Tax Credit Transfers and Direct Payments in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022

The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA; P.L. 117-169) created or modified 20 energy-related income tax credits. These credits subsidize clean or efficient energy production and usage by individuals and businesses.

The IRA also created two credit delivery mechanisms that extend the full value of IRA credits to organizations with little to no tax liability. This In Focus explains how these mechanisms benefit untaxed entities and businesses with low tax liabilities, respectively.

**Direct (Cash) Payments**

Federal business tax credits have traditionally been nonrefundable, meaning that if a business’s credits exceed its tax liabilities, the business cannot receive the difference as a refund. For example, if a business owes $4,000 of income taxes but is eligible for $7,000 of credits, those credits reduce the business’s income taxes to $0. However, the federal government does not send the business a refund for the remaining $3,000.

This presents challenges for untaxed entities such as state and local governments, school districts, and nonprofits. Because these organizations do not pay federal income taxes, they implicitly cannot benefit from nonrefundable tax credits. Lawmakers have at times changed the income tax code to incentivize certain behaviors (e.g., higher investment) among businesses and individuals, but nonprofits and other groups exempt from income tax do not respond to such incentives. To incentivize clean energy investments across a wider range of organizations, the IRA allows certain untaxed entities to receive direct cash payments of equal value to 12 nonrefundable tax credits:

- the alternative fuel vehicle refueling property credit (AFVRPC; Internal Revenue Code [IRC] §30C);
- the production tax credit (IRC §45);
- the credit for carbon oxide sequestration (IRC §45Q);
- the zero-emission nuclear power production credit (IRC §45U);
- the clean hydrogen production credit (IRC §45V);
- the credit for qualified commercial clean vehicles (IRC §45W);
- the advanced manufacturing production credit (IRC §45X);
- the clean electricity production credit (IRC §45Y);
- the clean fuel production credit (IRC §45Z);
- the investment tax credit (IRC §48);
- the qualifying advanced energy property credit (IRC §48C); and
- the clean electricity investment credit (IRC §48E).

Organizations receiving direct payments must file a return with the IRS at the tax filing deadline (with applicable extensions). Payments are only issued after returns have been processed. The untaxed entities eligible for direct payments are

- any private-sector entity exempt from federal income taxes, including 501(c)(3) organizations such as hospitals, private colleges, and think tanks;
- state governments and political subdivisions thereof (including city governments, county governments, and school districts) and Indian tribal governments;
- the Tennessee Valley Authority;
- Alaska Native Corporations; and
- rural electricity cooperatives.

Organizations that are not exempt from taxation can also elect to claim direct payments in place of the credits for carbon oxide sequestration, clean hydrogen production, and advanced manufacturing production. They may do so for five years, starting with the year a facility is placed in service. This election cannot be made after 2032.

**Credit Transfers**

Entities not eligible for direct payments may transfer any of the credits listed in the previous section, with the exception of the credit for qualified commercial clean vehicles. Credit transfers occur when one business sells its credits to another at an agreed-upon price in exchange for cash.

Such transfers hold two potential benefits for firms. First, businesses can sell their credits for a price between the credit’s maximum value and the business’s income tax liability. For example, if a firm owes $4,000 of federal income taxes but has a credit worth $7,000, it can sell the credit to a second firm for $6,000. In this example, the first firm gains $2,000 (because it pays an additional $4,000 in taxes but receives $6,000 in cash), while the second firm gains $1,000 (because it buys the credit for $6,000 but reduces its taxes by $7,000). Second, whereas traditional
tax credits are only claimed after firms file their taxes, transfers may occur at any time. Businesses in need of liquidity can sell their credits instead of taking out loans, which is especially important when interest rates are high.

Under proposed IRS regulations, if a firm is deemed ineligible for a credit it has already sold, the liability falls on the purchaser of the credit. This could cause transferable credits to trade at less than their full values if buyers factor these potential losses into their purchasing decisions. It also explains why insurance coverage is built into most credit purchase agreements. Last year, 74% of credit transfers included insurance coverage for the buyer.

Research has found that transferred tax credits typically sold at 89 to 95 cents on the dollar in 2023. Trading values differed significantly based on deal size. Credits purchased for less than $10 million traded at 89 cents on the dollar, whereas purchases exceeding $100 million traded at an average of 95 cents on the dollar. It is not clear how much of the difference between the credits’ sales prices and their maximum values was attributable to liability concerns, the preference for immediately available cash, or other factors.

The clean vehicle credit (IRC §30D) and the used clean vehicle credit (IRC §25E) are eligible for a special type of credit transfer from consumers to car dealers. Such transfers are discussed in CRS In Focus IF12570, Clean Vehicle Tax Credit Transfers to Car Dealers, by Nicholas E. Buffie.

**Intersection of the Two Mechanisms**

Entities eligible for direct pay cannot sell their credits. However, the law does not explicitly ban them from buying credits and receiving direct payments for those credits. Proposed IRS regulations would disallow such “credit chaining” for the sake of compliance with other aspects of the regulations, which state that entities must own any energy properties for which they receive direct payments.

**Fiscal Costs**

In its August 2022 cost estimate, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that the federal government will issue $36 billion of direct payments over FY2022-FY2031 for the five credits shown in Table 1. The JCT stated that direct payments would be “negligible” for five other credits, and it did not provide cost estimates for the direct payment portions of the AFVRPC and the credit for qualified commercial clean vehicles.

The gross direct payment estimates in Table 1 may slightly overstate the net costs of direct payments. This could occur, for example, if the direct pay provisions incentivize an untaxed entity to make a clean energy investment that otherwise would have been made by a taxable corporation. In this case, direct payments to the untaxed entity would merely displace traditional tax credits that would otherwise have been claimed by a taxable corporation. Although JCT’s dynamic scoring model includes such displacements in its total cost estimates (shown in the “Total Costs” column), the direct payment estimates do not distinguish between new costs incurred due to direct pay and costs shifted from traditional credits to direct pay. If the direct payment mechanism were repealed, the JCT would presumably estimate the net savings to the government to be less than the projected amount of direct payments issued.

The JCT has not published estimates of the fiscal costs of credit transferability.

**Table 1. Statutory Cost of IRA Direct Cash Payments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Payments</th>
<th>Total Costs</th>
<th>Direct Pay Share</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advanced</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
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<td>$30.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Production Credit</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero-Emission</td>
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<td>$30.0</td>
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<td>Nuclear Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>Production Credit</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Clean Hydrogen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oxide Sequestration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit for Carbon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Production Credit</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Joint Committee on Taxation.  
**Notes:** The credit for carbon oxide sequestration predated the IRA, and the estimate in this table only includes costs incurred under the IRA. The JCT estimated in its 2020 tax expenditures report that the credit would cost $0.1 billion over FY2020-FY2024.

**Additional Issues for Consideration**

These provisions have engendered various policy questions.

First, some tax professionals have argued that individuals should be allowed to buy transferrable tax credits from businesses. Proposed Treasury regulations only permit business-to-business transfers, but Treasury indicated that it was reconsidering its stance in October 2023.

Second, a temporary IRS regulation from June 2023 stipulates that organizations must register each property separately in their direct pay applications. Based on the legal definition of property, certain organizations must file paperwork for hundreds of essentially identical properties. For example, because each wind turbine is considered a separate property, wind farms may register hundreds of turbines. Some commentators have suggested that energy providers be allowed to group similar properties in their applications, thus reducing paperwork.

Third, Congress could change the number of credits eligible for direct payments and transfers. On the other hand, if these mechanisms prove effective at increasing clean energy investment, Congress could expand them to other parts of the tax code. On the other hand, if these mechanisms prove unexpectedly expensive, Congress could limit or eliminate them in an effort to decrease the federal budget deficit.

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