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Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends

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Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends

In the tripartite structure of the U.S. federal government, it is the job of courts to say what the law is, as Chief Justice John Marshall announced in 1803. When courts render decisions on the meaning of statutes, the prevailing view is that a judge's task is not to make the law, but rather to interpret the law made by Congress. Proponents of the two main theories of statutory interpretation—purposivism and textualism—disagree about how judges can best adhere to this ideal of legislative supremacy. While purposivists argue that courts should prioritize interpretations that advance the statute's purpose, textualists maintain that judges should primarily confine their focus to the statute's text. Courts applying either theory can encounter interpretive difficulties in disputes that apply a statute in ways Congress may not have anticipated.

Regardless of their interpretive theory, judges use many of the same tools to gather evidence of statutory meaning. Most frequently, judges rely on five types of interpretive tools. Although both purposivists and textualists may use any of these five tools, a judge's theory of statutory interpretation may influence the order in which these tools are applied and how much weight is given to each tool. The tools overlap and can be used in different ways.

First, judges often begin by looking to the **ordinary meaning** of the statutory text, asking how a word is understood in common parlance. Judges may look to dictionaries, books, or databases for evidence of a word's ordinary usage. Although this tool is theoretically aligned with textualism, it is commonly used by a wide variety of judges. Nonetheless, judges may disagree about what a word's ordinary meaning is, or whether a particular statutory term may instead be a term of art—that is, a word with a specialized meaning in a particular context or field.

Second, judges interpret specific provisions by looking to their broader **statutory context**, including the surrounding phrases and overall structure of the law. This context can inform whether a word's ordinary meaning applies in the circumstances covered by the statutory scheme. A judge might look to whether a term or phrase is used elsewhere in the statute in a way that sheds additional light on a disputed provision. A judge might also ask whether Congress used different language elsewhere in a meaningful way. Both purposivist and textualist judges tend to use this tool because it can provide textual evidence of Congress's meaning and goal.

Third, judges may turn to the **canons of construction**, which are presumptions about how courts ordinarily read statutes. Semantic canons focus on text, often reflecting rules of grammar or presumptions about legislative drafting. For instance, the rule against surplusage tells courts to give each word and clause of a statute operative effect, under the assumption that Congress chooses words meaningfully. Substantive canons are presumptions about particular outcomes, reflecting a judgment that Congress would or would not ordinarily want that outcome. For example, one substantive canon instructs that Congress generally drafts statutes consistently with the Constitution, so that courts should look for interpretations that avoid constitutional problems. Canons of construction are more closely aligned with textualism than purposivism, although judges across judicial philosophies have raised questions about whether or when the canons should be applied.

Fourth, judges may look to a statute's **legislative history**, or the record of Congress's deliberations when enacting a law. This tool is most closely associated with purposivism. Historically, legislative history was primarily used to discover evidence about Congress's intent. In a modern analysis, however, legislative history can also be used to support a textual interpretation or illuminate a law's scope. Some judges have suggested certain forms of legislative history are more reliable than others, with committee reports providing stronger evidence of Congress's understanding of the law than individual floor statements from non-sponsors, for example.

Finally, a judge might consider **statutory implementation**: the way a law has been applied in the past, or might be applied in the future. Judges may look to past agency enforcement of a law, or simply think through how a particular interpretation might operate. To the extent this tool asks what problem Congress sought to address and how it went about doing that, it mirrors the traditional purposivist inquiry. This tool is sometimes used by textualist judges too, who may look to statutory context to consider a law's operation.

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Introduction

“No vehicles in the park.”

For decades, lawyers have debated the proper scope of this hypothetical law.¹ The rule at first appears admirably straightforward, but thought experiments applying the law quickly reveal latent complications. Does this law forbid bicycles?² Baby strollers?³ Golf carts?⁴ Drones?⁵ Does it encompass the service vehicles of the park’s caretakers, or an ambulance responding to a parkgoer’s injury?⁶ Would it prevent the city from bringing in a World War II truck and mounting it on a pedestal as part of a war memorial?⁷ While many would read the hypothetical law to prohibit an enthusiastic mother from driving a minivan full of young soccer players into the park, it may not be so simple to justify that seemingly reasonable interpretation. If the soccer mom challenged the decision of a hypothetical Department of Parks and Recreation to prohibit her from entering, how would the Department’s lawyers justify this position? Should they refer primarily to the law’s text, or to its purpose? What tools should they use to discover the meaning of the text or the lawmaker’s purpose? How does their theory of interpretation influence their answers to the harder problems of application?

This deceptively simple hypothetical has endured because it usefully illustrates the challenges of statutory interpretation. Even a statutory provision that at first appears unambiguous can engender significant difficulties when applied in the real world. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter once aptly described the problem of determining statutory meaning as inherent in “the very nature of words.”⁸ The meaning of words depends on the context in which they are used and might change over time.⁹ Words are “inexact symbols” of meaning, and even in everyday communications, it is difficult to achieve one definite meaning.¹⁰

These “intrinsic difficulties of language” are heightened in the creation of a statute, which is crafted by a complicated governmental process and will likely be applied to an unforeseeable variety of circumstances.¹¹ Statutes are usually written in general terms, which may compound the difficulty of applying a provision to specific situations.¹² However, this generality—and the ensuing ambiguity—is often intentional: statutes are frequently drafted to address “*categories of conduct*.”¹³ The enacting legislature may have sought to ensure that the statute would be general

¹ See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, *A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park*, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1111–12 (2008) (revisiting the hypothetical on “the fiftieth anniversary” of a famous debate between the legal scholars H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller that used this example as a focal point).

² H.L.A. Hart, *Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals*, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958).

³ E.g., *FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc.*, 537 U.S. 293, 311 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

⁴ E.g., Frederick Schauer, *Formalism*, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 545 (1988).

⁵ E.g., Brad A. Greenberg, *Rethinking Technology Neutrality*, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1495, 1530 (2016). Assume the drone is able to carry objects, or even people—and ask why that matters. See *id.*

⁶ E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., *The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation*, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1260 (2015).

⁷ Lon L. Fuller, *Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart*, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 663 (1958).

⁸ Felix Frankfurter, *Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes*, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1947).

⁹ See, e.g., ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, *LEGISLATIVE PROCESS* 111 (2d ed. 2002).

¹⁰ See Frankfurter, *supra* note 8, at 528.

¹¹ *Id.* at 529.

¹² See, e.g., MIKVA & LANE, *supra* note 9, at 111.

¹³ *Id.*

enough to capture the situations it could not foresee,¹⁴ or may have intended to delegate interpretive authority to the agency responsible for enforcing the statute.¹⁵ Vague or ambiguous language might also be the result of compromise.¹⁶ Alternatively, a statute might be silent with respect to a particular application because Congress simply did not anticipate the situation.¹⁷

When a statute becomes the subject of a dispute in court, judges usually must interpret the law, ambiguous or not.¹⁸ As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in *Marbury v. Madison*: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”¹⁹ Judicial pronouncements about statutes are generally the final word on statutory meaning and will determine how the law is carried out—at least, unless Congress acts to amend the law. In the realm of statutory interpretation, many members of the judiciary view their role in “say[ing] what the law is” as subordinate to Congress’s position as the law’s drafter.²⁰ The legitimacy of any particular exercise in statutory interpretation is often judged by how well it carries out Congress’s will.²¹

Judges have taken a variety of approaches to resolving the meaning of a statute.²² The two theories of statutory interpretation that predominate today are purposivism and textualism.²³ Proponents of both theories generally share the goal of adhering to Congress’s intended meaning, but disagree about how best to achieve that goal.²⁴ Judges subscribing to these theories may

¹⁴ See, e.g., Frankfurter, *supra* note 8, at 528.

¹⁵ See, e.g., MIKVA & LANE, *supra* note 9, at 111–12.

¹⁶ See, e.g., John F. Manning, *Textualism and Legislative Intent*, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 445 (2005) (arguing that bills “are likely to look awkward” because they result from “a legislative process that has many twists and turns”). Cf. e.g., *Sturgeon v. Frost*, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1083–84, 1087 (2019) (describing a federal law as a “settlement” that sought to balance two potentially conflicting goals, and rejecting a construction that would “undermine” the law’s “grand bargain”).

¹⁷ See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, *THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW* 1182 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994).

¹⁸ See, e.g., *Cohens v. Virginia*, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”). Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 41, *Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund*, No. 15-1439, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1912 (U.S. 2017) (statements of Justice Samuel Alito) (describing statutory provision as “gibberish” and asking whether there is “a certain point at which we say this [provision] means nothing, we can’t figure out what it means, and, therefore, it has no effect”).

¹⁹ 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See also HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 640 (“Adjudication in its normal operation is at once a process for settling disputes and a process for making, or declaring, or settling law.”).

²⁰ See, e.g., MIKVA & LANE, *supra* note 9, at 102 (“All approaches to statutory interpretation are framed by the constitutional truism that the judicial will must bend to the legislative command.”). See generally Daniel A. Farber, *Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy*, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 283 (1989) (defining and exploring the concept of legislative supremacy in the field of statutory interpretation).

²¹ See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, *Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation*, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1251–52 (2002).

²² In a widely read article, Lon Fuller presented a hypothetical dispute from the year 4300 in which five Justices of the “Supreme Court of Newgarth” split irreconcilably on the proper resolution of a case. Lon L. Fuller, *The Case of the Speluncean Explorers*, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 616 (1949). Each Justice issues an opinion that embodies a different school of interpretation, representing “a microcosm of this century’s debates over the proper way to interpret statutes.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., *The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell*, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1732 (1993).

²³ See, e.g., John F. Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 75 (2006).

²⁴ See, e.g., *id.* at 91–92. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, *READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS* 30 (2012) (arguing against using the word “intent” even if it refers solely to the intent “to be derived solely from the words of the text” because it “inevitably causes readers to think of *subjective* intent”). For further discussion of the ways in which textualists are skeptical about legislative intent, see *infra* “Textualism.” For a discussion of the possible

employ different interpretive tools to discover Congress’s meaning,²⁵ looking to the ordinary meaning of the disputed statutory text,²⁶ its statutory context,²⁷ any applicable interpretive canons,²⁸ the legislative history of the provision,²⁹ and evidence about how the statute has been or may be implemented.³⁰

Understanding the theories that govern how judges read statutes can help Congress legislate more effectively. As a practical matter, judicial opinions interpreting statutes necessarily shape the way those statutes are implemented. If Congress knows how courts ascribe meaning to statutory text, it might be able to eliminate some ambiguity regarding its meaning by drafting according to the predominant legal theories.³¹ If Congress follows courts’ methodologies for statutory interpretation, it may better communicate its policy choices not only to courts, but also to the general public. Members of the public frequently interpret statutes in the same way as courts, whether because they look to courts as the final arbiters of statutes or because courts often intentionally mimic general understandings of how language is naturally interpreted.³² Finally, as this report discusses in detail, judges and legal scholars are engaged in an ongoing and evolving debate over the best way to determine the meaning of statutes.³³ For Members of Congress and their staff to participate meaningfully in this discussion, they must be aware of the scope and intricacies of that debate.

To help provide Congress with a general understanding of how courts interpret statutory language, this report begins by discussing the general goals of statutory interpretation, reviewing a variety of contemporary and historical approaches. The report then describes the two primary theories of interpretation employed today, before examining the main types of tools that courts use to determine statutory meaning. A separate CRS report explores in more detail the rules and presumptions that govern the construction of common components of federal legislation, such as legislative findings or severability clauses.³⁴

distinction between “purpose” and “intent,” see note 111.

²⁵ See, e.g., Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, *supra* note 23, at 84–85.

²⁶ See discussion *infra* “Ordinary Meaning.”

²⁷ See discussion *infra* “Statutory Context.”

²⁸ See discussion *infra* “Canons of Construction.”

²⁹ See discussion *infra* “Legislative History.”

³⁰ See discussion *infra* “Statutory Implementation.”

³¹ See, e.g., John F. Manning, *Inside Congress’s Mind*, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1932–33 (2015) (noting that some versions of textualism emphasize the importance of creating “clear interpretive rules” as a background against which Congress may legislate (quoting *Finley v. United States*, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989))).

³² See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, *On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes*, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992) (noting that his purposivist interpretive theory incorporates “widely shared substantive values, such as helping to achieve justice by interpreting the law in accordance with the ‘reasonable expectations’ of those to whom it applies” (citation omitted)); John F. Manning, *Textualism and the Equity of the Statute*, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 109 (2001) (noting that textualists ask how a “reasonable user of words would have understood the statutory text” (internal quotation mark omitted)).

³³ E.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, *The Law of Interpretation*, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1116 (2017).

³⁴ CRS Report R46484, *Understanding Federal Legislation: A Section-by-Section Guide to Key Legal Considerations*, by Victoria L. Killion.

Goals of Statutory Interpretation: A Historical Overview

Courts “say what the law is”³⁵ by resolving legal disputes in individual cases.³⁶ This is true whether a court is interpreting a positive law, such as a statute or regulation, or reasoning from a prior judicial precedent.³⁷ In the latter instance, a court is drawing from a body of law known as the common law. In the historical common-law tradition of making law through judicial opinions, a court reasons by example, applying general “principles of equity, natural justice, and . . . public policy” to the specific circumstances before the court.³⁸ Case by case, a common-law court decides whether each set of circumstances should follow the rule of a previous decision.³⁹ But in resolving a statutory dispute, courts generally do not simply determine, based on equity or natural justice, what would have been a reasonable course of action under the circumstances.⁴⁰ Instead, the court must “figure out what the statute means” and apply the statutory law to resolve the dispute.⁴¹

The predominant view of a judge’s proper role in statutory interpretation is one of “legislative supremacy.”⁴² This theory holds that when a court interprets a federal statute, it seeks “to give effect to the intent of Congress.”⁴³ Under this view, judges attempt to act as “faithful agents” of Congress.⁴⁴ They “are not free to simply substitute their policy views for those of the legislature that enacted the statute.”⁴⁵ This belief is rooted in the constitutional separation of powers: in the realm of legislation, the Constitution gives Congress, not courts, the power to make the law.⁴⁶ The

³⁵ *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

³⁶ *See, e.g.*, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, *THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS* 24–25 (1928). *See also, e.g.*, *Muskrat v. United States*, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (“[J]udicial power . . . is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.”).

³⁷ *E.g.*, HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 640.

³⁸ *Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R.*, 67 Mass. 263, 267–68 (1854). *See also* CARDOZO, *supra* note 36, at 28 (“[T]he problem which confronts the judge is in reality a twofold one: he must first extract from the precedents the underlying principle, the *ratio decidendi*; he must then determine the path or direction along which the principle is to move and develop, if it is not to wither and die.”).

³⁹ *See* Edward H. Levi, *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning*, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 501–02 (1948). *See also, e.g.*, *Rogers v. Tennessee*, 532 U.S. 451, 461 (2001) (“In the context of common law doctrines . . . , there often arises a need to clarify or even to reevaluate prior opinions as new circumstances and fact patterns present themselves. Such judicial acts, whether they be characterized as ‘making’ or ‘finding’ the law, are a necessary part of the judicial business . . .”).

⁴⁰ WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, *LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION* 5 (2d ed. 2006) (contrasting common law approach to statutory interpretation). *Cf. generally* Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, *Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition*, 101 VA. L. REV. 1357 (2015) (describing various arguments for and against applying common law principles of reasoning to statutory interpretation).

⁴¹ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 5.

⁴² *See, e.g.*, John F. Manning, *Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent*, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397, 2413, 2425 (2017).

⁴³ *United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc.*, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940). *See also, e.g.*, Manning, *Textualism and Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 16, at 423 (“In any system predicated on legislative supremacy, a faithful agent will of course seek the legislature’s intended meaning in some sense . . .”). Manning goes on to explain, however, that textualists do not “practice intentionalism,” because they seek an objective meaning rather than Congress’s actual intent. *Id.* at 423–24. For further discussion of this point, see *infra* “Textualism.”

⁴⁴ *See, e.g.*, Jonathan T. Molot, *The Rise and Fall of Textualism*, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 n.26 (2006) (citing a number of “works supporting the faithful agent theory”). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 5–8 (exploring various conceptions of “faithful agent” role).

⁴⁵ MIKVA & LANE, *supra* note 9, at 103.

⁴⁶ *See, e.g.*, *United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber*, 443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)

judicial power vested in the courts entails only “the power to pronounce the law as Congress has enacted it.”⁴⁷ Accordingly, courts must remain faithful to what the legislature enacted.⁴⁸

It was not always the case that judges described their role in statutory interpretation as being so constrained. This section broadly reviews the evolution of statutory interpretation in U.S. courts, noting the various schools of legal thought that predominated at particular periods in the nation’s history. However, while these other interpretive theories no longer represent a majority view, all continue to exist in some form today, and critically, they influenced the development of the theories that do dominate modern legal theory.

Early Years: Natural Law and Formalism

Legal thinking in this country’s early years was influenced by the idea of natural law,⁴⁹ which is the belief that law consists of a set of objectively correct principles derived “from a universalized conception of human nature or divine justice.”⁵⁰ The goal of judges in a natural law system⁵¹ is to “conform man-made law to those natural law principles.”⁵² Accordingly, courts looked to “the equity of the statute,”⁵³ seeking to find “the reason or final cause of the law” in order to address “the mischief for which the common law did not provide,” but the newly enacted statute did, “and to add life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the act.”⁵⁴

(“The Court reaches a result I would be inclined to vote for were I a Member of Congress considering a proposed amendment of [the disputed act]. I cannot join the Court’s judgment, however, because it is contrary to the explicit language of the statute and arrived at by means wholly incompatible with long-established principles of separation of powers.”); Levi, *supra* note 39, at 520 (“[The words of a statute] are not to be taken lightly since they express the will of the legislature. The legislature is the law-making body.”). See also Molot, *Reexamining Marbury*, *supra* note 21, at 1250–54 (examining Founders’ conceptions of the judicial power).

⁴⁷ King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 515 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

⁴⁸ See, e.g., HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1194–95.

⁴⁹ See generally Kirk A. Kennedy, *Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas*, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33, 41–50 (1997) (exploring the history and development of various strains of natural law). See also, e.g., CARDOZO, *supra* note 36, at 124–25 (“The theory of the older writers was that judges did not legislate at all. A preexisting rule was there, imbedded, if concealed, in the body of the customary law. All that the judges did, was to throw off the wrappings, and expose the statute to our view.”).

⁵⁰ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, *THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE* 5 (1990) (defining natural law as “the idea that there is a body of suprapolitical principles that underwrite ‘positive law,’ meaning law laid down by courts, legislatures, or other state organs”).

⁵¹ Natural law was not the only prominent view of statutory interpretation in the early history of American law. Notably, many subscribed to what was sometimes dubbed (mostly by its detractors) as “literalism.” See *United States v. Dotterweich*, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943); Learned Hand, *How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?*, in *THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND* 107 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952). Literalism refused to consider any sense of purpose that was not strictly grounded in the text. See William S. Jordan, III, *Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Relevance of English Practice*, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994) (“[T]he literal rule [in English law] holds that the intent of Parliament is determined from the actual words of the statute. If Parliament’s meaning is clear, that meaning is binding no matter how absurd the result may seem.”). See, e.g., *Caminetti v. United States*, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.”).

⁵² Manning, *Textualism and the Equity of the Statute*, *supra* note 32, at 29.

⁵³ *Id.* at 29–32.

⁵⁴ J. Clark Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, *Statutory Interpretation: Four Theories in Disarray*, 53 SMU L. REV. 81, 88 (2000).

A distinct, but not mutually exclusive,⁵⁵ view of the law that gained popularity in the 19th century,⁵⁶ formalism, posits that “the correct outcome of a case could be deduced” scientifically from fundamental “principles of common law” contained in prior cases.⁵⁷ These early formalists believed that they could use established forms of logic, based on these fundamental common-law principles, to determine the meaning of statutory text.⁵⁸

Both natural law and formalism share the belief that the law provides one right answer to any question and lawmakers can discover that answer.⁵⁹ For those who subscribed to these schools of thought, the source of this answer is neither the legislature nor the courts, but the higher principles of law themselves.⁶⁰ When natural law and formalism dominated legal thinking, “it did not matter as much whether judges conceived of themselves as faithful agents of Congress or coequal partners in law elaboration.”⁶¹ This is because under these theories, both courts and legislators are engaged in the same process of finding the one correct answer.⁶² And if courts discover the answer to the legal question presented, proponents of natural law and formalism contend that there is no need to defer to the legislature.⁶³ Accordingly, under these theories, courts might resort to equity or reason over a strict construction of the language of the statute because this gloss on the legislative text amounts to a “correction” of a defective statute, a correction that

⁵⁵ Formalism represents a certain way of reasoning and could be adopted in tandem with natural law approaches. See, e.g., POSNER, *THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE*, *supra* note 50, at 11. However, it is arguably more often associated with a more “literal” view of statutes—at least in its more modern formulations. See, e.g., Daniel Farber, *The Ages of American Formalism*, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 91 (1995) (“Formalists believe that certainty, stability, and logic are the primary values to be sought by judges To implement these values, they embrace formalist methods, such as textualism as a system for interpreting statutes”). Cf. Richard H. Pildes, *Forms of Formalism*, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 620 (1999) (“Rule-following in the sense of textual literalism was indeed an aspect of classical formalism—as it is likely to be of any body of American legal thought—but it was a marginal concern. Formalism was a project of rationalizing the central principles and methods of the common law”).

⁵⁶ Molot, *The Rise and Fall of Textualism*, *supra* note 44, at 12.

⁵⁷ POSNER, *THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE*, *supra* note 50, at 15.

⁵⁸ Thomas C. Grey, *Langdell’s Orthodoxy*, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1983). See also Richard A. Posner, *Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution*, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1987) (defining formalism in contrast to other scholars as “the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from premises accepted as authoritative”).

⁵⁹ See Lon L. Fuller, *A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel*, 3 NAT. L. F. 83, 84 (1958) (“It is an acceptance of the possibility of ‘discovery’ in the moral realm that seems to me to distinguish all the theories of natural law from opposing views.”); Pildes, *supra* note 55, at 608–09 (“To the classical formalists, law . . . meant a scientific system of rules and institutions that were *complete* in that the system made right answers available in all cases; *formal* in that right answers could be derived from the autonomous, logical working out of the system; *conceptually ordered* in that ground-level rules could all be derived from a few fundamental principles; and socially *acceptable* in that the legal system generated normative allegiance.”).

⁶⁰ See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, *THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES* 2 (1978) (arguing that in the 19th century, “law was conceived of as a mystical body of permanent truths, and the judge was seen as one who declared what those truths were and made them intelligible—as an oracle who ‘found’ and interpreted the law”).

⁶¹ Molot, *The Rise and Fall of Textualism*, *supra* note 44, at 12.

⁶² *Id.*

⁶³ See, e.g., Frank E. Horack, Jr., *In the Name of Legislative Intention*, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 119, 119 (1932) (“Jeffersonian conceptions of individual freedom and equality have kept alive the doctrine that our government is one of laws and not of man. In this idea there is safety, for if law is justice and judicial opinions are produced, cellophane wrapped, by some monotonously automatic process which man cannot disturb, then man lives ‘*non sub homine sed sub deo et lege*’ [not under man, but under God and law], and is free from mortal tyranny.”). See also Molot, *The Rise and Fall of Textualism*, *supra* note 44, at 12 (“The rise of formalism and heightened confidence in the constraining force of natural law principles enabled the federal courts to be very aggressive in their search for legal meaning and yet to be relatively unconcerned about exceeding their constitutional role or interfering with legislative supremacy.”).

would not have been necessary “if the original had been correctly stated.”⁶⁴ As a result, a prevalent view in the 19th century was that the judge merely said “what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he had known.”⁶⁵

20th Century: Rise of Legal Realism

Critically, then, the legitimacy of the theories that primarily governed early American jurisprudence hinged on the belief that a judge could divine the law by focusing on general principles of justice or logic.⁶⁶ As the school of legal realism gained traction in the early 20th century, however, legal scholars began to question these assumptions and called for judges to more self-consciously justify the legitimacy of their rulings.⁶⁷ The early legal realists sought to discover “how law ‘really’ operated,”⁶⁸ applying new insights from the fields of sociology and psychology to judicial decisionmaking.⁶⁹ Legal realism led to the widespread recognition that judges sometimes make law, rather than discover it.⁷⁰ As a result, judges more readily acknowledged that there were no “pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity”—or at least, that they could not divine those truths and invariably derive from them the proper conclusion in any given case.⁷¹ For legal realists, there is “no single right and accurate way of reading one case.”⁷² Accordingly, the need arose for judges to more openly justify the law that they announced in any given case.⁷³ Given the indeterminacy of the legal rules used in formalism, realists called for new rules they believed would better constrain judges and prevent arbitrary action.⁷⁴

⁶⁴ William H. Loyd, *The Equity of a Statute*, 58 U. PA. L. REV. 76, 77 n.8 (1909).

⁶⁵ Manning, *Textualism and the Equity of the Statute*, *supra* note 32, at 4 n.6 (quoting THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 133 (Sir David Ross trans., 1925)).

⁶⁶ See, e.g., Levi, *supra* note 39, at 501 (“The pretense [of legal reasoning] is that the law is a system of known rules applied by a judge . . .”).

⁶⁷ See generally Lon L. Fuller, *Reason and Fiat in Case Law*, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1946); Oliver Wendell Holmes, *The Theory of Legal Interpretation*, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899); Horack, *supra* note 63; Levi, *supra* note 39; Roscoe Pound, *Spurious Interpretation*, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1907); John Willis, *Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell*, 16 CAN. B. REV. 1 (1938). See, e.g., CARDOZO, *supra* note 36, at 41 (“The logic of [one] principle prevailed over the logic of the others. . . . The thing which really interests us, however, is why and how the choice was made between one logic and another. In this instance, the reason is not obscure. One path was followed . . . because of the conviction in the judicial mind that the one selected led to justice.”).

⁶⁸ Frederick Schauer, *The Limited Domain of the Law*, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1912 (2004).

⁶⁹ *Id.* at 1911, 1923.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., CARDOZO, *supra* note 36, at 128 (“Obscurity of statute . . . may leave the law unsettled, and cast a duty upon the courts to declare it retrospectively in the exercise of a power frankly legislative in function.”).

⁷¹ *Id.* at 22–23. See, e.g., *Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.*, 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If there were such a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in using their independent judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of law. The fallacy and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing to be found. Law . . . does not exist without some definite authority behind it.”).

⁷² Karl N. Llewellyn, *Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed*, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 395 (1950).

⁷³ See, e.g., Fuller, *Reason and Fiat in Case Law*, *supra* note 67, at 378.

⁷⁴ See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, *Legal Realism Now*, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 470–71 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, *LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960* (1986)).

Modern Jurisprudence: Responding to Legal Realism

In the field of statutory interpretation in particular, legal scholars and judges responded to legal realism in part by distinguishing the law-making role of the legislature from the law-interpreting role of the court.⁷⁵ In this realm especially, “law” was not some platonic ideal, but instead was the statute that Congress had passed.⁷⁶ Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously expressed this shift in prevailing legal theory when he stated, “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified.”⁷⁷

Judges noted that the Constitution itself restrained judicial discretion by designating Congress, not the courts, as the lawmaking branch.⁷⁸ Further, because Congress made the law, judges argued that they should restrain themselves to act “as merely the translator of another’s command.”⁷⁹ As Justice Frankfurter asserted: “In a democracy the legislative impulse and its expression should come from those popularly chosen to legislate, and equipped to devise policy, as courts are not.”⁸⁰ Rather than seeking to discover foundational principles of the law, as determined by judges, many legal theorists argued that courts should instead attempt “to discover the rule which the law-maker intended to establish; to discover the intention with which the law-maker made the rule, or the sense which he attached to the words wherein the rule is expressed.”⁸¹ To do otherwise was to risk attempting to make policy, usurping the legislative function.⁸² Today it is widely accepted that it is inappropriate for judges to prioritize their own policy views over the policy actually

⁷⁵ See, e.g., Horack, *supra* note 63, at 121 (“The problem of interpretation when applied in the field of government arises because the legislature makes the law and the courts apply it. And since the departmentalization of government, the task of applying generalized standards of conduct to particularized consequences makes even an honest difference of opinion inevitable.”).

⁷⁶ See, e.g., Levi, *supra* note 39, at 501, 520.

⁷⁷ *S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen*, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). As one scholar pointed out, the fact that statutes, in particular, were made through public, political processes meant that the law was “no longer the mysterious thing it was once.” Pound, *supra* note 67, at 384–85.

⁷⁸ See, e.g., HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1374 (arguing courts should “[r]espect the position of the legislature as the chief policy-determining agency of the society”); Manning, *Textualism and the Equity of the Statute*, *supra* note 32, at 57 (arguing “that the U.S. Constitution rejected English structural assumptions in ways that make the equity of the statute an inappropriate foundation for the ‘judicial Power of the United States’”). Cf. Steven P. Croley, *The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law*, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 693 (1995) (discussing the problem of “the countermajoritarian difficulty” proposed by Alexander Bickel, which notes the tension inherent in “the exercise of power possessed by judges neither placed in office by the majority nor directly accountable to the majority to invalidate majoritarian policies” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

⁷⁹ Frankfurter, *supra* note 8, at 534.

⁸⁰ *Id.* at 545. See, e.g., *Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press*, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should precede a determination of the limitations which should be set upon any property right in news or of the circumstances under which news gathered by a private agency should be deemed affected with a public interest.”).

⁸¹ Pound, *supra* note 67, at 381. As will be discussed in more detail, *infra* “Major Theories of Statutory Interpretation,” both purposivists and textualists pursue an objective legislative intent, rather than Congress’s *actual* intent.

⁸² See Frankfurter, *supra* note 8, at 533 (“[Courts] are confined by the nature and scope of the judicial function in its particular exercise in the field of interpretation. . . . [T]he function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature.”); Pound, *supra* note 67, at 382 (“[T]he object of spurious interpretation is to make, unmake, or remake, and not merely to discover. . . . It is essentially a legislative, not a judicial process. . . .”).

codified by the legislature.⁸³ This general view undergirds both modern purposivism and modern textualism.⁸⁴

Not all legal scholars and judges, however, reacted to legal realism by adopting a view of legislative supremacy in statutory interpretation. Some others argued instead that if judges make law, they should openly embrace this role and seek to make good law.⁸⁵ This school of thought, which continues today, points out that the Constitution has granted to judges the power of interpretation and argues that the constitutional duty of interpretation entails a meaningful duty to shape the law.⁸⁶ For example, one legal scholar has claimed that the Constitution purposefully “divorces statutory interpretation (given to the executive and the courts in articles II and III) from statutory enactment (by Congress under article I),” in order to ensure “that statutes will evolve because the perspective of the interpreter will be different from that of the legislator.”⁸⁷

At least one commentator has characterized this theory of “pragmatic dynamism”⁸⁸ as a revival of the natural law tradition of equitable interpretation.⁸⁹ Judge Guido Calabresi, while a professor at

⁸³ See, e.g., *Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t*, 576 U.S. 446, 464–65 (2015) (rejecting certain arguments regarding statutory meaning as “more appropriately addressed to Congress,” citing “rule of law values” (quoting *Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.*, 573 U.S. 258, 27 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)); *Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.*, 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014) (“[C]ourts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment[.]”). See generally, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, *Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation*, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593–94 (1995).

⁸⁴ See, e.g., HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1194 (arguing the principle of institutional settlement “obviously, forbids a court to substitute its own ideas for what the legislature has duly enacted”); Antonin Scalia, *Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws*, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“It is simply not compatible with democratic theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, and that unelected judges decide what that is.”). See also, e.g., Manning, *Textualism and Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 16, at 430 n.34 (“Textualists implicitly build on the influential work of legal realist Max Radin.”).

⁸⁵ See, e.g., Fuller, *A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel*, *supra* note 59, at 84 (rejecting “the notion that there is a ‘higher law’ transcending the concerns of this life” but defending the “one central aim common to all the schools of natural law, that of discovering those principles of social order which will enable men to attain a satisfactory life in common” through a collaborative process to establish these shared purposes).

⁸⁶ E.g., CARDOZO, *supra* note 36, at 133 (“[T]he judge is under a duty, within the limits of his power of innovation, to maintain a relation between law and morals”); *id.* at 135 (“You may say that there is no assurance that judges will interpret the *mores* of their day more wisely and truly than other men. . . . [This] is quite beside the point. The point is rather that this power of interpretation must be lodged somewhere, and the custom of the constitution has lodged it in the judges.”).

⁸⁷ WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., *DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION* 58 (1994). Eskridge argued that this conception of the Constitution is consistent with the framers’ intentions, claiming that they believed “in the productivity of evolving interpretation to meet new circumstances.” *Id.* at 117. But see Manning, *Textualism and the Equity of the Statute*, *supra* note 32, at 82 (“I believe that, properly understood, *The Federalist* in fact contradicts the assumptions underlying the equity of the statute.”). In turn, Eskridge responded to Manning’s article in *All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806*, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 994 (2001).

⁸⁸ ESKRIDGE, *supra* note 87, at 50. Eskridge argued that a statute’s meaning only becomes clear through application, and that this application “engenders dynamic interpretations”: “When successive applications of the statute occur in contexts not anticipated by its authors, the statute’s meaning evolves *beyond* original expectations. Indeed, sometimes subsequent applications reveal that factual or legal assumptions of the original statute have become (or were originally) erroneous; then the statute’s meaning often evolves *against* its original expectations.” *Id.* at 49.

In taking a dynamic approach to statutory meaning, pragmatists believe that the meaning of a statute evolves over time. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, *supra* note 87, at 50; *Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind.*, 853 F.3d 339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J., concurring). Other judges, however, including many purposivists and textualists, subscribe to a more static view of statutory meaning, looking instead to the text’s original meaning at the time of enactment. See, e.g., Carlos E. Gonzalez, *Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation*, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 626 (1996). Although this temporal distinction is an important part of some interpretive theories, this report does not discuss the issue further.

⁸⁹ See Manning, *Textualism and the Equity of the Statute*, *supra* note 32, at 81. See also *United States v. Marshall*, 908

Yale Law School, argued that judges should take an active role in determining whether statutes are “out of phase with the whole legal framework,”⁹⁰ and should have “the authority to treat statutes as if they were no more and no less than part of the common law.”⁹¹ Former federal judge Richard Posner, another pragmatist,⁹² has similarly argued that judges should take into account their “intuitions” or “preconceptions,”⁹³ and look to the practical consequences of their decisions in determining how to read a statute.⁹⁴

Major Theories of Statutory Interpretation

The two predominant theories of statutory interpretation today are purposivism and textualism—although, as explored below,⁹⁵ some have argued that the two theories are converging.⁹⁶ As previously discussed, both theories share the same general goal of faithfully interpreting statutes enacted by Congress.⁹⁷ This goal is grounded in the belief that the Constitution makes Congress the supreme legislator and that statutory interpretation should respect this legislative supremacy.⁹⁸ Interpretive problems arise, however, when courts attempt to determine how Congress meant to resolve the particular situation before the court.⁹⁹ The *actual* intent of the legislature that passed a

F.2d 1312, 1335–36 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that an “irrational” statutory sentencing scheme highlights “the disagreement between the severely positivistic view that the content of law is exhausted in clear, explicit, and definite enactments by or under express delegation from legislatures, and the natural lawyer’s or legal pragmatist’s view that the practice of interpretation and the general terms of the Constitution (such as ‘equal protection of the laws’) authorize judges to enrich positive law with the moral values and practical concerns of civilized society”).

⁹⁰ GUIDO CALABRESI, *A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES* 164 (1982).

⁹¹ *Id.* at 2. Judge Calabresi also pioneered the field of law and economics, later taken up by (among others) Judge Richard Posner. Richard A. Posner, *The Economic Approach to Law*, 53 *TEX. L. REV.* 757, 759 (1975). Law and economics seeks to apply the fundamental insights of economics to analyze law. *E.g.*, POSNER, *THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE*, *supra* note 50, at 353 (“The basic assumption of economics that guides the . . . economic analysis of law . . . is that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions . . .”).

⁹² *See, e.g.*, RICHARD A. POSNER, *THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY* 241 (1999) (defining “pragmatic adjudication” to include judges who “always try to do the best they can do for the present and the future, unchecked by any felt *duty* to secure consistency in principle with what other officials have done in the past” (quotation mark omitted)). *See also id.* (contrasting pragmatic judges with “legal positivist[s]” who believe “that the law is a system of rules laid down by legislatures and merely applied by judges”).

⁹³ POSNER, *THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE*, *supra* note 50, at 124–25.

⁹⁴ *Id.* at 460 (“The essence of interpretive decision making is considering the consequences of alternative decisions.”); *id.* at 462 (arguing that “legal advocates” should emphasize facts and policy and that “judges should at long last abandon . . . formalist adjudication”).

⁹⁵ *Infra* “A Convergence of Theories?”

⁹⁶ There are a variety of ways to characterize various approaches to the law. *See, e.g.*, Guido Calabresi, *An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the Allocation of Body Parts*, 55 *STAN. L. REV.* 2113 (2003) (categorizing schools of law on the basis of whether and how they incorporate nonlegal disciplines).

⁹⁷ *See supra* notes 42 to 48 and accompanying text.

⁹⁸ Manning, *Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 42, at 2413, 2425.

⁹⁹ *See supra* notes 8 to 17 and accompanying text.

given statute is usually unknowable with respect to the precise situation presented to the court.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, purposivists and textualists instead seek to construct an objective intent.¹⁰¹

Purposivists and textualists disagree about the best way to determine this objective intent and about the focus of the objective construct. Purposivists ask what a reasonable legislator would have been trying to achieve by enacting the disputed statute,¹⁰² while textualists ask what a reasonable English speaker would convey with the disputed words.¹⁰³ This disagreement is based in large part on distinct views of the institutional competence of the courts.¹⁰⁴ The concept of “institutional competence” assumes that each branch of government “has a special competence or expertise, and the key to good government is not just figuring out what is the best policy, but figuring out which institutions should be making which decisions and how all the institutions should interrelate.”¹⁰⁵ “[T]he rules of [statutory] interpretation allocate lawmaking power among the branches of government, and those rules should reflect and respect what, if anything, the Constitution has to say about that allocation.”¹⁰⁶

Consequently, because purposivists and textualists have different views of how judges can best act to advance the will of the legislature, they advocate different modes of interpretation¹⁰⁷ and may turn to different tools for evidence of Congress’s objective intent.¹⁰⁸ Although some jurists have argued that textualism has “won” the statutory interpretation debate¹⁰⁹—Justice Kagan declared in 2015 that “we’re all textualists now”¹¹⁰—critical distinctions in judges’ interpretive theories arguably remain, as discussed below.

¹⁰⁰ Manning, *Inside Congress’s Mind*, *supra* note 31, at 1912–13. *See also, e.g.*, Hand, *supra* note 51, at 106 (“[Often, t]he men who used the language did not have any intent at all about the case that has come up; it had not occurred to their minds. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to know what they would have said about it, if it had.”); Manning, *Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 42, at 2406 (“Since Congress is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it,’ . . . such intent does not exist as a fact in the world, simply waiting to be found.” (quoting Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Congress Is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron*, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992))).

¹⁰¹ *See, e.g.*, Manning, *Inside Congress’s Mind*, *supra* note 31, at 1913–14. *Cf.* Caleb Nelson, *What is Textualism?*, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 348 (2005) (arguing that both theories use evidence of “the subjective intent of the enacting legislature” to “construct their sense of objective meaning”).

¹⁰² *See* HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1148.

¹⁰³ *See* Frank H. Easterbrook, *The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction*, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988); Manning, *Textualism and the Equity of the Statute*, *supra* note 32, at 109; Scalia, *supra* note 84, at 17.

¹⁰⁴ *E.g.*, Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, *supra* note 23, at 91.

¹⁰⁵ William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, *An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process*, in HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at lx.

¹⁰⁶ Manning, *Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 42, at 2413 (describing the concept of institutional settlement pioneered by Hart & Sacks); *see also* HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 4–5 (defining “the principle of institutional settlement” as expressing “the judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures . . . ought to be accepted as binding” and arguing that “the effect to be given” to any particular settlement of a dispute, whether it was decided through a statute or a judicial decision, should be evaluated in light of the procedure that created that settlement).

¹⁰⁷ *See* Manning, *Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 42, at 2425–27.

¹⁰⁸ *See, e.g.*, Molot, *The Rise and Fall of Textualism*, *supra* note 44, at 26.

¹⁰⁹ *Cf., e.g.*, Jonathan R. Siegel, *The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism*, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 119–20 (2009) (discussing this idea, but ultimately disagreeing that the two methods have converged).

¹¹⁰ Elena Kagan, *The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes* at 8:28 (Nov. 17, 2015), <http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation/>; *cf., e.g.*, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, *Statutes in Common Law Courts*, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479, 480 (2013) (“The dust from the Thirty Years’ statutory interpretation wars may have settled and, while textualism has not won an unconditional surrender in the Supreme Court, it appears to have gained substantial territory before its truce with purposivism.”); *West Virginia v. EPA*, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2641 (2022) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (saying her prior remarks appeared to be “wrong” and

Purposivism

Purposivists argue “that legislation is a purposive act, and judges should construe statutes to execute that legislative purpose.”¹¹¹ Purposivists often focus on the legislative process, taking into account the problem that Congress was trying to solve by enacting the disputed law and asking how the statute accomplished that goal.¹¹² They argue that courts should interpret ambiguous text “in a way that is faithful to Congress’s purposes.”¹¹³ Two preeminent purposivists from the mid-20th century, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, advocated the “benevolent presumption . . . that the legislature is made up of reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”¹¹⁴ But there was a caveat to this presumption: it should not hold if “the contrary is made unmistakably to appear” in the text of the statute.¹¹⁵

Purposivists believe that judges can best observe legislative supremacy by paying attention to the legislative process.¹¹⁶ The Constitution “charges Congress, the people’s branch of representatives, with enacting laws,”¹¹⁷ and accordingly, purposivists contend that courts should look to “how Congress actually works.”¹¹⁸ As such, they argue that to preserve the “integrity of legislation,” judges should pay attention to “how Congress makes its purposes known, through text and reliable accompanying materials constituting legislative history.”¹¹⁹ Courts should take into consideration any “institutional device that facilitates compromise and helps develop the consensus needed to pass important legislation.”¹²⁰ As one purposivist judge said, “[w]hen courts construe statutes in ways that respect what legislators consider their work product, the judiciary

asserting that “[t]he current Court is textualist only when being so suits it”).

¹¹¹ ROBERT A. KATZMANN, *JUDGING STATUTES* 31 (2014). Academics sometimes distinguish between “purpose” and “intent,” most frequently using “purpose” to mean the objective intent that is the goal of new purposivism, and “intent” to mean the legislature’s *actual* intent, which was the goal of the old “intentionalism.” *See, e.g.*, Siegel, *supra* note 109, at 123–24. However, courts generally use the two words interchangeably, and this report follows suit. *See* MIKVA & LANE, *supra* note 9, at 107; *see, e.g.*, Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424–25 (1985) (referring both to “congressional intent” and “congressional purpose”).

¹¹² *E.g.* HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1148.

¹¹³ KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 31.

¹¹⁴ HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1148. *See also* Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 854 (“Given this statutory background, what would a reasonable human being intend this specific language to accomplish?” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¹¹⁵ HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1125.

¹¹⁶ *See* Manning, *Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 42, at 2425, 2426 (describing purposivism as a belief that “the judiciary respect[s] legislative supremacy by implementing the apparent legislative plan of action,” or by “supplying sensible means of carrying out legislative policies that Congress cannot possibly spell out completely in a world of great and ever-changing complexity”). *See also, e.g.*, Rebecca M. Kysar, *Interpreting by the Rules*, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1167 (2021) (exploring “ways in which taking [congressional] procedure seriously” can strengthen a judge’s role “as a faithful agent of the legislature”).

¹¹⁷ KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 4.

¹¹⁸ Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 858. As one textbook pithily asks, “Shouldn’t it make a normative difference that a statute was enacted by legislators seeking to solve a social problem in the face of disagreement, and not by a drunken mob of legislators with no apparent purpose or who had agreed to adopt any bill chosen by a throw of the dice?” ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 243.

¹¹⁹ KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 4.

¹²⁰ Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 860 (arguing that if legislators knew courts would not consider the legislative history that legislators considered critical to determining the meaning of a statute, the relevant policymakers “might not have agreed on the legislation”).

not only is more likely to reach the correct result, but also promotes comity with the first branch of government.”¹²¹

To discover what a reasonable legislator was trying to achieve,¹²² purposivists rely on the statute’s “policy context,” looking for “evidence that goes to the way a reasonable person conversant with the circumstances underlying enactment would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.”¹²³ Purposivists are more willing than textualists to consider legislative history.¹²⁴ Arguably, the core of purposivism is “reasoning by example” and asking whether various specific applications of the statute further its general purpose.¹²⁵ As a result, purposivists maintain that courts should first ask what problem Congress was trying to solve,¹²⁶ and then ask whether the suggested interpretation fits into that purpose.¹²⁷ Hart and Sacks suggested that judges should seek “to achieve consistency of solution . . . to make the results in the particular cases respond to . . . some general objective or purpose to be attributed to the statute.”¹²⁸ Judges should look for interpretations that promote “coherence and workability.”¹²⁹

Detractors argue that it is likely impossible to find one shared intention behind any given piece of legislation, and that it is inappropriate for judges to endeavor to find legislative purpose.¹³⁰ Such critics claim that judges are not well-equipped to understand how complex congressional processes bear on the law finally enacted by Congress—not least because the records of that process, in the form of legislative history, are often internally contradictory and otherwise

¹²¹ KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 36.

¹²² See HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1148.

¹²³ Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, *supra* note 23, at 91. See also Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 853–54 (“Sometimes [a court] can simply look to the surrounding language in the statute or to the entire statutory scheme and ask, ‘Given this statutory background, what would a reasonable human being intend this specific language to accomplish?’ Often this question has only one good answer, but sometimes the surrounding statutory language and the ‘reasonable human purpose’ test cannot answer the question. In such situations, legislative history may provide a clear and helpful resolution.”).

¹²⁴ See, e.g., Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 854; KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 35. See also discussion *infra* “Legislative History.”

¹²⁵ See Levi, *supra* note 39, at 501, 504–05. See also HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1119–20, 1378–79; MIKVA & LANE, *supra* note 9, at 111. Cf. Richard A. Posner, *Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom*, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“I suggest that the task for the judge called upon to interpret a statute is best described as one of imaginative reconstruction. The judge should try to think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.”). Posner distinguishes his own suggestion from the approach of Hart and Sacks by arguing the judge should attempt to take into account the actual compromises struck. *Id.* at 819–20.

¹²⁶ See, e.g., *United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber*, 443 U.S. 193, 201–08 (1979) (evaluating legislative history to determine “Congress’ primary concern in enacting” the disputed statute and refusing to adopt an interpretation that would “bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute” (quoting *United States v. Public Utils. Comm’n*, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 864–65 (noting difficulties of ascribing an “intent” to Congress, but concluding that it is possible).

¹²⁷ See, e.g., *Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.*, 566 U.S. 624, 632 (2012) (noting that a particular interpretation would undermine the purpose of a statute by imposing liability on “the very class for whose benefit [a particular statute] was enacted,” “provid[ing] strong indication that something in [that] interpretation is amiss”).

¹²⁸ HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1119.

¹²⁹ See Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 847. See also, e.g., *Cortez Byrd Chips v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co.*, 529 U.S. 193, 198–203 (2000) (concluding that “enlightenment” as to a statute’s meaning would “not come merely from parsing the language,” and looking to statutory history to avoid a reading that would be “at odds” with the law’s policy and “would create anomalous results”).

¹³⁰ See, e.g., Manning, *Textualism and Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 16, at 430.

unreliable.¹³¹ Opponents of purposivism also sometimes argue that the theory is too easily manipulable, allowing the purposivist to ignore the text and “achieve what he believes to be the provision’s purpose.”¹³²

Textualism

In contrast to purposivists, textualists focus on the words of a statute, emphasizing text over any unstated purpose.¹³³ Textualists argue courts should “read the words of that [statutory] text as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read them.”¹³⁴ They look for the meaning “that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the *corpus juris* [the body of law].”¹³⁵ Modern textualists therefore are more focused on how an ordinary (albeit well-educated) person would read the law, rather than on the legislators who wrote the law.¹³⁶ Textualists care about statutory purpose only to the extent that it is evident from the text.¹³⁷ Accordingly, textualists “look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words.”¹³⁸

Textualists believe that “judges best respect[] legislative supremacy” when they follow rules that prioritize the statutory text.¹³⁹ For textualists, focusing on the text alone and adopting the “presumption that Congress ‘means . . . what it says’ enables Congress to draw its lines reliably—without risking that a court will treat an awkward, strange, behind-the-scenes compromise as a legislative error or oversight.”¹⁴⁰ As Judge Frank Easterbrook stated, “[s]tatutes are not exercises in private language,” but are “public documents, negotiated and approved by many parties.”¹⁴¹ Textualism focuses on the words of a statute because it is that text that survived these political processes and was duly enacted by Congress, exercising its constitutional power to legislate.¹⁴²

¹³¹ See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 20–21, 376–78. But see, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, *Fixing Statutory Interpretation*, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2122 (2016) (reviewing KATZMANN, *supra* note 111) (agreeing, as textualist judge, that it is important for judges to understand the legislative process).

¹³² SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 18.

¹³³ E.g., George H. Taylor, *Structural Textualism*, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 327 (1995). See also, e.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (“If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.”); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624, 637 (2012) (“Vague notions of statutory purpose provide no warrant for expanding [the disputed statutory] prohibition beyond the field to which it is unambiguously limited . . .”).

¹³⁴ Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

¹³⁵ Scalia, *supra* note 84, at 17.

¹³⁶ See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, *Congressional Insiders and Outsiders*, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193, 2194 (2017).

¹³⁷ E.g. SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 33.

¹³⁸ Easterbrook, *The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction*, *supra* note 103, at 65. Cf. Holmes, *supra* note 67, at 417–18 (“[W]e ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used, and it is to the end of answering this last question that we let in evidence as to what the circumstances were.”).

¹³⁹ See Manning, *Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 42, at 2426–27.

¹⁴⁰ *Id.* at 2427 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)). See also SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 39 (arguing legal instruments should not always be construed to make sense because “often,” imperfect legal drafting “is the consequence of a compromise that it is not the function of the courts to upset”).

¹⁴¹ Easterbrook, *The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction*, *supra* note 103, at 60.

¹⁴² See, e.g., Scalia, *supra* note 84, at 17 (“[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”). See also Manning, *Textualism and Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 16, at 445 (“[F]or textualists, any attempt to overlay coherence on a statutory text that otherwise seems to have problems of fit unacceptably threatens to undermine the bargaining process that produced it.”).

Textualists have argued that focusing on “genuine but unexpressed legislative intent” invites the danger that judges “will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires”¹⁴³ and, accordingly, encroach into the legislative function by making, rather than interpreting, statutory law.¹⁴⁴

To discover what a reasonable English-speaker would think a statute’s text means, textualists look for evidence of the statute’s “semantic context,” seeking “evidence about the way a reasonable person conversant with relevant social and linguistic practices would have used the words.”¹⁴⁵ Many textualists decline to use legislative history under most circumstances.¹⁴⁶ Instead, textualist judges generally seek to discover “the shared conventions” that are inherent in the statutory language,¹⁴⁷ asking what “assumptions [were] shared by the speakers and the intended audience.”¹⁴⁸ As evidence of these shared assumptions, textualists might turn to rules of grammar, or to the so-called “canons of construction” that “reflect broader conventions of language use, common in society at large at the time the statute was enacted.”¹⁴⁹

Critics of textualism argue that the theory is an overly formalistic approach to determining the meaning of statutory text that ignores the fact that courts have been delegated interpretive authority under the Constitution.¹⁵⁰ Critics further claim that the theory of legislative supremacy requires courts to seek the meaning that Congress intended to convey.¹⁵¹ Opponents of textualism sometimes claim that Congress legislates with this background understanding, expecting courts to pay attention to legislative processes and the law’s purpose when applying it to specific circumstances.¹⁵² As a result, textualism’s detractors argue that considering evidence of a statute’s purpose can be more constraining on a judge than merely considering the text, divorced from evidence of legislative intent.¹⁵³

¹⁴³ Scalia, *supra* note 84, at 17–18. See also Molot, *The Rise and Fall of Textualism*, *supra* note 44, at 25–26 (examining parallels between textualism and legal realism).

¹⁴⁴ See, e.g., Easterbrook, *supra* note 138, at 62 (“The use of original *intent* rather than an objective inquiry into the reasonable import of the language permits a series of moves. Each move greatly increases the discretion, and therefore the power, of the court.”).

¹⁴⁵ Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, *supra* note 23, at 91. See also SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 33 (endorsing the “fair reading” method of statutory interpretation, which gathers purpose “only from the text itself, consistently with the other aspects of its context,” and defining this context to include “textual purpose” along with “(1) a word’s historical associations acquired from recurrent patterns of past usage, and (2) a word’s immediate syntactic setting—that is, the words that surround it in a specific utterance”). Cf. Frankfurter, *supra* note 8, at 533 (“And so the bottom problem is: What is below the surface of the words and yet fairly a part of them?”).

¹⁴⁶ E.g., Manning, *Textualism and Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 16, at 420. But see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, *What Does Legislative History Tell Us?*, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 444 (1990) (“No degree of skepticism concerning the value of legislative history allows us to escape its use. Especially not when we know that laws have no ‘spirit,’ that they are complex compromises with limits and often with conflicting provisions, the proponents of which have discordant understandings. Legislative history shows the extent of agreement.”). For an explanation of when textualists might employ legislative history, see *infra* “Purposes for Using Legislative History.”

¹⁴⁷ Manning, *Textualism and Legislative Intent*, *supra* note 16, at 433.

¹⁴⁸ Easterbrook, *What Does Legislative History Tell Us?*, *supra* note 146, at 443.

¹⁴⁹ Nelson, *supra* note 101, at 383.

¹⁵⁰ See, e.g., *supra* note 87 and accompanying text.

¹⁵¹ See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, *Textualism’s Theoretical Bankruptcy and its Implication for Statutory Interpretation*, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1817, 1822 (2020).

¹⁵² See, e.g., KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 47–48.

¹⁵³ See, e.g., *id.* at 48; Seidenfeld, *supra* note 151, at 1841–43.

Purposivism vs. Textualism In Practice

A Clear Distinction

The distinctions between these two theories were illustrated in the Supreme Court case of *Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy*.¹⁵⁴ The case arose out of a suit in which a student’s parents had successfully sued a school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.¹⁵⁵ As relevant to the case, that Act provided that “a court ‘may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ to parents who prevail in an action brought under the Act.”¹⁵⁶ The parents sought to recover fees paid to an expert who had provided assistance throughout the proceedings.¹⁵⁷ The issue before the Court was whether the Act “authorized the compensation of *expert* fees.”¹⁵⁸

In a textualist opinion written by Justice Alito, the majority of the Court concluded that the Act did not authorize the compensation of expert fees.¹⁵⁹ Emphasizing that courts must “begin with the text” and “enforce [that text] according to its terms,”¹⁶⁰ the Court stated that the provision “provides for an award of ‘reasonable attorneys’ fees,’” without “even hint[ing]” that the award should also include expert fees.¹⁶¹ The majority opinion rejected the parents’ arguments that awarding expert fees would be consistent with the statute’s goals and its legislative history, “in the face of the [Act’s] unambiguous text.”¹⁶²

By contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion embodied a purposivist approach to interpreting the statute.¹⁶³ He concluded that the disputed term “costs” should be interpreted “to include the award of expert fees” for two reasons: “First, that is what Congress said it intended by the phrase. Second, that interpretation furthers the [Act’s] statutorily defined purposes.”¹⁶⁴ Justice Breyer relied on the bill’s legislative history and the Act’s “basic purpose”—to guarantee that children with disabilities receive quality public education—as primary evidence of the statute’s meaning.¹⁶⁵ He did not agree that the statute’s text was unambiguous.¹⁶⁶ Although he expressed that a literal reading of the provision would not authorize the costs sought by the parents, he concluded that this reading was “not inevitable.”¹⁶⁷ Instead, he believed that his reading, “while linguistically the less natural, is legislatively the more likely.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁵⁴ *Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy*, 548 U.S. 291 (2006).

¹⁵⁵ *Id.* at 294.

¹⁵⁶ *Id.* at 293 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)).

¹⁵⁷ *Id.* at 294.

¹⁵⁸ *Id.* at 295 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁹ *See id.* at 298.

¹⁶⁰ *Id.* at 296 (quoting *Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.*, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation mark omitted)).

¹⁶¹ *Id.* at 297 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)).

¹⁶² *Id.* at 303–04.

¹⁶³ *See id.* at 309 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

¹⁶⁴ *Id.*

¹⁶⁵ *Id.* at 312–13.

¹⁶⁶ *Id.* at 318.

¹⁶⁷ *Id.* at 319.

¹⁶⁸ *Id.*

A Convergence of Theories?

Many judges, however, do not necessarily identify as pure purposivists or textualists; or even if they do, in practice, they will often employ some elements from each theory.¹⁶⁹ Some scholars have argued that even the theoretical gap between these two theories is narrowing.¹⁷⁰ Most modern purposivists consider the statutory text to be both a starting point¹⁷¹ and an ultimate constraint.¹⁷² Given the broad consensus that a statute’s text is primary, some have asserted that textualism has prevailed over purposivism.¹⁷³ Nonetheless, most textualists will look past the plain text, standing alone, to discover the relevant context and determine what problem Congress was trying to address.¹⁷⁴ Courts accordingly continue to disagree about what types of context are fairly deemed inherent in that text¹⁷⁵ and about which interpretive tools may help discover the context that is necessary to understand the statute’s meaning.¹⁷⁶

One Supreme Court case issued in 2017 demonstrates the increasing similarities between the two factions, as well as the remaining distinctions. In *NLRB v. SW General, Inc.*, the Supreme Court considered whether the service of the Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board violated a statute that limits the ability of federal employees to serve as “acting officers.”¹⁷⁷ The majority and dissenting opinions both began their analysis of the statute with its text before

¹⁶⁹ See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, *Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals*, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1302 (2018) (describing predominant approach among federal appellate judges as “intentional eclecticism”). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, *Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning*, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321–22 (1990) (“Many commentators argue that judicial interpretation is, or at least ought to be, inspired by grand theory. We think these commentators are wrong, both descriptively and normatively: Judges’ approaches to statutory interpretation are generally eclectic, not inspired by any grand theory, and this is a good methodology.”).

¹⁷⁰ See Molot, *The Rise and Fall of Textualism*, *supra* note 44, at 3 (“Given that nonadherents and adherents of textualism alike place great weight on statutory text and look beyond text to context, it is hard to tell what remains of the textualism-purposivism debate.”); Nelson, *supra* note 101, at 348 (“[J]udges whom we think of as textualists construct their sense of objective meaning from what the evidence that they are willing to consider tells them about the subjective intent of the enacting legislature. Many textualists do impose more restrictions than the typical intentionalist on the evidence of intent that they are willing to consider, but those restrictions need not reflect any fundamental disagreement about the goals of interpretation.”); Lawrence M. Solan, *The New Textualists’ New Text*, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2028 (2005) (“Gone largely unnoticed in the battles between these camps during the past quarter century is the fact that both sides in the debate agree upon almost everything when it comes to statutory interpretation.”).

¹⁷¹ See, e.g., KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 4.

¹⁷² See, e.g., HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1374 (arguing judges should not give the words of a statute either “a meaning they will not bear, or . . . a meaning which would violate any established policy of clear statement”); *id.* at 1375 (noting words “limit[] the particular meanings that can properly be attributed” to the statute).

¹⁷³ See, e.g., Jimmy Hoover, *Justice Breyer’s Statutory Interpretation Swan Song?*, LAW360 (Apr. 4, 2022), https://www.law360.com/publicpolicy/articles/1480811/justice-breyer-s-statutory-interpretation-swan-song-?nl_pk=77a8fbcd-0ce9-4d0f-a0ac-3a4c7fd100a8.

¹⁷⁴ See, e.g., Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, *supra* note 23, at 84 (“Because speakers use language purposively, textualists recognize that the relevant context for a statutory text includes the mischiefs the authors were addressing.”). See also, e.g., *McGirt v. Oklahoma*, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2464 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.) (referring to “Congress’s expressed policy” apparently obvious from the text of the statute).

¹⁷⁵ See, e.g., Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, *supra* note 23, at 91. Cf. Frankfurter, *supra* note 8, at 533 (“And so the bottom problem is: What is below the surface of the words and yet fairly a part of them?”).

¹⁷⁶ See, e.g., John F. Manning, *Legal Realism & the Canons’ Revival*, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 283, 285 (2002).

¹⁷⁷ *NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 929, 935 (2017). For more discussion of the substance of this case, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1840, *Help Wanted: Supreme Court Holds Vacancies Act Prohibits Nominees from Serving as Acting Officers*, by Valerie C. Brannon.

proceeding to consider many of the same sources to determine the meaning of the disputed statute.¹⁷⁸

The majority opinion in *SW General*, authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, principally represented a textualist point of view, although it also included some elements of purposivism.¹⁷⁹ In describing the facts of the case, the Chief Justice began with an explanation of the problem that Congress faced when it first enacted the disputed statute, and, in so doing, considered the original version of that statute and subsequent amendments intended to address continuing disputes over the ability of federal employees to serve as acting officers.¹⁸⁰ The Court’s analysis started with the statutory text, considering its meaning by looking to the ordinary meaning of the words, rules of grammar, and statutory context.¹⁸¹ The Court emphasized two “key words” in the disputed provision.¹⁸² The majority then noted that it did not need to consider the “extra-textual evidence” of “legislative history, purpose, and post-enactment practice” because the text was clear.¹⁸³ Nonetheless, the Court went on to evaluate and reject this evidence as “not compelling.”¹⁸⁴ Ultimately, the majority held that the acting officer’s service violated the relevant statute.¹⁸⁵

In dissent in *SW General*, Justice Sonia Sotomayor concluded that the “text, purpose, and history” of the statute suggested the opposite conclusion.¹⁸⁶ Like the majority opinion, the dissent began by considering the meaning of the text, and acknowledged that “taken in isolation,” certain words could support the majority’s reading.¹⁸⁷ However, Justice Sotomayor concluded that two textual canons of construction implied that the statute should be read differently in light of the full statutory context.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, while the dissenting opinion similarly considered “the events leading up to” the enactment of the relevant statute, Justice Sotomayor also placed some weight on the historical practice of the executive department *after* the passage of the statute.¹⁸⁹ The dissent used the provision’s legislative history to inform its understanding of the historical practice under the statute, in its earlier and current forms, and reached a different conclusion from the majority opinion.¹⁹⁰ As a result, the dissent represents a more purposivist view of the case, but one that still concentrated on the statutory text.¹⁹¹

As *SW General* illustrates, the particular tools a judge uses to discover evidence about the meaning of the statute, and the weight that the judge gives to that evidence, can influence the outcome of a case.¹⁹² In contrast to the opinions of Justices Alito and Breyer in *Arlington Central*

¹⁷⁸ See *SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. at 938; *id.* at 950 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

¹⁷⁹ See *The Supreme Court 2016 Term: Leading Case: NLRB v. SW General, Inc.*, 131 HARV. L. REV. 353, 353 (2017) (“[T]he Court relied on the ordinary meaning of the provision’s text over and against arguments from purpose, post-enactment practice, and even a semantic canon.”).

¹⁸⁰ *SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. at 935–36 (majority opinion).

¹⁸¹ *Id.* at 938–39.

¹⁸² *Id.* at 938.

¹⁸³ *Id.* at 941–42.

¹⁸⁴ *Id.* at 942.

¹⁸⁵ *Id.* at 944.

¹⁸⁶ *Id.* at 950 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

¹⁸⁷ See *id.* at 950.

¹⁸⁸ *Id.* at 950–52.

¹⁸⁹ *Id.* at 953–54.

¹⁹⁰ See *id.*

¹⁹¹ See *id.* at 950.

¹⁹² Compare *id.* at 938, 942 (majority opinion) (focusing primarily on two “key words” and rejecting “extra-textual

School District,¹⁹³ the two opinions in *SW General* considered many of the same interpretive tools, and the text of the statute was central to both opinions.¹⁹⁴ However, like the textualist majority opinion in *Arlington Central School District*,¹⁹⁵ the textualist majority opinion in *SW General* explained that legislative history is disfavored where the text is clear,¹⁹⁶ giving less weight to this tool than the dissenting opinion.¹⁹⁷ These cases demonstrate that if a judge’s theory of statutory interpretation counsels that some tools should be preferred over others,¹⁹⁸ that theory can change the way the judge resolves a particular dispute. A number of scholars have nonetheless argued that the divide between purposivism and textualism may not be so stark, in that the choice to use legislative history or the canons of construction may not always neatly track judges’ legal philosophies.¹⁹⁹

Empiricism and Refinement of the Theories

In theory, both purposivism and textualism seek the most objectively reasonable meaning of a statute, looking to the construct of an objective intent rather than attempting to discern Congress’s actual intent with respect to the question before the court.²⁰⁰ As two scholars argued in a 2017 article, the legal system often purposefully seeks “to replace real answers with fake ones.”²⁰¹ In this view, persistent disagreements about “real” answers such as actual legislative intent require the legal system to “helpfully” substitute “fake” answers “on which society (mostly) agrees.”²⁰² Objective intent qualifies as one of these “fake” answers, although as previously discussed, purposivists and textualists continue to disagree on the focus of objective intent. Accordingly, judges subscribing to these theories have justified their rulings by reference to specific, accepted tools of statutory interpretation that they claim helped constrain judges to appropriately defined legislative intent.²⁰³

Because the objective intent sought by both purposivists and textualists is a construct, it is open to attack on the basis that it does not reflect actual meaning. Some legal scholars have conducted empirical research to examine additional means of identifying intent and legal meaning.²⁰⁴

evidence”); *with id.* at 954 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority’s position “disregards the *full* text of the [relevant act] and finds no support in its *purpose or history*”) (emphasis added).

¹⁹³ *Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy*, 548 U.S. 291 (2006); *see supra* “A Clear Distinction.”

¹⁹⁴ *See SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. at 938 (majority opinion); *id.* at 950 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

¹⁹⁵ 548 U.S. at 304 (“Under these circumstances, where everything other than the legislative history overwhelmingly suggests that expert fees may not be recovered, the legislative history is simply not enough.”).

¹⁹⁶ *SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. at 942 (“The text is clear, so we need not consider this extra-textual evidence.”).

¹⁹⁷ *See id.* at 953 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

¹⁹⁸ *See, e.g.,* Molot, *The Rise and Fall of Textualism*, *supra* note 44, at 3–4 (noting differences in types of “context” considered by textualists and purposivists).

¹⁹⁹ *See, e.g.,* Gluck & Posner, *supra* note 169, at 1310–11; Anita S. Krishnakumar, *Reconsidering Substantive Canons*, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 891 (2017); John F. Manning, *The New Purposivism*, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 146–47 (2011); Nina Mendelson, *Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade*, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71, 100 (2018).

²⁰⁰ *See, e.g.,* Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, *supra* note 23, at 91. *See also discussion supra* “Major Theories of Statutory Interpretation.”

²⁰¹ Baude & Sachs, *supra* note 33, at 1096.

²⁰² *Id.*

²⁰³ *Supra* “20th Century: Rise of Legal Realism” and “Modern Jurisprudence: Responding to Legal Realism.”

²⁰⁴ *See, e.g.,* Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, *Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I*, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 907 (2013); Stephen C. Mouritsen, *Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning*, 13 COLUM. SCI. &

Scholars assessing tools of statutory interpretation have attempted to discern, for example, whether judges’ conceptions of ordinary meaning in fact align with how people usually use language and whether judges’ use of legislative history reflects a proper understanding of how a bill is passed.

Thus, for example, purposivists seek to ascribe legal meaning to texts, in part, by drawing on the legislative context in which statutes were enacted. To discover this context, they may look to legislative history such as committee reports but may also rely on other traditional tools of interpretation. As discussed in more detail below, some scholars have looked to evidence about how Congress actually operates in order to criticize—or support—existing uses of legislative history and the canons of construction.²⁰⁵ This scholarship, once termed “process-based theories” by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, seems to draw from purposivism while also challenging some judges’ use of particular tools.²⁰⁶

In comparison, textualists seek to determine the most objectively reasonable meaning of the words of a statute by asking how a reasonable English speaker would understand what is being conveyed. Some scholars have used empirical research to evaluate textualism’s assumptions about how people ordinarily use language, suggesting refinements in the tools used to assess ordinary meaning as well as the canons of construction.²⁰⁷

It remains to be seen how useful judges who focus on *objective* intent will consider tools that arguably go to *actual* meaning.²⁰⁸ Nonetheless, as discussed below, a number of judges have cited empirical studies to refine their statutory analyses, either to replace or supplement their traditional methods of discerning legislative intent. Further, at least one scholar has stated that some sources described as empirical in nature are still filtered through statutory context and legal interpretation, preventing those sources “from transforming legal interpretation into an empirical science.”²⁰⁹

Tools of Statutory Interpretation

Judges use a variety of tools to help them interpret statutes, most frequently relying on five types of interpretive tools: ordinary meaning, statutory context, canons of construction, legislative history, and evidence of the way a statute is implemented.²¹⁰

TECH. L. REV. 156, 164 (2011).

²⁰⁵ See, e.g., Jesse M. Cross, *Legislative History in the Modern Congress*, 57 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91, 95 (2020); Gluck & Bressman, *supra* note 204, at 905.

²⁰⁶ Barrett, *supra* note 136, at 2194.

²⁰⁷ See, e.g., Mouritsen, *Hard Cases and Hard Data*, *supra* note 204, at 164; Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum & Victoria Nourse, *Statutory Interpretation from the Outside*, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 221–23 (2022).

²⁰⁸ See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, *Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law*, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (2017) (arguing relying on a judge’s intuition about a word’s ordinary meaning is more appropriate than the frequency analysis involved in consulting corpus linguistics); Manning, *Inside Congress’s Mind*, *supra* note 31, at 1916 (arguing that studies about legislative drafting practices do not undermine “the intent skepticism that has framed so much of the discussion about how to read statutes”).

²⁰⁹ Brian G. Slocum, *Big Data and Accuracy in Statutory Interpretation*, 86 BROOKLYN L. REV. 357, 361 (2021).

²¹⁰ In addition to the tools discussed below, courts also rely on judicial precedent; that is, if another case has previously interpreted a particular statutory provision, a judge may afford that prior interpretation some significance. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, *Reconsidering Substantive Canons*, *supra* note 199, at 887 (“Supreme Court precedent and practical consequences . . . stand out as the two most frequently referenced alternate interpretive resources [in Supreme Court opinions decided between 2006 and 2012, other than text or plain meaning].”). However, this process of reasoning is more or less similar to the way courts normally resolve cases. This report focuses on judicial tools specifically used to interpret statutes, and accordingly, does not discuss this use of judicial precedent. Nonetheless, it is important to note

These tools often overlap. For example, a judge might use evidence of an agency’s implementation of a statute to support her own understanding of a word’s ordinary meaning.²¹¹ Further, basic principles about understanding statutory context are sometimes described as canons of construction.²¹²

Some theories of statutory interpretation counsel that certain tools are generally disfavored; for example, textualism teaches that judges should only rarely look to legislative history.²¹³ Consequently, a judge’s interpretive theory might influence which tools she uses. Different judges, then, might unearth different evidence about the meaning of a particular statute,²¹⁴ and even if they find the same evidence, they might consider it in different ways.²¹⁵ However, in practice, judges will often draw on whatever tools provide useful evidence of the meaning of the statute before them.

Ordinary Meaning

Courts often begin by looking for the “ordinary” or “plain” meaning of the statutory text.²¹⁶ Where a term is not expressly defined in the statute,²¹⁷ courts generally assume “that Congress uses common words in their popular meaning, as used in the common speech of men.”²¹⁸ Thus, for example, in the context of a case that raised the question of what it meant to “use” a gun, Justice Scalia stated the following in a dissenting opinion:

To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose. When someone asks, “Do you use a cane?,” he is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know whether

that judges sometimes adopt a “super-strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents,” meaning that they will be even more likely to adhere to a prior decision about statutory meaning than they would in any other decisional context. *ESKRIDGE*, *supra* note 87, at 253. *See, e.g.*, *Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois*, 431 U.S. 720, 737 (1977) (“[C]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation.”).

²¹¹ *See, e.g.*, *S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. Of Env’tl. Prot.*, 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006).

²¹² *See, e.g.*, *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 24, at 167 (describing the “whole-text canon”).

²¹³ *See, e.g.*, *Solan*, *supra* note 170, at 2029.

²¹⁴ *See generally, e.g.*, Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, *supra* note 23, at 91 (describing distinctions between contextual evidence used by textualists and purposivists).

²¹⁵ *See* Anita S. Krishnakumar, *Dueling Canons*, 65 *DUKE L.J.* 909, 930–31 (2016) (discussing instances in which majority and dissenting opinions in Supreme Court cases used “dueling canons” or invoked the same interpretive tools to support competing statutory constructions).

²¹⁶ *See, e.g.*, Anita S. Krishnakumar, *Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis*, 62 *HASTINGS L.J.* 221, 251 (2010) (noting that between January 31, 2006, and June 29, 2009, the majority of Supreme Court Justices “referenced text/plain meaning and Supreme Court precedent more frequently than any of the other interpretive tools”). Scholars sometimes use “plain meaning” to refer to the “literalist” school of statutory interpretation, *supra* note 51, and use “ordinary meaning” to refer to the concept invoked by modern textualists. *See, e.g.*, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., *Three Symmetries between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment within Both*, 99 *CORNELL L. REV.* 685, 687 (2014). This report does not make this distinction, focusing primarily on modern invocations of the concept by courts, which do not generally distinguish the terms in this way. *See* Mouritsen, *Hard Cases and Hard Data*, *supra* note 204, at 164.

²¹⁷ *Stenberg v. Carhart*, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”).

²¹⁸ *Frankfurter*, *supra* note 8, at 536. *See also, e.g.*, *Wooden v. United States*, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1069 (2022) (interpreting a statutory term in a criminal law by “consider[ing] first first how an ordinary person (a reporter; a police officer; yes, even a lawyer) might describe” the defendant’s crimes).

you *walk* with a cane. Similarly, to speak of “using a firearm” is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, *i.e.*, as a weapon.²¹⁹

The Supreme Court has also referred to this exercise as seeking a word’s “natural meaning”²²⁰ or its “normal and customary meaning.”²²¹ However, this “ordinary meaning” presumption can be overcome if there is evidence that the statutory term is a term of art that has a specialized meaning in law²²² or in another relevant field.²²³ In addition, a word’s ordinary meaning may change over time. In that situation, the Court will either effectuate the meaning of the term at the time of the statute’s enactment²²⁴ or, depending on the statutory context and relevant history, conclude that new applications are covered by the plain text.²²⁵

Judges may use a wide variety of materials to gather evidence of a text’s ordinary meaning. In many cases, “simple introspection” suffices, as judges are English speakers who presumably engage in everyday conversation like the rest of the general public.²²⁶ Judges also turn to dictionaries to help inform their understanding of a word’s normal usage.²²⁷ Judges may then have to choose between multiple definitions provided by the same dictionary²²⁸ or by different dictionaries.²²⁹ Courts have also turned to books to discover a word’s ordinary meaning, drawing from works such as *Moby Dick* or the *Bible*²³⁰ as well as *Aesop’s Fables*²³¹ and the work of Dr. Seuss.²³² Judges may also look for evidence of normal usage elsewhere in the law, such as in

²¹⁹ *Smith v. United States*, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

²²⁰ *Id.* at 228 (majority opinion).

²²¹ *Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.*, 341 U.S. 384, 388 (1951).

²²² *E.g.*, *FAA v. Cooper*, 566 U.S. 284, 291–92 (2012) (concluding that “‘actual damages’ is a legal term of art”).

²²³ *E.g.*, *Van Buren v. United States*, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1657 (2021) (concluding that the statutory term “access” has a long-standing technical meaning “[i]n the computing context”).

²²⁴ *E.g.*, *MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co.*, 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994). *Cf.*, *e.g.*, *Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma*, 140 S. Ct. 768, 776 (2020) (looking to dictionaries from the time of a statute’s enactment and modern dictionaries to determine that statutory terms had the same meaning in both time periods).

²²⁵ *E.g.*, *Bostock v. Clayton Cty.*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1750 (2020).

²²⁶ Solan, *supra* note 170, at 2054. *See, e.g.*, *FCC v. AT&T Inc.*, 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011) (“‘Personal’ ordinarily refers to individuals [and not to artificial entities]. . . . Certainly, if the chief executive officer of a corporation approached the chief financial officer and said, ‘I have something personal to tell you,’ we would not assume the CEO was about to discuss company business.”).

²²⁷ *See* Solan, *supra* note 170, at 2055; *e.g.*, *Republic of Sudan v. Harrison*, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1056 (2019). *Cf.* HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1190 (“A dictionary, it is vital to observe, never says what meaning a word *must* bear in a particular context. . . . An unabridged dictionary is simply an historical record, not necessarily all-inclusive, of the meanings which words in fact *have* borne, in the judgment of the editors, in the writings of reputable authors.”).

²²⁸ *See, e.g.*, *Muscarello v. United States*, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998) (emphasizing first dictionary definition as supplying “the word’s primary meaning”). *But see* James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, *Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras*, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 514 (2013) (noting many dictionaries use different principles other than frequency of use to order definitions).

²²⁹ *See, e.g.*, *MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co.*, 512 U.S. 218, 227 (1994) (rejecting definition that was not only contained in only one of the dictionaries consulted but also “*contradict[ed]* one of the meanings contained in virtually all other dictionaries”). *See generally* Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, *A Note on the Use of Dictionaries*, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 419 (2013).

²³⁰ *Muscarello*, 524 U.S. at 129.

²³¹ *Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.*, 566 U.S. 624, 634 (2012).

²³² *Yates v. United States*, 574 U.S. 528, 553 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

judicial decisions²³³ or in other governmental materials.²³⁴ More recently, some scholars and judges have turned to corpus linguistics as a source of concrete empirical data for determining the most common meanings of statutory phrases.²³⁵ “Corpus linguistics” uses large “collections of naturally occurring language called corpora,” for example, such as a database of newspapers, to study “language function and use.”²³⁶

The idea that courts should generally give the words of a statute their “usual” meaning is an old one.²³⁷ This principle straddles judicial philosophies: for example, all current members of the Supreme Court have invoked this rule of ordinary meaning.²³⁸ If Congress does in fact generally use words as they would be normally understood, this interpretive tool helps judges act as faithful agents of Congress by ensuring that judges and Congress—along with the ordinary people governed by statutes—are looking to the same interpretive context: “normal conversation.”²³⁹

Although there is wide judicial consensus on the general validity of this rule, disputes arise in its application. To say that a statutory word should be given the same meaning that it would have in “everyday language”²⁴⁰ serves only as a starting point for debate in many cases.²⁴¹ The ordinary

²³³ *E.g.*, *Wooden v. United States*, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1070 (2022); *S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. Of Env'tl. Prot.*, 547 U.S. 370, 376 (2006).

²³⁴ *E.g.*, *Smith v. United States*, 508 U.S. 223, 243 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The normal usage is reflected, for example, in the United States Sentencing Guidelines . . .”).

²³⁵ *See, e.g. Muscarello*, 524 U.S. at 129 (looking to a database of newspapers for evidence that a particular statutory phrase had been used to convey a certain meaning); *Caesars Entm't Corp. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 68 Pension Fund*, 932 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2019) (looking to the Corpus of Historical American English to help determine a statutory term's most common usage); *United States v. Woodson*, 960 F.3d 852, 855 (6th Cir. 2020) (looking to the Corpus of Contemporary American English for evidence of how a word “is used in ordinary speech”); *see generally, e.g., Stefan Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics*, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1417 (2017); Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, *Judging Ordinary Meaning*, 127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018).

²³⁶ Mouritsen, *Hard Cases and Hard Data*, *supra* note 204, at 159.

²³⁷ 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59 (“Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification, not so much regarding the propriety of grammar as their general and popular use.”).

²³⁸ *E.g.*, *FCC v. AT&T Inc.*, 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011) (Roberts, C.J.) (“When a statute does not define a term, we typically give the phrase its ordinary meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); *FDIC v. Meyer*, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (Thomas, J.) (“In the absence of such a [statutory] definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.”); *BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton*, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006) (Alito, J.) (“Unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.”); *Sebelius v. Cloer*, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.) (“As in any statutory construction case, we start, of course, with the statutory text, and proceed from the understanding that unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)); *Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch.*, 137 S. Ct. 743, 753 (2017) (Kagan, J.) (beginning statutory analysis by looking to text's “ordinary meaning”); *Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1723 (2017) (Gorsuch, J.) (referring to a word's meaning “as a matter of ordinary English”); *Quarles v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1877 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.) (referring to a statutory term's “ordinary usage”); *Babcock v. Kijakazi*, 142 S. Ct. 641, 645 (2022) (Barrett, J.) (attempting to discover statute's “plain meaning”); *Delaware v. Pennsylvania*, No. 145, Orig., slip op. at 10 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2023) (Jackson, J.) (looking to a statutory term's “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” (quoting *Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 571 U.S. 220, 227 (2014))).

²³⁹ *Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.*, 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). *Cf. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning*, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232 (1990) (arguing plain language serves “as a second-best coordinating device for multiple decisionmakers attempting to reach some methodological consensus in the face of substantive disagreements among them”).

²⁴⁰ *Yates v. United States*, 574 U.S. 528, 553 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

²⁴¹ *Compare, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty.*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (giving effect to the “the ordinary public meaning of the statute's language at the time of the law's adoption”), *with, e.g., id.* at 1824, 1833 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of giving effect to the law's “literal meaning rather than ordinary meaning”). *See also, e.g., Taylor, supra* note 133, at 360 (“[S]tructural textualism does not derive meaning simply in a formal manner;

meaning of a term may often be “clear,” or uncontroversial in its application to some core set of circumstances.²⁴² Some have argued that invoking a word’s plain meaning in these cases is tautological, equivalent to saying that “[w]ords should be read as saying what they say.”²⁴³ Moreover, at the margins, when a court is no longer considering a prototypical example of the disputed statutory term, the judge is called upon to explain how the statute applies to the facts before the court.²⁴⁴ Therefore, in some cases, merely adverting to the ordinary meaning tool may not help illuminate a statutory term.²⁴⁵

There are also a number of theoretical criticisms of the “ordinary meaning” standard. Some have argued that judges might invoke “ordinary meaning” merely to mask their own policy preferences.²⁴⁶ Judge Easterbrook claimed that frequently, “[t]he invocation of ‘plain meaning’ just sweeps under the rug the process by which meaning is divined.”²⁴⁷ Because “ordinary meaning” invites judges to refer to their own experiences as English speakers, it is arguably susceptible to the importation of personal policy preferences.²⁴⁸ Dictionaries or corpus linguistics may supply a more objective source of evidence of meaning than the judge’s intuitions can, but those sources may not be focused on a term’s usage in a particular statutory context.²⁴⁹

it also does not find meaning to be ‘plain’ in the sense of being immediately obvious. The inquiry demands argument, and meaning requires construction.”).

²⁴² Cf. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, *THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES* 98 (1993) (“When we speak of clarity in construing the concepts expressed by statutes, we are not really making statements about the clarity of the concepts themselves. Rather, we are expressing judgments about the goodness of fit between the statutory concept and the thing or event in the world that is the subject of dispute. . . . [For example,] we mean that a truck is such a typical token of the category *vehicle* that there should be no controversy about the applicability of the statute to the situation at hand.”).

²⁴³ *Chapman v. Higbee Co.*, 319 F.3d 825, 835 (6th Cir. 2003) (Suhreinhich, J., dissenting) (quoting Reed Dickerson, *THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES* 229 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

²⁴⁴ Cf. SOLAN, *supra* note 242, at 13, 26 (arguing most plain meaning is determined by “what linguists call a generative grammar, the set of internalized rules and principles that permit us, unselfconsciously, to speak and understand language with ease and with great rapidity,” and claiming that in determining whether a statute is ambiguous, “the question is whether the meaning of the disputed language is determined fully by our generative grammars, or whether disputed aspects of the meaning are left open as part of the residue of meaning that our internal grammars do not fully determine”).

²⁴⁵ *Compare, e.g., United States v. Marshall*, 908 F.2d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir. 1990) (“LSD is applied to paper in a solvent; after the solvent evaporates, a tiny quantity of LSD remains. Because the fibers absorb the alcohol, the LSD solidifies inside the paper rather than on it. You cannot pick a grain of LSD off the surface of the paper. Ordinary parlance calls the paper containing tiny crystals of LSD a mixture.”); *with id.* at 1332 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“[A]pparently some gelatin is part of a ‘mixture or substance’ and some is not. . . . Would the gelatin be a part of the mixture or substance in an LSD case if a defendant sprayed an LSD-alcohol solution into a capsule, but not if a grain of LSD were placed into the capsule with a tweezers? It is not enough to say that ‘ordinary usage’ precludes including the weight of a heavy glass bottle The words ‘mixture or substance’ are ambiguous”).

²⁴⁶ See Frederick Schauer, *The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw*, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 738 (1992) (“It is true that judges have historically tended to mask contested social and political choices of interpretation of indeterminate texts in the language of linguistic inexorability.”); SOLAN, *supra* note 242, at 27 (“[T]he appeal of neutral linguistic principles as justification for a decision will loom especially large when the judge’s ‘real reasons’ for the decision are not ones that are properly articulated in a judicial opinion.”); Patricia M. Wald, *The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme Court*, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 304 (1990) (“The second alternative source of meaning is for the courts to supply their *own* suppositions and assumptions regarding the will of Congress”).

²⁴⁷ Frank H. Easterbrook, *Statutes’ Domains*, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983).

²⁴⁸ See Ward Farnsworth et al., *Ambiguity about Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation*, 2 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 259 (2010); Solan, *supra* note 170, at 2048 (“[C]ourts find ordinary meaning anywhere they look and judges are not restrained in deciding where they are willing to look.”).

²⁴⁹ See, e.g., *Wright v. Spaulding*, 939 F.3d 695, 700 n.1 (6th Cir. 2019) (saying that in the case before the court, “corpus linguistics turned out not to be the most helpful tool in the toolkit”); see also, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan &

Statutory Context

Often, a statutory dispute will turn on the meaning of only a few words.²⁵⁰ Courts will interpret those words, though, in light of the full statutory context.²⁵¹ To gather evidence of statutory meaning, a judge may turn to the rest of the provision,²⁵² to the act as a whole,²⁵³ or to similar provisions elsewhere in the law.²⁵⁴ As the Supreme Court said in one opinion, “Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme. . . .”²⁵⁵

For instance, a court might look to see whether the disputed language is used in another statutory provision.²⁵⁶ Courts will generally try to give identical terms the same meaning throughout a statute,²⁵⁷ and another provision may offer context that illuminates the meaning of the relevant term.²⁵⁸ However, this rule calling for words to be defined consistently is defeasible, again depending on the context: “A given term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies.”²⁵⁹ For example, in *Azar v. Allina Health Services*, the Court concluded that a statutory phrase should be interpreted consistently throughout the Medicare Act but held that the Medicare Act did not need to be interpreted consistently with the Administrative Procedure Act.²⁶⁰ The Court’s view was based on the specific language, context, and functioning of both statutory schemes.²⁶¹ At least one scholar has argued that when seeking to compare terms used in different statutes, courts might reasonably look to whether the statutes deal with similar subjects or were enacted

Tammy Gales, *Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation*, 2018 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1311, 1315 (2017) (noting limitations inherent in certain databases, including, for example, geographic bias).

²⁵⁰ See, e.g., *Yates v. United States*, 574 U.S. 528, 536 (2015) (plurality opinion) (considering whether a fish is a “tangible object” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1519).

²⁵¹ See, e.g., *id.* at 532 (“A fish is no doubt an object that is tangible But it would cut [18 U.S.C.] § 1519 loose from its financial-fraud mooring to hold that it encompasses any and all objects”).

²⁵² E.g., *NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 929, 938–39 (2017) (considering disputed terms from statutory subsection individually and then considering them as a whole).

²⁵³ E.g., *FCC v. AT&T Inc.*, 562 U.S. 397, 407–08 (2011) (considering meaning of “personal privacy” in light of its use in a distinct but similar exemption within the same statute); *Holder v. Hall*, 512 U.S. 874, 883 (1994) (comparing the functioning of two sections within the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that “differ in structure, purpose, and application”).

²⁵⁴ E.g., *Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P.*, 142 S. Ct. 941, 947 (2022) (looking to how “nearby statutory provisions” use a specific word); *Peter v. NantKwest, Inc.*, 140 S. Ct. 365, 373 (2019) (looking to how two statutory phrases were used “across various statutes” dealing with similar subjects). In their book cataloguing the canons of construction, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner describe this concept as part of the “whole text canon.” SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 167; cf. Anita S. Krishnakumar, *Cracking the Whole Code Rule*, 96 N.Y.U.L. REV. 76 (2021) (reviewing the practice and identifying five types of whole code comparisons: (1) modeled, borrowed, and incorporated statutes; (2) consistent usage; (3) meaningful variation; (4) superfluity; and (5) harmonization).

²⁵⁵ *United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).

²⁵⁶ See *United Sav. Ass’n of Tex.*, 484 U.S. at 371. See also, e.g., *Brown v. Gardner*, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (looking to how a term is used in “analogous statutes”).

²⁵⁷ E.g., *Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt*, 139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512 (2019).

²⁵⁸ E.g., *Smith v. United States*, 508 U.S. 223, 234 (1993).

²⁵⁹ *Env’tl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp.*, 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007).

²⁶⁰ *Azar v. Allina Health Servs.*, 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1811–13 (2019) (interpreting a Medicare Act provision that required notice and comment procedures for rules or other policy statements that established a “substantive legal standard”).

²⁶¹ See *id.*

contemporaneously.²⁶² The scholar further found, however, that only the second factor was considered consistently by the Supreme Court.²⁶³

A judge might also look to the rest of the statute to find whether Congress used *different* language in other provisions. If Congress elsewhere used language that more clearly captured an interpretation urged by one of the parties, it might suggest that the disputed term should not be given that construction.²⁶⁴ Courts will generally read as meaningful “the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is included in other provisions of the same statute.”²⁶⁵ Some have questioned, however, whether this “meaningful variation form of cross-statute comparison” is consistent with congressional practice.²⁶⁶

Thus, statutory context can supply evidence of semantic, or text-focused, context. In *Smith v. United States*, for example, a defendant challenged his sentence following conviction for a drug trafficking offense during which he offered to trade a gun for cocaine.²⁶⁷ The Supreme Court had to decide whether the defendant should be subject to a sentence enhancement that applied to any “‘use’ of a firearm ‘during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.’”²⁶⁸ The defendant argued that this enhancement should apply only when a firearm was “used as a weapon,” not when it was used to barter for drugs.²⁶⁹ The Supreme Court disagreed.²⁷⁰

During the course of its analysis, the Court investigated how Congress had employed the term “use” in other provisions of the statute.²⁷¹ The Court found it compelling that a different subsection of the statute called for forfeiture of a firearm that was “used” in an interstate transfer of a firearm or in a federal offense involving the exportation of a firearm.²⁷² In the eyes of the Court, this other provision clearly contemplated that firearms could be “used” “as items of commerce rather than as weapons,”²⁷³ suggesting the same interpretation of “used” should apply to the disputed sentence enhancement.²⁷⁴ The Court also explained that Congress had used the phrase “involved in” instead of the word “use” elsewhere in the statute.²⁷⁵ Specifically, a different provision allowed the seizure of a firearm that was “‘involved in’ . . . the making of a false statement material to the lawfulness of a gun’s transfer.”²⁷⁶ The Court reasoned that this

²⁶² See Krishnakumar, *Cracking the Whole Code Rule*, *supra* note 254, at 103.

²⁶³ *Id.* at 104, 108 (reviewing “data from the Roberts Court’s first twelve-and-a-half Terms”).

²⁶⁴ *E.g.* *City of Chicago v. Env’tl. Def. Fund*, 511 U.S. 328, 337–38 (1994) (“Our interpretation is confirmed by comparing [the disputed statute] with another statutory exemption in [the same act]. . . . [T]his [other] provision shows that Congress knew how to draft a waste stream exemption . . . when it wanted to.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

²⁶⁵ *Hamdan v. Runsfeld*, 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006).

²⁶⁶ Krishnakumar, *Cracking the Whole Code Rule*, *supra* note 254, at 150–51. *See also, e.g.*, *Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S*, 566 U.S. 399, 416 (2012) (“[T]he mere possibility of clearer phrasing cannot defeat the most natural reading of a statute; if it could (with all due respect to Congress), we would interpret a great many statutes differently than we do.”).

²⁶⁷ *Smith v. United States*, 508 U.S. 223, 226–27 (1993).

²⁶⁸ *Id.* at 225 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).

²⁶⁹ *Id.* at 227.

²⁷⁰ *Id.* at 225.

²⁷¹ *Id.* at 233.

²⁷² *Id.* at 234.

²⁷³ *Id.* at 235.

²⁷⁴ *Id.* at 235–36.

²⁷⁵ *Id.* at 235.

²⁷⁶ *Id.* (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1)).

distinction demonstrated that Congress found it was necessary in the other provision to use more expansive language because “making a material misstatement in order to acquire or sell a gun is not ‘use’ of the gun.”²⁷⁷ By contrast, Congress “did not so expand the language for offenses in which firearms were ‘intended to be *used*,’ even though the firearms in many of those offenses function as items of commerce rather than as weapons.”²⁷⁸ Therefore, according to the majority opinion, “Congress apparently was of the view that one could use a gun by trading it.”²⁷⁹

Statutory context can also help a court determine how the disputed terms fit into the rest of the law, illuminating the purpose of a provision.²⁸⁰ Courts may consider statutory declarations of purpose as well as the broad functioning of the statutory scheme.²⁸¹ Judges sometimes weigh the practical consequences of the various proposed interpretations, as discussed in more detail in a later section.²⁸² It could be that “only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.”²⁸³ This use of statutory context often implicates the broader debate between purposivism and textualism,²⁸⁴ as well as arguments over when judges should use practical consequences to determine statutory meaning.²⁸⁵

Canons of Construction

Over time, courts have created the “canons of construction” to serve as guiding principles for interpreting statutes.²⁸⁶ The canons supply default assumptions about the way Congress generally expresses meaning,²⁸⁷ but are not “rules” in the sense that they must invariably be applied.²⁸⁸ A judge may decline to interpret a statute in accordance with any given canon if the canon’s application is not justified in that case.²⁸⁹ In some cases, two canons may appear to apply but

²⁷⁷ *Id.*

²⁷⁸ *Id.* (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(3)) (emphasis added).

²⁷⁹ *Id.* See also, e.g., *Babcock v. Kijakazi*, 142 S. Ct. 641, 645–46 (2022) (concluding statutory context confirmed statute’s plain meaning treating military technicians as civilians, because other statutory provisions “consistently distinguished technician employment from National Guard service”).

²⁸⁰ E.g., *Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.*, 566 U.S. 624, 632 (2012) (rejecting an interpretation that would undermine the purpose of a statute by imposing liability on “the very class for whose benefit [the statute] was enacted”).

²⁸¹ E.g. *United States v. Turkette*, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981) (considering statutory declaration of purpose and evaluating “various Titles of the Act” as “the tools through which this goal is to be accomplished”).

²⁸² E.g., Krishnakumar, *Reconsidering Substantive Canons*, *supra* note 199, at 887 (noting empirical evidence that the Supreme Court frequently uses practical consequences to interpret statutes). See, e.g., *King v. Burwell*, 576 U.S. 473, 490–91 (2015) (considering meaning of statutory phrase in light of the functioning of the entire Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); *id.* at 2494 (“It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner.”). For more information on statutory operation as a distinct tool, see *infra* “Practical Consequences.”

²⁸³ *United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).

²⁸⁴ Compare, e.g., *Freeman*, 566 U.S. at 637 (“Vague notions of statutory purpose provide no warrant for expanding [a statute’s] prohibition beyond the field to which it is unambiguously limited . . .”), with *King*, 576 U.S. at 497 (“In this instance, the context and structure of the Act compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase.”).

²⁸⁵ See *infra* “Practical Consequences.”

²⁸⁶ E.g. MIKVA & LANE, *supra* note 9, at 114 (“Canons of construction are judicially crafted maxims or aphorisms for determining the meaning of statutes. Canons are expressly intended to limit judicial discretion by rooting interpretive decisions in a system of aged and shared principles . . .”).

²⁸⁷ See, e.g., Nelson, *supra* note 101, at 383.

²⁸⁸ HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1191; SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 51.

²⁸⁹ See, e.g., Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” *One to Seven*, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 923 (2005) (“The application of a canon depends on its justification. When the conditions presupposed by a canon do not obtain, then it should not be used. . . . A canon . . . looks more like a formulaic summary

support different interpretations.²⁹⁰ Some judges, especially purposivists and some pragmatists, may even doubt the general validity of the canons as interpretive rules.²⁹¹ Nonetheless, the canons are widely used and defended, as discussed in more detail below.²⁹²

Judges may also disagree on what qualifies as a valid canon, either as a matter of theory or historical fact.²⁹³ These disagreements will sometimes stem from a judge’s individual theory of statutory interpretation and their justifications for using the canons more generally.²⁹⁴ This report’s **Appendix** combines two preeminent anthologies of the canons of construction, providing a list of widely accepted canons of construction.²⁹⁵ However, even the authors of these prominent lists disagree about whether certain canons are valid.²⁹⁶ This report does not attempt to resolve those disputes and set out a definitive compilation of the canons of construction, but merely describes the canons generally, giving examples where appropriate. Furthermore, new canons may emerge over time. For example, this report does not discuss the “major questions doctrine,”²⁹⁷ a relatively new interpretive rule—still with an uncertain scope—that requires Congress to speak clearly if it gives an agency authority over an issue of “vast ‘economic and political significance.’”²⁹⁸

Generally, legal scholars and judges divide the canons into two groups: semantic and substantive canons.²⁹⁹

of the end result of a process of reasoning, but a process sufficiently commonplace to justify a canonical formula.”).

²⁹⁰ See, e.g., *Lockhart v. United States*, 577 U.S. 347 (2016). *Lockhart* is discussed *infra* “Semantic Canons.”

²⁹¹ See, e.g., Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 869–71; Posner, *Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom*, *supra* note 125, at 806–07.

²⁹² *Infra* “Justifications: Disrepute, Rehabilitation, and Empirical Studies.” See also, e.g., Mendelson, *supra* note 199, at 75.

²⁹³ See, e.g., Nelson, *supra* note 101, at 386 (asking “What Makes Canons Canonical?”).

²⁹⁴ See, e.g., Manning, *Legal Realism & the Canons’ Revival*, *supra* note 176, at 288 (describing why some theorists disfavor the canons).

²⁹⁵ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT, & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, *CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY* (5th ed. 2014). The list in the latter casebook builds upon the list given in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, *Foreword: Law As Equilibrium*, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 97–108 (1994).

²⁹⁶ Compare, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 359 (describing as a “false notion” the idea that statutory exemptions should be strictly construed), with Eskridge & Frickey, *Law As Equilibrium*, *supra* note 295, at 105 (describing the “narrow interpretation of statutory exemptions” as a canon). See generally, e.g., Evan C. Zoldan, *Canon Spotting*, 59 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 629 (2022) (suggesting three criteria for identifying a canon: “it reflects use by legal interpreters; it affects an interpretive outcome when applied; and it is supported by a claim of theoretical justification”).

²⁹⁷ For more discussion of this issue, see CRS In Focus IF12077, *The Major Questions Doctrine*, by Kate R. Bowers. Compare *West Virginia v. EPA*, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022) (saying the Court’s cases applying the major questions doctrine have used an approach “distinct” from “routine statutory interpretation”), with *Gundy v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (describing the “major questions doctrine” as “nominally a canon of statutory construction”).

²⁹⁸ *Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA*, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)). The major questions doctrine is related to the “elephants in mouseholes” principle, which is mentioned elsewhere in the report. *Infra* note 484; notes 598 to 599 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Nathan Richardson, *Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine*, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 373 (2016) (arguing this principle has “its roots in the major questions doctrine”).

²⁹⁹ E.g., JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, *LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS* 202 (2d ed. 2013).

Semantic Canons

The semantic, or textual, canons represent “rules of thumb for decoding legal language.”³⁰⁰ Because these canons focus on statutory text, they are often favored by textualists.³⁰¹ The semantic canons frequently reflect the rules of grammar that govern ordinary language usage.³⁰² Consequently, these rules may overlap with indicators of a provision’s ordinary meaning³⁰³—and indeed, some authors label the principle that words should be given their ordinary meaning as a semantic canon.³⁰⁴ But there are a greater number of semantic canons beyond the ordinary meaning rule, several of which are discussed below.

For example, the “grammatical ‘rule of the last antecedent’” states that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”³⁰⁵ In *Barnhart v. Thomas*, the Supreme Court illustrated this canon with the following hypothetical:

Consider, for example, the case of parents who, before leaving their teenage son alone in the house for the weekend, warn him, “You will be punished if you throw a party or engage in any other activity that damages the house.” If the son nevertheless throws a party and is caught, he should hardly be able to avoid punishment by arguing that the house was not damaged. The parents proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any other activity that damages the house.³⁰⁶

The last-antecedent canon tells the reader of the parents’ edict that the descriptive clause “that damages the house” refers to the “nearest reasonable antecedent”: here, “any other activity.”³⁰⁷

³⁰⁰ *Id.* at 204.

³⁰¹ Manning, *Legal Realism & the Canons’ Revival*, *supra* note 176, at 290 (“Because textualists believe in a strong version of legislative supremacy, their skepticism about actual [legislative] intent or purpose has . . . inspired renewed emphasis on the canons of interpretation, particularly the linguistic or syntactic canons of interpretation.”); *id.* at 292 (“[T]extualists deem it essential to foster clear and predictable linguistic and syntactic rules to permit legislators and interpreters to decode enacted texts.”).

³⁰² *E.g.*, Kavanaugh, *supra* note 131, at 2159–60. *But see* Adam Schlusberg & Michael Sinclair, ‘Only a Sith Thinks Like That’: Llewellyn’s ‘Dueling Canons’, *Twenty-Five to Twenty-Eight* 36 (Sept. 24, 2010) (N.Y. Law Sch. Research Paper Series 10/11 #3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682164 (questioning whether it is “productive to call the rules of grammar ‘canons of construction’”).

³⁰³ *E.g.*, MANNING & STEPHENSON, *supra* note 299, at 204–05.

³⁰⁴ *E.g.*, SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 69. *Cf.* MIKVA & LANE, *supra* note 9, at 114 (“The authors do not, as some do, define the plain meaning rule as a canon of construction. This is based on our view that the plain meaning rule is the constitutionally compelled starting place for any statutory construction and that tools of interpretation are only applicable when, for whatever reason, the plain meaning rule fails to provide the answer.”). Judges also disagree about whether the plain meaning rule is a special and superior canon. *Compare, e.g.*, *State v. Peters*, 665 N.W.2d 171, 177–78 (Wis. 2003) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (arguing plain meaning rule, as well as rules saying courts may use dictionaries and that statutory definitions must control, are all canons, and arguing that all canons representing “[i]ntrinsic aids’ to construction . . . are essential to any application of the plain meaning rule”), *with Metro One Telecomms., Inc. v. Comm’r*, 704 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]here the plain meaning rule has provided a clear answer, we do not need to look to other canons of statutory construction.”).

³⁰⁵ *Barnhart v. Thomas*, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). *See also* *Lockhart v. United States*, 577 U.S. 347, 351 (2016) (“The rule reflects the basic intuition that when a modifier appears at the end of a list, it is easier to apply that modifier only to the item directly before it. That is particularly true where it takes more than a little mental energy to process the individual entries in the list, making it a heavy lift to carry the modifier across them all.”).

³⁰⁶ *Barnhart*, 540 U.S. at 27.

³⁰⁷ *See* SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 144–45 (discussing *Barnhart* and the Court’s hypothetical).

Accordingly, that clause modifies only the phrase “any other activity,” and not “party,” a more remote antecedent.³⁰⁸

In *Lockhart v. United States*, the Supreme Court applied the last-antecedent canon to interpret a federal criminal statute that imposed a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on any person possessing child pornography³⁰⁹ if that person had “a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.”³¹⁰ The question before the Court was “whether the limiting phrase that appears at the end of that list—‘involving a minor or ward’—applies to all three predicate crimes preceding it in the list or only the final predicate crime.”³¹¹ Invoking the rule of the last antecedent, the Court concluded that the limiting phrase “modifies only the phrase that it immediately follows: ‘abusive sexual conduct.’”³¹²

The dissenting opinion in *Lockhart* argued that a different semantic canon, the “series-qualifier canon,” applied instead of the last-antecedent canon.³¹³ The “series-qualifier” canon provides that under certain circumstances, a modifier should be applied to all terms in a list.³¹⁴ Because the modifying clause “involving a minor or ward” followed “a list of multiple, parallel terms,” the dissent claimed that it should apply to the entire series.³¹⁵ In the dissenters’ view, “the reference to a minor or ward applies as well to sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse as to abusive sexual conduct.”³¹⁶ By contrast, the majority of the Court believed the series-qualifier canon was inapplicable, concluding that the disputed provision “does not contain items that readers are used to seeing listed together or a concluding modifier that readers are accustomed to applying to each of them.”³¹⁷ Further, the majority argued, “the varied syntax of each item in the list makes it hard for the reader to carry the final modifying clause across all three.”³¹⁸ *Lockhart* therefore demonstrates the complexities of applying the canons of construction, particularly when different canons suggest different interpretations.

Another semantic canon, the rule against surplusage, relies less on the niceties of grammar and more on the general principles underlying how courts assume Congress conveys meaning.³¹⁹ The surplusage canon requires courts to give each word and clause of a statute operative effect, if

³⁰⁸ See *id.* at 145.

³⁰⁹ 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4).

³¹⁰ *Lockhart*, 577 U.S. at 349 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)).

³¹¹ *Id.* (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)).

³¹² *Id.* at 352 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)).

³¹³ *Id.* at 364 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (10th ed. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

³¹⁴ *Id.* (citing SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 147).

³¹⁵ *Id.* at 363–64. Cf. *id.* at 364–65 (“When the nouns in a list are so disparate that the modifying clause does not make sense when applied to them all, then the last-antecedent rule takes over. Suppose your friend told you not that she wants to meet ‘an actor, director, or producer involved with Star Wars,’ [in which case the modifier would apply to the entire list] but instead that she hopes someday to meet ‘a President, Supreme Court Justice, or actor involved with Star Wars.’ Presumably, you would know that she wants to meet a President or Justice even if that person has no connection to the famed film franchise.”).

³¹⁶ *Id.* at 366.

³¹⁷ *Id.* at 352 (majority opinion).

³¹⁸ *Id.*

³¹⁹ See SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 174. This canon is also sometimes referred to as the “canon against superfluity.” See, e.g., *Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship*, 564 U.S. 91, 106 (2011).

possible.³²⁰ Stated another way, courts should not interpret any statutory provision in a way that would render it or another part of the statute inoperative or redundant.³²¹ Accordingly, for example, when a court is faced with a statutory list of terms, it generally will read each term to convey some distinct meaning.³²² In *Bailey v. United States*, the Supreme Court considered a statute that imposed a five-year mandatory minimum sentence on a person who “uses or carries a firearm” during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.³²³ The Court refused to give the term “use” such a broad reading that “no role remains for ‘carry.’”³²⁴ Instead, the Court assumed “that Congress used two terms because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning,” and gave “use” a more limited connotation that “preserve[d] a meaningful role for ‘carries’ as an alternative basis for a charge.”³²⁵

Elsewhere, however, judges have questioned whether the assumption underlying the surplusage canon is true or whether instead it is more likely that Congress sometimes does use redundant language.³²⁶ In one case, the Supreme Court noted that “redundancies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human communication.”³²⁷ This discussion demonstrates the idea that the canons are presumptions, rather than rules, and cannot replace a broader contextual inquiry.³²⁸

Substantive Canons

In contrast to the semantic canons, the substantive canons express “judicial presumption[s] . . . in favor of or against a particular substantive outcome.”³²⁹ Some of these canons, particularly those that protect constitutional values, are described as “clear statement rules” because courts will favor certain outcomes unless the statute makes a “clear statement” that unambiguously dislodges the presumption.³³⁰ The substantive canons “look to the legal consequences of interpretation

³²⁰ See *Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).

³²¹ See, e.g., *Fourth Estate Pub. Ben. Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC*, 139 S. Ct. 881, 889 (2019); *Colautti v. Franklin*, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979). But see, e.g., *Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.*, 139 S. Ct. 873, 881 (2019) (stating that this rule “is not a silver bullet” and acknowledging that “[s]ometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy”).

³²² See, e.g., *McDonnell v. United States*, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016).

³²³ *Bailey v. United States*, 516 U.S. 137, 138–39 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)) (internal quotation mark omitted).

³²⁴ *Id.* at 145.

³²⁵ *Id.* at 146.

³²⁶ See, e.g., *Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship*, 564 U.S. 91, 106 (2011) (noting that “no interpretation” of the relevant statute “avoids excess language”); *id.* at 107 (“There are times when Congress enacts provisions that are superfluous, and the kind of excess language [at issue] . . . is hardly unusual in comparison to other [similar] statutes . . .”) (quoting *Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 325 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting)); *Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind.*, 853 F.3d 339, 344 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Congress may certainly choose to use both a belt and suspenders to achieve its objectives . . .”).

³²⁷ *Barton v. Barr*, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1453 (2020).

³²⁸ See also *infra* “Justifications: Disrepute, Rehabilitation, and Empirical Studies.”

³²⁹ MANNING & STEPHENSON, *supra* note 299, at 202.

³³⁰ See, e.g., HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1376; Manning, *Textualism and the Equity of the Statute*, *supra* note 32, at 121–22.

rather than to linguistic issues alone.³³¹ If a statute is susceptible to more than one meaning, they may tip the scale toward a particular result.³³²

Accordingly, invocation of the substantive canons frequently invites judicial disagreement.³³³ The canon of constitutional avoidance provides a good example of how even a well-established³³⁴ substantive canon can provoke debate.³³⁵ The canon of constitutional avoidance provides that if one plausible reading of a statute would raise “serious doubt” about the statute’s constitutionality, a court should look for another, “fairly possible” reading that would avoid the constitutional issue.³³⁶ Thus, for instance, the constitutional-avoidance canon might lead a court to adopt a limiting construction of a statutory provision, if a broader interpretation would allow the government to exercise a constitutionally problematic amount of power.³³⁷

The constitutional-avoidance canon may allow a court to adopt a “reasonable alternative interpretation”³³⁸ even if it is not otherwise “the most natural interpretation” of the disputed statute.³³⁹ For example, in *Bond v. United States*, the Supreme Court interpreted a statute making it a crime for a person to use “any chemical weapon.”³⁴⁰ The Court noted that the “expansive language” of the statute could be read to encompass the conduct of the defendant, who had placed toxic chemicals on the car door, mailbox, and door knob of a friend after discovering that the friend had become pregnant by the defendant’s husband.³⁴¹ However, the Court decided that it would not interpret the statute “to reach purely local crimes”³⁴² because such an interpretation would intrude on powers traditionally reserved for the states, implicating constitutional concerns about the balance of power between the federal government and the states.³⁴³ Instead, the Court read the statute more narrowly, to exclude the defendant’s conduct.³⁴⁴

³³¹ SOLAN, *supra* note 242, at 65.

³³² *See id.* (stating substantive canons “stack the deck in favor of one party and against another”); Scalia, *supra* note 84, at 27 (referring to “rules of construction that load the dice for or against a particular result”).

³³³ *See, e.g.*, ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 342.

³³⁴ *See* Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (saying the canon “has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate”).

³³⁵ *See, e.g.*, ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 362–67 (discussing arguments for and against using the canon).

³³⁶ *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). This canon is distinct from other variations on the principle of constitutional avoidance, including the “rule of judicial procedure” stating that “‘if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction . . . , the Court will decide only the latter.’” *See* SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 251 (quoting *Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth.*, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). The procedural rule tells a court *when* to decide a statutory question (i.e., before the constitutional question); the canon tells a judge *how* to interpret the statute. MANNING & STEPHENSON, *supra* note 299, at 250. This report uses the term to refer to the canon, although there is room for disagreement regarding how to classify various aspects of the constitutional avoidance doctrine. For more information on the doctrine, see CRS Report R43706, *The Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance: A Legal Overview*, by Andrew Nolan.

³³⁷ *See, e.g.*, *Gomez v. United States*, 490 U.S. 858, 863–64 (1989) (noting that “read literally,” disputed statute would allow federal magistrate to take on “any assignment that is not explicitly prohibited,” and instead adopting an alternative interpretation—that the additional duties must be related to statutorily specified duties of the office).

³³⁸ *Id.* at 864.

³³⁹ *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius*, 567 U.S. 519, 563 (2012).

³⁴⁰ 572 U.S. 844, 851 (2014) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 229(a)(1) (quotation mark omitted)).

³⁴¹ *Id.* at 860–61.

³⁴² *Id.* at 860.

³⁴³ *Id.* at 862–63.

³⁴⁴ *Id.* at 866.

Of course, judges may disagree on whether an alternative reading that avoids a constitutional problem is “fairly possible.”³⁴⁵ As the Supreme Court emphasized in one case, the constitutional-avoidance canon “does not give a court the authority to rewrite a statute as it pleases.”³⁴⁶ Accordingly, the Court has rejected application of the canon if the text “unambiguously forecloses” the proffered construction.³⁴⁷

Many of the substantive canons entail difficult judgments in determining whether triggering threshold conditions have been met.³⁴⁸ In the case of the canon of constitutional avoidance, a court need not conclude that a suggested reading of the statute in fact would render the statute unconstitutional; the canon requires only that there is a “serious doubt” about the constitutionality of the proffered interpretation.³⁴⁹ Judges disagree, however, on how much constitutional “doubt” must be present before a court may use the constitutional-avoidance canon to support a certain interpretation of a statute.³⁵⁰ As one treatise puts it: “How doubtful is doubtful?”³⁵¹ Some judges have argued that the constitutional-avoidance canon should be used sparingly, if at all.³⁵²

At a more general level, judges frequently disagree about whether substantive canons are appropriately used to interpret statutes, both in theory and in practical application.³⁵³ This disagreement sometimes stems from different beliefs about the general justifications for using the canons.³⁵⁴ To the extent that the substantive canons suggest that a judge should read a statute in a way that is not immediately evident from the statute’s text or purpose, both textualists and purposivists may be wary of employing these canons.³⁵⁵ Consequently, most courts will not apply

³⁴⁵ *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). See also Eric S. Fish, *Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy*, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1285 (2016) (distinguishing “tiebreaking avoidance,” in which the canon may be used to choose one of two similarly plausible interpretations, from “rewriting avoidance,” in which the canon may be used “to select a less-accurate interpretation”).

³⁴⁶ *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 843 (2018).

³⁴⁷ *United States v. Palomar-Santiago*, 141 S. Ct. 1615, 1622 (2021). See also, e.g., *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 561 U.S. 1, 17 (2010) (rejecting invocation of canon where construction would “revise” the law rather than interpret it, and “pervert[] the purpose of” the disputed law).

³⁴⁸ Compare, e.g., *Muscarello v. United States*, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (concluding statute is not sufficiently ambiguous to make the rule of lenity applicable), with *id.* at 148–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing rule of lenity should apply to resolve statutory ambiguity).

³⁴⁹ *Crowell*, 285 U.S. at 62. Cf. *Brown v. Plata*, 563 U.S. 493, 526 (2011) (concluding reading is “permissible” because the alternative interpretation “would raise serious constitutional concerns”); *Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez*, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (“It is well understood that when there are two reasonable constructions for a statute, yet one raises a constitutional question, the Court should prefer the interpretation which avoids the constitutional issue.”).

³⁵⁰ Anthony Vitarelli, Comment, *Constitutional Avoidance Step Zero*, 119 YALE L.J. 837, 841–42 (2010).

³⁵¹ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 250. Compare, e.g., *United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.*, 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (determining constitutional-avoidance canon supports reading *mens rea* requirement into statute because statute would otherwise “raise serious constitutional doubts”), with *id.* at 83 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing statute does not raise serious constitutional doubts).

³⁵² See, e.g., *United States v. Marshall*, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335–36 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“Courts often do interpretive handspings to avoid having even to *decide* a constitutional question. In doing so they expand, very questionably in my view, the effective scope of the Constitution, creating a constitutional penumbra in which statutes wither, shrink, are deformed. A better case for flexible interpretation is presented when the alternative is to nullify Congress’s action: when in other words there is not merely a constitutional question about, but a constitutional barrier to, the statute when interpreted literally.” (citation omitted)).

³⁵³ See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 342 (“The *substantive* canons of interpretation . . . are even more controversial, because they are rooted in broader policy or value judgments.”).

³⁵⁴ See, e.g., MANNING & STEPHENSON, *supra* note 299, at 248 (discussing possible justifications for the canons of construction).

³⁵⁵ See, e.g., Manning, *Textualism and the Equity of the Statute*, *supra* note 32, at 125; Nelson, *supra* note 101, at 393–

the substantive canons unless they conclude that after consulting other interpretive tools, the statute remains ambiguous.³⁵⁶ Again, however, such a conclusion often presents a debatable question about whether a statute is sufficiently ambiguous to call for the application of a substantive canon.³⁵⁷

Justifications: Disrepute, Rehabilitation, and Empirical Studies

Judges may choose not to apply a canon to resolve a statutory ambiguity if they disagree with the justifications generally proffered to justify that canon, or if they simply believe that those general justifications do not warrant its extension to the case before them.³⁵⁸ The canons of construction were a disfavored tool of statutory interpretation for a significant portion of the 20th century.³⁵⁹ This view was reflected in a frequently cited article written by legal scholar Karl Llewellyn in 1950, in which he argued that the canons were not useful interpretive tools because of their indeterminacy.³⁶⁰ He compiled a table of “thrusts” and “parries” that purported to demonstrate that for every canon, there was an opposing canon on the same point.³⁶¹ For example, one thrust declares that “[w]ords and phrases which have received judicial construction before enactment are to be understood according to that construction,” while the parry counters, “[n]ot if the statute clearly requires them to have a different meaning.”³⁶² Some modern judges have agreed with this criticism, arguing that judges effectively “need a canon for choosing between competing canons.”³⁶³

Others, however, have challenged Llewellyn’s list, questioning the validity of the rules that he claimed were canons.³⁶⁴ Scholars and judges have also cast doubt on whether his thrusts and

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³⁵⁶ Compare, e.g., *Beecham v. United States*, 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994) (“Because the statutory language is unambiguous, the rule of lenity, which petitioners urge us to employ here, is inapplicable.”), with *Liparota v. United States*, 471 U.S. 419, 427–28 (1985) (“Although the rule of lenity is not to be applied where to do so would conflict with the implied or expressed intent of Congress, it provides a time-honored interpretive guideline when the congressional purpose is unclear. In the instant case, the rule directly supports petitioner’s contention that the Government must prove knowledge of illegality to convict him . . .”). See also, e.g., *United States v. Monsanto*, 491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989) (noting the canons “are quite often useful in close cases, or when statutory language is ambiguous,” but declining to use them where “the language is clear and the statute comprehensive”).

³⁵⁷ See *supra* note 348.

³⁵⁸ E.g., *supra* notes 289 and 291.

³⁵⁹ E.g. MIKVA & LANE, *supra* note 9, at 115 (“The use of canons of construction for the interpretation of statutes has been held in scholarly ill repute for over a century.”). Cf. Posner, *Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom*, *supra* note 125, at 805 (“[I]t has been many years since any legal scholar had a good word to say about any but one or two of the canons, but scholarly opinion . . . has had little impact on the writing of judicial opinions, where the canons seem to be flourishing as vigorously as ever.”).

³⁶⁰ Llewellyn, *supra* note 72, at 401. Cf. Frankfurter, *supra* note 8, at 544 (“[C]anons of construction . . . give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in fact a delicate judgment . . .”); *id.* at 544–45 (arguing canons are valid only insofar as they are flexible “axioms of experience” that judges may revisit and adapt through application).

³⁶¹ Llewellyn, *supra* note 72, at 401. See also *SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.*, 320 U.S. 344, 353 (1943) (“Some authority is cited and a great array could be assembled to support the general proposition that penal statutes must be strictly construed. An almost equally impressive collection can be made of decisions holding that remedial statutes should be liberally construed. What, then, shall we say of the construction of a [statute] like this which may be the basis of either civil proceedings of a preventive or remedial nature or of punitive proceedings, or perhaps both?”).

³⁶² Llewellyn, *supra* note 72, at 403.

³⁶³ Posner, *Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom*, *supra* note 125, at 806.

³⁶⁴ See, e.g., Scalia, *supra* note 84, at 26–27 (identifying two examples of “faux canons”). Cf. Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” *Pairs Thirteen to Sixteen*, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 953, 985 (2008/09) (questioning the provenance of Llewellyn’s formulation of the canons).

parries are truly contradictory, arguing that many of his pairs instead represent two halves of one rule, the thrust giving the general rule, and the parry, the exception or condition.³⁶⁵ By and large, the canons of construction have been rehabilitated among jurists and legal scholars, primarily by textualists, who have argued on a number of bases that the canons represent “sound interpretive conventions.”³⁶⁶

The foregoing criticisms, however, have forced many judges to more diligently justify their use of the canons. One scholar has placed the canons into two categories based on the justifications given for their canonization.³⁶⁷ For that scholar, the first group of canons is descriptive; such canons “simply reflect broader conventions of language use, common in society at large at the time the statute was enacted.”³⁶⁸ Judges invoke these canons because, according to this scholar, they are accurate descriptions of the way that all people use words.³⁶⁹ As a result, courts expect that these principles will also apply to legislative drafting.³⁷⁰ The scholar describes the second group of canons as normative.³⁷¹ These normative canons are “used primarily by lawyers” rather than society at large and “relate specifically to the interpretation of statutes.”³⁷² Courts may think that these canons, as well, accurately capture insights about congressional behavior.³⁷³ But judges might also apply these canons as a matter of historical practice,³⁷⁴ or because they believe the

³⁶⁵ See Scalia, *supra* note 84, at 27; Schlüsselberg & Sinclair, *supra* note 302, at 38. See, e.g., *Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.*, 511 U.S. 244, 264, 280 (1994) (noting “apparent tension” between two canons and resolving the conflict). Cf. SOLAN, *supra* note 242, at 31 (suggesting some canons embody two “types of devices,” reflecting the way English speakers generally understand language: “[1] interpretive strategies that function to ease the rapid processing of language as it is heard or read, but which can be overridden if their application leads to nonsensical or ungrammatical interpretations of sentences, and [2] rules of grammar, which make certain interpretations impossible,” and questioning whether judges apply the canons consistently with linguistic theory).

³⁶⁶ E.g., SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at xxvii (“Nothing but conventions and contexts cause a symbol or sound to convey a particular idea.”); *id.* at xxviii (“We seek to restore sound interpretive conventions.”). See also Nelson, *supra* note 101, at 377, 383 (arguing textualists prefer the canons to legislative history because of their more rule-like nature); William N. Eskridge, Jr., *The New Textualism*, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 663 (1990) (“The new textualists . . . seek a revival of canons that rest upon precepts of grammar and logic, proceduralism, and federalism. The Court’s opinions in the last two Terms reflect this revival urged by the new textualists.”).

³⁶⁷ Nelson, *supra* note 101, at 383. Nelson prefers these categories to the traditional distinction between semantic and substantive canons. See *id.* at 394 n.140. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, *Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State*, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 454 (1989) (noting canons “have served different functions” and distinguishing widely shared and uncontroversial “invisible norms” from “background norms” that “more visibly serve substantive or institutional goals,” but recognizing that “the distinction . . . is imprecise”).

³⁶⁸ Nelson, *supra* note 101, at 383.

³⁶⁹ *Id.*

³⁷⁰ *Id.* at 383–84.

³⁷¹ *Id.* at 384.

³⁷² *Id.*

³⁷³ See *id.* at 390 (“Many of the canons used by textualists reflect observations about Congress’s own habits.”).

³⁷⁴ See Scalia, *supra* note 84, at 29 (“The rule of lenity is almost as old as the common law itself, so I suppose that is validated by sheer antiquity.”). See also, e.g., *United States v. Wiltberger*, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (“The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself.”).

canons reflect good policy,³⁷⁵ or because they believe the canons provide principles that limit judicial deference³⁷⁶ and promote predictability in judicial decisionmaking.³⁷⁷

Defenders of the canons have argued that they help judges act as faithful agents of the legislature, either because they reflect legislative drafting practices or because they provide coordinating background rules that can guide Congress when drafting legislation.³⁷⁸ For example, the constitutional-avoidance canon is frequently said to respect legislative supremacy³⁷⁹—although judges do not always agree on the reasons why.³⁸⁰ The Court has, at times, said that the constitutional-avoidance canon reflects what Congress meant because Congress would not have wanted to enact an unconstitutional statute.³⁸¹ Choosing a reasonable alternative interpretation “recognizes that Congress, like [the courts], is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution.”³⁸² Others have argued that even if the canon does not reflect actual congressional practice, it properly represents a judicial policy judgment “that courts should minimize the occasions on which they confront and perhaps contradict the legislative branch.”³⁸³

Some judges, however—primarily purposivists—have argued for greater caution in deploying the canons of construction, warning that insofar as they do not reflect the reality of legislative

³⁷⁵ See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, *Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?*, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (“[N]ormative canons are principles . . . that . . . direct courts to construe any ambiguity in a particular way in order to further some policy objective.”). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., *Public Values in Statutory Interpretation*, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (1989) (arguing interpreters should explicitly incorporate “rational background understandings,” or “underlying public values” into application of the canons of construction); Sunstein, *supra* note 367, at 413 (arguing some substantive canons can and should “be supported through an understanding of the ways in which they incorporate constitutional principles, promote deliberation in government, and respond to New Deal reforms of the legal system”).

³⁷⁶ See, e.g., Posner, *Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom*, *supra* note 125, at 807 (“A . . . line of defense is that even if the canons do not make very good sense, it is better that the judges should feel constrained by some interpretive rules than free to roam at large in a forest of difficult interpretive questions . . .”).

³⁷⁷ See, e.g., Nelson, *supra* note 101, at 391 (“[C]anons and presumptions can . . . take advantage of . . . relative predictability. . . . [S]ome specialized canons help courts discern Congress’s likely intent . . . simply because members of Congress know that the courts use them. That knowledge . . . enables members of Congress to convey their intended meaning in a way that the courts will understand.”). See also Eskridge & Frickey, *Law As Equilibrium*, *supra* note 295, at 67 (“[T]he canons may be understood as conventions, similar to driving a car on the right-hand side of the road; often it is not as important to choose the best convention as it is to choose one convention, and stick to it.”).

³⁷⁸ Christopher J. Walker, *Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation*, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1021 (2015); HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1376; see also, e.g., *Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.*, 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010) (noting that consistent application of presumption against extraterritoriality creates “a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects”). But see Abbe R. Gluck, *Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do*, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 179 (2017) (arguing that the system-coordinating justification for a formalist approach employing the canons is untenable).

³⁷⁹ See, e.g., William K. Kelley, *Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem*, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 843 (2001). But see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, *Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?*, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2002) (arguing the canon of constitutional avoidance is “wholly illegitimate” because it “acts as a roving commission to rewrite statutes to taste”).

³⁸⁰ See, e.g., MANNING & STEPHENSON, *supra* note 299, at 260–61. Others argue that even if the constitutional-avoidance canon does not advance legislative supremacy, it may be useful to protect constitutional values, by allowing courts to impose narrowing constructions on constitutionally dubious statutes. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 365.

³⁸¹ See, e.g., *Yates v. United States*, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957) (“[W]e should not assume that Congress chose to disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked.”).

³⁸² *Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council*, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).

³⁸³ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 249.

drafting, they may not respect legislative supremacy.³⁸⁴ Supporting this concern, some empirical studies have raised questions as to whether some of these canons do in fact reflect how ordinary English speakers or legislatures use words.³⁸⁵ One widely discussed article, published in 2013, surveyed 137 congressional staffers to assess whether legislative staffers were aware of various judicial doctrines of statutory interpretation and whether the drafters actually complied with those doctrines.³⁸⁶ Their findings demonstrated a wide range of awareness and use of various semantic and substantive canons, and suggested that some canons, such as the surplusage canon, are not widely used by Congress.³⁸⁷ However, some have pointed out that this study may not provide a complete view of the federal lawmaking process³⁸⁸—and the authors themselves recognized many of the limitations in their study.³⁸⁹

Responding to this study, then-professor (now Justice) Barrett explained that textualists would likely reject this legislative “process-based” approach to evaluating the canons because textualists do not use canons “in an effort to track the linguistic patterns of the governors; they use them because they reflect the linguistic patterns of the governed.”³⁹⁰ In response to this criticism, another group of scholars surveyed “4,500 demographically representative people recruited from the United States, as well as a sample of over one-hundred first-year U.S. law students” to test their knowledge of the canons.³⁹¹ The study found that while non-governmental speakers do frequently read laws in accordance with many of the canons tested, some of them are less frequently applied.³⁹² A number of judges have cited the initial study on congressional drafting practices in explaining their choices about whether to apply certain canons;³⁹³ it remains to be seen whether this second survey will be as influential.

Even if a judge agrees that a particular canon is generally valid, the court may still doubt that it should control the interpretation of a particular statute. Modern theory acknowledges that the application of a particular canon in any case is highly context-dependent.³⁹⁴ The canons merely supply “one indication” of meaning,³⁹⁵ suggesting only that “a particular meaning is linguistically

³⁸⁴ See, e.g., KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 52 (“[W]iping out legislative history, in the face of empirical evidence that Congress views it as essential in understanding its meaning, leaves us largely with a canon-based interpretive regime that may not only fail to reflect the reality of the legislative process, but may also undermine the constitutional understanding that Congress’s statuemaking should be respected as a democratic principle.”). See also Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 870 (arguing legislative history is more accessible than the canons to give notice of statutory meaning).

³⁸⁵ See, e.g., Tobia et al., *supra* note 207, at 249–62, 271; Gluck & Bressman, *supra* note 204, at 907.

³⁸⁶ Gluck & Bressman, *supra* note 204, at 920.

³⁸⁷ *Id.* at 949.

³⁸⁸ See, e.g., Kysar, *supra* note 116, at 1118–19; Jarrod Shobe, *Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting*, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 810–11, 837, 863–65 (2014).

³⁸⁹ See Gluck & Bressman, *supra* note 204, at 922–23 (noting limitations in survey sample); 1020–21 (noting possibility that collective or outside knowledge may impact drafting process).

³⁹⁰ Barrett, *supra* note 136, at 2194.

³⁹¹ Tobia et al., *supra* note 207, at 225.

³⁹² *Id.* at 249–62.

³⁹³ See, e.g., *Yates v. United States*, 574 U.S. 528, 562 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting); *United States v. Koutsostamatis*, 956 F.3d 301, 307 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020); *Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.*, 883 F.3d 100, 130 (2d Cir. 2018); *Loving v. IRS*, 742 F.3d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

³⁹⁴ See, e.g., HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1191 (“Of course there are pairs of maxims susceptible of being invoked for opposing conclusions. Once it is understood that meaning depends on context, and that contexts vary, how could it be otherwise?”).

³⁹⁵ Scalia, *supra* note 84, at 27 (“Every canon is simply *one indication* of meaning; and if there are more contrary indications (perhaps supported by other canons), it must yield.”). See, e.g., *Rice v. Rehner*, 463 U.S. 713, 732 (1983) (“[W]e have consistently refused to apply . . . a canon of construction when application would be tantamount to a

permissible, if the context warrants it.”³⁹⁶ Judges sometimes describe the canons as akin to rebuttable presumptions.³⁹⁷ Judges will weigh application of the canon against the evidence of statutory meaning discovered through other interpretive tools and may disagree about whether a canon is so contrary to other indicators of meaning that it should not be applied.³⁹⁸ The use of the canons “rest[s] on reasoning,” and their application should be justified in any given case.³⁹⁹

A judge’s willingness to deploy a particular canon, generally or in a specific case, may also depend on that judge’s particular theory of interpretation. Many judges will turn to the canons only if more favored tools fail to resolve any ambiguity.⁴⁰⁰ For example, Justice Clarence Thomas, who is generally described as a textualist,⁴⁰¹ stated the following in one Supreme Court opinion:

[C]anons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.⁴⁰²

Accordingly, in that opinion, Justice Thomas concluded that because the statutory text was clear, the canon against surplusage was inapplicable.⁴⁰³

In a similar vein, Justice William Brennan argued that it was unnecessary to invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance in his dissenting opinion in *NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago*.⁴⁰⁴ In particular, he contended that the alternative reading adopted by the majority was not a “fairly possible” interpretation of the statute, relying heavily on the statute’s legislative history to demonstrate that Congress intended to foreclose the majority opinion’s construction.⁴⁰⁵ Thus, although a particular canon might facially operate to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity, judges may disagree about whether a canon’s application is appropriate, if another interpretive

formalistic disregard of congressional intent. . . . In the present case, congressional intent is clear from the face of the statute and its legislative history.”).

³⁹⁶ HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1191. *See also, e.g.*, *Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation*, 141 S. Ct. 2434, 2448 (2021) (noting that canons must give way if they yield a “contextually implausible outcome,” because “[t]he most grammatical reading of a sentence in a vacuum does not always produce the best reading in context” (quoting *Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid*, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1171 (2021))) (internal quotation marks omitted).

³⁹⁷ *See, e.g.*, *District of Columbia v. Thompson*, 593 A.2d 621, 631 (D.C. 1991). *See also, e.g.*, Frank H. Easterbrook, *The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation*, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 83 (2017) (noting that “every canon implicitly begins or ends with the statement ‘unless the context indicates otherwise’”).

³⁹⁸ *See, e.g.*, *Lockhart v. United States*, 577 U.S. 347, 352 (2016) (arguing rule of last antecedent applies and “is not overcome by other indicia of meaning”); *id.* at 363 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing statutory context shows rule of last antecedent does not apply to the disputed provision).

³⁹⁹ *Sinclair*, *supra* note 289, at 992. *See also* *Varity Corp. v. Howe*, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (“To apply a canon properly one must understand its rationale.”).

⁴⁰⁰ *See, e.g.*, *Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff*, 553 U.S. 571, 589–90 (2008) (“[W]e have never held that [a particular canon] displaces the other traditional tools of statutory construction. . . . In this case, traditional tools of statutory construction and considerations of *stare decisis* compel [a certain] conclusion There is no need for us to resort to the . . . canon because there is no ambiguity left for us to construe.”).

⁴⁰¹ *See, e.g.*, Fallon, *Three Symmetries*, *supra* note 216 at 691 (describing Justice Thomas as “a recognized textualist”).

⁴⁰² *Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).

⁴⁰³ *Id.* Two concurring opinions in that case argued that the Court should have also considered the statute’s legislative history, *id.* at 255 (Stevens, J., concurring), and should have acknowledged that this interpretation did violate the canon against surplusage and explained why the canon did not control, *id.* at 256 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

⁴⁰⁴ *NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi.*, 440 U.S. 490, 511 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

⁴⁰⁵ *Id.* at 511–15.

tool suggests the statute should bear another meaning and if a particular jurisprudential methodology counsels for reliance on that particular tool.⁴⁰⁶

Legislative History

Where the text of the statute alone does not answer the relevant question, judges have at times turned to a statute’s legislative history,⁴⁰⁷ defined as the record of Congress’s deliberations when enacting a law.⁴⁰⁸ One of the Supreme Court’s most famous—and perhaps infamous—invocations of legislative history came in *United Steelworkers v. Weber*.⁴⁰⁹ In that case, the Court considered whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which “make[s] it unlawful to ‘discriminate . . . because of . . . race’ in hiring” and training employees, prohibited a private employer from adopting an affirmative action plan intended to increase the number of black employees in one of its training programs.⁴¹⁰ The Court noted that “a literal interpretation” of the relevant statutory provisions arguably would forbid such plans, since they “discriminate[d] against white employees solely because they [were] white.”⁴¹¹ Nonetheless, the Court concluded that in this case, such a “literal construction” was “misplaced.”⁴¹² Instead, writing for the majority, Justice Brennan used the legislative history of Title VII to uncover evidence of the statute’s purpose, examining a number of statements from individual Senators as well as the committee report.⁴¹³ He concluded that the law sought to “address centuries of racial injustice,” and Congress could not have “intended to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress designed Title VII to achieve.”⁴¹⁴ In Justice Brennan’s view, the private employer’s plan mirrored the purposes of the statute⁴¹⁵ by seeking “to abolish

⁴⁰⁶ See, e.g., *Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor*, 875 F.3d 821, 825 (2017) (concluding statutory context overcomes presumption of “so-called *Russello* structural canon”—that “[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (alteration in original) (quoting *Russello v. United States*, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).

⁴⁰⁷ See, e.g., *Mitchell v. Cohen*, 333 U.S. 411, 418 (1948).

⁴⁰⁸ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 303. This report addresses only pre-enactment legislative history, and does not discuss the even more contentious category of post-enactment legislative history. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 316 (discussing “subsequent legislative history,” or congressional statements and actions related to a law after its enactment, such as when Congress rejects amendments to a law). The report addresses separately other post-enactment interpretive tools *infra* “Statutory Implementation.” See also HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1255–70 (reviewing “post-enactment aids to interpretation,” including popular construction, administrative construction, judicial construction, and legislative silence or acquiescence).

⁴⁰⁹ *United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber*, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979). Cf., e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 12 (arguing this case’s reading of the statute “def[ies] the text”); Eskridge & Frickey, *Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning*, *supra* note 169, at 336 (arguing this case was decided “by romanticizing the legislative process and subordinating other purposes of Title VII”).

⁴¹⁰ *United Steelworkers*, 443 U.S. at 201 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(2)(a), (d)).

⁴¹¹ *Id.*

⁴¹² *Id.*

⁴¹³ *Id.* at 202–07.

⁴¹⁴ *Id.* at 204. See also *id.* at 207 (“Congress did not intend to limit traditional business freedom to such a degree as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action.”).

⁴¹⁵ *Id.* at 208.

traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy,”⁴¹⁶ and the legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended to leave an “area of discretion” for just such a plan.⁴¹⁷

Purposes for Using Legislative History

The use of legislative history has generated significant debate over the past century.⁴¹⁸ In its most controversial applications, legislative history has been deployed in opinions that cite a statute’s purpose to override arguably clear text, as demonstrated by *Weber*.⁴¹⁹ Most frequently, however, when modern judges use legislative history, it is not to contradict a clear text but to discover evidence of an ambiguous statute’s underlying purpose or confirm a reading suggested by other tools.⁴²⁰ As with the substantive canons, courts have suggested that legislative history should not be examined unless the statutory text is ambiguous.⁴²¹ Of course, judges may disagree whether the text is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant recourse to a statute’s legislative history.⁴²² Judges have also used legislative history to support a textual interpretation.⁴²³ An increasingly common phrasing in Supreme Court majority opinions discusses legislative history as additional support for “those who consider” it.⁴²⁴

Judges do not always use legislative history to determine a statute’s *purpose*.⁴²⁵ Even textualist judges may use legislative history to determine whether a statutory term has a specialized meaning⁴²⁶ or to determine whether a seemingly incongruous result nonetheless aligns with

⁴¹⁶ *Id.* at 204.

⁴¹⁷ *Id.* at 209.

⁴¹⁸ *E.g.*, MANNING & STEPHENSON, *supra* note 299, at 127. *See also id.* at 127–28 (outlining historical trends in use of legislative history in U.S. courts, beginning with a rule of general exclusion, swinging towards general inclusion around 1940, and describing the new backlash against its use beginning in the 1980s).

⁴¹⁹ *See Weber*, 443 U.S. at 201–02. *See also, e.g.*, *Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States*, 143 U.S. 457, 464–65 (1892).

⁴²⁰ *See, e.g.*, *Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy*, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text. We will not take the opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”). *See also, e.g.*, HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1379 (“Effect should not be given to evidence from the internal legislative history if the result would be to contradict a purpose otherwise indicated . . .”).

⁴²¹ *See, e.g.*, *Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.*, 490 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1989).

⁴²² *Compare, e.g.*, *Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy*, 548 U.S. 291, 304 (2006) (disregarding legislative history where statutory text was unambiguous), *with id.* at 323 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing statutory text was ambiguous and turning to legislative history). Then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh argued that “the indeterminacy of the trigger”—that is, determining when the text is ambiguous—“greatly exacerbates the problems with the use of legislative history.” Kavanaugh, *supra* note 131, at 2149.

⁴²³ *See, e.g.*, *Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. United States*, 559 U.S. 229, 236 n.3 (2010) (“Although reliance on legislative history is unnecessary in light of the statute’s unambiguous language, we note the support that record provides for the Government’s reading.”). *But see, e.g.*, *Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers*, 138 S. Ct. 767, 783–84 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing majority opinion should not have relied on committee report “to discuss the supposed ‘purpose’ of the statute”).

⁴²⁴ *E.g.*, *Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P.*, 142 S. Ct. 941, 946–48 (2022) (discussing the text and statutory context before turning to legislative history as additional “persuasive” support for “those who consider” it); *Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr*, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1072 (2020) (similar); *Sturgeon v. Frost*, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1085 (2019) (similar).

⁴²⁵ *See, e.g.*, Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 848.

⁴²⁶ *See, e.g.*, *Pierce v. Underwood*, 487 U.S. 552, 563–64 (1988) (relying on “a Committee Report prepared at the time of the original enactment of” the disputed statute to define the phrase “substantially justified,” as used in the disputed statute to describe a party’s litigating position). *See also, e.g.*, SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 388 (“[F]or the purpose of establishing linguistic usage—showing that a particular word or phrase is capable of bearing a particular

congressional intent.⁴²⁷ Some judges may also use legislative history to determine the scope of a statute and ascertain whether Congress sought to address the particular problem before the court at all.⁴²⁸ Thus, for example, in *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, the Court reviewed the history of various “tobacco-specific legislation that Congress ha[d] enacted over the past 35 years,” along with the history of the disputed provision located in the agency’s organic statute, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDC&A).⁴²⁹ In the Court’s view, the fact that the other legislative acts specifically concerned the issue of tobacco bore directly on the meaning of the FDC&A, which did not expressly address tobacco.⁴³⁰ The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to give the FDA jurisdiction to broadly regulate tobacco products in the FDC&A.⁴³¹

The Debate over Using Legislative History

To the extent that legislative history is used to determine statutory purpose, purposivists and textualists may disagree about whether legislative history is a permissible tool of statutory interpretation.⁴³² Many purposivists defend the use of legislative history on the grounds that these deliberative materials can illuminate the context and purpose of a statutory provision.⁴³³ Purposivists emphasize legislative process,⁴³⁴ and legislative history provides a record of that process.⁴³⁵ Defenders of legislative history generally argue that in statutory interpretation, judges should respect the processes Congress has established and should pay attention to those materials that Congress itself has used to memorialize the lawmaking process.⁴³⁶ This is particularly true, argue some, because Congress generally does place significance on at least certain types of legislative history.⁴³⁷ Thus, the central argument in favor of the use of legislative history is grounded in the purposivist view of legislative supremacy.⁴³⁸

meaning—it is no more forbidden (though no more persuasive) to quote a statement from the floor debate on the statute in question than it is to quote the *Wall Street Journal* or the *Oxford English Dictionary*.”).

⁴²⁷ See, e.g., *Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.*, 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that it is “entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including the background of [the disputed provision] and the legislative history of its adoption, to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed unthought of, and thus to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning [of the disputed term]”). See also, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 388 (“[L]egislative history can be consulted to refute attempted application of the absurdity doctrine—to establish that it is indeed thinkable that a particular word or phrase should mean precisely what it says.”). Similarly, courts may—in rare cases—use legislative history to determine that Congress made a mistake. See, e.g., *U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am.*, 508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993) (“In these unusual cases, we are convinced that the placement of the quotation marks in the 1916 Act was a simple scrivener’s error, a mistake made by someone unfamiliar with the law’s object and design.”).

⁴²⁸ See Easterbrook, *What Does Legislative History Tell Us?*, *supra* note 146, at 443.

⁴²⁹ *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 143–56 (2000).

⁴³⁰ *Id.* at 143.

⁴³¹ *Id.* at 142.

⁴³² See, e.g., Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, *supra* note 23, at 84, 90.

⁴³³ Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 848.

⁴³⁴ E.g., KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 31 (“[L]egislation is the product of a deliberative and informed process. Statutes in this conception have purposes or objectives that are discernible. The task of the judge is to make sense of legislation in a way that is faithful to Congress’s purposes.”).

⁴³⁵ E.g., *id.* at 29.

⁴³⁶ E.g., Breyer, *supra* note 32, at 858–60.

⁴³⁷ E.g., Gluck & Bressman, *supra* note 204, at 967; Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, *The Congressional Bureaucracy*, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1541, 1549 (2020).

⁴³⁸ E.g., KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 4 (“Our constitutional system charges Congress, the people’s branch of representatives, with enacting laws. So, how Congress makes its purposes known, through text and reliable

By contrast, many textualists argue that legislative history should be used sparingly.⁴³⁹ The first and perhaps most persistent objection is theoretical: Justice Scalia, for example, argued the use of legislative history improperly “assumes that what [judges] are looking for is the intent of the legislature rather than the meaning of the statutory text.”⁴⁴⁰ Accordingly, to the extent legislative history enables a judge to elevate a judgment about “background purposes” above “the clear import of an enacted text,” textualists disagree with the use of this tool.⁴⁴¹ Textualists frequently claim that using legislative history in this way is inappropriate because “as a formal matter,” it is this text, and not the “committee reports and floor statements,” that are “the law enacted by Congress.”⁴⁴² Textualists’ primary objections to legislative history are therefore rooted in their own distinct view of how courts best observe legislative supremacy.⁴⁴³

Many textualists also harbor more practical concerns about the reliability of legislative history.⁴⁴⁴ Justice Scalia frequently argued that “[e]ven if legislative intent did exist, there would be little reason to think it might be found in the sources that the courts consult.”⁴⁴⁵ In his view, even committee reports do not necessarily represent the understanding of the full Congress, given that they are created by a minority of Members, making it dangerous to draw assumptions about the whole body’s understanding of the statute from such documents.⁴⁴⁶ Justice Scalia also warned that legislative history is subject to intentional manipulation and gamesmanship, making it even less likely that these documents reflect legislative intent.⁴⁴⁷ Finally, judges have pointed out that due to the multiplicity of actors, “legislative history is often conflicting,” making it difficult to determine which parts of the record should be heeded.⁴⁴⁸ Judge Harold Leventhal once observed that using legislative history can be like “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.”⁴⁴⁹

accompanying materials constituting legislative history, should be respected, lest the integrity of legislation be undermined.”). See generally Manning, *Legal Realism & the Canons’ Revival*, *supra* note 176, at 288–89 (“Legislative history [in the view of purposivists] . . . might serve the same function as the canons (eliminating ambiguity), but with the distinct advantage of having a more democratic pedigree.”). This justification for using legislative history appeals beyond purposivists to at least some pragmatists. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 239.

⁴³⁹ See, e.g., Nelson, *supra* note 101, at 361.

⁴⁴⁰ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 375. See also *Conroy v. Aniskoff*, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”). This concern rests on the “intent skepticism” shared by both textualists and purposivists. Manning, *Inside Congress’s Mind*, *supra* note 31, at 1912–13.

⁴⁴¹ Manning, *What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?*, *supra* note 23, at 73.

⁴⁴² Kavanaugh, *supra* note 131, at 2149. See also, e.g., *NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 929, 942 (2017) (“What Congress ultimately agrees on is the text that it enacts, not the preferences expressed by certain legislators.”); *City of Chicago v. Env’tl. Def. Fund*, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994) (“[I]t is the statute, and not the Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law . . .”).

⁴⁴³ See, e.g., MANNING & STEPHENSON, *supra* note 299, at 151–53; *Lawson v. FMR LLC*, 571 U.S. 429, 459–60 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing against using legislative history to discover congressional intent because “we are a government of laws, not of men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended”).

⁴⁴⁴ See, e.g., MANNING & STEPHENSON, *supra* note 299, at 158.

⁴⁴⁵ E.g., SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 376.

⁴⁴⁶ *Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier*, 501 U.S. 597, 620–21 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).

⁴⁴⁷ See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 24, at 376–77. See also, e.g., *Circuit City Stores v. Adams*, 532 U.S. 105, 120 (2001) (“We ought not attribute to Congress an official purpose based on the motives of a particular group that lobbied for or against a certain proposal . . .”).

⁴⁴⁸ Kavanaugh, *supra* note 131, at 2149. See also, e.g., *Conroy v. Aniskoff*, 507 U.S. 511, 519–20 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing legislative history is indeterminate).

⁴⁴⁹ Patricia M. Wald, *Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term*, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983).

These concerns about the reliability of legislative history may apply whether the tool is used to discover a statute's purpose or for another reason.

In light of these criticisms, many judges who see value in examining legislative history to discern the legislature's intent have used such materials in more nuanced ways.⁴⁵⁰ Courts review legislative history in light of the text ultimately enacted,⁴⁵¹ and in conjunction with other interpretive tools.⁴⁵² Many judges also view some types of legislative history as more reliable than others, drawing from their understanding of congressional procedure.⁴⁵³ Justice Sotomayor, for example, has written that committee reports "are a particularly reliable source" of legislative history because they are circulated with a bill to Members and their staff, and are viewed by those people as reliable indicators of the bill's meaning.⁴⁵⁴ By contrast, the Court has noted that floor debates are a weaker form of legislative history because they "reflect at best the understanding of individual Congressmen."⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵⁰ See, e.g., *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.*, 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); see also, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, *A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules*, 122 *YALE L.J.* 70, 78 (2012) (arguing courts must view legislative history with a better understanding of congressional procedures). Cf. KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 46 (noting that in response to textualist critiques of legislative history, judges "tend to give it more of a supporting rather than a leading role in statutory interpretation"); Gluck & Posner, *supra* note 169, at 1326 (noting that none of the judges in their survey use legislative history "indiscriminately").

⁴⁵¹ See, e.g., *NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 929, 942–43 (2017).

⁴⁵² See, e.g., *Wyeth v. Levine*, 555 U.S. 555, 566–68 (2009) (looking to legislative history to determine whether Congress intended to overcome presumption embodied in substantive canon); *Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.*, 547 U.S. 651, 658–59 (2006) (looking to legislative history, including drafting history and committee reports, to determine the purpose of the disputed provision, and reviewing this purpose in light of the statutory context).

⁴⁵³ See, e.g., *Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.*, 341 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is inescapably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond Committee reports, which presumably are well considered and carefully prepared. . . . [T]o select casual statements from floor debates, not always distinguished for candor or accuracy, as a basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact is to substitute ourselves for the Congress in one of its important functions.").

⁴⁵⁴ *Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers*, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). See also George A. Costello, *Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History*, 1990 *DUKE L.J.* 39, 43 (1990) (noting committee reports are "ordinarily . . . considered the most reliable and persuasive element of legislative history" by the Supreme Court).


⁴⁵⁵ *Zuber v. Allen*, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) ("A committee report represents the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation. Floor debates reflect at best the understanding of individual Congressmen. It would take extensive and thoughtful debate to detract from the plain thrust of a committee report in this instance."). See also, e.g., *Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media*, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (describing witness statements from congressional hearings on a different bill as particularly unhelpful, especially given that the statements contradicted official committee reports).

One group of legal scholars created a hierarchy of legislative history derived from federal case law, shown in **Figure 1**.⁴⁵⁶ One 2020 article provided some empirical insight into legislative history hierarchy by conducting interviews with 30 congressional staffers.⁴⁵⁷ That study suggested courts should view legislative history, “in order of decreasing reliability, as follows: (1) [c]ommittee reports; (2) [a]ll statements by a Chair or Ranking Member of a committee or subcommittee on a topic within committee or subcommittee jurisdiction; (3) [o]ther markup and hearing statements; (4) [o]ther floor statements.”⁴⁵⁸

The preceding discussion does not account for a special form of legislative history—a history of amendment. Courts will generally accord significant weight to Congress’s *changes* to a prior statute in a subsequent statute.⁴⁵⁹ Like the other forms of legislative history discussed in this report, legislative action amending a statute provides a record of congressional deliberation prior to the enactment of the disputed statute.⁴⁶⁰

However, unlike the other forms of legislative history, a prior version of a statute is itself formally enacted, and to many, therefore provides stronger evidence of a statute’s evolution. The Supreme Court has said, “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”⁴⁶¹ As a result, a statute’s amendment history can even overcome other evidence of statutory meaning.⁴⁶²

Figure 1. Hierarchy of Legislative History



Source: ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 317.

⁴⁵⁶ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 317. *See also* KATZMANN, *supra* note 111, at 54 (arguing “conference committee reports and committee reports” should be considered most authoritative, “followed by statements of the bill’s managers in the Congressional Record, with stray statements of legislators on the floor—who had heretofore not been involved in consideration of the bill—at the bottom”).

⁴⁵⁷ Cross, *supra* note 205, at 95.

⁴⁵⁸ *Id.* at 97.

⁴⁵⁹ *See, e.g.,* Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1726–27 (2020) (concluding that the purpose of a law was to go beyond existing provisions regulating the same topic, and rejecting an interpretation that would have made the new law coextensive with prior coverage); United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948) (concluding amendment of disputed provision “was intended . . . to broaden the Act’s coverage or to assure its broad coverage”).

⁴⁶⁰ *See supra* note 408 and accompanying text.

⁴⁶¹ Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995). *See also, e.g.,* Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 640–41 (2016) (concluding mandatory nature of disputed provision was affirmed by its history, where it replaced a weaker precursor). In comparison, one Supreme Court opinion described as “noteworthy” a Senate vote approving a joint resolution that, if enacted into law, would have disapproved a particular agency interpretation of the disputed statute. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661, 666 (2022).

⁴⁶² *See, e.g.,* Pierce Cty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 145 (2003) (concluding substantive canon should not apply because that canon “would render the 1995 amendment to [the disputed provision] . . . an exercise in futility”).

Statutory Implementation

Finally, courts frequently investigate how a statute actually works, asking what problem Congress sought to address by enacting the disputed provision, and how Congress went about doing that.⁴⁶³ As a result, courts have assessed whether the consequences of an asserted interpretation align with the statutory scheme.⁴⁶⁴ A focus on practical consequences is, at least academically, sometimes aligned with the so-called dynamic theories of interpretation and, when viewed as such, is generally disfavored.⁴⁶⁵ Nonetheless, scholars have maintained that “practical considerations play an important role in the [Supreme] Court’s statutory cases,”⁴⁶⁶ as discussed in more detail below. Further, judges may look to the consequences of a particular meaning as part of a broader inquiry that primarily focuses on the text.⁴⁶⁷ Courts sometimes look for evidence of practical consequences in materials from the agencies that are charged with implementing the disputed statute, but they also rely on their own understandings of how the statute works.

Agency Interpretations

Administrative agencies are frequently the first official interpreters of statutes: in the course of implementing a statutory scheme, interpretive questions arise and must be resolved in order for the agency to do its work. When courts interpret a statute, they sometimes consider these agency interpretations, whether the agency’s views are asserted through administrative rulings or a pattern of action.⁴⁶⁸ A judge might cite an agency’s unofficial but public interpretation of a statutory term to support other evidence justifying a particular interpretation.⁴⁶⁹ Alternatively, a judge might use evidence of the way an administrative agency has implemented a statute to gain a sense of the problem that Congress sought to address and how the statutory scheme generally works to address that problem.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶³ See, e.g., *Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League*, 541 U.S. 125, 132–33 (2004) (“[C]oncentration on the writing on the page does not produce a persuasive answer here. . . . [I]n this litigation it helps if we ask how Congress could have envisioned the preemption clause actually working if the FCC applied it at the municipal respondents’ urging.”).

⁴⁶⁴ See, e.g., *Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.*, 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951) (rejecting interpretation under which “the exception swallows the proviso and destroys its practical effectiveness”).

⁴⁶⁵ See *supra* notes 89 to 94 and accompanying text (discussing dynamic theories of interpretation). See also, e.g., *BP p.l.c. v. Mayor of Baltimore*, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1542 (2021) (“[T]his Court’s task is to discern and apply the law’s plain meaning as faithfully as we can, not ‘to assess the consequences of each approach and adopt the one that produces the least mischief.’” (quoting *Lewis v. Chicago*, 560 U.S. 205, 217 (2010))).

⁴⁶⁶ Nicholas S. Zeppos, *The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis*, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1107 (1992). This finding was confirmed in more recent empirical studies of Supreme Court cases. See Krishnakumar, *Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era*, *supra* note 216, at 225–26 (suggesting there are two camps of Justices that use practical consequences in distinct ways); Krishnakumar, *Reconsidering Substantive Canons*, *supra* note 199, at 887 (noting empirical evidence that the Supreme Court frequently uses practical consequences to interpret statutes).

⁴⁶⁷ See, e.g., *RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty.*, 579 U.S. 325, 344 (2016) (“The practical problems we have identified with [the defendant’s reading of the statute] are not, by themselves, cause to reject it. Our point in reciting these troubling consequences of [the defendant’s] theory is simply to reinforce our conclusion, based on [the disputed statute’s] text and context . . .”).

⁴⁶⁸ See, e.g., *FCC v. Am. Broad. Co.*, 347 U.S. 284, 294–95 (1954).

⁴⁶⁹ See, e.g., *id.*; *S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl Prot.*, 547 U.S. 370, 377 (2006) (citing the EPA’s Water Quality Standards Handbook). Cf. *Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White*, 548 U.S. 53, 65–66 (2006) (considering potentially contradictory statements of EEOC).

⁴⁷⁰ See, e.g., *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 144–46 (2000). Cf., e.g., *Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ.*, 550 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2007) (noting Congress adopted language originally drafted by the Secretary of Education without amendment or comment, and viewing this as evidence Congress did not intend to

This use of an agency’s interpretation of a statute is distinct from the special weight, called *Chevron* deference, that a court will sometimes give to an agency interpretation.⁴⁷¹ *Chevron* deference generally applies when a court is reviewing an agency’s official interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with administering.⁴⁷² In such a situation, if a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue being litigated, then *Chevron* instructs a court to give the agency’s construction controlling weight, so long as it is reasonable.⁴⁷³ Even outside the context of *Chevron* deference, though, when a court is determining for itself the best reading of the statute, it will still consider an agency’s interpretation.⁴⁷⁴ Courts may view the agency’s interpretation as evidence that the statute can bear a particular meaning, similar to a dictionary definition.⁴⁷⁵

Two legal scholars suggested that “popular” constructions of a statute, especially those embodied in the actions of those entities implementing that law, should be entitled to some special weight.⁴⁷⁶ According to them, evidence of how a law has been implemented does not show merely “peoples’ understanding of the [disputed] term . . . in the abstract,” as a dictionary would, but gives “evidence of the understanding upon which people had *acted*,” and sometimes the ways in which people have acted against their own interests.⁴⁷⁷ In this sense, they contend that interpreters should give special weight to “action by the primary addressees who were required by the very nature of the arrangement to make the initial decisions under it.”⁴⁷⁸ This view accords with one of the central justifications given for deferring to agency interpretations under *Chevron*: courts should give special weight to agency constructions of statutes that they administer because they have special expertise in that subject area, and because Congress itself has given the agency a special role in interpreting the statute.⁴⁷⁹ Notwithstanding these considerations, however, judges regularly reject agency interpretations if they are contrary to the text of the statute or other strong evidence of the statute’s meaning.⁴⁸⁰

disturb the agency’s interpretation of the relevant language).

⁴⁷¹ See *Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council*, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). For more on *Chevron* deference, see CRS Report R44954, *Chevron Deference: A Primer*, by Valerie C. Brannon and Jared P. Cole. As that report discusses, in recent years, the “major questions doctrine” mentioned earlier in the report has become one limitation on the applicability of *Chevron* deference.

⁴⁷² See *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

⁴⁷³ See *id.* at 844.

⁴⁷⁴ See, e.g., *S.D. Warren Co.*, 547 U.S. at 377–78 (considering agency’s interpretation as evidence of statutory term’s meaning even though the particular “expressions of agency understanding do not command deference”).

⁴⁷⁵ E.g., *id.* at 378 (“[T]he administrative usage of ‘discharge’ in this way confirms our understanding of the everyday sense of the term.”); HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1270 (“Such action, manifestly, is especially cogent evidence that the words of the statute would bear the meaning which the action necessarily attributed to them.”).

⁴⁷⁶ See HART & SACKS, *supra* note 17, at 1270.

⁴⁷⁷ See *id.* at 1269.

⁴⁷⁸ See *id.* at 1270. See also, e.g., *NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 929, 953–54 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (considering as evidence the practices of executive branch prior to and following the enactment of the disputed statutory text). Cf. *Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.*, 563 U.S. 776, 793 (2011) (noting the “common practice” of “parties operating under the act”).

⁴⁷⁹ See *Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council*, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 865 (1984).

⁴⁸⁰ See, e.g., *SW Gen., Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. at 943 (majority opinion) (rejecting as insubstantial evidence of executive branch’s “post-enactment practice” under statute); *Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.*, 566 U.S. 624, 629–30 (2012) (noting that an agency had authority to interpret statute but rejecting its interpretation as “manifestly inconsistent with the statute [that the agency] purported to construe”).

Practical Consequences

Judges may also rely on their own understandings of how a statute should be implemented to interpret the statute’s meaning. Even textualists, who generally protest the use of consequentialist reasoning, do regularly invoke policy consequences to evaluate the validity of a proffered interpretation.⁴⁸¹ If a court believes that the practical consequences of a particular interpretation would undermine the purposes of the statute, the court may reject that reading even if it is the one that seems most consistent with the statutory text.⁴⁸² Similarly, judges will refer to concerns of administrability when interpreting statutes.⁴⁸³ Judges may also rely on policy considerations to limit the reach of a statute, if one possible construction would seem to expand the government’s authority beyond what the judge believes to be reasonable.⁴⁸⁴

In one prominent example, the Supreme Court concluded in *King v. Burwell* that “the context and structure of the [Patient Protection and Affordable Care] Act compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase.”⁴⁸⁵ The disputed statute provided that the availability of certain tax credits rested in part on whether a taxpayer had “enrolled in an insurance plan through ‘an Exchange *established by the State*.’”⁴⁸⁶ At issue was whether these tax credits were “available in States that have a Federal Exchange rather than a State Exchange.”⁴⁸⁷ The Court acknowledged that based solely on this statutory text, “it might seem that a Federal Exchange cannot fulfill [the] requirement” of being “established by the State.”⁴⁸⁸ Based on the statutory context and the “broader structure of the Act,” however, the Court concluded that a strict textualist approach to interpreting the statute was not the best reading of the statute.⁴⁸⁹ The Court reviewed the reforms that the Act aimed to achieve and considered how the exchanges would actually operate under this plain-text reading.⁴⁹⁰ The Court expressed that a reading that would deny tax credits to most individuals “could well push a

⁴⁸¹ See, e.g., Krishnakumar, *Reconsidering Substantive Canons*, supra note 199, at 886–87 (noting that Justices Scalia and Thomas referenced practical consequences in a number of their opinions). See also, e.g., *Van Buren v. United States*, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1659–60 (2021) (Barrett, J.) (looking to the “design” of a statute and concluding a particular reading was “ill fitted” to its operation); *Artis v. District of Columbia*, 138 S. Ct. 594, 612 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (pointing out “some examples of the absurdities that follow” from the majority’s reading).

⁴⁸² See, e.g., *King v. Burwell*, 576 U.S. 473, 488 (2015). Courts sometimes describe this as seeking to avoid absurd results. See, e.g., *Clinton v. City of New York*, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (“Acceptance of the Government’s new-found reading of [the disputed statute] ‘would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended.’”) (quoting *Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.*, 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982)); see generally John F. Manning, *The Absurdity Doctrine*, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003) (“Despite the absurdity doctrine’s deep roots, recent intellectual and judicial developments have undermined the doctrine’s strong intentionalist foundations.”).

⁴⁸³ See, e.g., *Robers v. United States*, 572 U.S. 639, 644 (2014).

⁴⁸⁴ See, e.g., *Van Buren*, 141 S. Ct. at 1661 (concluding that the “fallout” from reading a criminal law to encompass “a breathtaking amount of commonplace . . . activity” supported a narrower textual interpretation); *Rapanos v. United States*, 547 U.S. 715, 721–22 (2006) (plurality opinion) (discussing the consequences stemming from the agency’s reading of the law). Cf. *Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns*, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).

⁴⁸⁵ *King*, 576 U.S. at 497.

⁴⁸⁶ *Id.* at 483 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)-(c)).

⁴⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸⁸ *Id.* at 487.

⁴⁸⁹ *Id.* at 492.

⁴⁹⁰ *Id.* at 492–93.

State’s individual insurance market into a death spiral.”⁴⁹¹ Ultimately, the Court decided that it was “implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner.”⁴⁹²

Justice Scalia authored the dissent in *King*, arguing that it was “quite absurd” to read “Exchange established by the State” to mean “Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government.”⁴⁹³ Arguing that “[w]ords no longer have meaning if an Exchange that is *not* established by a State is ‘established by the State,’”⁴⁹⁴ the dissent described the majority opinion as “rewriting the law under the pretense of interpreting it.”⁴⁹⁵ The majority opinion itself recognized that “[r]eliance on context and structure in statutory interpretation is a ‘subtle business, calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of legislation becomes legislation itself.’”⁴⁹⁶ In the dispute before it, on the other hand, the Court argued such reliance was warranted “to avoid the type of calamitous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid.”⁴⁹⁷ The Court concluded by asserting that it was required to “respect the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done.”⁴⁹⁸

While *King*’s discussion of an interpretation’s practical consequences was quite obvious,⁴⁹⁹ courts may also consider the policy consequences of a particular interpretation in more subtle ways. Courts frequently will discuss pragmatic concerns in the context of a discussion of another interpretive tool.⁵⁰⁰ Many of the substantive canons, for instance, explicitly favor certain policy outcomes, inviting judges to choose the reading that comports with that outcome.⁵⁰¹

Conclusion

When Congress understands how courts interpret statutes, it can draft according to the prevailing interpretive conventions.⁵⁰² Because courts act as the arbiters of statutory meaning and necessarily shape the way a statute is implemented, Congress may be able to eliminate at least some misunderstandings by legislating with judges in mind.⁵⁰³ Understanding the theories and

⁴⁹¹ *Id.* at 492.

⁴⁹² *Id.* at 494.

⁴⁹³ *Id.* at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).

⁴⁹⁴ *Id.* at 500.

⁴⁹⁵ *Id.* at 516.

⁴⁹⁶ *Id.* at 497–98 (majority opinion) (quoting *Palmer v. Massachusetts*, 308 U.S. 79, 83 (1939)).

⁴⁹⁷ *Id.* at 498. *See also id.* (“Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter.”).

⁴⁹⁸ *Id.*

⁴⁹⁹ *See id.*

⁵⁰⁰ *See, e.g., Zeppos, supra* note 466, at 1108 (arguing empirical studies likely “undercount the role such consequentialist concerns play in the Court’s decisionmaking process” because “practical considerations are masked by the invocation of more formal sources of authority”).

⁵⁰¹ *See supra* notes 329 to 331 and accompanying text.

⁵⁰² *See, e.g., Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, supra* note 31, at 1932–33 (2015) (noting importance to textualists of creating stable background rules against which Congress may legislate). *See also, e.g., Project on Statutory Construction Promotes Inter-Branch Communications*, U.S. COURTS (Sept. 10, 2015), <http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2015/09/10/project-statutory-construction-promotes-inter-branch-communications> (discussing project through which federal appellate courts send Congress “opinions that note possible technical problems in statutes,” using them as “teaching tools” for legislative drafters).

⁵⁰³ *See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra* note 111, at 92–93.

tools that govern judicial statutory interpretation may be especially beneficial as some scholars turn their attention to actual legislative processes and legislative drafting practices. A continued dialogue between the courts and Congress can help ensure that, in Justice Thomas’s phrase, Congress successfully “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says.”⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰⁴ *Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992). This phrase has been repeated in a number of Supreme Court opinions by a variety of Justices. *See, e.g.*, *Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2017) (Gorsuch, J.); *Simmons v. Himmelreich*, 578 U.S. 621, 627 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.).

Appendix. Canons of Construction

This appendix draws from two different works to present an exemplary list of the canons of construction.⁵⁰⁵ The two works take different approaches to compiling the canons, and sometimes disagree on what counts as a legitimate canon of construction.⁵⁰⁶ In their book *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts*, Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner⁵⁰⁷ took an “unapologetically normative” approach to this task, collecting only those canons that they deemed valid under their approach to textualism.⁵⁰⁸ By contrast, a casebook authored by law professor William Eskridge and others took a more descriptive approach, compiling the canons “invoked by” the Supreme Court from 1986 to 2014.⁵⁰⁹ This appendix does not intend to favor a position in any ongoing debates about the validity of the canons, and where feasible, notes disagreement among the authors in the footnotes.

Some editorial choices were made in the process of combining and reproducing the authors’ lists. These edits include some generalization and consolidation of canons.⁵¹⁰ The list also omits a number of canons that are too specific⁵¹¹ or otherwise outside the scope⁵¹² of this report, which aims to provide a general overview of how courts interpret statutes. The appendix likewise excludes canons that seem to represent substantive legal principles rather than assumptions about how to read statutes.⁵¹³

⁵⁰⁵ ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, *READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS* (2012); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT, & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, *CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY* (5th ed. 2014). While a more recent edition of this latter source has been published since the report’s author first compiled this list, the appendix containing these canons was unchanged. This report therefore continues to cite to the fifth edition.

⁵⁰⁶ Compare, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 359 (describing as a “false notion” the idea that statutory exemptions should be strictly construed), with William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, *Foreword: Law As Equilibrium*, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 105 (1994) (describing as statute-based canon the “narrow interpretation of statutory exemptions”).

⁵⁰⁷ Bryan Garner’s biography describes him as “noted speaker, writer, and consultant regarding legal writing and drafting;” he is the current editor-in-chief of *Black’s Law Dictionary*. *Bryan Garner*, SMU Dedman School of Law, <https://www.smu.edu/Law/Faculty/Profiles/Garner-Bryan-A> (last visited Mar. 10, 2023).

⁵⁰⁸ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 9.

⁵⁰⁹ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1195. This list is built upon a preliminary compilation created by Eskridge and Frickey in 1994. See Eskridge & Frickey *supra* note 506, at 97. Professor Eskridge has acknowledged that this list does not include “all possible canons.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., *The New Textualism and Normative Canons*, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 536 n.31 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505).

⁵¹⁰ For example, the Eskridge & Frickey list contained a number of different canons relating to federal preemption of state law, which this list provides for with the general presumption against such preemption. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1205–07; *infra* note 586 and accompanying text.

⁵¹¹ See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1212–15 (discussing canons applicable to statutes governing a wide variety of specific issue areas). For example, this appendix excludes a canon of patent law that creates a presumption that “abstract ideas and laws of nature are not patentable.” *Id.* at 1214.

⁵¹² See, e.g., *id.* at 1199–1200 (discussing “canons” that apply when courts review agency interpretations of statutes). See also SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 53 (outlining the “interpretation principle” that “[e]very application of a text to particular circumstances entails interpretation”).

⁵¹³ For example, the Eskridge casebook describes a “[s]uper-strong rule against congressional interference with President’s inherent powers, his executive authority.” ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1204. Arguably, the cases cited in support of this rule do establish such a principle, but do not describe this rule as a presumption about how to generally read statutes. See, e.g., *Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). Cf. *Morrison v. Olson*, 487 U.S. 654, 682 (1988) (invoking canon of constitutional avoidance to narrowly construe statute to avoid infringing President’s removal powers).

This appendix names and briefly describes each canon, citing either or both of the two lists and applicable cases as appropriate. In many cases, the canon includes both the general rule and any relevant exceptions, in accord with the modern understanding that the application of a canon is highly context-dependent.⁵¹⁴ The list distinguishes semantic canons from substantive canons, but does not further group the canons.⁵¹⁵ The canons are listed in alphabetical order.

Semantic Canons

1. **“Artificial-Person Canon”**:⁵¹⁶ “The word person includes corporations and other entities, but not the sovereign.”⁵¹⁷
2. ***Casus Omissus***: A matter not covered by a statute should be treated as intentionally omitted (*casus omissus pro omisso habendus est*).⁵¹⁸
3. **“Conjunctive/Disjunctive Canon”**:⁵¹⁹ “And” usually “joins a conjunctive list,” combining items, while “or” usually joins “a disjunctive list,” denoting alternatives.⁵²⁰
4. ***Ejusdem Generis***: A general term that follows an enumerated list of more specific terms should be interpreted to cover only “matters similar to those specified.”⁵²¹
5. ***Expresio Unius***: “The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others (*expresio unius est exclusio alterius*).”⁵²² This canon is strongest “when the items expressed are members of an ‘associated group or series,’ justifying the

⁵¹⁴ See discussion *supra*, “Justifications: Disrepute, Rehabilitation, and Empirical Studies.” See also SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 59 (outlining the “principle of interrelating canons,” stating that “[n]o canon of interpretation is absolute”).

⁵¹⁵ Both lists from which this appendix is drawn do draw further distinctions, but such groupings require more discussion and justification than would arguably be helpful here.

⁵¹⁶ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 273 (emphasis added).

⁵¹⁷ *Id.* See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1196 (noting Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, supplies default statutory definitions). See, e.g., *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 573 U.S. 682, 707–08 (2014) (adopting Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” to conclude corporations were covered by disputed statute); *Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens*, 529 U.S. 765, 780 (2000) (applying the “longstanding interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign”).

⁵¹⁸ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 93; *State v. I.C.S.*, 145 So. 3d 350, 355 (La. 2014) (“We recognize the canon *casus omissus pro omisso habendus est*, which means that a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.”). See also, e.g., *Ebert v. Poston*, 266 U.S. 548, 554 (1925) (“A *casus omissus* does not justify judicial legislation. This Act is so carefully drawn as to leave little room for conjecture.” (citation omitted)). Cf. ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1198 (“Avoid the implication of broad congressional delegation of agency authority when statute carefully limits agency authority in particular matters.”).

⁵¹⁹ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 116 (emphasis added).

⁵²⁰ *Id.* See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1197. See, e.g., *City of Rome v. United States*, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980) (“By describing the elements of discriminatory purpose and effect in the conjunctive [by using “and”], Congress plainly intended that a voting practice not be precleared unless *both* discriminatory purpose and effect are absent.”); *United States v. Woods*, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013) (“[T]he operative terms are connected by the conjunction ‘or.’ . . . [That term’s] ordinary use is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to ‘be given separate meanings.’” (quoting *Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.*, 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979))). *But cf.* SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 116–25 (discussing nuances introduced by the use of “negatives, plurals, and various specific wordings”).

⁵²¹ *Gooch v. United States*, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936). *Accord* *Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.*, 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (“Under that rule [of *ejusdem generis*], when a statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it follows.”). See also SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 199; ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1195.

⁵²² SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 107. See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1195. See, e.g., *Lindh v. Murphy*, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) (describing “negative implications raised by disparate provisions”).

- inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.”⁵²³
6. **“Gender/Number Canon”**:⁵²⁴ Usually, “the masculine includes the feminine (and vice versa) and the singular includes the plural (and vice versa).”⁵²⁵
 7. **“General/Specific Canon”**:⁵²⁶ Where two laws conflict, “the specific governs the general (*generalia specialibus non derogant*).”⁵²⁷ That is, “a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies,”⁵²⁸ and conversely, “a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.”⁵²⁹
 8. **“General-Terms Canon”**:⁵³⁰ “General terms are to be given their general meaning (*generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda*).”⁵³¹
 9. **Grammar Canon**: Statutes “follow accepted standards of grammar.”⁵³²
 10. **“Harmonious-Reading Canon”**:⁵³³ “The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.”⁵³⁴

⁵²³ *Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.*, 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (quoting *United States v. Vonn*, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).

⁵²⁴ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 129 (emphasis added).

⁵²⁵ *Id.* See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1196 (noting Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, supplies default statutory definitions). See, e.g., *United States v. Hayes*, 555 U.S. 415, 432 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing singular statutory term should be read to encompass the plural, by reference to the Dictionary Act and semantic context); but see, e.g., *Niz-Chavez v. Garland*, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480 (2021) (emphasizing the use of “the singular article ‘a’” to conclude that the statute referred to a singular term).

⁵²⁶ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 183 (emphasis added).

⁵²⁷ *Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard*, 568 U.S. 17, 21 (2012). See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1199 (“Specific provisions targeting a particular issue apply instead of provisions more generally covering the issue.”); SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 183 (“If there is a conflict between a general provision and a specific provision, the specific provision prevails (*generalia specialibus non derogant*).”).

⁵²⁸ *Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin.*, 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976). See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1210.

⁵²⁹ *Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.*, 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976). But as the authors point out in *Reading Law*, it can be “difficult to determine whether a provision is a general or a specific one.” SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 187–88 (discussing *Radzanower*).

⁵³⁰ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 101 (emphasis added).

⁵³¹ *Id.* See, e.g., *Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker*, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002) (giving unqualified statutory term broad meaning). See also *Arizona v. Tohono O’odham Nation*, 818 F.3d 549, 557 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] word or phrase is not ambiguous just because it has a broad general meaning under the *generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda* canon of statutory construction.”).

⁵³² ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1197. See also SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 140. See, e.g., *Niz-Chavez v. Garland*, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1481 (2021) (discussing the use of definite versus indefinite articles); *Carr v. United States*, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010) (“Consistent with normal usage, we have frequently looked to Congress’ choice of verb tense to ascertain a statute’s temporal reach.”). Cf. *Nielsen v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954, 964–65 (2019) (noting that “an adverb cannot modify a noun,” but saying this rule of grammar is not dispositive and “merely complements” a reading based on statutory context).

⁵³³ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 180 (emphasis added).

⁵³⁴ *Id.* See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1198 (“Avoid interpreting a provision in a way that is inconsistent with the overall structure of the statute or with another provision or with a subsequent amendment to the statute or with another statute enacted by a Congress relying on a particular interpretation.” (citations omitted)). See, e.g., *Lindh v. Murphy*, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (favoring reading that “accords more coherence” to the disputed statutory provisions).

11. **“Irreconcilability Canon”**:⁵³⁵ “If a text contains truly irreconcilable provisions at the same level of generality, and they have been simultaneously adopted, neither provision should be given effect.”⁵³⁶
12. **Legislative History Canons**:⁵³⁷ “[C]lear evidence of congressional intent” gathered from legislative history “may illuminate ambiguous text.”⁵³⁸ The most “authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill.”⁵³⁹ Floor statements, especially those made by a bill’s sponsors prior to its passage, may be relevant,⁵⁴⁰ but should be used cautiously.⁵⁴¹ “[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”⁵⁴²
13. **“Mandatory/Permissive Canon”**:⁵⁴³ “Shall” is usually mandatory and imposes a duty; “may” usually grants discretion.⁵⁴⁴
14. **“Nearest-Reasonable-Referent Canon”**:⁵⁴⁵ “When the syntax involves something other than a parallel series of nouns or verbs, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies only to the nearest reasonable referent.”⁵⁴⁶
15. ***Noscitur a Sociis***: “Associated words bear on one another’s meaning”⁵⁴⁷

⁵³⁵ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 189 (emphasis added).

⁵³⁶ *Id.*

⁵³⁷ The authors of *Reading Law* disagree with the use of legislative history to discover statutory purpose and describe the idea “that committee reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in statutory construction” as a “false notion.” SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 367.

⁵³⁸ *Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy*, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1202 (“Consider legislative history (the internal evolution of a statute before enactment) if the statute is ambiguous.”).

⁵³⁹ *Garcia v. United States*, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1202 (“Committee reports (especially conference committee reports reflecting the understanding of both House and Senate) are the most authoritative legislative history, but cannot trump a textual plain meaning, and should not be relied on if they are themselves ambiguous or imprecise.” (citations omitted)); *id.* at 1203 (“Committee report language that cannot be tied to a specific statutory provision cannot be credited. House and Senate reports inconsistent with one another should be discounted.” (citations omitted)).

⁵⁴⁰ *See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 548 U.S. 557, 580 n.10 (2006). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1203.

⁵⁴¹ *See, e.g., Garcia*, 469 U.S. at 76 (“We have eschewed reliance on the passing comments of one Member, and casual statements from the floor debates.” (citation omitted)). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1203. *Cf. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline*, 540 U.S. 581, 599 (2004) (“Even from a sponsor, a single outlying statement cannot stand against a tide of context and history, not to mention 30 years of judicial interpretation producing no apparent legislative qualms.”).

⁵⁴² *Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.*, 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980) (quoting *United States v. Price*, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1203.

⁵⁴³ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 112 (emphasis added).

⁵⁴⁴ *Id.*; ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1197. *See, e.g., Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States*, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016) (“Unlike the word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement.”). *But see, e.g.,* SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 113–14 (noting controversy over whether “shall” is mandatory). Scalia and Garner describe the first half of this canon as “mandatory words impose a duty,” without specifically naming “shall” in the rule itself. SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 112.

⁵⁴⁵ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 152 (emphasis added).

⁵⁴⁶ *Id. See, e.g., Ray v. McCullough Payne & Haan, L.L.C.*, 838 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2016).

⁵⁴⁷ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 195. *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1195. *See, e.g., United States v. Williams*, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008) (“[T]he commonsense canon of *noscitur a sociis* . . . counsels that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.”); *Beecham v. United States*, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994) (“That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well.”). *Cf. S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’tl. Prot.*, 547 U.S. 370, 379–80 (2006)

16. **Ordinary Meaning Canon:** Words should be given “their ordinary, everyday meanings,”⁵⁴⁸ unless “Congress has provided a specific definition”⁵⁴⁹ or “the context indicates that they bear a technical sense.”⁵⁵⁰
17. **Plain Meaning Rule and Absurdity Doctrine:** “Follow the plain meaning of the statutory text, except when a textual plain meaning requires an absurd result or suggests a scrivener’s error.”⁵⁵¹
18. **“Predicate-Act Canon”**:⁵⁵² “The law has long recognized that the ‘[a]uthorization of an act also authorizes a necessary predicate act.’”⁵⁵³
19. **“Prefatory-Materials”⁵⁵⁴ and “Titles-and-Headings”⁵⁵⁵ Canons:** Preambles, purpose clauses, recitals, titles, and headings are all “permissible indicators of meaning,”⁵⁵⁶ though they generally will not be dispositive.⁵⁵⁷

(“[N]oscitur a sociis is no help absent some sort of gathering with a common feature to extrapolate.”).

⁵⁴⁸ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 69. See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1196. See, e.g., *Perrin v. United States*, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (“A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”). See also SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 78 (“Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted”); *Perrin*, 444 U.S. at 42 (“[W]e look to the ordinary meaning of the term . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute . . .”).

⁵⁴⁹ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1196. See also SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 225. See, e.g., *Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd.*, 357 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that although “in some instances there may be ambiguity” regarding whether the statute covered a single rail container, there was no ambiguity in that case, given that “Congress has defined ‘vehicle’ with sufficient breadth to include an individual rail car”).

⁵⁵⁰ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 69. See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1196. See, e.g., *Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.*, 513 U.S. 561, 576 (1995) (holding statutory word “is a term of art”); *cf.*, e.g., *Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.*, 139 S. Ct. 873, 879–80 (2019) (rejecting argument that statutory phrase is term of art).

⁵⁵¹ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1195 (citations omitted). See also SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 56 (“supremacy-of-text principle”); *id.* at 234 (absurdity doctrine). See, e.g., *Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”); *Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice*, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (“Where the literal reading of a statutory term would ‘compel an odd result,’ we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.” (quoting *Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.*, 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989))); *U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc.*, 508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993) (“[W]e are convinced that the placement of the quotation marks in the 1916 Act was a simple scrivener’s error, a mistake made by someone unfamiliar with the law’s object and design. . . . The true meaning of the 1916 Act is clear beyond question, and so we repunctuate.”); *cf.*, e.g., *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.*, 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005) (noting that a result may be “odd” but not “absurd”).

⁵⁵² SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 192 (emphasis added).

⁵⁵³ *Luis v. United States*, 578 U.S. 5, 26 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 192). See also, e.g., *State ex rel. Brown v. Klein*, 22 S.W. 693, 695 (Mo. 1893) (“[W]henever a power is given by a statute, everything necessary to the making of it effectual or requisite to attain the end is implied. *Quando lex aliquid concedit concedere videtur et id, per quod devenitur ad illud.*”).

⁵⁵⁴ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 217 (emphasis added).

⁵⁵⁵ *Id.* at 221 (emphasis added).

⁵⁵⁶ *Id.* at 217, 221. See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1197. See, e.g., *S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. Of Envtl. Prot.*, 547 U.S. 370, 385 (2006) (relying on congressional declarations of policy); *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section’ are ‘tools available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning of a statute.” (quoting *Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.*, 331 U.S. 519, 529 (1947))).

⁵⁵⁷ See, e.g., *Yates v. United States*, 574 U.S. 528, 552 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Titles, of course, are . . . not dispositive.”); *Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen*, 331 U.S. at 528 (“[H]eadings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text.”).

20. **Presumption of Consistent Usage:** “Generally, identical words used in different parts of the same statute are . . . presumed to have the same meaning.”⁵⁵⁸ Conversely, “a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.”⁵⁵⁹
21. **“Presumption of Nonexclusive ‘Include’”**:⁵⁶⁰ “[T]he term ‘including’ is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle.”⁵⁶¹
22. **“Presumption of Validity”**:⁵⁶² “An interpretation that validates outweighs one that invalidates (*ut res magis valeat quam pereat*).”⁵⁶³ Stated another way, courts should construe statutes to have effect.⁵⁶⁴
23. **“Proviso Canon”**:⁵⁶⁵ “A proviso,” or “a clause that introduces a condition,” traditionally by using the word “provided,” “conditions the principal matter that it qualifies—almost always the matter immediately preceding.”⁵⁶⁶
24. **Punctuation Canon:** Statutes “follow accepted punctuation standards,”⁵⁶⁷ and “[p]unctuation is a permissible indicator of meaning.”⁵⁶⁸
25. **Purposive Construction:** “[I]nterpret ambiguous statutes so as best to carry out their statutory purposes.”⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁵⁸ *Robers v. United States*, 572 U.S. 639, 643 (2014) (quoting *Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit*, 547 U.S. 71, 86 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also, e.g., Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt*, 139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512 (2019) (“In all but the most unusual situations, a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed meaning.”). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1198 (“presumption of statutory consistency”); SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 170 (“presumption of consistent usage”).

⁵⁵⁹ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 170. *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1198 (“presumption of meaningful variation”). *See, e.g., Russello v. United States*, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[Where] Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (alteration in original) (quoting *United States v. Wong Kim Bo*, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

⁵⁶⁰ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 132 (emphasis added).

⁵⁶¹ *Fed. Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co.*, 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941). *See also* SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 132 (“The verb *to include* introduces examples, not an exclusive list.”).

⁵⁶² SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 66 (emphasis added).

⁵⁶³ *Id.* at 66. *See, e.g., Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe*, 114 U.S. 525, 534 (1885) (discussing approvingly *United States v. Cornell*, 25 F. Cas. 646, 649 (D.R.I. 1819) (No. 14,867)). This principle overlaps with the canon of constitutional avoidance. *See infra* note 583 and accompanying text; *see, e.g., Virginia v. Black*, 538 U.S. 343, 378 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]pplying the maxim ‘*ut res magis valeat quam pereat*’ we would do precisely the opposite of what the plurality does here—that is, we would adopt the alternative reading that renders the statute constitutional rather than unconstitutional.”) (emphasis omitted).

⁵⁶⁴ *See Clark v. Barnard*, 108 U.S. 436, 461 (1883) (“It is admitted, that if it does not mean this, it does not mean anything, and we have already said that we are not at liberty to adopt that alternative. We must construe it, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat* . . .”). *See also, e.g., Election Cases*, 65 Pa. 20, 31 (1870) (concluding that the legislature could not have intended to require something impossible, and therefore construing it not to require that).

⁵⁶⁵ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 154 (emphasis added).

⁵⁶⁶ *Id.* *See, e.g., Pennington v. United States*, 48 Ct. Cl. 408, 411, 413 (1913) (rejecting argument that proviso was “a separate and independent statute” and holding instead that, according to the general rule, it modified only “the enacting clause to which [it was] attached”).

⁵⁶⁷ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1196. *See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am.*, 508 U.S. 439, 454 (1993) (“[T]he meaning of a statute will typically heed the commands of its punctuation.”).

⁵⁶⁸ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 161. *See, e.g., Jama v. ICE*, 543 U.S. 335, 344 (2005) (“Each clause is distinct and ends with a period, strongly suggesting that each may be understood completely . . .”).

⁵⁶⁹ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1210. The casebook also describes a number of subject-area-specific descriptions of purpose as canons; those are excluded from this appendix. *See, e.g., id.* at 1212 (“Sherman Act should

26. **Reddendo Singula Singulis**: “[W]ords and provisions are referred to their appropriate objects”⁵⁷⁰
27. **Rule Against Surplusage**: Courts should “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute”⁵⁷¹ so that “no clause is rendered ‘superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”⁵⁷²
28. **Rule of the Last Antecedent**: “[A] limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows”⁵⁷³
29. **“Scope-of-Subparts Canon”**:⁵⁷⁴ “Material within an indented subpart relates only to that subpart; material contained in unindented text relates to all the following or preceding indented subparts.”⁵⁷⁵
30. **Series-Qualifier Canon**: “‘When there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a modifier at the end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’”⁵⁷⁶
31. **“Subordinating/Superordinating Canon”**:⁵⁷⁷ “Subordinating language (signaled by *subject to*) or superordinating language (signaled by *notwithstanding* or *despite*) merely shows which provision prevails in the event of a clash—but does not necessarily denote a clash of provisions.”⁵⁷⁸

be applied in light of its overall purpose of benefitting consumers.”). Cf. SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 63 (“A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the document’s purpose should be favored.”); *see, e.g.*, Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Passenger R.R. Co., 102 Pa. 190, 196 (1883) (“[T]his purpose and object of the statute, [under the proposed construction,] would be defeated; the absurdity of such a construction is therefore apparent.”).

⁵⁷⁰ Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 204 (1918). *See also* SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 214 (“Distributive phrasing applies each expression to its appropriate referent”).

⁵⁷¹ Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

⁵⁷² Young v. UPS, 575 U.S. 206, 226 (2015) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)) (internal quotation mark omitted). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1197 (“Presumption against redundancy: avoid interpreting a provision in a way that would render other provisions of the statute superfluous or unnecessary.”); SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 174 (“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (*verba cum effectu sunt accipienda*). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”). *But see, e.g.*, Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873, 881 (2019) (“Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.”).

⁵⁷³ Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1197; SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 144 (defining rule as applicable to “a pronoun, relative pronoun, or demonstrative adjective” because “strictly speaking, only pronouns have antecedents”).

⁵⁷⁴ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 156 (emphasis added).

⁵⁷⁵ *Id. See, e.g.*, Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 344 (2005) (“Each clause is distinct and ends with a period, strongly suggesting that each may be understood completely without reading any further.”).

⁵⁷⁶ Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 364 (2016) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 147) (internal quotation marks omitted). Scalia and Garner describe this canon as applicable to either prepositive or postpositive modifiers. SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 147. *See also, e.g.*, Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920) (“When several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.”); *but see, e.g.*, Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, 141 S. Ct. 2434, 2448 (2021) (concluding the series-qualifier canon did not apply based on the statutory context).

⁵⁷⁷ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 126 (emphasis added).

⁵⁷⁸ *Id.* (quoted in part in NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 939 (2017)). *See, e.g.*, Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993) (“[T]he use of such a ‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly signals the drafter’s intention that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions of any other section.”); *see also* Merit

32. “**Unintelligibility Canon**”:⁵⁷⁹ “[A] statute must be capable of construction and interpretation; otherwise it will be inoperative and void.”⁵⁸⁰
33. “**Whole-Text Canon**”:⁵⁸¹ Courts “do not . . . construe statutory phrases in isolation; [they] read statutes as a whole.”⁵⁸²

Substantive Canons

1. **Canon of Constitutional Avoidance:** “[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”⁵⁸³
2. “**Dog that Didn’t Bark**”⁵⁸⁴ **Presumption:** A “prior legal rule should be retained if no one in legislative deliberations even mentioned the rule or discussed any changes in the rule.”⁵⁸⁵
3. **Federalism Canons:** Courts will generally require a clear statement before finding that a federal statute “alter[s] the federal-state balance.”⁵⁸⁶ Thus, for example,

Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 200 L. Ed. 2d 183, 194 (2018) (stating that a notwithstanding clause indicates that a certain provision “operates as an exception” to other provisions). Courts have recognized that the breadth of a “notwithstanding” clause may be influenced by context. *See, e.g., SW Gen.*, 137 S. Ct. at 940; *Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Thomas*, 92 F.3d 792, 796–97 (9th Cir. 1996).

⁵⁷⁹ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 134 (emphasis added).

⁵⁸⁰ *State v. Partlow*, 91 N.C. 550, 553 (1884). *See also* SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 134 (“An unintelligible text is inoperative.”).

⁵⁸¹ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 167 (emphasis added).

⁵⁸² *United States v. Morton*, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1197; SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 167. *See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”); *Pennington v. Coxe*, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 52–53 (1804) (“That a law is the best expositor of itself, that every part of an act is to be taken into view, for the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature; and that the details of one part may contain regulations restricting the extent of general expressions used in another part of the same act, are among those plain rules laid down by common sense for the exposition of statutes which have been uniformly acknowledged.”).

⁵⁸³ *Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council*, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); *cf., e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 561 U.S. 1, 17 (2010) (declining to apply the canon). *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1203–04; SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 247.

⁵⁸⁴ *Church of Scientology v. IRS*, 484 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987) (“All in all, we think this is a case where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘dog that didn’t bark,’ that an amendment having the effect petitioner ascribes to it would have been differently described by its sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the floor manager of the bill.”). *See also* Anita S. Krishnakumar, *The Sherlock Holmes Canon*, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2016) (examining these “‘failure to comment’ arguments” as “the Sherlock Holmes canon”).

⁵⁸⁵ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1203. *See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ.*, 550 U.S. 81, 91 (2007) (“No one at the time—no Member of Congress, no Department of Education official, no school district or State—expressed the view that this statutory language . . . was intended to require, or did require, the Secretary to change the Department’s system of calculation, a system that the Department and school districts across the Nation had followed for nearly 20 years . . .”). The authors of *Reading Law* reject this canon. SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 387. *See also* *Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh*, 543 U.S. 50, 73–74 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I have often criticized the Court’s use of legislative history because it lends itself to a kind of ventriloquism. . . . The Canon of Canine Silence that the Court invokes today introduces a reverse—and at least equally dangerous—phenomenon, under which courts may refuse to believe Congress’s own words unless they can see the lips of others moving in unison.”).

⁵⁸⁶ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1205. *See also id.* at 1205–06; SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 290. *See, e.g., Bond v. United States*, 572 U.S. 844, 860 (2014).

- courts require Congress to speak with “unmistakeable clarity” in order to “abrogate state sovereign immunity.”⁵⁸⁷
4. **In Pari Materia**: “[S]tatutes addressing the same subject matter generally should be read ‘as if they were one law.’”⁵⁸⁸
 5. **“Mens Rea Canon”**:⁵⁸⁹ Courts should “presume that a criminal statute derived from the common law carries with it the requirement of a culpable mental state—even if no such limitation appears in the text—unless it is clear that the Legislature intended to impose strict liability.”⁵⁹⁰ In the context of civil liability, “willfulness . . . cover[s] not only knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well.”⁵⁹¹
 6. **Nondelegation Doctrine**: Courts should presume that “Congress does not delegate authority without sufficient guidelines.”⁵⁹²
 7. **“Penalty/Illegality Canon”**:⁵⁹³ “[A] statute that penalizes an act makes it unlawful”⁵⁹⁴
 8. **“Pending-Action Canon”**:⁵⁹⁵ “When statutory law is altered during the pendency of a lawsuit, the courts at every level must apply the new law unless doing so would violate the presumption against retroactivity.”⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁸⁷ *Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak*, 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991). See also *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1209; *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 281.

⁵⁸⁸ *Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Schmidt*, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (quoting *Erlenbaugh v. United States*, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972)). See also *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1201 (“*In pari materia* rule: when similar statutory provisions are found in comparable statutory schemes, interpreters should presumptively apply them the same way.”); *id.* at 1210 (“*In pari materia*: similar statutes should be interpreted similarly, unless legislative history or purpose suggests material differences.”); *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 252 (“Statutes *in pari materia* are to be interpreted together, as though they were one law.”). Cf. *Smith v. City of Jackson*, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (“[W]hen Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes.”); *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1201 (“Presumption that Congress uses same term consistently in different statutes.”); *id.* (“Borrowed statute rule: when Congress borrows a statute, it adopts by implication interpretations placed on that statute, absent indication to the contrary.”).

⁵⁸⁹ *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 303 (emphasis added).

⁵⁹⁰ *Bond*, 572 U.S. at 857. See also *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1207; *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 303. See also, e.g., *United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.*, 438 U.S. 422, 437–38 (1978).

⁵⁹¹ *Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr*, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007). See also *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1207.

⁵⁹² *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1204. See *Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (“In recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”).

⁵⁹³ *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 295 (emphasis added).

⁵⁹⁴ *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius*, 567 U.S. 519, 664 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). See also *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 295.

⁵⁹⁵ *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 266 (emphasis added).

⁵⁹⁶ *Id.* Cf. *Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd.*, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974) (“[A] court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.”); but see *Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno*, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990) (noting “apparent tension” between the rule of *Bradley*, 416 U.S. at 711, and the presumption against retroactivity but declining to resolve that tension); *id.* at 841 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing these principles are not merely in tension but are “in irreconcilable contradiction”).

9. **Presumption Against Extraterritoriality:** Courts should presume, “absent a clear statement from Congress, that federal statutes do not apply outside the United States.”⁵⁹⁷
10. **“Presumption Against Hiding Elephants in Mouseholes”**.⁵⁹⁸
“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”⁵⁹⁹
11. **Presumption Against Implied Repeals:** “[R]epeals by implication are not favored.”⁶⁰⁰
12. **Presumption Against Implied Right of Action:** Courts should not imply a private remedy “unless . . . congressional intent [to create a private remedy] can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source.”⁶⁰¹ Without such intent, “a cause of action does not exist.”⁶⁰²

⁵⁹⁷ Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1208 (“Rule against extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Presumption that Congress legislates with domestic concerns in mind.” (citations omitted)); SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 268 (“A statute presumptively has no extraterritorial application (*statuta suo clauduntur territorio, nec ultra territorium disponunt*).”). Cf. ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1201 (“Presumption that statutes be interpreted consistent with international law and treaties.”); *id.* at 1204 (“Presumption that U.S. law conforms to U.S. international obligations. Presumption that Congress takes account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when it writes American laws.” (citations omitted)); *id.* at 1208 (“American laws apply to foreign-flag ships in U.S. territory and affecting Americans, but will not apply to the ‘internal affairs’ of a foreign-flag ship unless there is a clear statutory statement to that effect.”).

⁵⁹⁸ ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1201 (emphasis added).

⁵⁹⁹ Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1201. Cf., e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020) (declining to apply the canon where the statute was “written in starkly broad terms” and could not be considered a “mousehole”). Cf. Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 142 S. Ct. 2354, 2365 (2022) (citing *Whitman* to argue that a parenthetical phrase was “incapable of bearing” an “interpretive weight” that would have overridden other indicia of statutory meaning).

⁶⁰⁰ Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974) (quoting *Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank*, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)) (internal quotation mark omitted). See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1201, 1210 (“Presumption against repeals by implication. But where there is a clear repugnancy between a more recent statutory scheme and an earlier one, partial repeal will be inferred.” (citations omitted)); SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 327 (“Repeals by implication are disfavored But a provision that flatly contradicts an earlier-enacted provision repeals it.”); *id.* at 336 (“A statute is not repealed by nonuse or desuetude.”). Cf. *Posadas*, 296 U.S. at 503 (“There are two well-settled categories of repeals by implication—(1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.”).

⁶⁰¹ *Nw. Airlines v. Transp. Workers Union*, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981). See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1204 (“Presumption against ‘implying’ causes of action into federal statutes.”); *id.* at 1210 (“Presumption *against* private right of action unless statute expressly provides one”); SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 313 (“A statute’s mere prohibition of a certain act does not imply creation of a private right of action for its violation. The creation of such a right must be either express or clearly implied from the text of the statute.”). Cf. ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1210 (“When Congress enacts a specific remedy when no remedy was clearly recognized previously, the new remedy is regarded as exclusive.”). See also, e.g., *Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg*, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991) (“[A]ny private right of action for violating a federal statute must ultimately rest on congressional intent to provide a private remedy. From this the corollary follows that the breadth of the right once recognized should not, as a general matter, grow beyond the scope congressionally intended.” (citation omitted)).

⁶⁰² *Alexander v. Sandoval*, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).

13. **Presumption Against Retroactive Legislation:** “[C]ourts read laws as prospective in application unless Congress has unambiguously instructed retroactivity.”⁶⁰³
14. **Presumption Against Waiver of Sovereign Immunity:** A waiver of sovereign immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”⁶⁰⁴
15. **Presumption for Retaining the Common Law:** “[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law, [courts] must presume that ‘Congress intended to retain the substance of the common law.’”⁶⁰⁵
16. **Presumptions in Favor of Judicial Process:** Courts sometimes require clear statements from Congress in order to bar judicial review of certain claims.⁶⁰⁶
17. **“Presumption of Continuity”:**⁶⁰⁷ “Congress does not create discontinuities in legal rights and obligations without some clear statement.”⁶⁰⁸
18. **Presumption of Legislative Acquiescence:** “[A] long adhered to administrative interpretation dating from the legislative enactment, with no subsequent change having been made in the statute involved, raises a presumption of legislative acquiescence”⁶⁰⁹ This also applies to judicial interpretations of the statute.⁶¹⁰

⁶⁰³ *Vartelas v. Holder*, 566 U.S. 257, 266 (2012). See also *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1207; *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 261. Cf. *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1209 (“[L]aw takes effect on date of enactment.” (citing *Gozlon-Peretz v. United States*, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991))).

⁶⁰⁴ *United States v. King*, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). See also *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1209; *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 281. See also, e.g., *FAA v. Cooper*, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012). The same is true for a statute to waive state sovereign immunity. See *infra* note 587. Cf. *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1209 (“Presumption that federal agencies launched into commercial world with power to ‘sue and be sued’ are not entitled to sovereign immunity.”).

⁶⁰⁵ *Kirtsang v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.*, 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (first alteration in original) (quoting *Samantar v. Yousuf*, 560 U.S. 305, 320 n.13 (2010)). See also *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1208 (“Presumption in favor of following common law usage and rules where Congress has employed words or concepts with well-settled common law traditions.”); *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 318 (“A statute will be construed to alter the common law only when that disposition is clear.”); *id.* at 320 (“A statute that uses a common-law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning.”). See also, e.g., *Evans v. United States*, 504 U.S. 255, 259 (1992) (“[A] statutory term is generally presumed to have its common-law meaning.” (quoting *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).

⁶⁰⁶ *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1207 (“Presumption in favor of judicial review.”); *id.* (“Rule against interpreting statutes to deny a right to jury trial.”); *id.* (“Super-strong rule against implied congressional abrogation or repeal of habeas corpus.”); *id.* at 1208 (“Presumption against exhaustion of remedies requirement for lawsuit to enforce constitutional rights.”); *id.* (“Presumption that judgments will not be binding upon persons not party to adjudication.”); *id.* (“Presumption against foreclosure of private enforcement of important federal rights.”). See, e.g., *Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). But see *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 367 (describing as a “false notion” the idea “that a statute cannot oust courts of jurisdiction unless it does so expressly”).

⁶⁰⁷ *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1201 (emphasis added).

⁶⁰⁸ *Id.* See *Finley v. United States*, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989) (“Under established canons of statutory construction, ‘it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.’” (quoting *Anderson v. Pac. Coast S.S. Co.*, 225 U.S. 187, 199 (1912))); *Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.*, 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989) (“A party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change.”).

⁶⁰⁹ *Baker v. Compton*, 211 N.E.2d 162, 164 (Ind. 1965) (citing *Costanzo v. Tillinghast*, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932)). See also *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1202 (“acquiescence rules”); *id.* at 1199 (“Even informal and unsettled agency interpretations (such as those embodied in handbooks or litigation briefs) may be useful confirmations for the interpreter’s interpretation of statutory language.”).

⁶¹⁰ E.g., *Shapiro v. United States*, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948) (“In adopting the language used in the earlier act, Congress ‘must be considered to have adopted the construction given by this Court to such language, and made it a part of the enactment.’” (quoting *Hecht v. Malley*, 265 U.S. 144, 153 (1924))). See also *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 322 (“If a statute uses words or phrases that have already received authoritative construction by the jurisdiction’s court

More broadly, “when a statute refers to a general subject, the statute adopts the law on that subject as it exists whenever a question under the statute arises.”⁶¹¹ If Congress reenacts a statute without any change, it incorporates any settled judicial constructions of the statute “so broad and unquestioned that [a court] must presume Congress knew of and endorsed it.”⁶¹² However, “[o]rdinarily, . . . courts are slow to attribute significance to the failure of Congress to act on particular legislation.”⁶¹³

19. **Presumption of Narrow Construction of Exceptions:** “An exception to a ‘general statement of policy’ is ‘usually read . . . narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision.’”⁶¹⁴
20. **“Presumption of Purposive Amendment”:**⁶¹⁵ Courts should assume that Congress intends any statutory “amendment to have real and substantial effect.”⁶¹⁶
21. **“Repeal-of-Repealer Canon”:**⁶¹⁷ “The repeal or expiration of a repealing statute does not reinstate the original statute.”⁶¹⁸
22. **“Repealability Canon”:**⁶¹⁹ “[O]ne legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former legislature was competent to pass; and . . . one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.”⁶²⁰

of last resort, or even uniform construction by inferior courts or a responsible administrative agency, they are to be understood according to that construction.”)

⁶¹¹ *Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp.*, 139 S. Ct. 759, 769 (2019) (describing this as the “‘reference’ canon”).

⁶¹² *Jama v. ICE*, 543 U.S. 335, 349 (2005) (holding there was no such “congressional ratification”). *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1202 (“re-enactment rule”); *see also, e.g.*, *United States v. Davis*, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2331 (2019) (referring to but rejecting application of the “reenactment canon”).

⁶¹³ *Bob Jones Univ. v. United States*, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983).

⁶¹⁴ *Maracich v. Spears*, 570 U.S. 48, 60 (2013) (quoting *Commissioner v. Clark*, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (alteration in original)). *See also* *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1199, 1211. *See also, e.g.*, *A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling*, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (“Any exemption from . . . remedial legislation must . . . be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of statutory language and the intent of Congress.”). *But see* *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 359 (describing as “false notion” the idea “that tax exemptions—or any other exemptions for this matter—should be strictly construed”); *BP p.l.c. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore*, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1538–39 (2021) (rejecting narrow construction of exception and saying the Court has “no right to place our thumbs on one side of the scale or the other”). *Cf., e.g.*, *Bostock v. Clayton Cty.*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747 (2020) (“Nor is there any such thing as a ‘canon of donut holes,’ in which Congress’s failure to speak directly to a specific case that falls within a more general statutory rule creates a tacit exception. Instead, when Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule.”); *Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co.*, 446 U.S. 609, 616–17 (1980) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied . . .”).

⁶¹⁵ *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1198 (emphasis added).

⁶¹⁶ *Stone v. INS*, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995). *See also* *ESKRIDGE ET AL.*, *supra* note 505, at 1198 (“[S]tatutory amendments are meant to have real and substantial effect.”); *id.* at 1202 (“Statutory history (the formal evolution of a statute, as Congress amends it over the years) is always potentially relevant.”); *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 256 (“If the legislature amends or reenacts a provision other than by way of a consolidating statute or restyling project, a significant change in language is presumed to entail a change in meaning.”). *See also, e.g.*, *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc.*, 547 U.S. 47, 57–58 (2006) (“We refuse to interpret the Solomon Amendment in a way that negates its recent revision, and indeed would render it a largely meaningless exercise.”).

⁶¹⁷ *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 334 (emphasis added).

⁶¹⁸ *Id.*

⁶¹⁹ *Id.* at 278 (emphasis added).

⁶²⁰ *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810). *See also* *SCALIA & GARNER*, *supra* note 505, at 278 (“The legislature cannot derogate from its own authority or the authority of its successors.”).

23. **Rule of Lenity:** “Ambiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.”⁶²¹

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⁶²¹ SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 296. *See also* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1207, 1213. *E.g.*, *Liparota v. United States*, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985). *Cf.* ESKRIDGE ET AL., *supra* note 505, at 1207 (“Rule of lenity may apply to civil sanction that is punitive or when underlying liability is criminal.”); *see also* SCALIA & GARNER, *supra* note 505, at 297–98 (discussing this “interpretive problem”).