Congressional Record: October 23, 1997 (Senate)
Page S11011-S11012
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, since the founding of our Republic, we
have faced a dilemma as old perhaps as the concept of democracy itself.
That is how the Nation is governed: With an informed electorate, but at
the same time we can protect the national security by containing
information which might be used against ourselves.
This debate has largely, though not exclusively, been settled by the
judgment that we are best served by informing the people so they can
make the proper judgments about choosing the leadership of our country.
Indeed, this is the philosophy that gave rise to the first amendment
to the Constitution, but perhaps more exactly also to article I,
section 9, which reads, "a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public money shall be published from
time to time."
There has, however, in spite of this general judgment of the need to
govern the Nation based on the best possible information to the
electorate, and in spite of this rather specific constitutional
provision, been a notable and exceptional exception in the Nation's
accounting.
I speak obviously of the Central Intelligence Agency in its half-
century determination to keep its accounting, its expenditures, private
from the people of the United States. And, indeed, during both times of
national conflict and in the broad period of the cold war it was a
policy with a considerable rationale.
The United States faced, in the Soviet Union, an adversary which if
in possession of our expenditures of the intelligence community would
learn a great deal about our national intentions and our capabilities.
But now some 7 years after the end of the cold war, there is no longer
a rationale for not sharing with the American people at least the
aggregate amount of spending of the American intelligence community.
I do not speak, obviously, of specific requirements for expenditures
in individual programs or even broad categories of expenditures but
whether or not the American people should be informed of the total
aggregate spending since the United States no longer faces an adversary
which, if in possession of that amount of expenditures, could make real
use of it.
Last Wednesday, George Tenet, the new Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, perhaps because of this changed situation, took a
very important step. In response to a Freedom of Information Act
request filed by the Federation of American Scientists, Director Tenet
ended 50 years of what may have been unconstitutional secrecy and finally
disclosed the aggregate budget numbers of the U.S. intelligence community.
I take the floor today, Mr. President, to applaud President Clinton
and Director Tenet for taking this first step, but note with some
considerable regret that this judgment was made in response to a
lawsuit filed against the administration not with the support of this
Congress and, indeed, in spite of a vote taken in response to an
amendment that I offered on the floor of this Senate.
While I applaud Director Tenet, I also speak with regret that while
the budget numbers were offered this year, they specifically were not
made as a change in permanent policy, therefore, raising the specter
that the American people are being provided this information in 1997,
with the possibility they may never be given this information again.
That perhaps leads to the most cynical interpretation of all, that
what is really feared by the intelligence community is not the sharing
of this aggregate amount of spending with foreign adversaries, but if
the American people have this number they would be able to gauge this
year to next, to next, and into the future whether or not the
intelligence budget of this country is rising or falling, whether it is
too large or too small.
What is feared is that the American people will be as engaged in this
debate as they are about Social Security spending or health care or
education spending or even defense spending, which routinely is a part
of the American political debate.
A 1-year number provides precious little information for public
debate about the adequacy or the excessive nature of our spending.
What, of course, is peculiar about this inability to inform the public
is that defense spending, equally or arguably far more important to
national security, is so routinely debated. Perhaps that is the reason
why defense spending in the Nation today, excluding intelligence, is
now 4 percent lower than defense spending in 1980, why in real dollar
terms there has been in the last 7 years such a dramatic reduction in
defense expenditures, while according to the Brown report, intelligence
spending since 1980 in the United States has risen by 80 percent, an
increase in spending almost without parallel.
It is worth noting as well, Mr. President, that in the bipartisan
Brown Commission report, the commission could find no systematic basis
upon which the intelligence budget is even created. In the Commission's
words, "Most intelligence agencies seemed to lack a resource strategy
apart from what is reflected in the President's 6-year budget
projection. Indeed, until the intelligence community reforms its budget
process, it is poorly positioned to implement these strategies."
Mr. President, other countries in the democratic family of nations
have long recognized the need to include defense and intelligence
priorities in their national debate over budgetary matters. Indeed,
Australia, Britain, and Canada long ago lifted this veil of secrecy. I
think, indeed, even the State of Israel, which today faces potentially
more serious adversaries at the very heart of their democracy with a
daily terrorist threat, long ago decided that its democracy was better
served by sharing this information then continuing with the veil of
secrecy.
So, Mr. President, in this notable year when for the first time the
American people are given access to this information about intelligence
spending, the burden now passes to this Congress whether or not we will
allow this to be a single exception, or indeed we will now take the
challenge and make this a permanent change in how we govern the
national intelligence community.
I close, therefore, Mr. President, with the words of Justice Douglas,
who in 1974 wrote in making a judgment about whether or not the budget
should be revealed, "If taxpayers may not ask that rudimentary
question, their sovereignty becomes an empty symbol and a secret
bureaucracy is allowed to run our affairs."
More than 20 years later, Mr. President, this Senate still faces the
same judgment. Director Tenet has met his responsibilities. I am proud
that President Clinton allowed him to proceed. Now the question rests
with us.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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