Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy

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In 2021, U.S. and international forces withdrew from Afghanistan after nearly two decades of operations, and the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist extremist group that formerly ruled the country from 1996 to 2001, retook power. The United States does not recognize the Taliban or any other entity as the government of Afghanistan and reports there are no U.S. diplomatic or military personnel in the country. The Taliban’s rule appears to have had negative effects for many Afghans, as well as a number of U.S. policy interests.

The Taliban government is dominated by officials from the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime loyalists. Signs of dissension in the group’s ranks along various lines have emerged, though the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes. Some Afghans have sought to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban in nonviolent demonstrations, which the Taliban have sometimes violently dispersed, but the Taliban do not appear to face effective political opposition. Other Afghans have taken up arms against the Taliban, claiming guerilla-style attacks against Taliban forces and calling for international assistance. The regional Islamic State affiliate has conducted attacks against Taliban forces, Afghan civilians, and international targets alike.

Some Members of Congress have focused on a number of impacts of the Taliban’s renewed rule on U.S. interests:

- **Counterterrorism.** The Taliban takeover has had different impacts on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, historic Taliban adversaries and partners, respectively. With no U.S. military forces based in Afghanistan or neighboring states, the United States is pursuing an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism approach.

- **Women and Girls.** Taliban actions have been detrimental for the status of women and girls in Afghanistan, a longtime U.S. policy concern, with girls prohibited from attending school above the primary level and women’s roles drastically curtailed, including an April 2023 decision to ban women from working for the United Nations in Afghanistan.

- **Relocating U.S. Partners.** Some Members of Congress have closely followed ongoing U.S. efforts to relocate remaining U.S. citizens, as well as the tens of thousands of Afghans who worked for U.S. efforts and seek to leave the country.

Some Members have also expressed concern about dire humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has faced intersecting and overwhelming humanitarian and economic crises, a result of challenges both preexisting (such as natural disasters and Afghanistan’s weak economic base) and new (such as the cut-off of international development assistance, U.S. sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghan central bank assets). In response, the United States has provided over $2 billion in humanitarian and development assistance since August 2021 and the Biden Administration has issued general licenses authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions. The Administration also established a Switzerland-based “Afghan Fund” to hold and potentially disburse some of Afghanistan’s central bank assets to support the Afghan economy; the Fund has not, as of June 2023, made any disbursements.

Congressional oversight of U.S. Afghanistan policy has featured numerous hearings, past and ongoing investigations, and the creation of the Afghanistan War Commission. Congress has also imposed a variety of reporting requirements to monitor dynamics in Afghanistan and their implications for U.S. policy. Going forward, Congress may consider further reporting requirements, resources, or investigative efforts related to various U.S. interests as it evaluates the Biden Administration’s budget request and defense authorization measures and examines lessons learned in Afghanistan. Future reports from the congressionally created Afghanistan War Commission and other bodies may offer lessons for legislators.

Congressional action could be influenced or constrained by a lack of reliable information about events in Afghanistan and the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban. Perhaps more challengingly, the Biden Administration and many in Congress seek to ameliorate humanitarian and economic conditions in Afghanistan, but without taking any action that boosts the Taliban’s position or that may be perceived as doing so. Pursuing these policies in tandem may prove complicated given the Taliban’s evident aversion to make compromises in response to international pressure and its apparent willingness to accept considerable humanitarian and economic suffering in Afghanistan as the price of that uncompromising stance.
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Introduction

This report provides background information and analysis on developments in Afghanistan and implications for U.S. policy, including

- the Taliban’s government and the impact of their rule on terrorist groups, human rights, and the ability of U.S. Afghan partners to leave the country;
- regional dynamics; and
- the intersecting humanitarian and economic crises facing the country.

The report also provides information on legislation and other congressional action related to Afghanistan. The challenge at the heart of many U.S. policy debates over which Congress has influence (including humanitarian assistance, U.S. sanctions, and the status of U.S.-based central bank assets) is how to prioritize and, if possible, reconcile two U.S. interests: supporting the Afghan people and refraining from bolstering the Taliban’s rule.

Background: Taliban Takeover

The chapter of Afghan history that ended in 2021 arguably began in 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored it. In the subsequent 20 years, the United States suffered thousands of military casualties in Afghanistan, mostly at the hands of the rising Taliban insurgency, and Congress appropriated over $146 billion for reconstruction and security forces there. During this same period, an elected Afghan government replaced the Taliban and, with significant U.S. and international support, made modest but uneven improvements in most measures of human development, though Afghanistan remained one of the world’s poorest and most corrupt countries.

At the outset of 2021, the Afghan government was a partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, the result of nearly 20 years of substantial U.S. and international support, including the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops and the provision of tens of billions of dollars in assistance. President Donald Trump had withdrawn all but 2,500 U.S. troops, the lowest U.S. force level since 2001, in advance of the full military withdrawal to which the United States agreed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement.¹ U.S. officials committed to continue to provide financial support to Afghan forces and expressed confidence about their capabilities vis-a-vis the Taliban, while conceding that those forces remained reliant on U.S. support.²

At the same time, the Taliban were arguably at their strongest since 2001, when they were driven from power by U.S., international, and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, having steadily gained territory and improved their tactical capabilities over the course of their resilient two-decade

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¹ After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed a bilateral agreement on February 29, 2020, agreeing to two “interconnected” “guarantees”: the withdrawal of all U.S. and international forces by May 2021, and unspecified Taliban action to prevent other groups (including Al Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies. The text of the agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. Nonpublic annexes accompanied the agreement.

insurgency. The Afghan government against which the Taliban fought was weakened by deep internal divisions, factional infighting, and endemic corruption.

Several weeks after President Joseph Biden confirmed that international forces would depart Afghanistan by the fall of 2021, Taliban forces began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of the country. While the Taliban faced stiff, if ultimately unsuccessful, resistance from government forces in some areas, others were taken with minimal fighting. The Taliban captured their first provincial capital on August 6, after which the collapse of the Afghan government and its security forces accelerated. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whose seven-year tenure was characterized by electoral crises, pervasive corruption, and the gradual deterioration of Afghan military forces, fled the country on August 15. Taliban fighters began entering Kabul that same day, taking effective control of the country.

**Taliban Government**

On September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a “caretaker government” to rule Afghanistan. The Taliban refer to their government, as they have for decades referred to themselves, as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban, who did not enact a formal constitution during their 1996-2001 rule, have said they intend to govern according to Islamic law (sharia) but, according to one group of experts, “remain remarkably ambiguous when it comes to the type of Islamic state they want to form in Afghanistan.”

Haibatullah Akhundzada, Taliban leader since the 2016 killing of his predecessor in a U.S. drone strike, holds supreme power as the group’s emir. He has made few reported public appearances and only one photograph of him is known to be publicly available. Despite Taliban promises to form an inclusive government, nearly all members of the government are former officials from the Taliban’s prior rule or longtime loyalists. All are male, the vast majority are ethnic Pashtuns (Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, which represents a plurality of the population), and most are from southern Afghanistan. Over half were, and remain, designated for terrorism-related U.S. and/or U.N. sanctions, including the Acting Interior Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The U.S. Department of State has for years offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the arrest of Haqqani, who is the head of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) that conducted numerous attacks against U.S. and other international targets in Afghanistan.

Some reports since the Taliban takeover have indicated dissension in the group’s ranks along various lines. While the Taliban have a history of effectively managing internal disputes, governing Afghanistan presents new and unique challenges to the group’s consensus-based decision-making. Points of tension reportedly have existed between members of the group’s

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political wing and its military leaders (such as the Haqqanis) over who deserves the most credit for the group’s victory;⁸ between a leadership that seeks stability and rank and file fighters who are struggling to adjust to post-conflict life;⁹ and between those with different ideological perspectives (including on education for girls; see below).¹⁰ In a February 2023 speech, Haqqani criticized “power monopolization” within the Taliban, prompting other Taliban figures to state that criticisms should be voiced privately.¹¹ Some of these divisions are mirrored by an increasingly significant geographic divide between the Taliban’s political leadership in Kabul and the clerical establishment in Kandahar (where the emir is based and to which the Taliban have reportedly relocated some senior officials).¹²

### The Taliban and Drug Production

The Taliban have at times accommodated, actively facilitated, or efficiently repressed drug production and trafficking in territory under their control, sometimes pursuing contradictory policies simultaneously in different geographic areas or with respect to various aspects of the drug trade. In 2000, when they were previously in power, the Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation, nearly eliminating cultivation in Taliban-controlled areas at a time when Afghanistan was the world’s largest producer of opium.¹³ That ban came to an end with the Taliban’s fall in 2001, and opium production reportedly rebounded immediately. The Taliban’s insurgency became entwined with the booming opium economy, with the financial and political benefits of that trade evidently trumping the group’s ideological opposition to opium production. In April 2022, after the Taliban had returned to power, Akhundzada issued a decree again banning opium poppy cultivation. In June 2023, David Mansfield, a prominent researcher, estimated that despite “widespread skepticism” the ban had been effectively implemented, with poppy cultivation reduced by a “truly unprecedented” amount.¹⁴ A subsequent tweet from the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan stated, “Reports that the Taliban have implemented policies to significantly decrease opium poppy production this year are credible and important.”¹⁵ The economic impact is likely to be uneven but considerable, with the potential for increased emigration for those least able to cope with the ban and its effects.¹⁶

### Current and Potential Opposition

While the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover was swift, its triumph, according to many analysts, did not reflect massive popular support for the movement so much as a lack of support for the former government.¹⁷ Many elements of Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, appear to view the Taliban with skepticism, fear, or hostility, and small numbers of Afghans have demonstrated...

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⁸ “Cracks emerge within Taliban as Baradar-led group raises concern over Sirajuddin’s pro-Pashtun stance,” ANI, February 15, 2022.
¹⁶ Mansfield, op. cit.; William Byrd, “’The Taliban’s successful opium ban is bad for Afghans and the world,’” United States Institute of Peace, June 8, 2023.
nonviolently to advocate for their rights and express opposition to the Taliban.\textsuperscript{18} The Taliban have often violently dispersed these protests, and have sought to stifle dissenting voices, including with the March 2023 arrest of prominent education activist Matiullah Wesa.\textsuperscript{19} In December 2022, the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan said, “There is no significant visible political opposition to the Taliban inside Afghanistan,” and exiled officials associated with the former government “are fragmented and their statements have decreasing resonance for the population inside Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{20}

The Taliban face armed opposition from two very different quarters. The first is the National Resistance Front (NRF), made up of figures aligned with the former Afghan state. NRF leaders have appealed for U.S. and international support and have retained Washington, DC-based representation.\textsuperscript{21} They have not won explicit public backing from any foreign countries, perhaps due to the Taliban’s relatively stronger military position and closer Taliban ties with regional powers, including some that formerly supported Taliban opponents in the 1990s, such as Russia and Iran. The NRF has claimed numerous attacks against Taliban fighters, mostly in and around the central province of Panjshir, but it is difficult to assess the veracity of such claims, which the Taliban dismiss as “propaganda.”\textsuperscript{22} Still, the NRF does not appear to have either the military capabilities or the broad-based public support that would likely be necessary to seriously threaten the Taliban’s position.\textsuperscript{23}

An arguably more potent armed threat to the Taliban is the local Islamic State affiliate (Islamic State-Khorasan Province, ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), a longtime Taliban adversary. ISKP has opposed the Taliban since its 2015 establishment, viewing the Taliban’s Afghanistan-focused nationalist political project as counter to the Islamic State’s universalist vision of a global caliphate. ISKP has launched multiple attacks against Taliban targets, killing several senior officials (including provincial governors in March 2023 and June 2023). In addition, ISKP has claimed attacks against Afghan civilians (mostly targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority, the Hazaras) and a number of externally-oriented operations, including cross border rocket attacks against Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, attacks against the Russian and Pakistani embassies in Kabul, and an assault on a Kabul hotel frequented by Chinese nationals.\textsuperscript{24} U.N. sanctions monitors assess

\textsuperscript{18} Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan under the Taliban: findings on the current situation,” Stimson Center, October 20, 2022.
\textsuperscript{20} UNAMA, “Briefing to the United Nations Security Council by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Roza Otunbayeva,” December 20, 2022.
\textsuperscript{22} Zia Ur Rehman, “Afghanistan’s resistance alliance aims to pry Taliban’s grip loose,” Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2022.
\textsuperscript{24} Hazaras comprise 10%-15% of Afghanistan’s population. Since their August 2021 takeover, the Taliban have demonstrated a more accepting official stance toward the Hazaras than was the case during their former rule, particularly in urban areas, despite some reports of killings and forced displacement in the Hazaras’ historic homelands in central Afghanistan in fall 2021. While the Taliban government has not persecuted Hazaras, many Hazaras fault the Taliban for not establishing an inclusive government and not stopping the ISKP attacks that have repeatedly targeted Hazaras. Nilly Kohzad, “‘It doesn’t matter if we get killed,’ Afghanistan’s Hazaras speak out,” Diplomat, May 27, 2022.Sudha Ramachandran, “ISKP attacks in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, August 31, 2022.
the group’s attacks are intended “to portray the Taliban as incapable of providing security” and “to undermine the relationship between the Taliban and neighboring countries.”

Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors

Regional dynamics directly affect developments in Afghanistan, which is landlocked and has throughout its history been the object of intervention by its neighbors and other foreign powers. Events in Afghanistan also have consequences for those neighbors.

Pakistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan, which has played an active, and by many accounts destabilizing, role in Afghan affairs for decades, including by actively supporting the Taliban during its 1990s rule and much of its subsequent insurgency. Many analysts regarded the Taliban takeover at least initially as a triumph for Pakistan’s regional policy, pointing to statements of evident support for the takeover from Pakistani leaders. Senior Pakistani officials have held numerous meetings with the new Taliban government, both in Kabul and Islamabad, since August 2021.

However, there are some indications that the Taliban’s return to power may pose challenges for Pakistan. The Taliban’s victory has arguably given a morale and perhaps material boost to Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, including the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i-Taliban-i Pakistan, or TTP, a U.S.-designated FTO). TTP attacks against Pakistani security forces increased after August 2021, reportedly prompting the Pakistani government to seek the Afghan Taliban’s mediation of several ceasefires. The TTP has resumed attacks against Pakistani targets, including a January 2023 attack (claimed by a TTP faction) that targeted police officers and killed over 100. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the presence of over 1 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile border, at which Taliban and Pakistani government forces intermittently clashed in 2022.

Iran. Iran, with which Afghanistan shares its western border, opposed the Taliban’s 1990s rule but has maintained relations with the group while emphasizing the need for representation for Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups with which Iran has close ties (namely Tajiks, who speak a variant of Persian, and Hazaras, who are mostly Shia Muslims). Disputes over water rights and refugees persist, along with sporadic border clashes.

Central Asia. Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have responded in varying ways to the Taliban’s takeover. The Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan governments appear to be prioritizing stability and economic ties, including the planned

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26 For more, see CRS Report R47565, Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistan Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.


30 Rubin, op. cit. Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but successive Afghan governments, including the Taliban, have not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistan Relations,” Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017.

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and have had official engagements with the Taliban. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has opposed the Taliban and offered shelter to the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front, a consequence both of Tajikistan’s own struggles with Islamist militancy as well as ties with Afghan Tajiks (the country’s second largest ethnic group), some of whom oppose the Taliban’s rule.32

**China.** The prospect of greater Chinese influence and activity in Afghanistan has attracted some congressional attention since the Taliban takeover. China, which played a relatively limited role in Afghanistan under the former government, made some economic investments in Afghanistan (particularly in the development of Afghan minerals and other resources) prior to the Taliban takeover, but major projects have not come to fruition due to instability, lack of infrastructure, and other limitations.33 Despite concerns about Afghanistan-based Islamist terrorist groups, China has signaled tacit acceptance of the Taliban’s rule, with its foreign minister emphasizing in a May 2022 visit to Kabul that China “respects the independent choices made by the Afghan people.”34 In May 2023, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China agreed to extend China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to Afghanistan via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.35

**U.S. Policy Impacts of the Taliban’s Return to Power**

Renewed Taliban rule in Afghanistan has implications for a number of U.S. policy interests. It has created opportunities and challenges for the various terrorist groups that have a presence in Afghanistan, and has forced the United States to pursue an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism approach that lacks a local partner. Advancing protection of women’s and other human rights has been another major U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan since 2001; the Taliban have taken numerous actions to roll back those rights since retaking power. U.S. policymakers, including many Members of Congress, have also focused on securing the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens and Afghans who previously worked for the U.S. government, a halting effort that remains ongoing as of June 2023.

**Counterterrorism**

Islamist extremist terrorist groups have for decades operated in Afghanistan, and the Taliban have related to them in varying ways. ISKP and Al Qaeda (AQ) are two of the most significant of these terrorist groups, and the Taliban’s takeover has affected them differently.

Long a significant U.S. counterterrorism concern, ISKP has clashed with the Taliban, as mentioned above. Under the former U.S.-backed Afghan government, the United States launched airstrikes in support of Taliban offensives against ISKP, a rare area of prior U.S.-Taliban cooperation.36 In February 2022, the U.S. State Department announced rewards of up to $10 million each for information related to ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari as well as those responsible for the August 26, 2021, ISKP attack at Kabul airport that killed and injured hundreds of people, including over 30 U.S. servicemembers.37 In April 2023, the White House announced that the

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Taliban had killed the leader of the ISKP cell responsible for the airport attack. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Eric Kurilla estimated in March 2023 congressional testimony that ISKP could be capable of conducting “an external operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under six months.”

While ISKP is seen as more operationally ambitious and capable in Afghanistan than Al Qaeda, the July 2022 U.S. killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul attracted considerable attention to the issue of AQ-Taliban ties. Despite (or perhaps because of) U.S. counterterrorism pressure, those ties have persisted for decades. The circumstances of Zawahiri’s residence in Kabul and what they might reveal about internal Taliban dynamics beyond continued AQ ties remain unclear; neither the Taliban nor Al Qaeda officially acknowledged Zawahiri’s death. U.N. sanctions monitors reported in June 2023 that Al Qaeda “maintains a low profile” in Afghanistan and that the importance of the group’s Afghanistan-based leadership had declined.

From the outset of the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. officials said that the United States would maintain the ability to combat terrorist threats in Afghanistan such as ISKP and Al Qaeda without a military presence on the ground there by utilizing assets based outside of Afghanistan, in what U.S. officials have described as an “over-the-horizon” approach. With the Taliban in control of Afghanistan, the United States has had to alter any plans that had been predicated on the continued existence of the former Afghan government and its security forces. In March 2023 testimony, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley said of U.S. counterterrorism capabilities in Afghanistan:

   It’s not what it was. Nothing’s going to replace having troops and Afghan security forces and the amount of infrastructure we had. That’s not going to get replaced. We do have the capability to see into Afghanistan with a variety of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets and to determine any threats to the homeland. If we pick those up, we have the ability to strike at great distance.

The Biden Administration has cited the Zawahiri strike as a demonstration of U.S. over-the-horizon capabilities. Some Members of Congress have criticized the approach, with one calling it a “farce.”

40 CRS Insight IN11976, Al Qaeda Leader Zawahiri Killed in U.S. Drone Strike in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas.
41 National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested that some elements of the Taliban might not have supported or even been aware of Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul, possibly leading to tensions within the Taliban. “The National Security Advisor’s very busy week,” NPR, August 4, 2022.
43 See, for example, White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, April 14, 2021.
Afghan Women and Girls

The Afghanistan in which the Taliban came to power in August 2021 was in many ways a different country than the one they last ruled in 2001. After 2001, women became active participants in many parts of Afghan society; protections for them were enshrined in the country’s 2004 constitution. Though the Taliban takeover reduced the high levels of violence that characterized the conflict, a development particularly welcomed by women in rural areas, the Taliban’s return to power has made Afghanistan “the most repressive country in the world regarding women’s rights,” according to the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Upon taking power, the Taliban closed the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which had been a part of the former Afghan government, and reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which enforced the Taliban’s highly oppressive rule in the 1990s. The ministry monitors the implementation of Taliban edicts that seek to impose new restrictions on Afghan women. Those edicts include a December 2021 prohibition on women driving long distances or flying without a male guardian, a May 2022 decree mandating punishments for the male relatives of women who do not wear a hijab that fully covers their bodies, and a November 2022 decision to ban women from public parks and bath houses. According to a report from U.N. experts,

In their totality, the edicts significantly limit women’s and girls’ ability to engage in society, have access to basic services, and to earn a living. Women have described the continual announcement of restrictions as ‘day by day, the walls close in,’ feeling ‘suffocated,’ and the cumulative effect leaving them ‘without hope.’

Additionally, media sources report that divorce is becoming more difficult to obtain, even in cases of abuse, and that some Afghan women fear that their divorces from abusive husbands may be nullified.

Of particular concern to many U.S. policymakers are Taliban policies toward education for Afghan girls; per the U.N., “Afghanistan is the only country in the world where women and girls’ access to education is suspended.” Taliban spokespersons said in early 2022 that girls’ secondary schools, effectively shuttered in most of the country since the August 2021 takeover, would reopen with the start of the new school year in late March 2022. However, on March 23, 2022, with some girls already present in schools, the Taliban abruptly reversed course and announced that secondary schools for girls would remain closed, shocking many observers. The United States and many other countries condemned the decision, and in October 2022, the State Department announced visa restrictions on several Taliban figures responsible for the repression.
of women and girls in Afghanistan. One analysis attributes the change to the advocacy of hardline clerics within the group and Akhundzada. Other Taliban figures, including both Baradar and the Haqqanis, reportedly support secondary education for girls (and some educate their own daughters abroad). In December 2022, the Taliban also suspended women from attending university. The evidently greater influence of the group’s traditionally conservative leaders, and the unwillingness or inability of more pragmatic figures to assert themselves, suggests that external actors may have limited leverage over Taliban decisions.

The impact of Taliban restrictions on girls’ education has been considerable: U.N. experts stated in June 2023 that “reports of depression and suicide are widespread, especially among adolescent girls prevented from pursuing education.” Some Afghan women have reportedly continued to provide informal education to girls in private “secret schools,” and secondary schools for girls have remained open in some areas (largely in the north, where less conservative views on girls’ education prevail). Some Afghan women and girls have also attempted to continue their studies online, though those efforts are impeded by technological and infrastructure challenges. Some girls’ schools have continued to face attacks under Taliban rule, notably a September 2022 suicide bombing in Kabul and June 2023 reported poisoning in northern Afghanistan.

Beyond education, the Taliban have also severely restricted women’s access to employment. In December 2022, the Taliban banned women from working for national and international NGOs, threatening to suspend the licenses of NGOs that do not comply. U.N. Security Council members said the decision “would have a significant and immediate impact for humanitarian operations in country, including those of the UN.” Many implementing partners halted their work after the announcement of these restrictions, but some have since reportedly resumed some operations after reaching “acceptable workarounds” with local authorities. While interruptions to humanitarian operations have negative implications for many of the 28 million Afghans in need of assistance, women and girls have been disproportionately affected. Afghan women face more barriers to health care services, experience higher levels of unemployment, and adopt negative

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58 Diaa Hadid, “‘The Taliban took our last hope’: College education is banned for women in Afghanistan,” NPR, December 20, 2022.
59 Situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, op. cit.
61 Ruchi Kumar, “The Taliban ended college for women. Here’s how Afghan women are defying the ban,” NPR, February 24, 2023; Charlotte Greenfield and Muhammad Yunus Yawar, “Afghan girls struggle with poor internet as they turn to online classes,” Reuters, March 27, 2023.
coping mechanisms (such as reducing food consumption and selling belongings for food) at higher rates than men. Families may also be increasing the early and forced marriage of girls.65

In April 2023, the Taliban further banned women from working for the U.N.; the U.N. then instructed all Afghan staff to not report to the office while it considered how to respond, an order that the U.N. reportedly dropped in early May.66 Women are permitted to work in healthcare (for other women and girls) but face Taliban monitoring and interference.67 Other women have attempted to circumvent Taliban restrictions on working by operating online.68

Ongoing Relocations of U.S. Citizens and Certain Afghans

The Taliban’s entry into Kabul on August 15, 2021, triggered the mass evacuation of tens of thousands of U.S. citizens (including all diplomatic personnel), partner country citizens, and Afghans who worked for international efforts and/or the former Afghan government. U.S. officials say that U.S. military forces facilitated the evacuation of 124,000 individuals, including 5,300 U.S. citizens, as part of Operation Allies Refuge, “the largest air evacuation in US history.”69 Since that operation ended on August 30, 2021, the Biden Administration has said that it has assisted in the departure of 13,000 Afghans from the country, in addition to 950 U.S. citizens (as of April 2023) and 600 lawful permanent residents (as of August 2022).70

U.S. officials have characterized their efforts to secure the relocation of remaining U.S. citizens and eligible Afghan partners who seek to leave the country as an “enduring mission.”71 According to the State Department, the number of U.S. citizens it has identified in Afghanistan has fluctuated amid continued relocations and because of cases in which additional U.S. citizens come forward to ask for assistance to leave.72 On March 23, 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said there were “about 175” U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, of which 44 were “ready to leave, and we are working to effectuate their departure.”73 Additionally, the State Department reported that as of March 2023, over 150,000 Afghan SIV applicants whose applications were undergoing processing remained in Afghanistan.74

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71 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks on Afghanistan, August 30, 2021.

72 U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing—April 12, 2022.”


Some Afghans who seek to relocate reportedly remain in hiding, fearing Taliban retribution. The Taliban issued a general amnesty after coming to power, but, according to various accounts, the Taliban have carried out reprisals against figures aligned with the former government, including hundreds of killings.  

The Taliban have at times reportedly interfered with relocation flights, including by demanding seats for Taliban-selected individuals to work abroad and remit money, but in general appear to have not significantly impeded the departure of Afghans. The United States has reportedly paid, through Qatar, for tickets on some Afghan airlines that fly to Qatar for individuals to leave Afghanistan. Impediments to relocations from Afghanistan include logistical issues at Kabul’s international airport and issues with Afghans obtaining travel documentation.

Economic Contraction and Humanitarian Crisis

The Taliban’s return to power and resulting economic contraction have exacerbated one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world in Afghanistan, long one of the world’s poorest and most aid-dependent countries. A number of U.S. policy actions, including the cut-off of international development assistance, longstanding U.S. and international sanctions on the Taliban, and the U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank assets, appear relevant to the economic breakdown that underlies the humanitarian crisis.

The United States and other international donors provided billions of dollars a year to support the former Afghan government, financing over half of its $6 billion annual budget and as much as 80% of total public expenditures. Much of that development assistance halted with the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, leading the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) to contract by over 20% in 2021. In 2022, however, the Afghan economy reached “a fragile low-level equilibrium,” contracting by 3.6%, with “the Taliban’s economic management…more effective than expected,” per the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan. The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) projects slight GDP growth for 2023 (1.3%) and 2024 (0.4%). That growth is likely to be outstripped by population increase (around 2%), leading estimated per capita GDP to decline from $359 in 2022 to $345 in 2024.

Those estimates assume a stable level of international support, including from the United Nations, which requested $4.6 billion for Afghanistan for 2023, the largest ever annual appeal for a single country. In May 2023, the appeal was revised to $3.2 billion for 2023 due to “the changing

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76 Courtney Kube, Dan De Luce and Josh Lederman, “The Taliban have halted all evacuee flights out of Afghanistan for the past two weeks,” NBC News, December 23, 2021; Akmal Dawi, “US continues relocating Afghans even under Taliban rule,” VOA, April 4, 2023.


operating environment,” including the bans on women working for NGOs and the U.N. International support includes cash payments; the U.N. delivered $1.85 billion in cash into Afghanistan in 2022 for humanitarian operations.

The economic contraction has exacerbated what was already a severe humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan prior to August 2021, due primarily to conflict, drought, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported in February 2023 that humanitarian partners provided 26.1 million Afghans with at least one form of assistance in 2022, and that “the outlook remains grim” given projected droughts and higher commodity prices. As of May 2023, the World Food Program projected that 15.3 million Afghans would be food-insecure in mid-2023 and that 28 million people (two-thirds of Afghanistan’s population) would require some form of assistance this year.

**U.S. Policy**

The United States has provided over $2.1 billion in assistance for Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover, making it the largest international donor. The Biden Administration’s FY2024 budget request proposes $143 million for health, education, and other forms of bilateral assistance in Afghanistan (on top of any emergency humanitarian assistance). The lack of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan may complicate or constrain the implementation and/or oversight of U.S. funding. In March 2023, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Mike McCaul directed the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to assess, among other issues, the extent to which U.S. foreign assistance funds have been diverted to the Taliban in the form of taxes or fees.

Beyond assistance, the two U.S. policy areas that appear to have the greatest relevance to the economic and humanitarian situation are sanctions and the ongoing U.S. hold on Afghanistan’s central bank reserves. U.S. sanctions on the Taliban (in place in various forms since 1999) remain, but it is unclear to what extent they are affecting humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued several general licenses stating that U.S. sanctions on the Taliban do not prohibit the provision of assistance to Afghanistan and authorizing various humanitarian and commercial transactions. Still, the continued existence of sanctions might lead financial institutions, private sector firms, or other actors to “de-risk” Afghanistan by not engaging in the country rather than risk violation of U.S. sanctions.

The Biden Administration’s hold on the U.S.-based assets of the Afghan central bank (DAB) has also drawn scrutiny. Imposed days after the Taliban entered Kabul to prevent the Taliban from

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91 David Ainsworth, “Sanctions and banks make it a struggle to get money into Afghanistan,” Devex, January 17, 2022.
accessing the funds, the Taliban and some foreign leaders have urged the United States to release the hold on those assets, which total around $7 billion. On February 11, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that it would “seek to facilitate access of $3.5 billion [of the assets] ... for the benefit of the Afghan people,” pending ongoing litigation related to the September 11, 2001, attacks. In September 2022, the Administration announced the establishment of an “Afghan Fund” (based in Switzerland) to “make targeted disbursements of that $3.5 billion to help provide greater stability to the Afghan economy.” The fund’s four member Board of Trustees met for the first time in November 2022. It has not, as of June 2023, made any disbursements. In early 2023, USAID reported to SIGAR that it had undertaken a third-party assessment of the DAB and its anti-money laundering/countering terrorist financing controls but that “the results were not finalized as of mid-April 2023.”

**Congressional Action and Outlook**

The Taliban’s takeover attracted intense congressional and public scrutiny. U.S. public attention appears to have since decreased, but Afghanistan remains the subject of congressional engagement as some Members seek to account for the evident failure of U.S. efforts and grapple with the reality of the Taliban’s renewed rule.

Congressional oversight of Afghanistan has been robust. Congressional committees held at least ten hearings specifically on Afghanistan in the weeks after the Taliban’s takeover. Senate Foreign Relations minority staff released an assessment of the August 2021 evacuation in February 2022, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee then-ranking member produced an interim report on the withdrawal in August 2022. In addition, Congress established the Afghanistan War Commission (AWC, Section 1094 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, P.L. 117-81) charged with examining the war and developing “a series of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward” in a final report to be issued within

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92 CRS In Focus IF12052, Afghanistan Central Bank Reserves.
98 Hearings on Afghanistan include those held by House Foreign Affairs Committee (September 13, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Foreign Relations Committee (September 14, 2021, with Secretary Blinken); Senate Armed Services Committee (September 28, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); House Armed Services Committee (September 29, 2021, with Secretary Austin, General Milley, and General McKenzie); Senate Armed Services Committee (September 30, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Committee (October 5, 2021, with former U.S. officials); Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee (October 5, 2021, with outside witnesses); House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International Organizations, and Global Corporate Impact (October 6, 2021, with SIGAR); Senate Armed Service Committee (October 26, 2021, with DOD witnesses); and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (November 17, 2021, with former U.S. officials).
three years. Per its website as of early June 2023, the Commission “plans to formally convene in early 2023.”

In the 118th Congress, two House committees have sought further information from the Administration related to the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan and related contingency plans. One of them, the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), said in its February 2023 Authorization and Oversight Plan that it will “comprehensively review policy, decision-making, planning, and execution related to the August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan,” as well as “examine U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.” Three House panels (HFAC, the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability, and the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence) have held Afghanistan-focused hearings in the 118th Congress.

In shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Congress may consider a number of options.

- Congress may examine how U.S. assistance, and conditions thereon, may affect Taliban actions, including with regard to women’s rights more broadly and the ability of Afghan girls to attend school in particular, to inform congressional consideration of the Administration’s budget request and action on FY2024 appropriations;
- Congress may request or mandate additional information from the Administration about the number and status of U.S. citizens and Afghan partners who remain in Afghanistan and about the status of U.S. efforts to secure their relocation, including resources devoted to those efforts, obstacles to further relocations, and Administration plans to overcome those obstacles;
- Congress may examine the impact of U.S. sanctions on the designated entities/individuals, the Afghan economy, and Afghan society more broadly, including by requiring reporting thereon from the Administration and/or the Government Accountability Office, to assess whether they are achieving their intended objectives; and
- Congress may examine the impact and efficacy of oversight of previous U.S. efforts in Afghanistan to shape future U.S. policy efforts, congressional authorizing and appropriations measures, and oversight mechanisms (including those intended to oversee U.S. assistance to other foreign partners, such as Ukraine). Relevant reports from the AWC and the Department of Defense (and the federally funded research and development center with whom the Department contracts, as directed by Section 1323 of P.L. 117-81) are due to be submitted within approximately one and two years, respectively.

100 Afghanistan War Commission site, at https://www.afghanistanwarcommission.org/.
101 February 17, 2023 letters from Chairman James Comer et al. to White House National Security Affairs Director Sullivan, Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas, USAID Administrator Power, Secretary of Defense Austin and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Milley; June 8, 2023 letter from Chairman Michael McCaul to Secretary of State Blinken.
102 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Authorization and Oversight Plan, 118th Congress, adopted February 8, 2023.
Going forward, U.S. policy, including congressional action, could be influenced or constrained by a number of factors, including

- a dearth of information about dynamics in Afghanistan, given the lack of U.S. diplomats and other on the ground observers and Taliban-imposed limitations on journalists; and
- the historical legacy of U.S. conflict with the Taliban, which may make cooperation with the group, even to advance U.S. policy priorities, politically difficult.

Perhaps more fundamental is the challenge of how to pursue U.S. policy priorities that may be difficult to reconcile: stabilizing Afghanistan and providing support to Afghans while avoiding actions that might benefit the Taliban. While providing humanitarian aid may be sufficient to stave off mass casualties, it is unlikely to sustainably improve economic conditions. Financial assistance could improve the Afghan economy, ameliorating the humanitarian situation, but comes with the risk of diversion of some funds or broader benefits to the Taliban. In considering Administration budget requests, Members of Congress may weigh these and other options, including conditions on U.S. assistance.

The Taliban have called for international recognition, assistance, and sanctions relief, but since returning to power they have not shown a willingness to make compromises on important issues to obtain them. Nearly every country, U.S. partners and adversaries alike, has urged the Taliban to form a more inclusive government, and many countries have joined the United States in calling for the group to lift restrictions on women and girls and break ties with terrorist groups. In response, the Taliban have stalled, equivocated, and ultimately either ignored or rejected outright these calls. Foreign policy tools that the United States has traditionally used as leverage may not be as effective in Afghanistan as in some other contexts.104

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