Report of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review Group

Appendix F to the
Report of the
Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group

 

Report of the Weaponization and
Weapons Production and Military
Use Working Group

 

January 15, 1997

 

James B. Wright, Chair
Sandia National Laboratories

 

 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

WEAPONIZATION RULES AND PHILOSOPHIES

DOE CLASSIFICATION PRACTICES

CLASSIFICATION GUIDES AND GUIDELINES REVIEWED

DISCUSSION OF PROCESS

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WEAPONIZATION WORKING GROUP

ANNEX A - OVERARCHING ISSUES

ANNEX B - SPECIFIC DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING/ TRANSCLASSIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEX C - CLASSIFIED RATIONALES FOR SOME DECLASSIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS (SRD - not included)

ANNEX D - PROPOSED FRD TOPIC TRANSCLASSIFICATIONS FROM CG-W-5, "JOINT DOE/DOD NUCLEAR WEAPON CLASSIFICATION POLICY GUIDE" (CRD - not included)

INTRODUCTION

The Weaponization Working Group was created by the Steering Committee of DOE's Fundamental Classification Policy Review program and directed to evaluate DOE classification policy guidance of the weaponization portions of DOE's nuclear weapon program.

"Weaponization" is the term used to describe those features required to make a safe nuclear weapon which will operate efficiently in its intended environment. They include the nuclear assembly, warhead electrical and boosting systems, initiation and use control components, features for hardening to countermeasures, and support structures. Weaponization also includes nonnuclear testing and analysis needed to develop these features, and the nuclear effects testing needed to certify weapon hardness.

The Weaponization Working Group is chaired by Jim Wright of Sandia National Laboratories, CA, and includes the following members:

Otis Brooks, Sandia/NM Corey Knapp, Sandia/CA
Jack Campbell, DOE/OD
    (Headquarters Support)		 Lee MacLean, LLNL
A. B. "Butch" Cox, Sandia/NM Bill Nickell, Sandia/NM
Dick Craner, Sandia/NM
    (Classification Representative) 		Dave Roberts, AlliedSignal
Dennis Cummings, Allied Signal Ed Saunders, DNA/FC (now called the
    Defense Special Weapons Agency)
Tom Gonzales, LANL Cook Story, Sandia/CA
Stan Gooch, STRATCOM Lou Willett, DynMeridian
    (Headquarters Support)
Henry Hanser, Sandia/DC

WEAPONIZATION RULES AND PHILOSOPHIES

In addition to the general principles and the nuclear weapons-specific principles identified in Chapter 2 of the Report of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review, the "rules" identified below were followed by the Weaponization Working Group during their evaluations of DOE nuclear warhead weaponization classification policies and classification guides:

In addition, the Working Group Chair asked members to use a "contrarian" approach (e.g., question the accepted) and to identify topics currently classified which can no longer be protected. He also asked the Working Group to carefully consider the following questions:

  1. Has the "Born Classified" structure outlived its usefulness?

  2. Is there a continuing need for the category of classified information called "Formerly Restricted Data"?

DOE CLASSIFICATION PRACTICES

During 50 years of identifying and protecting information associated with the design, manufacture, and utilization of nuclear weapons by the DOE and its predecessor agencies (ERDA and AEC), a number of operational classification practices evolved:

  1. When in doubt, classify (per the "Born Classified" concept inferred from the Atomic Energy Act).

  2. Do not classify what is not protectable (e.g., visually observable design features or operational information).

  3. Systems information is generally classified at the SECRET level; component information is generally classified at the CONFIDENTIAL level.

  4. Identifying nuclear weapon utilization information as classified requires joint DOE/DoD agreement (per AEA requirement).

  5. General knowledge regarding a material, process, or design may be unclassified; while that knowledge applied to or associated with a specific weapon may be classified.

The Working Group members were also asked to be aware of and consider these practices during their classification policy analyses.

CLASSIFICATION GUIDES AND GUIDELINES REVIEWED

In addition, the Weaponization Working Group evaluated classification policy for the following subjects or classification guides that were relevant to the above identified subject areas:

DISCUSSION OF PROCESS

The above identified classification guides were assigned to individual members of the Weaponization Working Group, based on their expertise. Each member then created sub-working groups of recognized-subject experts to evaluate existing policy for their assigned classification guides, and to make recommendations to the Working Group Chairman.

Member assignments included:
  • Otis Brooks
 TCG-SAFF-1, TCG-UC-2, TCG-WI-1
  • Lee MacLean
 TCG-NAS-1, TCG-DS-1, TCG-WI-1
  • Dennis Cummings
 TCG-SAFF-1, TCG-UC-1
  • Ed Saunders
 TCG-NNT-1, TCG-UC-2
  • Stan Gooch
 TCG-SAFF-1, TCG-WPMU-1
  • A.B. (Butch) Cox
 Military Characteristics (MCs) & Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS)
  • Tom Gonzales
TCG-NAS-1, TCG-DS-1, TCG-WI-1
  • Cook Story
 CG-DR-1, Nuclear Warhead Program Classification Guides
  • Jim Wright
CG-DR-1
  • Henry Hanser
 TCG-BTS-1
  • Bill Nickell
 TCG-V/H-1; DoD/DOE Radiation Hardened Microelectronics
  • Corey Knapp
 CG-DR-1

Some classification guides were assigned to multiple Working Group members to obtain independent assessments. Several meetings were held by each of the sub-working groups.

It was recognized early during the Working Group meetings that joint meetings with the Weapon Design and Production Military Working Groups were necessary to resolve some classification issues. These meetings were held per coordination between the Working Group Leaders. Recommendations of the sub-working groups were reported to the Weaponization Working Group during Working Group meetings. However, not all sub-working group recommendations were accepted by the full Working Group.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WEAPONIZATION WORKING GROUP

Recommendations of the Weaponization Working Group are provided in the following four annexes:

Annex A: Overarching Issues
Annex B: Specific Declassification/Downgrading/
Transclassification Recommendations
Annex C: Classified Rationales for some Declassification Recommendations
Annex D: Proposed FRD Topic Transclassifications from CG-W-5,
"Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide"

Appendix F to the
Report of the
Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group

Report of the
Weaponization and Weapons Production and
Military Use Working Group

 

ANNEX A
OVERARCHING ISSUES

 

January 15, 1997

 

James B. Wright, Chair
Sandia National Laboratories

 

The Weaponization Working Group addressed three overarching issues of the DOE Classification Program. These include: the "Born Classified" concept, the classification category identified as Formerly Restricted Data (FRD), and classification associations.

BORN CLASSIFIED

The Current Policy

In Chapter 2, Section 11.Y. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; "Restricted Data" is defined as: "all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to Section 142."

Per Sections C and F of the introductory material to CG-W-5, the Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide, the Restricted Data definition "--covers virtually all information on nuclear weapons, such information is said to be 'born classified;' i.e., all information on nuclear weapons is classified unless specific official action is taken to declassify it."

Findings

The "Born Classified" concept of the Restricted Data system for the identification and control of nuclear weapon information was useful when the U.S. was seeking first to maintain a monopoly and then a substantial lead over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons technology. Much has changed in the world since then, however, and the "Born Classified" concept is too rigid in today's world of "openness," where there is need for international cooperation on nuclear weapon matters, desire for commercialization and technology transfer of some nuclear weapon technologies and production processes, and environmental cleanup and hazardous waste shipment concerns.

In addition, much information that was at one time protected as Restricted Data has been declassified, and classification guidelines are available for DOE programs. The "Born Classified" concept has outlived its usefulness and should be eliminated in favor of positive determinations being required to classify Restricted Data information.

Historical Perspective

The U.S. effort to develop an atomic bomb, which was carried out under the Manhattan Project, was conducted under a mantle of military security wherein essentially all information associated with that project was classified. However, shortly after the end of World War II, the United States released to the public a fairly detailed report of the Manhattan Project. While there was some adverse reaction to releasing so much information that many still considered to be sensitive, pressure continued for further declassifications of information associated with the Project. Then in March 1946, in response to many requests from scientists and contractors to declassify their wartime research and development in Atomic Energy, the Tolman Committee published the first atomic weapon declassification policy: the "Declassification Guide for Responsible Reviewers." (This, in effect, became the first Atomic Energy Classification Guide.) Thus, some information regarding atomic weapons had already been declassified when the Atomic Energy Act was first created by legislative action in July 1946.

Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 defined Restricted Data as: "All data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power, but shall not include any data which the commission from time to time determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security."

The words "all data" in the Restricted Data definition have been consistently interpreted by DOE and its predecessors to mean that any information that falls within the definition of Restricted Data is classified when it is created; i.e., it is "Born Classified," and no affirmative act of classification is necessary. But in fact, the words "Born Classified" do not appear in the Atomic Energy Act.

A major revision of the Atomic Energy Act occurred in 1954, wherein much Restricted Data was declassified to facilitate commercial applications of nuclear power reactor technologies and nuclear fuel reprocessing. Another revision to the Act removed information from Restricted Data that was primarily related to military utilization of atomic weapons and put it under joint control of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense. This information became known as "Formerly Restricted Data," although these words also are not found in the Atomic Energy Act.

In addition to the above actions, much additional Restricted Data has been declassified by specific action because of a desire for commercialization or because of a determination that national security is not adversely affected. Thus, while essentially all atomic energy information was protected under the Restricted Data umbrella in the early days, today there remains only a relatively small number of areas containing information protected as "Restricted Data."

As much atomic energy information was declassified over the past 50 years, a large number of classification guides were developed to identify the classified and unclassified information associated with DOE programs. Because of the many declassifications and the large number of classification guides available, the "Born Classified" concept is almost never needed today and, in fact, has lost most of its meaning.

Discussion

The Atomic Energy Act creates the presumption that any information meeting the Restricted Data definition is classified by virtue of its existence, without anyone having to make a positive determination; and without some affirmative act, all such information remains classified indefinitely. A positive action is not required to classify information; only to declassify it. In fact, many in the public domain are concerned that DOE has used the "Restricted Data" definition of the Atomic Energy Act to improperly maintain secrecy of many of their activities—that there has been much overuse and abuse.

While the "Born Classified" concept is conservative and safe in its approach, it is too rigid in today's world of openness. Both the current administration and the Secretary of Energy have given high priority to building public confidence. To the extent possible, this goal should be reflected in DOE's classification policies; and only atomic energy information that truly warrants protection in the interest of national security should be classified. There is now strong desire for international cooperation on some nuclear weapon technologies (e.g., safety and control). In addition, commercial potential exists for some nuclear weapon developed technologies, and there is a need to commercialize some nuclear weapon production processes as the DOE nuclear weapon program consolidates. Finally, there are mounting pressures for environmental cleanup of DOE facilities and full disclosures during shipments of hazardous wastes.

In addition to the above, there are public pressures for openness in several areas: (1) the effects of DOE activities on health, safety, and the environment; (2) historical actions of DOE and its predecessors (AEC and ERDA); and (3) dismantlement of surplus nuclear weapons and management of the resulting hazardous materials.

Clearly a more flexible and responsive approach is needed. A system similar to that used for National Security Information would be reasonable, wherein categories of potentially classified information are defined in the Atomic Energy Act (these categories are currently provided), and positive determinations are required to classify the information based on potential damage to the national security. Thus, the responsibility is placed on the classifier to justify that the information needs to be classified. In fact, the real-world procedures for RD and NSI classification determinations are quite similar: categorizing the information; and determining its classification according to guide topics.

Under this proposed concept, atomic energy information may be classified only if it meets the following criteria:

  1. the information concerns:
    (a) the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons;
    (b) the production of special nuclear materials; or
    (c) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy.

  2. the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the U.S. Government.

  3. an Original Classification Authority determines that unauthorized disclosure of the information could be expected to result in damage to the national security, including nuclear weapon proliferation considerations.

Implementation of this proposed system would be straightforward. Since the categories of RD information and many supporting classification guides already exist, the Original "RD" Classification Authorities would basically review, justify, and sign off on the guides. For developing technology areas not covered by existing guides, the Original Classification Authorities would make classification determinations and issue the appropriate guidance. Derivative Classifiers would then use these classification guides to make program classification determinations.

While this approach would shift the burden of proof to classifying information rather than declassifying it (as in the current RD system), once a determination to classify information has been made, automatic declassification schedules would not be imposed. Rather, the information would remain classified until a positive determination to declassify was made by an Original Declassification Authority. This is because atomic energy information consists mostly of scientific and technical information, and thus has long-term value to potential adversaries.

Also, as mentioned above, this approach would require the appointment of Original Classifiers to make the initial classification determinations, similar to the NSI classification system. These officials would, of course, be limited to federal agency employees and would be few in number. Within DOE, they likely would consist of the Director of the Office of Declassification, program managers, and a limited number of DOE field managers or Classification Officers. If a person not having Original Classification Authority believes information should be classified, that information would be forwarded to an Original Classifier or the Director, Office of Declassification, for a classification determination.

Recommendation

The Department of Energy should develop a system for the classification of Restricted Data that shifts from the presumption of "Born Classified" to a structure which places the burden of proof on the classifier that an item is classified. Criteria for classifying atomic energy information should be developed, per the above discussion, and Original Classification Authorities should be appointed to make the initial classification determinations for developing technology areas.

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

Current Policy

In the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 142.d, the category of classified information that is known as Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) is described as follows: The Commission shall remove from the Restricted Data category such data as the Commission and the Department of Defense jointly determine relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and which the Commission and Department of Defense jointly determine can be adequately safeguarded as defense information: Provided, however, That no such data so removed from the Restricted Data category shall be transmitted or otherwise made available to any nation or regional defense organization, while such data remains defense information, except pursuant to an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with subsection 144b.

FRD is also described in Section F introductory material of CG-W-5, the Joint DOE/DoD Classification Policy Guide for Nuclear Weapons, as follows: Information primarily of concern to the military pertaining to the utilization and deployment of nuclear weapons, e.g.: Stockpile quantities and location, command/control, including PAL and disablement, yields and effects, vulnerability and hardening, programmatic and reliability information, delivery and fuzing (when classified).

Findings

The nuclear weapon category of information called Formerly Restricted Data is sometimes used improperly, is confusing to many users, has outlived its usefulness, and should be eliminated. Elimination of FRD would remove an ambiguous category of classified information, would increase the flexibility of the RD system, and would simplify DoD operations with no penalty to national security.

Discussion

The category of nuclear weapon information known as Formerly Restricted Data was intended to identify classified nuclear weapon information that revealed little about weapon designs but that was essential for military planners. This included information such as yields, fuzing altitudes, stockpile numbers, weapon storage locations, some use control information, and weapon reliabilities. The words "Formerly Restricted Data," however, do not appear in the Atomic Energy Act. These words were coined by the Atomic Energy Commission to describe certain information that was removed from the Restricted Data category of information control.

Prior to 1954, the category of information known as FRD was included in the Restricted Data (RD) definition. This 1954 revision to the Atomic Energy Act, i.e., removal of the military utilization information from the RD category, permitted military planners and others with a "need-to-know" easier access to this information. Prior to 1954, a "Q" clearance was required for access to this information; after 1954, the clearance category of Defense Information (DI), now known as National Security Information (NSI), at a comparable level of classification, was adequate. (For communications with a foreign government, however, FRD is treated as RD and can only be shared under formal Agreements of Cooperation.)

While the creation of FRD reduced access requirements for this category of information, and thus provided needed relief for military planners and others, over the years of its use the FRD category has become a confusing and misleading designator. The question is often asked: Is "Formerly Restricted Data" information that is no longer classified, and thus no longer requires security protection? In fact, when properly used, FRD is little different from NSI except for the previously mentioned restriction on transmittal to a foreign nation.

As mentioned above, properly defined, FRD is information that reveals little about weapons design, but is essential for military planners. However, during the years of FRD's existence, some weapon design information has been designated as FRD that should properly be identified as RD. A good example is much nuclear weapon use control information and hardware as defined in TCG-UC-2, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon Use Control.

To resolve the ambiguities and inconsistencies and to reduce the number of topics classified by joint DOE/DoD guidance, thereby removing DOE from classification decisions on military utilization more properly made by DoD, the FRD category should be eliminated. Nuclear weapon information currently categorized as FRD should be evaluated for transclassification to NSI if it relates primarily to the military utilization of nuclear weapons, and to RD if it does not.

Examples of information that should be RD include:

Examples of information that should be NSI include:

Using the above guidance, nuclear weapon information currently identified as FRD can be transclassified to NSI and RD, as appropriate.

Recommendation

Eliminate the category of classified information identified as Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). Evaluate all classification guide topics currently designated FRD to determine that information which should revert to RD (e.g., much Use Control information) and which should be changed to NSI. (Recommended changes of FRD topics in CG-W-5 to RD or NSI are identified in Annex D to this report, and in Part II of Appendix C of the main report.) Coordinate proposals with DoD, and revise existing classification guidelines as necessary.

Minority Opinion

Mr. Stan Gooch, the STRATCOM Weaponization Working Group member, provided the following minority opinion: Retain the classification category of FRD (Formerly Restricted Data) because it uniquely identifies that category of information that is related primarily to the military utilization of nuclear weapons.

CLASSIFIED ASSOCIATIONS

Current Policy

Per Chapter IV, part B, paragraph 3 of DOE Order 5650.2B, "Certain information which would otherwise be unclassified may require classification when combined or associated with other unclassified or classified information."

Per current nuclear weapon program classification guides and some joint DOE/DoD topical classification guides (e.g., TCG-UC-2, topic 3281), the association of some components with specific nuclear weapons is classified because these associations may reveal certain operational capabilities (e.g., active protection).

Findings

Classified associations are often difficult to implement and maintain, sometimes ineffective, and costly; and they may give a false sense of maintaining an operational capability.

Discussion

Information that is not by itself classified must sometimes be classified because its association with other information explicitly or implicitly reveals additional information that is classified. Occasionally the association of a weapons component with a weapon system must be classified because an operational capability is revealed, for instance. Classification of associations is sometimes referred to as "protection-in-depth," "tiered classification," or "classification in context." Additional related identifiers include: "Keystone Concept" and "Compilations of Information."

The significance of information often depends upon its context. Classification of information because of its association with other information, for instance, occasionally occurs with respect to items of hardware or materials used to fabricate classified hardware. While a commercially available item or hardware can never be classified, its association with a classified project may cause the hardware to be classified. A chemical or other material may be unclassified, but if it is associated with a classified process such that the association indicates a classified use of the chemical or material, then the association is classified.

DOE classification guides or DOE-approved contractor classification guides often require "protection-in-depth"; that is, second or third levels of classification are often required to protect a system capability or design feature. For instance, pressure transducers purchased for development or operational testing may not be associated with specific weapons because their pressure range specification may reveal the pressure of the gas boost bottle or the final boosted pit pressure, which are classified values. In a classic example, the association of an RTG (Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generator) with a specific weapon is classified because it implies or reveals that the weapon has an active protection use control capability. In some instance, travel by an expert in a specific technological area to a specific facility may be classified, or "blind" budget arrangements may be required to protect certain program information.

Classified associations can affect information that is not normally classified, and thus they are sometimes difficult to control. In addition, because classification by association is not always effective, a false sense of protecting system or operational capability sometimes occurs. Finally, "protection-in-depth," or classified associations, results in unavoidable classification costs; thus it is important to classify only information or associations that truly warrant protection and that can be kept from an adversary.

Recommendation

DOE should discourage the use of classified associations to the extent possible, as they are often costly to implement or do not provide effective security protection.

Appendix F to the
Report of the
Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group

Report of the
Weaponization and Weapons Production and
Military Use Working Group

 

ANNEX B

SPECIFIC DECLASSIFICATION/
DOWNGRADING/ TRANSCLASSIFICATION
RECOMMENDATIONS

 

January 15, 1997

 

James B. Wright, Chair
Sandia National Laboratories

 

Specific recommendations on declassification, continued protection, downgrading, and transclassification of selected weaponization topics are provided in this annex. A complete listing of these recommendations is provided on the following page. A summary matrix of the recommendations is also provided, followed by the complete presentations. A few of the recommendations are not shared by all members of the Working Group. In those instances, a minority opinion is provided at the conclusion of the recommendation.

Much of the material addressed by the Weaponization Working Group is currently in the Formerly Restricted Data category. Consistent with the previous recommendation to eliminate FRD, and where applicable, we have included our judgments on transclassification of FRD to NSI or RD, should the FRD category be eliminated. These judgments are not applicable to Restricted Data, nor to those topics approved for declassification as recommended, but would apply to those topics not approved for declassification.

The rationale for our recommendations on certain topics can only be framed in classified text to be meaningful. These topics are identified in the summary matrix that follows and are presented in detail in the classified supplement, Annex C.

Annex D provides transclassification recommendations for topics listed in CG-W-5, the Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide. More specific transclassification recommendations on use control topics are given in Appendix C of the main report.

Listing of Specific Declassification/Downgrading/Transclassification Recommendations

Recommendation Subject Areas

Summary Matrix of Recommendations
Safing, Arming, Fuzing, & Firing (SAFF) Recommendations
     Radar Fuze Transmitting Frequencies and Related Design Information
     Radar Fuze Transmitting Frequency-Related Characteristics
     CDU Firing Sets and Implosion Detonator Performance
     Programmers for Bomb and Warhead Electrical Systems
     "Close-Coupled" Firing Systems
Use Control System Recommendations
     Use Control Technology
     Active Protection
Nuclear Assembly System Related Recommendations
     Neutron Generator Locations
     High Explosives Quantities in Nuclear Weapons
     Pit Reuse
     Physics Package Orientation
     Nuclear Weapon [Usage]
     Implosion Detonators and Thermally Stabilized PETN
     Boost Gas Quantity and Composition
     Gas Boost Reservoir Design Information
     [Classified Subject]
Vulnerability and Hardening Recommendations
     Nuclear Weapon Vulnerability and Hardening Requirements
     Boron Components
Military Use Recommendations
     Nuclear Weapon Storage Sites & Specific Weapons Stored at those Sites
     Warhead Service Life
     Weapon Retirement Numbers and Rates
     Nuclear Weapon Quantitative Reliability Information
     Nuclear Weapon Size, Shape, and Mass Properties
     WH/RV Weapon System Loadouts
     Rapidly-Selectable Yield Capability
     Limited-Life Component Maximum Service Life & Exchange Intervals
Miscellaneous Items
     Hazardous Materials in Warheads
     Simulator Technology
     Radiological Weapons and Warfare

Summary Matrix of Declassification/Downgrading/Transclassification Recommendations

Provided below is a summary matrix of the specific declassification recommendations of the Weaponization Working Group of DOE's Fundamental Classification Policy Review. The matrix summarizes recommended declassifications. The matrix also provides recommended transclassification actions for FRD topics should the declassification recommendations not be approved. Transclassification is not applicable to Restricted Data, nor to those topics approved for declassification as recommended.

Following the Summary Matrix are the complete evaluations pertaining to each recommendation presented in the format requested by the Steering Group.

GuideTopicRecommendation SummaryCurrent
Classi-
fication		Recommended
Transclassi-
fication
TCG-SAFF-1 Radar Fuze Transmitting Frequencies
  • Declassify fuze transmitting frequencies, and related design information
 CFRD NSI
TCG-SAFF-1 Radar Fuze Transmitting Frequency-
Related Characteristics
  • Declassify use of techniques, such as frequency diversity and agility, for specific radar fuzes
  • Continue to protect how they are used, and related design and manufacturing information
 CFRD

 

C-SFRD

 NSI

 

NSI

TCG-DS-1 &
TCG-SAFF-1		 CDU Firing Sets & Implosion Detonator Performance
  • Declassify designs of Capacitor Discharge Unit (CDU) firing sets, including 'keystone' high voltage section
  • Continue to classify performance and numbers of implosion detonators
 CRD

 
 

CRD

 NA

 
 

NA

TCG-SAFF-1 Programmers
  • Declassify all Programmer-associated information
  • Continue to protect major Safing, Arming, Fuzing, & Firing System interrelations
 CFRD

 
SRD

 NSI

 
NA

TCG-SAFF-1 "Close-
Coupled"
Firing
Systems		 See Classified Supplement Annex C SRD NA
TCG-UC-2 Use Control Technology
  • Classify Use Control new concepts, even if never used, at the level they would be classified if weaponized
  • Review classification of Use Control technologies for older weapons and upgrade to Secret as appropriate
  • Review need for "dual-use" of nuclear weapon use control technology in other nonnuclear weapon applications
  • DOE/DoD consider recategorizing some use control design information from FRD to RD (as recommended in Annex D).
 U-SRD/FRD

 

  C-SRD/FRD

 

 C-SRD/FRD

 

 

C-SRD/FRD

RD

 

RD

 

RD

 

 

RD

CG-UC-2 Active Protection
  • Declassify association of active protection with specified weapon and specified PAL category. (See Classified Supplement Annex C for more detail.)
  • Continue to classify penalty response information
 CFRD

 

 

C-TSRD/FRD

 NSI

 

 

RD

TCG-WI-1 Neutron Generator Locations
  • Declassify locations of neutron generators within weapons
 CRD NA
TCG-NAS-1 HE Quantities
  • Establish some unclassified amount of HE used in implosion systems to satisfy transportation safety requirements
 CRD NA
CG-DR-1 Pit Reuse
  • Maintain current classification policy
 U-SRD/FRD RD
Weapon
System Guides		 Physics Package Orientation
  • Declassify orientation of physics package, e.g., primary forward or aft, in RV/RB
 CRD NA
TCG-WI-1 Nuclear Weapon
[Usage]		 See Classified Supplement Annex C CRD NA
TCG-DS-1 Implosion Detonators and Thermally Stabilized PETN
  • Declassify use of thermally stabilized PETN in implosion detonators of specified weapons
  • Declassify basic design of implosion detonators used in specified weapons
  • Continue to classify required or achieved performance of implosion detonators
  • Continue to classify implosion detonator design details that may reveal classified weapon design features
 U-CRD

 

CRD
 

CRD
 

C-SRD

 NA

 

NA
 

NA
 

NA

TCG-BTS-1 Boost Gas Quantity & Composition
  • Downgrade to CRD the quantity and composition of boost gas stored in reservoirs
  • Continue to protect as SRD the nuclear assembly pit volume and boosted pit pressure
 SRD

 

SRD

 NA

 

NA

TCG-BTS-1 Gas Boost Reservoir Design Information
  • Declassify all reservoir design information, test data, and hardware that don't reveal boost gas quantities and composition (See Classified Supplement Annex C for more detail)
 C-SRD NA
TCG-BTS-1 [Classified Subject] See Classified Supplement Annex C SRD NA
TCG-V/H-1 Nuclear Weapon
Vulnerability & Hardening
  • Declassify hardness requirements for specific nuclear weapons
  • Continue to classify specific weapon's actual radiation hardness achieved, or its vulnerability
  • Declassify information relating to scientific principles of x-ray shielding that do not reveal specific weapon vulnerabilities
  • Continue to classify information relating to manufacturing techniques of x-ray shielding that relate to specific weapons
 NSI

 

C-TSFRD

 

C-SFRD

 

C-SFRD

 NA

 

RD

 

NSI

 

RD

TCG-WM-1 Boron Components
  • Declassify use of boron as a shielding material for neutron hardening purposes on specified weapons
  • Continue to classify boron chemistry that may reveal critical technologies
  • Classify boron parts if classified shapes, configurations, etc., are revealed
 CFRD

 

C-SRD/FRD


C-SRD

 NSI

 

RD


NA

TCG-WPMU-1 Weapon
Storage Sites/Specific
Weapons Stored
  • Declassify the capability to store and/or handle weapons
  • Continue to protect existing nuclear weapon storage locations
  • Declassify all information on former storage sites
  • Don't classify "second-order" implications of weapon storage locations, or specific weapons stored at those locations
 C-SFRD

C-SFRD


U-SFRD

NA

 NSI

NSI


NSI

NA

TCG-WPMU-1 WH Service Life
  • Declassify weapon's expected or estimated service life
 CFRD NSI
CG-DR-1;

TCG-WPMU-1

 Weapon Retirement
Numbers & Rates
  • Declassify weapon retirement numbers and rates for nuclear weapon systems that are being dismantled
 C-SFRD NSI
TCG-WPMU-1 Weapon Reliability
  • Declassify quantitative reliability requirements
  • Continue to classify reliability assessments
 SFRD

SFRD

 NSI

RD

Weapon
System Guides		 Weapon
Physical Properties
  • Declassify weapon size, shape, and mass properties
 C-SRD/FRD NA
MCs & STS WH/RV weapon system loadouts
  • Clarify DOE/DoD classification guidance as necessary to assure minimum WH/RV loadouts are unclassified
 U-SFRD NSI
CG-W-5 &
TCG-SAFF-1		 Rapidly-
Selectable Yield Capability
  • DOE/DoD coordinate as necessary to achieve declassification of fact of rapidly-selectable yields for specified weapons
  • Continue to protect how yield-select capability is achieved
 CFRD

 
 

C-SRD

 NSI

 
 

NA

TCG-WPMU-1;
MC & STS		 Limited-Life Component
Maximum Service Life & Exchange Intervals
  • Declassify all aspects of Limited-Life Component maximum service life and exchange intervals
 CFRD NSI
TCG-WM-1 Hazardous Materials in Warheads
  • Declassify presence of and some maximum amount of non-SNM hazardous materials used in warheads
 C-SRD/FRD NA
TCG-NNT-1 Simulator Technology
  • Don't classify simulator technology advancements unless outputs closely approximate weapon outputs
 CFRD NSI
AEC CG for Military Appli-
cation of Atomic Energy (1949); CG-SS-3; CG-WN-4		 Radiological Weapons & Warfare
  • DOE issue updated guidance reaffirming that information on radiological weapons and warfare is classified at levels ranging from U-S, depending on information revealed; and in the RD category for design information, FRD for military use information
U-SNSI/RD RD or NSI as appropriate

SAFING, ARMING, FUZING, & FIRING (SAFF) SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS

The basic purpose or function of a nuclear weapon's safing, arming, fuzing, and firing (SAFF) system, also referred to as the warhead electrical system (WES), is twofold: (1) to assure that the weapon will detonate at the intended time and place, and (2) to assure that it will not detonate at any other time or place, including adverse conditions such as accidents. These systems typically consist of a highly integrated array of electronic and electromechanical components, circuitry, and switching networks that together are designed for the following purposes: to provide warhead safing in both normal and abnormal environments; to provide signal conditioning and amplification for the fuzing and firing functions; to sense proper environments over the target for fuzing; and to provide the high voltages and large amounts of current necessary for firing the high-energy warhead detonators. Because of the very complex requirements of a modern SAFF system, its various functions are usually controlled by microprocessor-controlled programmers.

Radar Fuze Transmitting Frequencies
and Related Design Information

Current Policy

Topic 3414 of the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (TCG-SAFF-1) classifies, as CFRD, nuclear weapon radar fuze design information that reveals the radar transmission frequencies to within ±20% of center frequencies.

Findings

Nuclear weapon radar fuze transmission frequencies are revealed during developmental and operational flight testing. Thus, they are not protectable and should be declassified.

Discussion

A nuclear warhead is normally fuzed by components that sense a condition corresponding to the intended place and time of detonation. Fuzes are usually classified as radiating (e.g., radar) or passive (e.g., timer, baroswitch).

Consideration of possible countermeasures is the most critical single factor affecting the classification of fuzing systems information. Thus, the transmitting frequencies of radar fuzes used in U.S. nuclear weapons have historically been classified because it was believed that knowing this information would allow an enemy to premature or dud the weapon by employing electronic countermeasures. Continued protection of these transmitting frequencies, however, is not practical. The transmission frequencies can be determined from an analysis of the transmitted spectrum that can be intercepted first during development flight testing, and later during operational flight testing. Also, declassification of the radar transmitting frequencies would eliminate the need for continued protection of many piece parts and tooling at the production agency and at commercial suppliers. This makes sense from an economical viewpoint, and would declassify information that is basically not protectable.

Knowing the radar fuze transmitting frequencies could conceivably make the weapon system more susceptible to enemy attempts to premature or dud the radar's fuzes. However, radar fuzes in modern nuclear weapons are designed to be relatively insensitive to jamming and to deactivate in the event of severe jamming, with an alternate non-radar fuzing method taking over. Thus, while system accuracy may be degraded, the weapon would still function properly.

Recommendation

Declassify nuclear weapon radar fuze transmission frequencies, and design information revealing those frequencies.

Minority Opinion

Lt. Col. Edward Saunders, the DNA (now called the Defense Special Weapons Agency) Field Command Weaponization Working Group member, provided the following minority opinion: Non-concur with Group recommendation to declassify radar fuze operating frequencies and related design information. Non-concurrence is based on non-proliferation considerations. The Working Group recommendation supposes that adversaries have the electronic intelligence gathering means to intercept electromagnetic spectrums during weapons development. This is too general a supposition when applied to developing third world proliferants. Classification here may not prevent, but certainly delay, a proliferant in gaining the information.

Radar Fuze Transmitting Frequency-Related Characteristics

Current Policy

Per topic 3424.1 of the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (TCG-SAFF-1), it is classified CFRD that techniques such as frequency agility, random phase modulation, and time-base jitter are used in specified radar fuzes to overcome enemy electronic countermeasures (ECM).

Findings

The use of techniques such as frequency agility or time-base jitter that may be used in specific radar fuzes can be determined from an analysis of the spectrum of the radar transmission frequencies, which are revealed during development and operational flight testing.

Discussion

Techniques such as frequency diversity and agility may be designed into radar fuzes used in nuclear weapons to help prevent premature or dudding of the weapons if subjected to enemy electronic countermeasures or jamming environments. These methods have historically been classified to keep this knowledge from enemies, thus preventing them from using this knowledge to develop effective methods to countermeasure or jam the radar fuzes. The fact that capabilities such as frequency diversity and agility are designed into radar fuzes, however, can be determined from an analysis of the transmission frequencies, which are not protectable (see Radar Fuzing Transmitting Frequencies Recommendation). Since this information is not protectable, it should be declassified.

Declassification of this information would also eliminate the need for continued protection of many piece parts and related tooling at the production agencies and commercial suppliers.

A knowledge that countermeasure techniques, such as frequency diversity and agility, are used on specific radar fuzes might facilitate enemy attempts to premature or dud the weapons. However, radar fuzes in modern nuclear weapons are designed to be relatively insensitive to jamming and to deactivate in the event of severe jamming, with an alternate non-radar fuzing method taking over. Thus, while system accuracy may be degraded, the weapon would still function properly.

Recommendation

Declassify the use of countermeasure techniques, such as frequency diversity and agility, random phase modulations, or intentional time-base jitter, on specific nuclear weapon radar fuzes. Continue to classify how these countermeasure techniques are used, and related design and/or manufacturing information.

Minority Opinion

Lt. Col. Edward Saunders, the DNA (now called the Defense Special Weapons Agency) Field Command Weaponization Working Group member, provided the following minority opinion: Non-concur with Group recommendation to declassify counter-ECM or anti-jamming methods in radar fuzes. Non-concurrence is based on non-proliferation considerations. The Working Group recommendation supposes that adversaries have the electronic intelligence gathering means to intercept electromagnetic spectrums during weapons development. This is too general a supposition when applied to developing third world proliferants. Classification here may not prevent, but certainly delay, a proliferant in gaining the information.

CDU Firing Sets and Implosion Detonator Performance

Current Policy

Topical section 210 of TCG-DS-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Detonation Systems, classifies as CRD the required and actual performance of high-energy detonator systems used in the implosion systems of nuclear weapons. Parameters classified include simultaneity and reliability, energy requirements, and any hardening features. Topic 4220 of TCG-SAFF-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing, classifies as CRD complete design information on Capacitor Discharge Unit (CDU) firing sets that are used to fire the high-energy detonators. Per topic 4230 of TCG-SAFF-1, the high voltage circuit design (also known as an x-unit) of these firing sets is classified CRD as a "keystone" element. Per topics 4240 and 4280 of TCG-SAFF-1, many CDU design and operating characteristics are not classified, including the number and type of capacitors, the operating voltage, the total electrical capacity, and the low voltage circuitry.

Findings

Required and actual performance of nuclear weapon implosion detonators have historically been classified and should continue to be protected. Basically, all elements of CDU firing sets have been declassified. The high voltage circuitry of CDU firing sets is classified in some designs as a "keystone" element. However, this has not been an effective keystone, and does not need to be classified to protect detonator system required or actual performance.

Discussion

The primary function of CDU 1 firing sets is to provide sufficient energy to fire the high-energy detonators in the high explosive assemblies of nuclear weapon implosion systems. They also frequently initiate neutron generator operation, and may perform other energy storing/triggering functions. CDU-type firing sets have been used in most nuclear weapons in the stockpile, and will probably be used in future weapon developments unless size limitations dictate otherwise.

Complete designs of these CDU firing sets are classified to protect the energy, simultaneity, or precise timing requirements needed to fire the high-energy detonators of a particular implosion system. In addition, firing sets may be classified to conceal the number of detonators used in an implosion system, to protect vulnerability and hardening information on a weapon, or for proliferation considerations. The general design principles of CDU-type firing sets, however, are well-known technology, and therefore are not protectable by classification. In addition, most design and operating characteristics of specific CDU firing sets are unclassified. These include the low voltage circuitry, the number and types of energy-storage capacitors used, the operating voltage, and the electrical capacity. Therefore, to assure that complete designs of CDU firing sets are classified, in some designs the high voltage circuitry has been classified as a "keystone" element.

However, classification of the high voltage circuitry of CDU firesets, while at the same time treating specifics of capacitance and voltage as unclassified, is not an effective keystone. Rather, protection of implosion detonator energy, performance, and reliability parameters depends on protecting the number of implosion detonators and the electrical load requirements on the fireset. This requires that energy (current and voltage) waveforms from detonator-system/firing-system combinations need to continue to be classified; and it is also necessary to continue to protect some combination of: number of cables tied to the fireset, detonators per cable, or connection of cables.

Because the high voltage circuitry is not an effective keystone, and because this keystone has not been consistently applied to all CDU firing sets, there are no known reasons to continue to classify the CDU high voltage section or, in fact, the complete CDU firing set design. Economic and production advantages would result from declassifying CDU firing sets, and critical design parameters of detonator systems would not be revealed.

Recommendation

Declassify the basic designs of CDU firing sets, including the "keystone" high voltage sections. Continue to classify details of implosion detonator system performance, including the number of detonators and electrical load present in the cabling and detonator system.

Programmers for Bomb and Warhead Electrical Systems

Current Policy

Topic 1730 and associated subtopics of the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (TCG-SAFF-1) classifies, as CFRD, information associated with programmers that reveals all major SAFF interrelations controlled by the programmer, vulnerability reduction techniques, or system accuracies. Programmer parts and circuitry not revealing the above information are Unclassified.

Findings

Though it is important and necessary to protect sensitive details concerning precision of delivery, interrelationship of SAFF components as it relates to weapon function, and the means of precluding countermeasures, SAFF programmers do not provide enough information to impact these areas. Programmers do not inherently contain classified information, and thus do not warrant the CFRD classification.

Discussion

Safing, arming, fuzing, and firing systems of modern nuclear warheads include a computerized programmer that controls all initial weapon commands through the use of computer hardware and software, timers, and switch activators. A programmer's ultimate purpose is to assure that weapon detonation will be initiated at the proper time and altitude over a target. Thus, programmers typically contain parts and circuitry that allow them to enable other SAFF components, circumvention2 circuitry, and electronic clocks.

Though programmers are essentially at the center of a weapon's electronics system and can enable other SAFF components (e.g., electrical arm, gas transfer) at predetermined times according to specific inputs, programmers, in themselves, do not reveal nuclear weapon operational details. Programmers, even microprocessor driven programmers, are essentially warhead sequencers which, upon enablement, actuate other SAFF components with varying degrees of complexity. However, it is not practicable to derive operational details from such a component. In addition, it is not practicable to derive weapon system hardness through the inspection of circumvention circuitry typically found in a programmer. Knowledge of such circuitry would only negligibly benefit an adversary in impacting weapon system operational effectiveness. Finally, it is not possible to determine weapon utility and precision of delivery through knowledge of the accuracy of a programmer's electronic clock; and, it is not possible to determine fuzing altitudes or boosting times from knowledge of the time base itself, let alone the accuracy of the time base.

Recommendation

Declassify all programmer-associated information. Continue to protect major SAFF interrelations by the current practice of classifying system level block diagrams, schematics, and detailed descriptions.

"Close-Coupled" Firing Systems

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-5 for Discussion)

USE CONTROL SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS

Use control systems are designed into U.S. nuclear weapons to prevent or delay the unauthorized use of these weapons while allowing timely authorized use. A nuclear weapon's use control system may involve passive protection, active protection, and disablement and destruct systems. It may include the use of coded switches, cryptographic systems, limited try, and other features. Passive protection usually consists of a coded switch or Permissive Action Link that precludes operation of weapon electrical arming circuits until a correct numerical code is entered. Active protection senses attempts to gain unauthorized access to critical weapon components and responds by initiating weapon disablement.

Use Control Technology

Current Policy

Per topical section 1200 of TCG-UC-2, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon Use Control, use control design information and the development of new use control technologies can range in classification from Unclassified to Secret; and per topical section 1500, use control technology developed for nuclear weapon applications may be used in other weapon or non-weapon applications (Dual-Use). Finally, per TCG-UC-2, much nuclear weapon use control design information is categorized as FRD (Formerly Restricted Data).

Findings

New concepts in use control technology, even if never used in nuclear weapons, may reveal features of use control systems that have been designed into weapons; thus, these new concepts have the potential for revealing bypass information.

Some older use control technology may still be classified Confidential because it was developed before DOE's Sensitive Use Control Information (SUCI) policy was implemented. This older technology may be inadequately protected.

Use control technology developed for nuclear weapon applications may sometimes be applied to other nonnuclear weapon applications. This "dual-use," however, could lead to compromise of nuclear weapon use control technology and reveal bypass information.

The classification category of much use control design information is FRD because of historical practices. Much of this information is not properly categorized.

Discussion

The fact that special features may be designed into U.S. nuclear weapons to prevent unauthorized use is Unclassified. However, the effectiveness of use control technology is unique in its dependence on information availability. An excellent system that achieves its design goal of high resistance to bypass can instantly become a poor one if critical information becomes available to an adversary. For instance, information describing bypass of a use control system or feature could allow use of a weapon if physical access to the weapon occurred. Thus, much use control design information must be protected at the highest level, and distribution of nuclear weapon use control information should be limited to those who have a strict need-to-know.

The need to provide a high level of security for nuclear weapons requires the continued development of new, more advanced use control technology. The fact that these new systems and components are being developed may be unclassified, but the design specifics of how they operate should always be protected by classification. Even if newly developed use control features are never used on nuclear weapons, a knowledge of their design could reveal similar features that may have been developed and designed into a weapon, thus leading to possible vulnerability and potential bypass information.

Some older use control information developed for nuclear weapon applications may still be classified at the Confidential level. This is because this technology was developed before the use of the "Sensitive Use Control Information" (SUCI) designator, and before a policy to protect this information at the Secret level was developed by DOE in the mid-1980s. Because of the sensitivity and importance of nuclear weapon use control information, DOE should review classification levels of use control system technology developed for older weapons, and consider upgrading all sensitive technologies.

Also, because nuclear weapon use control systems can provide such a high level of security, there sometimes may be a desire to use these systems to provide protection to other sensitive technologies. This is sometimes known as "dual-use." If this occurs, the fact of dual use is classified so that knowledge associated with bypass of a nonnuclear system will not contribute to or allow adversarial bypass of a nuclear weapon use control system. However, it is believed that "dual-use" in a nuclear weapon context has definite potential to reveal highly sensitive information, and that compromise of this technology could lead to unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.

Finally, the current classification category of most design information for both active and passive use control systems is FRD. This practice has been followed because during the early use control system days of the 1960s, the information was considered necessary for military familiarization, handling, and operational purposes. However, much design information in modern nuclear weapon use control systems is not needed for military utilization purposes; thus, this information should be evaluated for possible recategorization to RD.

Recommendation

The development of new use control concepts for nuclear weapons should always remain classified, even if they are never designed into a nuclear weapon, because of the potential for revealing bypass information. In particular, every attempt should be made to protect these new concepts at the classification level they would appropriately require if weaponized.

DOE should review the classification levels assigned to use control technology developed for some older weapons and consider upgrading all sensitive information.

The DOE Office of Declassification should thoroughly review the "dual-use" of nuclear weapon use control technology in nonnuclear weapon applications. Because of the sensitivity of nuclear weapon use control technology, and the potential for allowing unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, this technology should not be transferred to other applications.

DOE should evaluate, with DoD, nuclear weapon use control design information that is currently categorized as FRD, for possible recategorization to RD. (Initial recommendations developed during this Review are given in Annex D of this appendix, and Appendix C of the main report.)

Active Protection

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-7 for Discussion)

Nuclear Assembly System Related Recommendations

The Weaponization Working Group reviewed several classification issues associated with a nuclear weapon's nuclear assembly system. Much information about a nuclear weapon's nuclear assembly system should remain classified. Some design details of even a primitive single-stage weapon could be of great value to a determined proliferator. Thus, this information should continue to be protected by classification. However, information about nuclear assembly systems that is widely known from unclassified sources, or information for which the continued protection imposes serious operational restrictions but would provide little assistance to potential adversaries, should not continue to be classified.

Neutron Generator Locations

Current Policy

Per topic 283.5 of CG-W-5, the Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide, and per topic 425 of TCG-WI-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide on Weapon Initiators, the fact that neutron generators are located outside the physics package is unclassified, but their physical locations within the nuclear weapon are classified CRD.

Findings

Revealing the physical locations of neutron generators within a nuclear weapon provides little or no information with respect to a nuclear weapon's initiation requirements. The location of a neutron generator could reveal the approximate location of the nuclear weapon's primary, or fission, stage, but this information is of limited value. The physical locations of neutron generators in a weapon should be declassified.

Discussion

All nuclear weapons must have an "initiator" to supply a large pulse of high-energy neutrons at the proper time to begin the fission chain reaction. The two types of initiators are internal (to the nuclear system), which generate neutrons as part of the implosion process; and external, which use an ion-acceleration principle to produce neutrons from D-D or D-T interactions.

The fact that neutron generators are located outside a nuclear weapon's physics package is unclassified. Their physical locations within a warhead, however, have always been classified CRD because it was felt that this information may tend to reveal a weapon's initiation requirements. In addition, it was felt that knowing the neutron generator locations could provide some information on the location or orientation of the nuclear weapon primary, or fission, stage. (See page F-B-33 for a discussion on physics package orientation.)

Knowing the neutron generator locations, however, appears to be of limited or no value to an adversary. Components or materials located between the neutron generators and a warhead primary reduce significantly any meaningful calculations. Some relaxation on classification policy regarding neutron generator locations was provided about 5 years ago, when it was determined that the general locations of neutron generators in warhead sections (e.g., center case) could be unclassified if the dimensional relationship between the nuclear assembly system and the neutron generators could not be determined.

Overall, it appears that knowing the specific physical locations of neutron generators within warheads provides no significant physics design information, there are no other known national security impacts, and there may be cost reductions and simplifications associated with assembly and maintenance procedures and manuals.

Recommendation

Declassify the physical locations of neutron generators within nuclear weapons.

High Explosives Quantities in Nuclear Weapons

Current Policy

Per topic 232 of CG-W-5, the Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide, and per topic 307 of TCG-NAS-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Assembly System Classification Guide, the quantity of high explosives used in nuclear assembly systems of nuclear weapons is classified CRD.

Findings

While the specific amounts of high explosives (HE) used in nuclear weapons should remain classified because this value reveals significant physics design information, some unclassified agreed-to amount is needed to satisfy HE shipping safety requirements.

Discussion

In an implosion weapon, the HE charge that surrounds the fissile material supplies the large amount of energy necessary to compress the core and achieve supercriticality. Electrically fired high-energy detonators initiate the HE to produce the required uniform shock wave.

Historically, the amount of HE used in nuclear assembly systems has been classified because it indicates the amount of energy required to drive the implosion. However, Department of Transportation highway shipping requirements are becoming more rigid, and some HE mass value is required to be revealed during the shipment of nuclear weapons. Being able to provide, as unclassified, some agreed-to amount of HE for nuclear weapon shipments that is well above the design mass would satisfy the federal regulations. This value should be determined by DOE, in conjunction with the nuclear weapon design laboratories.

Recommendation

DOE and the nuclear design laboratories should jointly identify some unclassified agreed-to amount of HE used in nuclear weapon assembly systems that can be used to satisfy highway transportation shipping safety requirements. The amount determined would be well above the actual masses of HE used in nuclear weapons.

Pit Reuse

Current Policy

Per topical section 2200 of CG-DR-1, the DOE Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon Disassembly and Reuse, the fact that pit reuse is being considered or is being done in unspecified weapons, or that a specified pit is being evaluated for reuse, is unclassified. However, the fact that a specified pit from a specified weapon will be used in another specified weapon may be classified. Also, any pit reuse information which reveals weapon production rates or stockpile quantities, or which reveals other sensitive weapon design information, is classified at the level and category of classified information revealed.

Findings

Current classification policy and topics associated with nuclear weapon pit reuse are adequate and proper.

Discussion

Some nuclear weapon components/materials that have been retired from the stockpile may be returned to the stockpile as part of another weapon. Reuse of these components/materials may require modifying, treating, or reconfiguring prior to their use on another weapon. The nuclear weapon pit, that component of a nuclear assembly system that consists of the active fissile material, is a nuclear weapon component that is being considered for reuse. The reuse of existing pits for future nuclear weapon design is an important consideration because the Rocky Flats production facility no longer produces these components.

Most information related to pit reuse is unclassified because no sensitive nuclear weapon design information is revealed. Any pit reuse information, however, that reveals weapon design information, nuclear weapon production rates, stockpile quantities, or stockpile problems is classified.

It is appropriate and completely natural to consider the reuse of pits for different weapons as the nuclear weapon complex consolidates and standardizes the use of some weapon components. Thus, the existing classification guidance for pit reuse appears to be adequate and proper and not overly conservative.

Recommendation

Maintain the current classification policy on pit reuse.

Physics Package Orientation

Current Policy

In some nuclear weapon program classification guides (e.g., topics 3015 and 3032 of the Sandia W88 Trident II Classification Guide), the orientation of the physics package in the reentry vehicle or reentry body, i.e., primary forward or aft, is classified CRD. (There is not consistency in this policy from system to system.)

Findings

Existing classification policy appears to be overly conservative. There is no known reason for classifying this information, and orientation of physics packages in RV/RBs should be declassified.

Discussion

There has been much speculation as to why there may be national security implications regarding the orientation of a physics package in a RV/RB, but the reasons appear to be lost in obscurity. Orientation of the physics package, primary forward for instance, may reveal some size information or a design capability of the primary to drive the secondary stage. Also, knowing the orientation of the physics package may allow one to better estimate the warhead yield, or could add value to attack scenarios for a ballistic missile defense system. Finally, there is speculation that the physics package orientation may have required protection when the fact of physical separation between the primary and secondary was classified. These reasons are all speculative, however, and the true reason for classifying the orientation of physics packages in RV/RBs is not known. Also, any physics design information gleaned from a knowledge of the physics package orientation would be "second or third order" information, and would have limited value.

Recommendation

Declassify the orientation of physics packages, i.e., primary forward or aft, in RVs or RBs.

Nuclear Weapon [Usage]

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-11 for Discussion)

Implosion Detonators and Thermally Stabilized PETN

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-15 for Discussion)

Boost Gas Quantity and Composition

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-17 for Discussion)

Gas Boost Reservoir Design Information

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-19 for Discussion)

[Classified Subject]

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-21 for Discussion)

VULNERABILITY AND HARDENING RECOMMENDATIONS

The susceptibility of a nuclear weapon or its parts to damage or destruction as the result of a defensive burst, usually an adversary's nuclear burst, is said to be its vulnerability. Hardening is the term applied to intentional measures taken to reduce that vulnerability; while "hardness" represents the resistance of a weapon or its components to adverse environments, usually from the effects of a defensive nuclear burst. Weapon hardness may result from intrinsic hardness, from hardening measures, or from both. Nuclear burst effects against which weapons may be hardened include hot and cold X rays, neutrons, gammas, blast, and several forms of nuclear electromagnetic pulses. Vulnerability to an enemy's nuclear defenses is of primary concern, so hardening is more often required in long-range strategic weapons than in tactical missiles, aircraft-delivered bombs, or battlefield weapons.

Nuclear Weapon Vulnerability and Hardening Requirements

Current Policy

The narrative section of TCG-V/H-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Vulnerability & Hardening, contains the following classification policy statements:

Per topic 1110 of TCG-V/H-1, required or actual system vulnerability, hardness, or hardening levels for specified weapons are classified SFRD/SNSI for blast, EMP, neutrons, gamma rays, X rays, or any other effects.

Findings

Hardness requirements of specific nuclear weapons reveal no design or vulnerability information and thus should be declassified; however, actual hardening achieved or vulnerabilities of specific weapons should remain classified. Current classification policy regarding X-ray shielding technology may be too conservative and should be thoroughly reviewed, with the intent of declassifying that technology that no longer requires protection.

Discussion

It is important for national security considerations to maintain the effectiveness of our nuclear weapons; therefore, any information regarding vulnerabilities or actual or shortfalls in hardening levels achieved for the U.S. nuclear stockpile should continue to be protected by classification. However, most generic information about nuclear weapon radiation environments is well known and has been widely published. Also, much information about the nature and physics of hardening against radiation environments is well known from nonnuclear weapon applications (e.g., satellite, reactor, medical, electrical system). This information has long been declassified or was never classified.

In addition, scientific principles of X-ray shielding are well known and have been frequently published in the open literature. However, the fabrication and manufacturing techniques for applying these scientific principles to X-ray hardening materials and constructs for U.S. nuclear weapons have required significant knowledge, technology, and facilities; and thus have been historically protected by classification to avoid making the information gratuitously available.

It is also logical to assume that nuclear weapons would be optimally hardened against multiple nuclear environments, e.g., X rays and neutrons. This is also known as "balanced hardening." In addition, it is well known that no weapon can be made invulnerable to an arbitrarily severe threat (e.g., a nearby nuclear burst). Finally, hardening limits may also be imposed by cost, technology, or space requirements. With this in mind, and because nuclear weapon radiation environments are reasonably known, a nuclear weapon's hardness requirements can be reasonably deduced and thus should be declassified. (Per the above discussion, actual hardening levels achieved and shortfalls in those hardness levels should remain classified.)

Recommendations

Boron Components

Current Policy

Per topics 601, 602, and 1007 of TCG-WM-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon Materials, and per topic 3110 of TCG-V/H-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Vulnerability and Hardening, the use of boron, any isotope, for neutron hardening (shielding) in unspecified nuclear weapons is not classified, but its use in specified weapons is classified CFRD.

Findings

The use of boron as a material for shielding or hardening against neutrons is well known, and its use for this purpose on unspecified weapons is unclassified. Because it is unclassified that specified weapons are neutron hardened, there is no reason to classify the use of boron on specified weapons to provide hardening against neutron environments.

Discussion

Information about most of the materials and methodologies used to harden nuclear weapons against defensive nuclear effects, other than x-ray hardening materials, is not classified. This is true because materials and general shielding methods of practical use against each nuclear burst effect can be deduced directly from the unclassified physics. Many come from, or are, the technology chosen for dealing with the same effects (namely, neutron radiation shielding) for reactor and space-borne systems.

Neutron shielding materials tend to be low Z, for instance, to best moderate or "thermalize" a neutron flux so that the neutrons can be absorbed efficiently. In general, the physics (e.g., neutron cross sections) involved in hardening candidates is unclassified. However, the engineering techniques, compromises, and final selection of materials for use in weapons, including amounts of materials used, locations, and some configurations, have usually been classified. This information could help an adversary plan a defense against that weapon, or could assist an emerging weapon nation in hardening their designs.

It is logical to assume that nuclear weapons are optimally hardened against multiple nuclear environments. This is also known as "balanced hardening." Neutrons entering a nuclear warhead can cause fissions in the fissile materials which result in rapid heating, and they can also cause damage to nonnuclear components.

The fact that boron is used for neutron hardening purposes in unspecified weapons has long been unclassified, but its use in specified weapons is classified to protect information about the hardness of specific weapons. However, the fact that specified weapons are hardened against the effects of radiation is not classified, and the specific effects (i.e., x-ray, neutron, etc.) against which these weapons are hardened also is not classified. And since, per the above discussion, it is well known that boron provides good screening against neutrons, it is only logical to assume that boron would be used for neutron hardening purposes in these weapons.

What should continue to remain classified, of course, is boron chemistry that may reveal critical technologies, and the details of boron for radiation management purposes. In addition, boron parts that reveal classified shapes, configurations, etc., would remain classified.

Recommendation

Declassify the use of boron as a shielding material for neutron hardening purposes on specified weapons. Continue to classify boron chemistry that may reveal critical technologies. Classify boron parts if classified shapes, configurations, etc., are revealed.

MILITARY USE RECOMMENDATIONS

For this discussion, military use encompasses activities involved in a nuclear weapon's Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS), including: shipping a weapon to a storage site, removing it from storage, and assembling, testing, transporting, and delivering it, when authorized, to detonate on target. It also includes the logistical and employment concepts and related physical environments a weapon encounters during its existence. The STS may also define the logistical flow involved in moving nuclear weapons to and from operational storage areas for quality assurance testing, modification and retrofit, and the recycling of limited-life components.

Once a nuclear weapon has been produced and transferred to military custody, the DoD becomes fully responsible for its accountability, possession, support, and security until it is employed or returned to the DOE for testing, modifying, or retirement.

Nuclear Weapon Storage Sites and
Specific Weapons Stored at those Sites

Current Policy

Per topic 2121 of the DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon Production and Military Use (TCG-WPMU-1), the storage locations (specific sites) of nuclear weapons (presence of weapons confirmed) in the United States, its territories, and at sea are classified CFRD; and confirmation of the specific types of nuclear weapons stored at those locations is SFRD. (As an exception to this policy, the locations of nuclear weapons at land-based strategic missile launch sites and on board missile-launching submarines are not classified.) Per topic 2123, information revealing that an installation was formerly a storage site for nuclear weapons is Unclassified.

Findings

The ability to protect the storage locations (specific sites) of nuclear weapons, and the specific types of nuclear weapons at these locations—in the United States, its territories, or at sea—is tenuous at best, is often not protected, and is often not protectable. The DoD does not protect second-order associations that imply a specific weapon is stored at a specific storage site, but the DOE does classify these associations. Detailed information associated with former (obsolete) nuclear weapon storage sites is often needed for environmental remediation purposes, but existing classification guidelines for this information are nonexistent.

Discussion

Nuclear bombs and warheads in the DoD custody are stored by the military services in specially designed storage structures. The highly secure structures are located at military installations throughout the United States, its territories, and aboard ships at sea. The specific storage locations of nuclear weapons in the United States, its territories, and at sea, and the types of weapons stored at these sites, have historically been protected by classification. This information has been classified to deny potential adversaries information that would allow them to target, neutralize, seize, or destroy U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear components. However, the fact that nuclear weapons are located at land-based strategic missile launch sites and on board missile-launching submarines is not classified.

This information, however, has been poorly protected in the past, and is basically unprotectable. There are many indicators that provide second-order information on nuclear weapon storage locations and types of weapons stored. Included are: military convoys and other extreme security practices; bomber and other military aircraft locations, and identification of the weapons those aircraft carry being unclassified; "point-of-departure" of Joint Test Assembly flights; and travel of military, DOE, and DOE contractor personnel to specific locations to conduct specific operations. Also, nuclear weapon storage locations have often been inconsistently protected by DoD, DOE, Congress, and local politicians. While the DOE requires in-depth protection of nuclear weapon storage locations and type of weapons stored at those locations, the DoD does not protect such second-order associations; and these locations may be occasionally revealed to achieve some national or local political objective.

Per existing classification guidelines, the identification of an installation as a former storage site for nuclear weapons is unclassified, but the guidelines do not specify what additional descriptive information about these sites can be released as unclassified. Much information about these sites, however, no longer has any sensitivity for national security purposes, and is often needed for environmental restoration purposes. In addition, historians are often interested in obtaining detailed information about these sites, including the old AEC nuclear weapon storage sites known as "National Stockpile Sites," or "Operational Storage Sites." Information that should be declassified and made publicly available includes: site locations and designators (e.g., site Able); types and descriptions of building construction and site layouts, etc.; and types of weapons stored at the sites. Other information, such as numbers of weapons stored, and any site association with current nuclear weapon storage sites, would remain classified.

Recommendation

While the locations of existing nuclear weapon storage sites may need to continue to be classified, DOE should not classify second-order implications that a specific site is storing or handling a specific nuclear weapon system, such as: "point of departure" of JTA flights, or personnel travel to specific locations to discuss specific weapon systems.

Much information regarding former nuclear weapon storage sites should be declassified and made publicly available. This includes information on the old AEC nuclear weapon storage sites. Any associations between the AEC nuclear weapon storage sites and current nuclear weapon storage sites should remain classified.

Warhead Service Life

Current Policy

Per topic 1214 of TCG-WPMU-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Weapon Production and Military Use, the design goal for a nuclear weapon's service life is Unclassified, but estimated remaining life based on facts available at any given time is classified CFRD. Also, per topic 1213, the projected retirement date from the stockpile for a nuclear weapon is CFRD. This classification philosophy is often reflected in a nuclear weapon's Military Characteristics (MCs) and Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS) documents.

Findings

Continuing to classify any information related to a nuclear weapon's service lifetime appears to be no longer warranted because, as weapon lifetimes are extended, this information diminishes in its value to national security.

Discussion

The paramount reason for classifying U.S. nuclear weapon service life information has been to protect estimates of U.S. national strengths and capabilities. Also, this information could be of intelligence value to adversaries because it may reveal weaknesses or deficiencies as well as actual or projected strengths.

This national security philosophy may have been applicable to early nuclear weapon programs, when expected service lifetimes may have been as short as a few years, and as significant design improvements were being made to both the nuclear and nonnuclear parts of nuclear weapons. However, the lifetimes of modern nuclear weapons have been significantly extended through more efficient designs and improved stockpile sampling and maintenance programs, and through modernization programs.3 Also, with the end of the cold war and resulting U.S./Russia agreements, fewer types of weapons are maintained in the U.S. inventory, and no new nuclear weapons are currently being designed. Therefore, in today's world, knowing the design or expected lifetime of a nuclear weapon appears to have little or no national security value.

Recommendation

Declassify a nuclear weapon's expected or estimated service life.

Minority Opinion

Lt. Col. Edward Saunders, the DNA (now called the Defense Special Weapons Agency) Field Command Weaponization Working Group member, provided the following minority opinion: Non-concur with the Group recommendation to declassify specific warhead service life. This information indicates warhead operational performance over time. This is of military operational importance.

Weapon Retirement Numbers and Rates

Current Policy

Per topic 1213 of TCG-WPMU-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide Weapon Production and Military Use, the projected dates for nuclear weapon retirements (Phase 7) are classified CFRD, pending announcement by the DoD. Per topic 1221 of TCG-WPMU-1, the fact that a weapon is in a specific weapon program phase (e.g., Phase 7 Retirement) is unclassified.

Per topic 1131 of CG-DR-1, the DOE Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapon Disassembly and Reuse, the total number of specified weapons to be retired in any time frame is classified C/SFRD (SFRD if stockpile quantities revealed; otherwise CFRD). Per topic 1140 of CG-DR-1, the retirement rate of nuclear weapons is SFRD if stockpile quantities are revealed; and CFRD if the total number of planned retirements of specified weapons is revealed, or if the number of specified weapons retired to date is revealed.

Findings

In today's environment of international agreements and reduced nuclear weapon stockpile numbers, it is no longer necessary to classify weapon retirement numbers and rates.

Discussion

Retirement of a nuclear weapon begins when it is removed from the stockpile by the DoD and made available for return to the DOE for eventual disassembly. There are several reasons for retiring nuclear weapons, including arms control treaties, force restructuring, aging, and modernization. After transfer to the DOE, the weapons are transferred to the DOE Pantex disassembly facility where they are disassembled. The retirement phase of a nuclear weapon can last several years, and the quantity of weapons being retired can be established by arms control treaties, Acts of Congress, Presidential Proclamation, or DoD directives.

Some aspects of nuclear weapon retirements and the subsequent processes leading to final disposition may reveal sensitive nuclear weapon related information, including weapon design, stockpile capabilities, or safeguards and security. This information may be classified to avoid helping potential proliferants, hostile nations, and potential adversaries to develop, improve, or use nuclear weapons. The numbers and rates of specified weapons to be retired or being retired has been classified in some instances because it was believed this information could reveal a quantitative diminishment of the total stockpile or of a specified weapon in the stockpile, or of a quantitative estimate of new replacement weapons. In general, this information has been classified to help protect U.S. national strengths and capabilities.

When the U.S. was retiring weapon systems and replacing their capability, it seemed reasonable to classify the number of weapons retired and their rates. In today's environment, however, when the U.S. is dismantling weapons to comply with international agreements that limit nuclear warheads, and is not replacing their capability, these reasons are not longer valid. The current and planned U.S. nuclear stockpile bears no resemblance to past stockpile numbers. Also, as the weapons are sequenced through subsequent stages toward final disposition in the retirement and disassembly process, the numbers and process rates of weapons and weapon components, for various operations, become further removed from revealing any sensitive information relating to current stockpile quantities or capabilities.

Thus, while the number and rates of nuclear weapons being retired may have revealed sensitive information when the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile was robust, this is not true in today's environment of international agreements and significantly reduced nuclear weapon stockpile numbers. Knowledge of the retirement numbers and rates of nuclear weapons being dismantled does not provide assistance to proliferants or potential adversaries, and will not endanger U.S. national security.

Recommendation

Declassify weapon retirement numbers and retirement rates for nuclear weapon systems that are being dismantled.

Nuclear Weapon Quantitative Reliability Information

Current Policy

Topic 1510 of the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide on Nuclear Weapon Production and Military Use (TCG-WPMU-1) classifies numerical nuclear weapon reliability requirements, assessments, or statements (favorable or unfavorable) at SFRD.

Findings

There appear to be no known reasons to continue to protect numerical reliability requirements for nuclear weapon systems; however, the reliability assessments should continue to be protected.

Discussion

The reliability of a nuclear weapon is the probability that it will perform in accordance with its design intent or requirements. Every nuclear weapon is assigned a reliability goal or requirement, which may vary depending upon the nature or purpose of the weapon. To help verify a nuclear weapon's reliability, a great deal of testing is conducted throughout its lifetime. In addition, calculations and statistical analyses are performed for every nuclear weapon part and component, and their interactions upon each other. The result is a weapon's assessed reliability figure.

Historically, all nuclear weapon quantitative reliability requirements or assessments have been classified to protect a nuclear weapon's operational capability. While this practice may have been valid during the early 1950s when there were relatively few weapons in the stockpile and they required continuous maintenance, it no longer appears to be so for the reliability requirement. Today's nuclear weapons are designed to be highly reliable, and with the advent of the "wooden bomb" concept in the late 1950s, the need for continuous maintenance has disappeared. In fact, there may be political or other benefits to be able to reveal, on an unclassified basis, a nuclear weapon's reliability requirements.

The assessment of a nuclear weapon's reliability, however, should remain classified. This numerical value does reveal a nuclear weapon system operational capability, and the assessed reliability, for a variety of reasons, may be different from the requirement.

Recommendation

Declassify the quantitative reliability requirements for nuclear weapon systems; continue to classify the actual assessments of numerical reliability for specific nuclear weapon systems.

Nuclear Weapon Size, Shape, and Mass Properties

Current Policy

Some nuclear weapon program classification guides require the size, shape, and mass properties of nuclear weapons to be classified.

Findings

The DOE/DoD classification policy for nuclear weapon size, shape, and mass properties appears to be inconsistently applied from system to system, these parameters are often revealed during development and operational testing, and they should be declassified.

Discussion

The size, shape, and mass properties of nuclear weapons are often classified per program classification guidance requirements, although there are inconsistencies between weapon programs. The classifications of these parameters range from U to CFRD/RD to SFRD/RD. Historically, it was believed that these parameters could reveal sensitive nuclear weapon design information, e.g., physical separation between stages. However, design declassifications over the years have voided these reasons for classification. In addition, it is believed that reasonable size, shape, and mass property estimates can be determined during system development flight testing. Therefore, these parameters appear to be basically unprotectable.

Recommendation

Declassify nuclear weapon size, shape, and mass properties. (Classification of these parameters may be appropriate for advanced developments prior to flight testing.)

Minority Opinion

Lt. Col. Edward Saunders, the DNA (now called the Defense Special Weapons Agency) Field Command Weaponization Working Group member, provided the following minority opinions: Non-concur with the Group recommendation to declassify weapon size, shape, and mass properties. This information should continue to be selectively reviewed. Complete weapon physical characteristics indicate overall weapons system performance, e.g., missile throw-weight. This is of military operational importance.

WH/RV Weapon System Loadouts

Current Policy

Paragraphs in the Military Characteristics (MCs) and Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS) documents for several WH/RV systems related to maximum/minimum system loadouts and flight range are identified (paragraph marked) as containing classified information (SFRD in the W88 MCs). Current WH/RV system classification guides also classify the actual number of RVs on a specific missile, but the maximum number of RVs a specific missile can carry is not classified.

Findings

Although the actual loadout (the actual number of RVs) on an operational missile should perhaps remain classified, there doesn't seem to be a compelling reason to classify the maximum and minimum numbers. In some cases, these numbers have been declassified because they were revealed during development flight testing, or because of treaty agreements.

Discussion

Historically, system loadout information associated with strategic ballistic missile systems has been classified to protect operational system capabilities. Maximum system loadouts for these systems, however, has not been classified because this information cannot be protected once a development flight program has been conducted. There appears to be no specific guidance regarding minimum RV system loadout information. However, there also appears to be no rationale to classify this information; and minimum system loadouts may very well be subject to treaty agreements, and thus be required to be Unclassified. For instance, minimum system loadouts are required to be verifiable under START II.

Recommendation

Clarify DOE/DoD classification guidance as necessary to assure that minimum WH/RV loadout information for strategic ballistic missile systems is unclassified.

Rapidly-Selectable Yield Capability

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-23 for Discussion)

Limited-Life Component Maximum Service Life & Exchange Intervals

(See Classified Supplement Page F-C-25 for Discussion)

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

Hazardous Materials in Warheads

Current Policy

Often it is necessary to classify the presence and/or quantities of non-SNM hazardous materials in nuclear weapons because their use may reveal a sensitive physics or other requirement. Topics 928, 929, and 933 of TCG-WM-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Nuclear Materials, provide examples of this policy. Classifications range from C-SRD/FRD, based on the use or application of a specific material.

Findings

Revealing the presence and/or quantities of hazardous materials in nuclear weapons is of little or no value to a sophisticated adversary or a proliferant. How these materials are used may require protection; but their quantities and/or presence should be declassified so they can be identified in highway transportation manifests, or identified for environmental considerations at DOE facilities.

Discussion

Non-SNM hazardous materials are sometimes used in nuclear weapons to provide a specific design or use capability. Examples include: a material used for hardening purposes, or the amount of a particular material used for a specific function. It has been assumed that a knowledge of the presence of these materials, or their quantities, in weapons may reveal their use to a sophisticated adversary.

Transportation of these hazardous materials over our nation's highways, however, without identifying the materials, is becoming increasingly difficult. The Department of Energy has a transportation National Security Exemption that applies to nuclear weapons, but not to weapon components, test assemblies, or trainers.

In addition, environmental considerations at a DOE facility may require that a listing of materials used at that facility be provided to environmental remediation specialists. A solution to the Department of Transportation shipping restrictions, and facility environmental concerns, would be to allow as unclassified the association of non-SNM hazardous materials, or the identification of those materials weighing less than xx pounds, with nuclear weapons or weapon components. In addition, this revision of the current classification policy for hazardous materials would help reduce weapon production costs and simplify maintenance procedures.

Recommendation

DOE should declassify the presence of and some maximum amount of non-SNM hazardous materials that are used in nuclear weapons or weapon components. How or why these hazardous materials are used in nuclear weapons may need to remain classified, as well as their use in specified weapons.

Simulator Technology

Current Policy

Per topic 5141 of TCG-NNT-1, the Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Non-Nuclear Testing, breakthroughs representing a substantial advance in nuclear weapon effects simulator technologies or capabilities are classified CFRD pending an evaluation by DOE and DoD.

Findings

Because the outputs from a nuclear weapon simulator do not closely approximate those from a nuclear weapon, significant advances in simulator technologies or capabilities should not be automatically classified but should be evaluated before making a classification determination.

Discussion

In the occasional instance when information about nonnuclear testing of a nuclear weapon is classified, the rationale most often given is the coincidental revelation of otherwise classified nuclear weapon design or performance information. Test results can also be classified because they reveal vulnerability/hardness limitations or levels, or because they disclose a problem or deficiency that does or might degrade a current or imminent stockpile capability.

Test methodologies and equipment, including effects simulators, are not usually classified because they employ widely known technology. However, specialized test equipment that reveals classified information about the tested item must be classified accordingly.

Simulation testing requirements, levels, and results are unclassified unless they correspond to a system hardness level or result in or reveal serious degradation of a weapon part. Simulators themselves, including their designs, performance characteristics, and output capabilities, are unclassified. However, substantial advances in simulator technology are required to be protected as classified until their significance and sensitivity can be evaluated.

Nuclear weapon simulators, however, are designed to simulate a single parameter of a nuclear weapon's output (e.g., x ray, neutron, EMP), and they do not closely approximate that characteristic. In addition, they are designed to provide the greatest output (e.g., current and voltage) based on current state-of-the-art pulsed power or pulsed reactor technologies. Therefore, since simulators do not comprehensively simulate all aspects of a nuclear weapon's output, advancements in simulator technology should not automatically be classified, but their capabilities should be reviewed and a determination made whether the output closely approximates that from a nuclear weapon.

Recommendation

Classify breakthroughs representing a substantial advance in simulator technology or capabilities only when a determination is made that the output characteristics closely approximate those of a nuclear weapon.

Radiological Weapons and Warfare

Current Policy

"AEC Classification Guide for Military Application of Atomic Energy," dated January 17, 1951, defines most related information as RD. CG-SS-3, dated August 1994, classifies the specified design of a credible Radiation Dispersal Device (RDD) as U-SNSI, but notes that it might be RD. CG-WN-4, dated September 1, 1994, specified that the DOE design analysis may be RD.

Findings

The overall classification level/category for U.S.-generated radiological weapon and warfare information should be SRD and SFRD, respectively. There can, as in guides for nuclear weapons, be a range of levels from U-SRD/FRD depending on the information revealed.

Discussion

Radiological warfare can have serious consequences. Therefore, the design of radiological weapons and the techniques of their use should be protected from potential adversaries. A key question is: should radiological weapon designs—that is, designs that produce radioactive contamination without a nuclear explosion—be classified RD? From a strict interpretation of "use of atomic energy" as a weapon, it can be concluded that radioactive materials generate atomic energy when emitting energetic particles and rays. Therefore, a weapon designed to dispense radioactive material appears to meet the RD definition. Military use would fall in the FRD category. Once a DOE laboratory has analyzed a design or device originated by sources other than the U.S. Government and determined that it is, in fact, a radiological weapon, this information and hardware should also be classified as RD. Nothing in this discussion or the previous finding should be construed to mean that information on the effects of radiation on humans or related human radiation experiments should be classified.

Recommendation

That the DOE Office of Declassification issue updated guidance reaffirming that information on radiological weapons and warfare is classified RD/FRD, at levels ranging from U-S depending on the information revealed, and categories of RD (design information) or FRD/NSI (military use information).

 

Appendix F to the
Report of the
Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group

Report of the
Weaponization and Weapons Production and
Military Use Working Group

 

ANNEX C

CLASSIFIED RATIONALES FOR
SOME DECLASSIFICATION
RECOMMENDATIONS

 

January 15, 1997

 

James B. Wright, Chair
Sandia National Laboratories

 

THIS ANNEX IS CLASSIFIED AND
CANNOT BE PROVIDED HERE

 

Appendix F to the
Report of the
Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group

Report of the
Weaponization and Weapons Production and
Military Use Working Group

 

ANNEX D

PROPOSED FRD TOPIC
TRANSCLASSIFICATIONS FROM CG-W-5,
"JOINT DOE/DOD NUCLEAR WEAPON
CLASSIFICATION POLICY GUIDE"

 

January 15, 1997

 

James B. Wright, Chair
Sandia National Laboratories

 

THIS ANNEX IS CLASSIFIED AND
CANNOT BE PROVIDED HERE

 

1 A capacitor discharge unit type firing set accumulates electrical energy from a low voltage power supply, stores this energy in a high voltage capacitor bank and, upon receipt of the proper fuzing signal, delivers the energy to the weapon detonators.

2 Circumvention provides a means of reducing an electronic system's susceptibility to upset from ionizing nuclear radiation. A system's electronics are turned off when encountering ionizing radiation and turned on again when the radiation is no longer present.

3 A classic example is the B61 bomb. Variants of this nuclear weapon have been in the U.S. nuclear inventory since the mid-1960s, and its lifetime is expected to extend many years into the future.

 

Report of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review Group