The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

Updated October 26, 2021
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The Palestinians are an Arab people whose origins are in present-day Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Congress pays close attention—through legislation and oversight—to the ongoing conflict between the Palestinians and Israel.

The current structure of Palestinian governing entities dates to 1994. In that year, Israel agreed with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to permit a Palestinian Authority (PA) to exercise limited rule over Gaza and specified areas of the West Bank, subject to overarching Israeli military administration that dates back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

After the PA’s establishment, U.S. policy toward the Palestinians focused on encouraging a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, countering Palestinian terrorist groups, and aiding Palestinian goals on governance and economic development. Since then, Congress has appropriated more than $5 billion in bilateral aid to the Palestinians, who rely heavily on external donor assistance.

Conducting relations with the Palestinians has presented challenges for several Administrations and Congresses. The United States has historically sought to bolster PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization supported in part by Iran). Since 2007, Hamas has had de facto control within Gaza, making the security, political, and humanitarian situation there particularly fraught. The Abbas-led PA still exercises limited self-rule over specified areas of the West Bank. Given Abbas’s advanced age (he was born in 1935), observers speculate about who will succeed him and implications for the current situation of divided rule in the West Bank and Gaza. In April 2021, Abbas controversially postponed PA legislative and presidential elections that had been scheduled for May and July, respectively. Domestic and international criticism of corruption and authoritarian practices within the PA have since intensified amid PA authorities’ repression of dissenting voices and public protests.

Lack of progress toward peace with Israel has led the PLO to advocate the Palestinian cause more assertively in international fora. A 2012 U.N. General Assembly resolution changed the non-member observer status of “Palestine” at the United Nations from an entity to a “state.” Palestinians also have applied international legal pressure on Israel. The Palestinians acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2015, and the ICC opened an investigation in March 2021 that could conceivably bring charges against Israeli, Palestinian, or other individuals for alleged war crimes committed in the West Bank and Gaza.

Under the Trump Administration, U.S. policy shifted in a direction that more explicitly favored Israel over the Palestinians. Actions of note included suspending U.S. aid for the Palestinians, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and opening an embassy there, and affording more favorable treatment to Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In late 2020, the Administration brokered agreements to help Israel move toward more formal relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. PLO/PA leaders voiced opposition to the agreements insofar as they signaled a change to Arab states’ previous stance that Israel should address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition to improved ties.

Biden Administration officials have taken steps to improve U.S.-Palestinian ties, including through the resumption of aid and a renewed emphasis on support for an eventual two-state solution. The Administration and Congress face a number of key issues, including (1) the future of aid; (2) the feasibility of reopening certain diplomatic offices in Jerusalem and Washington, DC; (3) reconstruction in Gaza following a May 2021 Israel-Hamas conflict; (4) controversies over Israeli settlements in the West Bank; and (5) how to respond to Palestinian actions in international fora (including the ICC). The trajectory of some of these issues may depend on a significant PLO/PA change to welfare payments to or on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in acts of terrorism.
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Introduction

Since the United States established ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 1990s, Congress has played a significant role in shaping U.S. policymaking toward the Palestinians. As successive Administrations have sought to facilitate a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and increase or decrease assistance to Palestinians, congressional action has often influenced executive branch decisions. After the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in 1993, Congress has appropriated more than $5 billion in bilateral aid to the Palestinians, while placing a number of restrictions and other conditions on certain types of aid. For background information, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.

Palestinian Overview and National Aspirations

The Palestinians are Arabs who live in the geographical area comprising present-day Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, or who have historical and cultural ties to that area. An estimated 5.2 million Palestinians (98% Sunni Muslim, 1% Christian) live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (see Table 1). Of these, about 2.2 million are registered as refugees in their own right or as descendants of the original refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In addition, approximately 635,000 Jewish Israeli citizens live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Of the more than 6 million diaspora Palestinians living outside of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, most are in Arab states—with more than 3 million registered as refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. For more information on Palestinian refugees, see Appendix A.

| Table 1. Basic Facts for the West Bank and Gaza Strip |
|-------------------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| Statistic                      | West Bank     | Gaza Strip    | Combined       |
| Population                     | 3.1 million   | 2.1 million   | 5.2 million    |
| Refugees                       | 828,000       | 1,386,000     | 2,214,000      |
| Median age                     | 21.9 (2019 est.) | 18.0 (2020 est.) | -              |
| Literacy rate (2018 est.)      | -             | -             | 97.2%          |
| Population growth rate         | 1.7%          | 2.0%          | -              |
| Real GDP growth rate           | -             | -             | -11.5% (2020 est.) |
| GDP per capita at PPP          | -             | -             | $5,316 (2020 est.) $5,742 (2021 proj) |
| Unemployment rate              | 15.0% (2020 est.) | 43.0% (2020 est.) | 25.9% (2020 est.) 24.9% (2021 proj) |
| Export partners (2017 est.)    | -             | -             | Israel 84.2%, Arab states 16.6% |

1 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) projections for 2021. PCBS estimated as of 2017 that an additional 1.47 million Palestinians were Arab citizens of Israel.
3 See the portal of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) at https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work.
Since the early 20th century, the dominant Palestinian national goal has been to establish an independent state in historic Palestine (the area covered by the British Mandate until the British withdrawal in 1948). Over time, Palestinians have debated among themselves, with Israelis, and with others over the nature and extent of such a state and how to achieve it. For more historical background, see Appendix B and CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.

Today, Fatah and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) are the largest Palestinian political movements (see Appendix A for profiles of both groups). The positions that their leaders express reflect two basic cleavages in Palestinian society:

1. Between those (including many members of Fatah, including its leader Mahmoud Abbas) who seek to establish a state in the West Bank and Gaza by nonviolent means—negotiations, international diplomacy, civil disobedience—and those (including Hamas) who insist on maintaining violence against Israel as an option;
2. Between those (Fatah) who favor a secular model of governance and those (Hamas) who call for a society governed more by Islamic norms.

The differences between these two factions are reflected in Palestinian governance (see Appendix C). Since Hamas forcibly seized control of Gaza in 2007, it has exercised de facto rule there, while Fatah’s leader Mahmoud Abbas—elected as president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2005—has headed the PA government based in the West Bank.

Having different Palestinian leaders in the two territories has complicated the question of who speaks for the Palestinians both domestically and internationally. In the West Bank, the PA exercises limited self-rule in specified urban areas (Areas A and B, as identified in a 1995 Israel-PLO agreement) where Israel maintains overarching control. Both territories face socioeconomic challenges based on Israeli military measures such as property confiscation and demolition,
Israeli movement and access restrictions, political uncertainty, longtime Palestinian dependence on foreign aid, and domestic governance problems—with Gaza’s economic challenges and overall isolation more acute (see “Gaza’s Challenges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” “PA West Bank Leadership Concerns,” Appendix C, and Appendix D). See Figure 1 and Figure 2 for maps of both territories.

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**Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the West Bank and Gaza**

With its global reach, COVID-19 has significantly affected the West Bank and Gaza. As of October 7, the World Health Organization identifies 441,882 confirmed cases and 4,465 deaths since March 2020, with Gaza accounting for about 75% of active cases. Over 1,439,000 people have been vaccinated, representing around 48% of the target population (age 16 and older), with approximately four-fifths of those people fully vaccinated.7 During early 2021, disparities between Israeli residents with speedy access to vaccines and West Bank/Gaza residents with little or no access led PA officials and some observers—including the World Bank—to call for greater efforts by Israel to share vaccines with Palestinians, and to assist the PA in procuring additional vaccines more expeditiously.8 Additionally, some observers criticized PA officials for allegedly directing vaccines to “the senior ranks of the governing party, allies in the media and even to family members of top dignitaries.”9 Israel agreed in June to advance up to 1.4 million doses to the PA, but the PA canceled the deal amid popular concern about the initial shipment approaching its expiration date.10 By the end of the summer, the PA had received sufficient vaccine doses to inoculate most eligible West Bank/Gaza residents, but some vaccine hesitancy has been reported.11

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10 Maayan Lubell, “Israel says COVID-19 vaccines rejected by Palestinians were safe,” Reuters, June 19, 2021.
11 Rasgon, “Palestinians Finally Have Vaccines.”
Figure 1. Map of West Bank

Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, 2018, adapted by CRS.

Note: All boundaries and depictions are approximate.
International diplomacy aimed at resolving Israeli-Palestinian disputes and advancing Palestinian national goals has stalled, with no direct Israel-PLO negotiations since 2014. Palestinians routinely assert that U.S. policy reflects a pro-Israel bias and a lack of sensitivity to PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ domestic political rivalry with Hamas. In light of the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, Arab leaders with a range of domestic and other regional concerns have focused less on championing the Palestinian cause. Many have built or strengthened informal ties with Israel based on common concerns regarding Iran and other perceived regional threats. In 2020, four countries—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco—agreed to take steps toward formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Their agreements with Israel are known as the Abraham Accords.

Citing the lack of progress in negotiations with Israel, Abbas and other PLO/PA leaders have sought support for Palestinian national aspirations and grievances in the United Nations and other international fora. Some Palestinians advocate the idea of a binational or one-state idea as an

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13 For more information, see CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti.
alternative to a negotiated two-state solution with Israel (see Figure 3). In a September 2021 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Abbas said:

I warn that undermining the two-State solution based on international law and UN resolutions will open the way for other alternatives imposed on us by the situation on the ground as a result of the continuation of the Israeli occupation of our State…. If the Israeli occupation authorities continue to entrench the reality of one apartheid state as is happening today, our Palestinian people and the entire world will not tolerate such a situation and circumstances on the ground will inevitably impose equal and full political rights for all on the land of historical Palestine, within one State.14

**Figure 3. Public Opinion Polling: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**

(Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip)

![Public Opinion Polling Chart]

Source: CRS graphic, based on underlying polling data from Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.

The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state neighbors, but also to the United States and many other countries and actors around the world for a variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. For at least 75 years, the issue has been one of the most provocative in the international arena.

### Key U.S. Policy Considerations and Issues

Major U.S. policy priorities with the Palestinians over successive Administrations have included facilitating or seeking a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process, helping the West Bank-based PA counter Hamas and other terrorist groups, and using aid to encourage Palestinian governance reform and economic development.

During President Trump’s time in office, his Administration took a number of actions that favored Israeli positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, and also suspended aid to the Palestinians, as set forth below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Trump Administration Policy Changes on Israeli-Palestinian Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>December 2017</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 2018</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The Abraham Accords signal some change to Arab states’ previous insistence—as expressed in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative\textsuperscript{15}—that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.\textsuperscript{16} Although Israel reportedly agreed to suspend plans to annex part of the West Bank as part of the UAE deal,\textsuperscript{17} PLO/PA officials denounced the deal as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, claiming that the UAE had acquiesced to a West Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto annexation.”\textsuperscript{18}

**Biden Administration Policies**

The Biden Administration has made efforts to improve ties with the Palestinians, including by revisiting some Trump-era actions. U.S. officials have resumed some types of aid to the Palestinians, along with diplomatic engagement with Palestinian leaders. In a March 10, 2021, hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that the United States has an obligation to seek to advance the prospects for a two-state solution, saying that it “is ultimately the only way that Israel will truly be secure as a Jewish and democratic state and the Palestinians will have the state to which they are entitled.”\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15} The Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and provide for the “[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.” The initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. The text of the initiative is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.


\textsuperscript{17} Jacob Magid, “US assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, ToI told,” *Times of Israel*, September 13, 2020. For information on the annexation issue, see CRS Report R46433, *Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions*, by Jim Zanotti.


\textsuperscript{19} Text of hearing transcript available at
Regarding the U.S. position on Jerusalem, a spokesperson for President Biden confirmed in February 2021 that “our embassy will remain in Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel’s capital. The ultimate status of Jerusalem is a final status issue which will need to be resolved by the parties in the context of direct negotiations.”

### May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict

From May 10 through May 21, 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Gaza-based militants led by Hamas. The following were key aspects of the conflict:

- **Overview.** Palestinian militants fired rockets with unprecedented intensity from Gaza into central Israel. The Iron Dome anti-rocket system played a prominent role in defending Israeli population centers. Israel conducted sustained air and artillery strikes in Gaza. Additionally, intercommunal protests and violence took place within Israel and Jerusalem—involving some Arab citizens of Israel, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Jewish nationalists, and Israeli authorities.

- **Political context.** Some factors that may have influenced the outbreak and trajectory of conflict included tensions over Jerusalem during Ramadan, the presence of a new U.S. Administration, and significant domestic political uncertainty for both Israelis and Palestinians (including a recent postponement of PA elections).

- **Fatalities.** In exchanges of fire between Israel and Gaza, 12 people in Israel (including 2 Thai nationals) and more than 250 people in Gaza (including more than 60 children) were killed. Amid unrest in the West Bank during that same timeframe (May 10-21), a U.N. source estimates that Israeli security forces killed 27 Palestinians.

In the conflict’s aftermath, President Biden committed to “working with the United Nations and other international stakeholders to provide rapid humanitarian assistance and to marshal international support for the people of Gaza and the Gaza reconstruction efforts” in partnership with the PA “in a manner that does not permit Hamas to simply restock its military arsenal.” With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally-supported post-conflict recovery remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Hamas conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014 (see “Gaza’s Challenges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction”). Because of the PA’s inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwilling to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction.

The following are key issues for the Biden Administration and Congress.

### U.S. Aid

The Biden Administration has resumed some economic development, security, and humanitarian aid for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (see also “Gaza’s Challenges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction”). As noted earlier, in 2019 the Trump Administration suspended all U.S. aid to the Palestinians, after a number of measures by the Administration and Congress in 2018.

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https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/475423704?3&deliveryId=72574526&uid=congressionaltranscripts


21 Another U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, also took part from Gaza.

22 Dina Kraft and Laura King, “Israel’s Netanyahu, master of political survival, tested by conflict with Gaza,” Los Angeles Times, May 23, 2021; “2 Thai workers killed, several people injured as Hamas bombards southern Israel,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2021.


26 For more information on this development and subsequent legislative amendments that facilitated renewed congressional appropriations of bilateral aid for the West Bank and Gaza starting in FY2020, see CRS Report R46274, *The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction*, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea.
to halt or limit various types of aid. Some of these measures reflected Trump Administration policies that unsuccessfully sought to compel Palestinian leaders to resume dialogue with U.S. officials and accept U.S. and Israeli negotiating demands. Other measures, such as the Taylor Force Act (TFA, enacted in March 2018 as Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141, and discussed further below), attracted bipartisan support.

In its FY2022 congressional budget justification, the State Department said:

> U.S. foreign assistance for the West Bank and Gaza serves important U.S. interests, including providing critical relief to those in great need and fostering economic development and the conditions needed for a sustainable two-state solution.

Past Administrations have used similar rationales to justify U.S. aid to the Palestinians. After the peace process began between Israel and the PLO in the 1990s, U.S. bilateral aid to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip supported U.S. efforts to incline the newly established PA toward better governance and economic development, and away from violence against Israel. Congress routinely attaches a number of conditions to aid to the Palestinians in annual appropriations language.

For background information on U.S. aid to the Palestinians, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.

**Bilateral Economic and Security Assistance**

Nearly all bilateral aid appropriated by Congress for the Palestinians comes from the following accounts (see Figure 4):

- **Economic Support Fund (ESF)** aid is the main channel for economic development and humanitarian assistance through NGO implementing partners in the West Bank and Gaza. The FY2022 congressional budget justification reads: “Economic and humanitarian assistance programs improve the lives of millions of Palestinians by providing immediate relief and advancing development across sectors such as health, appropriate infrastructure, economic growth, and civil society.”

- **International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)** funding goes toward nonlethal assistance programs that the United States started for the PA’s security forces and justice sector in the West Bank in 2008. According to the FY2022 congressional budget justification: “Security assistance supports the PA’s efforts to build professional and effective security and criminal justice institutions that maintain security and stability in the West Bank, uphold the rule of law, and contribute directly to regional security.”

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27 CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
28 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 254.
29 See, for example, sections 7037-7040, and 7041(k) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).
30 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 254.
31 State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, p. 308.
Figure 4. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2012-FY2022

The Biden Administration ended the two-year moratorium on bilateral aid to the Palestinians by notifying Congress (in March and April 2021, respectively) of its intent to obligate $75 million in FY2020 ESF and $40 million in INCLE (about $37 million from FY2016 appropriations and $3 million from FY2017). According to a June 15, 2021, letter from Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Ranking Member James Risch to Representative Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member Risch and some other Members placed an informal congressional hold on a portion of the FY2020 ESF because of potentially differing views between the Members and the Administration about whether the funds would directly benefit the PA.\(^{32}\) As mentioned below, the Taylor Force Act (Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141) prohibits most ESF directly benefitting the PA unless Palestinian leaders curtail domestically popular payments that arguably incentivize acts of terror. In September 2021, a media report said that Ranking Member Risch released the hold after the Biden Administration reallocated $20 million slated for infrastructure projects toward food assistance (see Table 2).\(^{33}\)

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\(^{33}\) Jacob Magid, “Top Republican releases remaining Palestinian aid he held up for months,” *Times of Israel*, September 23, 2021.
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Table 2. Details Regarding $75 Million in FY2020 ESF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial March 2021 Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$5.4 million for civil society organizations and independent media outlets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10 million for operating costs for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$24.5 million for water supply and sanitation needs and related general services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4.2 million for community engagement, job placement, and psychosocial support for Palestinian youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8 million in economic development assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$16.5 million for municipal infrastructure in Bethlehem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6.4 million for rapid response for vulnerable populations in Gaza.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final September 2021 Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$5.4 million for civil society organizations and independent media outlets in the West Bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10 million for operating costs for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4.3 million for water supply and sanitation needs for vulnerable households in Gaza.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8.2 million for community engagement, training, and job placement for Palestinian youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15.5 million in economic development assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$11.4 million for rapid response for vulnerable populations in Gaza.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20.2 in food assistance through the World Food Programme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID.

U.S. Contributions to UNRWA

Additionally, the Administration has resumed voluntary contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). UNRWA provides education, health care, and other social services to more than 5 million registered Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. It is funded almost entirely through voluntary contributions from governments and other donors.

During FY2021, the Biden Administration provided $318.8 million in contributions to UNRWA (see Table 3). U.S. contributions come from the Migration and Refugee Assistance account, which is administered through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM).

Some Members of Congress and Israeli officials want U.S. officials to pressure UNRWA to reform some of its practices.34 While many supporters of the organization may agree with the need for reform, some also argue that UNRWA provides critical humanitarian support to the Palestinian refugee population.35

UNRWA Contributions: Conditions and Oversight

U.S. contributions to UNRWA are subject to various legislative conditions and oversight measures. Section 301(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 87-195), as amended, says that “No contributions by the United States shall be made to [UNRWA] except on the condition that [UNRWA] take[s] all possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.”


35 See, for example, Better World Campaign, “Better World Campaign says UNRWA funding critical to U.S. interests in the Middle East,” January 9, 2018.
Additionally, since FY2015, annual appropriations legislation (for example, Section 7048(d) of P.L. 116-260) has included a provision requiring the State Department to report to Congress on whether UNRWA is

- using Operations Support Officers to inspect UNRWA installations and reporting any inappropriate use;
- acting promptly to address any staff or beneficiary violations of Section 301(c) or UNRWA internal policies;
- implementing procedures to maintain its facilities’ neutrality, and conducting regular inspections;
- taking necessary and appropriate measures to ensure Section 301(c) compliance and related reporting;
- taking steps to ensure the content of educational materials taught in UNRWA-administered schools and summer camps is consistent with the values of human rights, dignity, and tolerance and does not induce incitement;
- not engaging in financial violations of U.S. law, and taking steps to improve financial transparency; and
- in compliance with U.N. audit requirements.

The State Department (specifically PRM) and UNRWA have a nonbinding “Framework for Cooperation” in place for calendar years 2021 and 2022, patterned after similar framework documents from before the Trump Administration’s suspension of contributions in 2018. In the framework document, UNRWA has agreed to submit a report to PRM semiannually—alongside its annual operational report—as a way to evaluate UNRWA’s compliance with U.S. legislative requirements.

In a September 2021 SFRC hearing on the nomination of Julieta Valls Noyes to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, Noyes said that the Biden Administration shares concerns expressed by some Members via their summer 2021 introduction of an UNRWA Transparency and Accountability Act (S. 2479 and H.R. 4721) that would further condition U.S. contributions to UNRWA. However, Noyes asserted that the PRM-UNRWA framework document (see textbox above) “accounts for the need to make changes and to redouble efforts to ensure efficiency, the effectiveness and the neutrality of UNWRA.” Noyes also stated, “UNRWA is a force for stability in the region by providing vital services to Palestinians in need, education for school children, health care for people, and the only viable alternative to UNRWA in those areas would be Hamas.”

**Table 3. Historical U.S. Government Contributions to UNRWA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year(s)</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Fiscal Year(s)</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-1989</td>
<td>1,473.3</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>137.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>154.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>184.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>69.0</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>78.2</td>
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<td>249.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>233.3</td>
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<td>390.5</td>
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The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations

<table>
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<th>Fiscal Year(s)</th>
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<td>2005</td>
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Sources: U.S. State Department and UNRWA.
Note: All amounts are approximate.

Israeli-Palestinian Cooperative Programs

In the current Israeli-Palestinian context, where U.S. officials support the concept of negotiating a permanent resolution but do not anticipate imminent progress on that point, the Administration and Congress have pursued programs fostering Israeli-Palestinian cooperative action.

USAID Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization

Since 2002, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided a U.S. government vehicle for using foreign assistance to support people-to-people reconciliation activities and counteracting sources of instability and violent conflict. Congress began funding CMM projects for Israelis and Palestinians in FY2004. According to Section 7060(g) of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260), CMM funding (which comes from either the Economic Support Fund (ESF) or the Development Assistance (DA) accounts) is intended to “support people-to-people reconciliation programs which bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds from areas of civil strife and war.”

Through FY2012, Congress annually designated $10 million from CMM amounts for initiatives in the Middle East. Starting in FY2013, Congress removed the directive. Nevertheless, the executive branch continued allocating a portion of the CMM funds appropriated for global use for Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people initiatives. CMM projects for Israelis and Palestinians have been administered through USAID, the U.S. Embassy to Israel, and the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem (before it was subsumed into the embassy in 2019).

In September 2018, the Trump Administration changed the CMM program by halting new grants for initiatives involving Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. New people-to-people projects were limited to including Arab citizens of Israel as the counterparts to Israeli Jews. This change took place as part of the Trump Administration’s general suspension in 2018 and 2019 of most U.S. aid benefitting Palestinians.

In April 2021, the Biden Administration announced a resumption of many types of U.S. aid for the Palestinians, including $10 million for people-to-people programs involving Israelis and Palestinians. On May 13, 2021, USAID sent formal notification to Congress of its intent to obligate $10 million in DA funding for these programs, rebranded as Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization (CMS). The notification states:

In the West Bank and Gaza and Israel, people-to-people reconciliation activities and associated capacity building technical assistance will be carried out to address issues of common concern for Israelis and Palestinians. Consistent with other Reconciliation Fund Programs managed by USAID, activities may include but are not limited to: programs that facilitate cooperation and inclusion in the areas of general education, including for people with disabilities; mental health; information and communications technology; agriculture and trade; joint sports programs; peacebuilding skills development; and programs that promote greater understanding and opportunities for peace between Israelis and Palestinians through dialogue. Activities will be focused on “cross-border” projects implemented through local and U.S. organizations, but may also include activities between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel.

Funds Under Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act

As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Div. K, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the establishment of the following two funds, as well as $50 million (Congress can specify how to allocate any future appropriations among the two authorized funds) for each of the next five years (FY2022-FY2026):

The People-to-People Partnership for Peace Fund is authorized to be established by the Administrator of USAID near the end of December 2021. If established, the fund would support dialogue and reconciliation programs, as well as other projects designed, as stated in MEPPA, “to help build the foundation for peaceful co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians and for a sustainable two-state solution and an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation.”

Section 8004 of P.L. 116-260 provided authorizing language for the fund by adding Section 535 at the end of Chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.). This section provides that the fund:

- could work through Israeli, Palestinian, or international organizations committed to its purposes, including those that promote reconciliation between Israeli Jews and Arabs;
- could receive contributions, such as from foreign governments and international organizations; and
- would have an advisory board of experts appointed in a bipartisan fashion.

The Joint Investment for Peace Initiative was authorized to be established by the Chief Executive of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) any time after June

42 State Department, “The United States Restores Assistance for the Palestinians,” April 7, 2021.
43 USAID underwent an organizational restructuring under the Trump Administration. For more, see the relevant section in CRS Report R46656, Selected Trump Administration Foreign Aid Priorities: A Wrap-Up, coordinated by Emily M. Morgenstern.
2021. If established, the initiative would, as stated in MEPPA, “provide investments in, and support to, entities that carry out projects that contribute to the development of the Palestinian private sector economy in the West Bank and Gaza,” and would “prioritize support to projects that increase economic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.” A former PLO adviser has raised concerns that the authorizing legislation does not explicitly preclude Israeli settlers in the West Bank from receiving funding from the initiative.\(^45\)

Any appropriations for the two funds would be subject to the same mission directives and vetting practices that USAID applies to bilateral economic aid for the West Bank and Gaza. If both funds are established, Section 8006(d) of P.L. 116-260 requires that USAID and DFC submit a joint report to Congress no later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year describing lessons learned and best practices from their respective projects and investments, and how those projects and investments have contributed to the funds’ purposes.

The congressional budget justification for FY2022 anticipates a total of $50 million in appropriations to be allocated between the two funds.\(^46\)

### Taylor Force Act (TFA) and PLO/PA Payments “for Acts of Terrorism”

The Biden Administration has said that any resumption of aid to the Palestinians would comply with the TFA. The TFA seeks to discourage certain PLO/PA payments “for acts of terrorism” by prohibiting most Economic Support Fund aid (ESF) that “directly benefits” the PA. The TFA does not further define what constitutes a direct benefit.

During the legislative process for the TFA, some Members of Congress argued that these PLO/PA payments—made to Palestinians (and/or their families) who are imprisoned for or accused of terrorism by Israel—provide incentives for Palestinians to commit terrorist acts. For more information on violence and terrorism by Palestinians, see Appendix A.

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\(^46\) State Department, FY2022 Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 2, pp. 258-259.


\(^50\) See, for example, Corker Opening Statement at Hearing on Taylor Force Act, July 12, 2017, https://www.corker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-list?ID=CFA1D96C-2FF8-4A70-9C29-49451ADD90AE; Joel Gehrke, “House passes bill that could cut off Palestinian Authority funding due to aid of terrorists’ families,” Washington Examiner, December 5, 2017. For an analysis arguing that these PLO/PA payments are not the primary drivers of violence against Israel, see Shibley Telhami, “Why the discourse about Palestinian payments to prisoners’ families is distorted and misleading,” Brookings Institution, December 7, 2020.
As mentioned above, the TFA prohibits most ESF directly benefitting the PA, with specific exceptions for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network, and a certain amount for wastewater projects and vaccination programs. Thus, U.S. aid for economic development and humanitarian purposes either is required to fit under those exceptions, or be deemed by an Administration not to directly benefit the PA. As mentioned above, the Biden Administration modified its spending plan for FY2020 ESF after some Members of Congress differed with the Administration on whether some items in the initial plan would directly benefit the PA.

An Administration can only lift the TFA’s restrictions if it certifies that the PLO/PA has ended or significantly changed the payments in question in such a way that they do not incentivize acts of terrorism, and also certifies that the PLO/PA is taking additional steps to oppose violence against Israelis and Americans.

The prospect of the PLO/PA significantly changing these payments may encounter strong domestic opposition among Palestinians. Media reports in late 2020 suggested that the PA might consider changes—if it could make them domestically palatable—in hopes of removing obstacles to U.S. aid.51 PA officials may also focus on recouping the full amount of taxes that Israel collects on the PA’s behalf. After Congress and the Trump Administration enacted the TFA, Israel enacted a law in 2018 by which it withholds the transfer of these taxes by the amount of PLO/PA payments Israel estimates to be for acts of terrorism.52 Yet, President Abbas made the following statement at his speech before the U.N. General Assembly in September 2021:

Why should we have to clarify and justify providing assistance to families of prisoners and martyrs who are the victims of the occupation and its oppressive policies? We cannot abandon our people and we will continue striving to free all our prisoners.53

According to a June 2021 public opinion poll, 70% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza oppose significant changes to the PLO/PA payments.54

Gaza’s Challenges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The Gaza Strip (see Figure 2) presents complicated challenges for U.S. policy. Hamas, Israel, the PA, and several outside actors affect Gaza’s difficult security, political, and humanitarian situations. Since Hamas seized de facto control within Gaza in 2007 (for more information on Hamas and Gaza, see Appendix B and Appendix C), these situations have fueled periodic violence between Israel and Hamas (along with other Palestinian militants based in Gaza) that could recur in the future.

The precarious security situation in Gaza is linked to humanitarian conditions, and because Gaza does not have a self-sufficient economy (see Appendix C and Appendix D), external assistance largely drives humanitarian welfare. Gazans face chronic economic difficulties and shortages of electricity and safe drinking water.55 Large transfers of aid to the PA (particularly from Western

53 Transcript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021).
55 For information on the situation, see U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory (OCHA-oPt), Gaza Strip: Critical Humanitarian Indicators, at https://www.ochaopt.org/page/gaza-strip-
countries, Arab states, and international organizations) have historically been critical inputs for the economy in the West Bank and Gaza, but according to the World Bank the PA received $488 million in aid in 2020, 20% less than in 2019 and the lowest level in decades. According to PA financial statements, the PA has received only around $100 million in foreign aid for 2021 through August.

The possibility that humanitarian crisis could destabilize Gaza has prompted some efforts aimed at improving living conditions and reducing spillover threats. In fall 2018, Israel started allowing shipments of Qatari fuel and cash into Gaza to partially alleviate the electricity and funding shortages. In early 2021, Qatar announced that it would increase its annual contribution to Gaza by around 50% to $360 million, and also pledged $60 million to ease Gaza’s energy crisis by helping build a natural gas pipeline to Gaza from Israel.

Four large-scale conflicts took place between Israel and Gaza-based militants in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021. In each of these conflicts, the militants fired rockets into Israel, while Israel conducted airstrikes in Gaza targeting militants (for more information on threats to Israel from Palestinian violence, see the textbox in Appendix B). Israel also launched some ground operations in the 2008-2009 and 2014 conflicts. In the aftermath of each conflict, significant international attention focused on the still largely unfulfilled tasks of:

- improving humanitarian conditions and economic opportunities for Palestinians in Gaza; and
- preventing Hamas and other militants from reconstituting arsenals and military infrastructure.

No significant breakthrough has occurred to reconcile civilian infrastructure needs with security considerations. Officials in Gaza responsible for post-conflict reconstruction estimate that rebuilding costs from the May 2021 conflict would be $479 million, while remaining damages from past conflicts would cost another $600 million to repair. Although some countries, including Qatar and Egypt, have pledged in 2021 to assist with reconstruction, international actors only implemented around 15% of the rebuilding assistance pledged after the 2014 conflict, due partly to the security concerns mentioned above.

Major progress in reconstruction might require one or more of the following: (1) a political reunification of Gaza with the West Bank, (2) reduced Israeli and Egyptian restrictions on access and commerce, and/or (3) a long-term Hamas-Israel cease-fire. Egypt plays a key role in both Israel-Hamas and Hamas-Fatah mediation.
Political reunification would appear to depend on Hamas’s willingness to cede control of security in Gaza to the PA. In the past, PA President Abbas has insisted that he will not accept a situation where PA control is undermined by Hamas’s militia.\(^63\)

The May 2021 Israel-Hamas conflict disrupted the Qatari fuel shipments and cash payments to Gaza that (as mentioned above) Israel had allowed since 2018. The fuel shipments resumed in June 2021.\(^64\) Due to Israeli concerns about the potential for Hamas to divert money to its militia or for other purposes, Qatar began an arrangement in October 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United Nations.\(^65\) However, this mechanism does not address the unresolved issue of providing salaries to Gaza’s civil servants.\(^66\) Other Israel-Hamas disputes have continued and could conceivably escalate, including over what Israel allows into Gaza, and Israelis in Hamas custody.\(^67\)

**PA West Bank Leadership Concerns**

Uncertainty surrounds the future of Palestinian democracy and leadership. Questions include:

- Are future elections likely and what factors might influence their being held?
- Who might eventually succeed Mahmoud Abbas (see textbox below for his biography) as leader of the national movement?
- What challenges exist to rule of law and civil liberties in the West Bank?

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\(^{63}\) “Abbas: If PA not handed control of Gaza, Hamas must take full responsibility,” *Times of Israel*, August 18, 2018.

\(^{64}\) “Israel allows fuel tankers into Gaza for first time since clashes,” jpost.com, June 28, 2021.

\(^{65}\) “Palestinians in Gaza receive $100 handouts from Qatar via UN scheme,” *Agence France Presse*, October 14, 2021.


\(^{67}\) Ibid.
Mahmoud Abbas: Biography

Abbas (also known by his Arabic kunya as “Abu Mazen” or “the father of Mazen”—Abbas’s oldest son) is generally regarded as the leader of the Palestinian national movement, given his status as the current PLO chairman, PA president, and head of Fatah—having succeeded Yasser Arafat upon his death in 2004. Abbas was elected as PA president in 2005 popular elections, and when his four-year term expired in 2009, the PLO Central Council voted to extend his term indefinitely until new elections could take place.

Abbas was born in 1935 in Safed in what is now northern Israel. Abbas and his family left for Syria as refugees in 1948 when Israel was founded. He earned a B.A. in law from Damascus University and a Ph.D. in history from Moscow’s Oriental Institute.

Abbas was an early member of Fatah, joining in Qatar. In the 1970s and 1980s, Abbas became a top deputy to Arafat when he headed Fatah and the PLO. Abbas played an important role in negotiating the various Israeli-PLO agreements of the 1990s, and returned to the West Bank and Gaza in 1995.

In March 2003, Abbas was named as the first PA prime minister, but was not given full authority because Arafat (then the PA president) insisted on retaining ultimate decision-making authority and control over security services. Abbas resigned as prime minister in September 2003, apparently as a result of frustration with Arafat, the United States, and Israel.

Since Abbas assumed the leadership of the Palestinian national movement after Arafat’s death in 2004, he has been a part of the contentious negotiations and disputes that have largely characterized Palestinian relations with the United States and Israel, while also cooperating closely with both countries on security matters. While Abbas praises “martyrs” for the Palestinian cause, he also has made repeated public calls for nonviolent approaches to resolving Palestinian disputes with Israel.

Abbas appears motivated by a complex combination of factors that include safeguarding his personal authority and legacy, preventing destabilization and violence, and protecting his family members. Some observers have argued that Abbas’s rule became more authoritarian and corrupt after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 limited his authority there, and left the PA without a functioning legislature or realistic prospects for future elections.

Elections

Since divided rule took hold in 2007—with the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza—no PA presidential or legislative elections for the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem have occurred, and the Palestinian Legislative Council has ceased to function. During the 14-year West Bank-Gaza split, Fatah and Hamas have reached a number of Egypt-brokered agreements aimed at ending the split and allowing elections to take place, but have generally not implemented these agreements. Municipal elections for some West Bank cities and towns occurred in 2012 and 2017.

SOURCES

68 Some Jewish groups allege that Abbas’s doctoral thesis and a book based on the thesis (entitled The Other Side: The Secret Relationship Between Nazism and Zionism) downplayed the number of Holocaust victims and accused Jews of collaborating with the Nazis. Abbas has maintained that his work merely cited differences between other historians on Holocaust victim numbers, and has stated that “The Holocaust was a terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish nation, a crime against humanity that cannot be accepted by humankind.” “Profile: Mahmoud Abbas,” BBC News, November 29, 2012.

69 One of the Black September assassins involved in the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attack that killed 11 Israeli athletes has claimed that Abbas was responsible for financing the attack, even though Abbas “didn’t know what the money was being spent for.” Alexander Wolff, “The Mastermind,” Sports Illustrated, August 26, 2002.


71 See, for example, Daoud Kuttab, “Abbas bids adieu,” Al-Monitor, August 1, 2018.

In January 2021, the PA announced plans to hold legislative and presidential elections later in the year. In April, however, President Abbas postponed the elections, claiming that he did so because Israel was unwilling to allow East Jerusalem residents to vote. Some observers argue that Abbas may have been more concerned that Fatah could fare poorly in elections because of two breakaway electoral lists headed by former Fatah members, and the possibility that these lists might coordinate with Hamas to marginalize him and Fatah.

After Hamas’s May 2021 conflict with Israel, Hamas’s favorability with Palestinians surpassed Fatah’s in a June 2021 public opinion poll (see Figure 5). The poll suggested that many Palestinians viewed Hamas as defending Jerusalem for them, while also viewing Abbas as largely self-interested in postponing elections. Hamas lost some of its advantage over Fatah in another poll in September 2021.

Figure 5. Public Opinion Polling: Support for Domestic Political Factions
(Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip)

Source: CRS graphic, based on underlying polling data from Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.

In his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, Abbas claimed that the PA still plans to hold elections as soon as Israel allows the participation of Palestinians from East Jerusalem. He said that in the meantime, he would continue pursuing efforts to forge a unity government that would end the West Bank-Gaza split, and that additional municipal elections would occur in coming months.

The historical memory of Hamas’s surprise victory in the last PA elections to be held—the legislative elections of 2006—could affect various actors’ views on whether and how to hold future PA elections. After Hamas assumed control over PA ministries with its legislative majority, the United States and other Western actors significantly restructured assistance for the PA to prevent its use by those ministries. Changes made to U.S. law and annual appropriations legislation (see textbox below) remain possible constraints on aid to PA governments with Hamas

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75 Transcript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021).
participation or influence. The ensuing 2006-2007 struggle between Fatah and Hamas for control of the PA—fueled in part by external actors—contributed to the 2007 West Bank-Gaza split that created the divided rule of today.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fatah-Hamas “Unity Government” Scenario and U.S. Aid</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per regular annual appropriations provisions, U.S. aid is generally not permitted for a power-sharing PA government that includes Hamas as a member, or that results from an agreement with Hamas and over which Hamas exercises “undue influence.” This general restriction is only lifted if the President certifies that the PA government, including all ministers, has “publicly accepted and is complying with” the following two principles embodied in Section 620K of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 (PATA, P.L. 109-446): (1) recognition of “the Jewish state of Israel’s right to exist” and (2) acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. If the PA government is “Hamas-controlled,” PATA applies additional conditions, limitations, and restrictions on aid.</td>
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</table>

If future elections happen, it is unclear what implications they will have for Palestinian governance and international relationships. Open questions include whether elections can take place in a free and fair manner, include international observers, and garner acceptance from both Fatah and Hamas in the event of adverse outcomes for either.

**Succession**

Speculation surrounds who might lead the PA, PLO, and Fatah upon the end of Abbas’s tenure—whether via elections or otherwise.

**Marwan Barghouti**—a major Fatah leader who has supported negotiating with Israel at times, and armed resistance against Israel at other times—is more popular than Abbas in public opinion polls. Barghouti joined one of the breakaway electoral lists during the abortive campaign in early 2021.

Other Palestinian leaders who could be involved in succeeding Abbas include

- **Mohammed Dahlan** was a top security figure in Gaza under Arafat who is based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). His apparent involvement with Israel-UAE normalization has fueled some speculation about regional and international support for him in future PLO/PA leadership. While Dahlan has some political support in the West Bank and Gaza, he remains a pariah within Fatah leadership. The faction expelled him in 2011 after he and Abbas had a falling out, and in 2014 a PA court convicted him in absentia of libel, slander, and contempt of Palestinian institutions.

- **Majid Faraj** (arguably Abbas’s most trusted security figure) and **Salam Fayyad** (a previous PA prime minister) are prominent internationally, but have little domestic popular support.

- **Mohammed Shtayyeh** (PA prime minister since 2019) is an internationally visible Fatah insider.

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76 P.L. 116-260, §7040(f).
77 “Uncertainty as Palestine’s Abbas announces elections,” Al Jazeera, January 17, 2021.
Nasser al Qudwa (a former PLO diplomat and Arafat’s nephew) is another internationally visible figure who was expelled from Fatah in March 2021 for forming a breakaway electoral list (which Barghouti later joined).

Mahmoud al Aloul and Jibril Rajoub have political heft within Fatah, but relatively less international experience.

Governance and Human Rights Concerns

The PA has executive, legislative, and judicial organs of governance (see Appendix C for an overview), but in practical terms, President Abbas has few domestic checks on his power. The West Bank-Gaza split rendered the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) inoperative in 2007. Since then, Abbas has appointed prime ministers and other cabinet officials without legislative approval and has governed by presidential decree. He dissolved the PLC in 2018 pending future elections. Some Palestinian judges and other observers have protested President Abbas’s heightened control over the judiciary. In 2016, he created a new Constitutional Court made up of his appointees, and in 2019 he restructured the High Judicial Council that supervises the judicial system and nominates judges.

In March 2021, President Abbas issued a decree that requires non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to submit their yearly plans of action and budgets to the PA. Because of the new layer of requirements that the decree adds to existing regulations on NGOs, some observers interpret it as giving the PA significant control over the civil society sector in the West Bank.

Within this governing context, Abbas and the PA routinely face allegations of corruption and non-transparency. The State Department has noted continuing claims of corruption among Fatah officials, “particularly related to favoritism and nepotism in public-sector appointments.”

Some developments in 2021 have highlighted domestic and international concerns about PA governance. PA authorities reportedly increased repressive measures against public dissent after Abbas postponed 2021 PA legislative and presidential elections. These measures, which continued in the wake of the Israeli-Palestinian violence in May 2021, have included the reported arrest of dozens of people for political activity criticizing the PA.

In June 2021, Nizar Banat, a prominent activist from Hebron who also had been a candidate in the postponed legislative elections, died shortly after PA forces detained him for posting online critiques of PA policies. Claims from Banat’s family and other evidence suggest that the authorities may have beaten him to death.

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83 Muaddi, “Palestinian Authority’s push to regulate NGOs raises fear of power grab.”
The State Department spokesperson expressed deep disturbance over Banat’s death and its reported circumstances. He further said:

> We urge the Palestinian Authority to conduct a thorough and transparent investigation and to ensure full accountability in this case. We have serious concerns about Palestinian Authority restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression by Palestinians and harassment of civil society activists and organizations.89

In September, the PA charged 14 security personnel in a military court in connection with Banat’s death, but some observers expressed skepticism that the proceedings would significantly change the PA’s approaches to dissent.90

Heightened concerns regarding PA human rights abuses create a dilemma for U.S. officials who resumed security assistance for the PA in 2021 and generally seek to strengthen the PA relative to Hamas.91 A U.S. embassy spokesperson was quoted in July 2021 as saying that U.S. security assistance for the PA is intended to “to assist in the development of credible institutions of governance” in addition to strengthening Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.92

Additional concerns expressed by governments and human rights monitors regarding PA practices on rule of law and civil liberties include:

- **Internet restrictions.** In 2017, President Abbas issued the Electronic Crimes Law, prescribing heavy fines and lengthy prison terms for a range of vaguely defined offenses, including the publication or dissemination of material that is critical of the state, disturbs public order or national unity, or harms family and religious values.93

- **Criminal justice.** Some reports persist of arbitrary arrest, detention without trial or charges, torture, abuse, and isolation.94

- **Treatment of women.** Some reports persist of employment discrimination and repressive work conditions for women. Additionally, while the PA has taken some steps toward greater legal protection for women, stronger laws or enforcement of the laws may be possible in preventing forms of discrimination or ill-treatment, including rape and harassment. In a climate where domestic violence may be underreported, one in five married women claim that their spouse has abused them.95

### Israeli-Palestinian Diplomacy and Diplomatic Offices

Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. At his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, President Biden said:

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89 State Department, “Death of Palestinian Activist Nizar Banat,” June 24, 2021.
91 Michael J. Koplow, “Holding Your Nose with the Palestinian Authority,” Israel Policy Forum, July 1, 2021.
92 Kershner and Rasgon, “Critic’s Death Puts Focus on Palestinian Authority’s Authoritarianism.”
95 Ibid.
But I continue to believe that a two-state solution is the best way to ensure Israel—Israel’s future as a Jewish, democratic state living in peace alongside a viable, sovereign, and democratic Palestinian state.

We’re a long way from that goal at this moment, but we must never allow ourselves to give up on the possibility of progress.\(^{96}\)

Previously, in May 2021, Secretary Blinken spoke out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that he said could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement activity, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payment to terrorists.\(^{97}\)

During his September 2021 U.N. General Assembly speech, President Abbas said that the Palestinians are “ready to work throughout this year on the delineation of borders and solving all final status issues under the auspices of the international Quartet and in accordance with United Nations resolutions.”\(^{98}\) Abbas also stated that if Israel does not withdraw from the territory it occupied in 1967 within a year, the Palestinians would pursue a ruling on the legality of the occupation at the International Court of Justice, while also implying that the PLO may revisit its recognition of Israel’s right to exist that took place alongside the 1993 Declaration of Principles.

In August 2021, Abbas had met Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz—his first meeting with an Israeli cabinet minister since 2010. Gantz said that the two agreed on steps to improve security coordination and assist the PA financially, including a $155 million Israeli loan.\(^{99}\) Shortly after that meeting, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said that while Israel is open to helping the PA economically, Israel has no intention of engaging in a diplomatic process at the time.\(^{100}\)

In addition to the loan mentioned above, Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ circumstances, “including issuing 15,000 new work permits inside Israel for [West Bank] Palestinians… re-establishing Joint Economic Committees to discuss future projects, allowing reunification (i.e. legal status) for Palestinian spouses in the West Bank, and tentatively approving 2,000 new housing units for Palestinians in the part of the West Bank under full Israeli control.”\(^{101}\) In October 2021, Israeli authorities announced an additional 3,000 work permits inside Israel for Gazans.\(^{102}\) However, some critics charge that the measures mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than responsively address its causes through dialogue and negotiation with Palestinians.\(^{103}\)

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### Israeli Terrorist Designations Against Palestinian Civil Society Groups

In October 2021, Defense Minister Gantz—apparently acting with the approval of the state prosecutor, but without consulting Prime Minister Bennett or other key cabinet ministers—announced the designation of six

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\(^{97}\) State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021.

\(^{98}\) Transcript of Abbas’s speech (September 24, 2021). The international Quartet includes the United States, European Union, Russia, and the U.N. Secretary-General’s office.


\(^{100}\) Ibid.

\(^{101}\) Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict. Here’s what that looks like,” CNN, September 16, 2021.

\(^{102}\) “Israel announces 3,000 new Gaza work permits,” Al-Monitor, October 20, 2021.

\(^{103}\) Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict.”
Palestinian civil society groups as terrorist organizations under Israeli law because of purported links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). According to the New York Times, “The six [groups] are variously involved in highlighting rights abuses by Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, as well as in promoting the rights of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, women, farmworkers and children.” The designations, which have sparked some domestic and international criticism, could significantly curtail these groups’ funding and activities, and subject their supporters to Israeli criminal prosecution. Some of the groups receive funding from the European Union and other international actors. In response to a U.S. request for clarification, Israeli officials were preparing as of late October to share evidence that they claim supports the terrorist designations.

As part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to reengage with the Palestinians, then-Acting U.S. Representative to the United Nations Richard Mills said in January 2021 that the Administration would “take steps to re-open diplomatic missions that were closed by the last U.S. administration.” This statement apparently refers to (1) the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—which had operated for decades as an independent diplomatic mission engaging the Palestinians—that the Trump Administration merged into the U.S. embassy to Israel in 2019; and (2) the PLO representative office in Washington, DC, which the Trump Administration caused to close in 2018.

U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem

Since Ambassador Mills’s January statement, Biden Administration officials have repeated their intention to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem, without specifying the timing. One media report says that the Administration has agreed to delay the consulate’s reopening until sometime after a critical budget deadline for Israel’s new government in mid-November 2021. However, Israeli Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar said in October that Israel would continue to oppose the consulate’s reopening after this deadline. In previously stating his opposition to the reopening, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid voiced concerns that it could destabilize Israel’s government and insisted that “Jerusalem is the sovereign capital of Israel and Israel alone.” Additionally, Prime Minister Bennett revealed that he expressed displeasure about the proposed reopening in his August White House visit with President Biden.

Since the 2019 merger of the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem into the U.S. embassy to Israel, U.S. diplomats in Jerusalem have conducted relations with the Palestinians via the embassy’s Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU). Reversing the merger would presumably reestablish the consulate as an independent diplomatic mission that would work in parallel with, rather than as a part of, the embassy.

A senior Palestinian official was quoted in October 2021 as saying that reopening the consulate is more important to Palestinians than the PLO office in Washington, DC, because “the consulate is

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104 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US over outlawed Palestinian groups,” Times of Israel, October 24, 2021.
106 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US.”
110 Yerushalmi, “Bennett suggested Biden reopen consulate.”
the seed of the American Embassy to the future Palestinian state and a statement about everything related to the administration’s position on Jerusalem.”  

As Israelis and Palestinians continue to vie for U.S. and international validation of Jerusalem’s role in their respective national narratives, Israeli-Palestinian tensions over Jerusalem persist, including on issues such as:

- Access to, worship at, and Israeli security measures at holy sites, especially the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif “status quo.”

- East Jerusalem property issues, particularly actions by Israeli officials toward building new Jewish settlements and neighborhoods (see “Israeli Settlements in the West Bank”), or favoring Jewish residents or claimed historical sites over Palestinian ones.

PA officials are unsure whether the U.S. consulate, if reopened, would be located at the West Jerusalem (Agron Road) location of the former consulate general (and current PAU) or the East Jerusalem (Nablus Road) location currently known as “America House”—the educational and cultural arm of the PAU (see Figure 6).

Reportedly, Israeli Prime Minister Bennett was unsuccessful in August in an effort to convince President Biden to open a consulate somewhere in the West Bank near (but not within) Jerusalem, such as Ramallah or the town of Abu Dis.

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112 For background information see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti.


115 Khoury and Lis, “Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate.”

116 Ibid.
Reestablishing the consulate would probably require Israel’s approval given the need for cooperation from Israeli authorities to issue visas to and help protect U.S. diplomats.117 Given Israel’s insistence that the entire Jerusalem municipality is its capital and the tenuous nature of the current multi-party Israeli government coalition, Israeli approval for a separate U.S. diplomatic mission in Jerusalem focusing on the Palestinians could be politically fraught. Members in both Houses have written letters to President Biden sharing varying opinions on a possible consulate reopening.118

It is unclear whether Israel’s approval of a U.S. consulate reopening is essentially a practical matter—given Israel’s control over Jerusalem—or is also founded on law such as the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.119 President Trump’s December 2017 proclamation on Jerusalem recognized it as Israel’s capital, but did not delineate specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem.120 After the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, the U.S. consulate general continued to operate independently until it was subsumed into the embassy.

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in March 2019. Several other countries have operated independent consulates within Jerusalem for decades and continue to do so, including the United Kingdom and France.

**PLO Office in Washington, DC**

In September 2018, the State Department announced that the office maintained by the PLO in Washington, DC, would cease operating. Though not diplomatically accredited, the office had functioned since the 1990s as a focal point for U.S.-Palestinian relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>PLO opens office in Washington, DC, to disseminate information about itself and the Palestinian cause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Congress passes the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (Title X of P.L. 100-204), which determines that “the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization” and (under Section 1003) prohibits the PLO from maintaining an office in the United States. President Reagan signs P.L. 100-204 in December but adds a signing statement saying that “the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the United States will maintain is encompassed by the President’s authority under the Constitution, including the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors.” The State Department instructs the PLO to close its office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>As the Oslo peace process gets underway, the PLO opens a representative office in Washington, DC. Despite the prohibition of a PLO office in P.L. 100-204, Congress provides waiver authority to the executive branch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The PLO office briefly closes after a lapse in waiver authority, and reopens after Congress reinstates the waiver and the executive branch exercises it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>The State Department announces in November that it cannot renew the waiver (required every six months in annual appropriations legislation) because of statements made by Palestinian leaders about the International Criminal Court (ICC). but allows the PLO office to remain open so long as its activities are limited “to those related to achieving a lasting, comprehensive peace between the Israelis and Palestinians.” A State Department spokesperson justifies the actions by saying that they “are consistent with the president’s authorities to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>The State Department announces the closure of the PLO office in September.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is unclear whether the Administration can legally authorize the PLO to reopen its Washington office. Under the annual appropriations language found in Section 7041(k) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), the general prohibition in Section 1003 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA, Title X of P.L. 100-204) on a PLO office can generally only be waived by the President if he can certify that Palestinian leaders have not “actively supported an ICC investigation against Israeli nationals for alleged crimes against Palestinians.” The State Department determined in November 2017 that this waiver requirement had not been met because of Palestinian statements regarding ICC proceedings relating to Israelis. However, in September

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2018, the Justice Department issued a memorandum opinion for the State Department’s legal adviser stating that Congress cannot dictate State Department actions regarding the status of the PLO office—via the ATA or other legislation—because the President has exclusive constitutional authority “to receive foreign diplomatic agents in the United States and to determine the conditions under which they may operate.”\textsuperscript{125}

A separate question is whether the PLO would be willing to reopen its Washington office. Under the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA, Section 903 of P.L. 116-94), which became law in December 2019, the PLO’s establishment of an office in the United States could subject it to liability in U.S. courts for terrorism-related lawsuits. The extent to which Congress can provide by statute that a foreign entity is deemed to consent to personal jurisdiction by establishing or maintaining facilities in the United States appears to be untested in the U.S. legal system.\textsuperscript{126} However, the PSJVTA provision has reportedly given Palestinian officials and advisers pause about reopening the PLO office, and has led them to engage with the Administration and Congress about a possible amendment to the PSJVTA to facilitate the office’s reopening.\textsuperscript{127}

The Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), introduced by some Members of Congress in September 2021, would, among other things, amend the ATA to provide the President with a standing option to waive the prohibition on a PLO office in the United States for national security reasons (renewable every six months). The bill also would make it easier to terminate the ATA completely if the PLO/PA discontinues payments targeted by the TFA “for acts of terrorism.”

### Israeli Settlements in the West Bank

Israeli settlements in the West Bank have presented longstanding policy challenges for U.S. officials and lawmakers.\textsuperscript{128} As mentioned above, the Trump Administration took a number of actions apparently aimed at providing greater legitimacy to Israeli settlements in the West Bank.\textsuperscript{129} Biden Administration officials have not announced whether they intend to reverse or otherwise address these Trump Administration actions, but have specified that the United States would urge Israel to avoid settlement activity or annexation of territory.\textsuperscript{130}

Near the end of the Obama Administration in December 2016, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2334, with the United States abstaining and all other Security Council members in favor. Resolution 2334 reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) violate international law, and called upon states to “distinguish, in their relevant dealings,” between the territory of Israel and of the West Bank.\textsuperscript{131}


\textsuperscript{126} For background information on PSJVTA and this issue, see CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea.


\textsuperscript{129} Abigail Williams and Saphora Smith, “Pompeo becomes first secretary of state to visit Israeli settlement,” NBC News, November 19, 2020.

\textsuperscript{130} U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills; State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability.”

\textsuperscript{131} The most-cited international law pertaining to Israeli settlements is the Fourth Geneva Convention, Part III. Section
Israeli officials have continued construction-related announcements regarding settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In January 2021, the planning authority that operates under Israeli military jurisdiction approved plans for hundreds of additional homes in settlements whose expansion deep within the West Bank could increase the difficulty of negotiating borders between Israel and a future Palestinian state. Some observers say that construction plans moving forward in certain areas of East Jerusalem and its West Bank vicinity could present major obstacles to the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state (see Figure 7).

**Figure 7. Selected Planned Settlement Construction Areas in the West Bank and East Jerusalem**

III, Article 49 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, which states in its last sentence, “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” Israel maintains that the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) does not fall under the international law definition of “occupied territory,” but is rather “disputed territory” because the previous occupying power (Jordan) did not have an internationally recognized claim to it (only a few countries recognized Jordan’s 1950 annexation of the West Bank). Israel claims that given the demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the end of the British Mandate in 1948, Israel claims that no international actor has superior legal claim to the West Bank. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Settlements and International Law, November 30, 2015. Jordan renounced its claims to the West Bank in 1988 in favor of the PLO. While Israel applies civilian law to East Jerusalem, it considers the rest of the West Bank to be “disputed territory.”


In October 2021, the State Department spokesperson voiced U.S. concern about prospective Israeli actions to advance settlements deep in the West Bank, and called upon Israel and the PA to “refrain from unilateral steps that exacerbate tension and undercut efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution. This certainly includes settlement activity, as well as retroactive legalization of settlement outposts.”

### International Organizations

**In General**

The PLO has pursued a number of initiatives—either directly or with the help of supportive countries—in international organizations to advance its claims to statehood and other positions it takes vis-à-vis Israel. The United States and Israel generally oppose these initiatives and criticize international organizations for negative treatment of Israel.

In February 2021, Secretary of State Blinken announced that the United States would reengage with the U.N. Human Rights Council—from which the Trump Administration withdrew in June 2018—as an observer. As part of his announcement, Secretary Blinken said:

> We recognize that the Human Rights Council is a flawed body, in need of reform to its agenda, membership, and focus, including its disproportionate focus on Israel. However, our withdrawal in June 2018 did nothing to encourage meaningful change, but instead created a vacuum of U.S. leadership, which countries with authoritarian agendas have used to their advantage.

For more on Palestinian initiatives in international fora, see Appendix E.

### International Criminal Court (ICC) Actions

**Background**

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is in the early stages of an investigation into possible crimes committed by Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip since June 13, 2014. The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over alleged genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (“ICC crimes”) that occur on the territory of or are perpetrated by nationals of an entity deemed to be a State:

- after the Rome Statute enters into force for a State Party;
- during a period of time in which a nonparty State accepts jurisdiction; or
- pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution referring the situation in a State to the ICC.

The following actions by Palestinian leaders have influenced the overall context in which the ICC’s actions have taken place:

- In January 2015, Palestinian leaders deposited an instrument of accession for the “State of Palestine” to become party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, after

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134 State Department Press Briefing, October 22, 2021.
135 In October 2021, the United States regained its membership seat on the Council.
137 Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, assisted in preparing this subsection.
declaring acceptance in December 2014 of ICC jurisdiction over crimes allegedly “committed in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014.”

- Later in January 2015, the U.N. Secretary-General, acting as depositary, stated that the Rome Statute would enter into force for the “State of Palestine” on April 1, 2015.138

- Later that same month, the ICC Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination into the “situation in Palestine” to determine “whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation” against Israelis, Palestinians, or others, having found that the Palestinians had the proper capacity to accept ICC jurisdiction in light of the November 2012 adoption of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 67/19.139 As mentioned in Appendix E, Resolution 67/19 had changed the permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO (aka “State of Palestine”) from an “entity” to a “non-member state.”

- Palestinian leaders provided information to the ICC on alleged Israeli crimes regarding both the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict and settlement activity in the West Bank. In May 2018, Palestinian leaders made a formal referral of the “situation in Palestine” to the Prosecutor.140

As referenced above, the State Department cited Palestinian actions relating to the ICC in connection with the 2018 closure of the PLO office in Washington, DC. Various U.S. and Israeli officials have denounced Palestinian efforts that could subject Israelis to ICC investigation or prosecution.141 Neither the United States nor Israel is a State Party to the Rome Statute.

Palestinian accession and acceptance of jurisdiction grant the ICC Prosecutor authority to investigate all alleged ICC crimes committed after June 13, 2014, by any individual—Israeli, Palestinian, or otherwise—on “occupied Palestinian territory.” However, Palestinian actions do not ensure any formal ICC prosecution of alleged ICC crimes. A party to the Rome Statute can refer a situation to the Court and is required to cooperate with the Prosecutor on investigations, but it is the role of the Prosecutor to determine whether to bring charges against and prosecute an individual. In addition, a case is inadmissible before the ICC if it concerns conduct that is the subject of “genuine” legal proceedings (as described in Article 17 of the Statute) brought by a state with jurisdiction, including a state (such as Israel) that is not party to the Statute.

The ICC Prosecutor is required to notify all states with jurisdiction over a potential case, and such states are afforded the opportunity to challenge ICC jurisdiction over a case on inadmissibility grounds.

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141 See, for example, “Bolton warns ICC not to go after Israel, confirms closure of PLO’s DC office,” *Times of Israel*, September 10, 2018.
Investigation of Possible Crimes in West Bank and Gaza

On March 3, 2021, then-ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced that she was opening an investigation of possible ICC crimes in the West Bank and Gaza. She had previously sought a ruling from a pre-trial chamber to confirm her determination that the ICC has jurisdiction over the situation generally, and to determine the extent of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction specifically. In a 2-1 decision, the chamber ruled in February 2021 that the ICC has jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem), based on the Palestinians’ status as a State Party to the Rome Statute. Israel had argued that the ICC should not have jurisdiction in those territories because Palestinians do not have sovereign control there.

Broader Impact of ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Ruling?
The ICC pre-trial chamber’s February 2021 decision stated that because the ICC exercises jurisdiction over natural persons rather than states, its decision is strictly limited to the question of jurisdiction set forth in the Prosecutor’s Request and does not entail any determination on the border disputes between Palestine and Israel.

According to one commentator, Palestinians and other international actors could use the decision to support for Palestinian statehood and territorial claims. In response to the opening of an ICC investigation, Secretary of State Blinken said on March 3:

The United States firmly opposes and is deeply disappointed by this decision. The ICC has no jurisdiction over this matter. Israel is not a party to the ICC and has not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction, and we have serious concerns about the ICC’s attempts to exercise its jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. The Palestinians do not qualify as a sovereign state and therefore, are not qualified to obtain membership as a state in, participate as a state in, or delegate jurisdiction to the ICC.

Moreover, the United States believes a peaceful, secure and more prosperous future for the people of the Middle East depends on building bridges and creating new avenues for dialogue and exchange, not unilateral judicial actions that exacerbate tensions and undercut efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution.

We will continue to uphold our strong commitment to Israel and its security, including by opposing actions that seek to target Israel unfairly.

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144 ICC, “Decision on the ‘Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine,’” February 5, 2021. In a partly dissenting opinion (available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2021_01167.PDF), Judge Péter Kovács argued that the ICC’s jurisdiction in the West Bank should be limited to the competences transferred to the PA in the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, leading to an interpretation that might require Israel’s consent to ICC investigations of Israeli nationals.

145 Israeli Attorney General, The International Criminal Court’s Lack of Jurisdiction over the So-Called “Situation in Palestine,” December 20, 2019. Germany, Brazil, Australia, Uganda, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Hungary had filed amicus curiae briefs with the pre-trial chamber offering arguments in line with Israel’s objections to territorial jurisdiction, while the League of Arab States and Organization of Islamic Cooperation had filed briefs in support of territorial jurisdiction.


147 Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, The United States Opposes the ICC Investigation into the Palestinian Situation, March 3, 2021.
On March 11, 54 Senators sent a letter to Secretary Blinken commending his statements, and urging him to work with like-minded international partners to “steer the ICC away from further actions that could damage the Court’s credibility by giving the appearance of political bias.”

While Palestinian leaders (from both the PLO/PA and Hamas) welcomed the news of an ICC investigation, leading Israeli political figures roundly denounced it, with then-Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu calling the decision to investigate biased and anti-Semitic.

It is unclear how the current Prosecutor, Karim Khan, might choose to handle the investigation. The investigation could focus on a number of possible war crimes from Israeli and Palestinian actions, including:

- actions by Israel, Hamas, and other Palestinian militant groups during their 2014 and 2021 Gaza conflicts;
- lethal force used by Israeli soldiers in 2018-2019 against some Palestinian protestors in Gaza seeking to breach or approach the administrative boundary with Israel;
- other Israeli actions in and around the West Bank and Gaza, including settlement activity; and
- possible PA (West Bank) and Hamas (Gaza) human rights abuses.

An investigation could take months or years before the Prosecutor makes decisions on bringing specific charges against individuals. As mentioned above, if an ICC investigation produces any case against Israelis or Palestinians concerning conduct that is the subject of “genuine” legal proceedings by a state having jurisdiction, it would be inadmissible. In Bensouda’s March 3 announcement of the investigation, she said:

As a first step, the Office [of the Prosecutor] is required to notify all States Parties and those States which would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned about its investigation. This permits any such State to request the Office to defer to the State’s relevant investigation of its own nationals or others within its jurisdiction in relation to Rome Statute crimes referred to in the notification (subject to possible Pre-Trial Chamber review).

**Possible U.S. Responses**

It is unclear what diplomatic or other measures the Biden Administration might take to counter an ICC investigation focused on the West Bank and Gaza. Under Executive Order 13928 from June 2020, President Trump authorized sanctions against foreign persons or entities involved in or supporting ICC investigations or actions targeting U.S. personnel or personnel of U.S. allies.

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151 Before becoming the ICC Prosecutor in June 2021, Khan served as the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 2379 (2017) to promote accountability efforts for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq.
without the consent of the home government of those personnel. In September 2020, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions under E.O. 13928 against Prosecutor Bensouda and another top ICC official in connection with an investigation regarding Afghanistan that could subject U.S. personnel to prosecution. President Biden lifted these sanctions in April 2021 while stating continued U.S. objections to ICC assertions of jurisdiction over U.S. and allied personnel.

Role of Congress

As Congress exercises oversight over U.S. policy regarding Israeli-Palestinian developments, and considers legislative options—including on annual appropriations for the Palestinians, Members may consider a number of issues, including the following:

- various aspects of U.S.-Palestinian relations, including foreign aid and the possible reopening of diplomatic offices;
- the status of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy and how it relates to Israel’s normalization of relations with some Arab states;
- Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank;
- Palestinian international initiatives and the ICC’s investigation into possible Israeli and Palestinian war crimes in the West Bank and Gaza;
- human rights, humanitarian, and economic development concerns;
- countering terrorism from Hamas and other groups;
- the surrounding region’s effects on the West Bank and Gaza, and vice versa; and
- Palestinian domestic leadership and civil society.

Some key factors could influence issues for Congress. These factors include whether the PLO/PA significantly changes welfare payments to or on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in acts of terrorism, the extent to which Israeli legal institutions and proceedings might preclude the ICC from prosecuting cases against Israeli personnel, and how various PA domestic developments (elections, leadership succession, and governance concerns) unfold. Consideration of these factors takes place within the context of Biden Administration efforts to improve ties with the Palestinians, existing legislation such as the TFA, ongoing debate regarding various unilateral Israeli and Palestinian actions, and more visible Israel-Arab state relations.

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Appendix A. Key Palestinian Factions and Groups

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

The PLO is recognized by the United Nations (including Israel since 1993) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, wherever they may reside. It is an umbrella organization that includes 10 Palestinian factions (but not Hamas or other Islamist groups). The PLO was founded in 1964, and, since 1969, has been dominated by the secular nationalist Fatah movement. Organizationally, the PLO consists of an Executive Committee, the Palestinian National Council (or PNC, its legislature), and a Central Council.156

After waging guerrilla warfare against Israel under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the PNC declared Palestinian independence and statehood in 1988. This came at a point roughly coinciding with the PLO’s decision to publicly accept the “land-for-peace” principle of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and to contemplate recognizing Israel’s right to exist. The declaration had little practical effect, however, because the PLO was in exile in Tunisia and did not define the territorial scope of its state.157 The PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in 1993 upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles between the two parties.

While the Palestinian Authority (PA) maintains a measure of self-rule over various areas of the West Bank, as well as a legal claim to self-rule over Gaza despite Hamas’s security presence,158 the PLO remains the representative of the Palestinian people to Israel and other international actors. Under the name “State of Palestine,” the PLO maintains a permanent observer mission to the United Nations in New York and in Geneva as a “non-member state,” and has missions and embassies in other countries—some with full diplomatic status. The PLO also is a full member of both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Fatah

Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Yasser Arafat, has been the largest and most prominent faction in the PLO for decades. Since the establishment of the PA and limited self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, Fatah has dominated the PA, except during the period of partial Hamas rule in 2006-2007. Yet, popular disillusionment has come from the failure to establish a Palestinian state, internecine violence, corruption, and poor governance. Arafat’s

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156 The PNC consists of more than 700 members, a majority of whom are from the diaspora. The Central Council is chaired by the PNC president and has 124 members—consisting of the entire Executive Committee, plus (among others) representatives from Fatah and other PLO factions, the Palestinian Legislative Council, and prominent interest groups and professions. The Central Council functions as a link between the Executive Committee and the PNC. Either the PNC or the Central Council reportedly can elect the 18 members of the Executive Committee, which functions as a cabinet—with each member assuming discrete responsibilities—and the Executive Committee elects its own chairperson. The European Council on Foreign Relations’ online resource Mapping Palestinian Politics at https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/institutions is a source for much of the PLO organizational information in this paragraph.

157 The declaration included the phrase: “The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be.” The text is available at http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm.

158 The PA’s legal claim to self-rule over Gaza is subject to the original Oslo-era agreements of the 1990s, the agreements between Israel and the PA regarding movement and access that were formalized in November 2005 shortly after Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and the June 2014 formation of a PA government with formal sway over both the self-rule areas in the West Bank and Gaza.
2004 death removed a major unifying symbol, further eroding Fatah’s support under Mahmoud Abbas.

Fatah’s charter, dating back to the 1960s, still includes clauses calling for the destruction of the Zionist state and its economic, political, military, and cultural supports, despite the PLO’s 1993 acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.159 Abbas routinely expresses support for “legitimate peaceful resistance” to Israeli occupation under international law, complemented by negotiations. However, some of the other Fatah Central Committee members are either less outspoken in their advocacy of nonviolent resistance than Abbas, or reportedly explicitly insist on the need to preserve the option of armed struggle.160

Other PLO Factions and Leaders

Factions other than Fatah within the PLO include secular groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian People’s Party. All of these factions have minor political support relative to Fatah and Hamas.

A number of Palestinian politicians and other leaders without traditional factional affiliation have successfully gained followings domestically and in the international community under the PLO’s umbrella, even some who are not formally affiliated with the PLO. These figures—such as Salam Fayyad, Hanan Ashrawi (a female Christian), and Mustafa Barghouti—often have competing agendas. Several of them support a negotiated two-state solution, generally oppose violence, and appeal to the Palestinian intellectual elite and to prominent Western governments and organizations.

Non-PLO Factions

Hamas

Overview

Hamas (an Arabic acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement”) is a U.S.-designated terrorist organization and Fatah’s main rival for leadership of the Palestinian national movement. Countering Hamas is a focal point for Israel and the United States.

Hamas grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in Egypt in 1928 with affiliates and sympathizers throughout the Arab world. Hamas’s emergence as a major political and military group can be traced to the first Palestinian intifada (or uprising), which began in the Gaza Strip in 1987 in resistance to what Hamas terms the Israeli occupation of Palestinian-populated lands. The group presented an alternative to Yasser Arafat and his secular Fatah movement by using violence against Israeli civilian and military targets just as Arafat began

159 Fatah is the predominant member faction of the PLO, and the PLO formally recognized Israel’s right to exist pursuant to the “Letters of Mutual Recognition” of September 9, 1993 (although controversy remains over whether the PLO charter has been amended to accommodate this recognition).
160 The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB) is a militant offshoot of Fatah that emerged in the West Bank early in the second intifada and later began operating in Gaza as well. It was added to the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in March 2002. In line with the Abbas-led PA’s effort to centralize control, the Brigades lowered its profile in the West Bank after 2007. However, some observers have noted that militant elements remain within Fatah, including some members of the AAMB, and are generally known as the Tanzim. See, for example, Michael Milstein, “Fateh’s ‘Tanzim’ Formations: a potential challenge that is liable to intensify in the face of scenarios of deterioration in the Palestinian arena,” IDC Herzliya Institute for Policy and Strategy, June 2020.
negotiating with Israel. Hamas took a leading role in attacks against Israelis—including suicide bombings targeting civilians—during the second intifada (between 2000 and 2005—see Appendix B for more information on the two intifadas and Palestinian violence and terrorism). Shortly after Arafat’s death in 2004, the group decided to directly involve itself in politics. In 2006, a year after the election of Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas as PA president, and just a few months after Israel’s military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas defeated Fatah in Palestinian Legislative Council elections. Subsequently, Israel, the United States, and others in the international community have sought to neutralize or marginalize Hamas. As discussed in Appendix C, Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007 and has exercised de facto rule there since then.

According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, Hamas “comprises several thousand Gaza-based operatives.”

**Ideology, Organization, and Leadership**

Hamas’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Hamas’s founding charter committed the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine. A 2017 document updated Hamas’s founding principles. It clarified that Hamas’s conflict is with the “Zionist project” rather than the Jews, and expressed willingness to accept a Palestinian state within the 1949/50-1967 armistice lines if it results from “national consensus.”

Since Hamas’s inception during the first intifada in 1987, it has maintained its primary base of support and particularly strong influence in the Gaza Strip. It also has a significant presence in the West Bank and in various Arab countries.

The leadership structure of Hamas is opaque, and much of the open source reporting available on it cannot be independently verified. It is unclear who controls strategy, policy, and financial decisions. In previous years, some external leaders reportedly sought to move toward a less militant stance in exchange for Hamas obtaining a significant role in the PLO, which represents Palestinians internationally.

Overall policy guidance comes from a Shura (or consultative) Council, with reported representation from the West Bank, Gaza, and other places. Qatar-based Ismail Haniyeh is the overall leader of Hamas’s political bureau (politburo). Yahya Sinwar, previously a top commander from Hamas’s military wing, is the movement’s leader for Gaza. The militia, known as the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades, is led by Muhammad Deif and may seek to drive political decisions via its control over security. Haniyeh, Sinwar, and Deif have all been named by the Treasury Department as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

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161 For the English translation of the 1988 Hamas charter, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.

162 “Hamas in 2017: The document in full,” Middle East Eye, May 1, 2017. This document, unlike the 1988 charter, does not identify Hamas with the Muslim Brotherhood.


164 Izz al Din al Qassam was a Muslim Brotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anticolonialist resistance movement in historic Palestine during the British Mandate period. He was killed by British forces on November 19, 1935.

External Support

Hamas reportedly receives support from a number of sources, including some states. Along with some other non-PLO factions, Hamas has historically received much of its political and material support (including funding, weapons, and training) from Iran. Hamas became distant from Iran when it broke with Syria’s government in the early years of the country’s civil war. However, the Hamas-Iran relationship reportedly revived—including financially—around 2017.166

In 2014, a Treasury Department official stated publicly that Qatar “has for many years openly financed Hamas.”167 Qatari officials have denied that their government supported Hamas financially and have argued that their policy is to support the Palestinian people.

In addition to external assistance from states, Hamas has other sources of support. According to the State Department’s profile of Hamas in its Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, the group “raises funds in Gulf countries” and “receives donations from some Palestinian and other expatriates as well as from its own charity organizations.”

Some reports claim that Hamas officials use Turkey as a base of operations.168 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan periodically hosts top Hamas officials and expresses support for the group’s political aims.

On January 11, 2021, Representative Brian Mast introduced the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Prevention Act of 2021 (H.R. 261). The bill, which is virtually identical to a bill introduced during the 116th Congress (H.R. 1850), would require the President to report to Congress on foreign sources of support for Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, and impose sanctions on these sources as specified, subject to a waiver for national security reasons.

Other Rejectionist Groups

Several other small Palestinian groups continue to reject the PLO’s decision to recognize Israel’s right to exist and to conduct negotiations. They remain active in the West Bank and Gaza and retain some ability to carry out terrorist attacks and other forms of violence to undermine efforts at cooperation and conciliation. In Gaza, some observers speculate that Hamas permits or even supports the operations of some of these groups, including those with a presence in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, without avowing ties to them. Such groups provide Hamas opportunities to tacitly acquiesce to attacks against Israel while avoiding direct responsibility.

Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

The largest of these other groups is Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that, like Hamas, is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and receives support from Iran. PIJ emerged in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip as a rival to Hamas.

Since 2000, PIJ has conducted several attacks against Israeli targets (including suicide bombings), killing scores of Israelis.169 PIJ militants in Gaza sometimes take the lead in firing rockets into

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166 See, for example, Shlomi Eldar, “Hamas turns to Iran,” Al-Monitor, July 6, 2017.
169 Suicide bombing figures culled from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-%3b+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/Suicide%20and%20Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since.
Israel—perhaps to pressure Hamas into matching its hardline tactics or to demonstrate its credentials as a resistance movement to domestic audiences and external supporters.

PIJ’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism, Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, and Shiite revolutionary thought (inspired by the Iranian revolution). PIJ seeks liberation of all of historic Palestine through armed revolt and the establishment of an Islamic state, but unlike Hamas has not established a social services network, formed a political movement, or participated in elections. Perhaps largely for these reasons, PIJ has not approached the same level of support among Palestinians as Hamas. Some PIJ leaders reside in Syria, Lebanon, or other Arab states.

According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019, “PIJ has close to 1,000 members.”

**Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)**

Another—though smaller—Iran-sponsored militant group designated as an FTO is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). PFLP-GC is a splinter group from the PFLP. According to the State Department’s 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism, PFLP-GC’s operates in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza and has several hundred members. Its founder, Ahmed Jibril, died in Damascus (presumably of natural causes) in July 2021. His longtime deputy, Talal Naji, was elected to replace him.170

**Salafist Militant Groups**

A number of small Palestinian Salafist-Jihadist militant groups evincing affinities toward groups such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State have arisen in the Gaza Strip. Some Salafist groups reportedly include former Hamas militia commanders who became disaffected by actions from Hamas that they deemed to be overly moderate. Salafist groups do not currently appear to threaten Hamas’s rule in Gaza.

**Palestinian Refugees**

Of the some 700,000 Palestinians displaced before and during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, about one-third ended up in the West Bank, one-third in the Gaza Strip, and one-third in neighboring Arab countries. According to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), there are more than 5 million registered refugees (comprising original refugees and their descendants) in UNRWA’s areas of operation—the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Jordan offered Palestinian refugees citizenship, partly owing to its previous unilateral annexation of the West Bank (which ended in 1988), but the other refugees in the region are generally stateless and therefore limited in their ability to travel. Many of the refugees remain reliant on UNRWA for food, health care, and education.

For political and economic reasons, Arab host governments generally have not actively supported the assimilation of Palestinian refugees into their societies. Even if able to assimilate, many Palestinian refugees hold out hope of returning to the homes they or their ancestors left behind or possibly to a future Palestinian state. Many assert a sense of dispossession and betrayal over never having been allowed to return to their homes, land, and property. Some Palestinian factions have organized followings among refugee populations, and militias have proliferated at various times in some refugee areas. The refugees seek to influence both their host governments and the PLO/PA to pursue a solution to their claims as part of any final status deal with Israel.

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For additional information on Palestinian refugees and UNRWA, see CRS Report RS22967, *U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians*, by Jim Zanotti.
Appendix B. Historical Background

Various perspectives exist on the nature of Palestinian political identity while the area of historic Palestine was a part of the province of Greater Syria within the Ottoman Empire. This identity developed further during the British Mandate period (1923-1948). Although in 1947 the United Nations intended to create two states in Palestine—one Jewish and one Arab—with its partition plan (General Assembly Resolution 181), only the Jewish state came into being. Varying explanations for the failure to found an Arab state alongside a Jewish state in mandatory Palestine place blame on the British, the Zionists, neighboring Arab states, the Palestinians themselves, or some combination of these groups.

As the state of Israel won its independence in 1947-1948, roughly 700,000 Palestinians were driven or fled from their homes, an occurrence Palestinians call the nakba (“catastrophe”). Many ended up in neighboring states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) or in Arab Gulf states such as Kuwait. Palestinians remaining in Israel became Israeli citizens. Those who were in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza were subject to Jordanian and Egyptian administration, respectively. With their population in disarray, and no clear hierarchical structure or polity to govern their affairs, Palestinians’ interests were largely represented by Arab states that had conflicting interests.

1967 was a watershed year for the Palestinians. In the June Six-Day War, Israel decisively defeated the Arab states who had styled themselves as the Palestinians’ protectors, seizing East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip (as well as the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria). Thus, Israel gained control over the entire area that constituted Palestine under the British Mandate. Israel’s territorial gains provided buffer zones between Israel’s main Jewish population centers and its traditional Arab state antagonists. These buffer zones remain an important part of the Israeli strategic calculus to this day.

After the 1967 war, Israel only effectively annexed East Jerusalem (as well as the Golan Heights), leaving the West Bank and Gaza under military occupation. However, both territories became increasingly economically linked with Israel. Furthermore, Israel presided over the settlement of thousands of Jewish civilians in both territories (although many more in the West Bank than Gaza)—officially initiating some of these projects and assuming security responsibility for all of them. Settlement of the West Bank increased markedly once the Likud Party, with its vision of a “Greater Israel” extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, took power in 1977. Having Israelis settle in the West Bank presented some economic and cultural opportunities for Palestinians, but also new challenges to their identity and cohesion, civil rights, and territorial contiguity. These challenges persist and have since intensified.

The Arab states’ defeat in 1967, and Israeli rule and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza, allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to emerge as the representative of Palestinian national aspirations. Founded in 1964 as an umbrella organization of Palestinian factions and militias in exile under the aegis of the League of Arab States (Arab League), the PLO asserted its own identity after the Six-Day War by staging guerrilla raids against Israel from Jordanian territory. The late Yasser Arafat and his Fatah movement gained leadership of the PLO in 1969, and the PLO subsequently achieved international prominence on behalf of the


Palestinian national cause—representing both the refugees and those under Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza. Often this prominence came infamously from acts of terrorism and militancy.

Although Jordan forced the PLO to relocate to Lebanon in the early 1970s, and Israel forced it to move from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982, the organization and its influence survived. In 1987, Palestinians inside the West Bank and Gaza rose up in opposition to Israeli occupation (the first intifada, or uprising), leading to increased international attention and sympathy for the Palestinians’ situation. In December 1988, as the intifada continued, Arafat initiated dialogue with the United States by renouncing violence, promising to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and accepting the “land-for-peace” principle embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.173 Arafat’s turn to diplomacy with the United States and Israel may have been partly motivated by concerns that if the PLO’s leadership could not be repatriated from exile, its legitimacy with Palestinians might be overtaken by local leaders of the intifada in the West Bank and Gaza (which included Hamas). These concerns intensified when Arafat lost much of his Arab state support following his political backing for Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

After direct secret diplomacy with Israel brokered by Norway, the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in 1993, and through the “Oslo agreements” gained limited self-rule for Palestinians in Gaza and parts of the West Bank—via the creation of the PA. The agreements were gradually and partially implemented during the 1990s, but the expectation that they would lead to a final-status peace agreement has not been realized.

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**Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since the Oslo Agreements**

Various Palestinian groups have engaged in a variety of methods of violence since the Oslo-PLO agreements of the 1990s, killing hundreds of Israelis—both military and civilian.174 Palestinians who insist that they are engaging in asymmetric warfare with a stronger enemy point to the thousands of deaths inflicted on Palestinians by Israelis since 1993.175 Some through acts of terrorism aimed at civilians.176 Palestinian militants in Gaza periodically fire rockets and mortars into Israel indiscriminately. The possibility that a rocket threat could emerge from the West Bank is one factor that Israelis have cited in explaining their reluctance to consider a full withdrawal from there.177 Although Palestinian militants maintain rocket and mortar arsenals, Israel’s Iron Dome defense system reportedly has decreased the threat to Israel from these projectiles.178 Additionally, tunnels that Palestinian militants in Gaza used somewhat effectively in a 2014 conflict have been

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173 UNSCR 242, adopted in 1967 shortly after the Six-Day War, calls for a “just and lasting peace in the Middle East” based on (1) “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the [1967 Six-Day War]” and (2) “Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”


175 Ibid.

176 The most prominent attack by an Israeli civilian against Palestinians since 1993 was the killing of at least 29 Palestinians (and possibly between 10 to 23 more) and the wounding of about 150 more by Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein (a Brooklyn-born former military doctor) at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Mosque of Abraham) in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron on February 25, 1994 (the Jewish holy day of Purim) while the victims were at prayer. See George J. Church, “When Fury Rules.” *Time*, March 7, 1994. This incident has been cited by many analysts as a provocation for the Palestinian suicide bombing campaign that followed.

177 See, for example, Hirsh Goodman, “The Dangers of a Unilateral Israeli Withdrawal from the West Bank and Eastern Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2017.

neutralized to some extent by systematic Israeli efforts, with some financial and technological assistance from the United States.\textsuperscript{179} Since 2018, some Palestinians—with reported encouragement from Hamas—have tried to breach fences dividing Gaza from Israel, or have used incendiary kites or balloons to set fires to arable land in southern Israel.\textsuperscript{180} The purpose of these tactics may be to provoke Israeli responses that evoke international sympathy for Palestinians and criticism of Israel—a dynamic that bolstered Palestinian national aspirations in the late 1980s during the first intifada.\textsuperscript{181}

Isolated attacks still occur within Israel and the West Bank. Some are perpetrated by Palestinians who are unaffiliated with terrorist groups and who use small arms or vehicles as weapons. Antipathy between Jewish settlers and Palestinian residents in the West Bank leads to occasional attacks on both sides. Some militants have staged attacks at or near Gaza border crossings and attempted to capture Israeli soldiers there.

Many factors have contributed to the failure to complete the Oslo process. A second Palestinian intifada from 2000 to 2005 was marked by intense terrorist violence inside Israel. In response, Israel took actions that it asserted were necessary to safeguard its citizens’ security, rendering unusable much of the PA infrastructure built over the preceding decade. During the second intifada, U.S.- and internationally supported efforts to restart peace negotiations under various auspices failed to gain traction.

After Arafat’s death in 2004 and his succession by Mahmoud Abbas, Israel unilaterally withdrew its settlers and military forces from Gaza in 2005. Despite forsaking responsibility for Gaza, Israel has continued to control most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and even various buffer zones within the territory. The limited self-rule regime of the PA was undermined further by Hamas’s legislative election victory in 2006, and its takeover of Gaza in 2007. Having different Palestinian leaders controlling the West Bank and Gaza since then has complicated the question of who speaks for the Palestinians both domestically and internationally (see Appendix C).

\textsuperscript{179} CRS Report RL33222, \textit{U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel}, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
\textsuperscript{181} See, for example, Hussein Ibish, “The Nonviolent Violence of Hamas,” foreignpolicy.com, April 6, 2018.
Appendix C. Palestinian Governance

Achieving effective and transparent governance over the West Bank and Gaza and preventing Israeli-Palestinian violence has proven elusive for Palestinian leaders since their limited self-rule experiment began in 1994. The split established in 2007 between the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza exacerbated these difficulties.

Palestinian Authority (PA)

The Palestinian National Authority (or Palestinian Authority, hereafter PA) was granted limited rule under Israeli occupational authority in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank in the mid-1990s, pursuant to the Oslo agreements. One of the PLO’s options is to restructure or dissolve the PA (either in concert with Israel or unilaterally) pursuant to the claim that the PA is a constitutional creature of PLO agreements with Israel.

Although not a state, the PA is organized like one—complete with executive, legislative, and judicial organs of governance, as well as security forces. Ramallah is its de facto seat, but is not considered to be the PA capital because of Palestinian political consensus that Jerusalem (or at least the part east of the 1949-1967 Israel-Jordan armistice line, or “Green Line”) should be the capital of a Palestinian state.

The executive branch has both a president and a prime minister-led cabinet, and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) is the PA’s legislature (sidelined since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007). The judicial branch has separate high courts to decide substantive disputes and to settle controversies regarding Palestinian basic law, and also includes a High Judicial Council and separate security courts. As mentioned above, President Abbas created and appointed justices to a new Constitutional Court in 2016. The electoral base of the PA is composed of Palestinians from the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

Leadership succession within the PA after Mahmoud Abbas leaves office could present Hamas with opportunities to increase its influence, especially if the process does not definitively concentrate power around one or more non-Hamas figures. Though Hamas members have not run in past presidential elections, one or more could potentially run in future elections.

Under Article 37 of the Palestinian Basic Law, it appears that if Abbas were to leave office, the speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (currently Aziz Dweik, a member of Hamas) would take over duties as president for a period not to exceed 60 days, by which time elections for a more permanent successor are supposed to take place.

Succession to the PA presidency could be determined by elections or under the Palestinian Basic Law. Abbas’s term of office was supposed to be four years, with a new round of elections initially planned for 2009 that would have allowed Abbas to run for a second and final term. However, the split between the Abbas-led PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza has indefinitely postponed PA elections, with the last presidential election having taken place in 2005 and the last legislative

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182 The relevant Israel-PLO agreements that created the PA and established its parameters were the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, dated May 4, 1994; and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995.

183 The PA was originally intended to be a temporary, transitional mechanism for the five-year period prescribed for final-status negotiations, not an indefinite administrative authority.

184 The Palestinian Basic Law is the set of laws that govern the PA. The Palestinian Legislative Council originally passed it in 1997, and PA President Yasser Arafat ratified it in 2002. Some amendments have occurred since.
The election in 2006. In December 2009, the PLO’s Central Council voted to extend the terms of both Abbas and the current PLC until elections can be held. This precedent could lead to PLO action in selecting or attempting to select a successor to Abbas as PA president.

West Bank

The PA administers densely populated Palestinian areas in the West Bank subject to supervening Israeli control under the Oslo agreements (see Figure 1 for map). Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers regularly mount arrest operations to apprehend wanted Palestinians or foil terrorist plots. They maintain permanent posts throughout the West Bank and along the West Bank’s administrative borders with Israel and Jordan to protect Jewish settlers and broader security interests. The IDF sometimes takes measures that involve the expropriation of West Bank land or dispossession of Palestinians from their homes and communities.

Coordination between Israeli and PA authorities generally takes place discreetly, given the political sensitivity for PA leaders to be seen as collaborating with Israeli occupiers. In 2002, at the height of the second intifada, Israel demonstrated its ability to reoccupy PA-controlled areas of the West Bank in what it called Operation Defensive Shield. The IDF demolished many official PA buildings, Palestinian neighborhoods, and other infrastructure.

Gaza

Hamas’s security control of Gaza (see Figure 2 for map) presents a conundrum for the Abbas-led PA, Israel, and the international community. They have been unable to establish a durable political-security framework for Gaza that assists Gaza’s population without bolstering Hamas. For more information, see “Gaza’s Challenges: Hamas and Post-Conflict Reconstruction.”

Hamas’s preeminence in Gaza can be traced to 2006-2007. After victory in the 2006 PA legislative elections, Hamas consolidated its power in Gaza—while losing it in the West Bank—through violent struggle with Fatah in June 2007. Hamas’s security forces have maintained power in Gaza ever since, even after its de facto government relinquished nominal responsibility to the PA in June 2014. The State Department and some NGOs have raised concerns about possible Hamas violations of the rule of law and civil liberties.

Since Hamas’s 2007 takeover of Gaza, Israeli and Egyptian authorities have maintained strict control over Gaza’s border crossings. Israel justifies the restrictions it imposes as a way to deny Hamas materials to reconstitute its military capabilities. However, the restrictions also limit

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185 The two agreements that define respective Israeli and PA zones of control are (1) the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995; and (2) the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, dated January 17, 1997. East Jerusalem is excluded from these agreements, as Israel has effectively annexed it.


188 In November 2005, Israel and the PA signed an Agreement on Movement and Access, featuring U.S. and European Union participation in the travel and commerce regime that was supposed to emerge post-Gaza disengagement, but this agreement was never fully implemented. In September 2007, three months after Hamas’s takeover of Gaza, the closure regime was further formalized when Israel declared Gaza to be a “hostile entity.” Depending on circumstances since then, Israel has eased and re-tightened restrictions on various imports and exports. Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Gaza Up Close, September 1, 2021. Widespread unemployment and poverty persist.
commerce, affect the entire economy, and delay humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{189} For several years, Hamas compensated somewhat for these restrictions by routinely smuggling goods into Gaza from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula through a network of tunnels. However, after Egypt’s military regained political control in July 2013, it disrupted the tunnel system.

Observers routinely voice concerns that if current arrangements continue, the dispiriting living conditions that have persisted since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 could feed radicalization within Gaza and pressure its leaders to increase violence against Israel for political ends.\textsuperscript{190} Israel disputes the level of legal responsibility for Gaza’s residents that some international actors claim it retains—given its continued control of most of Gaza’s borders, airspace, maritime access, and various buffer zones within the territory.

Within limited parameters amid Gaza’s political uncertainties and access restrictions, UNRWA and other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations take care of many Gazans’ day-to-day humanitarian needs. These groups play significant roles in providing various forms of assistance and trying to facilitate reconstruction from previous conflicts. For more information on Palestinian refugees, see Appendix A.

Appendix D. Palestinian Economy

The economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip faces structural difficulties—with Gaza’s real per capita income about half that of the West Bank’s.\footnote{World Bank, \textit{Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee}, March 19, 2018, pp. 22-23.} Palestinians’ livelihoods largely depend on their ties to Israel’s relatively strong economy. Israel is the market for about 84% of West Bank/Gaza exports, and the source for about 56% of West Bank/Gaza imports.\footnote{Economist Intelligence Unit, Palestine Country Report (accessed March 12, 2021), based on 2019 figures.} Palestinians are constrained from developing other external ties because of the layers of control that Israel has put in place to enforce security.

Because the PA has been unable to become self-sufficient, it has been acutely dependent on foreign assistance. Facing a regular annual budget deficit of over $1 billion (and well beyond that amount for 2020 and 2021 given COVID-19), PA officials have traditionally sought aid from international sources to meet the PA’s financial commitments (see Figure D-1). As of August 2021, external donor funding for the calendar year (including from Arab states and European governments) was at a historically low level of $100 million.\footnote{Official PA financial statements available at http://www.pmo.ps/pmo/index.php.}

Part of the PA’s financial problems stem from a payroll that has become increasingly bloated over the PA’s 27-year existence. Domestic corruption and inefficiency also appear to pose difficulties.\footnote{See, e.g., Elliott Abrams, “Corruption in the Palestinian Authority,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 5, 2018.} Absent fundamental changes in revenue and expenses, the PA’s fiscal dependence on external sources is likely to continue.
Lacking sufficient private sector employment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza, many Palestinians have historically depended on easy entry into and exit out of Israel for their jobs and goods. Yet, the second intifada that began in 2000 reduced this access considerably. Israel constructed a West Bank separation barrier and increased security at crossing points, and unilaterally “disengaged” (withdrew its settlements and official military contingent) from Gaza in 2005. Israel now issues permits to control access. Its security forces significantly limit the flow of people and goods to flow between Israel and Gaza, while periodically halting these flows between Israel and the West Bank.

The Palestinians’ alternatives to functional dependence on Israel’s economy include

- attracting investment and building a self-sufficient economy;
- looking to neighboring Egypt and Jordan (which struggle with their own political and economic problems) for economic integration; or
- depending indefinitely on external assistance.

For the West Bank and Gaza to attract enough long-term investment to become more self-sufficient, most observers agree that uncertainties regarding the political and security situation and Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods, people, and capital would need to be significantly reduced. Such changes may be untenable absent an overall resolution of Israeli-Palestinian disputes. In the meantime, donors and lenders occasionally provide emergency funding to stave off fiscal crisis.

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Appendix E. Palestinian Initiatives in International Fora

The PLO has pursued a number of international initiatives—opposed by the United States and Israel—that are part of a broader effort to obtain greater international recognition of Palestinian statehood. Some 139 out of 193 U.N. member states reportedly have formally recognized the state of Palestine that the PLO declared in 1988.196

The PLO’s international initiatives are centered on the United Nations. In September 2011, PLO Chairman Abbas applied for Palestinian membership in the United Nations. Officially, the application remains pending in the Security Council’s membership committee, whose members did not achieve consensus during 2011 deliberations.197 The application for Palestinian membership would likely face a U.S. veto if it came to a future vote in the Security Council. In fall 2011, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).198

Under U.S. laws passed in 1990 and 1994,199 Palestinian admission to membership in UNESCO in 2011 triggered the withholding of U.S. assessed and voluntary financial contributions to the organization. If the Palestinians were to obtain membership in other U.N. entities, the 1990 and 1994 U.S. laws might trigger withholdings of U.S. financial contributions to these entities.200 Such withholdings could adversely affect these entities’ budgets and complicate the conduct of U.S. foreign policy within the U.N. system and other multilateral settings. The following are some other significant steps for the PLO in international fora:

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196 A list from the PLO’s observer mission to the United Nations is available at https://palestineun.org/about-palestine/diplomatic-relations/. It does not include the United States, Canada, Japan, or most Western European countries, but does include China, India, and Russia.

197 United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations,” S/2011/705, November 11, 2011. Paragraph 19 of this report provides a summary of the varying views that committee members advanced regarding Palestinian membership: “The view was expressed that the Committee should recommend to the Council that Palestine be admitted to membership in the United Nations. A different view was expressed that the membership application could not be supported at this time and an abstention was envisaged in the event of a vote. Yet another view expressed was that there were serious questions about the application, that the applicant did not meet the requirements for membership and that a favourable recommendation to the General Assembly would not be supported.”

198 For more information, see CRS Report R42999, The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), by Luisa Blanchfield and Marjorie Ann Browne.


200 In May 2018, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), but without consequences under U.S. law because the United States is not a member of or donor to UNIDO.
• On November 29, 2012, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/19. The resolution changed the permanent U.N. observer status of the PLO (recognized before as “Palestine” and now as “State of Palestine” within the U.N. system) from an “entity” to a “non-member state.”

• In 2016, the Palestinians acceded to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

• In 2017, the Palestinians obtained membership in Interpol.

• In 2018, the Palestinians applied to join the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and deposited an instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with the U.N. Secretary General.

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201 The PLO has had permanent observer status at the United Nations since 1974. Following the adoption of Resolution 67/19, the “State of Palestine” maintains many of the capacities it had as an observer entity—including participation in General Assembly debates and the ability to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions related to proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East issues. Despite its designation as a state, the “State of Palestine” is not a member of the United Nations, and therefore does not have the right to vote or to call for a vote in the General Assembly on resolutions. However, in November 2013, the “State of Palestine” participated in the balloting for a judge for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Article 13, Section 2(d) of the Statute for the Tribunal (Annex to U.N. Doc. S/25704, adopted pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), as subsequently amended) includes “non-Member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters” in the election of the tribunal’s judges.


203 UNCTAD website, State of Palestine expresses intent to join UNCTAD, May 24, 2018.