Intelligence Community Spending Trends

Updated January 9, 2023
Summary

The intelligence budget, as considered separate and distinct from the defense budget, dates to reforms initiated in the 1970s to improve oversight and accountability of the intelligence community. The intelligence budget funds intelligence and intelligence-related activities. These activities include the strategic and tactical collection, analysis, production and dissemination of information that is particularly relevant to United States national security; covert action; and counterintelligence programs directed against threats to the United States. Since the budget funds programs and activities that typically enable national security decisionmaking, military planning, and operations, changes to the topline figures for intelligence programs closely follow trends in national defense spending.

Intelligence spending is usually understood as the sum of two separate budget programs: (1) the National Intelligence Program (NIP), which covers the programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community oriented toward the strategic needs of decisionmakers, and (2) the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), which funds defense intelligence activities intended to support operational and tactical level intelligence priorities supporting defense operations. The combined NIP and MIP budgets do not encompass the total of U.S. intelligence-related spending. Many departments have intelligence-gathering entities that support a department-specific mission, use department funds, and do not fall within either the NIP or the MIP. This report considers only the NIP and MIP budget figures.

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), respectively, manage the NIP and MIP separately under different authorities, and work together in a number of ways to facilitate the integration of NIP and MIP intelligence efforts. Although Congress has occasionally debated whether to declassify the topline figures for each of the 18 statutory elements of the intelligence community, to date only the NIP and MIP budget totals are released to the public each year. These totals are significant. In FY2023 alone, the aggregate amount of appropriations requested for these two programs is $93.7 billion, including $67.1 billion for the NIP and $26.6 billion for the MIP, an increase of $3.9 billion over what was appropriated the previous year: For FY2022 the aggregate amount appropriated for the NIP and MIP was $89.8 billion, $65.7 billion for the NIP, and $24.1 billion for the MIP. The size of the intelligence budget has remained relatively constant over the past decade, between 11% and 11.7% of the total defense budget.
Introduction

This report examines intelligence funding from fiscal years 1965 to 2023, with an emphasis on the period from 2007 to 2023, during which total national and military intelligence program spending dollars have been publicly disclosed on an annual basis. A table of topline budget figures (see Table 1) and accompanying graphs (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) illustrate that in comparison with national defense spending, intelligence-related spending also fluctuates on an annual basis, though to a somewhat lesser degree. Intelligence spending generally has remained consistent at between 11% and 11.7% of annual national defense spending over the past decade.

Various tables and graphs included in this report illustrate trends in intelligence spending. Figure 1 illustrates highs and lows in NIP spending between 1965 and 1994. Table 1 compares NIP and MIP spending to national defense spending from FY2007 to FY2023, reporting values in both nominal and constant dollars. Figure 2 and Figure 3 use the data in Table 1 to provide an overview of intelligence spending compared to total national defense spending.

The Intelligence Budget

Total intelligence spending by the 18 elements of the U.S. intelligence community is usually understood as the combination of the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). The NIP funds strategic intelligence planning and policymaking, as well as the intelligence capabilities and activities that support more than one department or agency. This funding includes the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in their entirety, and the strategic-level intelligence activities associated with departmental intelligence community elements such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State (see Appendix A for a list of the 18 statutory elements of the intelligence community). The NIP also funds Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) programs throughout the intelligence community. The MIP funds defense activities that address tactical or operational-level requirements specific to the DOD. Programs that support both national and tactical or operational military requirements may receive both NIP and MIP resources.

The combined NIP and MIP budgets do not encompass the total of U.S. intelligence-related spending. Many departments have intelligence-gathering entities that support a department-specific mission, use department funds, and do not fall within either the NIP or the MIP. For example, the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP) is sometimes referenced in intelligence-related legislation. The HSIP is a small program that exists within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to fund those intelligence activities of the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis that serve predominantly department-specific missions. With the exception of U.S.

1 The topline number for the NIP was classified until 2007—with two exceptions (October 1997 and March 1998). The exceptions are discussed later in this report. Topline is a frequently used colloquial term referring to any aggregated budget total.

2 See also, Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-12. This report addresses intelligence spending within the NIP and MIP. Intelligence-related spending (such as the Homeland Security Intelligence Program) that does not fall within the NIP and MIP, supporting organizations outside of the statutory elements of the IC, is outside the scope of this report.

3 Per 6 U.S.C. §125(a), the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) have jurisdiction over the HSIP.
Coast Guard Intelligence (CG-2) and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the NIP does not fund intelligence activities of DHS, nor does the NIP fund law enforcement intelligence activities of state, local, tribal, and territorial governments within the United States. In addition, the MIP does not fund certain military platforms that can have a secondary intelligence application, but whose main purpose is not intelligence, such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) or the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) air-to-ground strike platform.⁴

The intelligence budget funds intelligence and intelligence-related activities—defined in this report to include the following:³

- The collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use of information that relates to a foreign country, or a government, political group, party, military force, movement, or other association in a foreign country, and that relates to the defense, foreign policy, national security, or related policies of the United States, and other activity in support of the collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use of such information;
- Activities taken to counter similar activities directed against the United States;
- Covert and clandestine activities affecting the relations of the United States with a foreign government, political group, party, military force, movement, or other association;⁵
- Collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use of information about activities of persons within the United States, its territories and possessions, or nationals of the United States abroad whose political and related activities pose, or may be considered by a department, agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or employee of the United States to pose, a threat to the internal security of the United States; and
- Covert or clandestine activities directed against persons within the United States, its territories and possessions, or nationals of the United States abroad whose political and related activities pose, or may be considered by a department, instrumentality, or employee of the United States to pose a threat to the internal security of the United States;

---

⁴ Generally, the MIP excludes the inherent intelligence gathering capabilities of a weapons system whose primary mission is not intelligence. For more information, see Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th ed., (Dewey: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-12.

⁵ For the purposes of this report, CRS uses the definition of intelligence and intelligence-related activities established by the Rules of the House of Representatives for the operations of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) (see Rule X, clause 11, (j)(1) of U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States, 117th Congress, 1st sess., February 2, 2021, p. 16, at https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/117-House-Rules-Clerk.pdf). The definition was first adopted by the House through H.Res. 658 (95th Congress, July 14, 1977), which established the HPSCI whose purpose, according to the House Rules was to, “oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities and programs of the United States Government.” In contrast, S.Res. 400 (94th Congress, June 23, 1976), which established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), described the SSCI as “oversee[ing] and [making] continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States government,” and specified that any such intelligence activity “does not include tactical foreign military intelligence serving no national policymaking function.” Unlike S.Res. 400, H.Res. 658 did not specifically exclude “tactical foreign military intelligence serving no national policymaking function” from its definition of intelligence and intelligence-related activities.

⁶ For more information on the distinction between covert action and clandestine activities, see CRS Report R45175, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions, by Michael E. DeVine.
agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or employee of the United States to pose, a threat to the internal security of the United States.

Origin of the Intelligence Budget

The intelligence budget, as considered separate and distinct from the defense budget, dates to reforms initiated in the 1970s to improve oversight and accountability of the intelligence community. Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan gradually centralized management and oversight over what was then known as the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), which consolidated the CIA budget with portions of the defense budget associated with national intelligence activities, such as cryptologic and reconnaissance programs. Originally, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) managed the NFIP, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council (NSC) provided oversight.9

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 modified the NFIP as the NIP. The IRTPA also created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI was given greater budgetary authority over the NIP in comparison to the authority the DCI had over the NFIP. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 104 provides overall policy to include a description of the DNI’s roles and responsibilities as program executive of the NIP.

Military-specific tactical or operational intelligence activities were not included in the NFIP. They were referred to as Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) and were managed separately by the Secretary of Defense. TIARA referred to the intelligence activities “of a single service” that were considered organic (meaning “to belong to”) to individual military units. In 1994, a new category was created called the Joint Military Intelligence Program (or JMIP) for defense-wide intelligence programs. A DOD memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense in 2005 merged TIARA and JMIP to create the MIP. DOD Directive 5205.12, effective November 2008, established policies and assigned responsibilities for management of the MIP, to include the role of USD(I&S) as MIP program executive and “principal proponent for MIP policies and resources to the Secretary of Defense and the DNI.”

---

8 See Executive Order (E.O.) 11905 (July 29, 1976), E.O. 12036 (January 24, 1978), E.O. 12333 (December 8, 1981), successive executive orders, signed by Presidents Gerald R. Ford, James E. Carter, and Ronald W. Reagan, respectively, providing the authority for the United States to conduct foreign intelligence activities.
9 Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-3. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) abolished the position of the DCI and established in its stead the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who manages the NIP.
15 DOD Directive 5205.12, “Military Intelligence Program,” November 14, 2008; change 2, October 1, 2020 at
Thus, the DNI and USD(I&S), respectively, manage the NIP and MIP separately under different authorities. A program is primarily NIP if it funds an activity that supports more than one department or agency, or provides a service of common concern for the IC. The NIP funds the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the CIA, and the national-level intelligence activities associated with the NSA, DIA, and NGA, which can be distinguished from their tactical-level activities supporting the military. It also funds Sensitive Compartmented Information programs throughout the intelligence community. A program is primarily MIP if it funds an activity that addresses tactical or operational-level requirements specific to the DOD. The DNI and USD(I&S) work together in a number of ways to facilitate the integration of NIP and MIP intelligence efforts. Programs that support both national and tactical or operational military requirements may receive both NIP and MIP resources.

The NIP may be perceived as more complicated than the MIP because it funds an aggregation of programs that span the entire intelligence community. In general, NIP programs are based on capabilities such as cryptology, reconnaissance, and signals collection that span several IC components. Each program within the NIP is headed by a program manager. Program managers exercise daily direct control over their NIP resources. The DNI acts as an intermediary in the budget process, facilitating communications between program managers, the President, and Congress. The DNI determines and controls defense and nondefense NIP funds from budget development through execution.

In contrast, the MIP encompasses only those defense dollars associated with the operational and tactical-level intelligence activities of the military services. According to the MIP charter directive:

The MIP consists of programs, projects, or activities that support the Secretary of Defense’s intelligence, counterintelligence, and related intelligence responsibilities. This includes those intelligence and counterintelligence programs, projects, or activities that provide capabilities to meet warfighters’ operational and tactical requirements more effectively.


16 For more information on the position of USD(I&S), see CRS In Focus IF10523, Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, by Michael E. DeVine.

17 50 U.S.C. Section 3003(6) defines the term National Intelligence Program as “[A]ll programs, projects, and activities of the IC, as well as any other programs of the IC designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of a United States department or agency or by the President. Such term does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed Forces.”

18 In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense and DNI formally agreed in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that the USD(I&S) position would be “dual-hatted”—the incumbent acting as both the USD(I&S) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) within the ODNI in order to improve the integration of national and military intelligence. According to the MOA, when acting as DDI, the incumbent reports directly to the DNI and serves as his principal advisor regarding defense intelligence matters. See Michael McConnell, DNI and Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum of Agreement,” May 2007, news release no. 637-07, May 24, 2007, “Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to be Dual-Hatted as Director of Defense Intelligence,” at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releases/20070524_release.pdf.

19 See ICD-104 for the roles and responsibilities of NIP Program Managers.


21 Ibid. pp. 4-11.
The term excludes capabilities associated with a weapons system whose primary mission is not intelligence.22 (emphasis CRS)

MIP dollars are managed within the budgets of DOD military departments and agencies by component managers. Examples include the senior intelligence officer (SIO) for the intelligence element of the U.S. Air Force (USAF A2/A6), who manages Air Force MIP dollars, and the senior leader for the intelligence element of the U.S. Navy (OPNAV N2/N6), who manages MIP dollars for the Navy. Both manage funds in accordance with USD(I&S) guidance and policy.23 MIP components include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); the intelligence elements of the military departments; the intelligence element of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM/J2); and military intelligence activities associated with DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA.24 Some DOD intelligence components make use of both NIP and MIP funds. The directors of DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA serve simultaneously as program managers for their NIP funds and component managers for their MIP funds.

Secrecy vs. Transparency

Congress and the American public’s ability to oversee intelligence dollars and understand how they are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process. IC officials have expressed general commitments to transparency.25 Yet, in terms of intelligence community spending, some believe that intelligence community disclosure of intelligence-related spending beyond just the topline NIP and MIP figures would not pose risks to national security.26

Most intelligence dollars are embedded in the defense budget. Historically, it was for security purposes. Disclosure of details associated with the intelligence community’s ability to oversee intelligence dollars and understand how they are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process. IC officials have expressed general commitments to transparency.25 Yet, in terms of intelligence community spending, some believe that intelligence community disclosure of intelligence-related spending beyond just the topline NIP and MIP figures would not pose risks to national security.26

Most intelligence dollars are embedded in the defense budget. Historically, it was for security purposes. Disclosure of details associated with the intelligence community’s ability to oversee intelligence dollars and understand how they are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process. IC officials have expressed general commitments to transparency.25 Yet, in terms of intelligence community spending, some believe that intelligence community disclosure of intelligence-related spending beyond just the topline NIP and MIP figures would not pose risks to national security.26

In 1999, then-DCI George Tenet articulated the potential risk of disclosure as follows:

28 See ODNI News Release No. 46 of November 21, 2014: “Beyond this [NIP] disclosure, there will be no other National Intelligence Program disclosures of currently classified information because such disclosures could harm...
Disclosure of the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide foreign governments with the United States’ own assessment of its intelligence capabilities and weaknesses … [T]he difference between Congressional appropriations from one year to the next provides a measure of Congress’s assessment of the nation’s intelligence efforts and their satisfaction of stated policy objectives. Not only does an increased, decreased, or unchanged appropriation reflect a congressional determination that existing intelligence programs are less than adequate, more than adequate, or just adequate, respectively, to meet the national security needs of the United States, but an actual figure also indicates the degree of change. This knowledge could assist foreign governments or other organizations in redirecting their own resources to frustrate U.S. intelligence collection efforts, with resulting damage to our national security.\(^{29}\)

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) agreed with critics who argued for more transparency but also found that disclosure of numbers below the topline could cause damage to national security. It recommended that the total amount of money spent on national intelligence be released to the public:

[...]

The top-line figure by itself provides little insight into U.S. intelligence sources and methods. The U.S. government readily provides copious information about spending on its military forces, including military intelligence. The intelligence community should not be subject to that much disclosure. But when even aggregate categorical numbers remain hidden, it is hard to judge priorities and foster accountability.\(^{30}\)

In response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations, Section 601(a) of P.L. 110-53 (codified at 50 U.S.C. Section 3306(b)) directs the DNI to disclose the NIP topline number:

Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 2007, the Director of National Intelligence shall disclose to the public the aggregate amount of funds appropriated by Congress for the National Intelligence Program for such fiscal year.

Section 601(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. Section 3306(c)(1)(A)) allows the President to “waive or postpone the disclosure” if the disclosure “would damage national security.”\(^{31}\) The first such disclosure was made on October 30, 2007.\(^{32}\) The Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) of 2010 (P.L. 111-259) further amended Section 601 to require the President to publicly disclose the amount requested for the NIP for the next fiscal year “at the time the President submits to Congress the budget.”\(^{33}\)
At the present time, U.S. law only requires the NIP topline figure to be disclosed. The DNI is not required to disclose any other information concerning the NIP budget, including whether the topline budget figures released concerns particular intelligence agencies or particular intelligence programs. In 2010, the Secretary of Defense began disclosing MIP appropriations figures on an annual basis and in 2011 disclosed those figures back to 2007. These actions have provided public access to previously classified budget numbers for national and military intelligence activities with the assumption that doing so no longer presented a risk to U.S. national security.

The most recent congressional effort to require the disclosure of more information on the intelligence budget was in 2019, when Representative Peter Welch introduced H.R. 2735, the Intelligence Budget Transparency Act of 2019 (116th Congress, 1st Session). This legislation would have amended Section 1105 of Title 31, U.S. Code by requiring the President to disclose in his annual budget request to Congress,

> [T]he total dollar amount proposed in the budget for intelligence or intelligence related activities of each element of the Government engaged in such activities in the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted and the estimated appropriation required for each of the ensuing four fiscal years.

Identical bills had been previously introduced in 2014 (H.R. 3855), 2015 (H.R. 2272 and S. 1307), and 2018 (H.R. 5406 and S. 2631).

---


35 §2(A) of H.R. 2735 (116th Cong., 1st Sess.).
Trends in Intelligence Spending

Historical Trends

Figure 1. Intelligence Spending 1965-1994

1994 constant dollars

The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) requests significant real growth in fiscal year 1994 when compared with actual appropriations in fiscal year 1993. The following diagram—which is based upon an unclassified chart provided last year by the Director of Central Intelligence and updated for the final fiscal year 1993 appropriated level and the fiscal year 1994 budget request—is in constant dollars and shows the tremendous real growth in the NFIP over the last 30 years. The funding level has come down little from the peak of the Cold War. Due to the classified nature of intelligence programs, the dollar figures have been omitted from the chart.


Figure 1 illustrates highs and lows in NIP spending between 1965 and 1994. Due to the classified nature of the intelligence budget at that time, the graphic does not include dollar figures.36 Figure 1 suggests that NIP spending appeared to decline steadily from about 1971 to 1980, climbed back to approximate 1968 levels by about 1983, and steadied to apparently constant levels between 1985 and 1994. The pattern of spending in Figure 1 generally follows the pattern of world events and associated defense spending.37 Analyses of defense spending over the past several decades usually attribute higher levels of defense spending in the 1960s to the Vietnam War; lower levels of defense spending in the 1970s to the period of détente between the United States and the


Soviet Union and to the worldwide economic recession; and higher levels of defense spending in the 1980s to the Reagan defense build-up.\textsuperscript{38}

**Recent Trends**

Table 1 compares NIP and MIP spending to national defense spending from FY2007 to FY2023, reporting values in both nominal and constant dollars. Budget toplines appropriated for FY2013 show adjustments made in accordance with automatic spending cuts required under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25).\textsuperscript{39} Topline numbers associated with national defense spending are reported in Table 1 and illustrated graphically in Figures 1 and 2.

### Table 1. Intelligence Spending, FY2007-FY2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NIP\textsuperscript{a}</th>
<th>MIP\textsuperscript{b}</th>
<th>NIP MIP Total</th>
<th>National Defense\textsuperscript{c}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY07</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY08</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY09</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY10</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY11</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY12</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY13\textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY14</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY15</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY16</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY17</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY18</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY19</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY20</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY21</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY22</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY23\textsuperscript{e}</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{39} P.L. 112-25. For more on required spending cuts and the Budget Control Act, see CRS Report R44039, *The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions*, by Brendan W. McGarry.
Notes:

a. NIP numbers include base budget and supplemental spending dollars known as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) dollars up to FY2022 when the President’s budget request proposed discontinuing OCO as a separate funding category.

b. MIP numbers include base budget and OCO dollars up to FY2022.

c. National defense spending (using topline numbers associated with Function 050 National Defense) is included for comparative purposes. See Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 5.1, Budget Authority by Function and Sub function: 1976-2027.

d. In 2013, in compliance with the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), the original $52.7 billion NIP total was reduced to $49.0 billion (DNI press release No. 24-13, October 30, 2013), and the original $19.2 billion MIP total was reduced to $18.6 billion (DOD press release No. 765-13, October 31, 2013).

e. NIP and MIP data for FY23 are budget requests. National Defense data for FY23 are estimates.

Figure 2. Intelligence Spending as a Percentage of the National Defense Budget: FY2007-FY2023


Note: See Table 1 for the topline numbers used to produce this graph.

Figure 3 adds four additional NIP topline values—numbers available for FYs 1997, 1998, 2005, and 2006. The topline number for the NIP was classified until 2007, with two exceptions. In October 1997, then-DCI George Tenet announced that the intelligence budget for FY1997 was $26.6 billion. In March 1998, then-DCI Tenet announced that the budget for FY1998 was $26.7 billion. In addition, intelligence community officials retroactively declassified NIP topline

---


numbers for FY2005 ($39.8 billion)\(^{42}\) and FY2006 ($40.9 billion).\(^{43}\) Nevertheless, corresponding MIP topline dollars for 1997, 1998, 2005, and 2006 are not publicly available. Figure 3 provides a snapshot of NIP spending over the past two decades. In spite of absent spending data between 1999 and 2004, the values that are present suggest relative constancy in NIP topline dollar appropriations.

**Figure 3. Intelligence Spending Based on Publicly Available Numbers:**
**FY1997-FY2023**

![Graph showing intelligence spending over the past two decades](image)


**Note:** Table 1 provides the other topline numbers used to produce this graph.

**Issues for Congress**

In examining the intelligence community funding from a strategic perspective, Congress may want to consider the following:

---

\(^{42}\) James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, *Memorandum for the Record*, March 2015, attached to a cover letter to Mr. Steven Aftergood, May 20, 2015: “The aggregate amount appropriated to the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) for FY 2005 is $39.8 billion, which includes funding to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),” at http://fas.org/irp/budget/fy2005.pdf.

• The risk, if any, to United States national security of declassifying and releasing to the public the topline annual budget figures for each of the elements of the intelligence community.

• The acceptable risk relative to budget limitations. Like all departmental and agency budgets of the federal government, the intelligence community must accept some risk in not being able to fund all of its priorities.

• The ways the intelligence community can become more efficient and cost-effective through enhancements in the collection, analysis and sharing of intelligence across its 18 elements. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is, in part, intended to realize greater efficiencies across the intelligence community through greater collaboration and coordination.

• Whether the intelligence community investment in operational security programs and technology is sufficient alongside the threat of compromise by adversarial foreign intelligence services.

• Whether the intelligence community has leveraged international partners effectively for coverage of emerging issues or areas where the intelligence community itself has limited investment. International partners can provide valuable insight in areas where they have particular exposure and experience.

• Whether the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is optimally organized to provide oversight of the intelligence community budgets of the 18 separate elements.
Appendix A. Intelligence Community Elements

In statute, the intelligence community comprises 18 elements, across six separate departments of the federal government, and two independent agencies. NIP spending is distributed across all 18, while MIP spending is confined to the DOD.\(^{44}\)

### Table A-1. Elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community (2022)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Defense (DOD) Components:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. National Security Agency (NSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence elements of the military services:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. U.S. Air Force Intelligence (USAF A2/6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. U.S. Army Intelligence (USA G2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence (USMC/MCISR-E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. U.S. Navy Intelligence (OPNAV N2/N6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. U.S. Space Force Intelligence (S-2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-DOD Components:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Energy (DOE) intelligence element:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (I&amp;CI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence elements:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&amp;A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence (USCG/CG-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Justice (DOJ) intelligence elements:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence (DEA/ONSI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Intelligence Branch (FBI/IB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of State (DOS) intelligence element:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Treasury (Treasury) intelligence element:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 50 U.S.C. §3003(4), ODNI.

\(^{44}\) See 50 U.S.C. §3003 for statutory definitions of the terms intelligence, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, intelligence community, national intelligence, intelligence related to national security, and national intelligence program.
Author Information

Michael E. DeVine
Analyst in Intelligence and National Security

Sofia Plagakis
Research Librarian

Acknowledgments

This report was originally written by former CRS Analyst in Intelligence and National Security Policy Anne Daugherty Miles.

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.