporary functions as
required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 1998 the sum of $196,900,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. DETAIL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL.
(a) Detail.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the head of a department or agency having jurisdiction
over an element in the intelligence community or the head of
an element of the intelligence community may detail any
employee of the department, agency, or element to serve in
any position in the Intelligence Community Assignment
Program.
(2) Basis of detail.--
(A) In general.--Personnel may be detailed under paragraph
(1) on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.
(B) Period of nonreimbursable detail.--Personnel detailed
on a nonreimbursable basis shall be detailed for such periods
not to exceed three years as are agreed upon between the
heads of the departments or agencies concerned. However, the
heads of the departments or agencies may provide for the
extension of a detail for not to exceed one year if the
extension is in the public interest.
(b) Benefits, Allowances, and Incentives.--The department,
agency, or element
[[Page S5977]]
detailing personnel to the Intelligence Community Assignment
Program under subsection (a) on a non-reimbursable basis may
provide such personnel any salary, pay, retirement, or other
benefits, allowances (including travel allowances), or
incentives as are provided to other personnel of the
department, agency, or element.
(c) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect on June
1, 1997.
SEC. 304. EXTENSION OF APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
441d) is amended by striking out "January 6, 1998" and
inserting in lieu thereof "January 6, 2001".
SEC. 305. ADMINISTRATIVE LOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(4) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
shall, for administrative purposes, be within the Central
Intelligence Agency.".
SEC. 306. ENCOURAGEMENT OF DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN INFORMATION
TO CONGRESS.
(a) Encouragement.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall take appropriate
actions to inform the employees of the executive branch, and
employees of contractors carrying out activities under
classified contracts, that the disclosure of information
described in paragraph (2) to the committee of Congress
having oversight responsibility for the department, agency,
or element to which such information relates, or to the
Members of Congress who represent such employees, is not
prohibited by law, executive order, or regulation or
otherwise contrary to public policy.
(2) Covered information.--Paragraph (1) applies to
information, including classified information, that an
employee reasonably believes to evidence--
(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation;
(B) a false statement to Congress on an issue of material
fact; or
(C) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse
of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety.
(b) Report.--On the date that is 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress
a report on the actions taken under subsection (a).
SEC. 307. PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST
UNITED STATES CITIZENS ABROAD TO VICTIMS AND
VICTIMS' FAMILIES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the national interests of the United States to
provide information regarding the murder or kidnapping of
United States citizens abroad to the victims, or the families
of victims, of such crimes; and
(2) the provision of such information is sufficiently
important that the discharge of the responsibility for
identifying and disseminating such information should be
vested in a cabinet-level officer of the United States
Government.
(b) Responsibility.--The Secretary of State shall take
appropriate actions to ensure that the United States
Government takes all appropriate actions to--
(1) identify promptly information (including classified
information) in the possession of the departments and
agencies of the United States Government regarding the murder
or kidnapping of United States citizens abroad; and
(2) subject to subsection (c), make such information
available to the victims or, where appropriate, the families
of victims of such crimes.
(c) Classified Information.--The Secretary shall work with
the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that
classified information relevant to a crime covered by
subsection (b) is promptly reviewed and, to the maximum
extent practicable without jeopardizing sensitive sources and
methods or other vital national security interests, made
available under that subsection.
SEC. 308. STANDARDS FOR SPELLING OF FOREIGN NAMES AND PLACES
AND FOR USE OF GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES.
(a) Survey of Current Standards.--
(1) Survey.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
carry out a survey of current standards for the spelling of
foreign names and places, and the use of geographic
coordinates for such places, among the elements of the
intelligence community.
(2) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the survey
carried out under paragraph (1).
(b) Guidelines.--
(1) Issuance.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director shall issue guidelines to
ensure the use of uniform spelling of foreign names and
places and the uniform use of geographic coordinates for such
places. The guidelines shall apply to all intelligence
reports, intelligence products, and intelligence databases
prepared and utilized by the elements of the intelligence
community.
(2) Basis.--The guidelines under paragraph (1) shall, to
the maximum extent practicable, be based on current United
States Government standards for the transliteration of
foreign names, standards for foreign place names developed by
the Board on Geographic Names, and a standard set of
geographic coordinates.
(3) Submittal to congress.--The Director shall submit a
copy of the guidelines to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(c) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term "congressional intelligence committees"
means the following:
(1) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 309. SENSE OF THE SENATE.
It is the sense of the Senate that any tax legislation
enacted by the Congress this year should meet a standard of
fairness in its distributional impact on upper, middle and
lower income taxpayers, and that any such legislation should
not disproportionately benefit the highest income taxpayers.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. MULTIYEAR LEASING AUTHORITY.
Section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 403f) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (e), by striking out "without regard"
and all that follows through the end and inserting in lieu
thereof a semicolon;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (f) as paragraph (g); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (e) the following new
paragraph (f):
"(f) Notwithstanding section 1341(a)(1) of title 31,
United States Code, enter into multiyear leases for lease
terms of not to exceed 15 years, except that--
"(1) any such lease shall be subject to the availability
of appropriations in an amount necessary to cover--
"(A) rental payments over the entire term of the lease; or
"(B) rental payments over the first 12 months of the term
of the lease and the penalty, if any, payable in the event of
the termination of the lease at the end of the first 12
months of the term; and
"(2) if the Agency enters into a lease using the authority
in subparagraph (1)(B)--
"(A) the lease shall include a clause that provides that
the lease shall be terminated if specific appropriations
available for the rental payments are not provided in advance
of the obligation to make the rental payments;
"(B) notwithstanding section 1552 of title 31, United
States Code, amounts obligated for paying costs associated
with terminating the lease shall remain available until such
costs are paid;
"(C) amounts obligated for payment of costs associated
with terminating the lease may be used instead to make rental
payments under the lease, but only to the extent that such
amounts are not required to pay such costs; and
"(D) amounts available in a fiscal year to make rental
payments under the lease shall be available for that purpose
for not more than 12 months commencing at any time during the
fiscal year; and".
SEC. 402. SUBPOENA AUTHORITY FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Authority.--Subsection (e) of section 17 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (7) as
paragraphs (6) through (8), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new
paragraph (5):
"(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the
production of all information, documents, reports, answers,
records, accounts, papers, and other data and documentary
evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General.
"(B) In the case of Government agencies, the Inspector
General shall obtain information, documents, reports,
answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and
evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using
procedures other than subpoenas.
"(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or
on behalf of any other element or component of the Agency.
"(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a
subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be
enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the
United States.
"(E) Not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year,
the Inspector General shall submit to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report of
the Inspector General's exercise of authority under this
paragraph during the preceding six months.".
(b) Limitation on Authority for Protection of National
Security.--Subsection (b)(3) of that section is amended by
inserting ", or from issuing any subpoena, after the
Inspector General has decided to initiate, carry out, or
complete such audit, inspection, or investigation or to issue
such subpoena," after "or investigation".
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. ACADEMIC DEGREES IN INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Section 2161 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
[[Page S5978]]
"Sec. 2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: master of
science in strategic intelligence; bachelor of science in
intelligence
"Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense,
the President of the Joint Military Intelligence College may,
upon recommendation by the faculty of the college, confer the
degree of master of science in strategic intelligence and the
degree of bachelor of science in intelligence upon the
graduates of the college who have fulfilled the requirements
for such degree.".
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The item relating to section
2161 in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108
of such title is amended to read as follows:
"2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: master of science in
strategic intelligence; bachelor of science in
intelligence.".
SEC. 502. FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND QUALITY OF LIFE
IMPROVEMENTS AT MENWITH HILL AND BAD AIBLING
STATIONS.
Section 506(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-93; 109 Stat. 974) is
amended by striking out "for fiscal years 1996 and 1997"
and inserting in lieu thereof "for fiscal years 1998 and
1999".
SEC. 503. MISUSE OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE NAME,
INITIALS, OR SEAL.
(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
"Sec. 426. Unauthorized use of National Reconnaissance
Office name, initials, or seal
"(a) Prohibited Acts.--Except with the joint written
permission of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence, no person may knowingly use, in
connection with any merchandise, retail product,
impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity, in a
manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that
such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the
Secretary or the Director, any of the following:
"(1) The words `National Reconnaissance Office' or the
initials `NRO'.
"(2) The seal of the National Reconnaissance Office.
"(3) Any colorable imitation of such words, initials, or
seal.
"(b) Injunction.--(1) Whenever it appears to the Attorney
General that any person is engaged or is about to engage in
an act or practice which constitutes or will constitute
conduct prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General
may initiate a civil proceeding in a district court of the
United States to enjoin such act or practice.
"(2) Such court shall proceed as soon as practicable to
the hearing and determination of such action and may, at any
time before final determination, enter such restraining
orders or prohibitions, or take such other action as is
warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to any
person or class of persons for whose protection the action is
brought."
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of that subchapter is amended by adding at the end
the following:
"426. Unauthorized use of National Reconnaissance Office name,
initials, or seal.".
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
(The remarks of Mr. Cochran pertaining to the introduction of S. 939
are located in today's Record under "Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.")
Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
____________________