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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

b. Espionage Investigations. - In April 1948, a non-District employee, whose loyalty to the United States was questionable, solicited and received classified information from a then unidentified Project employee. There were indications at that time of planned attempts to obtain additional Project information at periodic intervals for transfer to a foreign government. Upon learning of this plan, immediate steps were taken to identify this Project employee and to thwart the plan to establish an espionage channel. Especially selected CIC agents were rushed to the area where the information had been obtained and after a few weeks of intensive surveillance activity the employee who had passed the information was identified. These agents continued extensive surveillance and investigation of this employee, his associates and many other Project employees whose loyalty appeared doubtful after preliminary investigation. Suitable backgrounds were prepared for other agents who were placed in strategic positions within the Project. These agents were of great assistance as listening posts among suspected employees, and in locating persons who warranted more than the usual investigation. An "undercover" office was established in this area, which operated ostensibly as the office of a magazine subscription company and later as an insurance adjustment agency.

Other such special surveillance squads were organized in the District to supplement personnel investigations as investigative activities were intensified. These specially trained agents maintained close surveillance of District personnel believed to be

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most likely to transmit classified project information to unauthorized persons. Reports from all parts of District were carefully reviewed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to determine: (a) the members of any espionage network, including both District and non-District employees; (b) the modus operandi for infiltrating Project installations; (c) evidence of activities inspired by any foreign Government; and (d) connection, if any, between similar activities at District installations even though widely separated geographically. Other espionage attempts were detected but it is felt that prompt action and intensified investigative activity in each case prevented the passing of any substantial amount of Project information.

The CIC Special Agents assigned to espionage cases became proficient in all phases of investigation technique. Many of them displayed skill and ingenuity unsurpassed by the most experienced investigators. Pictures of certain individuals and activities were obtained by use of a telephoto lense or a special camera that could be concealed in the hand. Agents have borrowed the equipment of street photographers or enlisted the assistance of night club photographers to obtain certain pictures.

Agents impersonated men of all occupations in order to obtain information that would enable them to evaluate a suspect properly. An agent worked as a hotel clerk for over two years while another became bell captain in the few months he worked as a bell hop. Agents have posed as electricians, painters, exterminators, contractors, gamblers, etc. One suspect may have wondered why the

electrician took almost two hours to repair a light fixture and another might have thought it a coincidence that two men wearing hearing aids were sitting at tables near that selected by him and his party. Actually, the two men had special amplifiers carried in brief cases. The surveillance of a certain individual immediately after his arrival in the country was made comparatively easy by an agent who learned of the travelers plans in detail by sitting in at the ship panel with the customs officer. Many difficult twenty-four hours surveillances were maintained. One suspect was shadowed by an agent who travelled as fellow passenger on a cross-country plane trip. A crack train was held up for thirty minutes in one instance so as to allow time for agents to fly to a station to take up surveillance of a passenger.

c. Sabotage Investigations. - As previously noted, a second course of action to which the enemy could have committed itself was to sabotage Manhattan District installations. Attempts at such sabotage would seem likely if the enemy was aware of the great progress being made by our country in the development of the atomic bomb. Here can be seen the absolute need for secrecy, plant security and personnel clearance. It must be conceded that allied knowledge of the enemies' efforts towards the development of an atomic bomb was limited when Manhattan District operations were initiated. Progress of the District could not be delayed; it had to continue without interruption and particularly without destruction or damage caused by sabotage. From the very beginning, therefore,