Marine Corps Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV)

What Is the Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV)?

According to the Marine Corps, the Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV) aims to be a new armored vehicle family to replace the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) (Figure 1):

Since the 1980s, the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) has supported Marine Air-Ground Task Force missions on the battlefield. While the LAV remains operationally effective, the life cycle of this system is set to expire in the mid-2030s. The Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV) [the LAV’s replacement] will be highly mobile, networked, transportable, protected, and lethal. The capability will provide, sensors, communication systems and lethality options to overmatch threats that have historically been addressed with more heavily armored systems. The ARV will be an advanced combat vehicle system, capable of fighting for information that balances competing capability demands to sense, shoot, move, communicate and remain transportable as part of the naval expeditionary force.

Figure 1. U.S. Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)


ARV Desired Operational Capabilities

According to a Marine Corps May 2019 briefing, some of the ARV’s desired operational capabilities include:

- precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to defeat threats beyond the engagement range of threat systems;
- unmanned systems swarm capability to provide persistent, multifunction munitions;
- advanced, networked, multifunctional electronic warfare (EW) capabilities;
- a modern command-and-control suite and a full range of sensors;
- organic unmanned aerial and ground systems (UAS/UGS) that can be deployed from the ARV;
- active and passive vehicle protection; and
- robust cross-country/on-road mobility performance with shore-to-shore water mobility with size and weight similar to the LAV.

ARV in Marine Corps Force Structure

The ARV is to be the primary combat system in Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalions. The mission of the LAR Battalion is to:

- Conduct mounted and dismounted reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations in support of maneuver.
- Conduct offensive and defensive actions, deception, and raids to create decisive conditions for the Marine Division and the supported unit commander.

Program Status

The Marines plan for a number of ARV variants—referred to as a “family of vehicles.” The first described variant is to be the Command, Control, Communications and Computers/Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C4/UAS) version. Reportedly, on July 16, 2021 the Marines selected Textron Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems to build ARV prototypes with prototype delivery expected in the first quarter of FY2023 with evaluation of the prototypes concluding in the third quarter FY2023. If prototype testing proves successful, the Marines Corps could then initiate a production effort potentially worth an estimated $1.8 billion to $6.8 billion over five years. Reportedly, Textron (Figure 2) and General Dynamics (Figure 3) submitted proposals for prototype ARVs to the Marines for testing and evaluation in May 2021.
Figure 2. Notional Textron ARV


Figure 3. Notional General Dynamics ARV


The ARV and the Marine Corps 2030 Force Design Initiative
In March 2020, the Marines undertook a major force design initiative planned to occur over the next 10 years. The Marine Corps intends to redesign the force for naval expeditionary warfare and to better align itself with the National Defense Strategy, in particular, its focus on strategically competing with China and Russia. In February 2021, the Marines updated the Secretary of Defense on the progress on force design initiatives. The March 2020 force design initiative plan raises questions that some have about the role or even the desirability of the ARV in future force design. According to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger:

While I have repeatedly stated that all-domain reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance will be a critical element of any future contingency, I remain unconvinced that additional wheeled, manned armored ground reconnaissance units are the best and only answer – especially in the Indo-Pacific region. We need to see more evidence during Phase III to support this conclusion before engaging in an expansion of our existing capacity, or committing billions of dollars in procurement funds towards the acquisition of an Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV). (See page 10)

In the Marine’s February 2021 force design update to the Secretary of Defense, the Commandant further noted:

The 12 Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Companies identified in the initial Force Design Report must be re-evaluated in light of the emerging concept of multi-domain mobile reconnaissance. This may affect the overall requirement for armored land mobility in the form of the Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV). (See pages 5-6)

These two statements arguably raise questions regarding the future of the ongoing ARV program.

FY2022 ARV Budget Request

Table 1. FY2022 ARV Budget Request

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Category</th>
<th>Total Request ($M)</th>
<th>Total Request (Qty)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>$48.6</td>
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Notes: RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; $M = U.S. Dollars in Millions; Qty = FY2022 Procurement Quantities.

Table 2. FY2022 ARV Defense Authorizations and Appropriations

<table>
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<th>Appropriated ($M)</th>
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<td>$39.2 (H.R. 4432)</td>
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Potential Questions for Congress

• In view of the Commandant’s statements in 2020 and 2021 regarding the need for the ARV, what is the Marine Corps’ current official position on the operational requirement to procure the ARV?

• If the requirement for the service’s LAR companies and the ARV “must be re-evaluated” as stated in the February 2021 update, what are the Marines’ plans to reevaluate this requirement? If there is to be a reevaluation, when will this be communicated to Congress?

For additional information on the Marine Corps 2030 Force Design Initiative, see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert.

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