Report of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review Group

Appendix H to the
Report of the
Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group

 

Report of the
Military Reactors Working Group

 

January 15, 1997

 

Captain James Alley, USN, Chair
Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND

Classification Authority

Restricted Data (RD)

Formerly Restricted Data (FRD)

National Security Information (NSI)

Threat Analysis

CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW

Working Group Membership

Independence of Review

Access to Information

Scope of the Review

Review Methodology

Classification Considerations

Factors Favoring Classification

Factors Favoring Declassification

Conclusions Regarding Classification of Information

RECOMMENDATIONS

Army Nuclear Power Program

Current Policy

Findings

Discussion

Recommendation

Directed Nuclear Energy Systems

Current Policy

Findings

Discussion

Recommendations

Space Reactor Power Systems

Current Policy

Findings

Discussion

Recommendations

Thermoelectric Converter
Isotopic Heat Source
Multihundred Watt Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator

Current Policy

Findings

Discussion

Recommendations

ANNEX A–Membership of the Military Reactors Working Group
ANNEX B–Classification Guidance

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes the results of the Military Reactors Working Group review of information classification policies associated with military reactors. This review was conducted as part of the Department of Energy (DOE) Fundamental Classification Policy Review (FCPR). The Working Group focused on classification issues associated with nuclear power sources and related technologies, and did not address the classification of specific military applications of reactor technology. The Military Reactors Working Group did not address classification policies associated with nuclear weapons science and technologies; these were reviewed by other FCPR working groups.

Military reactors are associated with the following programs:

• Army Nuclear Power Program

• Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

• Space-Related Reactor Systems, which include:

  Space Reactor Power Systems

  Directed Nuclear Energy Systems

  Thermoelectric Conversion Systems

  Isotopic Heat Source Systems

  Multihundred Watt Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generation

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) is a joint DOE-Department of the Navy organization tasked with the responsibility to design, build, operate, maintain, and manage the nuclear-powered warships and facilities supporting the U.S. nuclear-powered fleet. Classification with the program is governed by a single guide, CG-RN-1.

At the time the Fundamental Classification Policy Review began, the NNPP was already engaged in a detailed review of their classification policy. Therefore, the Military Reactors Working Group did not review CG-RN-1. The Working Group maintained a dialogue with Naval Reactors personnel and exchanged draft reports with them.

The Knolls and Bettis Atomic Power Laboratories conducted the first portion of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion review. This work consisted of an examination of each topic contained in the classification guide. Working groups at the two laboratories compared their separately formulated assessments against current guidance and the results were exchanged and reevaluated in a series of conferences until consensus was reached. A similar review was independently conducted at NNPP Headquarters. Proposed changes were then compared with those from the laboratories and the merits debated by the Division Directors until a consensus was reached on each item. The final determination was made by the Director.

Twenty-one NNPP items have been recommended for declassification or downgrading, including information on ship design, materials and metallurgy, chemistry, power plant design, and reactor servicing. To facilitate release of information concerning public health, safety, and the environment, guidance has been reemphasized to separate this information from protected information.

The Military Reactors Working Group has reviewed the NNPP Classification Review Report and considers the results consistent with the general and area-specific principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review.

The remainder of this report addresses classification policy related to those military reactors which are not associated with the NNPP.

The United States has constructed 51 military reactors, in addition to those built for the NNPP. Used primarily for testing and research, all but four non-naval military reactors have been retired. Many military reactor technologies were declassified prior to this review. However, certain aspects of a limited number of military reactor programs have remained classified to date because of their relationship to military operations and missions. The Military Reactors Working Group examined each of these programs to determine which information required continued classification protection for reasons of national security, and which information could be reasonably declassified and released to the public. The Review concentrated on the limited group of classified military reactors programs which have potential for technical advances and future military applications.

Classification in directed nuclear energy systems (DNES), isotopic heat sources, thermoelectric conversion, space reactor power systems, and related programs was based on protecting technologies that were difficult or expensive to develop and which could be used by other countries to advance their military applications and missions. The classification guides associated with these areas are jointly owned, and DOE must coordinate final declassification decisions with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as appropriate.

With full understanding of the importance of reactor technology, the review was objectively performed by a group of experienced, technically knowledgeable, senior personnel. In addition to representatives from the Department of Energy, personnel from the following organizations participated in working group deliberations:

• The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)
• The Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
• U.S. Army
• U.S. Air Force
• U.S. Navy

The Working Group sought information on potential harm to U.S. national security that might result from declassification and release of additional military reactor information. Threat summaries were provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Air Force National Air Intelligence Center.

The Working Group actively participated in formulating and refining the general and area-specific principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review.

The Working Group concluded that classification should not restrict the ability of industry to use space nuclear reactor technology for civilian applications, unless there is a clear national security concern. The Working Group believes that classification of reactor technology is appropriate only to the extent that dissemination of the information would enable or assist in the military application of space nuclear reactor technology, not in the development of the reactor technology itself. The Working Group identified the following categories of information which should be considered for classification as Restricted Data or National Security Information:

a.	Information which would assist a potential adversary to identify or exploit potential vulnerabilities of planned or existing U.S. military space systems.
b.	Information which would assist foreign powers to develop or improve advanced military systems that derive significant military utility from nuclear reactor technology.
c.	Information which may reveal classified aspects of nuclear weapons designs or technology, or other military programs.
d.	Information which must remain classified solely because of its relationship to military operations or missions.

The Working Group reviewed existing classification guidance and the 337 individual classification topics associated with this guidance. Of the total, 189 topic areas had previously been identified as unclassified. The remaining guidance and topics were reviewed for conformity with the general and applied classification principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review. The Working Group then deduced policy recommendations from the results of the topic area determinations.

The Working Group determined that relatively few reactor technologies require continued classification protection. Most of these are related to military programs or missions. It was determined that environmental, health, and safety information generated by the various military reactors programs is, and should continue to be, unclassified and available for unrestricted release to the public. Working Group recommendations are summarized below. Of the remaining classified information:

• Army Nuclear Power Program information should be declassified;

• Thermoelectric conversion technologies should be declassified;

• Several technologies associated with the Space Reactor Power Program should be classified; and

• Directed nuclear energy systems technologies should remain classified.

The Working Group made the following additional recommendations:

• When unclassified technologies, such as space reactor power systems, are used for a classified military application, the application itself, not the power source, should carry the classification.

• Declassification of existing information could be more reasonably considered if options for classifying new developments are preserved. Implementation of the recommendations in the main body of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review Report would greatly facilitate this activity.

INTRODUCTION

On March 17, 1994, as part of the Department of Energy Openness Initiative, the Secretary of Energy inaugurated the Comprehensive Fundamental Classification Policy Review. For the first time in 50 years, the Department of Energy conducted a review of information related to nuclear weapons and nuclear power to determine which information requires continued classification protection, and which information may be reasonably declassified and released to the public. The Review is a policy-level effort, from which detailed classification guidance at the topic level will be derived. This, in turn, will lead to document review and declassification of information which no longer requires protection for reasons of national security.

Over the five-decade history of the Department of Energy and its predecessors, classification policy evolved, albeit slowly, toward greater openness. The Department gradually recognized the extent to which it required public trust and support to carry out its statutory responsibilities. Evolution of the global, competitive economy produced greater pressures to release classified technologies for commercial exploitation. The end of the Cold War provided a final impetus to a more open public discourse and access to information. Protection of some nuclear reactor technology information now appears unnecessary and counterproductive.

BACKGROUND

Classification Authority

The authority to classify military reactor information derives from two sources:

• Executive Order. Information which requires protection in the interest of national security or foreign relations of the United States is designated National Security Information (NSI). Executive Order 12958 is the most recent order concerning classification.

• Atomic Energy Act of 1954. A special more restrictive type of classified information, Restricted Data is defined and governed by the Atomic Energy Act.

Restricted Data (RD)

During the early development of atomic energy, Congress recognized its special significance to national defense and security. Congress created a unique category of classified information, Restricted Data, to provide special measures for protecting atomic energy technologies.

Restricted Data is all data concerning:

• Design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons;
• Production of special nuclear material (SNM); or
• Use of SNM in the production of energy.

Unlike information classified by executive order, Restricted Data is classified by law at its inception, that is, "born classified." The Atomic Energy Act further requires that the Department of Energy determine and declassify data, within the definition of Restricted Data, which can be published without undue risk to the common defense and security. The Secretary of Energy has this authority. Restricted Data is not automatically declassified; specific action must be taken to declassify it. Once declassified, the information is no longer Restricted Data.

Formerly Restricted Data (FRD)

Section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended) designates information as "Formerly Restricted Data" (FRD), which is:

"...such data as the Commission (Department of Energy) and Department of Defense jointly determine relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and which the Commission and Department of Defense jointly determine can be adequately safeguarded as defense information..."

National Security Information (NSI)

Executive Order 12958 of 17 April 1995 prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding National Security Information (NSI). It balances the desire to inform the public concerning the Government activities with the overall requirement to protect information against unauthorized disclosure which is vital to national security and foreign relations.

Executive Order 12958 prohibits classification unless the disclosure of the specific information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Unlike atomic energy information, NSI is unclassified unless positive action is taken to classify it.

The authority for classifying information as NSI is granted by the President to the Executive Branch on an agency or organizational basis. Unlike Restricted Data, NSI may be declassified by the same department or agency having primary responsibility in the particular area of interest. The Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and NASA exercise this authority for NSI related to space-based systems.

Information may be classified as NSI under Executive Order 12958 if it falls into one of nine categories. The following are particularly germane to military reactors:

a.	Military plans, weapons, systems or operations;
b.	Foreign government information;
c.	Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
d.	United States programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; and
e.	Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security.

Threat Analysis

Information concerning potential threats to military reactors programs was provided by both the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Air Force National Air Intelligence Center. The Working Group considered the following threat evaluations as part of its deliberations:

• Space nuclear power sources have been exclusively isotopic systems since 1965. They have little strategic value since the material contained in them requires sophisticated metallurgical techniques for separation. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory estimates it would be far simpler to divert Special Nuclear Materials during processing or transporting than to recover them from military or civilian space vehicles.

• Information related to the space reactors systems will not contribute significantly to nuclear weapons proliferation.

• No country save Russia currently possesses a credible antisatellite capability.

• There is a small possibility that an increased threat to U.S. satellites could be developed by Russia or other countries. Such a capability is not likely to be based on neutralizing satellite power sources.

• Release of key information about U.S. space nuclear power systems could lead to several adverse results.

• Identification and evaluation of the mission-related characteristics of systems with military applications would result in the increased likelihood that U.S. systems could be duplicated or defeated.

• Shortening the time, resources, and development required for an adversary to rapidly field similar systems or exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. systems could have adverse results.

CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW

The purpose of this review was to perform a detailed, independent, informed classification review of information associated with military reactors technologies.

Working Group Membership

The classification policy review was objectively performed by a group of experienced, technically knowledgeable, senior personnel from several organizations, including:

• The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)
• The Department of Energy
• The Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
• U.S. Army
• U.S. Air Force
• U.S. Navy

The members of the Military Reactors Working Group are listed in Annex A.

Independence of Review

The classification policy review was independently performed by the Military Reactors Working Group members named in this report. The members took into account the institutional priorities of their respective agencies, but conducted their review independent of outside influence. The Fundamental Classification Policy Review Steering Committee was apprised of Working Group progress and provided with preliminary findings. Although the Steering Committee provided guidance for the purpose of consistency in areas of overlap between the working groups, they did not attempt to influence the outcome. Consequently, the opinions expressed in this report are solely those of the Military Reactors Working Group.

Access to Information

Working Group members enjoyed full access to all materials and information necessary for their review. Subject to classification restraints, the members were free to consult other technical experts for topic information or recommendations. Due principally to the selection of Working Group members with extensive knowledge and experience, the Working Group was able to address most issues with little to no outside assistance.

Scope of the Review

Information concerning use of SNM in the production of energy for space-based systems is Restricted Data, unless previously declassified. All information necessary for the design, construction, and operation of civilian power reactors, with the exception of that information primarily applicable to military propulsion, production reactors, or Army Package Power Reactors, was declassified in 1956.

Many military reactor technologies had been declassified prior to this review. However, certain aspects of a limited number of military reactor programs have remained classified to date because of their relationship to military operations and missions. The Military Reactors Working Group examined each of these programs to determine which information required continued classification protection for reasons of national security, and which information could be reasonably declassified and released to the public. The Military Reactors Working Group concentrated on the limited group of classified military reactors programs which have potential for technical advances and future military applications.

The Military Reactors Working Group conducted a classification policy review of the following categories of reactors:

• Army Nuclear Power Program

• Space-Related Systems, which include:

  Space Reactor Power Systems

  Directed Nuclear Energy Systems

  Thermoelectric Conversion Systems

  Isotopic Heat Source Systems

  Multihundred Watt Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generation

The Review did not address information associated with the following categories of reactors:

• Air Force Technology Development Reactors. These reactors were associated with now-retired programs, such as the nuclear-powered airplane, the nuclear ramjet, and other related programs. All information concerning these programs had been declassified prior to the start of this study.

• Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) Reactors. The NNPP study started before the Fundamental Classification Policy Review began. The Military Reactors Working Group exchanged drafts with Headquarters, Naval Reactors, and reviewed the NNPP Classification Review Report. The Military Reactors Working Group feels that the NNPP report is consistent with the general and area-specific principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review.

• Test and Research Reactors. Many of these reactors were built over the years, of which four remain operational. Their purpose is related to materials testing and other research applications. The reactors themselves are unclassified, but some of the work involving these reactors may be classified.

Review Methodology

The Working Group sought information on potential harm to U.S. national security that might result from declassification and release of additional military reactor information. Threat summaries were provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Air Force National Air Intelligence Center.

The Working Group actively participated in formulating and refining the general and area-specific principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review.

The Working Group reviewed existing classification guidance and the 337 individual classification topics associated with this guidance. Of the total, 189 topic areas had previously been identified as unclassified; these topic areas were not further evaluated. The remaining guidance and topics were reviewed for conformity with the general and applied classification principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review. A listing of classification guidance sources used during this review is provided in Annex B.

Classification topics areas were divided among Working Group members. All members, in turn, were encouraged to consult other individuals who might be knowledgeable about military or civilian applications of specific technologies. For information requiring continued protection for national security reasons, Working Group members made a further determination whether information should be classified as Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, or National Security Information. The Working Group compared its findings with existing classification guidance. Where there were differences, the members evaluated why a change in classification guidance might be appropriate. Finally, the Working Group then deduced policy recommendations from the results of the topic area determinations.

No topic area was recommended for reclassification. In some cases, the Working Group determined that classification guidance should be more specific, or combined with other guidance to present a more complete picture.

The Working Group determined that relatively few military reactor technologies require continued classification protection. Most of these are related to military programs or missions. It was determined that environmental, health, and safety information generated by the various military reactors programs was already, and should continue to be, unclassified and available for unrestricted release to the public.

Working Group recommendations are provided later in this report.

Classification Considerations

The Working Group considered several classification factors during its deliberations.

Factors Favoring Classification

• The more crucial an item of information is to our nation's success, the greater its importance may be to a potential adversary, and the more important becomes the time advantage that may be gained through its classification.

• Releasing information related to certain space-based reactor power system technologies could expose vulnerabilities in U.S. military space applications to potential adversaries.

• Some military reactor concepts and technologies, if released, could increase the capability of potential adversaries to produce military systems similar to U.S. applications.

• Information which may not be sensitive of itself could lead to correlation or inadvertent disclosure of classified information. This could provide insights or might assist an adversary to solve a technical problem, to the detriment of U.S. national security.

• It would be beneficial to national security if a potential adversary could be required to expend at least as much time, effort, and resources to duplicate U.S. military applications of reactor technologies as the United States expended in its initial development.

• Certain information concerning Army reactors has been classified to prevent technical correlation between Army reactors and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program reactors, which remains classified. Other information concerning the location and usage of army reactors was classified for site security and political sensitivity considerations.

Factors Favoring Declassification

• National Security Information classification is specifically prohibited from use to:
  • Conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error;

  • Prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;

  • Restrain competition;

  • Prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security; or

  • Classify basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security.

• Declassification reduces the cost of handling and safeguarding the information

• Declassification fosters independent review of basic scientific research. Declassification could broaden the industrial base and stimulate technical development.

• Declassification promotes public awareness and trust.

Conclusions Regarding Classification of Information

The Working Group based its deliberations upon the general and area-specific classification principles of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review. The Working Group concluded that classification should not restrict the ability of industry to use space nuclear reactor technology for civilian applications, unless there is a clear national security concern. The Working Group believes that classification of reactor technology is appropriate only to the extent that dissemination of the information would enable or assist in the military application of space nuclear reactor technology, not in the development of the reactor technology itself.

The Working Group identified the following categories of information which should be considered for classification as Restricted Data or National Security Information:

• Information which would assist a potential adversary to identify or exploit potential vulnerabilities of planned or existing U.S. military space systems.

• Information which would assist foreign powers to develop or improve advanced military systems that derive significant military utility from nuclear reactor technology.

• Information which may reveal classified aspects of nuclear weapons designs or technology, or other military programs.

• Information which must remain classified solely because of its relationship to military operations or missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Army Nuclear Power Program

Current Policy

Most Army Nuclear Power Program information has already been declassified. The remaining classified information primarily concerns military missions and operations and is protected as National Security Information (NSI).

Reservation is made for protecting "breakthroughs," defined as new developments which are not predictable qualitatively, even by a person trained in the appropriate disciplines, or which permit an order of magnitude increase in performance or capability.

Findings

The Army Nuclear Power Program was developed to field mobile and stationary small-to-medium nuclear electrical generating plants for use in remote areas. For example, one mobile Army nuclear power plant was deployed as the emergency electrical power supply for the Panama Canal.

There are no Army nuclear electrical generating plants in use or under development.

Some Army Nuclear Power Program information has been protected because declassification might reveal details of related classified programs, such as the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program.

The Navy has concluded that declassification of Army Nuclear Power Program information is not likely to reveal significant information about the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program.

The Army concurs with the complete declassification of the Army Nuclear Power Program.

Discussion

There is no apparent reason why the Army Nuclear Power Program cannot be completely declassified.

Recommendation

The Army Nuclear Power Program should be declassified in its entirety, including:

• Power plant details;

• Documents, photographs, drawings, and maps detailing the purpose, locations, and projects for which power plants may have been operated;

• Assessments of the value of energy depots or power plant operations; and

• Programmatic information, including budgets and schedules for power plant operations.

Directed Nuclear Energy Systems

Current Policy

The following information associated with directed nuclear energy systems (DNES) is unclassified:

• That DNES is the use of controlled (nonexplosive) nuclear reactions for the generation of a directed energy beam.

• Basic physics information of controlled fission and lasers, including the association of any unclassified reactor or laser with the DNES program.

• That a particular laser is used or under consideration for use.

• DNES research using power levels and configurations unsuitable for military application or development.

• DNES research that will not substantially assist others in development of DNES, contribute to feasibility assessment of DNES development, or reveal the direction of DNES research.

• Previously published work and future work not directed toward, nor suitable for, military application.

The following detailed DNES information regarding military applications is protected as Restricted Data (RD):

• Detailed DNES design information on the controlled fission portion of the system.

• Details of how a controlled fission source is used to pump a laser in a DNES.

• Nuclear design information revealing or describing a significant technology advance which could greatly hasten or alter concept verification or weaponization.

• Fuel isotopic composition in a DNES and power source performance.

The following DNES information regarding military applications is protected as National Security Information (NSI):

• Specific quantitative energy beam characteristics, composition, or other details of the lasing medium (RD if nuclear design information is revealed).

• Designs of the laser portion of a DNES military application.

• Basic laser research designs directed toward a military application of a DNES.

• Programmatic and budget information associated with classified military applications.

• Information which might assist others to develop DNES, contribute to feasibility assessment, or reveal the direction of the DNES program.

Findings

The current guidance was approved in August 1987. It differentiates between military and nonmilitary use of reactor and laser technologies, and stipulates that safety and environmental data should be unclassified, except where classified information could be revealed.

Discussion

The current policy appears adequate, but could be misinterpreted as requiring classification of basic information which is unrelated to development of military applications.

Recommendations

The current classification policy concerning DNES, as described above, should remain in effect.

DNES classification guidance should be revised to provide clarification and stronger differentiation between DNES research conducted for military applications and research which is not suitable for military applications development.

Space Reactor Power Systems

Current Policy

All technology developed prior to August 27, 1973, concerning space reactor power systems is unclassified. Additionally, space reactor power systems information publicly released prior to February 1, 1987, is also unclassified.

Release of information pertaining to the enabling characteristics of space reactor power systems could allow adversaries to duplicate system design characteristics or exploit weaknesses.

Information concerning the reactor power supply, specifically multimegawatt (MMW) or particle bed reactor designs, is protected as Restricted Data.

Theoretical and basic reactor system information has essentially been declassified.

Information concerning military application of space reactor power system technology is protected as NSI on a case-by-case basis; but, for the most part, administrative, budgetary, programmatic, and safety-related information is unclassified unless specific guidance has been promulgated.

Some applied technology information, while unclassified, is subject to export control.

"Key information" is defined as information that reveals aspects, features, or attributes of space reactor power system concepts or technologies that:

(1)	Are innovative—not obvious, unexpected, or difficult or time-consuming to duplicate;
	AND
(2)	Permit either a significant technical advancement or resolution to a significant technical problem.

NOTE:

A significant technical advance is defined as an advance of sufficient magnitude to have a potential use in an operational or advanced system, and results in a significant developmental or military advantage.

Findings

Space reactor power systems technology is not undergoing a major development effort. While major advances are not foreseen in the immediate future, systems which employ the existing technology might be useful for military missions and operations.

One space reactor power system, the SP-100 Program, advanced to the engineering development phase of the ground engineering system (GES). The MMW and the particle bed reactor programs did not complete the technical feasibility phase of development.

Space reactor power system areas protected as Restricted Data concern specific MMW and particle bed reactor designs which resulted from Phase I development, and fuel fabrication methods and test data which reveal phenomena associated with fuel performance or lifetime.

Information concerning the integration of thermoelectric conversion materials with nuclear reactor fuels is also protected as Restricted Data, but is classified under guidance prescribed for both thermoelectric converter and space reactor power systems information.

Discussion

The definition of "key information" lends itself to underclassification of information since, under strict interpretation, the requirement for a technical advance, as defined above, can seldom be met. Had these systems completed more advanced testing, classification criteria likely would have matured with system development.

Given the lack of ongoing development programs, a technical advance in space reactor power systems technology, as defined above, is not likely to happen in the near future. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to classify specific space reactor power system technologies; namely, their potential usefulness for military missions, and the level of effort required for their development.

The basic classification policy, while sound, lends itself to inconsistency of definition. Existing guidance at the topic level simply refers the reader back to the definition of "key information."

Recommendations

As programs advance, the definition of "key information" should be refined to more accurately describe those aspects, features, or attributes significant to achieving military advantage which require continued classification protection. Likewise, as programs advance, those aspects, features, or attributes which do not contribute to gaining or retaining military advantage should be declassified.

Basic physical, mechanical, chemical, and thermochemical properties of fuel, such as thermal conductivity, thermal expansion, creep characteristics, high-temperature strength and ductility, phase diagrams, and electrical conductivity, are and should remain unclassified.

The potential usefulness for military missions justifies continuing classification protection for some aspects of space reactor power systems.

Detailed information on fabrication, process parameters, and testing of uranium nitride fuels and particle bed reactors, and test information which reveals key information related to performance limits or lifetime-limiting phenomena, should be protected as Restricted Data.

Information concerning integration of thermoelectric materials with nuclear reactor fuels should be considered in conjunction with space reactor power systems and reviewed for continued classification as Restricted Data, dependent upon program advances.

Information concerning multimegawatt and other baseline space reactor power systems designs should be reviewed for declassification. Priorities for review should be given to those technologies which might prove useful to NASA.

Space reactor impact points may be classified, if needed to protect recovery of nuclear materials or sensitive components, until recovery is completed. Decisions to classify orbital parameters should be made by the office having primary responsibility for the mission.

Information concerning integration of thermoelectric materials with nuclear reactor fuels should be considered in conjunction with space reactor power systems and reviewed for continued classification, dependent upon program advances.

When unclassified space reactor power systems are used for classified military missions or operations, the mission itself, not the power source, should carry the classification.

Thermoelectric Converter

Isotopic Heat Source

Multihundred Watt Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator

Current Policy

Current guidance provides Restricted Data (RD) protection to:

• Information concerning design, fabrication, testing, and operation of nuclear reactors which have fuel elements with integrated thermoelectric conversion materials.

• Identification, composition, and properties of materials whose permeability in a specified temperature range is greater than unmodified vitreous quartz and which act as a selective venting medium. (The concept of selective venting, as applied to isotopic heat sources, is unclassified.)

The following information is currently protected as National Security Information (NSI):

• Details of composition, capabilities, and properties of thermoelectric materials having a product of Figure of Merit and absolute temperature (ZT) exceeding 1.8 at 700ºK. (Items of information which do not contribute to attainment of a ZT exceeding 1.8 at 700ºK are unclassified.)

• Information revealing advanced performance, design, fabrication techniques, methods of incorporation of a radioisotopic heat source and thermoelectric materials, and high performance thermal insulators.

• Information concerning hardening against nuclear weapons effects.

• Information related to military missions and operations.

Reservation is made for protecting "breakthroughs," defined as significant technical advances not predictable qualitatively, even by persons trained in appropriate disciplines; or technical advances that permit an order of magnitude increase in performance and capability.

Findings

ZT exceeding 1.8 at 700ºK has not been achieved. Existing thermal conversion technologies are unclassified.

Thermoelectric conversion and isotopic heat source technologies are not undergoing a major development effort and major advances are not likely in the near future. The technologies remain useful for both military and civilian applications.

Discussion

The primary reason for classification of thermoelectric conversion and isotopic heat source technologies appears to be their potential usefulness for military missions.

Breakthroughs in thermoelectric conversion and isotopic heat source technologies are not likely. The advantages of working on an unclassified basis appear better than classifying technology that may not be further developed.

Information from other programs should be protected in accordance with guidance specific to those programs; however, classification of similar technologies should be consistent.

Future advancements and application of these advancements to military missions and operations may require consideration for classification should they be developed.

Recommendations

Classification of information concerning the integration of thermoelectric conversion materials with nuclear reactor fuels should be considered as part of the overall classification policy for Space Reactor Power Systems.

Information concerning nonselective venting, as applied to isotopic heat sources, should be declassified.

Information concerning selective venting should be declassified as related nuclear weapons program technology is declassified.

When unclassified radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) are used for classified missions or operations, the mission itself, not the RTG, should carry the classification.

Military applications of unclassified technologies should be classified as NSI only as required to protect military operations and missions.

• When aspects of military missions or operations, such as the details of hardening against nuclear weapons effects, are classified, the mission, not the technology, should carry the classification.

• Even in classified programs, data which might prove useful to NASA and other nonmilitary programs should be reexamined to determine if some of this information could be reasonably declassified.

Breakthroughs, as defined above, or technologies with demonstrated potential for breakthroughs, should be considered for classification, dependent upon program advances.

Subject to the above, the remaining classified information related to thermoelectric conversion, isotopic heat source, and multihundred watt radioisotope thermoelectric generator technologies should be declassified and released to the public.

Classification guidance for thermoelectric conversion, isotopic heat source, and multihundred watt radioisotope thermoelectric generator technologies should be consolidated.

ANNEX A

Membership of the Military Reactors Working Group

Organization	Member
Joint Chiefs of Staff Nuclear Policy Division	Capt. John Shaw, U.S. Navy Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff Nuclear Policy Division	Capt James Alley Alternate Chairman
Office of the Secretary of Defense Technical Readiness Directorate Defense Nuclear Agency (now called the Defense Special Weapons Agency)	Capt. Fred Nichols, U.S. Air Force
U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency	Lt. Colonel John Bliss, U.S. Army
U.S. Air Force Nuclear Surety, Weapons, and Space Safety Directorate, Headquarters, Air Force Safety Agency	Lt. Colonel Marcia Thornton, U.S. Air Force
Department of Energy Technical Guidance Division, Office of Declassification	Dr. Mortimer I. Kay
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	Ms. Mary Kicza

ANNEX B

Classification Guidance

Classification Guide	Topic
CG-DNES-1	Joint DOE/DoD Classification Guide for Directed Nuclear Energy Systems
CG-IHS-4	Classification Guide for Isotopic Heat Source Information
CG-MHW-2	Classification Guide for the Multihundred Watt Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator Program
CG-RAR-5	DOE–DoD Classification Guide For The Army Nuclear Power Program
CG-SRPS-1	Space Reactor Power Systems
CG-TE-2	DOE–DoD-NASA Classification Guide for Thermoelectric Converter Information
Classification Bulletin	Topic
SP-20	Declassification of Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion Technology
SP-21	Classification of Heat Source Reentry Impact Points
SP-23	Space Nuclear Systems Safety Information
SP-24	PIPE Experiment: Particle Bed Fuel Concept