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   United States of America
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 7
                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 8
             FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 9
                        SOUTHERN DIVISION
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
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                                 SA CR No. 05-293(B)-CJC
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                 Plaintiff.
                                    APPLICATION TO SEAL
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            ν.
                                    EX PARTE AND IN CAMERA
                                    DECLARATION OF JAY I.
   CHI MAK, et al.,
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                                    BRATT PURSUANT TO LOCAL
                                    RULE 79-5.1
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                 Defendants.
                                   Authorities: Rule 6(e),
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                                    Fed. R. Crim. P.;
                                   Deliberative Process
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                                    Privilege
        The United States of America, through its
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   undersigned counsel, applies for an order pursuant to
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   Local Rule 79-5.1 that would maintain the Ex Parte and
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   In Camera Declaration of Jay I. Bratt ("Bratt
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   Declaration") under seal. Good legal cause exists to
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   preserve the status quo and keep the declaration under
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   seal and in camera. In particular, the declaration
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   contains grand jury information that is not subject to
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   public disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e), Fed. R. Crim.
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       In addition, because the declaration discusses both
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   predecisional recommendations to the Attorney General
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   and internal Department of Justice ("DOJ")
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1 deliberations about how to proceed in this matter, the deliberative process privilege protects it from public 3 dissemination. Mr. Gertz has demonstrated no need for 4 the document such that he can overcome either Rule 6(e) 5 or the government's privilege. Last, as alternative, the Court should defer ruling on whether to unseal the declaration until after the July 24th hearing.

In support of this application, the government states as follows:

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Background

On July 10, 2008, the government filed a motion to continue the hearing date previously scheduled for July 13 24, 2008, and to extend the time (1) for the government 14 to file its response to William Gertz's motion to quash 15 the subpoena the Court issued to him, and (2) for Mr. 16 Gertz to file any reply. In support of its July 10th 17 motion, the government filed the Bratt Declaration in 18 camera and ex parte. In paragraph 2 of the declaration, 19 the government gave its reasons for filing the document 20 under seal. It did not, however, formally seek to seal 21 the declaration pursuant to the requirements of Local 22 Rule 79-5.1. Mr. Gertz objected to the government's

The government notes that Local Rule 79-5.1 appears to contemplate that the application and proposed order that accompany the document that the party seeks to file under seal will themselves be filed under seal and in camera. The government is not filing under seal and in camera. The government is not filing this application under seal or in camera because, unlike the Bratt Declaration, which did not address any of Mr. Gertz's arguments in support of his motion to

failure to follow the local rule.

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By minute order dated July 14, 2008, the Court denied the government's motion for a continuance. In the same order, the Court stated that it would make the Bratt Declaration public by the close of business on 6 Wednesday, July 16, "unless the Government can show good 7 | legal cause for maintaining the declaration under seal." See Minute Order, Docket Entry 754, at 2.

Argument

The Bratt Declaration Contains Rule 6(e) I. Information

In its Order, the Court stated that the "declaration does not reveal any . . . matter occurring before the grand jury." Id. The government respectfully submits that the Court was mistaken.

In In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance), 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980), a leading case setting forth the criteria for determining when a matter is something that occurs before the grand jury, the Fifth Circuit held that the secrecy provisions of Rule 6(e) apply not only to past events that have occurred before the grand jury, but also to "disclosure of matters which will occur, such as statements which reveal the identity of persons who will be called to testify or which report when the

quash, this pleading does discuss authorities and principles that are germane to issues that Mr. Gertz has raised in his motion to quash. This application, however, describes certain information in only general terms in order to preserve its status as confidential and privileged.

1 grand jury will return an indictment." Id. at 216-17; accord In re Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499-500 (D.C. Cir. 1998); SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 4 1368, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc). As this circuit 5 has explained, the scope of Rule 6(e) "extends to 6 anything which may reveal what occurred before the grand 7 jury, or information which would reveal the identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony, the 9 strategy or direction of the investigation, the 10 deliberations or questions of the jurors, and the like." 11 || Standley v. Dep't of Justice, 835 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 12 | 1987) (emphasis added).

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The information here is almost identical to that 14 considered by the Fifth Circuit in Lance, where the 15 court specifically found that an article in the Atlanta 16 Journal and Constitution "clearly discuss[ed] matters 17 occurring before the grand jury" because, inter alia, it "name[d] a specific witness who is expected to be 19 called before the grand jury. 610 F.2d at 218 n.12. 20 Here, the Bratt Declaration reveals that government 21 attorneys have formally sought the Attorney General's 22 approval to subpoena a specific witness to the grand 23 | jury and it names that witness. Rule 6(e) prohibits the disclosure of that sort of information.

The Bratt Declaration Reveals Matters that Are II. Protected by the Deliberative Process Privilege

As this circuit explained in FTC v. Warner Comms. Inc., the deliberative process privilegepermits the government to withhold documents that reflect advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which government decisions and policies are formulated.

NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, 421 U.S. 132, 150
(1975). It was developed to promote frank and independent discussion among those responsible for making governmental decisions, Environmental

Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973), and also to protect against premature disclosure of proposed agency policies or decisions. Coastal

States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d
854, 866 (D.C.Cir. 1980). The ultimate purpose of the privilege is to protect the quality of agency decisions. Sears, 421 U.S. at 151.

A document must meet two requirements for the deliberative process privilege to apply. First, the document must be predecisional—it must have been generated before the adoption of an agency's policy or decision. . . . Second, the document must be deliberative in nature, containing opinions, recommendations, or advice about agency policies. *Coastal States*, 617 F.2d at 866. . . .

The deliberative process privilege is a qualified one. A litigant may obtain deliberative materials

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if his or her need for the materials and the need for accurate fact-finding override the government's interest in non-disclosure. . . . Among the factors to be considered in making this determination are: 1) the relevance of the evidence; 2) the availability of other evidence; 3) the government's role in the litigation; and 4) the extent to which disclosure would hinder frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated policies and decisions.

742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984)2; see also Maricopa 12 Audubon Soc'y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 13 \parallel 1089, 1093-95 (9th Cir. 1997) (addressing the deliberative 14 process privilege in the context of Exemption 5 of the 15 Freedom of Information Act); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. 16 United States Forest Serv., 816 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 17 1988) (same).

The discussions and documents described in the

To assert the deliberative process privilege in a court proceeding, the "head of the department" having control over the requested information must make a formal claim, based on his personal consideration of the matter, specifying the information for which the government is asserting the privilege. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2000). To support the claim of privilege here, the government is submitting the accompanying declaration of J. Patrick Rowan, the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division at DOJ. Mr. Rowan is the senior DOJ Security Division at DOJ. Mr. Rowan is the senior DOJ official with oversight of the government's investigation in this matter. He is personally familiar with the information in the Bratt Declaration and has attested both to its deliberative nature and to the harm to DOJ if the information is publicly disseminated.

1 Bratt Declaration are both predecisional and 2 deliberative. The declaration describes discussions 3 that have occurred within DOJ regarding the position the 4 government should take in response to the court's 5 subpoena of Mr. Gertz and explains that no decision on 6 that issue has yet been made. The declaration also 7 | indicates who within DOJ will be making that decision. 8 The Bratt Declaration further discusses internal 9 recommendations made by Department of Justice officials, 10 as well as formal written requests, and therefore 11 discusses matters protected by the deliberative process 12 privilege. In particular, it discusses the 13 recommendations of attorneys within DOJ as to whether 14 the Attorney General should authorize the issuance of 15 particular grand jury subpoenas. See 816 F.2d at 1118-16 19 (explaining approvingly that the deliberative process 17 privilege has been held to cover all "recommendations, 18 draft documents, proposals, suggestions and other 19 subjective documents which reflect the personal opinions 20 of the writer rather than the policy of the agency," as 21 well as documents which would "inaccurately reflect or 22 prematurely disclose the views of the agency") (quoting 23 Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866); see also United States 24 v. Furrow, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174-75 (C.D. Cal. 25 2000) (death penalty evaluation form and prosecution 26 memorandum submitted to the Attorney General's committee 27 considering whether to authorize pursuit of that penalty 1 were protected by the deliberative process privilege).

The government has a strong interest in protecting 3 the predecisional and deliberative information contained 4 in the Bratt Declaration. As set forth in the 5 Declaration of J. Patrick Rowan ("Rowan Decl."), 6 dissemination of the declaration could have a chilling 7 effect on internal discussions within DOJ. See Rowan 8 Decl. at $\P\P$ 4-5. Among other things, the individuals 9 who raised issues about the government's continued 10 participation in the proceeding the Court initiated -11 issues that are separate from any of the arguments that 12 Mr. Gertz has raised in his motion to quash — might very 13 well refrain from raising similar concerns in the 14 future. Id.

For his part, Mr. Gertz has not demonstrated a need 16 for the information in the Bratt Declaration sufficient 17 to overcome the government's privilege. The internal 18 discussions within DOJ about how to participate in the 19 Court's proceedings and the recommendations of DOJ 20 attorneys about how to further the government's own 21 linvestigation of the leaks are not relevant to the 22 issues that Mr. Gertz has raised in his motion. 23 argues that to the extent that "the Bratt Declaration 24 contains information within the scope of Rule 6(e), then 25 Mr. Gertz has a particularized need for access to that 26 information in connection with these proceedings . . . William Gertz's Response to Motion to Continue 27 |

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("Gertz Response") at \P 4. That might be true if the information in the Bratt Declaration related to the grand jury proceedings that gave rise to the leaks in 4 his May 16, 2006, article. However, he has no such 5 particularized need for the information when it pertains 6 to future grand jury activity in the separate 7 investigation of the leaks.3

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Mr. Gertz also contends that the information in the 9 Bratt Declaration may "bear upon what the government has 10 represented, or may later represent, to the Court 11 regarding the character of the information reported in the May 16, 2006, Gertz article, the need for Mr. 13 Gertz's testimony, or other matters that may affect the 14 outcome of these proceedings." Id. at \P 5. As the 15 Court is aware, the declaration speaks solely to why the 16 government was not in a position to file a response to 17 the motion to quash by the July 10, 2008, due date and 18 was requesting additional time. It avoided the merits 19 of the dispute. Nor did the Bratt Declaration "contain 20 | information regarding Mr. Gertz or his employer, not 21 directly related to the issues implicated by the Motion 22 to Quash, of which Mr. Gertz should be aware." Id. 23 Gertz has no need for the privileged information (or the

Insofar as Mr. Gertz might fear that the government may use future activities in the grand jury to respond to the exhaustion argument he raises in his motion to quash, the government represents that it has no intention of doing so. Nor did the Bratt Declaration discuss such a scenario.

grand jury information subject to Rule 6(e)) in order to effectively participate in this litigation.

III. Alternatively, the Court Should Refrain from Ruling Whether to Unseal the Bratt Declaration until after the July 24, 2008, Hearing

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At the July 24, 2008, hearing, the Court may decide 6 to grant Mr. Gertz's motion to quash. Such a ruling 7 would render the issue of whether the Bratt Declaration 8 should be unsealed moot. Accordingly, given the 9 government's initial showing of the privileged and 10 confidential nature of the information in the Bratt 11 Declaration, the Court should defer ruling on whether to unseal it until after the hearing.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the government's application to seal the Bratt Declaration pursuant to Local Rule 79-5.1.

Respectfully submitted,

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⁴ Even if Mr. Gertz could establish a particularized need for the information in the declaration, that would only mean that he would have access to that information pursuant to a protective order; Rule 6(e) would still require the information to remain non-public.