Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)

As an operational concept, Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) influence what types of weapon systems and equipment the Army procures, what types and numbers of soldiers are needed, the organizational structure of the Army, and what type of training is required—all significant legislative congressional concerns. As such, an understanding of MDO could prove beneficial for congressional oversight activities.

What Are Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)?
According to the Army’s Field Manual (FM) Operations dated October 1, 2022:

Multi-Domain Operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders. Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost.

Multi-Domain Operations are the Army’s contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum. Below the threshold of armed conflict, multi-domain operations are how Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate readiness for conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they are how Army forces close with and destroy the enemy, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes.

Why Did the Army Adopt MDO?
MDO is described in a December 2018 Army publication, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028. The Army developed MDO in response to the 2018 National Defense Strategy which shifted the previous focus of U.S. national security from countering violent extremists worldwide to confronting revisionist powers—primarily Russia and China—that are said to “want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.” According to The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028:

China and Russia exploit the conditions of the operational environment to achieve their objectives without resorting to armed conflict by fracturing the U.S.’s alliances, partnerships, and resolve. They attempt to create stand-off through the integration of diplomatic and economic actions, unconventional and information warfare (social media, false narratives, cyber-attacks), and the actual or threatened employment of conventional forces. By creating instability within countries and alliances, China and Russia create political separation that results in strategic ambiguity reducing the speed of friendly recognition, decision, and reaction. Through these competitive actions, China and Russia believe they can achieve objectives below the threshold of armed conflict.

How the Army Intends to Compete
Arguably, competition is a critical aspect of MDO because if conducted successfully, conflict might be avoided. According to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Paper #2, The Army in Military Competition, dated March 1, 2021, the Army competes in three ways:

Narrative competition is reflected in the rise and fall of a country’s reputation based on general perceptions of its strength, reliability, and resolve. The Army contributes by being a lethal, competent, credible force and being recognized as such by allies, partners, and adversaries.

Direct competition encompasses the full range of competitive activities, from the lowest intensity competition below armed conflict through general state conflict. In direct competition, the objective is to create leverage for the United States and to deny leverage to adversaries.

Indirect competition’s objective is to gain advantage (or deny it to the adversary). This objective is in contrast to the more forceful concept of leverage in direct competition. The Army contributes by offering a range of credible options for policymakers.

Some of these options include overseas exercises, security cooperation, security force assistance, military-to-military exchanges, overseas basing, intelligence sharing, and disaster relief. In this regard, indirect competition is not a “new” operational concept but instead a “re-designation” of traditional activities short of armed conflict. Army leadership believes that if the Army and the other Services prevail in these “competitions,” U.S. national security objectives should be achieved.

How MDO Is Intended to Work
The Army’s central idea is to prevail by competing successfully in all domains short of conflict, thereby deterring a potential enemy. If deterrence fails, Army and Joint forces are to:

Penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) systems (layered and integrated long-range precision-strike systems, littoral anti-ship capabilities, air defenses, and long-range artillery and rocket systems) to enable strategic and operational maneuver of U.S. forces.
Dis-integrate—disrupt, degrade, or destroy A2/AD systems to enable operational and tactical maneuver of U.S. forces.

Exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to achieve operational and strategic objectives by defeating enemy forces in all domains.

Re-compete—consolidate gains across domains and force a return to competition on favorable terms to the United States and allies.

**How Will MDO Change the Organization of the Army?**

As part of the release of *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, an Army official explained that specific Army echelons are to be given different “problems” to address under MDO. Existing Divisions and Corps are to be tasked with fighting and defeating specific components of the enemy’s system. As such, the Army will no longer organize or center itself on Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as it did under previous National Defense Strategies. Under the previous BCT-centered organizational construct, Divisions and Corps had a limited warfighting role, but under MDO, Divisions and Corps headquarters are to return to their historic warfighting roles, in which they employed subordinate units and allocated Corps and Division-level assets to support subordinate units.

Under MDO, the Army plans to field five different types of divisions across the Active and Reserve Components:

- **The Armored Division** is to be optimized with armored breaching and bridging assets to conduct the military’s most difficult mission: defeating an adversary’s deliberate defenses (penetration).

- **Airborne** and **Air Assault Divisions** are to be capable of joint forcible entry with strategic and operational mobility and vertical envelopment to defeat an adversaries’ defense.

- **The Standard (Heavy) and Standard (Light) Divisions** are to be organized with mixes of brigade combat team types and task-organized to conduct a broad scope of missions worldwide.

The Army is also creating five Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs): two aligned to the Indo-Pacific region; one aligned to Europe; one stationed in the Arctic region and oriented on multiple threats; and a fifth aligned for global response. MDTFs are to be theater-level units to coordinate effects and fires in all domains against A2/AD networks.

**How Will MDO Impact Army Modernization?**

The Army says it will conduct MDO modernization in accordance with the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM). According to an August 2022 Army report to Congress, MDO-specific modernization is to be:

Focused signature modernization to provide a specific portion of the force with doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policies that enable MDO.

The portion of the Total Force that will undergo focused signature-modernization includes three theater headquarters, four corps, six divisions (including one Army National Guard [ARNG]), and 25 BCTs (including five in the ARNG). Army investments at the corps and division levels enable a data-centric, combat-credible force of Regular Army, ARNG, and Army Reserve formations able to conduct MDO as part of the Joint Force. The balance of the Army’s combat forces—five Regular Army and seven ARNG Divisions are to be modernized after 2030, depending on the progress of the Army’s focused modernization effort and fiscal considerations.

**Potential Need for a Joint MDO Doctrine**

Some suggest a shared vision among the Services on multi-domain operations is insufficient and that DOD needs a joint doctrine and warfighting concept for MDO. Joint MDO doctrine could compel the Services to adopt a coordinated approach to MDO, ensuring corresponding investments are made in systems needed to successfully prosecute MDO. The last joint doctrine, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP-1)*, was published in 2013 and updated in 2017; this update, many observed, did not fully take into account the National Security or National Defense Strategies’ emphasis on great power competition. Reportedly, the Secretary of Defense signed a new Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) in June 2021, and DOD’s next step is to issue strategic directives to define joint requirements for the four key tenets of the JWC: joint fires, Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2), contested logistics, and information advantage. Defense officials reportedly noted in an October 2022 article that JWC 3.0 is to be issued by the end of 2022 and will become doctrine for the Joint Force. It is possible this timeframe for formalizing JWC 3.0 is due to the October 2022 publication of the Biden Administration’s National Security Strategy and an effort to incorporate emerging lessons from the ongoing Ukraine Conflict.

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**CRS Products**

CRS In Focus IF11797, *The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF)*, by Andrew Feickert.

CRS In Focus IF11542, *The Army’s AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure Initiatives*, by Andrew Feickert.

CRS In Focus IF11670, *The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model*, by Andrew Feickert.

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