| First use of the atomic bomb | Smyth report--1945 | Tolman committee--1945 | AEC--1974 | DOE--1987 | DOE--1990, 1992 | Proposed general
description criteria
(this document, Chaps. 4, 5, and 11) |
| Information control factors | ||||||
| Generally known by competent scientists | The information is already substantially known outside the project | The published state of the art in the U.S. and elsewhere | The extent to which the information has been published, publicized, or otherwise disseminated | The published state of the art in the U.S. and elsewhere | Published state of the art | |
| Can be deduced or guessed by competent scientists from what is already known, combined with knowledge that the project was, overall, successful; could be discovered by a small group (15, of whom not over 5 would be senior men) of competent scientists working in a well equipped college lab in a year's time or less | The information is readily obtainable from theory or minor experimentation | Extent to which the information can be duplicated through simple theoretical calculations and experiments | Extent to which the information can be duplicated by competent scientists through simple theoretical equations or minor experimentation, or by reverse engineering an unclassified product | |||
| Known but unpublished classified state of the art (U.S. and abroad) | ||||||
| Extent of foreign knowledge of unpublished, unclassified, state of the art in the U.S. | ||||||
| Known but classified state of the art (U.S. and abroad) | ||||||
| Extent to which technological progress has made the information less sensitive | Extent to which technological progress has made the information less sensitive | |||||
| Extent to which the information has been compromised by unauthorized disclosure | Extent to which the information has been compromised through unauthorized disclosure | |||||
| Information disclosure risks | ||||||
| Use reveals "breakthrough" scientific and technical information--that a major new weapon was feasible | Disclosure would jeopardize U.S. military security | Assistance to the development of nuclear weapons capability in other nations | Impact on U.S. national security of release of the information | Assistance to development of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear country | Assistance to other nations in developing new armaments | |
| Assistance to improvements in nuclear weapons of a nuclear weapons state | Assistance to other nations in improving armaments | |||||
| Assistance in the production of special nuclear material | Assistance to other nations in producing materials for armaments | |||||
| Could be discovered by a small group (15, of whom not over 5 would be senior men) of competent scientists working in a well equipped college lab in a year's time or less | Extent of effort required in developing the information | Cost of acquiring the information | ||||
| Disclosure would weaken U.S. position in international discussions | Detrimental effects on foreign relations | Detrimental effects on foreign relations | Detrimental effects on foreign relations | |||
| Disclosure would jeopardize patent position | Value of the information to U.S. classified programs | Any other national security impact or significance | Any other national security impact or significance | |||
| Detrimental effects on classification program credibility | Detrimental effects on classification program credibility | |||||
| Information disclosure benefits | ||||||
| Use provides a major advantage in winning a war | Advancement of military aspects of nuclear science or technology | Adverse effects of classification on progress in the field under consideration | Benefits to the progress in a U.S. program | Benefits to the U.S. program | Benefits to the progress of the U.S. program | |
| The feasibility of providing adequate security protection | Continuing classification costs | Benefits to the U.S. program of eliminating classification costs | ||||
| Of true scientific interest and likely to be truly helpful to scientific workers in the U.S. | Advancement of science or technology, in general | Value of information to U.S. unclassified programs | Benefits to general scientific and technical progress | |||
| Advancement of nonmilitary aspects of nuclear science or technology | Technology transfer benefits | Technology transfer benefits | ||||
| Benefits to U.S. foreign relations | Benefits to U.S. foreign relations, arms control negotiations, or treaty obligations | Benefits to U.S. foreign relations, arms control negotiations, or treaty obligations | ||||
| Importance to a reasonable understanding of what was done on the project as a whole | Importance of the information to public discussion and education | Importance of the information to public discussion and education | ||||
| Disclosure defined what could be revealed--the remaining secrets would be better kept | Adverse effects of classification on delivery schedules for items (e.g., weapons to stockpile) | Any other significant benefit to the U.S. | ||||
| Has no real bearing on the production of atomic bombs | Strengthening the credibility of the classification program | Benefits to classification program credibility | Benefits to classification program credibility | |||