1. The term "bigot" is said to have been coined during World War II, with reference to the controls on information sent TO GIBRALTAR, or TOGIB, reversed as BIGOT.

2. The Executive Order on classification allows Agency heads to create Special Access Programs to control access distribution and protection of particularly sensitive information. These include DoD Special Access Programs (SAPs), the DCI's Sensitive Compartmented Information Programs, and other information controlled by access lists. This includes CIA human source and operational information and Joint Chiefs of Staff war plans.

3. Acquisition programs for the protection of sensitive research, development, test and evaluation, or procurement activities in support of sensitive military and intelligence requirements.

Intelligence programs for the protection of planning sensitive intelligence or counterintelligence operations or for the collection and exploitation of intelligence.

Operations and Support programs for the protection of planning and executing sensitive military operations or providing sensitive support to non-DoD departments and agencies.

4. Acknowledged programs are those which are acknowledged to exist, although the public may not be aware of the Special Access Program. Details of the program are under special protective controls.

Unacknowledged programs are those of which the mere existence of the Special Access Program is protected from all within government and industry who have not been determined to have a need-to-know. Knowledge of the existence of the program could endanger its success.

5. The current sentencing guidelines illustrate this confusion. The guidelines are based on the assumption, codified in the executive order on classified information, that the disclosure of Top Secret information will cause greater damage than the disclosure of Secret information. Under the existing guidelines a person will receive a more severe sentence for disclosing Top Secret than for disclosing Secret information. However, information protected as Secret SAP is often much more sensitive than "collateral" (i.e. non-SAP) Top Secret. Thus, the current sentencing guidelines could result in a person receiving a lighter sentence than is justified by the harm caused by the disclosure. The sentencing guidelines must be rewritten to reflect the classification system recommended by the Commission.

6. WNINTEL: Warning Notice- Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved ORCON: Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator NO FORN: Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals REL: Authorized for Release to (Name of country(ies) or international organization).

7. NO CONTRACT: Not Releasable to Contractors or Consultants PROPIN: Caution- Proprietary Information Involved

8. Commissioner Lapham's remarks on secrecy agreements are contained in Appendix A.

9. It is not clear how many pages of information are involved. Some of these documents may consist of one or two pages, others may be much longer documents. This is important because the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which together account for between 84 to 87 percent of those classification actions, report that an experienced reviewer is able to review approximately 200 pages of classified documents per day. (We are informed by DoD that during its review of MIA/POW documents an experienced reviewer was able to review about 200 pages of material per day, but that the average rate of declassification could be as low as 75 to 100 pages per person per day.) Based upon this data we estimate that an experienced reviewer, working an average of 240 days per year and reviewing an average of 200 pages per day could review 48,000 pages per year. Assuming an average of three pages per document or 18 million pages per year, it would require 375 reviewers to review a single year's product. Assuming an average grade of GS-12 (about $43,000 per year), this review would cost in excess of $16 million in direct salary costs. This does not take into account the additional administrative costs, for example, of finding the documents and all of the copies. Moreover, creating a governmentwide computer data base and entering all classification and declassification decisions will be a difficult and expensive undertaking.

10. 1993 Status Report on the Implementation of National Security Directive 47.

11. PERSEREC has proposed that the NAC be expanded to include all current NAC inquiries plus checks of other national automated databases. For example, the Title 31 data base maintained by the Treasury Department contains information on large and/or suspicious currency transactions that merchants and individuals are required to file with Treasury. These publicly available databases can provide investigators with leads concerning unexplained affluence and/or an important counterintelligence indicator that can be difficult to detect through traditional credit checks. Searches of these databases also can be automated such that investigators are notified only when certain thresholds are reached.

12. Based on OPM figures.

13. Commissioner ChayesU supplemental view on procedural safeguards is contained in Appendix B.

14. Commissioner Lapham's remarks on the polygraph are contained in Appendix C.

15. "Polygraph" is Greek for "many writings," reflecting the multiple readings that are recorded simultaneously. The instrument-which was basically developed by 1949-measures physiological changes in response to questions.

16. NRO and CIA have approximately 40,000 contractors who have access and who have never been polygraphed.

17. The goals of the program are to:

(a) provide an arsenal of valid and reliable security and applicant screening tests based on scientific evaluation of existing tests in comparison with new tests;

(b) eliminate privacy-invading or personally offensive control questions;

(c) evaluate a variety of sensors, transducers, and recording devices to establish the most effective and noninvasive physiological data collection systems;

(d) develop algorithms that provide valid and reliable diagnostic results for each screening test that meets acceptable levels of validity;

(e) develop countermeasure detection algorithms for all screening tests;

(f) evaluate the effectiveness and utility of applicant screening tests;

(g) determine the deterrent effects of the screening polygraph;

(h) develop other tools for detecting deception that could be used in conjunction with or in place of the polygraph.

18. National Operations Security Doctrine, Interagency OPSEC Support Staff; January 1993.

19. Membership currently consists of representatives from the DoE, CIA, NSA, GSA, FBI, and the Secret Service.

20. The training of over 2200 government employees occurred from 1991 to 1993.

21. Examples include voting trusts proxies, special security agreements, board resolutions, and reciprocal agreements.

22. The Exxon-Florio Amendment, Section 5021 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-418), enacted August 23,1988, permits the President to halt or reverse the acquisition of a US business by a foreign firm if he believes it would harm national security in a manner not adequately addressed by other federal laws. Executive Order No. 11858, as amended, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 28, 1988), delegates to the Interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) the authority to determine when a proposed transaction warrants review, investigations, and to submit recommendations to approve, limit, or halt transactions.

23. DoD Instruction 2015.4, dated 5 Nov 63, established the DoD Mutual Weapons Development Data Exchange Program and the Defense Development Exchange Program. Cooperative efforts expanded in 1976 with the creation of the International Professional Scientist and Engineer Program, followed by the Personnel Exchange Program.

24. A two-year US Army study of the Defense Data Exchange Program found that foreign governments successfully used a variety of overt and covert collection methods to gain access to prohibited (non-releasable) classified and unclassified technologies, weapons systems, and programs.

25. The NDP establishes criteria and conditions that implement the security requirements contained in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Executive Order 12356.

26. The terms "white" and "black" are also used to describe acknowledged and unacknowledged programs respectively. Although there is no standard definition of these terms in the security lexicon, in its broadest sense, "black" refers to not only to the aspect of covertness/clandestinity of a program but also to SAPs and other special activities that impose need-to-know or access controls beyond those normally provided for Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential information. Because these terms are not clearly defined and could be considered offensive to some, the Commission encourages the use of the terms "acknowledged" and "unacknowledged."

27. "Resource Estimates for Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures," a study prepared for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, C3I (CI & SCM) by the Institute for Defense Analysis, September 1992 (updated December 1993)

28. "Capturing Security Costs in Industry: Final Report of the National Industrial Security Program Resources Working Group," December 1993.