a. The establishment and management of an interagency mechanism (the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC)) and implementing procedures.

b. The promulgation of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, and other guidance governing decisions on the disclosure of CMI.

c. The continuing review of intelligence and the conduct of on-site surveys to determine the capability of foreign recipients to provide CMI the requisite degree of security protection.

d. The submission of an annual report to the NSC covering the highlights of the program, including exceptions to policy that were approved during the reported year.

e. The negotiation of General Security Agreements (GSAs) or other bilateral security arrangements with foreign governments, outlining the responsibilities of both parties pertaining to the safeguarding of classified information provided by the other party. These agreements are described under Section H, below.

f. The development and issuance of instructional guidance to be uniformly applied by all personnel involved in any manner with international programs through which classified military information (CMI) may be disclosed.

a. Category 1 - Organization, Training And Employment Of Military Forces. Military information of a general nature necessary to the organization of military, paramilitary or irregular forces. It includes those tactics, techniques and tactical doctrine (including military intelligence and counterintelligence doctrine and techniques) necessary to train and employ those forces. This category does not include specific technical data and training needed to operate and maintain individual items of military material and munitions.

b. Category 2 - Military Materiel And Munitions. All military materiel, arms and munitions procured and controlled by the U.S. Government for the equipage, operation, maintenance and support of its military forces or the military, paramilitary or irregular forces of its allies. This category includes items developed by U.S. private interests as a result of U.S. Government contracts or derived from technology paid for by the U.S. Government. Items on the USML proposed for sale by U.S. private interests under the ITAR (reference c) or items specifically covered by other U.S. Government prescribed export control regulations fall within this definition. (Items under development fall under Category 3.) This category also comprises information to include technical data and training necessary to operate, maintain or support specific military materiel, arms or munitions. It does not include information and techniques used to produce, coproduce or manufacture the item.

c. Category 3 - Applied Research And Development Information. Classified military information resulting from the extension of fundamental theories, designs and data from purely theoretical or experimental investigation into possible military applications. This includes research, the construction and testing of prototypes and design changes affecting qualitative performance during the service life of an item. This also includes engineering data, general operational requirements, concepts and military characteristics required to adopt the item for production. Development ceases when materiel has completed operational suitability testing or has for all practical purposes been adopted for military use or production. It includes tactics, techniques and tactical doctrine pertaining to specific equipment not yet in production or not yet approved for adoption of U.S. forces. It includes military information, materiel or munitions under development by U.S. private interests as a result of U.S. Government contracts, or derived from technology paid for by the U.S. Government.

d. Category 4 - Production Information. Designs, drawings, chemical and mathematical equations, specifications, models, manufacturing techniques, software source code and related information (excluding Category 2 and 3 information) necessary to manufacture or substantially upgrade military materiel and munitions. The following information is furnished to further clarify the definition of Production Information:

e. Category 5 - Combined Military Operations, Planning And Readiness. That information necessary to plan, assure readiness for and provide support to the achievement of mutual force development goals or participation in specific combined tactical operations and exercises. Includes installations and facilities located within territory under the jurisdiction of, or of direct concern to, the recipient foreign government or international organization. This category is limited to that information on installations and facilities as well as readiness, planning and operational information which is necessary to further specific multilateral or bilateral plans and agreements for common defense purposes between the United States and the recipient. It does not include strategic planning and guidance or North American Defense information.

f. Category 6 - U.S. Order Of Battle. Information pertaining to U.S. forces located within territory which is under the jurisdiction of a recipient government or is otherwise of direct concern to a foreign government or international organization. In general, authorization is limited to U.S. Order of Battle in the recipient countries or in adjacent geographical areas.

g. Category 7 - North American Defense. North American Defense Information is that which concerns plans, programs, projects, operations and certain specific technical data pertaining to equipment directly related to North American Defense, especially when it is originated by or under the mission and control of the Space Command (formerly the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)). North American Defense Information includes, but is not limited to:

h. Category 8 - Military Intelligence. Information of a military character pertaining to foreign nations. This category of information does not include national intelligence or sensitive compartmented information under the purview of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

1. Classified information the disclosure of which is prohibited by Federal law or international agreement.

2. Naval nuclear propulsion information, except under an agreement negotiated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (reference g).

3. Proprietary information owned by private firms or citizens without the owner's consent. If release is authorized by legislation, that legislation will govern the release. (Note: While the private firm may retain property rights, foreign disclosure of any classified information is governed by the NDP-1.)

4. National or interdepartmental intelligence produced within the National Foreign Intelligence Board structure without the permission of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

5. National security telecommunications and information systems security information (INFOSEC), communications security (COMSEC) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). The National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC) controls the release of INFOSEC. The Director of Central Intelligence SIGINT Committee controls the release of SIGINT information. Information that has been sanitized to delete the controlled INFOSEC and SIGINT information is governed by NDP-1.

6. Operational counterintelligence information, the disclosure of which is the responsibility of the DCI

7. Atomic information, disclosures of which are made in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group (JAIEG) organized under the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) is responsible for reviewing these releases.

8. Strategic planning and guidance. Only the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may authorize the disclosure of this information.

a. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

b. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

d. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.

e. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence.

f. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

g. The Director, National Security Agency/Central Security Service.

a. Controlling disclosures within their respective Component.

b. Ensuring the competency of subordinate officials appointed as designated disclosure officials.

c. Ensuring coordination of their proposed disclosure actions with other DoD Components having a joint or shared interest in the information.

d. Appointing a member and alternate to represent their Component on the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC).

e. Ensuring that their Component enters disclosure decisions into the Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information System (FORDTIS) in accordance with DoD Instruction 5230.18 (reference nn).

f. Coordinating requests for disclosures of CMI involved in litigation with the DoD or Component General Counsel, as appropriate.

g. Ensuring that persons traveling overseas receive disclosure guidance and are knowledgeable of and comply with overseas travel policy in DoD 5200.1-R, (reference oo).

a. The proposed disclosure is in support of a lawful and authorized Government purpose.

b. Their Component is the originator of the information. If another DoD Component or U.S. Government Department is the originator, the request or proposal must be forwarded to that Component or Department for a decision.

c. The disclosure meets all disclosure criteria (see Subsection 2, below).

d. The classification level of the CMI does not exceed the classification level that has been delegated for the subject matter category and specific nation or organization as described in Annex A, NDP-1 or Component implementing regulations or Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter (DDL).

e. The disclosure is consistent with applicable Disclosure Policy Statements in Annexes B and C, NDP-1.

f. Other DoD Components having joint or shared interest in the information must be consulted and agree to the disclosure.

a. A decision to disclose CMI must satisfy each of the following five criteria. Failure to satisfy any one of the criteria is cause for denial unless the proponent of the disclosure believes disclosure would result in a clearly defined benefit to the United States and an exception to the NDP is obtained as described in Section G, below. The criteria are:

a. Once the decision has been made that CMI can be disclosed to a foreign government or international organization, actual release is dependent upon the recipient agreeing to certain minimal conditions. These conditions are:

b. If there is a general security agreement (see Section H., below) with the intended recipient government, the above conditions normally will be satisfied by the terms of that agreement. Therefore, for bilateral government-to-government programs (e.g., FMS, coproduction, cooperative research and development) the security requirement normally can be satisfied by referencing the applicable security agreement in the sales contract or program agreement. However, in those cases where there is no security agreement with the intended recipient government, and in the case of commercial sales, other solutions are necessary, as described below.

c. When there is no general security agreement or equivalent agreement with the intended recipient government, the specific security conditions must be included in the government sales contract or program agreement, or in a separate program security agreement. The contract or agreement must specify that the security conditions will apply as long as the recipient has the U.S. information or system in its custody.

d. Requests for commercial export authorizations that will involve the transfer of significant military equipment (see definitions) or classified information must be accompanied by a Department of State form DSP-83, Non-transfer and use Certificate, with all items properly completed and signed. If classified information is involved, the form must be signed by an official of a foreign government agency that has the authority to commit the government to compliance with the certification contained therein (see Sections 124.10 and 125.3(a) of the ITAR. The foreign end-user should be consulted to identify the responsible government agency. The signature of an appropriate foreign government official is accepted as recognition that the transfer is for government purposes and, therefore, that the classified material will be protected in compliance with a general security agreement, or other legally binding government-to-government security agreement with the recipient government. However, if there is no general security agreement or other government-to-government agreement containing required security principles, such agreement will be necessary prior to the transfer of the material. This can be achieved by an exchange of diplomatic notes or by a security MOU for the specific transaction. The CSO or U.S. designated government representative will provide information to contractors on the existence of specific agreements, as required. If a foreign government refuses to sign the Form DSP-83, citing an existing agreement as the basis for its refusal, that government should be requested to contact the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls, in writing, through its embassy in Washington, DC to address the requirement. The correspondence must cite the pertinent agreement and certify that the material to be transferred is for government purposes and will be protected in compliance with the cited agreement.

a. Classified information officially obtained from a foreign government may not be disclosed unless the originating government specifically agrees in writing to further disclosure.

b. Combined military information may not be disclosed unless all parties agree in writing.

c. Joint information may not be disclosed without prior written agreement of all Departments and Agencies having control or jurisdiction.

d. Information originated by or for another Department or Agency may not be disclosed unless that Department or Agency consents in writing to the disclosure.

e. Disclosures of intelligence information shall be governed by the requirements of section I, subparagraph 5.c.(2) and section II, subparagraph 5.b.(7) of NDP-1. (NOTE: These requirements are classified and therefore cannot be described in this Handbook.)

f. Disclosure under subparagraph a. through c., above, must be reported to the Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information System (FORDTIS) by the organization that makes the disclosure; disclosures under subparagraphs d. and e. must be reported by the organization that authorizes the disclosure. The FORDTIS is discussed in paragraph 8, below.

a. NDP-1 prohibits creating false impressions of the U.S. Government's readiness to make available CMI, including classified equipment and technology. Accordingly, proposals to or discussions with representatives of foreign governments and international organizations which result from either U.S. or combined initial planning and which will lead to the eventual disclosure of classified military equipment, technology, or information, including intelligence threat data or countermeasures information, must be authorized in advance by designated disclosure officials in the Departments and Agencies originating the information, or if the disclosure of any CMI to be involved will require an exception to NDP-1, by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense or the NDPC, in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.11.

b. DoD Directive 2100.3 (reference pp) prohibits "*** an individual representing the U.S. [from making] commitments, express or implied, to furnish funds, including long term credit arrangements, goods or services to foreign governments (the terms foreign government and foreign official shall include officials of any international organization or supra-national authority as well as of any foreign national government) without:

a. FORDTIS is an automated system used to staff and record cases and provide reference data support in fulfilling Department of Defense responsibilities assigned by the NDP-1, the AECA, and the EAA (reference e). It supports the implementation of departmental policies contained in DoD Directive 2040.2, (reference qq, DoD Directive 5230.11, DoD Directive C-5230.23 (reference q), and DoD Instruction 5230.20, (reference ff). Decisions on the release of CMI; liaison officer certifications; personnel exchanges; munitions, Commerce Control List (CCL), and international export control regime license applications whwn they are required; and NDP exception cases (NDPE) are recorded in FORDTIS. Foreign government visit requests are processed and recorded in the separate Foreign Visit System (FVS).

b. The purpose of FORDTIS is to assist decision-makers and analysts in reviewing, coordinating and reaching decisions on proposals to release classified military information and technology to foreign nations and international organizations. If the system is to satisfy this purpose, the reporting requirements of DoD Instruction 5230.18 must be satisfied by all DoD components.

a. General members have a broad interest in all aspects of Committee deliberations and therefore, vote on all issues that come before the committee. They are:

b. Special members have a significant interest in some, but not all, aspects of committee deliberations. They normally vote only on those issues in which they have a direct interest. They are:

a. A proposed disclosure may not satisfy NDP disclosure criteria described in subparagraph E.2., above.

b. The proposed disclosure may be inconsistent with one or more of the policy statements in Annexes B and C in NDP-1.

c. The classification assigned to the information to be disclosed may exceed the delegated disclosure authority level in NDP-1.

d. The proposed recipient cannot comply with the conditions listed in section E.3., above.

e. The information to be disclosed may be under the jurisdiction of, or shared by another Department or Agency which does not support the disclosure.

1. The GSA, negotiated through diplomatic channels, requires each party to the agreement to afford to the classified information provided by the other substantially the same degree of security protection afforded it by the releasing government. (Note: It is for this reason that, in some cases, foreign government information must be protected differently than U.S. classified information.) It contains provisions concerning limits on the use of each government's information, including restrictions on third party transfers and proprietary rights. It provides for the reporting of losses or compromises or possible losses or compromises of classified information. It does not commit governments to share classified information, and the existence of such an agreement with a particular country does not constitute authority to release classified material to that government. It does commit each government to protect the other's classified information if a decision is made to provide the information. It also satisfies, in part, the eligibility requirements of the AECA (reference b) concerning the agreement of the recipient government to protect U.S. classified defense articles and technical data.

2. The Industrial Security Agreement is negotiated by the DoD as an annex to the GSA with those foreign governments with which DoD has entered into arrangements involving industry participation, such as the reciprocal procurement agreements. Other Federal Departments and Agencies also may be a party to this agreement. It includes provisions for information handling, security classification guidance, visits, and the exchange of security assurances, and it designates a responsible government agency to administer the agreement. Authority to negotiate the agreements and to negotiate amendments or approve exceptions to the provisions of these agreements rests with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). The Director, DIS, has been delegated authority to administer implementation of the provisions of this agreement.

a. Personnel security, including clearance and investigations.

b. All aspects of document and information control, including the use of U.S. information, the flow of information from national level to user, and methods to protect the information and restrict access to properly cleared persons.

c. Physical security.