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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations

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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Appropriations

The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as well as countering illicit narcotics, since the 1990s. Over the past decade, top U.S. funding priorities for foreign assistance in the region have included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America, combating drug production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and strengthening security and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have prioritized programs intended to combat HIV/AIDS and foster stability in Haiti, address security concerns in the Caribbean, and respond to the political and humanitarian crises in Venezuela and their impact on the broader region.

FY2024 Budget Request

The Biden Administration requested nearly \$2.5 billion in foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2024 under accounts managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). That sum was \$427.3 million (20.9%) more than the estimated amount allocated to the region in FY2023. The Administration's FY2024 budget request also included \$52.0 million for the Inter-American Foundation (IAF)—an independent U.S. government agency that supports grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Administration's FY2024 budget proposal for the region continued to prioritize efforts to stem irregular migration. The Administration requested at least \$945.8 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America—\$275.0 million (41.0%) more than the estimated FY2023 allocation for Central America. The Administration also requested \$51.4 million for a new Americas Partnership Opportunity Fund intended to support migration management throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. In October 2023, the Administration requested an additional \$1.25 billion of emergency supplemental foreign assistance to respond to irregular migration in the region.

Among other regional priorities for FY2024, the Administration requested \$444.0 million for Colombia to support counternarcotics efforts, peace accord implementation, and the integration of Venezuelan migrants; \$291.5 million for Haiti to restore democratic institutions, improve security, and address health and economic challenges; \$111.4 million for Mexico to strengthen the rule of law and combat illicit drugs; and \$64.5 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).

Legislative Developments

Congress concluded action on regular FY2024 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations on March 23, 2024, when President Biden signed into law the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47), with SFOPS appropriations legislation included as Division F. The House passed its SFOPS bill (H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) in September 2023, and the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its SFOPS bill (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) in July 2023, but neither was enacted. Instead, Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 118-15, P.L. 118-22, P.L. 118-35, and P.L. 118-40) that funded most foreign aid programs in the region at FY2023 levels from October 1, 2023, until the March 2024 enactment of P.L. 118-47. On April 24, 2024, the President signed into law a supplemental appropriations measure (P.L. 118-50) that included additional SFOPS funding for FY2024 but did not designate any assistance specifically for Latin America and the Caribbean.

P.L. 118-47 and its accompanying explanatory statement include some funding directives and reporting requirements related to Latin America and the Caribbean but do not specify comprehensive appropriations totals for most countries or for the region as a whole. Those allocation decisions are left to the Administration, subject to overall enacted appropriations levels and consultation with Congress. The act directs the Administration to prioritize programs that address violence, poverty, corruption, and other factors that contribute to irregular migration; counter fentanyl and other narcotics trafficking; protect Indigenous rights and support civil society and independent institutions; and advance democracy and human rights.

During the remainder of the 118th Congress, Members may track the Administration's implementation of P.L. 118-47 and review the reports mandated by the act as they engage in oversight and consider FY2025 appropriations and other legislation to help guide U.S. foreign assistance policy in the region.

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Introduction

Foreign assistance (also referred to as *foreign aid* in this report) is one of the tools the United States employs to advance U.S. interests and policy goals in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹ Current aid programs reflect the diverse challenges faced by countries in the region, as well as the broad range of these countries' ties to the United States (see **Figure 1** for a map of Latin America and the Caribbean). Some countries receive U.S. assistance across many sectors to address political, socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in consolidating democratic governance and improving living conditions; these countries no longer receive traditional U.S. development assistance but typically receive some U.S. support to address shared security challenges, such as transnational crime. Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funds for Latin America and the Caribbean and conducts oversight of aid programs and the executive branch agencies that allocate, program, and administer them.

Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean



Source: Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

¹ For more information on foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, *Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, by Emily M. McCabe and Nick M. Brown.

This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It assesses trends in aid to the region; analyzes the Biden Administration’s FY2024 base and supplemental budget requests for aid administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF); and examines congressional action on FY2024 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. The **Appendix** provides detailed aid allocations by foreign assistance account and country or regional program for FY2022, FY2023, and the FY2024 request.

Report Notes

To compare the Biden Administration’s FY2024 foreign assistance request with previous years’ appropriations, most aid figures in this report refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is requested for individual countries or regional programs. The foreign assistance accounts examined in this report accounted for 60.3% of the total aid obligated by all U.S. agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2021 (the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available).

Several other sources of U.S. assistance to the region exist. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean receive U.S. assistance to address humanitarian needs through USAID- and State Department-managed foreign assistance accounts, such as Food for Peace Act Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Migration and Refugee Assistance. Some countries also receive assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the Department of Defense, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps, and International Development Finance Corporation, or from multilateral organizations that the United States supports financially, such as the Organization of American States, Inter-American Development Bank, and Pan American Health Organization. This report examines some of these assistance sources briefly but otherwise excludes them from the analysis due to data inconsistencies.


Source: ForeignAssistance.gov.

Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Between FY1946 and FY2021, the United States provided \$100.4 billion (\$209.9 billion in constant 2021 dollars) of assistance to the region.² U.S. assistance spiked in the early 1960s, following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in Latin America and the Caribbean in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S. assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided considerable support to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American civil conflicts (see **Figure 2**).

² These totals include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies to the 33 independent Latin American and Caribbean countries (identified in **Figure 1**) and regional programs. The Department of Defense has not yet reported its final assistance obligations for FY2020 or FY2021. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Department of State, <https://foreignassistance.gov/>.

Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2021
(obligations in constant 2021 dollars)



Source: CRS Graphics, using data from ForeignAssistance.gov.

Notes: Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies, adjusted for inflation. Comprehensive data for FY2022 and FY2023 are not yet available.

U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase again in the late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through FY2010. The higher levels of assistance were partially due to increased spending on humanitarian and development assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The establishment of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004 also provided many countries in the region with new sources of U.S. assistance.³ In addition, U.S. assistance to Haiti spiked in the aftermath of a massive earthquake in 2010.

Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S. assistance. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive Administrations and Congresses provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking and end Colombia's long-running internal armed conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined with his Mexican counterpart, Felipe Calderón, to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counter-drug and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a similar program for the countries of the Caribbean, known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).

U.S. foreign assistance priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean have shifted over the past two decades to respond to advances in development in the region as well as subsequent setbacks. Between 2002 and 2019, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin America decreased

³ For more information on the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, see CRS In Focus IF10797, *PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities*, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, and CRS Report RL32427, *Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues*, by Nick M. Brown.

from 45.3% to 30.4%, largely due to stronger economic growth and the implementation of more effective social policies.⁴ Health and education indicators also improved significantly during that period. In 2019, the World Bank classified most Latin American and Caribbean countries as “upper middle income” and a few as “high income” economies.⁵ Some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, began to provide assistance to others in the region based on their own development experiences. Although overall U.S. assistance levels for Latin America and the Caribbean remained fairly stable, the U.S. government concentrated those resources in fewer countries and sectors due to the changes in the region.

In the past few years, U.S. assistance efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean have expanded as many countries in the region have experienced setbacks in long-term development and new challenges have emerged.⁶ Socioeconomic conditions began to stagnate in many Latin American and Caribbean countries around 2015 amid a decline in global commodity prices. These conditions deteriorated sharply in 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic swept away more than a decade of development gains.⁷ Political conditions also have deteriorated as governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua have entrenched authoritarian rule, Haiti has been unable to reestablish an elected government since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, and widespread corruption and violence have eroded the quality of democracy elsewhere in the region. These challenges have contributed to political unrest and large-scale migration flows throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.⁸

Biden Administration’s FY2024 Foreign Assistance Budget Request⁹

For FY2024, the Biden Administration requested nearly \$2.5 billion of foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean under accounts managed by the State Department and USAID. That sum is \$427.4 million (20.9%) more than the estimated amount allocated for the region in FY2023 (see **Table 1**). The Administration’s FY2024 budget proposal also included \$52.0 million for the IAF, an independent U.S. government agency that supports grassroots development in the region (see “Inter-American Foundation”). In October 2023, the Administration requested an additional \$1.25 billion of emergency supplemental foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean intended to address irregular migration (see “Emergency Supplemental Request”).

⁴ UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Social Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean 2022*, November 24, 2022, p. 19.

⁵ World Bank, “The World by Income and Region,” <https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/the-world-by-income-and-region.html>.

⁶ For more information on recent challenges in the region, see CRS Insight IN12092, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues for the 118th Congress*, by Peter J. Meyer.

⁷ ECLAC, *Social Panorama of Latin America 2021*, January 2022.

⁸ See, for example, Moisés Naím, “Why Hard-Liners Are Gaining Steam in Latin America,” *Politico Magazine*, July 12, 2022, and Michael Stott, “Repression and Poverty Trigger Record Migration in the Americas,” *Financial Times*, September 11, 2022.

⁹ Unless otherwise noted, data and other information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*, April 2023; U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2024*, April 2023; and U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2025*, April 2024. For information on the Administration’s global FY2024 request, see CRS Report R47579, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2024 Budget and Appropriations*, by Emily M. McCabe and Cory R. Gill.

Major Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts¹⁰

The Administration's FY2024 foreign aid budget proposal requested \$970.7 million (39.3% of the total for Latin America and the Caribbean) through the **Development Assistance (DA)** account, which seeks to foster broad-based economic growth and social welfare in low- and middle-income countries. USAID typically uses DA funding for long-term projects in areas such as agriculture, democracy and governance, economic reform, education, and environmental protection. Compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, the Administration proposed a \$307.1 million (46.3%) increase in DA funding for the region, with the majority of the proposed increase in assistance allocated to activities intended to address root causes of migration from Central America and to restore democratic institutions and support development in Haiti. The request also included additional funding to advance environmental objectives, such as forest conservation in the Amazon Basin and climate change resilience in the Caribbean, as well as to support Venezuelan migrant integration throughout South America.

Another \$532.1 million (21.5%) of the Administration's budget proposal for the region was requested through the **Economic Support Fund (ESF)** account, which provides economic assistance, in part to promote special U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, ESF programs generally aim to promote political and economic stability and often are indistinguishable from programs funded through the DA account, though the State Department rather than USAID makes ESF policy and program decisions. Compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, the Administration sought a \$59.6 million (12.6%) increase in ESF assistance for the region. Among other changes, the Administration requested \$51.4 million for a new Americas Partnership Opportunity Fund intended to support migration management throughout the hemisphere and \$18.0 million to implement commitments made at the 2022 Summit of the Americas.¹¹

The Administration requested \$309.5 million (12.5% of the total) for the region through the **Global Health Programs (GHP)** account. This sum included a request for \$190.0 million for the State Department, primarily to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS. It also included a request for \$119.5 million for USAID to combat malaria; support maternal and child health, nutrition, and family planning programs; and advance global health security activities intended to prevent, detect, and respond to disease outbreaks. Compared with FY2023 estimated allocations, the Administration proposed a \$8.8 million (4.4%) reduction in State Department-managed GHP aid and a \$4.0 million (3.5%) increase in USAID-managed GHP aid for the region. The Administration requested the additional USAID-managed funds primarily to expand reproductive health programming in Haiti.

The remaining \$658.3 million (26.6%) of the Administration's FY2024 budget proposal for Latin America and the Caribbean was requested for security assistance programs, including the following:

- \$536.5 million requested through the **International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)** account for counternarcotics, civilian law enforcement efforts, and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. Compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, the Administration proposed a \$66.4 million

¹⁰ For more information on the various foreign assistance accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report R40482, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts*, by Cory R. Gill and Emily M. McCabe.

¹¹ For information on summit commitments, see CRS Insight IN11934, *2022 Summit of the Americas*, by Peter J. Meyer.

(14.1%) increase in INCLE funding for the region, primarily as additional aid for Central America.

- \$32.1 million requested through the **Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)** account to help countries in the region carry out humanitarian demining programs, strengthen conventional weapons stockpile management, develop strategic trade controls and border security measures, and enhance their counterterrorism capacities. Compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, the Administration proposed a \$9 million (21.9%) reduction in NADR funding for the region, due to the Colombian government gradually assuming responsibility for demining efforts formerly funded by U.S. assistance.
- \$16.2 million requested through the **International Military Education and Training (IMET)** account to train Latin American and Caribbean military and civilian security personnel. Compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, the Administration requested a \$3.6 million (29.1%) increase in IMET funding to be spread among countries throughout the hemisphere.
- \$73.5 million requested through the **Foreign Military Financing (FMF)** account to provide U.S. military equipment and services to partners in the region. Compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, the Administration proposed a \$4.5 million (6.5%) increase in FMF funding for the region, with reduced aid to Costa Rica, Peru, and Colombia more than offset by increased funding for regional programs.

Table 1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account: FY2021 Actual-FY2024 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)

Foreign Assistance Account	FY2021 (actual)	FY2022 (actual)	FY2023 (estimate)	FY2024 (request)	% Change: FY2023-FY2024
Development Assistance	490.6	656.5	663.7	970.7	+46.3%
Economic Support Fund	480.7 ^a	501.4 ^b	472.5	532.1	+12.6%
Global Health Programs (USAID)	55.5	91.5	115.5	119.5	+3.5%
Global Health Programs (State)	195.0	191.3	198.8	190.0	-4.4%
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	553.0	541.8	470.2	536.5	+14.1%
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs	31.0	32.1	41.1	32.1	-21.9%
International Military Education and Training	13.8	11.3	12.5	16.2	+29.1%
Foreign Military Financing	76.9	78.5	69.0	73.5	+6.5%
Total	1,896.5^a	2,104.4^b	2,043.3	2,470.7	+20.9%

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2023*, May 2022; U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2024*,

April 2023; and U.S. Department of State, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2025, April 2024*.

Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development.

- a. Sum includes \$97.2 million of supplemental assistance appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2).
- b. Sum includes \$64.0 million of supplemental assistance appropriated in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).

Major Country and Regional Initiatives

Although the Biden Administration proposed an overall increase in State Department- and USAID-managed assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2024 compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, proposed changes varied considerably by country or regional program (see **Table 2**). Some of the Administration’s top funding priorities in the region are discussed below.

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Since FY2010, the CBSI has funded maritime and aerial security cooperation, law enforcement capacity-building, border and port security, justice sector reform, and crime prevention programs in the Caribbean.¹² The Administration’s FY2024 budget proposal included \$64.5 million for the CBSI, \$17.5 million (21.3%) less than the FY2023 estimated allocation.

Central America. Addressing the underlying drivers of irregular migration from Central America to the United States has been a top U.S. policy priority in the region since an unexpected surge of unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arrived at the U.S. border in 2014. However, specific policy approaches have shifted from one Administration to another. The Biden Administration developed a U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America intended to support improved governance, security, and broad-based economic growth in the subregion.¹³ The Biden Administration also has allocated increased humanitarian assistance to Central America intended to stabilize populations with acute needs, in line with its Collaborative Migration Management Strategy (see “U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Central America” text box).¹⁴

U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Central America

Since 2020, a series of tropical storms and the COVID-19 pandemic have contributed to sharp increases in food insecurity and other humanitarian challenges in Central America. The Biden Administration has sought to address these challenges and stabilize populations in Central America as part of its broader Collaborative Migration Management Strategy. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department allocated \$209.8 million of humanitarian assistance to support vulnerable populations in Central America in FY2021, an estimated \$216.3 million for such purposes in FY2022, and an estimated \$139.9 million in FY2023. These assistance funds, which U.S. agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from global humanitarian accounts, are not included in the country or regional totals found in **Table 1**, **Table 2**, or the **Appendix** of this report.

¹² For more information on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10789, *Caribbean Basin Security Initiative*, by Karla I. Rios.

¹³ White House, *U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America*, July 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf>. For more information on U.S. policy toward Central America, see CRS In Focus IF11151, *Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy*, by Peter J. Meyer.

¹⁴ White House, *Collaborative Migration Management Strategy*, July 2021, p. 7, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf>.

Sources: U.S. Agency for International Development, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—Regional Response,” Fact Sheet #12, Fiscal Year 2021, September 30, 2021, and U.S. Department of State, FY2022-FY2024 allocation estimates for Central America, provided to CRS in November 2023.

For FY2024, the Administration requested at least \$945.8 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America—\$275.0 million (41.0%) more than the FY2023 estimated allocation.¹⁵ The Central America request included \$124.8 million for El Salvador, \$164.5 million for Guatemala, \$136.5 million for Honduras, and a combined \$17.1 million for the other four countries of the isthmus. The Central America request also included \$341.3 million for CARSI and \$161.7 million for other State Department- and USAID-managed regional programs in Central America.

Colombia. Colombia has been among the top recipients of U.S. assistance worldwide since the FY2000 launch of Plan Colombia, a counternarcotics and security initiative. The focus of U.S. assistance efforts has evolved over time, responding to changes in Colombia’s long-running internal conflict and Colombian government priorities.¹⁶ For FY2024, the Administration requested \$444.0 million for Colombia to support ongoing counternarcotics efforts, peace accord implementation, Venezuelan migrant integration, and forest conservation. Compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, the Administration requested a \$9.1 million (2.0%) reduction in aid to Colombia.

Haiti. The United States has provided Haiti significant aid intended to support the country’s recovery from recurrent natural disasters and foster long-term stability, with a particular spike in assistance in the aftermath of a massive 2010 earthquake. Since the 2021 assassination of President Moïse, Haiti has been mired in interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises.¹⁷ The Biden Administration’s FY2024 request included \$291.5 million to help Haiti restore democratic institutions; improve security conditions; and address health, economic, and environmental challenges. Compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, the Administration proposed a \$60.6 million (26.2%) increase in assistance for Haiti. The Administration stated that it would use the additional funds to strengthen the police and combat gang influence, address the drivers of irregular migration and support returnees’ reintegration, and support credible elections, among other activities.

Haiti and the Global Fragility Act

In April 2022, the Biden Administration designated Haiti as a priority country for the Global Fragility Act (P.L. 116-94, Division J, Title V), intended to stabilize conflict-affected areas. The Administration released a 10-year plan for Haiti, as mandated by the act, in March 2023. Haiti is eligible to receive assistance through three funds authorized by the act: the Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF), the Complex Crisis Fund, and the Multi-Donor Global Fragility Fund. These assistance funds are not included in the country or regional totals found in **Table I**, **Table 2**, or the **Appendix** of this report.

Note: For additional information, see CRS Report R47394, *Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy*, by Karla I. Rios and Clare Ribando Seelke.

¹⁵ These figures are based on amounts allocated to, and requested for, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and State Department- and USAID-managed Central America regional programs.

¹⁶ For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Insight IN12180, *Colombia: Issues for the 118th Congress*, and CRS Report R47426, *U.S.-Colombia Security Relations: Future Prospects in Brief*. For further information, congressional offices may contact CRS Specialist in Latin American Affairs Clare Ribando Seelke.

¹⁷ For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Report R47394, *Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy*, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Karla I. Rios.

Mexico. Mexico traditionally was not a major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status, but it began receiving larger amounts of counternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the Mérida Initiative in FY2008. Bilateral security cooperation efforts have shifted along with the priorities of U.S. and Mexican administrations and now are guided by the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities, launched in October 2021.¹⁸ For FY2024, the Biden Administration requested \$111.4 million to support Mexican efforts to strengthen the rule of law, combat transnational crime, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the energy and agriculture sectors. Compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, the Administration proposed a \$6.8 million (6.5%) increase in aid for Mexico.

Venezuela. The United States has provided democracy assistance to Venezuelan civil society for two decades and has increased such assistance over the past five years in response to the increasingly authoritarian rule of President Nicolás Maduro. The United States also has provided humanitarian support for those who have fled the country’s humanitarian crisis (see the “U.S. Assistance to Respond to Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis” text box).¹⁹ The Biden Administration requested \$54.0 million for FY2024 to support democratic actors, human rights advocates, and other civil society organizations; strengthen small businesses; and reduce maternal and child mortality in Venezuela. Compared with the FY2023 estimated allocation, the Administration proposed a \$3.4 million (5.8%) reduction in assistance for Venezuela.

U.S. Assistance to Respond to Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, an estimated 7.8 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees have fled the country’s political and humanitarian crisis since 2015. Of these, approximately 6.6 million are residing in other Latin American and Caribbean countries. From FY2017 through FY2023, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department committed more than \$2.9 billion of humanitarian assistance—including \$591.0 million in FY2023—to help countries in the region respond to Venezuelan migrant and refugee flows, support host communities, and assist those who remain in Venezuela. Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil have been among the top recipients. These assistance funds, which U.S. agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from global humanitarian accounts, are not included in the country or regional totals found in **Table 1**, **Table 2**, or the **Appendix** of this report.

Sources: R4V Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, “Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela,” June 3, 2024, and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Venezuela Regional Crisis—Complex Emergency,” fact sheets, <https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/venezuela/venezuela-regional-crisis-archive>.

Table 2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Country or Regional Program: FY2021 Actual-FY2024 Request
(thousands of current U.S. dollars)

Country or Regional Program	FY2021 (actual) ^a	FY2022 (actual) ^b	FY2023 (estimate)	FY2024 (request)	% Change: FY2023-FY2024
Argentina	700	632	650	800	+23.1%
Bahamas	200	210	200	250	+25.0%
Belize	1,250	245	250	250	—

¹⁸ For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS Report R42917, *Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations*, and CRS In Focus IF10578, *U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework*, by Clare Ribando Seelke.

¹⁹ For more information on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, *Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations*, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.

Country or Regional Program	FY2021 (actual)^a	FY2022 (actual)^b	FY2023 (estimate)	FY2024 (request)	% Change: FY2023-FY2024
Bolivia	4,000	0	0	0	—
Brazil	27,950	29,781	39,198	42,000	+7.1%
Chile	455	434	357	650	+82.1%
Colombia	478,192	490,337	453,096	444,025	-2.0%
Costa Rica	9,225	8,183	12,725	600	-95.3%
Cuba	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	—
Dominican Republic	35,155	46,460	44,613	46,545	+4.3%
Ecuador	28,750	45,554	49,000	48,600	-0.8%
El Salvador	80,790	98,652	87,096	124,800	+43.3%
Guatemala	103,849	137,442	121,370	164,502	+35.5%
Guyana	200	190	200	250	+25.0%
Haiti	204,377	237,428	230,905	291,455	+26.2%
Honduras	79,902	117,878	141,774	136,450	-3.8%
Jamaica	24,446	24,300	22,524	11,750	-47.8%
Mexico	158,910	127,107	104,575	111,400	+6.5%
Nicaragua	12,592	16,960	17,209	15,000	-12.8%
Panama	14,019	12,507	13,747	1,225	-91.1%
Paraguay	9,600	4,343	3,900	4,500	+15.4%
Peru	98,885	109,134	100,379	107,635	+7.2%
Suriname	200	162	200	250	+25.0%
Trinidad and Tobago	2,999	1,735	1,607	350	-78.2%
Uruguay	900	347	350	400	+14.3%
Venezuela	38,000	48,600	57,350	54,000	-5.8%
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean	7,700	24,621	22,220	24,000	+8.0%
USAID Caribbean Development	15,800	15,438	13,000	17,000	+30.8%
USAID Central America Regional	5,000	35,000	29,950	85,178	+184.4%
USAID South America Regional	15,000	27,000	26,000	55,400	+113.1%
USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional	45,540	38,697	56,850	41,678	-26.7%
State Central America Regional	—	278,000	246,700	417,800	+69.4%
State Western Hemisphere Regional	366,909	102,044	120,305	201,910	+67.8%

Country or Regional Program	FY2021 (actual) ^a	FY2022 (actual) ^b	FY2023 (estimate)	FY2024 (request)	% Change: FY2023-FY2024
[Caribbean Basin Security Initiative]	[74,800]	[80,000]	[82,000]	[64,500]	[-21.3%]
Total	1,896,495^a	2,104,421^b	2,043,300	2,470,653	+20.9%

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2023*, May 2022; U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2024*, April 2023; and U.S. Department of State, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2025*, April 2024.

Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023 totals include \$5 million appropriated as voluntary contributions to the Organization of American States. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives, including the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, as well as activities that cross borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the vast majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. Prior to FY2022, activities funded through the State Central America Regional program were funded under the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.

- a. FY2021 sums include some supplemental assistance appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2).
- b. FY2022 sums include some supplemental assistance appropriated in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).

Inter-American Foundation

In addition to State Department- and USAID-managed assistance for the region, the Biden Administration requested \$52.0 million for the IAF for FY2024 (see **Table 3**). The IAF is an independent U.S. government agency established through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 (22 U.S.C. §290f) to provide grants and other targeted assistance for grassroots development efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. Congress created the agency after conducting a comprehensive review of previous assistance activities in the region and determining that programs at the government-to-government level had not promoted significant social and civic change.²⁰ The IAF is active in 27 countries, including several countries where USAID no longer has field missions.²¹ The Administration’s FY2024 request included funding for the IAF to continue supporting local efforts to address the root causes of Central American migration, integrate displaced Venezuelans and Nicaraguans into host communities, promote inclusive economic growth, reduce food insecurity, foster civic engagement, mitigate chronic violence, provide alternatives to the illicit drug trade, build resilience to natural disasters, and manage natural resources sustainably.

²⁰ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Report on H.R.14580 to Promote the Foreign Policy, Security, and General Welfare of the United States by Assisting Peoples of the World to Achieve Development Within a Framework of Democratic, Economic, Social, and Political Institutions, and for Other Purposes*, 91st Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1969, H.Rept. 91-611 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), p. 57.

²¹ Inter-American Foundation (IAF), “Where We Work,” <https://www.iaf.gov/where-we-work/>.

Table 3. Inter-American Foundation Appropriations: FY2021 Actual-FY2024 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)

FY2021 (actual)	FY2022 (actual)	FY2023 (enacted)	FY2024 (request)	% Change FY2023- FY2024
38.0	42.0	47.0	52.0	+10.6%

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2023*, May 2022, and U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2024*, April 2023.

Emergency Supplemental Request²²

In October 2023, the White House sent an emergency FY2024 supplemental funding request to Congress that included \$1.25 billion of foreign assistance intended to address irregular migration in Latin America and the Caribbean.²³ That request modified an August 2023 supplemental request of \$782 million for the same purpose.²⁴

The Administration requested \$850.0 million of the supplemental funds for Latin America and the Caribbean through the **Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)** account, intended to address the humanitarian needs of vulnerable migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons. The Administration’s supplemental request added to a base FY2024 budget proposal that included \$3.9 billion in global MRA funds, including an anticipated allocation of \$398.0 million of Overseas Assistance funding for the Western Hemisphere.²⁵ The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration administers the MRA account, often channeling such assistance through international organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

According to the supplemental proposal, the MRA funds were requested to address humanitarian needs in Latin America and the Caribbean and promote access to regular migration and international protection pathways. Some of the funds were requested to support partner countries’ migrant regularization and integration programs and strengthen their capacities to screen migrants for protection needs and manage migration flows. Other MRA funds were requested to establish and operate Safe Mobility Offices—centers located throughout the region to screen and vet potential candidates for refugee resettlement or other legal pathways to the United States, Canada, Spain, or other countries.²⁶

²² Unless otherwise noted, data and other information in this section are drawn from Letter from Shalanda D. Young, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to Patrick Murray, Speaker Pro Tempore of the House of Representatives, October 20, 2023, p. 69, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Letter-regarding-critical-national-security-funding-needs-for-FY-2024.pdf> (hereinafter: Young letter, October 2023).

²³ The emergency supplemental request also included \$50.0 million under the State Department’s Diplomatic Programs account to advance and oversee U.S. migration management initiatives throughout the region.

²⁴ Letter from Shalanda D. Young, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to Kevin McCarthy, Speaker of the House of Representatives, August 10, 2023, pp. 56-58, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Final-Supplemental-Funding-Request-Letter-and-Technical-Materials.pdf>.

²⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2024*, April 2023, pp. 342-345.

²⁶ Initial Safe Mobility Offices have been established in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Guatemala. For more information, see <https://movilidadsegura.org/en/>.

The Administration's FY2024 supplemental request also included \$400.0 million of ESF aid intended to "support safe, orderly, and humane migration" in the region and "reduce irregular encounters at the U.S. Southwest border."²⁷ The Administration stated that it would use these funds to expand migrant integration efforts in selected communities as well as to engage with private sector and multilateral partners to spur greater investment in such initiatives. The Administration also planned to use the requested ESF aid to "incentivize sustained cooperation" from partner countries hosting Safe Mobility Offices.²⁸

Legislative Developments

Regular Appropriations

Congress concluded action on regular FY2024 appropriations midway through the fiscal year. The House Appropriations Committee reported its regular FY2024 SFOPS bill (H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-146) on July 17, 2023, and the bill was passed by the House on September 28, 2023. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported a separate SFOPS bill (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) on July 20, 2023. Congress did not take further action on either bill. It passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 118-15, P.L. 118-22, P.L. 118-35, and P.L. 118-40) that largely funded foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2023 level from October 1, 2023, until March 23, 2024, when President Biden signed into law the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47), with SFOPS appropriations legislation included as Division F.

P.L. 118-47 does not specify comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean country or for the region as a whole, leaving some allocations to be determined by executive agencies, subject to overall enacted appropriations levels and consultation with Congress. Nevertheless, the act and the accompanying explanatory statement include some funding directives (included in **Table 4**), restrictions, and/or reporting requirements for some countries and U.S. initiatives in the region. For example, the act and explanatory statement direct the Administration to prioritize programs in the region that address violence, poverty, corruption, and other factors that contribute to irregular migration to the United States; counter fentanyl and other narcotics trafficking; protect Indigenous rights and support civil society and independent institutions; and advance democracy, constitutional order, and human rights.²⁹

The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 118-47 also directs U.S. agencies to comply with directives, reporting requirements, and instructions in H.Rept. 118-146 (accompanying H.R. 4665) and S.Rept. 118-71 (accompanying S. 2438) as though they were included in the explanatory statement, "unless specifically directed to the contrary."³⁰ Provisions of the act, explanatory statement, and House and Senate reports related to selected countries and initiatives are detailed below.

²⁷ Young letter, October 2023.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ §7045(a) and "Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. Granger, Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 2882, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024," *Congressional Record*, vol. 170, no. 51, Book II (March 22, 2024), p. H2096 (hereinafter: Explanatory Statement, 2024).

³⁰ Although directives included in an explanatory statement are not considered statutorily binding, agencies tend to follow such directives as if they had been included in appropriations bill language.

**Table 4. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Selected Countries and Initiatives:
FY2024 Appropriations Legislation**
(millions of current U.S. dollars)

Initiative, region, or country	FY2022 (actual) ^a	FY2023 (estimate)	FY2024 (request)	H.R. 4665 and H.Rept. 118-146	S. 2438 and S.Rept. 118-71	P.L. 118-47 and explanatory statement
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative	80.0	82.0	64.5	97.5	82.0	88.0
Central America	704.9 ^b	670.8	945.8 ^b	NA	NA	NA
Colombia	490.3	453.1	444.0	NA	487.4	377.5 ^c
Haiti	237.4	230.9	291.5	NA	NA	NA
Inter- American Foundation	42.0	47.0	52.0	22.5	52.0	47.0
Mexico	127.1	104.6	111.4	NA	NA	NA
Venezuela	48.6	57.4	54.0	50.0	50.0	50.0 ^c

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2024*, April 2023; U.S. Department of State, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2025*, April 2024; H.R. 4665; H.Rept. 118-146; S. 2438; S.Rept. 118-71; P.L. 118-47; and “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. Granger, Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 2882, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024,” *Congressional Record*, vol. 170, no. 51, Book II (March 22, 2024).

Notes: “NA” indicates that comprehensive appropriation totals are not specified in the bill/legislation or report/explanatory statement.

- FY2022 figures include supplemental assistance appropriated in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).
- These Central America figures are based on amounts allocated to, and requested for, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and State Department- and USAID-managed Central America regional programs.
- Totals may not be comprehensive because P.L. 118-47 and the explanatory statement do not specify International Military Education and Training; Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; or Global Health Programs assistance levels for Colombia or a Global Health Programs aid level for Venezuela.

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. P.L. 118-47 provides not less than \$88.0 million for the CBSI, which is \$23.5 million more than the Administration requested for FY2024 and \$6.0 million more than Congress appropriated for the initiative in FY2023.³¹ The explanatory statement directs that CBSI funds “shall be prioritized for countries within the transit zones of illicit drug shipments toward the United States that have increased interdiction of illicit drugs and are most directly impacted by the crisis in Haiti.”³² H.Rept. 118-146 directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the USAID Administrator, to submit a report to the Appropriations Committees “not later than 45 days after enactment” of the act detailing the uses of all funds provided for the CBSI from FY2016 through FY2022 on a country-by-country basis. It also

³¹ §7045(k).

³² Explanatory Statement, 2024, p. H2097.

directs the agencies to integrate that information into the ForeignAssistance.gov website, “as appropriate.”³³

Central America. P.L. 118-147 does not stipulate an overall assistance level for Central America. However, the act states that \$61.5 million “should be made available” to support anti-corruption entities and activities and \$70.0 million “should be made available” for programs to reduce violence against women and girls in Central America.³⁴ The act also designates \$15.0 million for democracy and religious freedom programs in Nicaragua. The explanatory statement designates \$46.0 million in security assistance for Costa Rica.³⁵

The act requires the State Department to withhold 60% of ESF aid and security assistance (e.g., INCLE and IMET) made available to support the central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras until the Secretary of State certifies that those governments have met a series of conditions related to combatting corruption, protecting human rights, countering organized crime, improving the business environment, and cooperating with the United States on migration issues, among other congressional concerns. Congress has enacted similar conditions annually since FY2016. For FY2024, the withholding requirements do not apply to aid intended to combat corruption and impunity, combat gender-based violence, promote and protect human rights, support women’s economic empowerment, or address food security or other humanitarian challenges. The act also maintains a prohibition on FMF for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras that Congress has enacted annually since FY2021.

The explanatory statement, H.Rept. 118-146, and S.Rept. 118-71 include numerous other directives and reporting requirements related to Central America. Among other reporting requirements, H.Rept. 118-146 directs the Secretary of State and/or USAID Administrator to submit reports on the effectiveness of assistance programming in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras; how CARSF funding was used between FY2015 and FY2023; how IMET aid was used in Central America in FY2023; assistance efforts to strengthen Central American countries’ resilience to natural disasters; and the implementation of youth empowerment activities in Central America.³⁶

Colombia. The explanatory statement designates at least \$377.5 million in assistance for Colombia, including \$77.0 million in IMET aid, \$129.0 million in ESF aid, \$134.5 million in INCLE aid, and \$37.0 million in FMF aid.³⁷ That total is \$66.5 million less than the Administration requested for FY2024 and \$75.6 million less than Congress appropriated for the country in FY2023. The total may not be comprehensive, however, as the explanatory statement does not designate specific funding levels for Colombia under the GHP, NADR, or IMET accounts, through which Colombia received nearly \$34.6 million in aid for FY2023.

P.L. 118-147 places several conditions on U.S. assistance to Colombia. Prior to obligating any assistance funds for Colombia, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator, is to submit a report to the Appropriations Committees detailing the Colombian government’s counternarcotics strategy and how U.S. assistance would support implementation of that strategy. The act also requires the Secretary of State to submit a pre-obligation report to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and House and Senate

³³ H.Rept. 118-146, p. 123.

³⁴ §7045(b)(1).

³⁵ §7045(i) and Explanatory Statement, 2024, pp. H2091-H2092.

³⁶ Some of these reports are to be submitted to the Appropriations Committees, while others are to be submitted to the Appropriations Committees, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. H.Rept. 118-146, pp. 115-117.

³⁷ Explanatory Statement, 2024, pp. H2091-H2092.

Appropriations Committees regarding the status of U.S.-Colombian relations, including an analysis of how the Colombian government's policies align with U.S. national interests.³⁸

Additionally, the act requires the State Department to withhold some security assistance for Colombia until the country has met certain conditions. Of the INCLE assistance made available for Colombia, 20% may not be obligated until the Secretary of State certifies that the Colombian government has reduced overall coca cultivation, production, and trafficking and has continued cooperating with the United States on joint counternarcotics strategies and extraditions in the previous 12 months.³⁹ Of the FMF funds made available for Colombia, 20% may not be obligated until the Secretary of State certifies that the Colombian government has met a series of human rights conditions, such as reducing threats and attacks against human rights defenders and other civil society activists and holding accountable perpetrators of gross violations of human rights.⁴⁰

Haiti. P.L. 118-147 does not specify a comprehensive appropriation level for Haiti but states that funds “shall be made available for assistance for Haiti to support the basic needs of the Haitian people.”⁴¹ The act requires the State Department to withhold any aid made available to support the central government of Haiti until the Secretary of State certifies by January 1, 2025, that elections have been scheduled or held in Haiti and that it is in the United States’ national interest to provide such assistance. That withholding requirement does not apply to aid intended to support democracy programs; strengthen the police and justice administration; provide disaster relief and recovery; or support education, public health, food security, or other basic human needs. As in prior years, the act prohibits assistance to the armed forces of Haiti.⁴²

The House and Senate reports require the State Department to provide information regarding U.S. security assistance for Haiti. H.Rept. 118-71 directs the Secretary of State to submit a report “not later than 60 days” after enactment of the act to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and House and Senate Appropriations Committees on potential options to “counter destabilization in Haiti, including any contribution to a new multilateral peacekeeping force.”⁴³ S.Rept. 118-71 directs the Secretary of State to consult with the Appropriations Committees not later than 90 days after enactment of the act on the feasibility of establishing a second Haitian National Police training center in Haiti and on lessons learned from prior support to the Haitian National Police.⁴⁴

Inter-American Foundation. P.L. 118-147 appropriates \$47.0 million for the IAF, which is \$5.0 million less than the Administration requested for FY2024 and the same amount that Congress appropriated for the agency in FY2023.

Mexico. P.L. 118-147 does not specify a comprehensive appropriation level for Mexico. The act directs that not less than \$125.0 million in global ESF and INCLE funds “shall be made available for programs to counter the flow of fentanyl, fentanyl precursors, and other synthetic drugs into the United States,” including in Mexico.⁴⁵

The act requires the State Department to withhold 15% of any security assistance (e.g., INCLE, NADR, IMET, FMF) made available for Mexico until the Secretary of State certifies that the

³⁸ §7045(c)(1); Explanatory Statement, 2024, p. H2096; and S.Rept. 118-71, pp. 98-99.

³⁹ §7045(c)(3)(A).

⁴⁰ §7045(c)(3)(B).

⁴¹ §7045(g).

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ H.Rept. 118-146, p. 119.

⁴⁴ S.Rept. 118-71, p. 99.

⁴⁵ §7036.

Mexican government has taken steps to reduce the amount of fentanyl arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border, dismantle transnational criminal organizations, support joint counternarcotics operations and intelligence sharing with U.S. counterparts, and respect U.S. extradition requests for criminals.⁴⁶ Prior to obligating any INCLE assistance for Mexico, S.Rept. 118-71 requires the Secretary of State to submit a report to the Appropriations committees on the extent to which the Mexican government is investigating and prosecuting human rights violations, enforcing prohibitions against torture, and searching for victims of forced disappearances, as well as how U.S. assistance contributes to such efforts.⁴⁷

Congress also enacted several other reporting requirements related to assistance for Mexico. P.L. 118-147 directs the Secretary of State to submit a report not later than 60 days after enactment of the act to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and House and Senate Appropriations Committees “detailing how assistance for Mexico is strategically aligned to address the proliferation of fentanyl, fentanyl precursors, and other synthetic drugs from Mexico to the United States.”⁴⁸ H.Rept. 118-146 directs the Secretary of State to submit a report to those same committees not later than 90 days after enactment of the act on the progress and outcomes of the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities.⁴⁹

Venezuela. P.L. 118-147 appropriates \$50.0 million in ESF aid for democracy programs in Venezuela. The act requires 50% of any funds allocated for election-related activities to be withheld until the Secretary of State determines that such elections allow for participation from the Venezuelan diaspora, are open to credible international observation, and allow for opposition candidates selected through credible and democratic processes to participate.⁵⁰

The act also states that funds “shall be made available” for communities in countries that are supporting or are otherwise impacted by Venezuelan migrants.⁵¹ H.Rept. 118-146 directs the Secretary of State to submit a report not later than 45 days after enactment of the act to the Appropriations Committees on the needs of communities in Latin American and Caribbean countries that are hosting migrants from Venezuela and the amount of assistance provided to such communities by the United States and other donors in FY2022 and FY2023.⁵²

Supplemental Appropriations

On April 24, 2024, President Biden signed into law a supplemental appropriations measure (P.L. 118-50) that focuses primarily on Israel, Ukraine, and the Indo-Pacific. The act does not specifically designate any resources to fund the Administration’s \$1.25 billion emergency supplemental assistance request for irregular migration management in Latin America and the Caribbean. The act does provide \$9.15 billion in humanitarian assistance “to address humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations and communities”—a portion of which could be allocated to the region.⁵³

⁴⁶ §7045(h).

⁴⁷ S.Rept. 118-71, p. 100.

⁴⁸ §7036(d)(2).

⁴⁹ H.Rept. 118-146, p. 120.

⁵⁰ §7045(l).

⁵¹ §7045(l)(3).

⁵² H.Rept. 118-146, pp. 60-61.

⁵³ Division A, Title III.

Outlook

It remains unclear how much foreign assistance appropriated in P.L. 118-47 and P.L. 118-50 may be allocated to Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2024. Nevertheless, P.L. 118-47 includes a variety of funding directives intended to address challenges in the region and establishes four broad priorities for U.S. assistance: addressing the underlying drivers of irregular migration; countering fentanyl and other illicit narcotics; supporting Indigenous rights, civil society, and independent institutions; and advancing democracy and human rights. P.L. 118-47 also includes numerous withholding and reporting requirements intended to improve the effectiveness of U.S. assistance activities and inform congressional oversight efforts. Such provisions could assist the 118th Congress as it assesses whether or not to appropriate additional supplemental assistance in FY2024, considers the Biden Administration's FY2025 budget request, and debates other legislation to help guide U.S. foreign assistance policy in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Appendix. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account and by Country or Regional Program: FY2022 Actual, FY2023 Estimate, and FY2024 Request

Table A-1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Actual

(millions of current U.S. dollars)

Country or Regional Program	DA	ESF	GHP-USAID	GHP-State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
Argentina	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.6	—	0.6
Bahamas	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Belize	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Brazil	25.0	—	4.0	—	—	—	0.8	—	29.8
Chile	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	0.4
Colombia	80.0	147.0 ^a	9.0	2.9	189.0	21.0	1.5	40.0	490.3
Costa Rica	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	7.5	8.2
Cuba	—	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	20.0
Dominican Republic	21.7	3.0 ^a	—	21.3	—	—	0.5	—	46.5
Ecuador	27.0	—	—	—	13.3	—	0.3	5.0	45.6
El Salvador	84.0	—	4.0	10.3	—	—	0.4	—	98.7
Guatemala	85.5	20.0 ^a	19.0	12.6	—	—	0.4	—	137.4
Guyana	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Haiti	59.0	20.5 ^a	24.5	103.1	30.3	—	0.1	—	237.4
Honduras	95.0	10.0 ^a	5.0	7.5	—	—	0.4	—	117.9
Jamaica	6.5	—	4.0	13.2	—	—	0.6	—	24.3
Mexico	4.0	56.8	—	—	64.0	1.2	1.2	—	127.1
Nicaragua	15.0	—	—	2.0	—	—	—	—	17.0
Panama	—	—	—	11.3	—	0.5	0.7	—	12.5
Paraguay	4.0	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	4.3
Peru	45.7	—	6.0	2.0	47.8	1.0	0.6	6.0	109.1
Suriname	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Trinidad and Tobago	—	—	—	1.4	—	—	0.3	—	1.7
Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	0.3
Venezuela	—	40.0	5.0	3.6	—	—	—	—	48.6

Country or Regional Program	DA	ESF	GHP-USAID	GHP-State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean	14.3	10.0 ^a	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	24.6
USAID Caribbean Development ^b	8.9	6.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	15.4
USAID Central America ^b	33.0	2.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	35.0
USAID South America ^b	27.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	27.0
USAID Latin America and Caribbean ^b	21.0	6.7	11.0	—	—	—	—	—	38.7
State Central America	—	111.0	—	—	155.0	2.0	—	10.0	278.0
State Western Hemisphere ^b	—	43.0	—	0.2	42.4	6.5	—	10.0	102.0
[Caribbean Basin Security Initiative] ^b	[—]	[35.0]	[—]	[—]	[35.0]	[—]	[—]	[10.0]	[80.0]
Total	656.5	501.4^a	91.5	191.3	541.8	32.1	11.3	78.5	2,104.4^a

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2024*, April 2023, and “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. DeLauro, Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to H.R. 2471, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022,” *Congressional Record*, vol. 168, no. 42, Book IV (March 9, 2022), p. H3007.

Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; GHP = Global Health Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = U.S. Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development.

- a. ESF figures for noted countries include a combined \$64.0 million of supplemental assistance appropriated in the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). ESF total includes \$5.0 million appropriated as a voluntary contribution to the Organization of American States.
- b. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.

Table A-2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2023 Estimate

(millions of current U.S. dollars)

Country or Regional Program	DA	ESF	GHP-USAID	GHP-State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
Argentina	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	—	0.7
Bahamas	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Belize	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	0.3

Country or Regional Program	DA	ESF	GHP-USAID	GHP-State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
Brazil	29.0	—	7.0	2.4	—	—	0.8	—	39.2
Chile	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	0.4
Colombia	86.0	144.0	8.8	3.0	150.0	21.0	1.9	38.5	453.1
Costa Rica	—	4.5	—	—	—	—	0.7	7.5	12.7
Cuba	—	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	20.0
Dominican Republic	18.1	—	4.0	22.0	—	—	0.5	—	44.6
Ecuador	27.6	—	—	—	15.0	1.0	0.4	5.0	49.0
El Salvador	71.2	—	5.0	10.6	—	—	0.3	—	87.1
Guatemala	80.9	—	25.0	15.2	—	—	0.3	—	121.4
Guyana	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Haiti	46.4	7.0	30.0	102.5	45.0	—	—	—	230.9
Honduras	126.7	—	6.0	8.7	—	—	0.4	—	141.8
Jamaica	2.0	2.0	5.0	12.9	—	—	0.6	—	22.5
Mexico	—	54.0	—	—	48.0	1.0	1.6	—	104.6
Nicaragua	15.0	—	—	2.2	—	—	—	—	17.2
Panama	—	—	—	12.5	—	0.5	0.7	—	13.7
Paraguay	3.5	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	3.9
Peru	45.0	—	7.0	1.4	41.3	2.0	0.7	3.0	100.4
Suriname	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Trinidad and Tobago	—	—	—	1.3	—	—	0.3	—	1.6
Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	0.4
Venezuela	—	50.0	3.8	3.6	—	—	—	—	57.4
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean	9.5	9.5	2.5	—	—	—	0.7	—	22.2
USAID Caribbean Development ^a	13.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13.0
USAID Central America ^a	24.5	4.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	30.0
USAID South America ^a	26.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	26.0
USAID Latin America and Caribbean ^a	38.4	7.0	11.5	—	—	—	—	—	56.9
State Central America ^a	—	107.2	—	—	129.5	5.0	—	5.0	246.7
State Western Hemisphere ^a	—	57.8	—	0.5	41.4	10.6	—	10.0	120.3

Country or Regional Program	DA	ESF	GHP-USAID	GHP-State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
[Caribbean Basin Security Initiative] ^a	[—]	[37.0]	[—]	[—]	[35.0]	[—]	[—]	[10.0]	[82.0]
Total	663.7	472.5^b	115.5	198.8	470.2	41.1	12.5	69.0	2,043.3^a

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2025*, April 2024, and “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Leahy, Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 2617, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,” *Congressional Record*, vol. 168, no. 198, Book II (December 20, 2022), p. S9299.

Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; GHP = Global Health Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = U.S. Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development.

- a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
- b. ESF total includes \$5.0 million appropriated as a voluntary contribution to the Organization of American States.

Table A-3. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2024 Request

(millions of current U.S. dollars)

Country or Regional Program	DA	ESF	GHP-USAID	GHP-State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
Argentina	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.8	—	0.8
Bahamas	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	0.3
Belize	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	0.3
Brazil	35.0	—	6.0	—	—	—	1.0	—	42.0
Chile	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	—	0.7
Colombia	103.0	122.0	9.0	—	160.0	10.0	2.0	38.0	444.0
Costa Rica	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.6	—	0.6
Cuba	—	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	20.0
Dominican Republic	21.9	—	4.0	20.0	—	—	0.7	—	46.5
Ecuador	27.0	—	—	—	15.0	1.0	0.6	5.0	48.6
El Salvador	119.0	—	5.0	—	—	—	0.8	—	124.8
Guatemala	138.7	—	25.0	—	—	—	0.8	—	164.5
Guyana	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	0.3
Haiti	113.2	—	33.0	100.0	45.0	—	0.3	—	291.5
Honduras	129.7	—	6.0	—	—	—	0.8	—	136.5
Jamaica	6.0	—	5.0	—	—	—	0.8	—	11.8
Mexico	—	60.7	—	—	48.0	1.0	1.7	—	111.4

Country or Regional Program	DA	ESF	GHP-USAID	GHP-State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
Nicaragua	15.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15.0
Panama	—	—	—	—	—	0.5	0.7	—	1.2
Paraguay	4.0	—	—	—	—	—	0.5	—	4.5
Peru	55.0	—	8.5	—	41.3	2.0	0.8	—	107.6
Suriname	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	0.3
Trinidad and Tobago	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	0.4
Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	0.4
Venezuela	—	50.0	4.0	—	—	—	—	—	54.0
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean	20.5	—	2.5	—	—	—	1.0	—	24.0
USAID Caribbean Development ^a	17.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17.0
USAID Central America ^a	85.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	85.2
USAID South America ^a	55.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	55.4
USAID Latin America and Caribbean ^a	25.2	5.0	11.5	—	—	—	—	—	41.7
State Central America ^a	—	167.5	—	43.6	191.2	5.0	—	10.5	417.8
State Western Hemisphere ^a	—	106.9	—	26.4	36.0	12.6	—	20.0	201.9
[Caribbean Basin Security Initiative] ^a	[—]	[28.0]	[—]	[—]	[29.0]	[—]	[—]	[7.5]	[64.5]
Total	90.7	532.1	119.5	190.0	536.5	32.1	16.2	73.5	2,470.7

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Supplementary Tables, Fiscal Year 2024*, April 2023.

Notes: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = U.S. Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development.

- a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.

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