Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)

As an operational concept, Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) influence what types of weapon systems and equipment the Army procures, what types and numbers of soldiers are needed, the organizational structure of the Army, and what type of training is required—all significant legislative concerns for Congress. As such, an understanding of MDO could prove beneficial for congressional oversight activities.

What Are Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)?

According to the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC):

Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) describes how the U.S. Army, as part of the joint force [Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Space Force] can counter and defeat a near-peer adversary capable of contesting the U.S. in all domains [air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace] in both competition and armed conflict. The concept describes how U.S. ground forces, as part of the joint and multinational team, deter adversaries and defeat highly capable near-peer enemies in the 2025-2050 timeframe.

MDO provides commanders numerous options for executing simultaneous and sequential operations using surprise and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities across all domains to present multiple dilemmas to an adversary in order to gain physical and psychological advantages and influence and control over the operational environment.

Why Did the Army Adopt MDO?

MDO is described in detail in a December 2018 Army publication titled The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028. MDO was developed in response to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which shifted the previous focus of U.S. national security from countering violent extremists worldwide to confronting revisionist powers—primarily Russia and China—that are said to “want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.” According to The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028:

China and Russia exploit the conditions of the operational environment to achieve their objectives without resorting to armed conflict by fracturing the U.S.’s alliances, partnerships, and resolve. They attempt to create stand-off through the integration of diplomatic and economic actions, unconventional and information warfare (social media, false narratives, cyber-attacks), and the actual or threatened employment of conventional forces. By creating instability within countries and alliances, China and Russia create political separation that results in strategic ambiguity reducing the speed of friendly recognition, decision, and reaction. Through these competitive actions, China and Russia believe they can achieve objectives below the threshold of armed conflict.

How the Army Intends to Compete

Arguably, competition is a critical aspect of MDO because if it is conducted successfully, conflict might be avoided. According to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Paper #2, The Army in Military Competition, dated March 1, 2021, the Army competes in three ways:

Narrative competition, which is reflected in the rise and fall of a country’s reputation based on general perceptions of its strength, reliability, and resolve. The Army contributes by being a lethal, competent, credible force and being recognized as such by allies and partners, as well as by adversaries.

Direct competition, which encompasses the full range of competitive activities, from the lowest intensity competition below armed conflict through general state conflict. In direct competition, the objective is to create leverage for the United States and to deny it to the adversary.

Indirect competition, in which the objective is to gain advantage (or deny it to the adversary). This objective is in contrast to the more forceful concept of leverage in direct competition. The Army contributes by offering a range of credible (low- and moderate-intensity and risk) options for policymakers.

Some of these options include activities such as overseas exercises, security cooperation, security force assistance, military-to-military exchanges, overseas basing, intelligence sharing, and disaster relief. In this regard, indirect competition is not a “new” operational concept but instead more along the lines of a redesignation of traditional activities short of armed conflict. Army leadership believes that if the Army and the other Services prevail in these “competitions,” U.S. national security objectives should be achieved.

How MDO Is Intended to Work

The Army’s central idea is to prevail by competing successfully in all domains short of conflict, thereby deterring a potential enemy. If deterrence fails, Army forces—along with the Joint Force—are to:

Penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) systems (layered and integrated long-range precision-strike
systems, littoral anti-ship capabilities, air defenses, and long-range artillery and rocket systems) to enable strategic and operational maneuver of U.S. forces. **Dis-integrate**—disrupt, degrade, or destroy A2/AD systems to enable operational and tactical maneuver of U.S. forces. **Exploit** the resulting freedom of maneuver to achieve operational and strategic objectives by defeating enemy forces in all domains. **Re-compete**—consolidate gains across domains and force a return to competition on favorable terms to the United States and allies.

**How Will MDO Change the Organization of the Army?**

As part of the release of *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, an Army official described to the media that specific Army echelons will be given different “problems” to address under MDO. Existing Divisions and Corps will be tasked with fighting and defeating specific components of the enemy’s system. As such, the Army will no longer organize or center itself on Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as it did under previous National Defense Strategies. Under the previous BCT-centered organizational construct, Divisions and Corps had a limited warfighting role, but under MDO, Divisions and Corps headquarters are to return to their historic warfighting roles, in which they employed subordinate units and allocated Corps- and Division-level assets to support subordinate units.

According to the online magazine *Breaking Defense*, MDO calls for the creation of Field Armies, an intermediate command level between already established Theater Armies—such as U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) or U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR)—and Corps. While one Field Army currently exists—the U.S. 8th Army in Korea—it is not known how many more Field Armies are envisioned under MDO, where they would come from within Army force structure, and where they might be stationed. These Field Armies would supposedly be capable of commanding multiple Corps against near-peer threats.

**The Army’s Way Ahead**

Army leaders reportedly note that MDO will not only have an impact on Army organizations and operations; it will drive Army modernization efforts as well, in terms of development and acquisition of supporting capabilities and systems. Army leadership seeks to have MDO become a joint, multiservice operational concept instead of Army-centric.

**Project Convergence**

Started in the summer of 2020, Project Convergence is an Army initiative designed to rapidly merge the Service’s capabilities with Joint Force assets in the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains. The Army is currently conducting Project Convergence 2021 in the October-November 2021 timeframe and is planning for Project Convergence 2022 as well. Project Convergence is intended to inform and test MDO concepts, technologies, force structures, and procedures, not just within the Army, but as they also relate to the other Services, as well as Allies and Partner Nations.

(For additional information on Project Convergence, see CRS In Focus IF11654, *The Army’s Project Convergence*, by Andrew Feickert.)

**AimPoint Force Structure Initiative**

The primary means by which the Army intends to build its MDO capability is through what it calls the AimPoint Force Structure Initiative. According to the Army, the AimPoint Force is to be a flexible force structure. While little change is expected at brigade level and below, the Army suggests major changes will occur at higher echelons—division, corps, and theater command—that have primarily played a supporting role in counterinsurgency operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under MDO, higher field headquarters will now be required to take the lead in coordinating large-scale campaigns against well-armed nation-states such as Russia and China. The Army also notes that the AimPoint Force will be resource-informed, meaning it will be subject to budget constraints and political considerations. Because of the geographic distinctions between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, individual higher-echelon AimPoint formation force structure will likely differ by theater as opposed to current one-size-fits-all units.

As an example, the Army is creating five Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs): two aligned to the Indo-Pacific region; one aligned to Europe; one stationed in the Arctic region and oriented on multiple threats; and a fifth aligned for global response. MDTFs are to be theater-level units intended to coordinate effects and fires in all domains against A2/AD networks so U.S. Joint Forces can conduct their operational plan (OPLAN)-directed roles.

(For additional information on the Army’s AimPoint Force Structure Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF11542, *The Army’s AimPoint Force Structure Initiative*, by Andrew Feickert.)

(For additional information on MDTFs, see CRS In Focus IF11409, *Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)*, by Andrew Feickert.)

**The Need for a Joint MDO Doctrine?**

Some suggest a shared vision among the Services on multi-domain operations is insufficient and a joint doctrine and warfighting concept for MDO is needed. Such a joint MDO doctrine could compel the Services to adopt a coordinated approach to MDO and ensure corresponding investments are made in systems needed to successfully prosecute MDO. The last joint doctrine, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP-1)*, was published in 2013 and updated in 2017, but this update did not fully take into account the current National Security or National Defense Strategies’ emphasis on great power competition. Reportedly, the new Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) was signed by the Secretary of Defense in June 2021, and the next step will be to issue strategic directives to define joint requirements for the four key tenets of the JWC: joint fires, Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2), contested logistics, and information advantage.

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