FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
June 15, 1999
NEWS MEDIA CONTACT:
Jayne Brady, 202/586-5806
Since taking over as Secretary nothing has been a higher priority for me and I appreciate the Panel's recognition of the actions we've already taken to correct these problems.
I agree with the Report's conclusion that serious change is needed in the department's organizational structure. That is what motivated the sweeping organizational changes we are making to strengthen the management of the department by establishing clear lines of authority and accountability. In fact I've gone so far as to have the security office report directly to me. The PFIAB recommendations are helpful in that they propose to codify many of the changes I have announced over the past seven weeks.
In fact, I believe the security and counterintelligence problems at the Department of Energy are broader than the Board recognizes. These problems cut across the entire department and are not limited to the weapons labs and production sites. The Department of Energy needs to improve security at all of its sites. Plutonium located at our environmental management sites demands the same level of security as plutonium at Los Alamos National Laboratory and classified research at Argonne National Laboratory needs to be just as secure from espionage as nuclear designs at the Livermore National Laboratory.
I have strong reservations about the Board's recommendation to establish a semi-independent or independent agency for nuclear weapons matters. By establishing an autonomous security structure within a new agency, the Board's recommendation would risk eroding the link between national security and 'science at its best,' which has been the strength of our nuclear deterrent from its very inception. I am also concerned that the U.S. nuclear deterrent deserves cabinet level attention. The Board's recommendation would place it in a less prominent position where the tension between programmatic goals and security would persist.
These are serious issues that deserve full and continuing discussion. We will study the PFIAB's recommendations in more detail and assess what additional recommendations we should incorporate into our ongoing efforts to ensure that the Department of Energy security and counterintelligence are the best in the U.S. government."