Mr. Franz Boening

Dear Mr. Boening:

The Publications Review Board has completed its review of your re-submitted manuscript entitled “M-Memorandum.” The Board determined that, if published in its current format as is in toto – i.e. including all accompanying end notes (sourcing and reference information) and with identified redactions deleted, it contains no classified information and has no security objection to its publication. We have enclosed a copy of the currently approved version of the manuscript.

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Please do not hesitate to contact the Publications Review Board at 703-613-8460 if you have any questions or if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

R. Puhl
Chairman, Publications Review Board
May 10, 2001

To: Office of the Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency

Info: Director of Central Intelligence
   Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
   Office of Congressional Relations
   Deputy Director for Operations
   Chief, Latin America Division, Directorate of Operations
   Counter-Narcotics Center

From: Franz Boening, Central Intelligence Agency

Subject: The MonteCIA Affair: Possible Violations of US law, Scandal, and Counterintelligence Failure during CIA's relationship with Vladimiro Lenin

MONTESINOS-Torres, (action filed under Title Seven, "The Whistleblower Provision" of the 1999 Intelligence Authorization Act) [1a-g]

1. Introduction: This unclassified memorandum, (accompanied by one brief classified and two unclassified annexes), constitutes an urgent concern under Title Seven ("the Whistleblower Provisions, " sections 701 and 702) of the 1999 Intelligence Authorization Act. I wish to call to your attention several very serious issues, including possible violations of US laws, related to CIA's alleged operational relationship with Vladimiro Lenin MONTESINOS-Torres, a Peruvian national (1) You will recall that Montesinos, until his forced resignation and flight 1 September 2000, was the alter-ego and overall intelligence advisor to ousted Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori. According to various press accounts, Montesinos was also CIA's "special friend" within the Peruvian Government. [1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, 1g, 1m, 2z; 1i, page 38.] He has since been accused of a variety of crimes in Peru, among them narcotics and weapons trafficking, money-laundering, extortion, bribery, murder, and torture. As of April 2001, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and DEA were assisting the Peruvian Government in its investigation of Montesinos. [1h]

I allege that:

- CIA may have violated US laws during its 10+ year relationship with Montesinos (paragraph five);
- CIA's professional behavior was so scandalous that it seriously damaged American prestige and credibility (paragraph six);
- the relationship continued because of an egregious counterintelligence failure (paragraph eight)
(1) On November 13, 2000 I urged CIA management to investigate our relationship with Montesinos. I received no acknowledgement.

2. I will demonstrate that my urgent concerns are validated by the language of the whistleblower provisions (sections 701 and 702 of the FY 1999 IA Act, passed October 1998) and by section 502 of the 1947 National Security Act. The relevant portions of these acts read, respectively, as follows:

- the term "urgent concern" means any of the following: A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order, or deficiency related to the funding, administration, or operations of an intelligence activity involving classified information . . .(bolded italics are the author's)

- . . . the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in intelligence activities shall—(1) keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities . . .including any significant intelligence failure . . . . (bolded italics the author's)

3. I contend that from 1990-2000, the period (according to news reports) of CIA's most recent relationship with Montesinos, that the latter not only violated both Peruvian and US narcotics, visa, and money-laundering laws-allegations whose truth is becoming axiomatic according to overt reporting-but that CIA itself may have violated US laws. CIA's possible violations were the unfortunate by-product of CIA's conscious policy not to act on clear indicators of Montesinos' criminal activity. CIA pursued this passive policy in order to prolong the relationship with Montesinos, which it considered useful.

4. CIA's seeming disregard for the criminal reporting and other requirements of US law and its relentless lack of true curiosity about Montesinos activities calls into question the professionalism-and indeed ethics-of CIA officers and their management. So prevalent was CIA's policy of dismissing criminal and counterintelligence indicators that even a casual observer can legitimately wonder if CIA's officers ever attempted to seriously vet Montesinos' information and activities; to question his motivation; to corroborate serious criminal charges made against him by others or; to take seriously its US crimes reporting responsibilities. CIA's conduct also calls into question how seriously it took its responsibilities vis-a-vis other elements of the USG.

5. The Possible Violations of US Laws: It is likely that CIA has violated one or all of the laws in the sub-paragraphs below. (Note: CIA's unfortunate and mendacious habit of seeking "deniability" before the requirements of US law seems to have contributed to the possible violations. While seeking deniability in the face of the law-foreign laws is wholly appropriate when a CIA officer operates in a foreign capital, it would seem completely inappropriate for CIA to seek deniability before US laws. Indeed, in the Montesinos relationship, CIA's extraordinarily poor appreciation for
political risk and its tendency to "hike near the edge of the cliff" may have caused it to err
legally.)

a. The 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act. It is now clear, based on
numerous overt accounts and considerable physical evidence, that Montesino was
ineligible for the US visa. (A glance at the tough questions on the NIV application,
OF-156, demonstrates this.) Moreover, CIA had good reason to believe that
Montesinos was ineligible. So...how did he obtain the visas? If contemporaneous
allegations of Montesinos' involvement in narcotics trafficking had been taken
seriously, they would almost certainly have made him ineligible to receive a visa. (2)

b. US Customs Service financial declaration requirements, the Bank Secrecy
Act, and CIA's duty to report possible crimes to the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network of the US Treasury Department. Was Montesinos guilty of money-
laundering in the United States? Did CIA assist Montesinos to launder money here or
abroad, whether intentionally or unintentionally? (See classified annex and April 13,
2001 entry in chronology.) [2m]

c. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. According to news accounts, CIA
provided years of support to Montesinos' organization, the Servicio de Inteligencia
National (National Intelligence Service, aka SIN). CIA did this at a time when Peru
was a regular violator of human rights. (See classified annex.) Peru's record of
human rights violations, including those for which it is alleged Montesinos bears
personal responsibility, are documented by investigators for the Organization of
American States, Human Rights Watch, Derechos, Desaparacidos, Amnesty
International, and in years of State Department human rights reports. In particular,
Montesinos is reported to have commanded the notorious "Grupo Colina", a death
squad organized by the SIN. Separate press information alleges that CIA helped SIN
to establish a "counternarcotics" unit in the early 1990s, that engaged in human rights
violations. Given the overall requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act, it would
seem that CIA's support to Montesinos' organization may have violated the law (3) [1b,
11]

(2) I do not believe that a visa to Montesinos was even possible without a waiver
from the State Department. The second bullet of question 29 of the OF-156 reads,
"Have you ever been arrested or convicted of any offence or crime, even though subject
of a pardon, amnesty, or other similar legal action? Have you ever distributed or sold a
controlled substance?" CIA knew, for example, that Montesinos was an ex-convict. [1c,
1j] Did he obtain a visa without a waiver? Montesinos' IUS visa was revoked on 10
November 2000. See classified annex.

(3) Few knowledgeable observers would consider Peru during the Fujimori years to
have been an oasis of liberal human rights practices. It is well worth noting that the
State Department itself was critical of Peru's human rights record during the 1990s.
Moreover, the Peruvian Congress, completely controlled by Fujimori after its initial
dissolution in 1992, granted four amnesties to Peruvian government officials during the
1990s all designed to give the military and security services a pass for earlier human
rights violations. Can CIA, or anyone else, possibly assert that Peru did not have a
human rights problem during the 1990s? Did CIA take the Foreign Assistance Act
seriously?

d. Executive Order 13107 (December 10, 1998) on the Implementation of
Human Rights Treaties; specifically, USG obligations under the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. According to overt accounts, Montesinos and the SIN are not only
generally accused of torture but Montesinos is personally accused of torture by
several Peruvian officers in November 1992 incidents. Since the Peruvian
Government has publicly complained of a lack of cooperation from CIA it would
appear that Article nine of the Convention Against Torture obligates USG (and
CIA) to "afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal proceedings brought in respect of any of the offences referred to in
article 4, including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the
proceedings. [1g, page 2]

e. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. Based on overt information, it
would appear that Montesinos was detainable under this act during any possible
travel to the US after 1991. (Note: See classified annex. The author
acknowledges that Montesinos was not taken to task under this law during the
19900 Nevertheless, the simple fact that he was probably prosecutable under it is
both significant and embarrassing.) [1g]

f. The CIA's own 1995 human rights guidelines for agent and liaison
relationships. (Note: The guidelines, which appear to be ignored as often as
observed, do not have the force of law. The guidelines are a response to the
Harbury, Bamaca, Alpirez, Constant et.al. scandals of 1993-94.)

6. The (quiet) Foreign Policy Scandal and its Cost: Notwithstanding the
seriousness of the above allegations, I must also emphasize that CIA's relationship with
Montesinos was extraordinarily scandalous, at the political level. In effect, during the
1990s, CIA pursued a type of separate foreign policy vis-à-vis Peru. (4) It worked
with, supported, apologized for, and ultimately helped to persuade others to arrange the
peaceful departure of a man-operating at the apex of society-who is currently wanted
in Peru for extortion, the blackmail and bribery of politicians, illicit enrichment, murder,
kidnapping; money-laundering, and narcotics and weapons trafficking over a 10 year
period. [1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, 1g, 1k, 1m]. Yet, during the same period, the stated
policy of the USG was to promote human rights, democracy, and to fight narco-
trafficking. As a result of CIA's irresponsible behavior, USG credibility was seriously
compromised. It is doubtful that Peruvian policymakers will take seriously the USG's
stated policies when Montesinos' conduct-obvious to astute Peruvians but not to CIA-had
so effectively undermined them. Had CIA been the equivalent of the "lawyer for Tony
Soprano " during MonteCIA? What was the political cost?
(4) Although primary authorship of the scandal belongs to the CIA, other elements of the USG that tolerated the relationship for too long must share blame.

7. As is now known Montesinos secretly undermined important USG policy objectives on an industrial scale—over a 10-year period. Indeed, CIA's dubious support for Montesinos and the SIN suggests a political scandal of the first order—comparable in magnitude, and exceeding in duration and titillating variety, the Iran-Contra Scandal. Did CIA share with other elements of the USG all aspects of its confidential relationship? Was CIA even aware of the overall foreign policy of the USG? (5) This question can be largely addressed by examining what I hold to be the main cause of the scandal. (6) [1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1e, 1g]

8. The Decade-long Counterintelligence Failure: Numerous domestic and foreign news accounts (in Asia, Europe, North and South America), including those sourced to the USG, allege that CIA both supported and apologized for Montesinos during the 1990s. CIA has not denied these accounts and, since August-September 2000, has chosen to make no public comment whatsoever. Yet, how can a lengthy, friendly, supportive relationship with a human rights violator, a corruptor of the democratic process, and one of Peru's biggest narco-traffickers and money-launderers—operating at the very apex of society—not be considered a counterintelligence failure? (7) Indeed, Montesinos is today viewed as the main architect of the societal-level political corruption that afflicted Peru during the 1990s. The corruption, almost certainly fueled by narco-revenues, appears to have infiltrated most important sections of the ruling class: the senior and mid-levels of the military (including the military justice system), the Supreme Court, the prime minister's office, the police force, the Fourth Estate, probably the Attorney General's office, and parts of the Peruvian Congress. In virtually all cases, CIA's special friend, Montesinos, played the central role in personally suborning individuals. Although corruption schemes were undoubtedly complicated, endorsed by Fujimori, and involved more than one seducer, it remains nevertheless true that Montesinos held center stage. This fact is clearly and conclusively demonstrated in thousands of videotapes (the Vladvideos) currently in the possession of the Peruvian judicial authorities [1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, 1g, 1l, 1m]

9. According to various newspaper accounts, two prime ministers (Victor Joy Way and Federico Salas); the Chief of the Peruvian Joint Staff (Nicolas de Bari Hermoza-Rios); one former defense minister (Víctor Malca Villanueva); one former Minister of Interior (Agustín Mantilla Campos), many senior military officers (Jose Villanueva Ruesta, former Commander General of the Army; General Walter Chacon, former Chief of the Peruvian Army Joint Command; Juan Llanque Cervantes, former Director of Army Instruction and Doctrine; Luis Cubas Portal, former chief of the 2nd military region and Montesinos' brother-in-law; General Luis Delgado, former president of the Military Justice Supreme Council; Colonel Jose Abel Villalobos Candela, the former SIN Technical Director; Colonel Roberto Huaman, Montesinos's former right-hand man and; Juan Delgado del la Paz) and; several congressman (Alex Kouris, Ernesto Garmarra), judges (Alipio Montes de Oca, the former president of the National Election Board; possibly Raul Castillo and Luis Serpa Segura) and civilians (Juan Silvio Valencia Rosas;
Jose Francisco Crousillat, television executive and; Albert Venero Garrido et. al) are
either strongly suspected, under investigation, have been arrested, have fled the county,
or have admitted to corruption charges, since November 2001. In literally all cases,
Montesinos is viewed as the ringleader of civil corruption-by the David Waisman
Commission of the Peruvian Congress, by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Jose
Carlos Ugaz, and by the 80-person investigatory team assembled by Antonio Vidal's
Ministry of Interior (8) [1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, 1f, 1l, 1m, 3b]

(5) Generally speaking, US foreign policy, summarized in annual reports to
Congress, stresses national security issues and the promotion of free trade, free markets,
democracy and human rights (italics the author's).

(6) According to domestic news reporting, all other elements of the USG gradually grew
to oppose CIA's relationship wit Montesinos, In fact, DEA appears to have viewed
Montesinos as an outright narcotics trafficker for years.

(7) For those who may be irritated by the rhetorical question, please consider
the reverse: Is accidentally working with and supporting the narco-corrupter of an
entire society some sort of CIA success?

10. So...large swaths of the political and military classes of an entire nation were
suborned and corrupted... Is an objective observer to believe that CIA, (after all, an
intelligence agency) was completely unaware of Montesinos' efforts to suborn, bribe or
blackmail? How can this be?

11. Those whom Montesinos could not suborn, he harassed or intimidated. Journalists,
newspapers, individuals and opposition politicians were subjected to all forms of
pressure in the 1990s. Among other things, SIN almost certainly engaged in large-scale
wire-tapping of politicians and bombings of media outlets critical of the government (see
chrono.) I find it inconceivable that CIA was unaware of the Montesinos' campaign of
harassment against civil society. Did CIA ever protest to its special friend? And, if it
did protest, why did Montesinos' activities apparently not seriously jeopardize the
relationship? [1s, 3h]

12. On the human rights front Montesinos and the SIN (along with the Direccion
National Contra el Terrorismo DINCOTE and the Army) were widely perceived to be
behind Peru's serious human rights problems in the 90s. While government extrajudicial
killings and disappearances gradually declined as the decade progressed--as the war
against Shining Path and the MRTA was being won--torture by the security services
remained a serious problem throughout the Fujimori-Montesinos years. The 1997
Human Rights Watch report on Peru reported that nearly 80 percent of males arrested on
suspicion of terrorism were tortured at some point. Most were later released
for lack of evidence. Montesinos and SIN were directly accused of torture in several
sensational cases (see chrono). Indeed, the only way that CIA could have not known
about these serious human rights violations, especially torture, was if its officers never
read the newspaper, listened to the radio, or watched television. Since I consider this
unlikely, it is safe to say that CIA simply ignored the problem, perhaps in keeping with
CIA's unfortunate history of ignoring rights problems. (9) In sharp contrast, US
ambassador to Peru Dennis Jett, in the late 1990s, spoke out vigorously against Peru's
terrible rights record. For this reason, I contend that CIA actually pursued (the functional
equivalent of) its own foreign policy during the Montesinos years. For only CIA could
have warned the USG about the true nature of Montesinos. Montesinos was
reportedly CIA's special friend-not State's, not DEA's, not FBI's, not DIA's, not
USIS', not Commerce's, not the US Ambassador's, not anyone else's. CIA
singularly failed to take its counterintelligence duties seriously. (See classified
annex.) [1i, 1b, 1g]

(8) These names have been reported in the Peruvian and Latin American press.
The Washington Post story on May 9, 2000, however, reported the arrests of 70
officials, including 18 generals. Unfortunately, the article provided only a few
names. Note the suborning of de Oca and General Luis Delgado. Of course, it
is likely that more personalities will be prosecuted as the investigation
continues. [1m]

13. But... why? The failure outlined above occurred because CIA chose to ignore or
downplay obvious criminal indicators. Quite simply, if CIA incorrectly assesses the core
motivations of its liaison partner or its secret agent, as the case may be, (Montesinos'
arguable agent of influence status represents elements of both), CIA will operate at its
peril... and its conduct may jeopardize US foreign policy and erode USG credibility.
This is roughly what happened in the Montesinos case. In its effort to combat drug
traffickers, CIA deluded itself into believing-despite a mountain of freely available,
contrary evidence—that Montesinos and the SIN were sincerely helping to further USG
policy goals. What it didn't take into account is that men like Montesinos, if
fundamentally misunderstood, can subvert whole aspects of US foreign policy. The
counterintelligence failure was exacerbated and prolonged by CIA's hubris and apparent
tendency towards secrecy, even with USG colleagues. CIA's hubris, secretiveness,
disinclination to accept contrary assessments and evidence, its lax management, and its
desire to avoid embarrassment, all proved to be a smoldering recipe for disaster.

14. The counterintelligence process demands vigilance and a constant
reexamination of one's operational assumptions. Perhaps the best known (albeit least
common), type of counterintelligence failure occurs when a USG official is secretly
recruited by a foreign power and operates undetected for years. Professional CIA
officers know, however, that there are other types and levels of counterintelligence
failure-some of which can inflict the same magnitude of damage to America. (In truth,
aspects of the Iran-Contra Scandal were exacerbated by counterintelligence failures.) In
the foreign field, an important type of CI failure occurs when it is discovered that a

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foreign agent or liaison service has an entirely different-and malicious-agenda from that which he/she/it describes to CIA. Montesinos' lengthy (and not so) concealed anti-human rights, anti-democracy, and narco-trafficking activities fall into this category.

(9) CIA's tendency to ignore or downplay rights concerns has been criticized even in reports from CIA's own Office of the Inspector General.

15. As is now becoming apparent Montesinos almost certainly acted as only one in a small galaxy of Latin American narco-traffickers - I contend this was an important aspect of the MonteCIA Scandal-Montesinos and the SIN almost certainly used CIA tools and bureaucratic support to facilitate his crimes. (See classified annex.)

16. In addition to almost single-handedly undermining Peruvian democracy (he made over 1700 videotapes of himself bribing congressmen, civilians, and supreme court justices!), the Peruvian Government currently believes that Montesinos had a secret paid relationship with several narcotics traffickers in the 1990s. Indeed, media accounts indicate that as of April 2001, approximately $220 million in secret bank accounts had already been identified. As of spring 2001, FBI and DEA appeared to share Peru's assessment of Montesinos' corruption and were assisting Peru in attempting to locate him, to evaluate criminal evidence, and to bring him to justice. Nonetheless, the Attorney General of Peru, Garcia SAYAN, openly complained in spring 2001 that he was not receiving cooperation from "all elements of the USG." [11, 1m, 1t]

17. As we now know from the newspapers, CIA's relationship with, Iontesinos imploded in the late summer of 2000. At that time, even CIA became convinced that Montesinos had participated in a scheme to provide arms to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (the FARC, Fuerzas Revolutionarias de Columbia), which is on the USG's list of designated terrorist groups and which reportedly benefits directly from Colombian narco-trafficking. Even CIA was finally persuaded that Montesinos could no longer be trusted. But could CIA really explain away the numerous warnings it had received in the 1990s that Montesinos was personally in league with narco-traffickers, that he had engaged inhuman rights violations, and that he had personally subverted Peruvian democracy? How substantial had been CIA's counterintelligence performance? How much would need to be spent in order to counter the strengthened FARC, reinforced with arms supplied by Montesinos? [1n]

18. In order to understand the foreign policy scandal, the counterintelligence fiasco, and CIA's performance, it is helpful to review a chronology of the contemporaneously available information and developments (i.e. the criminal and counterintelligence indicators) that should have alerted CIA to Montesinos' character and agenda. Did CIA overlook or ignore compelling evidence of a problem? Or, is the author unfair to suggest that CIA presided over a counterintelligence disaster and precipitated a scandal? I invite readers to judge for themselves. (My comments are enclosed in brackets. Most entries can be traced to multiple media sources.) (10)
(10) Of course, according to the newspapers, other USG departments—probably
employing nothing more sophisticated than common sense—did not ignore the criminal
and counterintelligence indicators. At various times, they warned CIA that the
relationship with Montesinos was counter-productive. Their warnings went unheeded.

A Partial Chronology of Events:

early 1970s: CIA’s clandestine relationship with Montesinos begins. (Source:
Gustavo Gorriti in The Betrayal of Peruvian Democracy. Comment: This information
and some other entries comes from the former award-winning investigative reporter for
Lima’s leading news magazine, Caretas. Gorriti, a winner of the Press Freedom Award,
is currently an editor of Panama City’s La Prensa after having fled Peru.) [1g, pages 3, 5;
1p, page 66; 1m]

August 27, 1976-September 21, 1976: Montesinos deserts his post at El Agarobo on the
cuadranion border and walks into the US Embassy, Lima. He flies to the US as an
official guest of the USG, lectures at the Inter-American Defense College, and establishes
contact with a variety of US officials, including CIA. (Source: Gorriti. Comment: It
was almost certainly this psychologically important, early, shared experience that
facilitated CIA’s re-establishment of a relationship in 1990. See November 2000 entry
from Bogota Cambio.) [1g, page 5; 1p]

September 21, 1976: Montesinos returns to Peru and shortly thereafter is cashiered out of
the Peruvian Army. (Gorriti) [1g, page 5].

May 31, 1977: Montesinos is convicted of falsehood and desertion of command and
sentenced to one year in prison. While incarcerated, Montesinos allegedly meets Jorge
Whittembury Rebaza, a Peruvian officer in jail for narcotics trafficking. (Source:
Gorriti, Semana. Comment: Montesinos’ real crime, as everyone in Peru knew, was that
he had passed documents to the CIA. Rebaza and Montesinos apparently remained
friends for years afterward. It was Rebaza who seems to have encouraged Montesinos to
become a lawyer for the drug traffickers.) [1g, page 5]

1979-90: Montesinos works as a known legal defender of several prominent Peruvian
and Columbian narco-traffickers. Allegedly, his favored modus operandi is to bribe
Peruvian judicial officials in order to ensure favorable verdicts. (Source: Gorriti.
Comment: See November 2000 entry from Cambio. Montesinos’ other favored tactics
reportedly included falsification of documents and effecting the disappearance of files.)
[1g, pages 5-6; 1p, page 62.]

1983: Montesinos rents a home in Lima for an alleged narco-trafficker. The home is
titter discovered to house a cocaine-processing laboratory. (Source: Derechos. Gustavo
Gorriti does the original reporting on this incident.) [1g, page six.]
ca 1983-85: Sometime during this period Montesinos flees Peru after alleged involvement in a coup attempt (Gorriti) [1g, page 6.]

1986: Montesinos defends Peruvian police officers accused of corruption with regard to the drug organization of Reynaldo Rodriguez Lopez. (Gorriti) [1g, page 6.]

1988: Montesinos is accused of fixing the cover-up for the Peruvian Army's massacre at Cayara. Montesinos' relationship with Peruvian General Jose Valdivia, accused of the massacre, is established. Prosecutor Carlos Escobar is thwarted by Montesinos when the latter surreptitiously obtains Escobar's file on the massacre and Valdivia modifies it. In December, three witnesses essential to Escobar's case are assassinated. (Gorriti) [1g, pages 7-8.]

July 28, 1990: Alberto Fujimori is elected President of Peru and Montesinos, one of his political advisors, soon becomes the de facto head of the SIN. During the campaign period, CIA supposedly recontacts Montesinos. Rumors allege that Montesinos fixed Fujimori's delicate "real estate problems" and doctored the latter's birth certificate in order to make him appear to be a native born Peruvian-necessary to run for president. Most accounts indicate that Montesinos established his personal relationship with Fujimori just as the latter started to run for president. (Source: Gorriti, various.

Comment: Since Fujimori's flight to Japan in November 2000, it has been ascertained that he was almost certainly born in Japan where there is a record of his birth. Note, however, that if Montesinos did doctor the birth certificate, he now had the capability to blackmail the president, i.e. principle. Blackmail became perhaps Montesinos' favorite way to achieve his goals.) [1g, page 8; 1p, page 63.]

July 1990: The then head of Peruvian Naval Intelligence leaks to the US mission in Lima the fact of the mass firing of Peruvian police officials upon the inauguration of Fujimori. Among those fired were those who investigated Rodriguez Lopez in 1986 and one of the most efficient anti-drug police investigators, General Juan Gambini. (Source: A declassified DIA document available at the National Security Archive at //www.nsarchiv.org, and Gorriti. Did CIA ask Montesinos or itself the reason for the firings?) [1r; 2g, page 3.]

April 1991: Montesinos and Fujimori make the CIA the lead USG liaison agency with regard to Peru's "war on drugs"; DEA is pushed to the side. Montesinos allegedly fears DEA's investigative skills based on his experiences as drug lawyer in the 1980s. During the same period, Fujimori sharply attacks DEA. (Gorriti) [1g, page 11]

June 1991: The Defense Attache's Office in Lima reports that General Luis Palmino Rodriguez, a Peruvian military attaché in the Middle East, is a critic of Montesinos. Wearing a bulletproof vest and carrying a sidearm, Palmino warns DAO-Lima of Montesinos' intention to frustrate US-Peruvian counter-drug efforts. (Comment: From declassified DIA document. Did CIA seek to vet this credible allegation?) [2g, page 3; 1r]
September 1991: CIA and SIN allegedly establish a special counterdrug unit within SIN.
(Source: Gorriti. Comment: See next entry and late 1993 entry.) [1g, page 11.]

November 3, 1991: The Barrios Altos Incident, one of the first actions by the army
intelligence death squad, the "Grupo Colina," alleged to be under the overall command
of Montesinos and the direct command of Major Martin Santiago Rivas. Fifteen unarmed
civilians die in a poor Lima suburb, including one 8-year old child. During the incident,
which reportedly took place 50 meters from a police station, a witness records the license
plate of one of the death squad's vehicles. It is traced to Santiago Fujimori, the brother
of the president. (Source: various. Comment: Did CIA ask Montesinos about this
incident? Was the policy "anything goes" as long as Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso)
was crushed? Does CIA ever show professional curiosity about major human rights
violations?) [1g, page 13; 1j.]

March 1992: Grilled by the press, Fujimori admits publicly that Montesinos works for
SIN. (Gorriti) [1g, pages 10-11.]

1992: Augustin Mantilla, an aide to former Peruvian President Alan Garcia, alleges from
prison that CIA has a close relationship with Montesinos. Mantilla is arrested after
Fujimori's April 5, 1992 self-coup (i.e. the dissolution of Congress, the auto-golpe.
(Source: Gorriti. Comment: By spring 2001, Mantilla was being charged with illicit
enrichment.) [1g, page 11; 1p, page 64.]

April 5, 1992 to mid-1990s: Fujimori suspends the Peruvian Congress and constitutional
rule. Various reports circulate that in the years after the suspension of Congress,
Montesinos is involved not only in all senior military appointments but also in the
selection of Supreme Court justices. (Source: various. Comment: Did CIA not
consider it suspect that Montesinos should participate in choosing Supreme Court
justices-especially in view of his dubious legal activities during the 1980s?) [1a; 1g,
pages 12, 14; 1p.]

April 5-6, 1992: Gustavo Gorriti is arrested hours after the auto-golpe and questioned
about information he had on Montesinos. After two days of investigation and
international protest, he is released and finds that all information on Montesinos has been
erased from his computer. Similarly, police generals who had arrested Montesinos' former legal clients in the 1980s lose their jobs immediately. (Source: Derechos.
Comment: A seemingly constant thread in Montesinos' character is that he gets even
with people who have opposed him.) [1x]

April 1992: Former Peruvian Vice-President Maximo San Ramon, sacked by Fujimori,
accuses Montesinos and the SIN of directly organizing the drug trade. Installed by the
congress as the president of Peru in the immediate aftermath of the auto-golpe, San
Ramon says that negotiations with Fujimori have only one condition: Montesinos' dismissal. He alleges that Montesinos is the true ruler of Peru. (Comment: Gorriti.
San Ramon's untenable position only lasted a bit more than a month. Nevertheless, how
often do vice-presidents accuse their own government of such serious activity? How did
CIA seek to corroborate this extraordinary allegation?) [1g, page 14]

June 18, 1992: Senator Allan Cranston (D-Calif.) writes to Assistant Secretary of State
ilernard Aronson and asks rhetorically whether the USG is not risking the same type of
relationship with Montesinos that it tolerated with former Panamanian President-and
drug trafficker/CIA asset--Manuel Noriega. (Comment: The considered judgment of
elected officials can be extremely useful. However, CIA, with its "superior
counterintelligence sense" dismisses Cranston's concerns. Officially, the State
Department responded that it was limited in what it can say, since there was "no
diplomatic relation" with Montesinos. [1g, page 12: 1]

July 18, 1992: The La Cantuta Massacre of nine university students and a professor by
the Grupo Colina, a government death squad. (Source: various. The squad is headed by
Major Santiago Martin Rivas, but under the direction of Montesinos.) [1g, 1j, 1i, 2g.
The La Cantuta Massacre was a public event.]

November 1992: Montesinos is personally accused of torturing e arrested perpetrators
of a coup attempt. (Source: Gorriti and Amnesty International.) [1g, page two]

December 1992: Maximo San Ramon, the former Peruvian vice-president removed from
office in April 1992, releases a document which names the members of the army
responsible for the Barrios Altos Incident. The Peruvian Army Joint Command responds
that the document is forged. The national magazine Si subsequently publishes testimony
of an army intelligence officer confirming the army's involvement in the killings. [1g,
page 13]

April 1993: Luis Frank, Jose Luis, and Luis Fernando Aybar Cancho are named by
DEA-DINANDRO (which coordinated anti-drug proceedings in Peru), with shipping
cocaine to Russia. The Aybar Canchos are jailed by the Peruvian authorities but are
inexplicably freed shortly thereafter. They form the Nipon Corporation. The Army
Directorate of Intelligence--controlled by Montesinos--approves the company as a
supplier to the Peruvian Army. (Source: IndependentMedia Peru. Comment: Luis
Aybar Cancho resurfaced, so to speak, in spring and summer 2000 when he was linked to
arms shipments to the FARC. From jail to Peruvian military contractor? Did CIA
compare notes with DEA or DINANDRO? The author believes that if this information
had registered on CIA, it would have asked Montesinos some very tough questions. See
below.) [1n, pages 2-4]

April 1993: Henry Pease, a Peruvian congressman, reads a document in the
congressional chamber signed "Sleeping Lion". The anonymous drafters of the
document relate details of the La Cantuta Massacre and allege that the Grupo Colina is
under th direction of Montesinos and Army Chief Nicolas de Bari Hermoza-Rios.
(Gorriti) [1g, page 16]

May 1993: A Peruvian army general, Rodolfo Robles, the third-ranking officer in the
army, directly accuses Montesinos, by name, of having ordered the La Cantuta Massacre
while the head of SIN. Robles seeks refuge in the US Embassy. According to a later DIA report, Robles sources his information to General Willy Chirinos, an army intelligence officer. Robles will later endure an assassination attempt and will spend a few years in exile in Argentina. The week after Robles makes his accusation, Chirinos is transferred to an academic position from his previous posting. Chirinos later denies being the source of information on the Grupo Colina. (Source: various. Comment: These are extremely serious and credible charges from Sleeping Lion and Robles. What specific steps did CIA take to vet information surrounding Montesinos, La Cantuta and the Grupo Colina? Or do charges of human rights abuses not merit follow-up.) [1j; 1q; 1g, page 16]

July 8, 1993: The Peruvian independent magazine Si receives a map allegedly detailing location of the grave containing some of the victims of La Cantuta. The Attorney-General, Blanca Colan, refuses to investigate and threatens the editor of Si with prosecution. Some bodies are ultimately disinterred, a critical identification is made, and the arrests of several officers, including Rivas, takes place. (Source: Gorriti. Comment: See March 27, 2001 entry.) [1g, page 17]

Late 1993: Gustavo Gorriti publicly alleges that the CIA and the SIN established a special unit within SIN ostensibly to fight narcotics. The journalist alleges that the unit was later involved in rights abuses and the April 5, 1992 auto-golpe, but not in actually catching traffickers or cocaine. (Comment: Neither Gorriti nor this author know details of this unit. Even Gorriti has been unable to learn much more. Although I want to be wrong here . . . did this unit morph into the Grupo Colina?) [1g, page 11]

1990s: Various Peruvian newspapers allege, on several occasions, that cocaine seized by the Peruvian authorities has disappeared from government-controlled warehouses; the government does not account for the disappearances. During this period, Montesinos is in charge of Peru's counter-drug efforts. (Comment: Did CIA ever extract from Montesinos a convincing explanation for the vanished drugs? See last entry of chrono.) [2h]

1994: Demetrio Limonier CHAVEZ Penaherrera (aka "El Vaticano"), one of Peru's top drug lords, allegations that he paid Montesinos a regular retainer to facilitate his (El Vaticano's) narcotics smuggling out of the Huallaga Valley. (Comment: Only one overt account records El Vaticano's accusation as occurring in 1994; most say it occurred in 1996. See August 1996 entry below.) [2g, page 4; 1f, 1j, 1k, 2f, 1p.]

1995: Susana Higuchi, the wife of Alberto Fujimori, divorces him and complains that he is controlled by Montesinos, whom she fears. (Comment: Did CIA not ask itself why Fujimori's wife fears Montesinos? Is it not unusual when the wife of a sitting president fears CIA's intelligence partner? Is there a precedent for such a thing . . . anywhere? Interestingly, Ms. Higuchi probably knew Montesinos well since she, the president, and their children maintained an apartment at SIN Hq's.) [1p, pages 63 and 65]

May 10, 1996: 170 kgs of cocaine is found on board a plane habitually used by President
Fujimori and piloted by Escarena Ichikawa) [see ll.]

1996: Montesinos is accused in Peru of covering up, with the help of the judicial
authorities, a group of drug traffickers led by the Lopez Paredes brothers. (Comment:
Did CIA ask its friend about the charges? See November 2000 entry from Cambio.) [lf]

1996: During an official visit to Peru, US Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey praises the
Peruvian Government's counterdrug efforts. [le]

August, 1996: El Vaticano alleges over Lima's Frequencia Latina (Channel 2) that he
engaged in his narcotics activities with the direct complicity of Montesinos. El Vaticano,
arrested in Columbia and extradited to Peru, claims that he paid Montesinos $50,000 a
month in protection money during the early 1990s. He produces a persuasive transcript
of conversations with Peruvian Army officers who were paid to transport cocaine.
Separate press accounts allege that Montesinos orders El Vaticano incarcerated when the
latter is tortured. El Vaticano retracts his accusation. The Peruvian Government pursues
no investigation. (Comment: What specific steps did CIA take to vet this truly
extraordinary allegation supported by a transcript?) [1p; li, page 14.]

August 22, 1996: The Fujimori-controlled congress rejects position motions to
investigate Montesinos or even to clarify his role within SIN. [lj]

September 1996: The Guardian of London reports that Defense Minister Tomas Castillo
admitted that Montesinos was tried in 1983 for treason. Accused of using a clandestine
newspaper to foment a military coup, Montesinos was acquitted. [lj]

September 1996: Human Rights Watch and the Washington Office on Latin America
write to Anthony Lake and suggest that the US relationship with Montesinos be severed.
(Source: Washington Post) [li, page six.]

October 1996: Democratic Senators Patrick Leahy (Vt.) and Christopher Dodd (Conn.)
remind DCI Deutsch that continuing the relationship with Montesinos is prohibited by the
new CIA human rights guidelines. (Comment: These guidelines were instituted in
spring 1995. Of course, they're just guidelines. Nothing says that CIA actually has to
take them seriously.) [probably li.]

October 1996: DAO reports that, according to a Lima newspaper, the Peruvian
Government is engaged in surveillance of Fujimori's political enemies in the United
States. SIN allegedly uses the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington DC as a
platform. (Comment: Did CIA ask Montesinos about Peru's alleged espionage in the
US? From a counterintelligence perspective, is not the allegation alone alerting?) [2g,
page four.]

November 26, 1996: Army Intelligence/SIE agents (the Servicio de Inteligencia del
Ejercito subordinate to the SIN) beat and abducted Rodolfo Robles after his return from
temporary exile in Argentina. Robles is believed to have been attacked because of his
denunciation of a bomb attack by the Grupo Colina against the Puno transmitter of
Global Television. He is released in December 1996 as a result of heavy domestic and
international pressure. (Source: HRW. Comment: Robles, the fearless ort, appears to
have remained an active critic of Montesinos and SIN in the mid-1990s.) [1i, page 35.]

December 1996-April 1997: The seizure by members of the Movimiento Revolutionario
upac Amaru (MRTA) of the Japanese Embassy in Lima. (Comment: The author does
not consider the successful retaking of the embassy in April 1997 to be an event carrying
great counter-intelligence or criminal significance. He draws attention to it only to point
out what was happening elsewhere in Peruvian society as international observers were
preoccupied with the embassy crisis. In addition to the entries below, human rights
observers remind us that during this period, the army was accused of torturing 40
suspected members of MRTA at Alto Yurinaki. All but one of the arrestees was
eventually released. Also, certain observers accused the government of executing MRTA
members on the spot after they had surrendered at the Japanese Embassy.) [1i, 1p.
MRTA’s seizure of the Japanese Embassy was a public event.]

March 1997: Mariella Barreto, a Peruvian military officer, is found decapitated and
ismembered along a roadside (her hands and feet, allegedly burned during earlier
torture, have been cut off). Before her death, she had revealed that she knew details of
the La Cantuta Massacre, including where some of the victims were buried. (Source:
various. Comment: Did CIA ask Montesinos about Ms. Barreto? Barreto, Sleeping
Lion, Robles ...do CIA's counterintelligence analysts not consider them credible?
Barreto was reportedly the co-worker and mistress of Martin Santiago Rivas, the
commander of the Grupo Colina.) [2d; 1p, page 67; 1i, page 27.]

March 26, 1997: Rodolfo Robles' son is attacked by four assailants while driving his
father's car. [1i, page 35]

April 1997: Jornal do Brasil reports that, according to a secret report of the Brazilian
Federal Police, Montesinos is believed to have a relationship with the Columbian
trafficker, Evaristo Porras. Jornal further reports that already on 17 June 1978, Porras
was arrested in Lima, Peru for possession of cocaine-and freed by his lawyer-
Vladimiro Montesinos. (Comment: See November 2000 Cambio. It was known that
Evaristo Porras Ardila, Montesinos' first client, was an expert in laundering money for
the Medillin Cartelin the 1970s.) [1f]

April 1997: Frecuencia Latina, (Channel 2) broadcasts the sensational allegations of a
female army officer, Leonor La Rosa, who says, from her hospital bed, that she was
ordered by Montesinos to seduce an officer for a collection of videotapes that Montesinos
is amassing. La Rosa is left crippled after alleging torture by SIN/SIE in an underground
cell. La Rosa also alleges that SIE planned to blow up a television station and to
intimidate journalists, including Cesar Hildebrandt, the presenter of the television
program En Persona and the lawyer Heriberto Benitez, the lawyer for Rodolfo Robles.
(Source: State, HRW, various. Comment: Did CIA ask Montesinos about Ms. La Rosa?
Did CIA ask its partner whether and what he was videotaping—even out of friendly
curiosity? Note how Robles' credibility as a critic caused even his defenders, such as
Benitez, to be viewed as enemies of SIN. La Rosa, who currently lives in Sweden as a
paraplegic, was reportedly a personal friend of Barreto.) [1g, 1f, 1p, page 67; 1i,
page 27, 34.]

Spring 1997: Frecuencia Latina broadcasts a report on Montesinos' tax accounts during
a year in which he reported more than a half million dollars in income-despite his
modest Peruvian salary. In response, Baruch Ivcher, an Israeli-born Peruvian and the
owner of Channel 2, is audited, and accused of selling arms to Ecuador. Ivcher flees the
country and journalists loyal to him either quit or are fired. (Source: various; see below.
Comment: Did CIA ever ask Montesinos about the sources of his obviously
enormous income? After all, he made less than $20,000 a year as a Peruvian Government
official.) [1p, page 67; 1i, page 31.]

July 13, 1997: Frecuencia Latina broadcasts the results of an investigation, which
purports to show that SIN tapped the telephones of 197 politicians and other
personalities, among them Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela and former UN Secretary-
General Javier Perez de Cuellar, then a candidate for president. Shortly thereafter the
citizenship of the owner of Channel 2, Baruch Ivcher, is revoked. SIN denies the
wiretapping allegation; there is no investigation. (Source: HRW, various. Comment:
Did CIA query Montesinos on this issue? Clearly, CIA should have been aware by now
that it was supporting arguably the most anti-democratic element of Peruvian society.
Was a friendly relationship with a man and an organization, which had hijacked Peruvian
democracy acceptable to CIA?) [1i, page 30; 1p]

1997: Jesus Rebollo, the head of the Mexican Counterdrug Program, is arrested for
corruption. (Comment: CIA is reminded that top counter-drug officials throughout Latin
America can be bought.) [2c. Rebollo's arrest was a public event.]

January 1998: Jose' Arrieta Matos, a well-known reporter for Frecuencia Latina, flees
the country after learning that the government intends to arrest him on bogus charges of
obstructing justice and contempt. (Source: HRW. Comment: Matos led the
investigation into the case of Leonor La Rosa.) [1i]

1998: The Aybar Canchos are linked to another arms deal with Jordan and the FARC.

February 1998: Boris Fogel, a suspected drug trafficker, is arrested in Panama, as a result
of a tip from the Peruvian authorities. Nevertheless, he alleges from his prison cell that
since 1993 "the Camels" (Los Camellos) has received Peruvian Government protection.
He charges that Montesinos received $700 for every kilo of cocaine shipped. He further
alleges that the Peruvian Government transported coca out of the Huallaga valley in
Peruvian Air Force helicopters. (Comment: Although the Peruvian authorities
apparently helped to arrange the arrest, suspect operational details were left unexplained.
Did CIA question Montesinos? El Vaticano, Lopez Paredes, Fogel . . . . all unconvincing?
See November 2000 entry from Cambio.) [1f]
March 1998: The March 1998 report from the US General Accounting Office, Status of
MS International CounterNarcotics Activities, cites widespread corruption in Peru.
(Comment: GAO correctly evaluated obvious criminal indicators from 4000 miles away;
why couldn't CIA do the same thing "up close and personal?") [2c]

March 1998: The entire seven-person Peruvian National Magistrates Council (Consejo
National del Magistratura) resigns in protest over a new law limiting its earlier right to
investigate irregularities committed by judges. (Source: HRW. Comment: The gradual
subornation and emasculation of the judicial authorities was a basic strategy of Fujimori
and Montesinos. How often do whole judicial councils resign, anyway? As one can see,
when such an event occurs, it would seem to suggest a wholesale breakdown in a nation's
legal system.) [1i. The resignation off the Peruvian National Magistrates Council
was a public event.]

March 17, 1998: A former army intelligence officer, Luis Zanatta, accuses Montesinos
of tapping the phones of politicians and journalists. Zanatta further alleges that Mariella
Barreto (see above) confided to him her involvement in the La Cantuta Massacre.
(Comment: Robles, Sleeping Lion, Barreto, Zanatta . . . . is CIA paying attention? Note
that Zanatta also appears to add support to the 1997 charge of wire-tapping.) [2d; 1p,
page 67]

May 1998: Journalists for El Dominical, owned by El Comercio, one of Peru's oldest
dailies, are reported to receive death threats. The threats precede the publication of an
interview with Julio Salas, a former police officer who fled Peru in 1997, after
denouncing SIN's harassment of Baruch Ivcher, the owner of Frecuencia Latina.
(Source HRW.) [1i]

May 14, 1998: US Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey attempts to distance himself from
Montesinos. He says, among other things, "I'm offended by his attempt to rehabilitate
his image before the Peruvian people using my visit to Peru to place himself once again
in the public view." (Source: CNN Espanol and Panamericana TV) [2a]

[August 1998: 680 kilograms of cocaine belonging to Los Camellos is seized in
Bulgaria. Another 2300 kilos at El Callao, marked with the image of a camel, is seized .
The US Drug Enforcement Agency suspects Montesinos of, ties to Los Camellos. (See
Cambio article.) [1f, 1e.]

December 1999: An opposition congressman claims to have discovered an illicit $2
million account in Montesinos' name. Peruvian Attorney-General Blanca Nelida Colan
refuses to investigate and dismisses the charge. [1i]

April 9, 2000: MSNBC reports that Russian crime syndicates are supplying arms to
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia via Jordan in exchange for shipments of
cocaine. Fujimori and Montesinos claim to crack the case dubbed "Operation Siberia."
April-May 2000: The Peruvian Presidential elections and immediate aftermath. OAS and other international monitors make numerous allegations of vote-rigging during the election. Montesinos is allegedly instrumental in ensuring Fujimori's bare "victory." See classified annex. (Comment: Does CIA ever directly challenge its partners about the integrity of the democratic process? Or does it operate in a vacuum, completely detached from this core US foreign policy concern? Would CIA ever sever an operational relationship over something as "minor" as election fraud? Would a US congressman agree with CIA? Fortunately, Secretary of State Albright ordered a lessening of ties to Montesinos after the elections.) [3d, 3k. Peruvian elections were a public event.]

Late summer 2000: [redacted] because of credible evidence that the latter has engaged in a clandestine plot to supply arms to the FARC. (The FARC is on the USG's list of designated terrorist groups and one of the targets of Plan Columbia, the centerpiece of the USG's counter-drug strategy in Colombia.) [1n]

September 2000: The Videotape Scandal breaks; Montesinos is forced, under pressure, to leave for Panama when he is seen on tape bribing a Peruvian congressman. The Organization of American States, supported (prompted?) by the USG, arranges for Montesinos' temporary resettlement in Panama. Later evidence reveals that he has secretly made over 1700 videotapes in which he is seen personally bribing a wide variety of Peruvian officials. Most of the tapes (except for a handful taken by Fujimori), are seized by the Peruvian judicial authorities, which continue to review them. [11, 3q.]

September 21, 2000: Sarkis Soghanalian, an arms trafficker allegedly involved in shipments of arms to the FARC—and just arrested by the FBI in Los Angeles—states that he visited Lima from 12-18 January 1999 to meet with SIN. Soghanalian asserts that he and Aybar Canchos had the blessing of SIN/Montesinos to ship weapons. (Source: La Republica.) [2j.]

September 23, 2000: Francisco Loayza, a former intelligence mentor of Montesinos who has known him for 20+ years, claims that Montesinos once told him that the drug trade is an important source of revenue for Peru. "...Montesinos told me that the world economy was becoming "narco-ized" and that Peru had to better its economic situation," related Loayza. (Source: Miami Herald. Comment: Loayza, an interesting character, is also a successful author who became a bitter enemy of Montesinos in the 1990s. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find an English version of Loayza's book, The Dark Face of Power.) [1c]

September 24, 2000: Public demonstrations in Panama protest Montesinos' asylum in the country, a phenomenon not witnessed since 1979. [11, page 7.]

23 October 2000: Peruvian First Vice-President Francisco Tudela resigns because of his
belief that Fujimori seeks to rehabilitate Montesinos and grant him amnesty. [2k]

November 3, 2000: Peruvian Attorney General Blanca Nelida Colan resigns. Colan was particularly known for having dismissed allegations in 1996 that Montesinos' had been paid $50,000 a month by El Vaticano. (Source: CNN) [The resignation of an Attorney General is a public event. See also 1f, page one.]

November 2000: Roberto Escobar, the brother of the infamous Pablo Escobar, the former leader of the Columbian Medellin Cartel, killed in 1993, alleges in an interview with the Columbian magazine Cambio, that in 1989-90 he and his brother funneled one million dollars to the presidential campaign of Alberto Fujimori. Roberto Escobar says that Montesinos was the Escobars' liaison inside Fujimori's campaign. Roberto also alleges that Fujimori himself promised to his brother Pablo that he would cooperate with the latter's cocaine cartel if elected president. (Comment: Pablo Escobar! Incredible.) [2c, 2h]

November 2000: The Peruvian lawyer for El Vaticano, Jose Pablo Castro Mora, states that Montesinos ordered the killing of his client (see above) after the latter refused to increase his monthly payment to Montesinos from $50,000 to $100,000 a month. (Source: Lima Programas del Peru. Comment: El Vaticano is still alive in prison, albeit reportedly a "vegetable" as a result of torture received in 1996.)

November 2000: Fujimori's last prime minister, Federico Salas, lends some credence to earlier charges of torture at SIN when he reveals to a congressional commission the existence of six underground cells at SIN Hqs. The cells were used for detention and interrogation. The admission of the cells' existence comes only weeks after the government denied their existence. (Comment: The original denial occurred while Fujimori was still resident. Fujimori fled Peru in mid-month and arrived in Japan on November 17th.) [1p]

November 2000: Federico Salas tells a congressional commission that Montesinos felt himself answerable to no one, not even to the president. He describes how Montesinos threatened a coup in September 2000 when Fujimori ordered him fired. According to Salas, Montesinos said, "No president, much less a puny head of the cabinet, has the power to force him from his position . . . he had 3000 armed men, and if he wanted to, he could carry out a coup d'etat at that moment." (Source: Isabel Hinton in the New Yorker. Comment: Federico Salas may or may not survive corruption charges.) [1p, page 68]

November 2000: Bogota's Cambio, citing declassified Peruvian Government files and Brazil's Parliamentary Commission to Investigate Drug Trafficking, reports, among other things, that Montesinos' relationship with the Columbian mafia began in 1979 when he offered his services as a lawyer. Since then, Montesinos was always known as the "mafia's lawyer. " He was linked to Columbian narco-traffickers Evaristo Porras Ardila (an inmate in Bogota's Modelo prison in 2000); to the Cachique Rivera Organization (during the 1990s), made up of Peruvian brothers linked to the Call Cartel whose leader, in turn, was "Abelardo"; to the trafficking organization known as Los Camellos, headed
by Columbian Vicente Wilson Rivera Gonzalez (aka "Don Vicente", who has been under investigation in Panama since 1987 for money laundering) and to the Lopez Paredes brothers, prominent drug traffickers. (Comment: Amazing . . . .multiple relationships with international traffickers! . . . . Did CIA take none of these allegations seriously?!) Perhaps someone at CIA should have reviewed some old newspaper articles before reestablishing a relationship with Montesinos in 1990. After all, effective counterintelligence requires good research.) [1f, 2c]

January 2001: Jose Villanueva Ruesta, the former Commander-General of the Army and the Chairman of the Armed Forces Central Command, is arrested. He is accused of covering up the escape of Montesinos.) [3f]

January 2001: Several members of Montesinos' family are arrested, including his daughter, Silvana Montesinos Bercerra. Maria Trinidad, Silvana's mother, continues under house arrest. General Walter Chacon, former Chief of the Peruvian Army Joint Command; Juan Llanque Cervantes, former director of Army Instruction and Doctrine, and Juan Delgada de la Paz are arrested for corruption. General Luis Delgado, former president of the Military Justice Supreme Council, is arrested and charged with moneylaundering (Comment: Note the arrest of even the former chief judicial officer of the military.) [2r, 3e, 3f]

January 2001: Albert Venero Garrido, Montesinos' alleged partner in Russian weapons sales (and his cousin, according to Yediot Aharonot), is arrested in Miami and extradited to Peru. Venero is also the former de-facto head of the Peruvian military's pension fund. He is arrested by the FBI before he is able to transfer $15 million in allegedly pilfered funds to another bank. [2m, 2s]

February 2001: The President of the Peruvian Congress, Carlos Ferrero, affirms this belief that CIA knows the whereabouts of Montesinos and complains of CIA's lack of cooperation. Another parliamentarian, Robinson Rivereneyra, says that CIA used Montesinos to arm the FARC in order to justify Plan Columbia. (Comment: I do not believe that CIA knows the whereabouts of Montesinos or attempted to arm the FARC. Nevertheless, the comments above are manifestations of the loss of USG credibility. Misguided relationships like CIA's with Montesinos carry a political cost.) [2o, 3j]

Fall 2000-Spring 2001: The Peruvian Government succeeds in identifying 220 million dollars worth of illicit accounts held by Montesinos in Panama, Switzerland, the United States, Uruguay, and the Cayman Islands. [2m, page 7; 3r. There are numerous media accounts of Montesinos' financial accounts.]

March 2001: Juan Silvaio Valencia Rosas, one of Montesinos' alleged front men, surrenders to the Peruvian authorities. Valencia is reportedly guilty of having laundered money for Montesinos and having harbored him during his temporary return to Peru in October 2000. [3i]

March 2001: The Peruvian Congress airs a videotape made by Montesinos on 22 July
1999. In it he discussed with the Army, Navy, and Police commanders important
developments. Among other things, Montesinos used "rude language" to describe US
Drug Coordinator General Barry McCaffrey, and discusses the possibility of creating a
regional force involving Brazil, Columbia, and Peru to prevent US intervention in
Columbia (Plan Colombia).

March 27, 2001: Retired Generals Julio Salazar Monroe and Jean Rivera Lazo are
rearrrested for their involvement in the Grupo Colina. Two other members of the group,
Juan Pampa Quilla and Wilson Carbajal Garcia are detained. Major Martin Santiago
Rivas the former commander of the group, remained at large. (Source: HRW.
Comment: With Montesinos and Fujimori gone, the members of the infamous Grupo
Colina, SIN's de facto state terrorism unit, were slowly being brought to justice.
Although certain officers, such as Rivas, were actually convicted in 1994 for the
massacre at La Cantuta, virtually no one besides Fujimori, Montesinos and their
supporters considered the penalty proportionate to the original crimes. Also, just as
Rivas was about to be prosecuted for the Barrios Altos Incident, he and others in the
group were amnestied in 1995 by the Fujimori-controlled congress. I call reader's
attention to this fact because, if Robles is correct, the Grupo Colina resumed its activities
after 1995. Monroe, in particular, was viewed as one of Montesinos' right-hand men.
See above.) [11, 2w]

April 13, 2001: The mainstream Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot (in its Shiv'a Yamim
supplement) reports in an investigative article on an Israeli arms trafficker, Moshe
Rothschild, that Montesinos had opened Swiss bank accounts at the Bank Leumi-now
blocked—with warm letters of recommendation from certain US officials. A bank
official told the newspaper, "Even the pope could not have furnished such letters."
Hundreds of deposits are made to these accounts in 1997-98. (Comment: See classified
annex.) [2m, page 7]

April 18, 2001: Peru's interim president, Valentín Paniagua, accepts the resignation of
Peru's army, navy and air force chiefs when a videotape reveals that they backed
Fujimori's auto-golpe in April 1992. [2x]

April 21, 2001: The Swiss Government hands over bank documents concerning 70
million dollars (120 million SF) in blocked Montesinos accounts to the Peruvian
authorities. However, "...the (Swiss) Justice Ministry said a small number of documents
related to the case would remain in Switzerland pending the outcome of several appeals
filed by lawyers of the former spy." In addition, a Swiss Justice official informs that
Hermoza-Ríos' accounts and those of former Peruvian prime minister Victor Jovay Way,
have been blocked. (Source: Swiss Info WWW. Comment: Montesinos' lawyers
want the return of certain bank documents? Which ones? See April 13, 2001 entry
above.) [1v, 2m]

April 25, 2001: General Nicolas de Bariermoza-Ríos, the former Chairman of the
Armed Forces Joint Command, confesses that the large balances in his Swiss bank
accounts come from illicit sources. (Source: Lima Radio Programas del Peru.)
Comment: Hermoza-Rios, along with Fujimori himself, was probably Montesinos' most important collaborator in the drug trade. It would seem that Hermoza-Rios' recent admission will make it difficult for CIA to claim that "nothing is proven" against Montesinos. Washington Post reporting indicates that Hermoza-Rios' admission of culpability is with regard to weapons trafficking. [1w. In the original complaint of 5/10/2001 this entry was listed as 2000. In November 2008 I corrected this entry to read 2001.]

May 1, 2001: Citing DEA in Peru, the Peruvian Attorney General's Office reports that Montesinos appears to have resold seized drugs at his disposal in the 90s to Mexican drug traffickers. Victor Malca Villanueva, the former Peruvian ambassador to Mexico and a former Peruvian defense minister, is allegedly Montesinos' front man. (Source: Mexico City Reforma.) Comment: If DEA is correct, this would appear to explain where drugs seized by the Peruvian Government disappeared to in the 1990s. How diabolical...

Montesinos resold seized drugs to the Mexican cartel via his man in Mexico City, Villanueva? If DEA's theory is correct, it would certainly seem to dilute any USG claim to progress in the Peruvian drug wars of the 90s. Villanueva, like Montesinos, is on the run and hasn't been seen since January 2001.) [2n, 2p]

10. Analysis: Since newspaper accounts report that CIA remained in professional contact with Montesinos until the late summer of 2000 it is not unfair to say that until that time none of the developments described above were considered serious enough to justify severing the relationship. (See classified annex.) Readers are asked to use their common sense to decide whether CIA exercised appropriate political judgment or counterintelligence sensitivity. (Personally, I do not believe that a degree in criminology is necessary to assess this case.) Was CIA simply not paying attention or had it chosen to willfully disregard indications of criminality? Or...was something more sinister at play? What could explain such relentlessly unprofessional behavior?

20. It is worth noting that the relationship with Montesino ostensibly endured through five Directors of Central Intelligence (Webster, Gates, Woolsey, Deutsch, and Tenet and five Deputy Directors of Operations (Tweiten, Price, Devine, Downing, and Pavitt). Fair questions might be:

- Is CIA on autopilot?
- Do case officers occasionally read newspapers and apply independent judgment or do they rely exclusively on information from special friends?
- Does a re-examination of aggregate counterintelligence evidence ever occur?
- Will CIA do absolutely anything to maintain a prestigious covert relationship? including working at cross purposes to America's stated foreign policy?
- At the US public policy level, is it wise to allow CIA to handle contacts at the policy level of a foreign country?
- And, the two most frightening questions: Did CIA maintain a relationship with Montesinos in the 1980s?
21. Whatever the stated reasons were for CIA's failure, MonteCIA seems to been an extraordinary example of how not to conduct operations. Frankly, I must agree with late Senator Cranston; it is all embarrassingly reminiscent of Manuel Noriega. 3 (See classified annex.)

22. Conclusion: As a 20-year employee of CIA with considerable agent-handling experience, I find MonteCIA personally distasteful, professionally inexplicable, and quite possibly legally indefensible. Consequently, I have initiated this whistleblower action. The need for accountability, especially before the elected officials of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, other congressional committees, and the incoming US Drug Coordinator strongly suggests that a detailed explanation be given for the counterintelligence failure, the foreign policy scandal, and that possible violations of law be thoroughly investigated. Let us hope that CIA chooses not to invoke the overworked excuse of sources and Methods to avoid embarrassment and accountability. (Or, to protect whom—the most wanted man in South America? (11) Secrecy, in this instance, is the enemy of accountability. Fortunately, since DCI Tenet spoke of the need for accountability during his 1997 confirmation hearing, it is hard to believe that he will allow CIA to hide behind the mantra of sources and methods. Therefore, I have no doubt that he will support a thorough investigation of this matter.

23. Should you have any questions concerning this memorandum, please do not hesitate to contact me. In the meantime, I remain,

Yours Sincerely,

Franz. Boening

Postscript: Given my previous whistle-blowing experience with CIA in 1998-99, I plan to track CIA's response to the best of my limited ability. Naturally, I shall be most disappointed if I incur any bureaucratic retaliation as a result of this memorandum. Should any such retaliation occur, it shall be swiftly reported to the appropriate congressional committees.

My hope is that an investigation of this matter will help the USG to restore some of its badly damaged credibility in the Latin American Drug Wars. This is an important issue to me and other Americans. A fresh wind blowing over the landscape can help us to achieve this.

On a separate issue—and in order to be helpful—I will make my personal, unclassified file on Montesinos available to CIA and/or law enforcement investigators.

(As of late April 2001, there was an international arrest warrant issued on Montesinos
and a $5 million reward offered from the Peruvian Government. Details are available at the Website of the Peruvian Ministry of Interior.) [2u] 

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Franz Boening is a 45 year-old CIA employee who entered on duty in 1980. After learning Arabic in the early 1980s, he spent 10-12 years in agent operations, primarily in the Middle East. However, shortly after protesting privately to the DDO in 1994 of CIA's paid relationship with/or the Haitian Immanuel Constant, Boening was asked to return permanently from abroad. Upon return from abroad in 1995, Boening was asked to work in declassification, where he worked from summer 1995-spring 1999. (Note: Constant, whose paid relationship with CIA was revealed by former Secretary of State Warren Christopher in a moment of acute embarrassment, had been tied to hundreds of extra-judicial murders in Haiti from 1991-94. When the US Marines liberated Port-au-Prince in September 1994, they found pictures of Constant's torture victims on the walls of the organization he headed, the Front Revolutionnaire pour la Avancement et Progress en Haïti.)

In fall 1998, Boening filed CIA's first Title Seven action over testimony and comments made by the CIA's information release officer, Lee Strickland, to Congressman Dennis Kucinch, (D, Ohio). Boening protested what he interpreted to be highly misleading remarks made by Strickland with regard to whether or not the CIA protects human rights violators. Strickland's comments were made to "clarify" CIA's position on the Human Rights Information Act, which CIA opposed. The Human Rights Information Act did not become law.

As a result of Boening's action, DCI Tenet "regretted" Strickland's comments to the US Congressman. Boening, in turn, was allowed to consult directly with the congressman regarding the legislation.

Since spring 1999, Boening has worked at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, where he does Internet exploitation and training.
Unclassified

Unclassified Annex:

Myths Surrounding CIA’s Relationship with Montesinos

It is useful to address, at least cursorily, what the USG/CIA got from Vladimiro Montesinos in return for CIA’s relationship with him. Was the seeming counterintelligence failure and the political scandal worth it? Let’s take a very brief look at a few myths surrounding this unusual character. Newspaper accounts usually assert that CIA worked with Montesinos, in some fashion or other, against terrorism and the drug trade. So, how much did Montesinos help us?

1. Myth: Montesinos broke the back of the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) with the 1992 arrest of Abimael Guzman. Fact: Not according to Washington Post reporting or that of Peruvian award-winning journalist Gustavo Gorriti. Rather, it was the Ministry of Interior and DINCOTE under Minister Antonio Vidal that finally arrested Guzman—not Montesinos. Montesinos was reportedly extremely frustrated that he and the SIN did not receive primary credit for the takedown.

2. Myth: Montesino and SIN liberated the Japanese Embassy of MRTA terrorists in spring 1997. Fact: Not entirely true. Minister of Interior Antonio Vidal played an equal, if not greater role, in the planning of the operation. He was fired, according to Gorriti, only days before the operation was to take place lest he receive too much credit. Both Fujimori and Montesinos reportedly feared a man of his integrity looking "too good." [1g]

3. Myth: There was no good evidence that Montesinos and the SIN were involved in criminal activities. Fact: The author considers this claim to be complete and utter nonsense (see chrono). Those who make this claim probably mean to say that they personally are unaware of a smoking gun. In fact, if one takes the long view and examines the anti-democracy activities and the anti-human rights activities of SIN, the evidence of criminality becomes overwhelming. Why the focus only on Montesinos’ seeming drug activities (where the criminal indicators were still extremely strong)? Why did CIA not also focus its intelligence efforts on anti-human rights activities or the intimidation of journalists, for example? These sorts of activities are themselves criminal and counterintelligence indicators. Does CIA not realize this obvious fact? For any system that is willing to engage in the gross violations of democratic practices and the massacre of innocents is also quite willing to engage in narco-trafficking. Cayara, Lopez Rodriguez, Barrios Altos, Robles, La Cantuta, Barreto, Evaristo Porras, La Rosa, Cachique Rivera, Lopez Paredes, Francisco Loayza, El Vaticano, Boris Fogel, Sleeping Lion, Aybar Canchos, Alto Yurinaki, Maximo San Ramon, Luis Palmino Rodriguez, Baruch Ivcher, Luis Zanatta, Los Camellos et al. Did CIA ignore literally everything?
Finally, why would any thoughtful person assume that the standard for severing
an intelligence relationship must be legal evidence of wrongdoing? Why did CIA
apparently bend over backwards to defend Montesinos? Did CIA consider itself
Montesinos’ lawyer? Practically speaking, did CIA work on behalf of the citizens of
Idaho and Iowa or for, 'the Doctor'? In foreign policy, the intelligence standard for
severing a relationship should simply be whether a heavy preponderance of the evidence
indicates that a partner is unsuitable or undermines the broad mix of US foreign policy
objectives.

4. Myth: [Montesinos helped America in the Latin American Drug Wars, After all,
Peruvian coca acreage declined markedly after 1995 and many drug seizures took place
Fact: True and true. Unfortunately, the real measure of success is not coca plantings
but whether cocaine production or shipments to North America actually declined.
This is far more difficult to determine. After all, human beings don't consume coca
plants, they consume cocaine. What is known, moreover, is that yields in the remaining
acres under cultivation appear to have increased somewhat even as total acreage under
cultivation declined (according to the Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues in Paris
and DEA analysis). [3g] Likewise, some overt reporting indicates that while acreage
was declining in Peru it was actually increasing in Columbia. Let's face it- Peru still
produces a lot of cocaine. Secondly, it seems possible that at least some of the cocaine
seized by the Peruvian Government in the Huallaga Valley and elsewhere in the 1990s,
may have been resold to the Mexican Cartels, if current DEA theories are valid. A recent
news service report suggests that Montesinos' alleged front man in Mexico, former
Defense Minister Victor Malca Villanueva, was the man to whom Montesinos allegedly
shipped seized drugs for resale. (This would seem to explain the occasional stories in the
Peruvian press in the 90s of missing drugs from government warehouses.) While it may
be true that Malca is innocent of the charge, it is undeniably true that he could not be
found as of early May 2001. He fled Peru in January 2000. [2n]

Thirdly, if Montesinos and the SIN arranged shipments of arms to the FARC during the
1990s, this didn't help America. The author would note in this regard that the Aybar
Cancho brothers, linked to the 2000 Russia/Jordan/FARC arms shipments, apparently
became military contractors for the Peruvian military already in 1993.

Finally, this author understands that the street price of cocaine in the US market
has been on a downward glide path from the mid-1990's to 2000. Unfortunately, since
price is a generally a function of supply and demand (even for cocaine), and demand
remains reasonably strong in this country, this would seem to indicate that cocaine
remains quite plentiful.
Unclassified Annex: Was Montesinos n Agent?

This question deserves closer examination. I suggest that as you read my personal
analysis below, you ask yourself the following question: Does anyone seriously expect
CIA to do anything other than minimize the extent of this embarrassing relationship?

The narco-corruptor of Peru, a human rights violator, a narcotics and weapons
trafﬁcker, a blackmailer, a briber, a money-launderer, and arguably the most wanted man
in Latin America. Who, in his right mind, would admit that they had been
Montesinos' friend? As we are now aware, the man in question, aka the Black Monk,
Santanico, Rasputin, Vladi, doctor, Doc, Asesor, Monje Negro, Francisco Romero in
Peru) was forced to resign as the head of the SIN in September 2000 after a videotape he
made of himself bribing a Peruvian congressman became public. Later revelations of
Montesinos’ numerous illicit activities, in turn, directly led to the resignation in
November 2000 of 11 President Fujimori.

Despite this, the Organization of American States, supported by the USG,
arranged for Montesinos to obtain temporary asylum in Panama. But, the question
remained: since when does the USG intervene so swiftly to arrange resettlement for
someone just caught red-handed subverting the democratic process? Why not just arrest
him? Signiﬁcantly, by February 2001, the USG (i.e., State and Justice, not CIA) were
now claiming that they would help to bring Montesinos "to justice" and continued to
maintain that Montesinos had not been an agent. Although an FBI team was in Peru as of
early April 2000 Attorney General Garcia SAYAN complained of a lack of cooperation
from CIA.

Of course, the contention by the USG that Montesinos was not "an agent" is
somewhat strained and, unfortunately, typical of CIA’s hair-splitting mendacity. What
CIA actually means to assert—now that its judgment has been so discredited—is that
Montesinos had not recently been a paid, responsive agent in the narrow, classical sense.
CIA is absolutely correct. The friendly symbiosis of MonteCIA was much too complete
to be called case officer-agent. For example, no mere agent would beneﬁt from the
fawning, sappy behavior that CIA exhibited during its relationship. (See classiﬁed
annex.) Likewise, no mere agent would have caused CIA to attempt to dissuade US
embassy colleagues from writing unfavorable reports on him (as is alleged in Washington
Post reporting). This would be an unheard of courtesy for a mere agent. No. . . in this
unusual case, it can be credibly argued that CIA itself acted as Montesinos' agent
within the USG—so complete was the counterintelligence failure and so unique the
chemistry of MonteCIA.

Viewed from another optic, every professional case officer knows that it is not
necessary for a person to take a formal salary in order or CIA to view him/her as
"special." And, rest assured, CIA viewed Montesinos as unique, useful, and often
responsive. CIA may indeed have fretted about its limited ability to inﬂuence this prickly
lpersonality but the strange sense of bonhomie, emotional obligation, shared history, and
support still provided considerable forward momentum on various issues (i.e. Lori
Berenson). Besides, Montesinos did not brag openly about his relationship with CIA.
This is one of the behavioral characteristics that every case officer seeks to establish in
any "special" person.

CIA will argue, probably out of embarrassment, that Montesinos was not paid a
cash salary and was not always responsive so, ipso facto, he could not have been an
agent. I would respond that no one, paid or unpaid, is ever fully responsive. In other words, it was generally friendly,
supportive, and exceedingly durable. CIA was able to overlook virtually any "malicious
rumor" about Montesinos and the latter, in turn, tried not to get too annoyed when CIA
asked him the occasional tough question. The relationship endured. (Note: The
apparent, albeit largely ephemeral, decrease in Peruvian cocaine production after 1995
also helped to reinforce CIA's belief in Montesinos' utility.)

Both sides got what they wanted: CIA, the psychic rewards of a warm welcome
by the most powerful official (or was it the first?) in a nation of 26 million, and
Montesinos, the very useful political insurance policy that only CIA could provide.

**CIA, the lawyer for Tony Soprano?** Judge for yourself.
Master Endnotes for M document, November 2008

General Background. Nearly all media accounts that mention the CIA allege that it was M's protector inside the US Government and that its cooperation with him was close.


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3i. Lima Programas del Peru, 3/14/01. Montesinos’ ‘Front Man’ Gives Depositions at Palace of Justice.

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CIA will not release this separate annex despite the fact that it supports the charge of criminal wrongdoing by “M” on US soil.