Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management: An Introduction

Introduction
A supply chain consists of the system of organizations, people, activities, information, and resources that provide products or services to consumers. Like other types of goods, a global supply chain exists for the development, manufacture, and distribution of information technology (IT) products (i.e., hardware and software) and information communications technology (ICT). As with other goods and services, risks exist to this cyber supply chain. This field is known as cyber supply chain risk management (C-SCRM or Cyber SCRM).

Congress and federal agencies have taken actions to bolster cyber supply chain security. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ordered federal agencies to remove Kaspersky security products from their networks because of the risk posed. Legislation was subsequently enacted codifying that order. In addition, Congress in 2018 instructed federal agencies and contractors not to use ICT made by certain Chinese companies. Congress established the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC), which issued an initial rule in 2020. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA, a part of DHS) hosts a public-private ICT SCRM Task Force. The Federal Communications Commission authorized the use of Universal Service Fund money to rip-and-replace certain ICT. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission issued a report highlighting supply chain concerns. Additional legislation has been debated as part of national economic competition bills (e.g., the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act of 2021 and the America COMPETES act of 2022).

While interest in cyber supply chain security has increased recently, there have been other periods of intense scrutiny on supply chain issues. In 2012, for example: the White House issued a report on global supply chain security; the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released an unclassified report on threats from Chinese multinational companies Huawei and ZTE; ZTE was exposed selling phones in the United States with backdoor access; the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) cited supply chain security as a major threat in the Worldwide Threat Assessment; and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied the issue.

This In Focus reviews C-SCRM, discusses ways in which it is currently managed, and highlights issues that Congress may consider for federal agencies.

Cyber Supply Chain Risks
One way to view risks to cyber supply chain security is through the threat actors, their motivations, and ways in which they may compromise technology. DNI has identified Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as cyber threat nations. However, in its report on Department of State telecommunications, GAO highlights that technology is manufactured worldwide and vulnerabilities may be inserted by other malicious actors, such as foreign intelligence services, insiders, or criminals. These actors may be motivated to steal intellectual property, tamper with products, insert counterfeit goods, gain unauthorized access, sell extraneous access, or manipulate the operation of technology. They may accomplish their goals through inserting malicious code in software, manipulating hardware, or a combination of the two.

Cyber supply chain risks do not solely result from malicious human interference. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finds that natural disasters may impede delivery of critical network components; poor quality assurance and engineering practices by vendors may create deficient products; or an entity’s own business practices may result in seeking, buying, and managing sub-par goods. These threats may result in data loss, modification, or exfiltration; system failures; or product unavailability.

Managing Risk
NIST defines C-SCRM as “the process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks associated with the distributed and interconnected nature of [IT] product and service supply chains.” This definition distinguishes C-SCRM as an ongoing activity, rather than a single task, and accounts for the procurement and maintenance of hardware and software.

NIST Special Publication 800-161 provides guidance to federal agencies for how they may go about implementing risk management practices. NIST recommends that C-SCRM should align with an organization’s existing risk management framework. Activities for risk management include cataloguing current systems and business practices, surveying systems for vulnerabilities, and developing processes to mitigate those vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis.

Just because a risk could possibly manifest does not mean that it always exists, nor is it managed as if it perpetually exists. Instead, managers accept that risk is not binary but exists on a spectrum. This perspective pushes managers to consider how they are most at risk and prioritize mitigation strategies. This defense-in-depth strategy accepts that complete security is not guaranteed, but can lead system administrators to deploy tools effectively so that they can detect unwanted activity and stop damages from compounding.

Attackers may not know which defensive strategies are deployed on systems. The chance of exposure is a
consideration attackers evaluate when seeking to mass-compromise technology—and may incentivize them to pursue specific attacks against deliberate targets instead. Attackers may also identify a common vulnerability but seek to selectively use it in order to maintain that method for as long as possible.

Conceptualizing risk is challenging because entities may not have threat information available to them, may lack an appreciation of their own vulnerabilities, or lack a framework to take that information and make resource decisions with it. For entities with general risk management programs, they may not have relevant expertise in IT products and threats to apply their established risk management practices to the supply chain. The prioritization of risk management requires that entities understand their own weaknesses, why they may be targeted, who or what may target them, and how. In order to extend these principles to their supply chain, entities will also need information on their vendors and suppliers, threat tactics, and best practices to mitigate risk.

**Potential Issues for Congress**

Generally, risk profiles (e.g., risk tolerance, resource allocations, vulnerabilities, threats, etc.) and risk management are unique from one entity or sector to another. This makes risk management an activity which is individualized for each entity or sector. However, there are policy areas in which Congress may act with regard to C-SCRM that can affect its success.

**Clarity of Responsibility**

Federal IT management is distributed among many federal agencies. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) creates strategic guidance, NIST creates documents describing implementation, CISA helps agencies with security management, and agencies themselves have to implement information security programs. Congress may consider creating specific responsibilities for federal or national supply chain security and assign those responsibilities across agencies or to a single federal entity. Rather than assign a single federal agency with all the responsibility for supply chain security, Congress may identify unique responsibilities and parse those out to agencies; such as intelligence gathering, technical expertise, the development and promulgation of defensive measures, and coordinating federal efforts. While this approach may provide clarity, its effectiveness may depend on the scope of authority Congress grants and resource allocations to the designated entity or entities.

**Increased Awareness**

The federal government may increase the information available from open and restricted government sources to all agencies and the information technology sector. To assist with increased awareness, the federal government could undertake activities to better understand the business relationships involved in the design or delivery of an IT product or service, and assess those businesses for potential risks. Rather than barring corporate activity, the government could alert industry and consumers of those risks so that they may make informed decisions on whether and how they may use those products or services. This may help agencies better assess their own risk, and allow the companies to directly mitigate vulnerabilities in their products. Such a strategy recognizes that government is positioned to support the private sector, which has different responsibilities and greater control over technology.

**Oversight**

As part of regular oversight, Congress may ask federal agencies and regulated sectors about their C-SCRM programs, effectiveness, and challenges. Congress may also require such programs. In performing agency oversight, Congress may request a review and report by an agency into how it assesses and manages cyber supply chain risks. This review could inform future congressional activity and compel agencies to consider these issues.

An example of such oversight is the Wolf Provision (found in Section 514 of Division B of P.L. 115-141, the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018). The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Inspector General has an audit of NASA’s implementation of the provision.

**Prohibition on Specific Companies**

As with the Kaspersky and Chinese-made products, Congress may ban a certain company’s products from being purchased or used by federal agencies. While such a prohibition may limit exposure to specific perceived risks posed by a product, set of products, or a company’s work, complexities of the global cyber supply chain, business relationships, corporate restructuring, and other factors may inhibit the intended effectiveness. Such prohibitions have also faced court challenges regarding the banned company’s due process and laws against bills of attainder.

**Single Evaluator**

Currently, agencies are responsible for evaluating risks posed by IT for themselves. However, some agencies lack the capability or capacity to perform thorough evaluations of their systems for supply chain risks. An option for Congress would be to assign a single federal agency the responsibility to evaluate supply chain risks in IT for all other agencies. This agency would examine IT hardware and software for potential risks. In order to do so, the agency would likely need access to threat intelligence, technical expertise, business relationships of the vendors, building products, and security experts, among other factors.

This strategy would align with the Trump Administration’s initiative to increase shared services. FedRAMP is a program Congress may look to in establishing such a program. In FedRAMP, one agency evaluates cloud service providers and creates documentation on the security of those services available to all agencies. This avoids the duplicate efforts of every agency examining the same product, and allows agencies to assess the product relative to their specific concerns.

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