Congressional Record: June 9, 1999 (House)
Page H3872-H3964
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000
[...]
Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Cox
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 14 printed in the Congressional Record
offered by Mr. Cox:
TITLE XIV--PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROL MATTERS
SEC. 1401. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES WITH THE MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than October 31, 1999, the
President shall transmit to Congress a report on the
compliance, or lack of compliance (both as to acquiring and
transferring missile technology), by the People's Republic of
China, with the Missile Technology Control Regime, and on any
actual or suspected transfer by Russia or any other country
of missile technology to the People's Republic of China in
violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The
report shall include a list specifying each actual or
suspected violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime
by the People's Republic of China, Russia, or other country
and, for each such violation, a description of the remedial
action (if any) taken by the United States or any other
country.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--The report under subsection
(a) shall also include information concerning--
(1) actual or suspected use by the People's Republic of
China of United States missile technology;
(2) actual or suspected missile proliferation activities by
the People's Republic of China;
(3) actual or suspected transfer of missile technology by
Russia or other countries to the People's Republic of China:
and
(4) United States actions to enforce the Missile Technology
Control Regime with respect to the People's Republic of
China, including actions to prevent the transfer of missile
technology from Russia and other countries to the People's
Republic of China.
SEC. 1402. ANNUAL REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Annual Report.--The President shall transmit to
Congress an annual report on transfers to the People's
Republic of China by the United States and other countries of
technology with potential military applications, during the
1-year period preceding the transmittal of the report.
(b) Initial Report.--The initial report under this section
shall be transmitted not later than October 31, 1999.
SEC. 1403. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSFER OF SATELLITE
EXPORT CONTROL AUTHORITY.
Not later than August 31, 1999, the President shall
transmit to Congress a report on the implementation of
subsection (a) of section 1513 of the Strom Thurmond National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law
105-261; 112 Stat. 2174; 22 U.S.C. 2778 note), transferring
satellites and related items from the Commerce Control List
of dual-use items to the United States Munitions List. The
report shall update the information provided in the report
under subsection (d) of that section.
SEC. 1404. SECURITY IN CONNECTION WITH SATELLITE EXPORT
LICENSING.
(a) Security at Foreign Launches.--As a condition of the
export license for any satellite to be launched outside the
jurisdiction of the United States, the Secretary of State
shall require the following:
(1) That the technology transfer control plan required by
section 1514(a)(1) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261;
112 Stat. 2175; 22 U.S.C. 2778 note) be prepared by the
Department of Defense, and agreed to by the licensee, and
that the plan set forth the security arrangements for the
launch of the satellite, both before and during launch
operations, and include enhanced security measures if the
launch site is within the jurisdiction of the People's
Republic of China or any other country that is subject to
section 1514 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.
(2) That each person providing security for the launch of
that satellite--
(A) be employed by, or under a contract with, the
Department of Defense;
(B) have received appropriate training in the regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of State known as the
International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (hereafter in
this section referred to as ``ITAR'');
(C) have significant experience and expertise with
satellite launches; and
(D) have been investigated in a manner at least as
comprehensive as the investigation required for the issuance
of a security clearance at the level designated as
``Secret''.
(3) That the number of such persons providing security for
the launch of the satellite shall be sufficient to maintain
24-hour security of the satellite and related launch vehicle
and other sensitive technology.
(4) That the licensee agree to reimburse the Department of
Defense for all costs associated with the provision of
security for the launch of the satellite.
(b) Defense Department Monitors.--The Secretary of Defense
shall--
(1) ensure that persons assigned as space launch campaign
monitors are provided sufficient training and have adequate
experience in the ITAR and have significant experience and
expertise with satellite technology, launch vehicle
technology, and launch operations technology;
(2) ensure that adequate numbers of such monitors are
assigned to space launch campaigns so that 24-hour, 7-day per
week coverage is provided;
(3) take steps to ensure, to the maximum extent possible,
the continuity of service by monitors for the entire space
launch campaign period (from satellite marketing to launch
and, if necessary, completion of a launch failure analysis);
and
(4) adopt measures designed to make service as a space
launch campaign monitor an attractive career opportunity.
SEC. 1405. REPORTING OF TECHNOLOGY PASSED TO PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OF FOREIGN LAUNCH
SECURITY VIOLATIONS.
(a) Monitoring of Information.--The Secretary of Defense
shall require that space launch monitors of the Department of
Defense assigned to monitor launches in the People's Republic
of China maintain records of all information authorized to be
transmitted to the People's Republic of China, including
copies of any documents authorized for such transmission, and
reports on launch-related activities.
(b) Transmission to Other Agencies.--The Secretary of
Defense shall ensure that records under subsection (a) are
transmitted
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on a current basis to appropriate elements of the Department
of Defense and to the Department of State, the Department of
Commerce, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
(c) Retention of Records.--Records described in subsection
(a) shall be retained for at least the period of the statute
of limitations for violations of the Arms Export Control Act.
(d) Guidelines.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe
guidelines providing space launch monitors of the Department
of Defense with the responsibility and the ability to report
serious security violations, problems, or other issues at an
overseas launch site directly to the headquarters office of
the responsible Department of Defense component.
SEC. 1406. REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
EXPORTING HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS TO THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Review.--The Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Secretary of State, in consultation with
other appropriate departments and agencies, shall conduct a
comprehensive review of the national security implications of
exporting high-performance computers to the People's Republic
of China. As part of the review, the Secretary shall conduct
empirical testing of the extent to which national security-
related operations can be performed using clustered,
massively-parallel processing or other combinations of
computers.
(b) Report.--The Secretary of Energy shall submit to
Congress a report on the results of the review under
subsection (a). The report shall be submitted not later than
six months after the date of the enactment of this Act and
shall be updated not later than the end of each subsequent 1-
year period.
SEC. 1407. END-USE VERIFICATION FOR USE BY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA OF HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS.
(a) Revised HPC Verification System.--The President shall
seek to enter into an agreement with the People's Republic of
China to revise the existing verification system with the
People's Republic of China with respect to end-use
verification for high-performance computers exported or to be
exported to the People's Republic of China so as to provide
for an open and transparent system providing for effective
end-use verification for such computers and, at a minimum,
providing for on-site inspection of the end-use and end-user
of such computers, without notice, by United States nationals
designated by the United States Government. The President
shall transmit a copy of the agreement to Congress.
(b) Definition.--As used in this section and section 1406,
the term ``high performance computer'' means a computer
which, by virtue of its composite theoretical performance
level, would be subject to section 1211 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (50 U.S.C.
App. 2404 note).
(c) Adjustment of Composite Theoretical Performance Levels
for Post-shipment Verification.--Section 1213 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(e) Adjustment of Performance Levels.--Whenever a new
composite theoretical performance level is established under
section 1211(d), that level shall apply for purposes of
subsection (a) of this section in lieu of the level set forth
in that subsection.''.
SEC. 1408. PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW OF EXPORT OF CONTROLLED
TECHNOLOGIES AND ITEMS.
(a) Recommendations for Prioritization of National Security
Concerns.--The President shall submit to Congress the
President's recommendations for the establishment of a
mechanism to identify, on a continuing basis, those
controlled technologies and items the export of which is of
greatest national security concern relative to other
controlled technologies and items.
(b) Recommendations for Executive Department Approvals for
Exports of Greatest National Security Concern.--With respect
to controlled technologies and items identified under
subsection (a), the President shall submit to Congress the
President's recommendations for the establishment of a
mechanism to identify procedures for export of such
technologies and items so as to provide--
(1) that the period for review by an executive department
or agency of a license application for any such export shall
be extended to a period longer than that otherwise required
when such longer period is considered necessary by the head
of that department or agency for national security purposes;
and
(2) that a license for such an export may be approved only
with the agreement of each executive department or agency
that reviewed the application for the license, subject to
appeal procedures to be established by the President.
(c) Recommendations for Streamlined Licensing Procedures
for Other Exports.--With respect to controlled technologies
and items other than those identified under subsection (a),
the President shall submit to Congress the President's
recommendations for modifications to licensing procedures for
export of such technologies and items so as to streamline the
licensing process and provide greater transparency,
predictability, and certainty.
SEC. 1409. NOTICE OF FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF UNITED STATES
FIRMS IN NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIES.
Section 721(b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50
U.S.C. 2170(b)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The President'';
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Whenever a person engaged in interstate commerce in
the United States is the subject of a merger, acquisition, or
takeover described in paragraph (1), that person shall
promptly notify the President, or the President's designee,
of such planned merger, acquisition, or takeover. Whenever
any executive department or agency becomes aware of any such
planned merger, acquisition, or takeover, the head of that
department or agency shall promptly notify the President, or
the President's designee, of such planned merger,
acquisition, or takeover.''.
SEC. 1410. FIVE-AGENCY INSPECTORS GENERAL EXAMINATION OF
COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ACQUISITION BY THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF MILITARILY
SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY.
Not later than January 1, 2000, the Inspectors General of
the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, and Commerce
and the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall submit to Congress a report on the adequacy of current
export controls and counterintelligence measures to protect
against the acquisition by the People's Republic of China of
militarily sensitive United States technology. Such report
shall include a description of measures taken to address any
deficiencies found in such export controls and
counterintelligence measures.
SEC. 1411. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY SECURITY IN DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE.
(a) Enhanced Multilateral Export Controls.--
(1) New international controls.--The President shall work
(in the context of the scheduled 1999 review of the Wassenaar
Arrangement and otherwise) to establish new binding
international controls on technology transfers that threaten
international peace and United States national security.
(2) Improved sharing of information.--The President shall
take appropriate actions (in the context of the scheduled
1999 review of the Wassenaar Arrangement and otherwise) to
improve the sharing of information by nations that are major
exporters of technology so that the United States can track
movements of technology and enforce technology controls and
re-export requirements.
(b) Office of Technology Security.--(1) There is hereby
established in the Department of Defense an Office of
Technology Security. The Office shall support United States
Government efforts to--
(1) establish new binding international controls on
technology transfers that threaten international peace and
United States national security; and
(2) improve the sharing of information by nations that are
major exporters of technology so that the United States can
track movements of technology and enforce technology controls
and re-export requirements.
At the end of subtitle A of title XXXI (page 419, after
line 3), insert the following new section:
SEC. 3106. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CYBER
SECURITY PROGRAM.
(a) Increased Funds for Counterintelligence Cyber
Security.--The amounts provided in section 3103 in the matter
preceding paragraph (1) and in paragraph (3) are each hereby
increased by $8,600,000, to be available for
Counterintelligence Cyber Security programs.
(b) Offsetting Reductions Derived From Contractor Travel.--
(1) The amount provided in section 3101 in the matter
preceding paragraph (1) (for weapons activities in carrying
out programs necessary for national security) is hereby
reduced by $4,700,000.
(2) The amount provided in section 3102 in the matter
preceding paragraph (1) of subsection (a) (for environmental
restoration and waste management in carrying out programs
necessary for national security) is hereby reduced by
$1,900,000.
(3) The amount provided in section 3103 in the matter
preceding paragraph (1) is hereby reduced by $2,000,000.
At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert
the following new subtitle:
Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information
SEC. 3181. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``National Security
Information Protection Improvement Act''.
SEC. 3182. SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT ON ESPIONAGE
BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Reports Required.--The President shall transmit to
Congress a report, not less often than every six months, on
the steps being taken by the Department of Energy, the
Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Central Intelligence Agency, and all other relevant
executive departments and agencies to respond to espionage
and other intelligence activities by the People's Republic of
China, particularly with respect to the theft of
sophisticated United States nuclear weapons design
information and the targeting by the People's Republic of
China of United States nuclear weapons codes and other
national security information of strategic concern.
(b) Initial Report.--The first report under this section
shall be transmitted not later than January 1, 2000.
[[Page H3953]]
SEC. 3183. REPORT ON WHETHER DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SHOULD
CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
RESPONSIBILITY.
Not later than January 1, 2000, the President shall
transmit to Congress a report regarding the feasibility of
alternatives to the current arrangements for controlling
United States nuclear weapons development, testing, and
maintenance within the Department of Energy, including the
reestablishment of the Atomic Energy Commission as an
independent nuclear agency. The report shall describe the
benefits and shortcomings of each such alternative, as well
as the current system, from the standpoint of protecting such
weapons and related research and technology from theft and
exploitation. The President shall include with such report
the President's recommendation for the appropriate
arrangements for controlling United States nuclear weapons
development, testing, and maintenance outside the Department
of Energy if it should be determined that the Department of
Energy should no longer have that responsibility.
SEC. 3184. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE AND OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--The Department of Energy Organization Act
is amended by inserting after section 212 (42 U.S.C. 7143)
the following new sections:
``office of foreign intelligence
``Sec. 213. (a) There shall be within the Department an
Office of Foreign Intelligence, to be headed by a Director,
who shall report directly to the Secretary.
``(b) The Director shall be responsible for the programs
and activities of the Department relating to the analysis of
intelligence with respect to nuclear weapons and materials,
other nuclear matters, and energy security.
``(c) The Secretary may delegate to the Deputy Secretary of
Energy the day-to-day supervision of the Director.
``office of counterintelligence
``Sec. 214. (a) There shall be within the Department an
Office of Counterintelligence, to be headed by a Director,
who shall report directly to the Secretary.
``(b) The Director shall carry out all counterintelligence
activities in the Department relating to the defense
activities of the Department.
``(c) The Secretary may delegate to the Deputy Secretary of
Energy the day-to-day supervision of the Director.
``(d)(1) The Director shall keep the intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of all significant
security breaches at any of the national laboratories.
``(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term
`intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select
Committee of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 212 the following new items:
``Sec. 213. Office of Foreign Intelligence.
``Sec. 214. Office of Counterintelligence.''.
SEC. 3185. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AT DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY NATIONAL LABORATORIES.
(a) Program Required.--The Secretary of Energy shall
establish and maintain at each national laboratory a
counterintelligence program for the defense-related
activities of the Department of Energy at such laboratory.
(b) Head of Program.--The Secretary shall ensure that, for
each national laboratory, the head of the counterintelligence
program of that laboratory--
(1) has extensive experience in counterintelligence
activities within the Federal Government; and
(2) with respect to the counterintelligence program, is
responsible directly to, and is hired with the concurrence
of, the Director of Counterintelligence of the Department of
Energy and the director of the national laboratory.
SEC. 3186. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT OTHER DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY FACILITIES.
(a) Assignment of Counterintelligence Personnel.--(1) The
Secretary of Energy shall assign to each Department of Energy
facility, other than a national laboratory, at which
Restricted Data is located an individual who shall assess
security and counterintelligence matters at that facility.
(2) An individual assigned to a facility under this
subsection shall be stationed at the facility.
(b) Supervision.--Each individual assigned under subsection
(a) shall report directly to the Director of the Office of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
SEC. 3187. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS.
(a) Counterintelligence Polygraph Program Required.--The
Secretary of Energy, acting through the Director of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, shall carry
out a counterintelligence polygraph program for the defense
activities of the Department of Energy. The program shall
consist of the administration on a regular basis of a
polygraph examination to each covered person who has access
to a program that the Director of Counterintelligence and the
Assistant Secretary assigned the functions under section
203(a)(5) of the Department of Energy Organization Act
determine requires special access restrictions.
(b) Covered Persons.--For purposes of subsection (a), a
covered person is any of the following:
(1) An officer or employee of the Department.
(2) An expert or consultant under contract to the
Department.
(3) An officer or employee of any contractor of the
Department.
(c) Additional Polygraph Examinations.--In addition to the
polygraph examinations administered under subsection (a), the
Secretary, in carrying out the defense activities of the
Department--
(1) may administer a polygraph examination to any employee
of the Department or of any contractor of the Department, for
counterintelligence purposes; and
(2) shall administer a polygraph examination to any such
employee in connection with an investigation of such
employee, if such employee requests the administration of a
polygraph examination for exculpatory purposes.
(d) Regulations.--(1) The Secretary shall prescribe any
regulations necessary to carry out this section. Such
regulations shall include procedures, to be developed in
consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, for identifying and addressing ``false
positive'' results of polygraph examinations.
(2) Notwithstanding section 501 of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7191) or any other provision of
law, the Secretary may, in prescribing regulations under
paragraph (1), waive any requirement for notice or comment if
the Secretary determines that it is in the national security
interest to expedite the implementation of such regulations.
(e) No Change in Other Polygraph Authority.--This section
shall not be construed to affect the authority under any
other provision of law of the Secretary to administer a
polygraph examination.
SEC. 3188. CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REGULATIONS RELATING TO
THE SAFEGUARDING AND SECURITY OF RESTRICTED
DATA.
(a) In General.--Chapter 18 of title I of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) is amended by inserting
after section 234A the following new section:
``Sec. 234B. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of
Department of Energy Regulations Regarding Security of
Classified or Sensitive Information or Data.--
``a. Any individual or entity that has entered into a
contract or agreement with the Department of Energy, or a
subcontract or subagreement thereto, and that commits a gross
violation or a pattern of gross violations of any applicable
rule, regulation, or order prescribed or otherwise issued by
the Secretary pursuant to this subtitle relating to the
safeguarding or security of Restricted Data or other
classified or sensitive information shall be subject to a
civil penalty of not to exceed $500,000 for each such
violation.
``b. The Secretary shall include, in each contract entered
into after the date of the enactment of this section with a
contractor of the Department, provisions which provide an
appropriate reduction in the fees or amounts paid to the
contractor under the contract in the event of a violation by
the contractor or contractor employee of any rule,
regulation, or order relating to the safeguarding or security
of Restricted Data or other classified or sensitive
information. The provisions shall specify various degrees of
violations and the amount of the reduction attributable to
each degree of violation.
``c. The powers and limitations applicable to the
assessment of civil penalties under section 234A shall apply
to the assessment of civil penalties under this section.''.
(b) Clarifying Amendment.--The section heading of section
234A of that Act (42 U.S.C. 2282a) is amended by inserting
``Safety'' before ``Regulations''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections in the first
section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 234 the following new items:
``234A. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of Department of Energy
Safety Regulations.
``234B. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of Department of Energy
Regulations Regarding Security of Classified or Sensitive
Information or Data.''.
SEC. 3189. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR MISUSE OF RESTRICTED DATA.
(a) Communication of Restricted Data.--Section 224 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2274) is amended--
(1) in clause a., by striking ``$20,000'' and inserting
``$400,000''; and
(2) in clause b., by striking ``$10,000'' and inserting
``$200,000''.
(b) Receipt of Restricted Data.--Section 225 of such Act
(42 U.S.C. 2275) is amended by striking ``$20,000'' and
inserting ``$400,000''.
(c) Disclosure of Restricted Data.--Section 227 of such Act
(42 U.S.C. 2277) is amended by striking ``$2,500'' and
inserting ``$50,000''.
SEC. 3190. RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO NATIONAL LABORATORIES BY
FOREIGN VISITORS FROM SENSITIVE COUNTRIES.
(a) Background Review Required.--The Secretary of Energy
may not admit to any facility of a national laboratory any
individual who is a citizen or agent of a nation that is
named on the current sensitive countries list unless the
Secretary first completes a background review with respect to
that individual.
(b) Moratorium Pending Certification.--(1) During the
period described in paragraph
[[Page H3954]]
(2), the Secretary may not admit to any facility of a
national laboratory any individual who is a citizen or agent
of a nation that is named on the current sensitive countries
list.
(2) The period referred to in paragraph (1) is the period
beginning 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act
and ending on the later of the following:
(A) The date that is 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(B) The date that is 45 days after the date on which the
Secretary submits to Congress a certification described in
paragraph (3).
(3) A certification referred to in paragraph (2) is a
certification by the Director of Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy, with the concurrence of the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that all security
measures are in place that are necessary and appropriate to
prevent espionage or intelligence gathering by or for a
sensitive country, including access by individuals referred
to in paragraph (1) to classified information of the national
laboratory.
(c) Waiver of Moratorium.--(1) The Secretary of Energy may
waive the prohibition in subsection (b) on a case-by-case
basis with respect to any specific individual or any specific
delegation of individuals whose admission to a national
laboratory is determined by the Secretary to be in the
interest of the national security of the United States.
(2) Not later than the seventh day of the month following a
month in which a waiver is made, the Secretary shall submit a
report in writing providing notice of each waiver made in
that month to the following:
(A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Each such report shall be in classified form and shall
contain the identity of each individual or delegation for
whom such a waiver was made and, with respect to each such
individual or delegation, the following information:
(A) A detailed justification for the waiver.
(B) For each individual with respect to whom a background
review was conducted, whether the background review
determined that negative information exists with respect to
that individual.
(C) The Secretary's certification that the admission of
that individual or delegation to a national laboratory is in
the interest of the national security of the United States.
(4) The authority of the Secretary under paragraph (1) may
be delegated only to the Director of Counterintelligence of
the Department of Energy.
(d) Exception to Moratorium for Certain Individuals.--The
moratorium under subsection (b) shall not apply to any person
who--
(1) is, on the date of the enactment of this Act, an
employee or assignee of the Department of Energy, or of a
contractor of the Department; and
(2) has undergone a background review in accordance with
subsection (a).
(e) Exception to Moratorium for Certain Programs.--In the
case of a program undertaken pursuant to an international
agreement between the United States and a foreign nation, the
moratorium under subsection (b) shall not apply to the
admittance to a facility that is important to that program of
a citizen of that foreign nation whose admittance is
important to that program.
(f) Sense of Congress Regarding Background Reviews.--It is
the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Energy, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Director of Central Intelligence should ensure that
background reviews carried out under this section are
completed in not more than 15 days.
(g) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ``background review'', commonly known as an
indices check, means a review of information provided by the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding personal
background, including information relating to any history of
criminal activity or to any evidence of espionage.
(2) The term ``sensitive countries list'' means the list
prescribed by the Secretary of Energy known as the Department
of Energy List of Sensitive Countries.
SEC. 3191. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO ACCESS BY FOREIGN
VISITORS AND EMPLOYEES TO DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
FACILITIES ENGAGED IN DEFENSE ACTIVITIES.
(a) Security Clearance Review Required.--The Secretary of
Energy may not allow unescorted access to any classified
area, or access to classified information, of any facility of
the Department of Energy engaged in the defense activities of
the Department to any individual who is a citizen of a
foreign nation unless--
(1) the Secretary, acting through the Director of
Counterintelligence, first completes a security clearance
investigation with respect to that individual in a manner at
least as comprehensive as the investigation required for the
issuance of a security clearance at the level required for
such access under the rules and regulations of the
Department; or
(2) a foreign government first completes a security
clearance investigation with respect to that individual in a
manner that the Secretary of State, pursuant to an
international agreement between the United States and that
foreign government, determines is equivalent to the
investigation required for the issuance of a security
clearance at the level required for such access under the
rules and regulations of the Department.
(b) Effect on Current Employees.--The Secretary shall
ensure that any individual who, on the date of the enactment
of this Act, is a citizen of a foreign nation and an employee
of the Department or of a contractor of the Department is not
discharged from such employment as a result of this section
before the completion of the security clearance investigation
of such individual under subsection (a) unless the Director
of Counterintelligence determines that such discharge is
necessary for the national security of the United States.
SEC. 3192. ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
STANDARDS AT NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND OTHER
DEFENSE FACILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.
(a) Report on Security and Counterintelligence Standards at
National Laboratories and Other DOE Defense Facilities.--Not
later than March 1 of each year, the Secretary of Energy,
acting through the Director of Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy, shall submit a report on the security
and counterintelligence standards at the national
laboratories, and other facilities of the Department of
Energy engaged in the defense activities of the Department,
to the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Contents of Report.--The report shall be in classified
form and shall contain, for each such national laboratory or
facility, the following information:
(1) A description of all security measures that are in
place to prevent access by unauthorized individuals to
classified information of the national laboratory or
facility.
(2) A certification by the Director of Counterintelligence
of the Department of Energy as to whether--
(A) all security measures are in place to prevent access by
unauthorized individuals to classified information of the
national laboratory or facility; and
(B) such security measures comply with Presidential
Decision Directives and other applicable Federal requirements
relating to the safeguarding and security of classified
information.
(3) For each admission of an individual under section 3190
not described in a previous report under this section, the
identity of that individual, and whether the background
review required by that section determined that information
relevant to security exists with respect to that individual.
SEC. 3193. REPORT ON SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF NATIONAL
LABORATORY COMPUTERS.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than March 1 of each year,
the National Counterintelligence Policy Board shall prepare a
report, in consultation with the Director of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, on the
security vulnerabilities of the computers of the national
laboratories.
(b) Preparation of Report.--In preparing the report, the
National Counterintelligence Policy Board shall establish a
so-called ``red team'' of individuals to perform an
operational evaluation of the security vulnerabilities of the
computers of the national laboratories, including by direct
experimentation. Such individuals shall be selected by the
National Counterintelligence Policy Board from among
employees of the Department of Defense, the National Security
Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, and of other agencies, and may be detailed
to the National Counterintelligence Policy Board from such
agencies without reimbursement and without interruption or
loss of civil service status or privilege.
(c) Submission of Report to Secretary of Energy and to FBI
Director.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the report
shall be submitted in classified and unclassified form to the
Secretary of Energy and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(d) Forwarding to Congressional Committees.--Not later than
30 days after the report is submitted, the Secretary and the
Director shall each separately forward that report, with the
recommendations in classified and unclassified form of the
Secretary or the Director, as applicable, in response to the
findings of that report, to the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 3194. GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DEFENSE-RELATED COMPUTERS.
(a) Procedures Required.--The Secretary of Energy shall
establish procedures to govern access to classified
information on DOE defense-related computers. Those
procedures shall, at a minimum, provide that each employee of
the Department of Energy who requires access to classified
information shall be required as a condition of such access
to provide to the Secretary written consent which permits
access by an authorized investigative agency to any DOE
defense-related
[[Page H3955]]
computer used in the performance of the defense-related
duties of such employee during the period of that employee's
access to classified information and for a period of three
years thereafter.
(b) Expectation of Privacy in DOE Defense-Related
Computers.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law
(including any provision of law enacted by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986), no user of a DOE
defense-related computer shall have any expectation of
privacy in the use of that computer.
(c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) The term `DOE defense-related computer'' means a
computer of the Department of Energy or a Department of
Energy contractor that is used, in whole or in part, for a
Department of Energy defense-related activity.
(2) The term ``computer'' means an electronic, magnetic,
optical, electrochemical, or other high-speed data processing
device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions,
and includes any data storage facility or communications
facility directly related to, or operating in conjunction
with, such device.
(3) The term ``authorized investigative agency'' means an
agency authorized by law or regulation to conduct a
counterintelligence investigation or investigations of
persons who are proposed for access to classified information
to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for
obtaining and retaining access to such information.
(4) The term ``classified information'' means any
information that has been determined pursuant to Executive
Order No. 12356 of April 2, 1982, or successor orders, or the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated.
(5) The term ``employee'' includes any person who receives
a salary or compensation of any kind from the Department of
Energy, is a contractor of the Department of Energy or an
employee thereof, is an unpaid consultant of the Department
of Energy, or otherwise acts for or on behalf of the
Department of Energy.
(d) Establishment of Procedures.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Energy shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary
to implement this section.
SEC. 3195. DEFINITION OF NATIONAL LABORATORY.
For purposes of this subtitle, the term ``national
laboratory'' means any of the following:
(1) The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore,
California.
(2) The Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New
Mexico.
(3) The Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New
Mexico.
(4) The Oak Ridge National Laboratories, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson)
each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox).
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I am delighted that the amendment that the gentleman from Washington
(Mr. Dicks) and I are offering today has, like the report of our select
committee itself, been brought to the floor in a bipartisan fashion,
endorsed in this case by every Republican and Democratic member of our
select committee. In addition, the amendment is supported by the
representatives of the congressional districts in which our national
weapons laboratories are located: the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs.
Wilson), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), the gentleman from
Tennessee (Mr. Wamp) and the gentlewoman from California (Mrs.
Tauscher). The amendment is also supported by the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence) of
the Committees on International Relations and Armed Services as well as
by the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) of the Committee on
Rules. All of these people have contributed in important ways to
fashioning the amendment that is before us.
Last year, this House created the Select Committee on U.S. Security
and Military/Commercial Concerns With the People's Republic of China to
investigate efforts by the PRC to acquire American high technology for
military purposes. It was my privilege to chair that committee and to
serve with leaders on national security and foreign policy from both
sides of the aisle, in particular our ranking Democratic member the
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), at the time the ranking
Democratic member also of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. The vice chairman of our select committee was the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), who was then and is now the chairman
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The gentleman from
Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), who serves as the chairman of the Subcommittee
on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations,
was also a leader on the select committee, as were the gentleman from
Utah (Mr. Hansen) and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt),
senior members of the Committee on Armed Services, and the gentleman
from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), who on the Committee on Armed Services
is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Research and
Development. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Roybal-Allard) and
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott) were strong contributors to our
committee and to the fashioning of this amendment.
I want to pay tribute to these of my colleagues who are hardworking
and patriotic members who spent months on a very difficult and grueling
investigation essentially behind closed doors without any notice by the
rest of our colleagues. During that period of time we heard 150 hours
of testimony from 75 different witnesses and reviewed over half a
million pages of evidentiary material. The amendment that we are
bringing to the floor today is a start on the implementation of the 38
recommendations of this select committee. Most of the legislative
recommendations that our select committee has made fall within the
jurisdiction of standing committees of the House of Representatives and
of the other body, and for that reason are not being offered today,
notwithstanding that we had half a year of hearings on our
recommendations before reaching them. We are deferring at the request
of those committees to their jurisdiction, but we hope and expect
inasmuch as our recommendations were laid at their feet on the 3rd of
January of this year that very shortly we will be back on the floor
with the lion's share of the recommendations that our select committee
has made.
What we have prepared for consideration today as a start on that
process is an amendment that will require the Department of Defense to
prepare the Technology Transfer Control Plans for satellite launches in
the People's Republic of China, a very significant substantive matter
into which the select committee inquired. The amendment will also
require that the Department of Defense have highly trained employees to
provide round-the-clock monitoring and security for these foreign
launches that we have thought was always being provided ever since this
program was adopted a decade ago. The amendment will require improved
controls over information transmitted to the PRC during the course of
launches. It will require the President to report on how he is
implementing a key reform already adopted by the Congress last year,
the transfer of satellite export control authority from the Commerce
Department to the State Department.
Our select committee also recommended an improved intelligence
community focus on the People's Republic of China's intelligence
efforts directed against the United States, including reports to the
Congress on PRC espionage and on technology transfers to the PRC. And
we have recommended and called for in this amendment a five-agency
inspectors general counterintelligence review of countermeasures
against PRC technology acquisition. This amendment directly implements
a recommendation in that respect of the select committee. Our report
also calls for stronger multilateral governance of exports of certain
militarily useful goods and technologies. We found that the United
States should insist on PRC compliance with the MTCR, the Missile
Technology Control Regime, and this amendment calls for follow-up on
that.
We found that the United States should work to revive the strong
multilateral proliferation controls that were dismantled in 1994. Our
amendment responds by requiring the President to submit a full report
on PRC compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime, including
a list of violations, and any remedial actions that he has taken. We
require the President to work for new binding international controls on
harmful technology transfers, so that when the United States controls
an export, as in many cases we
[[Page H3956]]
already do, we do not go it alone and we find that only our producers
and our workers are injured with no national security benefit because
someone else is rushing in to make the sale. We had a system just like
this in 1994. It was allowed to dissipate and we need to show
international leadership and put that system back together.
In furtherance of that goal, this amendment creates a new Office of
Technology Security in the Department of Defense, dedicated exclusively
to support of these efforts. Our report unanimously concluded that no
adequate verification exists that high-powered computers, what used to
be called supercomputers, now high-performance computers, that are
exported to the PRC are being used for civilian rather than military
purposes. We have called for the establishment of an open transparent
system, an effective verification regime in the PRC by September of
this year as a condition for export licensing and the continued sale of
the current speeds of computers and even faster ones in the future.
We have also called for a comprehensive annual assessment of the
national security implications of such exports. We direct the President
in this amendment to revise the existing verification agreement with
the PRC to include real on-site inspections. We have agreed in a
bilateral with the PRC already in principle that this should occur but
that bilateral is shot full of holes and we need to make it work. We
need to have end use verification without notice, on demand, negotiated
simply as a term of trade, not in any way calling into question the
national sovereignty of the PRC. And we further require in this
amendment a comprehensive annual report on the national security
implications of these exports.
These are important improvements, but I want to emphasize this
represents, even after we pass this amendment, unfinished business by
this Congress. We have much work to do. Some additional hearings
undoubtedly will be required but most importantly markups and the
movement of legislation through our standing committees of jurisdiction
to the floor so that we can do the heavy lifting that is called for in
the full 38 of our recommendations, some 26 of which are touched upon
although not implemented in full in the amendment that is before us
today. In that regard, I am very happy that the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gilman) of the Committee on International Relations has assured me
that his committee will move legislation addressing these
recommendations in the immediate future.
Our report found wholesale inexcusable security weaknesses at our
Nation's national weapons laboratories, among the most sensitive
national defense sites in our country. Our report recommended a battery
of urgent reforms, and this amendment comprehensively implements them.
We establish offices of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
within the Energy Department, reporting directly to the Secretary of
Energy, as well as counterintelligence programs at each national
laboratory. We require a DOE counterintelligence polygraph program,
something that should have been in place frankly for a long time. We
establish a moratorium on foreign visitor programs with a national
security waiver that the Energy Secretary can issue until such time as
there is certified and in place a program with adequate security
measures. We bar access by foreigners to classified areas and
information at Department of Energy facilities until they have been
cleared, until the foreign visitors have been cleared for security. And
we clarify and confirm that the Federal Government has every right, has
now and in fact always has had every right to search defense-related
computers throughout the DOE complex.
In conclusion, this is a balanced response to an urgent problem. It
is a first of several important steps that we need to take. I want in
closing to thank again the staff of the committees of jurisdiction that
have worked with us in bringing this amendment to the floor and the
staff of our select committee, including in particular our select
committee staff director Dean McGrath, special counsel Mike Sheehy, the
policy committee's executive director Ben Cohen and Jonathan Burks,
Walker Roberts of the Committee on International Relations staff,
Robert Rangel of the Committee on Armed Services staff, Andrew Hunter
with the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) and Hugh Brady with the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt). Their hard work has served
the national interest.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that in
concluding my remarks, my time be handled by the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee).
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Connecticut?
There was no objection.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume. We had a select committee, and the select committee issued a
report. In that report they stated that the appropriate congressional
committees report legislation. But apparently we have now tried a new
tack. To prevent opposition for this legislation, a lot of the most
important provisions apparently have been removed. We now have nine or
ten reports from the administration. I know we all look forward to
getting more reports from the administration and that will be helpful
to all of us. But I am fearful that the entire process is leading to a
frenzy that will shut down American industry. And if there is anything
that would harm American national security, it is our leadership in
these very high tech fields. When we look at where computers come from
these days, we find that we do not control all the computers.
Approximately 14 of the top 25 manufacturers of workstations are not
U.S. companies but foreign competitors. And even in the most powerful
supercomputers, Hitachi, NEC and Fujitsu manufacture 20 percent of
them. Now, when we look at what supercomputers are, we find that you
can buy the next generation of Intel, which will have a 500 megahertz
system, is what we are used to calling it, but if you put it in MTOPS,
the same numbers the government uses, you will find that this computer
which has a board that you can put eight chips in will operate at
16,000 MTOPS.
Now, when I first got to Congress, the Defense Department and the
State Department prevented the sale of American machine tools, because
our machine tools were so good they did not want the Russians to get
them. We did that for so long that we no longer were the leader in
machine tools. And finally when we caught the Russians getting a
machine tool of the quality they wanted, what they bought was a
Toshiba. If we are not very careful here, we will do little to increase
our security as far as theft of American development, scientific and
defense-related, but we will cripple the industries that give us the
lead.
{time} 1400
If we start trying to block the kind of sales that are commercially
available, countries will not just sit back and say, well, I cannot get
it in the United States, so I am not going to go to Japan, I am not
going to go to Taiwan, I am not going to go to Israel and Moscow and
all the other places these products are available.
So, while we have this great instinct at the moment to respond to
what clearly has been a problem, if we do not do it in a comprehensive
manner, I think we will do more damage to American national security
than we will to those trying to pilfer our secrets.
It is clear that what we need to do is rather than simply broaden our
controls we need to narrow our controls and focus them on choke point
technologies, fissionable material, the things that make weapons and
the technologies we can control. If we try to control a product that is
available in Radio Shack in Beijing, we are kidding ourselves.
Now in the discussions of having the follow on to COCOM to be a more
effective force, we have now been through two administrations, and
COCOM, even when the Soviet Union was at its height, we always had
problem with our allies selling the technologies we wanted to control.
With the end of COCOM, we have barely been able to get them to sit down
in the room to discuss these technologies, but they are certainly not
restricting the sale.
So what I see happening here is in an attempt to create the image of
action
[[Page H3957]]
we are taking steps that may not be harmful today but certainly are
not, one, the comprehensive solution that we need in the comprehensive
review and certainly violate the committee's own statement again where
the committee stated that the appropriate congressional committees
should report the legislation.
That is not a turf fight; that is about people who look at the entire
issue, balance America's interest, both in security and economic, take
a look at what is doable rather than simply ad hoc adding section after
section.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from
Connecticut for yielding as this Member needs to start a classified
briefing with Dr. Perry on his North Korea visit.
I wanted to say that I understand the gentleman's concern, for
example, about the potential loss of jurisdiction for the House
International Relations Committee. I had those jurisdiction concerns
myself, and still do to some extent, although part of yesterday was
spent in discussing and negotiating, in effect, on this amendment's
language with the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and indirectly
with the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks). Also, I am a member of
the select committee that has done the work leading to this amendment
by the gentleman from California, and I thank the gentleman from
California for his kind remarks.
Sections 1401 through 1411 are, for the most part, with International
Relations jurisdiction. We have seen changes in this amendment, but
also I think it is incumbent on us to recognize that we need to look at
the language of this amendment very closely, clearly before conference
is conducted, to see if, in fact, the amendment might have unintended
consequences that are not visible now. But I also think, as Chairman
Cox suggested that our International Relations Committee needs to
conduct oversight, as several other committees do as we proceed to the
implementation of the recommendations in the Cox Committee's
recommendations. I do understand the desire of the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cox) to have action on his amendment now, and I think
he has made great accommodations to our jurisdictional consensus.
As my colleagues know, the recommendations, the 38, were unanimously
approved by the Cox select committee. Now comes the difficult task of
writing appropriate legislation. So I do understand the concerns of the
distinguished gentleman from Connecticut heard here today relating to
jurisdiction. I think we on the International Relations Committee ought
to commit ourselves to trying to move quickly on oversight but also to
refine the language of this amendment as necessary in the next several
weeks.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Reclaiming my time, I just add that, as my colleagues
know, giving Members of Congress not even 24 hours to see the language
on amendment of this nature is also problematic. I understand the
negotiations were going on until the very end, but this is too serious
to do on an ad hoc basis with a section here and a section there.
Mr. Chairman, I think if we look at that, at one point televisions
were American. Next thing we know, they did not make them in America
virtually. At one point machine tools, we have the leadership in
manufacturing machine tools; it went to Japan. High tech is easier to
move, cheaper to move and is available in lots of other countries. We
are not careful, we are going to kill the American expertise and
superiority in this area.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks).
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Cox-Dicks
amendment. The amendment is bipartisan and represents a good common
ground that members of both parties can support. Most importantly, it
will help to solve the important security problems we have at the
Department of Energy, and before I go any further I want to echo and
associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from California who
served this House in a very successful and distinguished way as
chairman of the committee, the select committee, and it was about a
year ago that we started down this road, and he has done an excellent
job representing the House, and I am proud to associate myself with
th Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Cox
Mr. COX. Mr
committee. And I, too, want to compliment the staff, particularly the
investigative staff who did a principle amount of the work on this very
important issue.
I am proud that the House has managed to address this problem in a
bipartisan fashion. We have had several bumps and long terms along the
road, but we have arrived in the right place I believe. I commend the
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) for working hard to ensure the
bipartisan agreement was possible. The amendment we have crafted, while
not perfect, is a good one. I urge members to vote for this amendment
to help solve the glaring security problems at the Department of
Energy. Our new Secretary, Bill Richardson, is doing a great job there
to solve these problems with the help of Ed Curran who is in charge of
counter intelligence. We can help him, and we should.
This amendment codifies major portions of Presidential Decision
Directive 61, PDD 61, to establish strong, independent Office of
Counter intelligence at DOE with direct access to the Secretary, and I
might point out in fairness the President had made his decision on this
directive in February of 1998, four months before our select committee
was established, and it took awhile to get the recommendations of Mr.
Curran in place, but Secretary Richardson is doing that with great
force and vigor.
This also, this amendment also requires regular polygraphing of
employees handling sensitive nuclear information, greatly increases
civil and criminal penalties for mishandling or release of classified
information, imposes a strong moratorium on foreign visitors to
national labs until strong security measures are in place, re-enforces
prohibitions on giving classified information to foreign nationals,
requires a comprehensive annual report on security and counter
intelligence at all DOE defense facilities, requires a report and red
team analysis of DOE computer vulnerabilities including funding for a
new cyber security program and requires DOE employees to consent to
searches of their work computers used in DOE defense activity as a
condition of receiving security clearance.
Mr. Chairman, these measures are tough but appropriate, and they give
Energy Secretary Richardson the authority he needs to solve the
problem. That should be our goal today. Let us stay away from the blame
game.
As I mentioned, this amendment is not perfect. It will require some
further work in conference on a few issues. In particular it was my
intention that this amendment would not affect the nuclear Navy, and we
have committed to work on this issue in the context of conference
committee, and in fact it is my belief that this amendment does not
reach the nuclear Navy labs.
We have also agreed to address in conference the concerns that we may
undermine existing bilateral agreements with China and Russia and
interfere in launch campaigns with our European allies by requiring the
Department of Defense to hire security personnel at launch campaigns.
By the way, this was one of my recommendations, and I hope that we can
keep it in place. We need to continue to work on it.
Again I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) for
working with me on this amendment, and I urge every member to support
it.
I think in addressing what my good friend, the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) has said earlier, it was our intent and our
hope that each of the committees of Congress that has jurisdiction
would take action, and of course the defense authorization bill gave us
a vehicle working with members of the defense committee, the gentleman
from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the gentleman from
[[Page H3958]]
South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Weldon) and others who are members of the committee in a bipartisan
fashion to draft this amendment. So we are trying our very best to live
up not only to our select committee's recommendation, but also to
respect the jurisdiction of the House and the committees in the House,
many of whom were involved in the drafting of this amendment.
So, again it has been a great pleasure to work with the gentleman
from California (Mr. Cox) and his staff on drafting this amendment and
working on the select committee report. I think it was good that in a
time of upheaval here in the House, during impeachment that we could
come to a bipartisan agreement on an important national security issue.
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), Chairman of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Vice Chairman of the Select
Committee.
(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I want to take the opportunity in this debate
to restate to the whole House and to the whole world the important work
that was done by the subcommittee of the gentleman from California (Mr.
Cox). I think it is very fair to say that it was bipartisan, it was
unanimous, and it was extraordinarily significant, and that just did
not happen by circumstance.
I rise in strong support of the bipartisan amendment that we have got
before us today. Obviously the amendment provides reasonable steps to
start the process, to carry out some, not all, of the recommendations
of the Cox committee.
I want to commend very much publicly the gentleman from California
(Mr. Cox) and ranking member (Mr. Dicks), other members of the
committee, for their excellent work, for their very strong leadership
in what I think is obviously a vital national security matter, and
anybody who reads the report would have to come to that same
conclusion. It was a pleasure to be associated with that effort.
However I speak as Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and Vice Chairman of the Cox Committee on China both today
because I have tried to serve as a bridge between the two
organizations. Obviously the intelligence peace is just one part of
what the Cox committee did, but it is a very important part, and now
that the Cox report has been released, those committee chairmen with
jurisdiction over various aspects of our findings on the Cox committee
can get down to the business and will get down to the business of
taking legislative and other steps to implement the recommendations in
the bipartisan undertaking that that committee was. Hence the amendment
today.
With this in mind, Mr. Chairman, I have asked that the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence move forward in 6 specific areas.
First we will examine all manner of Chinese directed espionage against
the United States. That is no small matter. Second, we will examine
Chinese directed covert action type activities conducted against the
United States such as the use of agents of influence and efforts to
subvert or otherwise manipulate the United States political process,
something that is near and dear to our hearts and must not be tampered
with. Third, we will examine counterintelligence programs, past,
present and proposed, for the Department of Energy, Department of
Defense, for the national labs, with the emphasis on the adequacy of
the proposed enhancements and the structural changes meant to manage
them. Fourth, we will investigate the issue of whether the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence was kept properly advised of
developments by the FBI and the Department of Energy. This is important
because there is conflicting testimony, and oversight is a tradition in
this House, but it is also a responsibility in this House. It is built
on trust and candor, and we must have that between the branch of
government. So that is an area that must be cleared up.
Fifth, we will examine issues relating to the role the intelligence
community plays in supporting policymakers in determining U.S. export
and technology transfer policies. Certainly there is an argument that
can be made that we were a little over zealous in selling things that
perhaps we should have been more cautious about. That in no way takes
away from the thought that my friend and colleague from Connecticut has
expressed that we must have access to the international marketplace.
Quality of life in this country, jobs in this country, depend on our
ability to export, but we need to be smart about what we export and
make sure it is always to our advantage. And finally, we will examine
the policy of treating advanced counter intelligence investigations
principally as law enforcement rather than national security matters.
{time} 1415
We have to determine whether it is more important that a spy end up
behind bars, even if it takes years of investigation, than for the
hemorrhaging of the national security data that can be stopped.
In addition, our FY 2000 intelligence authorization included
provisions that respond directly to problems raised in the Cox report
and some of the matters in this amendment. These include new funds for
such things as red teaming CIA's China analysis, improving CIA
information security, background investigations, understanding and
defeating foreign denial and deception techniques which are out there,
and running more and better offensive operations against hostile
foreign intelligence services, which we in fact know are conducting
espionage against the United States of America, its personnel and its
secrets.
We provided funds to improve the Department of Energy's
counterintelligence capabilities, analysis of foreign nuclear programs,
cyber security and other such matters. We are increasing funds for FBI
agent training in counterintelligence and DOD acquisition and
information systems protection. We are funding more linguistic
capabilities across the intelligence community and many more details we
are beefing up. It is important we do this because we have let down.
This amendment helps us. We are in support of it.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield one minute to the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member of the Committee on Armed
Services.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding time
to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. It is worthy of
our support. It is a comprehensive approach put together by experts
after extensive study. Let me commend the committee that took testimony
and studied this issue at length. In particular, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) did
first class work thereon.
There is no doubt that this amendment is prepared by a bipartisan
group, and it is certainly timely, because we recently discovered these
problems. While it might not be perfect, it is a great start for us to
move into the conference with the Senate.
I commend the sponsors and those who worked so hard on this
amendment. I urge my colleagues to support it. Again, I commend the
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), the gentleman from Washington (Mr.
Dicks), and those members of the committee who put so much effort into
it.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Scott).
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman I rise in support of the amendment. As a
member of the select committee, I want to congratulate the gentleman
from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks)
for the bipartisan manner in which they handled this very important
national security matter.
I would also like to publicly thank my two colleagues for offering
our committee's recommendations to the defense authorization bill
before us today. I urge Members of this body to support and accept the
bipartisan and unanimous findings and recommendations of the committee
by voting for this amendment.
This language, the language in the amendment, gives Congress the
common ground needed to enhance the Nation's intelligence
infrastructure and prevent our country from repeating
[[Page H3959]]
many of the episodes which occurred over the past few years.
Mr. Chairman, we could take the next few hours taking partisan
potshots that criticize this agency or that administration or in fact
any Congress over the last 20 years for not taking any of the perceived
and real espionage threats seriously. However, I believe that this
House can contribute much more to our country today and begin to move
forward by focusing on fixing the problem, rather than casting blame.
This amendment addresses a number of concerns and offers several steps
to strengthen this country's national security. This is a strong
bipartisan constructive effort to solve the national security problems
that our committee examined over the past year, and I urge my
colleagues to adopt the amendment.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New
Mexico (Mrs. Wilson).
(Mrs. WILSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment before
us today, and I wanted to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox)
and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), as well as the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), the gentlewoman from California (Mrs.
Tauscher), the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and their
staffs for this hard work on this amendment over the last month. This
is a serious effort by serious people who spent considerable time and
thought on this problem, and I thank them for their efforts to make our
laboratories safe from our Nation's adversaries.
Let me say a word or two about these laboratories. Millions and
millions of people here and abroad now enjoy personal and political
freedom because these labs, employing some of the greatest minds in the
world, have allowed us to defend ourselves against the enemies of
freedom. The list of Nobel Prize winners from America's national labs
is staggering. The number of scientific breakthroughs is breathtaking.
The number of seminal discoveries is unparalleled in any other group of
institutions in the world. These labs are treasures for science and for
freedom. It should not surprise us then that these laboratories have
been the target of systematic, relentless assault by the People's
Republic of China.
Over the last few months, through the investigation of the gentleman
from California (Mr. Cox) and his committee, we have seen the breakdown
of institutions of government. We have seen one hand of government not
know what the other hand of government was doing. There were errors and
omissions and miscommunications and failures of policy and procedure.
In all of this, one fact remains: With only one exception that we
know about, the employees of the laboratories remained loyal Americans,
putting the Nation's interests above their own. That is why this
amendment is so important. It recognizes that the problem is not the
people; it is the system, and this amendment addresses the problems in
the system, across a broad spectrum of activities.
It directs a review of the organizational structure of our nuclear
weapons complex; it establishes an office of counterintelligence and
foreign intelligence within the Department of Energy; it requires each
lab to have a counterintelligence program; and it establishes a
counterintelligence polygraph program; it enhances civil and monetary
penalties; and deals with the issue of foreign visitors in a way that
protects our national secrets, while allowing our scientists to be
engaged in a broader scientific community. It also addresses the
emerging problem of computer security, ensuring there is an annual
evaluation, an operational evaluation, of national laboratory computer
systems.
I want to commend the select committee on its analysis and its
identification of the serious problem of our failure as a Nation to
protect our national secrets. This amendment goes a long way toward
beginning the restoration of that security.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield two minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Mrs. Tauscher).
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me
time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Cox-Dicks amendment.
Working with the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman
from Washington (Mr. Dicks) and my other colleagues has exemplified the
bipartisan spirit and cooperation that the nation deserves in
formulating a sensible response to the security deficiencies at our
national laboratories.
The report that the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) released last month was startling
in that it exposed 20 years of systemic failure in our
counterintelligence operation that spanned several administrations. Our
intelligence agencies failed to embrace new technologies and our
counterintelligence units failed to protect our secrets above all else.
Our gravest error has been the lack of an individual clearly
responsible for protecting our Nation's secrets.
This amendment, Mr. Chairman, will take us a long way in solving the
structural deficiencies in our counterintelligence operation and
improving security at the laboratories. It establishes a structural
chain of command with ultimate authority for protecting our secrets
with the Secretary of Energy and it gives the Secretary the tools to do
it, such as polygraph examination of scientists with access to the most
sensitive information and increased financial penalties for employees
who mishandle classified material.
We are fortunate that Energy Secretary Richardson has stepped forward
to assume that responsibility. This legislation provides him with the
authority and tools he needs to manage the job.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this important
amendment.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this
legislation, but I do want to make two points. The first point I want
to make is I want to congratulate both the gentleman from South
Carolina (Mr. Spence) and the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton)
because this is not a new issue for the Committee on Armed Services. In
fact, during the last several years, it has been a tireless effort on
behalf of both the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence) and the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) to address the very concerns that
were dealt with in great detail by the Cox committee.
I can remember having debates on this floor about the elimination,
largely pushed by our government, of COCOM and that process that
greatly troubled Members on both sides of the aisle. I can remember
amendments on past defense bills where we focused on the need to deal
with the proliferation of the exportation of computers and high
technology. So I want to give appropriate credit to the authorizing
committee for the leadership role it has played in the past on these
issues.
Secondarily, I want to make the statement that this amendment is not
the end. It is the beginning. This does not solve all of our problems.
Our problems are not just with the labs. In fact, many of the problems
at our labs are created by ourselves when in the 1993-94 time frame we
did away with the color coded classification status and we put a
moratorium on the FBI background checks. Those were things we did
ourselves. We should not have done it back then, and now we are trying
to right that wrong. But this does not solve all of our problems, and
we must commit ourselves to work on all of the recommendations
contained in the Cox committee report, which I had the pleasure of
serving on.
Mr. Chairman, the bottom line here is that this is not just a problem
of our laboratories, it is a problem of our export policies, and this
is not to say that we want to stop our country from exporting abroad.
It is a case of providing a common sense approach, working with
American industry, to make sure we are competitive, but that we do not
open the door for all kinds of technologies to be sold to Tier III
nations or those nations that our State Department lists as terrorist
nations.
As I said when we released the Cox committee report, the basic
problem in
[[Page H3960]]
my mind was the failure of our government to protect the American
people. I am sure we can blame China or we can blame companies, but, in
the end, our government has failed us. This takes one step forward to
try to begin to address those concerns.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from South
Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
(Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment and I
salute the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks) for taking the lead in working this amendment
out.
This amendment started as a bipartisan effort to address the
counterintelligence problem at DOE. It included the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Thornberry), the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson),
the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), and myself.
When our amendment was not made in order under the first rule, a
number of other amendments which really duplicate component parts of
this were made in order. They are still made in order under this rule,
which creates a problem. We were principally working as an alternative
to a moratorium proposed by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) in an
amendment which will later be brought up which would effectively, in my
opinion, ban the foreign visitors program at the national laboratories.
We tried to come up with constructive alternative to that, something
that would put in this counterintelligence where needed, strengthen
security, but not abolish the program.
After the rule was not made in order, the gentleman from California
(Mr. Cox) joined our effort to come up with a bipartisan compromise,
and he added provisions to the amendment that relate to export
controls. We have spent a couple of days trying to iron those out.
While there are still wrinkles, we have a bill that we think is an
acceptable piece of work and one we can support.
I still find problems with it and want to serve notice that we have
got work to do in conference. For example, just to take as one example,
section 1407. We direct the President to negotiate an agreement with
China that will include end use verification of any high performance
computers that are exported to China.
{time} 1430
I agree with that goal, but I am also realistic. I doubt any
sovereign nation which has not been defeated in war would agree to end
use verification without notice. I question the wisdom of legislating
unattainable objectives.
Nonetheless, this is better than the original draft. It is a good
compromise. We still have some work to do in conference. I am
particularly pleased with section 3109. This addresses the
controversial issue of foreign visitors to our labs.
We have crafted a bipartisan provision in the Cox/Dicks amendment
that will make the necessary security improvements to our labs without
crippling international programs that are critical to national
security, Nunn-Lugar, our lab-to-lab programs with the FSU, the former
Soviet Union, to make sure bomb grade plutonium and uranium will not
fall into the hands of countries which we do not want to have it, or
terrorist organizations; training the IAEA inspectors, things like that
that are constructive, useful, and can only take place at the labs
because that is where the expertise lies.
Our provision allows the program to stand but puts new restrictions
on it. The Ryun amendment in my opinion would require a 2-year
moratorium that effectively bans the program. We think we have a good
bipartisan solution here. We recommend the entire amendment.
We would also say to Members as other amendments come up that this
amendment really takes care of the Ryun amendment. It is a better
solution. This amendment makes unnecessary, I would suggest, the
amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) on
polygraph because we codify the polygraphs requirements the
administration is now putting in place.
This also makes unnecessary a number of other amendments because we
have subsumed them and included them in this particular amendment. It
is a good amendment. I recommend its adoption.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. I
have been part of a group that has worked for several weeks on an
appropriate, constructive proposal to deal with some of the security
problems we have found.
I was concerned, frankly, that some of the ideas floating around here
were simply a reaction, without thinking and working through the
implications. I was also concerned that some of them focus on just
little pieces of the problem without looking at the broader problem.
I think this amendment is balanced. It does deal with the wide range
of security problems. It is commonsense, but yet it significantly
improves the security at our nuclear weapons labs and other places, but
it also allows important work to continue, work that is in our national
interest. It does not cut off our nose to spite our face.
I think the other key point to be made is this is not the complete
response. I agree completely with what the gentleman from California
(Chairman Cox) has said, that we have more work to do. The Cox
committee said, for example, we need to look at whether the Department
of Energy is even equipped to handle the Department of Energy's nuclear
weapons complex. GAO has said the same thing. We have got more work to
do to get to the bottom of the problems which arose here.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Hawaii (Mrs. Mink).
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for
yielding time to me.
Mr. Chairman, the task the Select Committee on the People's Republic
of China was given was to investigate breaches in national security,
and it was a difficult one. Espionage charges against certain spies or
foreign agents was expected to emanate from this investigation. A lot
of the information that was alluded to was put in parenthesis to
indicate that further investigations were ongoing and that the
administration did not wish to have all of this information disclosed
at this time.
There were a few charges, most of them previously noted, some
including convictions and many others are still under investigation.
It described, I think, more importantly the general technique used by
the People's Republic of China. There was detailed discussion regarding
theft of certain classified information in the report. It described the
actions of certain U.S. satellite manufacturers which served to
transfer technology relevant to nuclear missile development. It
highlighted the failures of the U.S. security system to protect these
important nuclear secrets.
I think that all of these are important disclosures on how these
breaches of national security occurred. I think the committee needs to
be applauded for pointing this out and bringing it to the attention of
the Congress of the United States.
I rise today, however, to caution my colleagues on the implementation
of these concerns we have heard articulated today, that we do not
indirectly or maybe purposefully encourage race-baiting our loyal
American citizens who are following the law, making important
contributions in our nuclear labs and in other sensitive areas in
private industry, making important, notable achievements to our
scientific knowledge and our database, to our country; and that these
individuals, if they are Chinese or Asians generally, are not singled
out for special considerations, for special testing, for security
investigations, perhaps even having their security clearances pulled
while ongoing further investigations happen.
I think it is important for people not to say, we have three volumes
of reports and it is significant, and rely on the newspaper's account.
I call to the attention of this body three pages at least, page 91,
pages 40, 41, and page 2, and commend this Congress to read it.
Volume I, Page 91 is particularly disconcerting to most of us who are
concerned about the potential of scapegoating loyal Americans. Page 91
[[Page H3961]]
says, ``The PRC employs various approaches to coop U.S. scientists to
obtain classified information. These approaches include appealing to
common ethnic heritage, arranging visits to ancestral homes and
relatives, paying for trips and travel to the PRC, flattering the
guest's knowledge and intelligence, holding elaborate banquets to honor
these guests, and doggedly peppering U.S. scientists with technical
questions.''
On page 40, Mr. Chairman, it says ``U.S. scientists who are overseas
in the PRC are prime targets for approaches by professional and
nonprofessional PRC organizations who would like to coopt them. Select
committees have received information about Chinese American scientists
from the U.S. nuclear design labs being identified in this manner.''
Page 41 says, ``The number of PRC nationals attending educational
institutions in the U.S. presents another opportunity for the PRC to
collect sensitive technology. It is estimated that at any given time,
there are over 100,000 PRC nationals who are attending U.S.
universities who have remained in the U.S. after graduating.''
It goes on further to say, ``The Select Committee judges that the PRC
is increasingly looking to PRC scholars who remain in the U.S. as
assets who have developed a network of personal contacts that can be
helpful to the PRC.''
I submit that all of this suggestive language enlarges the reach of
the investigation and interjects doubt and suspicion regarding all of
the Chinese American citizens who are here who are in fact loyal
American citizens.
I caution this Congress to pay attention to the potential harm this
kind of allegation can bring to this large, loyal segment of our
American community.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. DeLay), the House majority whip.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment brought
to us by the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks), and I congratulate the two of them for an
outstanding job and a great service to the American people. Also I
commend their committee. The American people owe them a great deal of
praise for the work they have done.
American national security has been squandered for too long. It is
time for this Congress to correct that problem. The revelations in the
Cox report could not be more startling. The People's Republic of China
orchestrated a multifaceted cabal of spies to methodically steal all of
America's nuclear secrets. This theft by the Communist Chinese was so
complete that the bipartisan Committee on National Security has
concluded that the PRC's nuclear weapons design is now on a par with
our own.''
I know the press is trying to sweep this story under the rug. The
fiasco exposed in the Cox report is being painted as simply another
innocent and unavoidable blunder where no one is to blame. In other
words, it is no big deal. But considering the military ambitiousness of
Red China, there can be no doubt that this is only the tip of the
iceberg. They are going full steam ahead with their nuclear weapons
program, and using our technology to build it.
Because of gross negligence at the White House, future PRC warheads
aimed at the United States will largely be the product of American
expertise. Predictably, the Clinton administration is trying to ride
out this storm, like it always does. The difference is this tempest
puts our whole Nation at risk. There can be no compromises when the
security of America is at stake. We have to shore up security and
counterintelligence failures, and begin a serious battle against
espionage.
This amendment does that by establishing new procedures to combat the
vulnerability of classified technology. It also requires the President
to submit detailed reports to Congress on security matters concerning
our arsenals in Red China.
This amendment is only the beginning. Much more must be done, because
there are consequences to the President's careless disregard to protect
classified information, and it is time we tackle that problem.
Americans can be reassured, and China should know that this issue will
not fade away. This is just the first step.
China must not mistake the weakness of our President for the weakness
of the American people. Congress must be strong where the
administration has been weak. We need to flex our muscles and let the
world know that America takes its national security seriously.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Guam
(Mr. Underwood).
(Mr. UNDERWOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, first I want to commend both the
chairman, the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the ranking
member, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) on this report, and
for working diligently on the issues of security presented by the
recent situation that we face at the Department of Energy. I want to
particularly thank them for the deliberate nature in which they
addressed these issues, and also for not politicizing it, unlike some
people who have come to the floor.
In times of concern over national security, we must remind ourselves
that sparing no effort to ensure our national security should not be at
the expense of our basic beliefs about the civil rights of our people
as a whole, as members of ethnic groups, and as individuals. In times
of heightened concern about the national security, it is sometimes all
too easy to conclude that there may be groups of people among us who
are contributing to our national insecurity.
The most tragic example in American history was the treatment of
Japanese Americans during World War II, but in recent memory we have
stigmatized Arab Americans, especially in the immediate reaction to the
Oklahoma bombing.
Of course, we have many allegations of racial and ethnic profiling in
many communities around the country. It is vitally important to our
national security to continue to ensure the security of our military
secrets, but also our civil rights. We should spare no effort to ensure
that no one is profiled or stigmatized or asked additional questions or
given special treatment or subjected to lie detector tests because of
their ethnic background.
We must stand firmly for the national security of our military
knowledge and our military technology, but equally firm for civil
rights and fair treatment, which marks our society as unique in the
world.
I wish to express my concern that Asian-Pacific Americans are not
placed under a cloud of suspicion, and that all of the procedures being
suggested today, as I know they have by both the gentleman from
California (Chairman Cox) and the ranking member, the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks),that every one be examined for any potential
problems. Let us make sure that all our security concerns really deal
only with security concerns.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Gilman), the chairman of the Committee on International
Relations.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to rise in strong support of the Cox/Dicks
amendment, which implements key recommendations of the Select Committee
on the U.S. National Security amd Military/Commercial Concerns for the
People's Republic of China.
I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) for working
with our Committee on International Relations to modify many of those
provisions in his amendment that fall within our committee's
jurisdiction. I am both gratified and saddened by the success of the
Select Committee.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks), and their colleagues on the Select Committee,
including the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), one of the
subcommittee members, have provided an outstanding service by exposing
not only Chinese espionage against the crown jewels of our defense
establishment, but in bringing to light the failure of the Clinton
administration to safeguard our military secrets
[[Page H3962]]
and in putting trade and commerce ahead of our national security.
The advances in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that China
will reap from their acquisition of American science and technology
directly undermine the fundamental national security of our Nation.
{time} 1445
The impact of the loss of these military-related secrets to the
national interests of our Nation and to peace and stability of Asia,
though, is incalculable.
In addition, we must be greatly concerned about the prospects of
Chinese proliferation of stolen American nuclear and missile secrets to
rogue regimes and others in the Middle East and in South Asia.
Beijing's aggressive actions have in fact proven what many have long
suspected: that the Chinese view our Nation, not as a strategic
partner, but as a chief strategic obstacle to its own geopolitical
ambitions.
The continued assertion by this administration that the United States
and China are strategic partners is naive and misguided and certainly
cannot be found in Chinese actions and policies to date.
Regrettably, the Clinton administration's response to this threat to
our national interest is at best anemic. The Congress has a great deal
to do to rectify the problems that have properly been identified by the
Cox committee.
This legislative package is the sound first step in addressing those
problems. Our Committee on International Relations stands committed to
working with the Committee on Armed Services in fully investigating
these issues and in implementing the Cox committee's recommendations.
The Committee on International Relations has already held two
hearings to hear testimony from the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox)
and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), and we have already
acted on one of the select committee's recommendations. That provision
is included in the measure that we will be taking up next week, H.R.
973, the Security Assistance Act of 1999. That bill includes a
provision to impose higher civil and criminal penalties against
companies which violate our export laws.
I urge my colleagues to support the amendment and to support the Cox-
Dicks report.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi).
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I want to take the occasion of the debate
on the report, on the Cox-Dicks report, to comment on comments made by
our colleagues, the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Mrs. Mink) and the
gentleman from Guam (Mr. Underwood) regarding the issue of sensitivity
on the issue of our Asian-American community.
But sensitivity is not really enough of a word. We certainly have to
be sensitive as we go forward that the FBI in its investigations does
not look into the background of anyone because of their ethnic
background or their surname. Certainly they must be sensitive, but we
have to make certain that one of the casualties of this investigation
is not the good reputations of the people who have been so important to
our national security--people from our Asian-American community, with
their brilliance, with their patriotism, with their dedication.
I hope that as we go forward with all of these amendments and all of
the investigations that will continue, that we do not shed a light of
suspicion on individuals or companies or concerns in America. I happen
to be blessed in my district with a large Asian-American population,
mostly Chinese American. Many of those families have been there longer
than my own. They have been there for many generations. Some have been
there for only many days. But all of them love America.
They came here for a reason. We are the freest country in the world,
and we cannot let this espionage investigation jeopardize that. Our
country's attitude toward people and their rights cannot be a casualty
of this investigation. I am particularly concerned, as one who has
never pulled a punch in criticizing China and its activities in terms
of human rights, proliferation and trade. I want to say here
unequivocally that the jeopardizing of our rights in this country would
be a more destructive consequence than any espionage we can find in
this investigation.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Menendez).
(Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I intend to support this amendment. But I
really have real concerns when there are those who would use national
security to achieve partisan political advantage. However, in their
zealous effort to make this a partisan political issue, even though it
goes back 2 decades and even though it includes efforts during
Republican administrations to have some turn us back to the Stone Age.
There was an original amendment which would have restricted the
export of your basic laptop computer to China. That simply is not
reality.
We need to proceed as we move on beyond this amendment cautiously
with this debate. This near faux pax would have been disastrous for
American industry while having no impact on China. We need to carefully
consider how to best address our national security while simultaneously
taking into consideration the reality of today's global marketplace,
and we need to understand that America does not have a monopoly on
advanced technology.
Now, the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, of
which I am the ranking Democrat, has jurisdiction over the Nation's
export control policies. I am disconcerted that we have not had an
opportunity to consider the proposals contained in the amendment before
us in the subcommittee or in the full committee.
So we look forward to working on those issues in the days ahead. But
the issues raised in the Cox-Dicks report are not partisan issues.
Democrats and Republicans are equally concerned about our national
security.
So let us proceed with caution and address the issues raised by the
report in a responsible manner, with the full input of the relevant
committees, industries, and government agencies. Let us not unfairly
stigmatize Americans of Asian descent who have contributed to the
greatness of this country.
I believe that everyone in this Chamber wants to ensure the national
security of the United States. But we also have to do it in a way that
keeps the tip of the iceberg in terms of America's technology away from
those others who may not have it in the global marketplace, but make
sure we are competitive in all other respects. No one has a cornerstone
on national security interest in this Chamber.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 seconds to the distinguished
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the ranking member of the
Committee on International Relations.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I have heard some of the debate here.
Some try to make it seem that this is a Clinton-era problem. It is hard
to make that argument with problems that date back to 1982. Some of the
Members who spoke on the floor said, oh, this is just because we lost
COCOM. COCOM left us. We never lost it. They left us once the Soviet
Union fell apart.
We cannot get our allies to agree to fully significant controls. The
Bush administration could not save it, and the Clinton administration
could not save it. We have to deal with that reality, or we will take
actions here that will only injure American dominance in these high-
tech areas.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks).
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to, just as we end this debate, again
thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and his staff for the
cooperation we have had in drafting this amendment. I think this
amendment will go a long ways to dealing with the security problems at
our national labs.
I can tell my colleagues, Secretary Bill Richardson, Ed Curran, one
of our finest FBI leaders in this country, are committed to finally
getting this problem cured and resolved. This is the heart and soul of
this amendment. It is the heart and soul of our report.
I want to thank all of my colleagues, the gentleman from South
Carolina (Mr. Spratt), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott), and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Roybal-
[[Page H3963]]
Allard) for their leadership on the committee.
We had a good team, and the Republicans had a good team. Let us have
an overwhelming vote for this Cox-Dicks amendment.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cunningham).
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Cox-
Dicks amendment. It is one thing to spin that administration to
administration had problems; it is another thing for the President of
the United States to know about it, be briefed in 1996, and do nothing.
That is what in my opinion is criminal.
Let me give my colleagues a couple of ideas. I encourage all of my
colleagues to go and get the classified brief. We had an asset, I
cannot tell my colleagues what it is on the floor. We were building a
countermeasure for that asset. It would not have worked. We got the
asset. It not only saved the billion dollars, now we can build it.
Secondly, we have an asset against our fighter pilots. Ninety percent
of the time, both in the intercept and in the engagement, our pilots
die. We have that asset. It also helps us design what we need into the
joint strike fighter, what we do into the F-22.
Doing the opposite things gives the Chinese, not only saving billions
of dollars for a W-88 warhead and our technology, but it allows them to
be more dangerous in the weapons that they could put at the United
States. So this Cox-Dicks amendment is very very important. It is a
good first step.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from San
Diego, California (Mr. Hunter).
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the two authors of the
report along with all the committee members who participated in it.
This amendment is very strong in a couple of ways. It gives at least
a temporary review to the Department of Defense for militarily critical
technology that could be sent to potential adversaries. That is a very
important thing.
It also tries to reinstate a structure, a multilateral structure
where we can persuade our friends, other nations, our allies to join
with us in restricting militarily critical technology from going to
potential enemies.
Now, let me just say there is unfinished business in this report and
in this amendment. After this thing passes, we will still have
supercomputers going to China where we have no end use verification. We
will still be sending American satellites to China for launch by their
Long March rockets which also is a mainstay of their nuclear and
strategic assets.
We will still, after a fairly short moratorium, be allowing visits to
the 65 scientists who came from Algeria, Cuba, Libya, Iran, and Iraq
into our national weapons labs.
There is unfinished business. I look forward to voting for this
amendment and moving ahead to complete the job.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time remains on each
side?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) has 1 minute
remaining and the right to close.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would like, as essentially all of the other speakers have done thus
far, once again to thank the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), the
ranking member on the select committee, and thank all of the chairmen
and ranking members of the committees of jurisdiction who have worked
with us on this amendment.
This amendment does not cover many of the important topics of our
recommendations. Some of the debate here has focused on export controls
on computers. There is nothing about export controls on computers in
this amendment.
It is also important to recognize that hard work remains ahead for
our standing committees. I think that the ranking member and I will be
testifying before several of them to move this legislation along.
Lastly, some mention has been made on the floor about racial and
ethnic profiling by the Communist Party of China. The CCP ethnic and
racial profiling that is detailed in our report is a significant
distinction between the Communist Party and America.
In this country, the liberty and dignity of the individual are
paramount. We do not think of people as members of groups or
essentially tools of the State. That is why what we are investing in
our armed services, in our intelligence community, and our national
laboratories is so important. It is for the pursuit of freedom, not
just for Americans, but for people around the world. That is ultimately
the purpose to which this amendment is directed. I urge my colleagues
to support it.
Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Select Committee
on China, I rise in support of the Dicks/Cox amendment to the
Department of Defense Authorization bill.
Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Norm Dicks have crafted a
responsible, bi-partisan amendment that addresses many of the problems
the Select Committee found during its six month investigation.
This amendment implements most of the President's recommendations for
tightening security at our national labs, including establishing an
independent Office of Counterintelligence at the Department of Energy
with direct line to the Secretary of Energy. It requires polygraphing
of all Department of Energy lab employees who have access to sensitive
nuclear information, and increases the civil and criminal penalties for
mishandling of classified information. The amendment also tightens the
security of the computer system at the national labs.
In addition, the amendment places a temporary moratorium on foreign
visitors from sensitive countries to our national labs until these
strong security and counter-intelligence measures are in place. It also
requires, the Department of Energy to submit a comprehensive annual
report to Congress on security and counterintelligence at all DOE
defense facilities to ensure that these measures are indeed protecting
our national security.
In the area of technology exports, the amendment implements many of
the Select Committee's recommendations, including requiring a
comprehensive report on the adequacy of current export controls in
preventing the loss of militarily significant technology to China. It
also requires a report on the effect of High Performance Computers sold
to China, and requires that the President negotiate with China to
ensure that the computers we export to them are used for their stated
purpose.
Another area that the committee investigated was the adequacy of U.S.
policies regarding security at Chinese satellite launch sides.
Unfortunately, what we found was that there are numerous problems with
the security personnel hired by U.S. satellite companies. These
include, guards sleeping on the job, an insufficient number of security
personnel at launch site, and guards reporting to work under the
influence of alcohol. The committee also found numerous deficiencies in
the Defense Department's monitoring an oversight of satellite launches
in China.
Therefore, I am pleased that the Dicks/Cox amendment includes
provisions to address these problems, such as mandating new minimum
standards for security guards on satellite launch campaigns, requiring
the Department of Defense to develop technology transfer control plans
and requiring that the Department of Defense contract the guard force
for security at the launch sites. Finally, the amendment ensures that
the Defense Department monitors assigned to foreign launches have the
adequate training and support to properly execute their jobs.
In closing, I'd like to echo the statements of my colleagues on the
Select Committee. Many of the findings contained in the Cox Committee
report are indeed grave. This responsible amendment is an important
first step towards addressing these findings and ensuring that our
national security is protected. For that reason, I hope my colleagues
in Congress will vote in favor of this important, bipartisan amendment.
{time} 1500
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cox).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
[[Page H3964]]
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 428,
noes 0, not voting 6, as follows: