Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

The State of Qatar, a small Arab Gulf monarchy which has about 300,000 citizens in a total population of about 2.4 million, has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence, often independent of the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Oman) alliance. Qatar has fostered a close defense and security alliance with the United States and has maintained ties to a wide range of actors who are often at odds with each other, including Sunni Islamists, Iran and Iran-backed groups, and Israeli officials.

Qatar’s support for regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and its sometimes controversial Al Jazeera media network have contributed to a backlash against Qatar led by fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration sought a resolution of the dispute, in part because the rift was hindering U.S. efforts to formalize a broad front of Arab states to counter Iran. During the rift, Qatar deepened relations with Turkey and Iran. On January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt agreed to lift the blockade, and Qatar agreed to drop its pursuit of legal cases against those countries in international organizations. The intra-GCC reconciliation process has since proceeded, albeit unevenly, and particularly slowly with the UAE.

Qatar’s leaders work with the United States to secure the Persian Gulf, as do the other GCC leaders. The United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts more than 8,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces deployed at these facilities participate in operations throughout the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a “Strategic Dialogue” that has included discussion of efforts to improve accommodations for U.S. personnel deployed to Al Udeid Air Base, which has been used extensively in the U.S. operation to evacuate U.S. personnel and Afghan allies from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. Qatar has been active as a mediator between the international community and the new Taliban regime there, and Doha has served as the temporary location for a U.S. embassy to Afghanistan after U.S. Embassy Kabul closed in the course of the U.S. withdrawal. In 2017, the United States and Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding to cooperate against international terrorism.

The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar’s former Amir (ruler) departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. At the same time, apparently out of concern for opening up divisions in Qatari society and politics, Qatar delayed holding elections for a legislative body for several years, but the first vote for 30 out of 45 seats of the “Shura Council” was held on October 2, 2021. U.S. and international reports, which are scrutinizing Qatar as its hosting of the World Cup soccer tournament approaches in 2022, criticize Qatar for not adhering to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps to improve the conditions for expatriate workers.

Like other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices that started in 2014 and were compounded by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. As of early October, Qatar has reported about 237,000 infections and 600 deaths from the disease, which has affected Qatar’s expatriate population disproportionately. Qatar has been able to weather economic headwinds because of its small population, substantial financial reserves, and its favorable business conditions for entrepreneurs. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar withdrew from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to focus on its natural gas export sector; Qatar has the third largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Brief History

Prior to 1867, Qatar was ruled by the family of the leaders of neighboring Bahrain, the Al Khalifa. That year, an uprising in the territory led the United Kingdom, then the main Western power in the Persian Gulf region, to install a leading Qatari family, the Al Thani, to rule over what is now Qatar. The Al Thani family claims descent from the central Arabian tribe of Banu Tamim, the tribe to which Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, belonged. Thus, Qatar officially subscribes to Wahhabism, a conservative Islamic tradition that it shares with Saudi Arabia.

In 1916, in the midst of World War I and after the Ottoman Empire relinquished its territorial claims over Qatar, the Al Thani family signed an agreement under which Qatar formally became a British protectorate. In 1971, after Britain announced it would no longer exercise responsibility for Persian Gulf security, Qatar and Bahrain considered joining with the seven emirates (principalities) that were then called the “Trucial States” to form the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, Qatar and Bahrain decided to become independent rather than join that union. The UAE was separately formed in late 1971. Qatar adopted its first written constitution in April 1970 and became fully independent on September 1, 1971. The United States opened an embassy in Doha in 1973. The United States is currently represented by Charge D’Affaires John Desrocher, appointed to that post in June 2021.

### Table 1. Senior Leaders of Qatar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amir (ruler) and Minister of Defense</td>
<td>Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Amir and Crown Prince (heir apparent)</td>
<td>Abdullah bin Hamad Al Thani (since 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister and Minister of Interior</td>
<td>Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani (since 2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Affairs</td>
<td>Khalid bin Mohamed Al Attiyah (since 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani (since 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
<td>Ali Sharif al-Imadi (since 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of the Shura Council</td>
<td>Ahmad bin Abdallah bin Zaid Al Mahmoud (since 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to the United States</td>
<td>Mishal bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (since 2017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Qatari Government Websites.*

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Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>11,586 sq. km (slightly smaller than Connecticut)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| People     | Population: 2.3 million, of which about 90% are expatriates.  
Religions: Muslim 68%, of which about 90% are Sunni; Christian 14%; Hindu 14%; 3% Buddhist; and 1% other. Figures include expatriates.  
Ethnic Groups: Arab 40%; Pakistani 18%; Indian 18%; Iranian 10%; other 14%. Figures include expatriates. Virtually all citizens are Arab. |
| Economy    | Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $350 billion on purchasing power parity (ppp) basis  
GDP per capita: $125,000 on ppp basis  
Inflation: 0.6%  
GDP Growth Rate: 1.5% in 2019; -3% in 2020  
Export Partners: (In descending order) Japan, South Korea, India, China, Singapore, UAE  
Import Partners: (In descending order) United States, China, Germany, Japan, Britain, Italy |
| Oil and Gas| Oil Exports: Slightly more than 700,000 barrels per day. Negligible amounts to the United States.  
Producer of condensates (light oil) vital to S. Korean petrochemical industry.  
Gas (LNG) Exports: 126 billion cubic meters per year |

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map borders and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from Department of State; World Bank Group, Esri; and Google Maps. At-a-glance information from CIA World Factbook, Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Qatar; World Bank; http://www.statista.com.
Governance

Qatar’s governing structure approximates that of the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) in that it is led by a hereditary Amir (literally “prince,” but interpreted as “ruler”), Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. He became ruler in June 2013 when his father, Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, relinquished power voluntarily—an unprecedented move in the modern Gulf. The Amir governs through a prime minister, who is a member of the Al Thani family, and a cabinet, several of whom are members of the Al Thani or other prominent families. On January 28, 2020, the Amir appointed a new Prime Minister, U.S.-educated Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani. The Amir’s younger brother, Shaykh Abdullah bin Hamad, is deputy Amir and the heir apparent.

Political parties are banned and authorities prohibit politically oriented associations. Political disagreements in Qatar are aired mainly in private as part of a process of consensus building in which the leadership tries to balance the interests of the country’s families. There have been no significant protests by Qatari citizens in many years, but some in the large expatriate community have sometimes protested for improved working conditions. On the other hand, the elections were held on October 2, 2021, for a Shura (Advisory) Council, a legislative body that will expand popular participation in national decisionmaking.

Qatari citizens approved a constitution in a 2003 referendum, by a 98% vote in favor. The document affirms that Qatar is a hereditary emirate, specifies Islamic law as a key source of legislation, and provides for elections for 30 of the 45 seats of the country’s Advisory Council (Majlis Ash-Shura, Shura Council), a national legislative body. According to the constitution, the Shura Council is empowered to remove ministers (two-thirds majority vote), approve a national budget, and to draft and vote on proposed legislation, although subject to a veto by the Amir. Still, it remains unclear how much influence the new Shura Council will have on sensitive issues such as foreign and defense policy, economic and energy policy, and citizenship laws.

The country has long held elections for a 29-seat Central Municipal Council, which advises the government on local public services. Elections for the fifth Council (each serving a four-year term) were held in April 2019. Voter registration was lower than expected; roughly 1 in 13 Qatari adults cast ballots.

October 2, 2021, Shura Council Election

Qatar’s leaders long delayed the Shura Council elections, reportedly out of concern that the elections would divide Qataris and potentially provide opportunity for Qatar’s neighbors to interfere in Qatari politics. Apparently deciding that the country should move forward to expand political participation, in October 2019, the Amir ordered the establishment of a committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, to organize the first Council elections. In November 2020, the Amir announced the first Shura Council elections would take place in October 2021. An election law adopted in early August 2021 to govern the Council elections requires voters to be above 18 years old, be “original” Qataris (families present in Qatar prior to 1930), be born in Qatar, and

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2 Shaykh is an honorific term.
have Qatari grandfathers. Candidates are also to be fluent in Arabic. That definition excluded from voting many members of the Al Murrah tribe, which is nomadic, and many of whom do not have Qatari citizenship. Several hundred Al Murrah protested the election law on August 9, and have continued to argue their exclusion through established complaint processes after the October 2 election.

According to Qatari officials, 284 candidates ran in the October 2, 2021, election, of which 28 were women. Campaigning was said to focus on appeals to familial and tribal relationships rather than issues and differences of opinion among competing candidates. The turnout was about 63% of eligible voters. None of the women was elected. The government noted in post-election releases that the Amir will soon appoint the 15 remaining seats of the Shura Council to “ensure representation across communities in Qatar,” but no date for those appointments has been announced.

**Human Rights Issues**

The State Department human rights report for 2020 identifies the most significant human rights problems in Qatar as:

- restrictions on free expression, including criminalization of libel; restrictions on peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including prohibitions on political parties and labor unions; restrictions on migrant workers’ freedom of movement; limits on the ability of citizens to choose their government in free and fair elections; lack of investigation of and accountability for violence against women; criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual conduct; and reports of forced labor.

A National Human Rights Committee (NHRC), which investigates allegations of human rights abuses, operates independently, but it is funded largely by the Qatar Foundation that is run by the Amir’s mother, Shaykha Moza. Among the NHRC’s functions is to monitor the situation of about 1,000-2,000 stateless residents (“bidoons”), mostly members of families whose citizenship was revoked decades ago for opposing Qatar’s leaders. Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the Amir appoints all judges.

**Freedom of Expression**

Despite the absence of open opposition among the citizenry, the 2011 “Arab Spring” uprisings apparently prompted the government to increase penalties for criticizing the leadership. In 2014, the government approved a cybercrimes law that provides for up to three years in prison for spreading “false news.” One law, enacted in January 2020, authorizes imprisonment for anyone who “broadcasts, publishes, or republishes false or biased rumors, statements, or news, or inflammatory propaganda, domestically or abroad, with the intent to harm national interests, stir up public opinion, or infringe on the social system or the public system of the state.” Qatari officials assert that the law targets those who organize violent opposition activities.

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8 *Bidoon* is the Arabic word for “without,” and refers to persons without documentation for their residency in country.

Al Jazeera Media Network

According to the 2020 State Department human rights report, the government owns and partially funds the Al Jazeera Media Network, which has evolved since its establishment in the mid-1990s into a global media organization. A U.S.-based representative for Al Jazeera says that, in 2011, its legal standing was changed to an independent legal entity with characteristics similar to a U.S. non-profit. The network features a wide range of guests from all over the region debating issues; Arab leaders have sometimes reacted to the network’s critical coverage by closing Al Jazeera’s bureaus or imprisoning its journalists. The network has run stories that criticize Qatar, including on the situation of expatriate laborers. The State Department quotes “some observers and former Al Jazeera employees” as alleging that Qatar’s government “influences” Al Jazeera content. Officials in the United Arab Emirates and other neighboring countries have sometimes criticized Al Jazeera for providing a platform for Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and other Islamists to promote their ideology. Some Members of Congress have asserted that Al Jazeera is an arm of the Qatar government and that its U.S. bureau should be required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

10 Information provided to CRS in August 2020 by CLS Strategies, a firm that represents Al Jazeera in the United States.
11 See, e.g., “Renewed Calls for Qatar to Address Treatment of Migrant Workers,” Al Jazeera, September 19, 2019.
13 Jared Malsin, “In the Eye of the Storm: Can Al Jazeera Survive the Gulf Crisis?” Time, August 21, 2017.
Qatari Leadership

Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani

Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani was born on June 3, 1980. He is the fourth son of the former Amir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the ninth Al Thani ruler in Qatar. He was appointed heir apparent in August 2003 when his elder brother, Shaykh Jasim, renounced his claim, reportedly based on his father's lack of confidence in Shaykh Jasim's ability to lead. Shaykh Tamim became Amir on June 25, 2013, when Amir Hamad stepped down in a voluntary transfer of power that was unprecedented for Qatar and the Gulf region. Amir Tamim was educated at Great Britain's Sherbourne School and graduated from its Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in 1998, from which his father graduated in 1971. Amir Tamim heads the Qatari Investment Authority, which has billions of dollars of investments in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. He is reportedly highly popular for resisting Saudi-led pressure during the intra-GCC crisis.

Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani

Amir Tamim's father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, seized power from his father, Amir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, in June 1995, during his father's absence in Europe. In 1972, after finishing his education in Britain and assuming command of some Qatari military units, Hamad had helped his father depose his grandfather in a bloodless seizure of power while then-Amir Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani was on a hunting trip in Iran.

While Shaykh Hamad is no longer Qatar's ruler, he, his wife, and several of their other children remain key figures in the ruling establishment. Qatari media refer to Shaykh Hamad as "The Father Amir" and acknowledge that he has some continuing role in many aspects of policy. His favored wife (of three), Shaykha Moza al-Misnad Al Thani, continues to chair the powerful Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development (QF). The QF runs Doha’s Education City, where several Western universities have established branches and which is a large investor in the United States and Europe. One daughter (and full sister of the current Amir), Shaykha Mayassa, chairs the Qatar Museums, a major buyer of global artwork. Another daughter, Shaykha Hind, is vice chairman of the QF. Both daughters graduated from Duke University. Another relative, Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani, remains active in Qatar’s investment activities and international circles. During Amir Hamad's rule, Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim was Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and architect of Qatar's relatively independent foreign policy. Shaykh Hamad's father, former Amir Khalifa bin Hamad, died in October 2016.

Sources: various press, and Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Women’s Rights

According to the State Department, social and legal discrimination against women continues, despite the constitutional assertion of equality. The application of Islamic law, which is not gender-neutral on marriage, divorce, child custody and guardianship, and inheritance, as well as a lack of laws against domestic violence, contribute to this gender inequality. Laws prevent women from passing citizenship to their children, though a 2018 permanent residency law has created a mechanism for children born to Qatari women married to non-Qatari men to access government health and education. Guardianship laws require women to obtain permission from their male guardians to travel alone before the age of 25 if they are unmarried, as well as “to marry, obtain a government scholarship to pursue higher education, work in government, and obtain some reproductive health care.”

Women in Qatar drive and own property, and constitute about 15% of business owners and more than a third of the overall workforce, including as professionals. Women serve in public office, such as minister of public health, chair of the Qatar Foundation, head of the General Authority for Museums, and ambassadors to the United Nations and several countries. Qatar’s constitution recognizes the right of women to vote and hold office, and two women have been elected at the municipal council level. In November 2017, the Amir appointed four women to the Majlis As-Shura for the first time in the body’s history. As noted above, however, none of the women candidates was elected in the October 2, 2021, Shura Council elections. In December 2019, the spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry, Lolwah Al Khater, was appointed “assistant minister” of Foreign Affairs (number two at the Foreign Ministry).

 Trafficking in Persons and Labor Issues

The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2020 maintained Qatar at a Tier 2 ranking on the basis that the government makes significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Qatar has enacted a Domestic Worker Law to better protect those workers and it has established a coordinating body for anti-trafficking initiatives. Still, Qatar remains a destination country for men and women subjected to forced labor and, to a much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Female domestic workers remain vulnerable to trafficking due to their positioning in private residences. Alongside the January 2018 U.S.-Qatar “Strategic Dialogue,” the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to create a framework to combat trafficking in persons.

The State Department assesses Qatar’s labor laws as not adequately protecting the rights of workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, or bargain collectively. Qatari law does not prohibit anti-union discrimination or provide for reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. Yet, the State Department credits the country with taking steps to protect labor rights, including for expatriate workers. In 2016, a labor reform law went into effect that provided

17 Human Rights Watch, “Everything I Have to Do is Tied to a Man”: Women and Qatar’s Male Guardianship Rules, March 29, 2021.
20 This section is based on the U.S. Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 25, 2020.
for changes to the “kafala” system (sponsorship requirement for foreign workers) to enable employees to switch employers at the end of their labor contracts rather than having to leave Qatar. The law abolished the kafala system entirely at the end of 2019, and further reforms that took effect in August 2020, established a monthly minimum wage of $275 and provide for stricter penalties for those that fail to provide their mostly expatriate labor force with adequate housing. The government also has increased its cooperation with the International Labor Organization (ILO) to help expatriate workers obtain their rights.

Scrutiny of Qatar’s labor practices has centered on the plight of the many expatriate workers hired to prepare for the 2022 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament. An Amnesty International report from September 2019 alleged that workers sometimes are not paid for work and adequate dispute resolution mechanisms are lacking. The Qatar government responded by stating: “Many of the cases included in the report precede recent legislative amendments—including the establishment of the Committees for the Settlement of Labour Disputes. These have significantly improved the processes and increased the speed for resolving labour disputes.” Hundreds of expatriate workers demonstrated in August 2019 against poor working conditions and unpaid and delayed wages. Some studies suggested that crowded conditions for expatriate laborers in Qatar fueled a relatively high per capita infection rate from COVID-19 in the spring of 2020.

Religious Freedom

Qatar’s constitution stipulates that Islam is the state religion and Islamic law is “a main source of legislation,” but Qatari laws also incorporate secular legal traditions. The overwhelming majority (about 95%) of Qatari citizens are Sunni Muslims, possibly explaining an absence of observable sectarian tensions. The government permits eight registered Christian denominations to worship publicly at the Mesaymir Religious Complex, and it has allowed the Evangelical Churches Alliance of Qatar to build a church. Hindu, Jewish, Buddhists, or other non-Muslim religious groups are registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and they have established villas and private homes as houses of worship. According to the International Religious Freedom report for 2019, in January 2019, a delegation led by the Secretary of State met with senior counterparts in Doha and signed a statement of intent to “support the shared ideals of tolerance and appreciation for diversity.”

Foreign Policy

Qatar uses its ample financial resources to support a foreign policy that attempts to influence outcomes in the region. Its policies have enabled Qatar to mediate some regional conflicts, as well as to back regional actors at odds with those supported by some of the other GCC states. Qatar has at times also used its military forces in its interventions. Regional and bilateral issues reportedly constitute the focus of high-level U.S.-Qatar meetings.

23 “These two countries are tiny, rich and have the world’s highest coronavirus infection rates,” Associated Press, July 23, 2020.
Qatar and the Intra-GCC Dispute

A consistent source of friction within the GCC has been Qatar’s relationship with Muslim Brotherhood movements. Qatari officials maintain that the Brotherhood, a political Islamist movement, participates in the legitimate political process. UAE leaders, in particular, assert that the Brotherhood seeks to destabilize established governments in the region. In 2014, differences over this and other issues led Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain to withdraw their ambassadors from Doha, returning them several months later after Qatar pledged to implement a November 2013 commitment to end support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations. The differences erupted again in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and Jordan, cut diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. These countries presented Qatar with 13 demands as conditions for lifting the blockade, including closing Al Jazeera, severing relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, scaling back relations with Iran, and closing a Turkish military base in Qatar. Amir Tamim expressed openness to negotiations but said Qatar would not “surrender” its sovereignty by agreeing to the demands.

President Trump initially echoed criticism of Qatar’s policies, and mediation of the rift was spearheaded by then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson who, working with Kuwaiti leaders, conducted “shuttle diplomacy” in the region during July 2017. A U.S. envoy appointed in 2017 to work on the issue, General (retired) Anthony Zinni, resigned in 2019. In July 2019, Jordan started a thaw in the boycott by restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar. During October 2019-January 2020, Qatar and Saudi Arabia held high-level direct talks, but the talks were suspended in early January 2020.

At the 41st GCC summit in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia, on January 5, 2021, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt announced that they would be restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar, while Qatar agreed to drop its pursuit of legal cases against those countries in international organizations. The Al-Ula Declaration does not make direct reference to the 13 demands originally articulated in June 2017, but rather to restoring “collaboration among all Member States” and strengthening “the bonds of brotherhood among them.” Direct flights between Doha and Riyadh resumed on January 11, and flights between Qatar and the other blockading nations resumed on January 18. A senior UAE official visited Qatar on August 26, the first such visit in over four years, to discuss “...ways to further develop cooperation...especially in the economic and trade fields...” And, in late September, the Amir, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, and the UAE National Security Advisor met at a Red Sea resort, signaling an acceleration of the thaw. Analysts expect the normalization between GCC countries to boost Qatar’s tourism sector,

26 Cable News Network released the text of the November 2013 agreement, which was signed between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. The November 2014 agreement was among all the GCC states except Oman.
27 The list of demands can be found at “List of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations,” Associated Press, June 23, 2017.
29 Qatar says talks to end GCC crisis were suspended in January, Al Jazeera, February 15, 2020.
32 “Emir of Qatar receives delegation led by Tahnoun bin Zayed,” Emirates News Agency, August 26, 2021.
improve attendance at the 2022 World Cup in Doha, and improve economic cooperation in the region more generally.³³

The intra-GCC rift had roots in and implications for the broader region:

- In Egypt, Qatar supported, politically and financially, the government of Muslim Brotherhood-linked figure, Muhammad Morsi, who was elected president in 2012. The UAE and Saudi Arabia backed Morsi’s ouster by Egypt’s military in 2013 and have financially backed the regime of former military leader and now President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

- In Libya, Qatar joined the United States and several GCC and other partner countries in air operations to help oust Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi in 2011. Subsequently, Qatar, reportedly in partnership with Turkey, has supported the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli, which is supported by Muslim Brotherhood-linked factions. The UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia support ex-military commander Khalifa Haftar, who controls large parts of eastern and northern Libya and who sought to seize control of Tripoli in 2019.³⁴

- In Yemen, in 2015, Qatar joined the Saudi-led military coalition to battle Iran-backed Zaidi Shiite Houthi rebels, including deploying about 1,000 military personnel, along with armor, to guard the Saudi border from Houthi incursions. The Qatari Air Force also flew air strikes against the Houthis.³⁵ As a result of the intra-GCC rift, in mid-2017 Qatar withdrew from the mission.

- In Syria, Qatar provided funds and weaponry to rebels fighting the regime of President Bashar Al Asad, including those reportedly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.³⁶ Qatar also claimed that its ties to Jabhat al Nusra (JAN), an Al Qaeda affiliate that was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), were instrumental in persuading the group to sever its ties to Al Qaeda in 2016, and to release its Lebanese and Western prisoners.³⁷

**Iran**

Qatari leaders have consistently pursued dialogue with Iran to reduce regional tensions, while simultaneously cooperating with U.S. efforts to counter Iran strategically. In solidarity with its GCC partners, Qatar withdrew its Ambassador from Tehran in January 2016 during a Saudi-Iranian rift over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shiite cleric. However, Qatar turned to Iran to help it cope with the GCC rift, including by importing Iranian foodstuffs and by overflying Iranian airspace to fly around the GCC countries that were boycotting Qatar. Qatar Airways paid Iran over $130 million per year in overflight fees.³⁸ In August 2017, Qatar restored full diplomatic

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³⁵ Author conversations with Qatar Embassy personnel, 2019.


relations with Iran, and Qatar did not support the May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement, instead stating that efforts to “denuclearize” the region should not lead to “escalation.” Through mutual visits of high-ranking officials, Qatar and Iran sought to de-escalate the U.S.-Iran tensions in the Gulf in 2019, and Qatar reportedly has sought to start a formal dialogue between the GCC and Iran to lower Gulf tensions. Qatar and Iran have shared a large natural gas field in the Persian Gulf without incident, although some Iranian officials have occasionally accused Qatar of cheating on the arrangement.

**Israeli-Palestinian Issues/Hamas**

Qatar has maintained contact with all parties in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, including hosting a visit by then-Prime Minister of Israel Shimon Peres in 1996 and allowing Israel to open a formal trade office in Doha from 2000 until the 2009 Israel-Hamas conflict erupted. However, small levels of direct Israel-Qatar trade, as well as visits to Doha by Israeli security officials, athletes, doctors, and other Israelis, reportedly continued after that clash. Amir Tamim regularly accuses Israel of abuses against the Palestinians and expresses support for Palestinian efforts to gain full United Nations membership and recognition.

Qatar has engaged with the Islamist group Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and U.S.-designated terrorist group that has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip since 2007. Qatari officials assert that their engagement with Hamas can help foster Israeli-Palestinian peace. Some of Hamas’ top leaders have been based in Doha, and the current leader of its political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly relocated there in 2020. Much of Qatar’s leverage with Hamas and Israel comes in the form of substantial financial aid it provides to the people of Gaza, which Israeli officials support as a means of promoting calm on the Israel-Gaza border. Qatar’s aid is provided through a “Gaza Reconstruction Committee” headed by Qatari official Mohammad Al-Emadi, who serves informally as an envoy to Israel. In March 2020, Qatar donated $10 million to the Palestinian Authority to help it cope with the COVID-19 outbreak. In June 2020, Qatar reportedly threatened to suspend the payments to Gaza if Israel proceeded with its plans to annex some West Bank areas. Qatar criticized the August 13, 2020, UAE-Israeli announcement of a commitment to normalized relations (“Abraham Accords”) as a UAE betrayal of the Palestinian cause, and indicated that Qatar would not join the Accords unless and until there were a broader Israel-Palestinian settlement. Qatar was a key mediator to end eleven days of clashes between Israel and Hamas in May 2021, reportedly facilitated, in part, by new pledges of Qatari aid to Gaza.

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39 Qatar Foreign Ministry Statement, May 9, 2018.
41 “Iran, Qatar, Face off Over North Field, South Pars, Oil and Gas News,” June 6-12, 2016.
43 “Qatar cozies up to Israel, again,” Electronic Intifada, February 26, 2020.
48 “Qatar to suspend Gaza payments to pressure Israel over annexation,” Axios, June 23, 2020.
Qatar’s critics assert that the country’s relations with Hamas leaders constitute support for a terrorist organization. In the 115th Congress, the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Act of 2017 (H.R. 2712), which was ordered to be reported to the full House on November 15, 2017, appeared directed at Qatar by sanctioning foreign governments determined to be providing financial or other material support to Hamas or its leaders. Versions of that bill introduced in the 116th Congress, H.R. 1850 and S. 2680, did not directly reference Qatar as supporting Hamas and contained exceptions for purely humanitarian aid. H.R. 1850 passed the House on July 23, 2019, by voice vote. The bill was reintroduced in the 117th Congress (H.R. 261).

Afghanistan/Taliban Office

Qatar did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan when the movement ruled during 1996-2001. However, the stalemate in the conflict there apparently contributed to a Qatari decision, with U.S. support, to allow the Taliban to open a representative office in Doha in 2013, through which moderate Taliban figures could engage with outside stakeholders in the Afghan situation. U.S.-Taliban talks led to a May 2014, exchange of captured U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban figures who subsequently joined the Taliban office in Doha. After the Trump Administration decided to engage the Taliban with the intent of winding down U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, Qatar brokered and hosted many rounds of talks between the United States and Taliban representatives, culminating in a U.S.-Taliban peace agreement that was signed in Doha on February 29, 2020 (“Doha Agreement”). Doha also hosted several rounds of talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban on a political solution for Afghanistan, which proved unsuccessful. In addition, Qatar’s contacts with the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) that is an ally of the Taliban, helped produce a November 2019 prisoner exchange that included the release from Afghan custody of Anas Haqqani, the brother of the deputy leader of the Taliban movement, Sirajuddin Haqqani.

During 2001-2021, Qatari ground forces did not deploy to Afghanistan, but U.S. forces engaged there used Qatari facilities, and Qatar’s air force delivered cargo and provided other logistical support to U.S. forces. Following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of the country, Qatar helped the United States evacuate U.S. and Afghan citizens from Kabul. In addition to other support, a Qatari diplomat to Afghanistan reportedly escorted small groups of Americans into the Kabul airport for evacuation. After the completion of the U.S. withdrawal on August 30, several Qatar Airways charter flights evacuated U.S. and other nationals, facilitated by Qatari technical support that enabled Kabul airport to reopen. Senior U.S. officials, including in visits to Doha in September 2021 by Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin, thanked Qatar for its help in the evacuation operation, as well as for its hosting, in Doha, of a temporary U.S. embassy to Afghanistan. U.S. Embassy Kabul was closed in conjunction with the U.S. withdrawal and Taliban takeover, and its diplomats were transferred to Doha. Also in September, Qatar’s Foreign Minister became the first senior foreign official to visit Kabul for official meetings with Taliban government leaders; he also met with senior figures from the ousted government.

including former president Hamid Karzai and former chief executive officer Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who sought unsuccessfully to broker a broad-based Afghan government. He and other Qatari officials have sought to pressure the Taliban to respect rights and protect civilians.  

Qatar also came in for some criticism for its difficulties handling the large number of evacuees sent to Al Udeid Air Base in a short period of time. About 40,000 evacuees were processed at that base by the time the last U.S. soldier left Kabul on August 30. Reports from the first week of evacuations found that evacuees were facing unsanitary and crowded conditions at Al Udeid. DOD and Department of State officials told news outlets that they were working to reduce bottlenecks and deploy extra staff to alleviate the “dire conditions” at Al Udeid. Security screening processes at Al Udeid detected at least one Afghan evacuee with potential ties to ISIS, and at least 100 others were flagged for potential matches to intelligence agency watch lists. In most of those cases, the individuals were ultimately cleared by follow-on screening.

Other Qatari Relationships and Mediation Efforts

Elsewhere in the region

- In March 2021, Qatar, along with Turkey and Russia, launched new consultations to reach a political settlement to the Syrian civil war, in line with U.N. resolutions, as well as to discuss mechanisms to deliver humanitarian aid.
- In Sudan, Qatar provided funds and promises of investment to achieve a series of agreements between the government and various rebel factions in Darfur. Qatar’s influence in Sudan in the aftermath of the ouster of longtime President Omar Hassan Al Bashir in 2019 is uncertain, amid competition with other GCC states for influence there.

U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation

U.S.-Qatar defense and security relations are extensive, including through a “Strategic Dialogue” that first convened in January 2018. The U.S-Qatar defense relationship emerged after the six Gulf monarchies formed the GCC in late 1981 to back Iraq against the threat posed by Iran in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. In the latter stages of that war, Iran attacked international shipping in the Gulf and some Gulf state oil loading facilities, but none in Qatar. GCC forces participated in the U.S.-led military coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in February 1991, and Qatari armored forces helped defeat an Iraqi attack on the Saudi town of Khafji in January 1991.

Qatar is a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (the Islamic State organization). In 2014, Qatar flew some airstrikes in Syria against Islamic State positions. However, by the end of 2014, the coalition ceased identifying Qatar as a participant in coalition strikes inside Syria. In 2019, Qatar indicated it would join the U.S.-led maritime security mission (Operation Sentinel) intended to deter Iran from further attacks on commercial shipping in the

54 “Qatar calls on Taliban to protect civilians,” AFP, August 17, 2021.
57 “Turkey, Russia, Qatar to push for political resolution in Syria,” Reuters, March 11, 2021.
Gulf, which includes Bahrain, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The Qatar government has not announced whether it is participating in that mission, which began operations in late 2019.

### Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)

The United States and Qatar signed a formal DCA on June 23, 1992, and it was renewed for 10 years, reportedly with some modifications, in December 2013. The text of the pact is classified, but it reportedly addresses U.S. military access to Qatari military facilities, prepositioning of U.S. armor and other military equipment, and U.S. training of Qatar’s military forces. More than 8,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed at the various facilities in Qatar, including Al Udeid Air Base, discussed further below.

Qatar’s force of about 16,500 is the smallest in the region except for Bahrain. Of that force, about 12,000 are ground forces, 2,500 are naval forces, and 2,000 are air forces. Qatar has sought to compensate for the small size of its force with purchases of advanced weaponry such as U.S.-made combat aircraft and German-made Leopard tanks, as discussed further below.

### Al Udeid Air Base (Air Force/CENTCOM)

Most of the U.S. military personnel in Qatar are U.S. Air Force personnel based at the large Al Udeid air base southwest of Doha. Al Udeid Base also hosts the forward headquarters for CENTCOM. U.S. personnel deployed to Qatar participate in U.S. operations such as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization, and they provide a substantial capability against Iran. In conjunction with U.S.-Iran tensions since mid-2019, the United States deployed F-22 combat aircraft to Al Udeid.

The U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue has produced agreements to expand defense and security cooperation, including the possibility of “permanent” U.S. basing there, centered on the expansion and improvements of Al Udeid over the next two decades. In January 2019, during the second U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue, the Qatar Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense signed a memorandum of understanding that DOD referred to as a “positive step towards the eventual formalization of Qatar’s commitment to support sustainment costs and future infrastructure costs at [Al Udeid Air Base].” Al Udeid has been steadily expanded and enhanced with Qatari funding (over $8 billion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al Udeid since 2003) and about $500 million in U.S. military construction funding since 2003. Qatar reportedly

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60 “Qatar, Kuwait told U.S. they will join naval coalition, official says,” Reuters, November 25, 2019.


63 “Qatar is now one of the most well-equipped military forces in the Middle East,” *Army Recognition*, July 20, 2020.


67 Figures compiled by CRS.
is providing another $1.8 billion for the Al Udeid expansion plan. The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-283) authorized $790 million for military construction projects for Al Udeid, pursuant to an agreement with the State of Qatar for required in-kind contributions. In 2018, the State Department approved the sale to Qatar of equipment, with an estimated value of about $200 million, to upgrade its Air Operation Center.

As Saliyah Facility (Army) and Hamad Port

From 1992 until 2021, the U.S. Army component of U.S. Central Command prepositions armor (enough to outfit one brigade) at Camp As Sayliyah outside Doha. U.S. armor stationed in Qatar was deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom that removed Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in 2003. Because the ground force threat to the Gulf from Iraq has largely ended since the 2003 Iraq war, the Defense Department has de-emphasized prepositioning armor in Qatar. The As Sayliyah facility was closed in June 2021. By contrast, the naval threat in the Gulf has increased, and Qatar has been expanding the Hamad Port to be able to potentially accommodate larger U.S. Navy operations.

U.S. Arms Sales to Qatar

Over the past two decades, Qatar has shifted its weaponry mix from European sources toward U.S.-made equipment. According to the State Department military cooperation factsheet cited above, the United States has $25 billion dollars in active government-to-government sales cases with Qatar under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, and, since 2014, the United States has authorized the permanent export of over $2.8 billion in defense articles to Qatar via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process. Qatar has a 100% favorable rate on Blue Lantern end-use monitoring (EUM) checks for direct commercial sales and a “satisfactory” rating for the FMS Golden Sentry EUM monitoring program.

- **Tanks.** Qatar fields 30 French-made AMX-30s main battle tanks and, since 2016, Germany has delivered 62 “Leopard 2” tanks to Qatar. Qatar has not purchased U.S.-made tanks, to date.

- **Combat Aircraft.** On November 17, 2016, based on a Qatari request in 2013, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of the potential sale to Qatar of up to 72 U.S.-made F-15s, with an estimated value of $21 billion. The approval came after an evaluation of the sale with respect to the U.S. legal requirement to preserve Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME). During June-December 2017, the United States and Qatar signed agreements for Qatar to purchase all 72 of them, with deliveries to be completed by 2023. Qatar signed a $7 billion agreement in May 2015 to buy 24 French-made Rafale
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aircraft,\(^{73}\) and deliveries began in early 2019. In September 2017, Qatar signed a “Statement of Intent” with the United Kingdom to purchase 24 Typhoon combat aircraft.

- **Attack Helicopters.** In 2012, the United States sold Qatar AH-64 Apache, UH-60 M Blackhawk, and MH-60 helicopters, with an estimated value of about $6.6 billion. On April 9, 2018, DSCA announced that the State Department had approved a sale to Qatar of 5,000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapons Systems II Guidance Sections for use on the Apaches, with an estimated value of $300 million. On May 9, 2019, DSCA notified Congress of a possible sale of another 24 AH-64E Apaches to help Qatar defend its oil and gas platforms, at an estimated cost of $3 billion. S.J.Res. 26 was introduced on May 14, 2019, to prohibit the sale but, after the Administration stated an intent to veto the bill, a motion to discharge the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from further consideration of the bill failed 42-57.\(^{74}\)

- **Short-Range Missile and Rocket Systems.** During 2012-2016, the United States sold Qatar Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, Javelin guided missiles, the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). On April 22, 2016, DSCA notified Congress of a potential sale to Qatar of 252 RIM-116C Rolling Airframe Tactical Missiles and 2 RIM 116C-II Rolling Airframe Telemetry Missiles, at an estimated cost of $260 million.\(^{75}\) A July 2019 joint U.S.-Qatar statement said that Qatar had recommitted to a 2018 agreement to buy 40 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAM) at an estimated value of $215 million. On July 10, 2019, Raytheon announced that Qatar will be the first country to purchases its Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile – Extended Range (AMRAAM-ER) weapon.\(^{76}\)

- **Ballistic Missiles.** At its national day parade in December 2017, the Qatari military displayed a newly-purchased SY 400-BP-12A ballistic missile, which has a 120-mile range and is considered suited to a surface attack mission.\(^{77}\)

- **Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).** Qatar has purchased various U.S.-made BMD systems, consistent with U.S. efforts to promote a coordinated Gulf missile defense capability against Iran’s missile arsenal. In 2012, the United States sold Qatar Patriot Configuration 3 (PAC-3, made by Raytheon) fire units and missiles at an estimated value of nearly $10 billion. Also that year, the United States agreed to sell Qatar the Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense (THAAD), the most sophisticated ground-based missile defense system the United States has made available for sale. No THAAD purchase has been finalized.\(^{78}\)

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\(^{74}\) Marianne Levine, “Senate fails to block arms sales to Bahrain and Qatar,” Politico, June 13, 2019.

\(^{75}\) DSCA Transmittal Number 16-07.

\(^{76}\) Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 11, 2019.

\(^{77}\) “Why is Qatar Showing Off its New Short-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenal?” Al Arabiya English, December 20, 2017.

• Naval Vessels. In 2016, DSCA transmitted a proposed sale to Qatar of an unspecified number of U.S.-made Mk-V fast patrol boats, along with other equipment, with a total estimated value of about $124 million. In August 2017, Qatar finalized a purchase from Italy of four multirole corvette ships, two fast patrol missile ships, and an amphibious logistics ship, estimated at $5 billion.79

Other Defense Partnerships
Qatar has developed defense relations with several other partners.

• NATO. Qatar established relations with NATO under the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” (ICI). Qatar’s Ambassador to Belgium serves as the interlocutor with NATO, the headquarters of which is based near Brussels. In June 2018, Qatar’s Defense Minister said that his country’s long-term “ambition” is to join NATO.80

• France. Prior to 2000, Qatar bought most of its major combat systems from France. In March 2019, France and Qatar signed agreements on defense information exchange, cooperation to combat cybercrime, and education.81

• Turkey. Turkey helped Qatar cope with the intra-GCC rift by increasing food exports to Qatar. Turkey also added more than 1,500 troops to its Tariq bin Ziyad base in Qatar, which was established in 2014, and it opened a second military base in Qatar in September 2019.82 To limit Turkey’s influence in the Gulf, the Saudi-led boycotting states demanded that Qatar close the Turkish bases.83

• Russia. Since 2016, Qatar has broadened its relationship with Russia, including with several visits to Russia by Amir Tamim, apparently in recognition of Russia’s heightened role in the region. One of Qatar’s sovereign wealth funds has increased its investments in Russia, particularly in the Rosneft energy firm. Qatar is reportedly considering buying the S-400 sophisticated air defense system,84 but U.S. opposition and the potential for U.S. sanctions for the sale apparently has contributed to Qatar’s lack of movement to complete the purchase. Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) sanctions persons or entities that conduct transactions with Russia’s defense or intelligence sector.

Counter-terrorism Cooperation85
According to the State Department, “The United States and Qatar continued to increase CT [counter-terrorism] cooperation in 2019, building on progress made after the U.S. Secretary of State and Qatari Foreign Minister signed a CT MOU [memorandum of understanding] in July...
2017.” The State Department’s recent reports on international terrorism state that U.S. technical assistance to Qatari law enforcement and judicial agencies have increased. A Department of Justice resident legal advisor has been stationed in Qatar since April 2018, providing technical assistance to Qatar’s CT efforts and building prosecutorial capacity. In November 2018, Qatar began using its own funds to pay for a three-year U.S. Department of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training program, including training pertinent to Qatar’s preparations to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022. There were no terrorist incidents in Qatar in 2019 or 2020.

At the same time, Qatar’s efforts to prevent the movement of terrorists in or through Qatar were at times said to be lacking. At least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to Al Qaeda figures residing in or transiting Qatar, including suspected September 11, 2001, attacks mastermind Khalid Shaykh Mohammad.86

**Terrorism Financing Issues**

U.S. officials credit Qatar with taking steps to prevent terrorism financing and the movement of suspected terrorists into or through Qatar. According to the State Department, the Qatari government passed a new AML/CFT (anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism) law in 2019 and sought feedback from the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. government during the drafting process. Qatar continued to maintain restrictions, imposed in 2017, on the overseas activities of Qatari charities, requiring all such activity to be conducted through one of two approved charities in an effort to better monitor charitable giving for terrorist financing abuse.

The country is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a regional body that coordinates efforts combatting money laundering and terrorist financing. In February 2017, Qatar hosted a meeting of the “Egmont Group” consisting of 152 country Financial Intelligence Units. Qatar is also a member of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), a U.S.-GCC initiative announced in May 2017 and Qatar joined the United States and other TFTC countries in designating terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda and IS later in 2017. In September 2021, the United States and Qatar conducted a joint operation to uncover and sanction a Gulf-based financing network used by Lebanese Hezbollah, a designated FTO that is extensively linked to Iran.87

**Countering Violent Extremism**

State Department officials maintain that: “Qatar has made significant strides in addressing state-sourced internal and external support for educational and religious content espousing intolerance, discrimination, sectarianism, and violence, although examples are still found in textbooks and disseminated through satellite television and other media.” Qatar has hosted workshops and participated in regional meetings on the issue.

**Economic Issues amid COVID-19 and the GCC Rift**

Qatar has been wrestling with volatility in world energy prices since mid-2014, and the economic effects of the intra-GCC rift and the COVID-19 pandemic. About 40% of Qatar’s food was

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86 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.

imported from Saudi Arabia prior to the intra-GCC crisis, and there were reports of runs on stocks of food when the blockade began in June 2017. However, Qatar’s main sovereign wealth fund, run by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), as well as funds held by the Central Bank, total about $350 billion, according to Qatar’s Central Bank, giving the country a substantial ability to weather financial demands.\(^8\) The government was able to procure similar goods from Turkey, Iran, and India. After an initial spike of COVID-19 cases in the spring of 2020, government-mandated lockdowns, social distancing, and travel restrictions resulted in a relatively low number of deaths through the end of 2020, and a total of about 600 deaths from the disease to date. Over 75% of the population (including expatriates) have been fully vaccinated to date, using both the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines.\(^8\) Qatar’s 2020 budget, announced in December 2019, anticipated a surplus of about $1.2 billion,\(^9\) but the economic effects of COVID-19 are expected to put the country’s budget into deficit for all of 2021.\(^9\) As a public health crisis, observers have noted that the infection spread most rapidly among Qatar’s expatriate labor population that often live in crowded conditions.\(^9\)

Large oil and gas reserves and its small citizen population have combined to make Qatar the country with the world’s highest per capita income. Oil and gas still account for over 90% of Qatar’s export earnings, and over half of government revenues. Proven oil reserves of about 25 billion barrels enable Qatar to continue its current levels of oil production (about 700,000 barrels per day) for over 50 years. Its proven reserves of natural gas are about 13% of the world’s total and it is the second largest exporter of natural gas in the world.\(^9\) In 2018, Qatar withdrew from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to focus on its more high-priority natural gas exports. Qatar is the source of the gas supplies for the Dolphin Gas Project established by the UAE in 1999 and which became operational in 2007. The project involves production and processing of natural gas from Qatar’s offshore North Field, which is connected to Iran’s South Pars Field (see Figure 2), and transportation of the processed gas by subsea pipeline to the UAE and Oman.\(^9\) Qatar Petroleum announced in early 2021 that it will boost LNG output by about 40% by 2026 through expansion projects at its North Field.\(^9\) Qatar did not reduce its gas supplies to the other GCC states as retaliation for the blockade. Some economic data is presented in Figure 1.

**U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations**

In contrast to the two least wealthy GCC states (Bahrain and Oman), which have free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States, Qatar and the United States have not negotiated an FTA. However, in April 2004, the United States and Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Qatar has used the benefits of the more limited agreement to

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\(^{90}\) “Qatar Announces 2020 Budget, its Biggest in Five Years,” *Al Jazeera*, December 19, 2019.


\(^{93}\) CIA, *The World Factbook*.


undertake large investments in the United States, including the City Center project in Washington, DC. Also, several U.S. universities and other institutions, such as Cornell University, Carnegie Mellon University, Georgetown University, Brookings Institution, and Rand Corporation, have established branches and offices at the Qatar Foundation’s Education City outside Doha. The joint statement of a 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” QIA’s commitment of $45 billion in future investments in U.S. companies and real estate.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Foreign Trade Statistics” compilation, in 2020, U.S. exports to Qatar were about $3.4 billion, and U.S. imports from Qatar were about $1.2 billion. U.S. exports to Qatar consist mainly of aircraft, machinery, and information technology. U.S. imports from Qatar consist mainly of petroleum products, but U.S. imports of Qatar’s crude oil or natural gas have declined to negligible levels in recent years, reflecting the significant increase in U.S. domestic production. State-run Qatar Petroleum is a major investor in the emerging U.S. LNG export market.\(^{96}\)

Qatar’s airline, Qatar Airways, has been a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft, although the status of additional planned purchases of U.S. aircraft is unclear in light of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on air travel.\(^{97}\) Some U.S. airlines have challenged Qatar Airways’ benefits under a U.S.-Qatar “open skies” agreement. The U.S. carriers assert that the airline’s privileges under that agreement should be revoked because the airline’s aircraft purchases are subsidized by Qatar’s government, giving it an unfair competitive advantage.\(^{98}\) The United States and Qatar reached a set of “understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, committing Qatar Airways to financial transparency and containing some limitations on the airline’s ability to pick up passengers in Europe for flights to the United States. Some assert that Qatar Airways’ 2018 purchase of Air Italy might represent a violation of those limitations.

**U.S. Assistance**

In large part because of its wealth, Qatar receives virtually no U.S. assistance. At times, small amounts of U.S. aid have been provided to help Qatar develop capabilities to prevent smuggling of arms and narcotics, and the movement of terrorists or proliferation-related gear into Qatar or around its waterways. In FY2016, the United States spent about $100,000 on programs in Qatar, about two-thirds of which was for counter-narcotics programming. In FY2017, the United States provided a total of $78,000 in aid to Qatar, of which $53,000 was for programs to support Qatar’s counter-narcotics capabilities. The remainder was for maternal and other health programs. Virtually no U.S. aid of any kind was provided for Qatar programs in FY2019, the last fiscal year for which precise data is available.

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\(^{97}\) The White House announced after the July 9 Trump-Tamim meeting that Qatar Airways would buy (1) five Boeing 777 Freighters; (2) large-cabin aircraft from Gulfstream; and (3) GE jet engines and services to power its 787 and 777 aircraft. White House, “U.S.-Qatar Joint Statement,” July 9, 2019.

Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure

Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency, as adapted by CRS.

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