IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________ STEVEN AFTERGOOD ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 02-1146 (RMU) v. ) ) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ) Washington, DC 20505 ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________)
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF FILING OF UNCLASSIFIED DECLARATION
OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GEORGE J. TENET
Defendant, the United States Central Intelligence Agency, gives notice of the filing of the attached unclassified declaration of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet. This declaration is submitted in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment in this action, filed contemporaneously with this notice.
Respectfully submitted,Dated: April 4, 2003.
ROBERT E. LEIDENHEIMER, JR., D.C. BAR #420959
Assistant United States Attorney
Judiciary Center Building
555 4th St., N.W., Room 10-816
Washington, D.C. 20530
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________ STEVEN AFTERGOOD ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 02-1146 (RMU) v. ) ) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ) Washington, DC 20505 ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________)
DECLARATION OF GEORGE J. TENET
I, GEORGE J. TENET, hereby declare:
1. I am the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), a position I have held since 11 July 1997. Prior to serving as DCI, I served since July 1995 as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Before that, I served on the National Security Council (NSC) staff as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Intelligence Programs. Prior to my service at the NSC, I spent more than seven years on the staff of the Senate Select Committee on intelligence, including serving as Staff Director for over four years.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the position of DCI were established by the National Security Act of 1947 (Act), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. �� 401 et seq. Pursuant to section 102(a) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. 403(a), as DCI, I serve as head of the United States Intelligence Community; act as the principal advisor to the President of the United States for intelligence matters related to national security; and serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
3. Under section 102A of the Act, 50 U.S.C. � 403-1, the function of the CIA is to assist me as DCI to carry out my responsibilities as set forth in subparagraphs (1) through (5) of section 103(d) of the Act. Pursuant to that section, codified at 50 U.S.C. � 403-3(d), as head of the CIA, I am charged with collecting intelligence through human sources and other appropriate means (excluding police, subpoena, and law enforcement powers or internal security functions); to provide overall direction for the collection of national intelligence through human sources by elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community (ensuring that the most effective use is made of resources and that the risks to the United States and those involved in the collection of national intelligence through human sources are minimized); to correlate and evaluate intelligence related to the national security and to provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence; to perform such additional services as are of common concern to the elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community; and to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or National Security Council may direct. A more particularized statement of the authorities of the DCI and CIA is set forth in sections 1.5 and 1.8 of Executive Order 12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).
4. By virtue of my position as DCI, I have official custody and control of the files and records of the CIA, and pursuant to section 104(a) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. � 403-4(a), I have, to the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, access to all intelligence related to the national security which is collected by any department, agency, or other entity of the United States.
5. Sections 103(c) and 104 of the Act outline my responsibilities as head of the U.S. Intelligence Community, including the development and approval of an annual budget. Moreover, I am specifically charged by section 103(c)(7) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. � 403-3(c)(7), and by section 1.3(a)(5) of Executive Order 12333, to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Finally, pursuant to Executive Order 12958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995), the President has authorized me to exercise original TOP SECRET classification authority on his behalf.
6. Through the exercise of my official duties, I have become aware of this civil litigation. The representations set forth herein are based upon my personal review and appraisal of the information discussed below and upon discussions with CIA and other Intelligence Community personnel who are knowledgeable about the activities described herein.
7. I understand that plaintiff has submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the CIA for "a copy of documents that indicate the total budget appropriation for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal year 2002" (hereinafter "FY02 IC aggregate budget figure"). I also understand that plaintiff alleges that the CIA has improperly withheld such documents.
8. The CIA has withheld the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure on the bases of FOIA Exemption (b)(1), because that figure is currently and properly classified under the standards of Executive Order 12958; and FOIA Exemption (b)(3), because its release could reveal intelligence sources and methods that I am statutorily charged with protecting by the National Security Act of 1947 and the Central intelligence Agency Act of 1949. My purpose in submitting this declaration is to describe for the Court and plaintiff as fully as I may on the public record my bases for making the above determinations.
9. As head of the Intelligence Community, my responsibilities include developing and presenting to the President an annual budget request for the National ForeiIgn Intelligence Program (NFIP), and participating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget requests for the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). The budgets for the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA jointly constitute the aggregate budget of the United States for intelligence and intelligence-related activities. In some years, Congress passes supplemental appropriations acts that add funds to the amounts contained in the regular annual appropriations. Although the amounts provided by the annual and supplemental appropriations for these programs are not presented or identified in a single budget request or document, taken together they constitute the overall intelligence budget. Therefore, the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure constitutes the aggregate of the NFIP, JMIP, TIARA, and any supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 2002.
A. Congressional Treatment of the Intelligence Budget.
10. At the creation of the modern national security establishment in 1947, national policymakers had to address a paradox of intelligence appropriations: the more they publicly disclosed about the amount of appropriations, the less they could publicly debate about the objects of such appropriations without causing damage to the national security.
11. Consequently, for over fifty years, the Executive Branch, when seeking intelligence appropriations, has protected the appropriations figures to prevent the identification of intelligence activities that could be revealed by disclosing trends in intelligence spending and any correlation between specific spending figures and particular intelligence programs.
12. Each year the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as the two Appropriations Committees, produce classified reports and annexes to accompany the open intelligence authorization and appropriations bills. The open bills contain limited general information about intelligence objectives and specific information about some programs. For example, House Report 107-592, on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, revealed at page 15 that the fiscal year 2002 intelligence budget supplemental was $1.694 billion. The classified reports and annexes contain detailed budget numbers broken down into various programs and activities. These classified versions, which, taken together, reflect the aggregate intelligence budget, are always classified at the SECRET level or higher.
13. The result of this arrangement is that while most of the specific budget numbers remain protected from wider view, intelligence objectives, priorities, and even perceived failings are, as far as possible, debated openly. At least once a year, I testify before the congressional intelligence oversight committees in open proceedings. In addition to the open discussions, the committees discuss and debate more sensitive matters in closed sessions in secure rooms so as not to reveal information which, if publicly disclosed, could reasonably be expected to harm national security. It is an unfortunate reality of life that there is simply no way directly to share this sensitive information with the American public without also making it available to those foreign countries and entities that would use these revelations to harm the United States and kill its citizens. Therefore, the American public, as well as our foreign enemies, is not privy to these classified debates. However, the American public's elected representatives in Congress take seriously their obligations to their constituents to consider carefully how tax monies are spent for intelligence purposes and whether the funded intelligence activities are appropriate to the needs of the nation.
14. Congress provides funding for the various intelligence programs of the United States through separate appropriations acts enacted for several departments and agencies. The specific amounts or purposes of the intelligence appropriations inserted into those acts are not publicly identified, both to protect the classified nature of the intelligence programs themselves and to protect the classified intelligence methods used to transfer funds to and between intelligence agencies. For example, sections 5 and 8 of the CIA Act of 1949 constitute the CIA's primary authorities for the secret transfer and spending of intelligence funds. These two sections demonstrate Congress's early finding that for reasons of national security, CIA's intelligence appropriations and expenditures, respectively, be shielded from the view of our enemies. Furthermore, on at least three occasions in recent years, Congress has declined to enact legislative proposals that would require the United States to disclose the aggregate intelligence budget on an annual basis. For example, the Senate considered and rejected such a provision for the FY 1998 Intelligence Authorization bill. Further, the House rejected proposed amendments to the annual Intelligence Authorization Acts for FYs 1997 and 1998 that would have mandated disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget figure.
15. In sum, Congress goes to great lengths every year to discuss, as far as possible, intelligence programs and priorities while keeping the actual budget numbers behind those programs, including the top-line aggregate number, safely hidden from our enemies.1 Consistent with these Congressional measures, and because statute and Executive Order place responsibility on me for protecting against disclosure of information that could damage national security, it is essential that I consider carefully any action that could undermine that protection.
B. Previous Releases.
16. In October 1997, after careful consideration of the facts and circumstances unique to that point in time, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal year 1997 was $26.6 billion. At the time of that disclosure I issued a public statement that included the following two points:
First, disclosure of future aggregate figures will be considered only after determining whether such disclosure could cause harm to the national security by showing trends over time.17. In March 1998, again after careful consideration of the facts and circumstances unique to that point in time, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal year 1998 was $26.7 billion. I did so only after evaluating whether, in my judgment, the public disclosure of the 1998 appropriation, when compared with the 1997 appropriation, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, such as by showing trends over time, or could otherwise tend to reveal intelligence sources or methods. In March 1998, I did not expect that the public release of the 1998 appropriation could damage the national security or reveal intelligence sources and methods. I considered the fact that the 1998 appropriation represented approximately a $0.1 billion increase--or less than a 0.4 percent change--over the 1997 appropriation. It appeared unlikely to me at that time that an adversary could correlate this specific spending increase with any particular intelligence programs. Therefore, I released the 1998 appropriation.
Second, we will continue to protect from disclosure any and all subsidiary information concerning the intelligence budget: whether the information concerns particular intelligence agencies or particular intelligence programs. In other words, the Administration intends to draw the line at the top-line, aggregate figure. Beyond this figure, there will be no other disclosures of currently classified budget information because such disclosures could harm national security.
18. In April 1999, once again after careful consideration of the facts and circumstances unique to that point in time, I decided against releasing the fiscal year 1999 aggregate intelligence budget. In April 1999, in my judgment, the disclosure of the figure reasonably could be expected to harm the national security in ways I could identify and describe, and to reveal intelligence methods.
19. This year, I have again carefully considered in response to plaintiff's request, the ramifications of releasing the total intelligence budget--this time for fiscal year 2002. 1 have done so keeping in mind the facts and circumstances unique to today. I have concluded that publicly disclosing the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure now could harm the national security in ways I can identify and describe, and reveal intelligence sources and methods that, in the interest of maintaining an effective intelligence service ought not be publicly revealed.
III. CONSIDERING THE CURRENT REQUEST.
20. In evaluating whether to release the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure, I have taken into consideration several significant factors.
A. The War on Terrorism and Growing Tensions in the Middle East.
21. Having been brutally attacked on September 11, 2001, the United States is now at war with terrorist groups located around the world. These groups have conducted horrendous attacks against Americans at home and overseas, costing our nation thousands of lives and billions of dollars. They have declared their intentions to continue these attacks, with weapons of mass destruction if possible. Although the Intelligence Community has been targeting many of these terrorist groups for years, our efforts increased dramatically as a result of the September 11th attacks. We are also preparing to respond to growing tensions in the Middle East. To succeed, our intelligence efforts must be accomplished covertly and clandestinely. As a consequence I view it as my responsibility to consider carefully whether these intelligence activities may be negatively affected by the release of any information related to intelligence activities, budgetary or otherwise.
B. Sharing of U.S. Intelligence Information Among Our Adversaries.
22. Significantly, terrorist groups, such as Osama Bin Laden's al-Qa'ida, not only conduct their own intelligence collection and analysis operations, but may also receive information from nations and other terrorist groups hostile to the United States. As I will discuss in greater detail below, our adversaries can gain useful information about U.S. intelligence programs and activities from budget figures. Consequently, information about the intelligence budget is of great interest to nations and non-state groups (e.g., terrorists and drug traffickers) wishing to calculate the strengths and weaknesses of the United States and their own points of vulnerability to U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Foreign governments are also keenly interested in U.S. intelligence priorities. Nowhere are those priorities better reflected than in the level of spending on particular intelligence activities. That is why foreign intelligence services, to varying degrees, devote resources to learning the amounts and objects of intelligence spending by other governments.
23. Some of these foreign governments are highly experienced in studying publicly available information2 and comparing it with clandestinely obtained information concerning the U.S. intelligence budget to acquire detailed knowledge and estimates of how the budget is structured, where intelligence funds are hidden, and how and where intelligence funds are transferred for various purposes. Foreign governments also have the expertise (publicly available and widely taught in universities) to do cost analyses of government programs, including intelligence programs. As a result, these organizations already possess important information that helps them discern how United States intelligence programs are funded.
24. When a foreign intelligence service gleans from our budget data information about U.S. intelligence priorities and activities, it does not necessarily keep this information to itself. Rather, just as the United States shares intelligence information with cooperating intelligence services when appropriate, hostile intelligence services share damaging information about U.S. intelligence activities with other nations and non-state groups such as terrorists who share an animus towards the United States. Therefore, when I consider the possible damage to U.S. national security from disclosure of the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure, I must take into account not only the individual sophistication and capabilities of the intelligence services of various countries, but also the likely widespread disclosure of harmful information to those services and groups less able themselves to analyze U.S. intelligence budget data.
C. Combining Released Information with Classified Information Already Possessed by Adversaries.25. Finally, in evaluating whether to release the total intelligence appropriation, I have to consider whether a release could add to information that is already available to hostile individuals in a way that could reasonably be expected to reveal or lead to identification of other information that could damage the national security. Information that is in the public domain is not, in fact, entirely accurate. Where official release of the budget total, even if it does not itself reveal all the sensitivities of the intelligence Community, would provide valuable analytic benchmarks or clues to make our sensitive intelligence activities, sources, or methods more readily and precisely identifiable by hostile services and groups, then official release reasonably could be expected to damage the national security.
26. In October 2002 I testified before an open, televised joint session of the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees on the subject of the activities of the Intelligence Community in connection with the attacks of September 11. I felt strongly that the American public needed to know about our efforts to fight terrorism both before and after September 1l. Consequently, I made a considered decision to discuss in more detail than I normally would the resources CIA has marshaled to fight terrorism. Though I did not reveal specific budget numbers, at several points that day I did discuss percentages or personnel strength when I felt it was necessary. For example, in my statement to the committees, I stated that counterterrorism activities constituted nearly 10 percent of CIA's FY 2002 budget request. In response to a question from Representative Richard Burr, I described how in response to September 11th CIA tripled the number of officers assigned to its Counterterrorist Center and quadrupled the Center's budget.
27. While I felt that this information was essential to provide the American public with a greater understanding of the challenges we face in protecting national interests, I also know that some of the information I revealed on that occasion constitutes additional pieces of the puzzle that could assist our adversaries deriving information about our intelligence activities. Nevertheless, exercising my discretion under Section 3.2(b) of Executive Order 12958, I determined that the public interest in this information outweighed the potential damage to the national security that might reasonably be expected from disclosure, and I determined to release it. I made the decision to accept the consequences of releasing the percentage of the overall budget spent combating terrorism with the expectation the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure would remain protected and thus mitigate to some extent the utility to our adversaries of the disclosure. Thus, in light of my limited disclosure in October 2002, the need to protect the overall total budget figure is even stronger.
28. I will discuss in greater detail in my classified declaration the potential consequences of disclosing the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure, but given these realties, I am concerned that release of the total budget figure, by providing official confirmation of the budget's upper boundary, will tell hostile forces whether they have collected all the pieces of the intelligence jigsaw puzzle and whether they have placed those pieces together correctly. My classified declaration contains highly classified and compartmented information and, therefore, I respectfully request that the Court alone review my classified declaration. Once the border is established it is much easier to place the known jigsaw pieces in place and to experiment with various ways of making suspected pieces fit to attain the clearest and most cogent picture of intelligence activities, priorities, vulnerabilities, and strengths.
29. Having provided the above background, I will directly address my reasons for denying plaintiff's POIA request. Those of my reasons that can be discussed in this unclassified declaration are set forth below. However, I have included more sensitive information in my classified declaration for the ex parte, in camera review by the Court.
IV. FOIA EXEMPTION (b)(1): CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
A. Authority to Classify Information.
30. The authority to classify information is derived from a succession of Executive Orders, the most recent of which is Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information." Section 1.1(c) of the Order defines "classified information" as "information that has been determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure ...." I have withheld from release under FOIA the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure because it is classified information under the criteria established in Executive order 12958.
31. Information may be originally classified under Executive Order 12958 only if it: 1) is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; 2) falls within one or more of the categories of information set forth in section 1.5 of the Order; and 3) is classified by an original classification authority who determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security that the original classification authority can identify or describe.3 The FYO2 IC aggregate budget figure meets these requirements.
32. The FY02 IC aggregate budget figure is information clearly owned, produced by, and under the control of the United States Government. Additionally, the aggregate intelligence budget falls within the category of information listed at section 1.5(c) of the Order: "intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology."
33. Finally, as an original classification authority, I have made the determination required under the Order to classify the intelligence budget. By Presidential Order of 13 October 1995, "National Security Information", 3 C.F.R. 513 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. 435 note (Supp. I 1995), and pursuant to section 1.4(a)(2) of Executive Order 12958, the President designated me as an official authorized to exercise original classification authority up to TOP SECRET. I have determined that the disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Consequently, I have classified the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure at the SECRET level. In the paragraphs below, I will identify and describe the serious damage to national security that I reasonably expect could result from the disclosure of the FY 02 IC aggregate budget figure. Please note that, even if I had determined that disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget would reasonably be expected to cause only some damage, as opposed to serious damage, it would still mean the information should be classified at the CONFIDENTIAL level--sufficient to bring it within FOIA Exemption (b)(1).
B. Damage to National Security.34. I have concluded that disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security for several reasons. First, disclosure of the aggregate budget could be expected to assist adversaries in correlating specific spending figures with particular intelligence programs.
1. Correlation of Specific Spending Figures with Particular Intelligence Programs.
35. As discussed earlier, intelligence services want to learn the amounts and objects of intelligence spending by other nations, particularly that of real or perceived adversaries. Should I release the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure, U.S. adversaries could use that number, in conjunction with other information available to them from open or clandestine sources, to derive more specific information about U.S. intelligence programs, potentially going so far as to link budget increases or decreases to specific intelligence programs. In effect, hostile services can track trends in the U.S. intelligence budget and use that information to determine and budget for their own response to U.S. intelligence programs. The result is that carefully planned intelligence activities, including sophisticated collection systems, lose some or all of their value against certain targets. At worst, depending on the program, property and lives may be put at risk.
36. As I will explain further in my classified declaration, budget figures provide useful benchmarks that, when combined with other public and clandestinely-acquired information, can assist experiencced intelligence analysts, in reaching accurate estimates of the nature and extent of numerous foreign intelligence activities, including covert operations, scientific and technical research and development, and analytic capabilities. Such information would permit foreign governments to learn about U.S. intelligence collection priorities and redirect their own resources to frustrate our intelligence collection efforts, with resulting damage to our national security.
37. While the harm resulting from a foreign intelligence service's sophisticated analysis of our intelligence budget may be significant, that damage may increase dramatically depending on whether and to whom that information is passed. As I discussed earlier, of particular concern now is the opportunity our adversaries may have to pass on damaging information to terrorist groups who have vowed to continue attacks on American targets. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.
2. Additional Resources Available to Target the United States.38. Disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget reasonably could be expected to free foreign governments' limited collection and analysis resources for other efforts targeted against the United States. No government has unlimited intelligence resources. Resources devoted to targeting the nature and extent of United States' intelligence spending are resources that cannot be devoted to other efforts targeted against the United States. Disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget would free those foreign resources for other intelligence collection activities directed against the United States, with the resulting damage to our national security.
3. Access to U.S. Self-Assessments of Intelligence Capabilities.
39. Disclosure of the total intelligence appropriation reasonably could be expected to provide foreign intelligence services with our own assessment of our intelligence capabilities and weaknesses. For example, the difference between Congressional appropriations from one year to the next provides a measure of Congress's assessment of the nation's intelligence efforts and their satisfaction of stated policy objectives. Not only does an increased, decreased, or unchanged appropriation reflect a congressional determination that existing intelligence programs are less than adequate, more than adequate, or just adequate, respectively, to meet the national security needs of the United States, but an actual figure also indicates the degree of change. This knowledge could assist foreign governments or other organizations in redirecting their own resources to frustrate U.S. intelligence collection efforts, with resulting damage to our national security. Because I have determined it to be in our national security interest to deny foreign governments and other organizations information that would assist them in assessing the strength of United States intelligence capabilities, I have determined that disclosure of the total appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause serous damage to the national security.
40. I am unable to elaborate further publicly on the bases for my determination without disclosing classified information,. Additional information in support of my determination is included in my classified declaration.
41. In summary, I have determined that disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget reasonably could be expected to provide foreign intelligence services with a valuable benchmark for identifying and frustrating U.S. intelligence programs. For all of the above reasons, singularly and collectively, I have determined that disclosure of the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Therefore, I have determined that the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure is currently and properly classified SECRET.
V. FOIA EXEMPTION (b)(3): INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS.
42. Section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that the DCI, as head of the Intelligence Community, "shall protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Disclosure of the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure would threaten to reveal intelligence sources and methods because the disclosure would tend to reveal how and for what purposes intelligence appropriations are secretly transferred to and expended by intelligence agencies.
43. Because there are a finite number of places where intelligence funds may be hidden in the federal budget, a skilled budget analyst could construct a hypothetical intelligence budget by aggregating suspected intelligence line items from the publicly disclosed appropriations. Release of the aggregate intelligence budget would provide a mathematic benchmark to test and refine such a hypothesis. Repeated disclosures of the total appropriation could provide more data with which to test and refine the hypothesis. Confirmation of the hypothetical budget could disclose the actual locations in the appropriations acts where intelligence funds are hidden.
44. Simply stated, the means of covertly providing money to the CIA and the Intelligence Community for the purpose of carrying out the classified intelligence activities of the United States is itself a congressionally enabled intelligence method. Disclosure of the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure could assist in finding the locations of secret intelligence appropriations, and thus defeat these congressionally approved secret funding mechanisms. Therefore I have determined that disclosure of the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure would tend to reveal intelligence sources and methods that are protected from disclosure. I am unable to elaborate further on the bases for my determination without disclosing classified information. Additional information in support of my determination is included in my classified declarations.
45. In fulfillment of my statutory responsibility as head of the United States Intelligence Community, as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security, and as head of the CIA, to protect classified information and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, I have determined for the reasons set forth above and in my classified declaration that the FY02 IC aggregate budget figure must be withheld because its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security and would tend to reveal intelligence sources and methods.
I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this 19th day of March, 2003.
[signed:] GEORGE J. TENET[NOTES]
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
1. The Congressional Joint Inquiry that examined the Intelligence Community's performance in relation to the September 11th attacks included in its Final Report a recommendation that the President should submit counterterrorism budget recommendations with greater emphasis on long-term investments. Significantly, this was followed by the recommendation that "in making such budget recommendations, the President should provide for the consideration of a separate classified Intelligence Community budget" (emphasis added). Recommendations of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, p. 11 (Dec. 10, 2002).
2. These publicly available sources go beyond Congressional debates and the print media. For instance, the intelligence budget is the subject of intense interest on the part of many entities (including plaintiff's employer, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)) that study national security issues and/or wish to do business with the intelligence Community. Much speculative information is available on the Internet and other public sources that our adversaries can easily access. Attachment 1, obtained from a public Internet website, demonstrates the kind of conclusions, right or wrong, about the intelligence budget that a sophisticated analyst can derive using available information. It also shows the relative ease with which someone may obtain detailed and free analyses of the U.S. intelligence budget. Releasing the actual FY02 IC aggregate budget figure would only serve to help our adversaries select those budget analyses that may be more credible than others.
3. The severity of the damage to the national security affects the level of classification assigned to the information: the unauthorized disclosure of information reasonably expected to cause exceptionally grave damage is classified TOP SECRET; information reasonably expected to cause serious damage is classified SECRET; and information reasonably expected to cause damage is classified CONFIDENTIAL.