U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine

The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, both before and after Russia renewed its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through June 23, 2022, the United States has provided more than $8.7 billion in security assistance “to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.” Since the start of the 2022 war, the Biden Administration has committed a total of more than $6.1 billion in security assistance to “provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself.”

FY2022 security assistance packages are being funded via more than $23 billion in regular and supplemental appropriations, including the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division N), and the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). In total, FY2022 appropriations include $12.55 billion to replenish Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks sent to Ukraine via presidential drawdown authority; $6.3 billion for DOD’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI); and $4.65 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Ukraine and “countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.” FY2022 supplemental appropriations also have included funds for additional U.S. troop deployments to Europe.

Overview of Programs Since 2014

The United States has used a variety of security assistance programs and authorities to help build the defensive capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through train, equip, and advise efforts across multiple spending accounts. Prior to the 2022 war, the two primary accounts were the State Department’s FMF (22 U.S.C. §2763) and DOD’s USAI (P.L. 114-92, §1250) (see Table 2).

USAID packages have included training, equipment, and advisory efforts to enhance Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. FY2022 appropriations also directed that USAID funds be provided for logistics support, supplies, and services; salaries and stipends; sustainment; weapons replacement; and intelligence support. Prior to FY2022, a portion of annual USAID funds was contingent on DOD and State certifying Ukraine’s progress on key defense reforms.

The United States also has been providing defense items to Ukraine via Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), by which the President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks without congressional approval in response to an “unforeseen emergency” (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)). Since August 2021, the Biden Administration has authorized 13 drawdowns valued at $5.06 billion (see Table 1).

Table 1. Presidential Drawdowns for Ukraine, FY2021-FY2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Date Authorized</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>August 27, 2021</td>
<td>$60,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>December 28, 2021</td>
<td>$200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>February 25, 2022</td>
<td>$350,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>March 12, 2022</td>
<td>$200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>March 16, 2022</td>
<td>$800,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>April 5, 2022</td>
<td>$100,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>April 13, 2022</td>
<td>$800,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>April 21, 2022</td>
<td>$800,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>May 6, 2022</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>May 19, 2022</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>June 1, 2022</td>
<td>$700,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>June 15, 2022</td>
<td>$350,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>June 23, 2022</td>
<td>$450,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $5,060,000,000

Source: Department of State and Department of Defense.

Ukraine also has received assistance pursuant to DOD’s security cooperation authorities, notably Building Partner Capacity (10 U.S.C. §333) and Defense Institution Building (10 U.S.C. §332), and International Military Education and Training (IMET), which has provided professional military education at U.S. defense institutions for Ukrainian military officers. Other State Department- and DOD-funded security assistance has supported conventional weapons destruction, border security, law enforcement training, and counter-weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

Through the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, established in 2015, the U.S. Army and National Guard, together with military trainers from U.S. allied states, provided training, mentoring, and doctrinal assistance to the UAF before the war (at a training facility in western Ukraine that was targeted by a Russian missile strike in March 2022). This training mission was suspended at the outset of Russia’s invasion. In April 2022, DOD announced it would resume training Ukrainian personnel, outside Ukraine, specifically to operate U.S. and allied systems. Separately, U.S. Special Operations Forces have trained and advised Ukrainian special forces.

Provision of Defense Equipment

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the Obama Administration provided Ukraine nonlethal security assistance, such as body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents, counter-mortar radars, uniforms, medical kits, and other related items. In 2017, the Trump Administration announced U.S. willingness to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine.

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Since 2018, Ukraine used FMF, as well as some of its national funds, to procure U.S. defense equipment, including Javelin anti-armor missiles and Mark VI patrol boats purchased through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Ukraine also used a combination of FMF and national funds to refurbish former U.S. Coast Guard Island-class patrol boats provided through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA; 22 U.S.C. §2321j) program. On April 24, 2022, the State Department notified Congress of a potential FMS sale of up to $165 million for nonstandard ammunition for Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine has purchased firearms, ammunition, ordnance, and other laser, imaging, or guidance equipment directly from U.S. suppliers via Direct Commercial Sales.

According to DOD, USAI packages prior to FY2022 provided sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, counter-artillery radars, Mark VI patrol boats, electronic warfare detection and secure communications, satellite imagery and analysis capability, counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS), air surveillance systems to monitor sovereign airspace, night vision devices, and equipment to support military medical treatment and combat evacuation procedures.

In 2022, the United States has provided more advanced defense equipment to Ukraine, as well as greater amounts of previously provided equipment. According to DOD, U.S. security assistance committed to Ukraine as of June 17, 2022 has included the following:

- High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition;
- 1,400+ Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
- 6,500+ Javelin anti-armor systems and 20,000+ other anti-armor systems;
- 121 Phoenix Ghost Tactical UAS and 700+ Switchblade Tactical UAS;
- 126 155 mm Howitzers with 260,000 artillery rounds;
- 20 Mi-17 helicopters;
- hundreds of Armored Humvee Vehicles;
- 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
- 7,000+ small arms and 50+ million rounds of ammunition;
- laser-guided rocket systems; and
- other essential nonlethal equipment, including communications and intelligence equipment.

Several NATO and European Union (EU) members also have provided weapons and military assistance to Ukraine. In addition, the Biden Administration authorized third-party transfers of U.S. defense articles and equipment from several NATO and EU members to Ukraine.

### Recent Legislation

Prior to and immediately following Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine, Congress authorized or proposed increased funding levels for existing security assistance authorities. Congress increased the PDA (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)) funding cap from $100 million up to $200 million via P.L. 117-70; up to $300 million via P.L. 117-86; up to $3 billion via P.L. 117-103; and up to $11 billion via P.L. 117-128. Similarly, Congress increased a special authority (22 U.S.C. §2364) used to overcome PDA caps from $250 million to $500 million via P.L. 117-103 and up to $1 billion via P.L. 117-128.

P.L. 117-128 requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to report on measures being taken to account for the end-use of U.S. weapons transferred to Ukraine. The act also requires the Secretaries to provide monthly descriptions of U.S. security assistance provided to Ukraine since February 24, 2022, including a comprehensive list of the defense articles and services provided, as well as the associated authority and funding.

Additionally, the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-118) modifies provisions in the FAA and Arms Export Control Act to bypass bureaucratic barriers for leasing or lending U.S. defense articles to Ukraine and neighboring countries.

### Discussion on Future Assistance

Since 2014, U.S. policy increasingly emphasized support for the UAF’s ability to deter Russia and defend its territorial integrity. Much of U.S. assistance has been focused on providing systems and capabilities that Ukraine’s domestic defense industry cannot produce, as well as on increasing UAF resilience and ability to sustain combat operations.

Ukrainian officials have sought to acquire advanced systems, including fighter aircraft, anti-ship, and additional air defense and anti-missile capabilities. Increasingly, the provision of security assistance to Ukraine includes a greater focus on transitioning the UAF to NATO standard weaponry and training. This takes time but could significantly improve UAF capabilities.

Concerns remain about the potential for escalation. In June 2022, the Biden Administration announced the provision to Ukraine of more advanced HIMARS systems but without their longest-range rockets. The Administration reportedly received Ukrainian assurances that the UAF will not use these weapons to attack Russian territory.

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