Credit Rating Agencies: Background and Regulatory Issues

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) provide investors with evaluations of the creditworthiness of debt (i.e., how likely a debt is to be repaid in full) issued by a wide spectrum of entities, including corporations, sovereign nations, and municipalities. Their ratings are typically a letter hierarchical format (e.g., AAA as the safest, and progressively lower grades—AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB, all the way down to D—representing greater risk). For regulatory and investment purposes, ratings are placed into two broad categories. *Investment grade* debt is rated BBB- or Baa3 (depending on the CRA) or higher. *Noninvestment grade* debt (also known as “high yield” or “junk” bonds) has a rating below these benchmarks and is generally associated with higher risk firms. This In Focus examines CRAs, their regulation, and related policy issues.

**Background and Early Regulation**

In 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the designations of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs). NRSROs were originally used to help determine capital charges on different grades of debt securities held by broker-dealers under the SEC’s net capital rule (Rule 15c3-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The net capital rule is aimed at ensuring that broker-dealers maintain sufficient liquid assets to promptly satisfy their liabilities if needed.

When the SEC began using ratings to enforce the net capital rule in 1975, the SEC staff, in consultation with agency commissioners, determined that the ratings of the three dominant agencies—Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch—were nationally used and were thus generally considered NRSROs with respect to SEC enforcement of the net capital rule. Between 1975 and 2000, the SEC added four more NRSROs to the original three. The SEC never defined the term NRSRO or specified how a CRA might become one. Its approach was essentially described as one of “we know it when we see it.” As of March 2024, there were 10 NRSROs—three categorized by the SEC as “large” (S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch) and garnering 91% of revenue—three as “medium,” and four as “small.”

In 2006, Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (P.L. 109-291), which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to try to improve ratings quality for the protection of investors by fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating industry. Among other things, P.L. 109-291 added Section 15E to the Securities Exchange Act, which established SEC oversight over those CRAs that register as NRSROs. It also provided the SEC with examination authority and established a registration program for CRAs seeking NRSRO designation. NRSRO applicants and registered NRSROs were required to disclose ratings performance, conflicts of interest, and the procedures used to determine ratings.

Under the law, the SEC was also authorized to conduct annual deficiency and compliance examinations at NRSROs, which are not publicly identified.

**The Financial Crisis and Dodd-Frank Changes**

In the run-up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the provision of investment grade ratings by the three dominant CRAs—S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch—for structured finance securities was widely seen as a critical part of the process of structuring the residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations that held subprime housing mortgages. The issuance of private MBS reportedly grew from $126 billion in 2000 to $1.145 trillion in 2006.

Various reporting, including the 2011 *Financial Crisis Inquiry Report*, argued that the three leading CRAs fundamentally failed in their ratings of these securities, exacerbating the market collapse. During the housing boom preceding the financial crisis, the CRAs often gave top-tier AAA ratings to many structured securities only to downgrade many of them later to levels often below investment grade. CRA ratings on corporate bonds reportedly did not encounter the same problems. Criticism of the CRAs, however, was not universal. A frequent defense of their failings was that their rating missteps could be traced in part to their view that rising housing prices would be sustained, a perspective also said to be held by a number of respected financial market observers at the time.

Critics of CRAs argue that overly favorable ratings were in place heading into the crisis because of the *issuer-pays* model used by the CRAs. CRAs are typically paid by the issuers of the securities being rated by the agencies, which many see as a conflict of interest (*Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011*). Rating structured finance became a substantial revenue generator for the CRAs. For example, according to some reporting (*Morgenson, New York Times, 2008*), by the first quarter of 2007, such ratings constituted 53% of Moody’s total revenue. In addition, “ratings shopping”—wherein structured finance issuers shopped for CRAs offering potentially more favorable ratings—may have played a role (*Zhou and Kumar, 2012*). Other possible causes of the allegedly inflated structured product ratings included the following:

- The CRA industry is highly concentrated (*Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011*). According to recent SEC data, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch issued about 95% of outstanding ratings.
- Despite high profits, the CRAs reportedly suffered from inadequate staffing, exercise of due diligence, and use of internal controls and a failure to properly update their rating models (*Brookings, 2017*).
• The CRAs encountered challenges from reportedly significant levels of mortgage fraud and lax mortgage underwriting protocols (Brookings, 2017).
• Unlike largely homogeneous and seasoned corporate bonds, the highly complex structured finance instruments had relatively little experience over multiple economic cycles and involved heterogeneous individualized risks (Levitin and Wachter, 2012).
• The CRA predictive quantitative models contain potentially flawed assumptions (McNamara, 2012).
• The CRAs did not use data from more applicable historical periods in which housing prices were in decline (Levitin and Wachter, 2012).
• Various CRA quantitative models were opportunistically reverse-engineered by some of the issuers of structured instruments seeking favorable ratings (Brookings, 2017).
• The CRAs were immune from legal liability for misstatements in registration statements. Historically, the CRAs did not use CRA predictive quantitative models and then provide subsequent ratings appearing in issuer prospectuses and registration statements for asset-backed securities such as MBS. This raised the prospect of a shutdown of the securitization market. The SEC responded with “no action” letters that effectively indefinitely rescinded the NRSRROs’ “expert liability” status for ratings of asset-backed securities, and these rescindments are still in effect.

In 2010, when newly subject to the expert liability status, the three major CRAs opposed giving their consent to their ratings appearing in issuer prospectuses and registration statements for asset-backed securities such as MBS. This raised the prospect of a shutdown of the securitization market. The SEC responded with “no action” letters that effectively indefinitely rescinded the NRSRROs’ “expert liability” status for ratings of asset-backed securities, and these rescindments are still in effect.

The act also attempted to reduce reliance on credit ratings by directing federal agencies to remove specific references to NRSRRO-assigned credit ratings in their regulations and guidance while also adopting alternative schemes. In the ensuing years, most agencies have reportedly done so. However, a Federal Reserve response to the economic and financial turmoil from the COVID-19 pandemic stood in contrast to the move away from ratings references in regulation. In early 2020, the Federal Reserve created several emergency corporate lending facilities. Under them, a corporate recipient was required to have investment grade debt rated by “major NRSRROs.”

Later Market and Regulatory Developments
In February 2024, the SEC’s annual report on NRSRROs warned of several financial risks that staff found through their NRSRRO assessments. One was that the increase in interest rates since 2022 had increased debt service payments for highly leveraged companies, putting them under financial stress and rendering NRSRRO’s monitoring of low-rated or highly leveraged companies an important area for SEC examination. Another area flagged for SEC examination was NRSRRO’s surveillance of collateralized loan obligations and securitizations backed by auto loans and consumer assets, given potential impacts on credit quality from the interest rate increases. In its examinations of NRSRROs, the SEC also found a number of material deficiencies. These included nine instances of failures to sufficiently address conflicts of interest; eight findings implicating poor disclosure; six findings related to internal control issues; three findings on insufficient retention or production of records; and two findings regarding the misuse of material, nonpublic information—indicating that some problems still percolate within the industry.

On June 1, 2020, the SEC’s Credit Ratings Subcommittee of the Fixed Income Market Structure Advisory Committee recommended some NRSRRO reforms: (1) expanding NRSRRO disclosure, (2) enhancing issuer—corporate and securitized—disclosures, and (3) adopting a scheme for bondholders to ratify issuer-selected NRSRROs. On July 21, 2021, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing that examined NRSRROs. One academic witness at that hearing called for further reforms of NRSRROs to address continued issues such as conflicts of interest through the issuer-pays model, lack of liability, high concentration, and lack of transparency in the industry.

The author gratefully acknowledges Gary Shorter, now retired, for his work on the original version of this product.

Rena S. Miller, Specialist in Financial Economics
Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.