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In Brief: Highlights of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act

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
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Background

The Administration’s FY2018 budget request, submitted to Congress on May 23, 2017, seeks \$677.1 billion in budget authority for national defense-related activities (budget function 050).¹ Of the national defense total, \$667.6 billion is discretionary spending. The remaining \$9.6 billion is mandatory spending not provided by annual appropriations acts (see **Figure 1**).²

Figure 1. FY2018 Budget Request for National Defense (050)
dollars in billions



Source: OMB Analytical Perspectives (Table 25-1).

Notes: Totals may not reconcile due to rounding. OCO is Overseas Contingency Operations

The term *base budget* is commonly used to refer to funds intended to pay for activities the Department of Defense (DOD) and other national defense-related agencies would pursue even if U.S. forces were not engaged in contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. In principle, the remainder of the DOD budget request funds the expected incremental cost of those contingency operations. Such appropriations are formally designated for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and are effectively exempted from the discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA/P.L. 112-25).³

For each fiscal year through 2021, the BCA set separate limits (or “caps”) on two categories of discretionary spending: appropriations for national defense (those activities encompassed in budget function 050) and appropriations for nondefense activities (most other federal programs). The limits are enforced by “sequestration”—a process through which, if the discretionary spending enacted for either category exceeds the relevant BCA limit, as much of that spending as is necessary to meet the limit will be automatically cancelled. The sequestration procedure achieves these reductions largely by across-the-board reductions to non-exempt programs,

¹ For more information on federal budget functions and budget function 050 (national defense) specifically, see CRS In Focus IF10618, *Defense Primer: The National Defense Budget Function (050)*, by Christopher T. Mann.

² For more information on the budget request, see CRS Report R44866, *FY2018 Defense Budget Request: The Basics*, coordinated by Lynn M. Williams.

³ For more information on the designation of OCO funding as it relates to the BCA, see CRS Report R44519, *Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status*, coordinated by Lynn M. Williams and Susan B. Epstein.

activities, and accounts.⁴ The BCA limit for base budget national defense discretionary spending in FY2018 is \$549.1 billion.⁵ The President’s request for \$603.0 billion in base budget national defense discretionary appropriations thus exceeds the BCA limit by approximately \$54 billion.

Of the \$667.6 billion in defense discretionary funding requested by the President, \$659.8 billion falls within the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and is subject to authorization by the annual National Defense Authorization Act (see **Table 1**).

Table 1. FY2018 Defense Budget Request Subject to Authorization by the NDAA
billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority

	Within the scope of NDAA	Outside the scope of NDAA	Total
Department of Defense	\$574.6	\$0.1	\$574.7
Atomic Energy Defense Programs	\$20.5	\$0.1	\$20.6
Other Defense Related Programs	\$0.2	\$7.6	\$7.8
Subtotal: Base Budget	\$595.3	\$7.8	\$603.1
Overseas Contingency Operations	\$64.6	—	\$64.6
Total, National Defense	\$659.8	\$7.8	\$667.6

Source: H.R. 2810, H.Rept. 115-200, S. 1519, and S.Rept. 115-125.

Notes: Totals may not reconcile due to rounding. Authorization of funding for the Maritime Security Program (\$210 million) is in the jurisdiction of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), but not the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). The SASC’s reporting of the Administration’s budget request for DOD is slightly higher than the HASC’s, rounding to \$574.7 billion, as the Senate included \$124 million associated with the Compact of the Free Association with Palau (funded in federal budget function 800).

FY2018 NDAA – Selected Highlights

Authorization of Appropriations

In terms of the total amount authorized, the House-passed version of the FY2018 NDAA (H.R. 2810) and S. 1519—the version of the NDAA reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)—differ by slightly more than \$3 billion (less than 0.5%). The House bill’s \$689.0 billion total would exceed the Administration’s request by \$29.2 billion (about 4.4%), whereas the SASC proposal would exceed the request by \$32.3 billion or about 4.8% (see **Table 2**).

Despite recommending base budget authorization totals that would exceed the BCA spending limit of \$549 billion by upwards of 10%, neither H.R. 2810 nor S. 1519 includes a provision that would repeal or modify the BCA limit for FY2018 in current law.⁶

⁴ See CRS Report R42972, *Sequestration as a Budget Enforcement Process: Frequently Asked Questions*, by Megan S. Lynch.

⁵ For more information on the BCA effects on defense spending, see CRS Report R44039, *The Budget Control Act and the Defense Budget: Frequently Asked Questions*, by Lynn M. Williams.

⁶ For more detail on authorizations proposed by the H.R. 2810 and S. 1519 in the context of federal budget function 050 (subject to the BCA limits), see H.Rept. 115-200, p. 352, “National Defense Budget Authority Implication,” and S.Rept. 115-125, p. 374, “Discretionary Budget Authority Implication (050).”

Table 2. FY2018 Defense Authorizations
billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority

	Request for NDAA	H.R. 2810	SASC-reported S. 1519
DOD Base Budget	\$574.6	\$593.4	\$610.9
Atomic Energy Defense Activities	\$20.5	\$20.8	\$21.0
Defense-related/Maritime Administration	\$0.2	\$0.2	n/a
Subtotal: Base Budget	\$595.3	\$614.4	\$631.9
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)	\$64.6	\$64.6	\$60.2
OCO for Base Budget Purposes	\$0.0	\$10.0	\$0.0
GRAND TOTAL: FY2018 NDAA	\$659.8	\$689.0	\$692.1

Sources: H.R. 2810, H.Rept. 115-200, S. 1519, and S.Rept. 115-125.

Notes: Totals may not reconcile due to rounding. The SASC’s reporting of the Administration’s budget request for DOD is slightly higher than the HASC’s, rounding to \$574.7 billion, as the Senate included \$124 million associated with the Compact of the Free Association with Palau (funded in federal budget function 800).

The total amounts recommended for authorization by the House and Senate bills vary by only \$3.1 billion—about 0.0045% of the amount they would authorize. Behind those similar totals, however, the two bills differ more strikingly in how they would allocate funds between the base budget and OCO:

- The House bill (H.R. 2810) would authorize \$593.4 billion for base budget purposes—an increase of \$18.8 billion over the budget request—whereas S. 1519 would authorize \$36.3 billion more than the request (\$610.9 billion).
- The SASC bill (S. 1519) would authorize a total of \$60.2 billion designated as OCO funding (\$4.4 billion less than the Administration’s request), whereas the House bill would authorize \$74.6 billion designated as OCO—\$10.0 billion more than was requested.

The Administration’s base budget request would exceed the BCA defense spending cap. Thus, appropriations provided at that level would trigger sequestration absent a change in the law. The differences between the House-passed and Senate committee-approved versions of the FY2018 NDAA reflect, in large part, differences in how the chambers would categorize and allocate additional funding for base budget purposes without increasing the amount by which base budget spending would exceed the BCA cap. As a result, comparisons of the amounts that would be authorized by the Administration request and the two versions of the NDAA are complicated by two factors:

“OCO for Base” Authorizations

In addition to authorizing \$593.4 billion as base budget funding, H.R. 2810 would authorize an additional \$10.0 billion that would be designated as OCO funding—and, thus, would be exempt from the BCA cap—but would be spent for base budget purposes. The majority of this “OCO for base” funding would increase procurement amounts by an additional \$6.0 billion, all of which

would be authorized for shipbuilding activities. In contrast, SASC would not authorize OCO-designated funds for base budget purposes.⁷

European Defense Initiative Authorizations

Comparison of the base budget authorizations in the House and Senate bills with the Administration's base budget request is also complicated by the bills' handling of the \$4.8 billion requested for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)—an array of investments, deployments, and security assistance grants intended to reassure U.S. allies threatened by Russian military and political maneuvers.⁸ The Administration included its EDI funding request in the OCO budget, but the House and Senate NDAs would authorize it largely as part of the base budget.

Base Budget Comparisons

The House authorization of “OCO for base” funding, and both committees' rejection of the President's request to designate most EDI funding as an OCO expense, complicate base budget comparisons. One way to compare the Administration's base budget request (**Table 3**, column “a”) with the amounts the House and Senate bills would authorize *for that request* would be to adjust the base budget authorization totals in the House and Senate bills to eliminate the following realignments in funding:

- For H.R. 2810, add to the base budget (**Table 3**, column “b”) the bill's “OCO for base” authorizations (**Table 3**, column “c”) and deduct the EDI funds (**Table 3**, column “d”) to get a comparable *adjusted* base budget total (**Table 3**, column “e”).
- For S. 1519, deduct from the base budget (**Table 3**, column “f”) the EDI funds (**Table 3**, column “g”) to get a comparable *adjusted* base budget total (**Table 3**, column “h”).

Viewed in that light, the two versions of the NDAs do not differ dramatically in the base budget amounts they would authorize for the major components of the Administration's base budget. The Senate bill would authorize a net total of \$8.0 billion more than the House measure, with procurement funds accounting for the largest share of the difference.

⁷ In recent years, Congress and the Obama Administration designated certain funds for OCO but have authorized the obligation of the funding for base budget purposes. For background and a summary of similar actions related to FY2017 authorizations and appropriations, see CRS Report R44454, *Defense: FY2017 Budget Request, Authorization, and Appropriations*, by Pat Towell and Lynn M. Williams. For more information on the designation of funding for Overseas Contingency Operations and the applicability of the Budget Control Act limits, see CRS Report R44519, *Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status*, coordinated by Lynn M. Williams and Susan B. Epstein.

⁸ The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) was formally known as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). The budget request was not updated to reflect the change.

Table 3. FY2018 Proposed DOD Base Budget Authorizations

billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority

Title	Request		House-passed H.R. 2810			SASC-reported S. 1519		
	(a) Base	(b) Base	(c) OCO for Base	(d) EDI	(e) Adjusted Base	(f) Base	(g) EDI	(h) Adjusted Base
Procurement	\$114.0	\$127.9	\$6.0	\$1.9	\$132.0	\$140.3	\$1.9	\$138.4
RD&E	\$82.7	\$84.0	\$0.8	\$0.1	\$84.7	\$86.0	\$0.1	\$85.9
O&M	\$188.6	\$191.6	\$2.1	\$2.3	\$191.4	\$194.9	\$2.1	\$192.8
Military Personnel	\$141.7	\$141.9	\$1.1	\$0.2	\$142.8	\$141.5	\$0.2	\$141.3
Other	\$37.9	\$37.8	—	\$0.1	\$37.7	\$37.9	\$0.1	\$37.8
Military Construction	\$9.8	\$9.6	—	\$0.2	\$9.4	\$10.2	\$0.3	\$9.9
Total	\$574.6	\$592.8	\$10.0	\$4.5	\$598.2	\$610.9	\$4.6	\$606.3

Sources: H.R. 2810, H.Rept. 115-200, S. 1519, and S.Rept. 115-125.

Note: Totals may not reconcile due to rounding.

OCO Comparisons

Similarly, for a comparison of the OCO funding levels in the budget request and the OCO authorizations proposed by the two versions of the NDAA, one could, in each case, deduct the EDI-related funding (see Table 4).

Table 4. FY2018 Proposed DOD Authorizations for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)

billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority

	Request			H.R. 2810 (excludes OCO for base)			SASC-reported S. 1519		
	(a) OCO	(b) EDI	(c) Adjusted OCO	(d) OCO	(e) EDI	(f) Adjusted OCO	(g) OCO	(h) EDI	(i) Adjusted OCO
Procurement	\$10.2	\$1.9	\$8.3	\$11.9	\$0.0	\$11.9	\$8.4	\$0.0	\$8.4
RDT&E	\$0.6	\$0.1	\$0.5	\$1.3	\$0.0	\$1.3	\$0.5	\$0.0	\$0.5
O&M (excluding Counter-ISIL)	\$46.3	\$2.3	\$44.0	\$44.2	\$0.0	\$44.2	\$44.4	\$0.5	\$43.9
Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund	\$1.8	\$0.0	\$1.8	\$1.8	\$0.0	\$1.8	\$1.8	\$0.0	\$1.8
Military Personnel	\$4.3	\$0.2	\$4.1	\$4.1	\$0.0	\$4.1	\$4.1	\$0.0	\$4.1
Other (excluding Counter-ISIL)	\$0.6	\$0.1	\$0.5	\$0.7	\$0.0	\$0.7	\$0.8	\$0.0	\$0.8
Military Construction	\$0.6	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.6	\$0.2	\$0.4	\$0.3	\$0.0	\$0.3
Total	\$64.6	\$4.8	\$59.8	\$64.6	\$0.2	\$64.4	\$60.3	\$0.3	\$59.8

Source: H.R. 2810, H.Rept. 115-200, S. 1519, and S.Rept. 115-125.

Notes: Totals may not reconcile due to rounding. OCO request shown for H.R. 2810 does not include amounts separately authorized in that bill as “OCO for Base”. Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund is presented as a separate line because H.R. 2810 would authorize it in the O&M title and S. 1519 would authorize it in the “Other” title.

European Defense Initiative Comparisons

For the most part, the House and Senate bills would fully support the Administration’s EDI request, although they propose to authorize most of the funds as part of the base budget, rather than as OCO funding, as the Administration proposed. Both bills would designate some EDI funding as OCO:

- the House-passed bill (H.R. 2810) would authorize as OCO funding \$195 million of the \$307 million requested for EDI-related military construction; and
- the Senate bill (S. 1519) would authorize funding for security assistance to Ukraine in the OCO budget and would add \$350 million to the \$150 million requested for such activities (see **Table 5**).

Table 5. Proposed Authorizations for European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)

millions of dollars of discretionary budget authority

	Request	House-passed H.R. 2810	SASC-reported S. 1519
Base budget	\$0.0	\$4,470.4	\$4,627.3
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)	\$4,777.3	\$195.0	\$500.0
Total	\$4,777.3	\$4,665.6	\$5,127.3

Source: H.R. 2810, H.Rept. 115-200, S. 1519, and S.Rept. 115-125.

Selected Budgetary and Policy Proposals

The House-passed and Senate committee-approved bills each would authorize a larger number of Army personnel (active and reserve) than was requested and the Senate bill also would authorize a larger than requested Marine Corps. **Table 6** summarizes the end-strength authorizations proposed by the Administration and the levels that would be authorized in the House-passed NDAA (H.R. 2810) or the SASC-reported bill (S. 1519).

Table 6. FY2018 Military End-Strength

Service Component	Request	House-passed H.R. 2810	change from request	SASC-reported S. 1519	change from request
	end-strength	end-strength		end-strength	
Army	476,000	486,000	+10,000	481,000	+5,000
Navy	327,900	327,900	0	327,900	0
Marine Corps	185,000	185,000	0	186,000	+1,000
Air Force	325,100	325,100	0	325,100	0
Total, Active Forces	1,314,000	1,324,000	+10,000	1,320,000	+6,000

Service Component	Request	House-passed H.R. 2810		SASC-reported S. 1519	
		end-strength	end-strength	change from request	end-strength
Army National Guard	343,000	347,000	+4,000	343,500	+500
Army Reserve	199,000	202,000	+3,000	199,500	+500
Navy Reserve	59,000	59,000	0	59,000	0
Marine Corps Reserve	38,500	38,500	0	38,500	0
Air National Guard	106,600	106,600	0	106,600	0
Air Force Reserve	69,800	69,800	0	69,800	0
Total.	815,900	822,900	+7,000	816,900	+1,000
DOD Selected Reserves					
Coast Guard Reserve	7,000	7,000	0	7,000	0

Source: H.R. 2810, H.Rept. 115-200, S. 1519, and S.Rept. 115-125.

Table 7 provides a summary of selected budget reductions or statutory prohibitions proposed by the two bills. Table 8 provides a summary of selected budget increases or policy initiatives proposed by the bills.

Table 7. Selected Budget Reductions and Prohibitions

Issue	House (H.R. 2810)	SASC-reported (S. 1519)
Limitation on procurement of Icebreaking Vessels	Would prohibit the use of DOD funds for the procurement of an icebreaker vessel (§123).	No comparable provision.
Cost limitation on CVN-78 class aircraft carriers	No comparable provision.	Would establish a \$12 billion cost limitation for procurement of aircraft carriers after CVN-79 (§125).
Cost controls for Presidential Aircraft Recapitalization Program	Would fix the capability requirements for the aircraft based on the system requirements document dated December 2016, require the use of fixed-price contracts, and require quarterly briefings to Congress on efforts to control costs in the program (§211).	No comparable provision.
Prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release of individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to the U.S. or certain countries	Would prohibit the use of any funds available to DOD to transfer or release detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions (§1022); or to Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen (§1024).	Would prohibit the use of any fund available to DOD to transfer or release detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions (§1031); or to Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen (§1033).
Prohibition on retirement of certain Maritime Mine Counter-measures (MCM) platforms	Would prohibit the retirement, transfer, or storage of AVENGER-class MCM ships and Sea Dragon (MH-53) helicopters. Would also prohibit reductions in associated manning levels (§1035).	Extends for one year §1045 of P.L. 114-328, which prohibits the retirement, transfer, or storage of AVENGER-class MCM ships and Sea Dragon (MH-53) helicopters in FY2017. Would also prohibit

Issue	House (H.R. 2810)	SASC-reported (S. 1519)
Prohibition on use of funds relating to the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over Crimea	Would prohibit obligation of FY2018 funding to implement any activity that recognizes the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over Crimea (§1232).	reductions in associated manning levels (§1047). Extends for one year §1234 of P.L. 114-328, which prohibits obligation of FY2017 funding to implement any activity that recognizes the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over Crimea (§1242).
Air Force space contractor responsibility watch list (CRWL)	No comparable provision.	Would require the establishment and maintenance of a CRWL for Air Force space programs and would prohibit the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center from soliciting an offer from, or awarding a contract to, a contractor on the CRWL without approval of the Commander (§1602).
Limitation on use of funds for Delta IV launch vehicle	No comparable provision.	Would prohibit obligation of funding to maintain and support the Delta IV launch vehicle until the Secretary of the Air Force certifies that the Air Force plans to launch a satellite on a Delta IV launch vehicle within 3 years (§1604).
Prohibition on contracting for foreign commercial satellite services	Would prohibit the SECDEF from entering into a contract for satellite services provided using satellites launched from, or using a launch system designed or manufactured by, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, or any country that is a state sponsor of terrorism (§1612).	No comparable provisions.
Prohibition on a new Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round	Would state that nothing in the act is to be construed as authorization for a new BRAC round (§2702).	Would state that nothing in the act is to be construed as authorization for a new BRAC round (§2702).
Prohibition on availability of funds for programs in the Russian Federation	Would prohibit obligation of FY2018 funds for atomic energy defense activities with the Russian Federation (§3117).	No comparable provision.
Reductions to the request on the basis of unobligated balances from prior budgets, under execution, excessive fuel price estimates , or foreign currency adjustments	Would reduce the request by \$1.9 billion, of which \$1.4 billion comes from O&M accounts.	Would reduce the request by \$1.9 billion, of which \$1.1 billion comes from unobligated balances in military personnel accounts.

Sources: H.R. 2810, H.Rept. 115-200, S. 1519, and S.Rept. 115-125.

Table 8. Selected Budget Increases and Policy Initiatives

Issue	House (H.R. 2810)	SASC-reported (S. 1519)
Minimum number of aircraft carriers	Would increase the required number of operational aircraft carriers from 11 to 12, effective September 30, 2023 (§121).	No comparable provision.
Multiyear procurement authority	Would provide multiyear procurement authority for Virginia-class submarines (§124), Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) destroyers (§125), and V-22 aircraft (§128).	Would provide multiyear procurement authority for Virginia-class submarines (§121), Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) destroyers (§122), and V-22 aircraft (§123).
Minimum number of Air Force fighter aircraft	No comparable provision.	Would establish an inventory requirement of 1,970 Air Force fighter aircraft (§131).
Procurement of economic order quantities (EOQ) for the F-35 Aircraft Program	Would authorize procurement of EOQ for certain material and equipment for the F-35 program, limited to not more than \$661.0 million annually (§141).	Would authorize procurement of EOQ for certain material and equipment for the F-35 program, limited to not more than \$661.0 million annually (§141).
Wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images	Would amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice to prohibit wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images (§523).	Would amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice to prohibit wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images (§532) and would require the President to amend the Manual for Courts-Martial to include as an enumerated offense the distribution of certain visual depictions (§521).
Aviation incentive pay and bonus authorities	No comparable provision.	Would require DOD to justify aviation bonus levels through a business case analysis and would establish a tiered limitation on maximum amounts of such bonuses (§616) and would establish a new authority for aviation incentive pay and bonuses for remotely piloted aircraft pilots (§617).
Military end-strength authorized above the level requested in the budget	Would increase the military personnel authorization by \$1.06 billion to pay for recommended increase in active-duty and reserve component Army personnel.	Would increase the military personnel authorization by \$437 million to pay for recommended increase in active duty and reserve component Army Personnel and active duty Marines.
Budget proposed 2.1% raise in Military Basic Pay in lieu of the 2.4% raise that otherwise would occur by law	Would direct a 2.4% pay increase; adds \$206.4 million to the budget request to fund the increase (§601).	Would authorize a 2.1% pay raise (§601).
Procurement through online marketplaces	Would require the General Services Administration to contract with multiple commercial online marketplaces for the procurement of commercial products. Would require DOD to purchase products from the marketplaces in appropriate circumstances (§801).	No comparable provision.

Issue	House (H.R. 2810)	SASC-reported (S. 1519)
Repeal of suspension of public-private competition for the conversion to performance by a contractor	No comparable provision.	Would repeal the FY2010 NDAA suspension of public-private competitions conducted pursuant to OMB Circular A-76 (§801).
Increase in simplified acquisition threshold	No comparable provision.	Would raise the simplified acquisition threshold for DOD procurements from \$150,000 to \$250,000 (§812).
GAO bid protest reforms	No comparable provision.	Would require the party filing the protest to pay for the costs incurred for processing the protest in certain cases (§821).
Background and security clearance investigations	No comparable provision.	Would require the conduct of background investigations for DOD personnel to transfer from the Office of Personnel Management to the Defense Security Service (§938).
Chief Information Warfare Officer	No comparable provision.	Would establish a DOD Chief Information Warfare Officer who would be responsible for all matters “relating to the information environment” of the DOD and serve as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense (§902).
Contracts for Foreign Military Sales (FMS)	Would require the SECDEF to develop standard timeline milestones for the foreign military sales process (§864).	Would require DOD to consult with “the relevant US commercial entities” involved in an FMS case before delivering a formal pricing and availability response to the foreign customer, giving the commercial entity opportunity to justify any differences (§1283).
Policy on minimum number of battle force ships	Would establish a policy of the U.S. to have available, as soon as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships (§1016).	Would establish a policy of the U.S. to have available, as soon as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships (§1016).
Reports on U.S. Strategy for certain countries.	Would require SECDEF to submit reports to Congress detailing U.S. strategies in Afghanistan (§1212) and Syria (§1221), and for countering threats by the Russian Federation (§1253). Would require the President to submit reports on U.S. strategy for Somalia (§1273) and Yemen (§1277).	No comparable provisions.
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty	Would include a series of provisions related to the INF treaty, including mandating that DOD establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground launched cruise missile system of INF range, authorization of funding for programs to counter Russian land-based cruise missiles of INF range, and requirement for the submission of a	Would establish a policy of the U.S. regarding U.S. actions to bring the Russian Federation back into compliance with the INF treaty (§1635).

Issue	House (H.R. 2810)	SASC-reported (S. 1519)
Deterring Russian aggression	<p>report on Russian compliance that could lead to the U.S. release from its obligations under the INF Treaty (§1241-1248).</p> <p>Would require the SECDEF to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to counter threats by the Russian Federation and require several reports on associated aspects. (§1251-1259).</p>	<p>Would express a sense of Congress that the U.S., NATO, and other European partners should demonstrate resolve in deterring Russian aggression through military exercises with an emphasis on participation of U.S. forces based in the continental U.S.; would require several related reports (§1246-1249).</p>
Future years plan for the European Deterrence Initiative ^a	<p>Would require the SECDEF to develop and submit a plan for the U.S. military's role in the European theater and would also pause divestment of any remaining sites under the European Infrastructure Consolidation (§1275).</p>	<p>No comparable provision.</p>
Reporting associated with Authorization for Use of Military Force	<p>Would require the President to report on the U.S. strategy to “defeat Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and their associated forces and co-belligerents” and include an analysis of the existing legal framework to accomplish the strategy, particularly with respect to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40) and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107-243). See §1291.</p>	<p>No comparable provision.</p>
Establishment of Space Corps in the Department of the Air Force	<p>Would authorize the creation of a Space Corps within the Air Force. The Space Corps would be led by a Chief of Staff of the Space Corps and would be composed of such offices and officials determined appropriate by the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Space Corps (§1601).</p>	<p>No comparable provision.</p>
Establishment of U.S. Space Command as a subordinate unified command of the United States Strategic Command	<p>Would direct the establishment of U.S. Space Command as a subordinate unified command under U.S. Strategic Command not later than January 1, 2019 (§1602).</p>	<p>No comparable provision.</p>
Notification requirements for sensitive military cyber operations and cyber weapons	<p>Would require the SECDEF to promptly notify Congress of any “sensitive military cyber operation” and also promptly provide (1) results of any legal review of cyber capability that is intended for use as a weapon; and (2) notification of use of any approved cyber capability as a weapon</p>	<p>Would establish a policy of the U.S. on cyberspace, cybersecurity, and cyber warfare and would grant the Secretary of Defense authority to “develop, prepare, coordinate, and when appropriately authorized to do so, conduct military cyber operations in response to a cyber attack ... ”</p>

Issue	House (H.R. 2810)	SASC-reported (S. 1519)
Cyber posture review	(§1651). No comparable provision.	(§1621). Would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a compressive review of the cyber posture of the U.S. for the next 5 to 10 years (§1622).
Administration of Missile Defense and Defeat Programs	Would establish a unified <i>major force program</i> for missile defense and missile defeat programs for budgetary purposes and would require the transfer of acquisition authority and total obligation authority for each program covered by the section from the Missile Defense Agency to a military department not later than FY2020 (§1681).	No comparable provision.
Defense of Hawaii from North Korean Ballistic Missile Attack	Would direct the SECDEF to ensure existing ballistic missile defense assets are used to provide “additional, interim but increasingly capable, ballistic missile defense capability” for Hawaii (§1685).	No comparable provision.

Source: H.R. 2810, H.Rept. 115-200, S. 1519, and S.Rept. 115-125.

- a. The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) was formerly known as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). The budget request was not updated to reflect the change, therefore the funding tables generally reference ERI and related legislative text generally references EDI.
- b. A *major force program* (MFP) is an aggregation of program elements that reflects DOD a force or mission. MFPs are components of the Future Years Defense Program, and each MFP identifies resources necessary to achieve an objective or plan over a specified period of time. For more information on the DOD budget process, see CRS In Focus IF10429, *Defense Primer: Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Process (PPBE)*, by Lynn M. Williams.

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