Congressional Record: June 7, 1999 (House)
Page H3752-H3758
{time} 2030
NATIONAL SECURITY
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Green of Wisconsin). Under the Speaker's
announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania
(Mr. Weldon) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the
majority leader.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to talk to
our colleagues about what I think is one of the gravest issues to face
this Nation, certainly in the 13 years that I have had the honor of
serving in this body.
I come before our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the
Republican Party but as someone who believes that national security
issues rise above party politics. I am very proud of the fact, Mr.
Speaker, that both times I ran for mayor of my hometown I was the
nominee of both the Republican and the Democrat Parties. In fact I
today enjoy significant support from Democrats back in my home district
in Pennsylvania.
In Congress, Mr. Speaker, I have taken great pride in working with
Members of the other side on national security issues, and I have been
the first to acknowledge that many of the struggles that we have won in
this body against the White House involving national security were won
only because we had the support of strong leadership on the Democrat
side as well as the Republican side. I give those comments today, Mr.
Speaker, because I want to focus on what is happening with the debate
surrounding the Cox Commission of which I was a member and the
resultant information that has been put forward to the American people
about a matter that needs to be thoroughly investigated.
Mr. Speaker, it is my contention that when the administration got a
preliminary view of the Cox Committee report in early January, in fact
we gave it to the administration sometime around January 2nd or 3rd,
they got a chance to see a document that nine of us, Democrats and
Republicans, had worked on together for 7 months in a very nonpartisan
way. We did not care where problems had occurred, in which
administrations they were in. If we saw evidence of our security being
harmed or potentially harmed, we laid the facts basically where they
were. We did not attempt to spin them or distort them or attempt to
have them be other than what they in fact were. We did that because we
wanted to have the integrity of our report kept intact once it was
completed. No member of the Cox Committee released any information to
the media. We swore to ourselves that we would not in fact jeopardize
our findings. We gave it to the White House the first week of January
and we asked for a very quick response to assist us in making that
report available in a declassified version so the American people and
our colleagues could read it and talk about it. As we all know, that
took 5 months. But what gave me the first indication that this report
was going to be spun politically was about a month later, in February.
In fact it was February the 1st. Sandy Berger, the National Security
Adviser to the White House, issued a statement that I have a copy of to
selective members of the Washington media, responding to the 38
recommendations that we made in our Cox Committee report that were
still classified. Without asking any member of the Cox Commission,
Sandy Berger released the White House's spin in response to those
recommendations.
Two days after he released that spin, I had the occasion of asking
the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, in a closed
National Security Committee hearing in front of 40 Members from both
parties if he agreed as the head of the CIA with our findings that our
security had been harmed. Now, Mr. Speaker, this was 2 days after Sandy
Berger released public information about our still classified report.
George Tenet said, ``Congressman, we at the CIA haven't finished
reading the document yet.'' Which meant, Mr. Speaker, that the White
House, before the CIA had even completed reading our report, was
spinning it publicly to try to deflect attention away from the White
House and any responsibility of this administration. That is not what
the nine members of the Cox Committee did and that is not the approach
we used. We did not spin anything. Yet that was my first inclination
that this White House was not going to deal in an honorable way with
the findings and the conclusions that we drew from our extensive
research into the results of the transfer of technology both legally
and illegally to China.
Mr. Speaker, that spin continues today. Since the report was released
some 2 weeks ago, the administration has sent Bill Richardson, a friend
of mine whom I served with in this body, out a road show traveling
around the country convincing the American people that the only issue
in the Cox report is Chinese espionage, the stealing of our W-88
nuclear warhead design, the stealing of our nuclear design technology.
And the reason why the White House has wanted to spin the Cox
Commission report in this way is because they can point to this stuff
to having occurred before the Clinton administration took office. So
what Richardson has been saying publicly, on national TV shows, on the
talk shows on Sunday mornings is, ``Look, when this administration in
1995 found out that China had stolen some of our designs, prior to us
coming into office, we took aggressive steps to stop it. These problems
didn't happen under the Clinton administration. They happened under
previous administrations.''
I am here tonight, Mr. Speaker, to challenge that notion and to offer
to debate Secretary Richardson anytime anyplace in a public format on
the issues that I am about to unveil. First of all, Mr. Speaker, even
though the Cox Committee report did not just focus on the nuclear
laboratories and their security, let us talk about the labs for a few
moments, because if you listen to Secretary Bill Richardson traveling
around the country, he would have us believe that the only problems
with the labs were problems that started under previous administrations
which he has now cleaned up. That is hogwash, Mr. Speaker. Let us look
at the facts.
Mr. Speaker, it was in 1993 and 1994 when Hazel O'Leary was appointed
to be the Secretary of Energy by President Bill Clinton that she
decided that the color-coded ID system used in our Department of Energy
labs which said based upon the color of the chain and the ID that you
wore around your neck, you would only be allowed access to certain
parts of our laboratories. It was the way that we kept people out of
illegally accessing information that they did not have the proper
clearance for. When Hazel O'Leary came into office, this long
established practice that had been under previous administrations,
Republican and Democrat, was overturned because she thought that color-
coding was discriminatory. So what happened, Mr. Speaker, was in 1993
and 1994, the Clinton administration did away with that identification
process which made it almost impossible for the lab directors and
others to know whether or not a person was in a correct area of a lab
gathering information and access to data that they should not have had.
Now, Mr. Speaker, if that was a good decision back in 1993 and 1994
which maybe the President would say was the case, why then did this
administration 2 weeks ago move to reinstate the policy that Hazel
O'Leary did away with in 1993 and 1994? If it was good back in
[[Page H3753]]
1993 and 1994 and if the color-coded ID system was not necessary, why
did they all of a sudden 2 weeks ago tell the labs, ``You're now going
to put back into place a color-coded ID system'' at a tremendous cost
to taxpayers. That was under this administration, Mr. Speaker.
Number two, it was this administration and Hazel O'Leary who decided
that FBI background checks, which had been the case under previous
administrations, before people could gain access to our labs, that FBI
background checks had to be done so that we could determine whether or
not those people were spies or whether or not they were appropriately
entitled to have access to classified information. Again it was
Secretary O'Leary, Bill Clinton's appointee, who in 1993 and 1994 put a
hold in at least two of our labs on FBI background checks, allowing
scores of people to get access to our labs, not just Chinese or Asian
nationals but a whole host of people because they were not being
required to have FBI background checks.
Number three, Mr. Speaker. It was in the 1993-1994 time frame when an
employee of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory who had retired was
accused of releasing sensitive and classified information in a public
setting. The Oakland office of the Department of Energy did an
investigation of that employee and they found out, and in fact accused
him of violating the requirements of security at our labs. What did
they do? They penalized that retiree by removing the access he had to
classified information even as a retiree. They took the appropriate
steps. What did Hazel O'Leary do, Mr. Speaker? When that removal of
that retiree's classified status was undertaken and when he appealed
it, all the way up to the Secretary's office, Secretary O'Leary
overruled the Oakland office of the Department of Energy and reinstated
the employee's classification status. Every employee in every
laboratory in America saw the signal being sent by this administration,
``We don't need color-coded IDs, we don't need to have FBI background
checks, and when employees give out classified information, we're not
going to consider that a major issue.''
One more point, Mr. Speaker. And you do not hear Bill Richardson
talking about these facts, but I am offering to debate him here
tonight, anytime, anyplace. Mr. Richardson says that when this
administration found out, in 1995, that the Chinese had stolen the
designs to one of our most sophisticated warheads, the W-88 and the W-
87, that they immediately took action, they began a process of closing
in on the security, and he said that began in 1995.
Mr. Speaker, I want to call particular attention to my colleagues and
to the American people this two-page spread that was in the July 31st,
1995 issue of U.S. News and World Report entitled ``Shockwave''
documenting the annihilation and destruction that would be caused by a
nuclear attack or a nuclear bomb going off. In this document, Mr.
Speaker, is an illustration of the W-87 warhead. Mr. Speaker, in 1995,
this was classified. Mr. Speaker, this administration, in 1995, leaked
this document to U.S. News and World Report, giving the entire populace
of the world, through U.S. News and World Report, access to the design
of the W-87 nuclear warhead, the same year that Bill Richardson is
saying they were putting the clamps on the control of our technology.
But it does not stop there, Mr. Speaker. Because when this occurred,
the Department of Energy began an internal investigation as to who
would have leaked this design of this W-87 nuclear warhead, who would
have given this information out to a national magazine. Mr. Speaker, I
have the name of the person that was conducting that investigation, and
I have been told that he was told to stop the investigation because
they knew where it was going to lead to, that it was Hazel O'Leary
herself who gave U.S. News and World Report the actual diagram of the
W-87 nuclear warhead in 1995. Yet Secretary Richardson, on the Sunday
morning news shows, is saying, ``We have taken the steps to close these
gaps.''
Mr. Speaker, I am today asking for a full investigation as to whether
or not the Department of Energy did such an internal investigation and
I want to know whether or not the individual who was overseeing this
was told by his superiors not to pursue finding out who leaked this
information in 1995. And, Mr. Speaker, if this administration was so
intent on controlling access to these kinds of secrets, then they would
surely be able to give us the answers to the questions I am posing
tonight. Who did the investigation, and who did they find out leaked
this particular diagram to U.S. News and World Report in 1995? It was
not the Reagan administration, Mr. Speaker, and it was not the Bush
administration. It was this administration.
Mr. Speaker, the comments of Bill Richardson around the country are
hollow, they are shallow, and they are nothing more than political
rhetoric being spun to deflect attention away from one of the most
gravest issues that has confronted this Nation in this century, and,
that is, the overall loss of our technology, in many cases where we
relaxed standards to allow people to take information or where we
lowered the thresholds to give people information. Today we have the
Secretary telling us that our labs are secure. I can tell you right
now, Mr. Speaker, there are no controls on e-mails that are being sent
out of our labs at this very moment. They will tell you they have a
software system that looks for keywords, that if an e-mail is sent to
Beijing or some other city and a keyword is in that e-mail, it raises a
flag and that person then will be investigated. Raising a flag after
the e-mail leaves the laboratory does us no good, Mr. Speaker.
{time} 2045
So for Richardson to say that secure measures are in place today is
wrong, it is factually wrong, it is not correct, and he needs to be
honest with the American people.
Secondarily, Mr. Speaker, we have just learned that later on this
year China will be testing the newest version of their long-range ICBM
missile with a range of 13,000 kilometers that can be launched from a
submarine that has the potential for a MIRV or a multiple reentry
capability. This rocket, this long-range ICBM, the JL-2, is beyond
anything they have had in the past, and it is almost a replica of the
trident class ICBMs that we have used in this Nation.
We did not think China would have this capability until several years
down the road. We now have word they will test that missile, that ICBM,
this year.
Mr. Speaker, this is a very serious issue. The American people need
to understand what is happening to their country. They need to
understand the blame game cannot stop by firing lower level employees
who are only following directions. The blame game cannot stop by saying
it was industries' fault. Industry was only abiding by the rules set by
this government, and they cannot blame Chinese or Asian Americans, many
of whom are some of our finest citizens. It was this government and
this administration that failed the American people, and the American
people need to see the factual information.
With that in mind, Mr. Speaker, the following two charts are now
available on my web site nationally:
The first chart, Mr. Speaker, for the first time ever gives the
complete linkage between those agencies and entities of the Peoples
Liberation Army and the Central Military Commission of the PLA which
are all indicated by the red boxes, and you cannot read them, our
colleagues cannot read them, but you can get this off of our web site,
and I have offered to give copies of this chart in a smaller form to
every Member of Congress regardless of party.
The red boxes indicate Chinese arms of the PLA. The green boxes, Mr.
Speaker, which are again too small to read, are the financing entities
that were established to finance the acquisition of technologies for
the arms of the PLA and the Central Military Commission. They would
identify the technology, and the green financing entities would then
finance the purchase of that.
How would they finance the purchase of it? Through the blue boxes or
the front companies. Literally hundreds of front companies were
established in this country, in Hong Kong, in Macao, all over the
world, whose sole purpose it was, was to acquire western and American
technology.
[[Page H3754]]
Mr. Speaker, in this chart our colleagues and the American people can
read for themselves who all of these players are and who all of these
characters and all these organizations are, but there is something new
here, Mr. Speaker:
For the first time that I am aware of each of these boxes are
interconnected with solid and dotted lines. The solid lines indicate
direct working relationships between financing entities, PLA
organizations and Chinese front companies. The dotted lines indicate
working relationships.
I am asking now to enter in the Record, Mr. Speaker, a document I
entitled sources and references:
Sources and References
(1a) Chan, Christine. ``More J&A Securities Staff
Quizzed.'' Hong Kong South China Morning Post, July 16, 1998:
p a11. Article in Hong Kong South China Morning Post which
cites corporation chairman Zhang Guoqing and corporation
president Yang Jun as under investigation in connection with
their activities at the People's Liberation Army-backed J&A
Securities.
(1b) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company Ordinance
Increasing Share Capital and Creating Additional Shares.
Company Reference No. 433562. June 8, 1995. Various company
ordinances increasing capital, creating shares, and providing
board information for the J&A corporation signed by Zhang
Guoqing on behalf of the corporation.
(1c) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. 1997 Brief:
Introduction to J&A Securities Limited. 1997. J&A Securities
Limited company brochure for 1997 which lists corporation
officer and board members.
(1d) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company Ordinances
Appoint Directors and Officers and for Other Purposes.
Company Reference No. 433562. December 21, 1993 through
August 18, 1994. Various company ordinances changing the
name, appointing directors and officers, and providing board
information for the J&A corporation.
(1e) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company ordinances
Appoint Directors and Officers and for Other Purposes.
Company Reference No. 433562. February 14, 1996 through July
18, 1997. Various company ordinances appointing directors and
providing board information.
(1f) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Mortgage and
Charge Details. Company Reference No. 433562. April 1, 1998.
Documents that detail loans and other incomes from The China
State Bank, The Standard Chartered Bank. Documents also
certify relationships with additional companies.
(2) Laris, Michael. ``Chinese Executive Defend Loral's
Role; Undue Missile Aid by U.S. Firm Denied,'' The Washington
Post. June 22, 1998: p a17. Article in The Washington Post
that identifies a Hong Kong businessman `Zhang' (Zhang
Quoqing) as the source of $300,000 given to Johnny Chung.
(3) Rempel, William C.; et. al. ``Testimony Links Top China
Official, Funds For Clinton.'' The Los Angeles Times. April
4, 1999: p a1. Article in the Los Angeles Times that details
the link between a Chinese intelligence official, Johnny
Chung, $300,000 intended for the Clinton campaign.
(4) ``General's Daughter In Probe.'' Agence France-Presse
Wire. Clips from a French Newswire with citations from the
South China Morning Post which cites the link between Liu
Chao Ying (Daughter of China's Top General and Aerospace
Official), Johnny Chung, and executives from Hong Kong and
Chinese companies.
(5) Chin, Michelle. ``Lippo Fund to Focus on Chain
Stores.'' South China Morning Post. July 13, 1995: p 3.
Article that cites the directors of the Lippo Fund and lists
the China Aerospace International Holdings corp as partner in
the fund.
(6) Pusat Data Business Indonesia. Conglomeration
Indonesia, 2nd edition. Jakarta, Indonesia. Pusat Data
Business Indonesia. 1995. Company and shareholder information
from a standard business reference work on nice conglomerates
run by individuals with links to the Chinese government.
(7) Kelly, Michael. ``TRB: CITIC-VIP.'' The New Republic.
January 6, 1999. Article which links numerous high-profile
Chinese government operatives who met with Clinton through
Johnny Chung.
(8) Liu, Melinda. ``The Portrait of a Hustler.'' Newsweek.
March 31, 1997: p 36. Article in Newsweek that cites Johnny
Chung's connection to the White House and the First Family.
(9) Partial citation and timeline of activity at Marswell
Investments Limited. Document which describes the directors
and officers at various Hong Kong `Front' companies.
(10) Translation Section of the U.S. Consulate General in
Hong Kong. `` `Princeling' Influence Within PLA Said
Growing.'' Hong Kong Guo Jih Pao. December 9, 1996. Serial:
HK3012054596. Article translated from Hong Kong newspaper by
FBIS which details the link between the PLA and CITIC.
(11) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key
Player: Wang Jun.'' Www.washingtonpost.com. January 6, 1999.
Washington Post website profile on Wang Jun, chairman of an
arms trading company and White House coffee attendee.
(12) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key
Player: Ng Lap Seng.'' Www.washingtonpost.com. January 6,
1999. Washington Post website profile on Ng Lap Seng,
chairman of a Chinese financial conglomerate and DNC doner.
(13) Summary of documentation on China Aerospace
International Holdings Limited (CASIL). An analysis of CASIL
background and its involvement with the satellite business
and a citing of key figures.
(14) Dun & Bradstreet. ``Ever-Victory System Engrg.''
Worldbase. April 25, 1997: p. 48. Business citation that
establishes the link between Asia-Pacific Satellite and China
Aerospace International Holdings, Ltd.
(15) The United States Department of State. ``Sasser Writes
Home About the Chinese Army.'' United States Department of
State. October 1, 1998. A report from the U.S. Ambassador to
China on the PLA and their plans to develop communications
networks with private companies.
(16) Lim, Wah Dr., et. al., ``Independent Review Committee
Report on the LM-38B Launch Failure.'' Palo Alto, California.
Space Systems/Loral. May 10, 1996. A report initiated by the
Loral Company to evaluate the cause of failure for a Chinese
Space Launch Vehicle.
(17) Diamond, John. ``U.S. Probes Hughes, Chinese General's
Son, in Satellite Export Deal.'' The Associated Press. July
3, 1998. AP wire article.
(18) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key
Player: Maria Hsia.'' Www.washingtonpost.com January 6, 1999.
Washington Post website profile on Maria Hsia, Veteran
Democrat fund-raiser indicted on money laundering charges in
connection with an event attended by Vice President Gore.
(19) Suro, Robert. ``Gore's Ties to Hsia Cast Shadow on
2000 Race.'' The Washington Post. February 23, 1998: p a1. A
Washington Post article that details the link between Maria
Hsia and Vice President Gore.
(20) Reed Business Information Limited. ``The Bank of East
Asia Limited.'' The Bankers Almanac. Reed Business
Information Limited. 1998. Standard business reference
material on the Bank of East Asia including profile and
personnel information.
(21) Sun, Lena H.; Pomfret, John. ``The Curious Cast of
Asian Donors.'' The Washington Post. January 27, 1997: p a1.
A Washington Post article on the Clinton connection to Asian
Donors.
(22) China Charity Federation. ``Founders of China Charity
Federation and Permanent Members to the Executive
Council.'' January 6, 1999. Promotional
Materials that link the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation to Silver Faith Holding.
(23) Liang, Hsiao-chi and Ma, Chien-hsing. ``In a Major
Reversal of Fortune in Struggle for Supremacy, Marketplace
Wai Lands Himself in a Predicament.'' Hong Kong Yi Chou Kan.
February 20, 1998: pp 38-42. Article in Hong Kong newspaper
on CPC Officials and Triad links.
(24) Op. Cit. Liu, Melinda.
(25) The Hughes Corporation. ``China Programs Starting from
1/1/96.'' Hughes Network Systems. Internal company document
specifying programs in China.
(26) Gerth, Jeff and Golden, Tim. ``China Set Cash to U.S.
Bank, With Suspicions Slow to Rise.'' The New York Times. May
12, 1999: p a1. New York Times article on money sent to the
United States from Chinese banks.
Mr. Speaker, this 4-page document gives 28 specific unclassified
documents or 26 unclassified documents that are studied on this chart
that provide all the linkages so the American people in unclassified
form can read how all of these link together for the first time ever,
and I encourage everyone of our colleagues and every person across this
country to turn on the web site, get access to this, and then get
access to these unclassified documents, and I would say to our
colleagues, ``If you can't locate them, I have a master copy of each of
these documents in my office. In fact I have several master copies. I
will give you copies of whatever one of these documents you can't
find.''
Now, as extensive as this is, Mr. Speaker, I can tell you this is
only scratching the surface. In one of our House hearings one of our
colleagues asked the FBI when they were doing the investigation of
these linkages how much of what they know is now available in public
form with all the reports, all the investigations, how much of what the
FBI and the CIA knows is available to the public, and this was the
answer:
Less than 1 percent.
So, as broad as this is, as documented as this is, we only know
publicly less than 1 percent of what the FBI and the CIA know about the
linkages between PLA front organizations, front companies and financing
mechanisms, and the bottom line question has to be asked, Mr. Speaker,
is:
What made this happen? What was the grease that caused these
transactions to take place? What caused these proliferation controls to
be lowered? What caused these accesses to take place?
And that gets to my second chart, Mr. Speaker, which is the time
line.
[[Page H3755]]
This chart, Mr. Speaker, for the first time that I know of gives a
detailed analysis of what has happened in this country since 1993.
Now my colleagues on the other side are going to say, ``Well, a
minute, Kurt. You picked 1993. You are being partisan because that is
when Clinton took office.''
That is not the case, Mr. Speaker. I picked 1993 because two things
happened.
Up until 1993, Mr. Speaker, under Democrats and Republican Presidents
alike, there was a process in place to control technology from Nations
like America to be sent abroad to what we consider to be Tier 3 nations
or nations that are not allowed or were not supposed to have very
capable technology that could come back to hurt us. This process was
called COCON. COCON was an international organization of allied
nations, the U.S. and Japan, that met on a regular basis, and they
decided collectively what kind of technology would be allowed to be
sold and to which countries it could be sold to.
In 1993, without pre-approval of any of the other countries, France,
Great Britain, Japan or any of the other ones, this administration
ended COCON, ended it, and the doors opened up.
Now they put into place something called the Wassanar agreement which
everyone has acknowledged is a total failure, yet COCON worked. In 1993
COCON ended, and the floodgates opened.
Something else happened in that year, Mr. Speaker. I would like to
enter in the Record at this point in time, Mr. Speaker, a letter from
the White House dated September 15, 1993, to Edward McCracken, Chief
Executive Officer of Silicon Graphics from Bill Clinton. Mr. Speaker,
every American needs to read this letter because this letter was sent
by the President of the United States September 15, 1993, and who did
he send it to? To one of his biggest contributors and one of those
blocks of people who supported his candidacy, Edward McCracken, Chief
Executive Officer, Silicon Graphics, Mountain View, California.
The White House,
Washington, September 15, 1993.
Hon. Edward McCracken,
Chief Executive Officer,
Silicon Graphics, Mountain View, CA.
Dear Edward: Thanks for taking the time to come by for
lunch on Wednesday. It was good to see you--and it was a
pleasure to get your insights.
I wanted to bring you up to date on a topic we were not
able to discuss at lunch; the issue of export controls. As
you know, for some time the United States has imposed
stringent exports controls on many of our most competitive
exports. By some estimates, unnecessary export controls cost
U.S. companies $9 billion a year in lost sales. One reason I
ran for President was to tailor export controls to the
realities of a post-Cold War world.
Let me be clear. We will continue to need strong controls
to combat the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and dangerous conventional weapons, as well
as to send a strong signal to countries that support
international terrorism. But we also need to make long
overdue reforms to ensure that we do not unfairly and
unnecessarily burden our important commercial interests.
In that regard, I wanted you to know that we hope to
announce some important reforms by September 30. As you may
know, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown has been leading a process
within the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (IPCC) to
examine how we might better promote U.S. exports. As part of
that process, the National Security Council has led an effort
to develop specific export control reforms. I hope to
announce those when the TPCC issues its report on September
30.
We have not yet finalized all of these reforms, because I
want to be sure that they get a full interagency review. But
I am optimistic that the steps we take will help liberalize
controls on many of our most competitive exports, while
protecting our important national security concerns. Let me
give you a sense of the reform we are considering:
Liberalize Computer and Telecommunications Controls. When
this Administration began, the U.S. controlled any computer
with a capacity above 12.9 MTOPs. My administration is in the
process of raising that level to 67 MTOPs for most free world
countries, relieving well over 13 billion of computer exports
each year from the need for a license. By September 30, I
hope to raise that level further--and also announce important
liberalizations for telecommunications exports to most free
world destinations.
Reduce Processing Time. Delays in processing export control
licenses is a burden on business--and a legitimate gripe
against the Federal government. I hope to announce
significant reductions in the time it takes the government to
process export license applications.
Expand Distribution Licenses. We hope to expand
significantly the availability of distribution licenses for
controlled computers so that exporters need not come back
repeatedly to the Federal government for a license.
Eliminate Unnecessary Unilateral Controls. Controls imposed
only by the U.S. (and not by competitor countries) at times
can put our exporters at an unfair disadvantage as competitor
companies export like products freely. I expect to announce
that, by December 31, my administration will identify and
eliminate wherever possible unnecessary U.S. unilateral
export control policies.
I expect that these reforms will help liberalize controls
on tens of billions of dollars worth of U.S. exports. It can
help unleash our companies to compete successfully in the
global market.
These reforms fit into a broader framework. Soon we will
complete our review of nonproliferation and export control
policy, which will set guidelines for further steps we should
take. I am also currently engaged in seeking major reforms to
COCOM, which should lead to significant liberalization of
controls on computers, telecommunications and machine tools,
while establishing a more effective structure for addressing
the changing national security threats we will face in the
years ahead.
Let me assure you that I am personally committed to
developing a more intelligent export control policy, one that
prevents dangerous technologies from falling into the wrong
hands without unfairly burdening American commerce. It is
important. It is the right thing to do. And many of these
changes are long overdue. I look forward to working with you
in building a new consensus around an effective exports
control policy that meets these objectives.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
But what is the content of the letter, Mr. Speaker? The letter
outlines the administration's plans to liberalize, liberalize the
availability of technology to nations abroad.
So here it is in black and white where the President is telling the
CEO of Silicon Graphics this is what we are going to do for you over
the next 6 years.
Guess what, Mr. Speaker. They did it.
What were some of the highlights? Let me read from the letter. Quote:
Liberalize computer and telecommunication controls, reduce processing
times, expand distribution licenses, eliminate unnecessary unilateral
controls, and it goes into detail in describing.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I am a free trader, and I believe in allowing our
companies to compete. But what you had in 1993 was the wholesale
opening of the flood gates. At the same time Hazel O'Leary is saying we
do not have to worry about the people who work in our labs, they do not
need color-coded IDs, they do not need to have FBI background checks,
and when they give out classified information, we are going to ignore
that and not worry about it. And, oh, by the way, US News, if you want
this chart of the W-87, we will give it to you, and you can run it
nationwide.
Mr. Speaker, these stories need to be told across America.
This time line from 1993 to 1999 shows every decision made by this
administration that allowed a new technology to flow, in this case to
China. It also shows activities of China in violation of arms control
regimes. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I would ask at this time to insert
Chronology of Chinese Weapons Related Transfers:
[From the Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1998]
Indignation Rings Shallow on Nuke Tests
(By Curt Weldon)
Escalating tensions between India and Pakistan should come
as no surprise to the Clinton administration. Since the
president took office, there have been dozens of reported
transfers of sensitive military technology by Russia and
China--in direct violation of numerous international arms
control agreements--to a host of nations, including Pakistan
and India.
Yet the Clinton administration has repeatedly chosen to
turn a blind eye to this proliferation of missile, chemical-
biological and nuclear technology, consistently refusing to
impose sanctions on violators. And in those handful of
instances where sanctions were imposed, they usually were
either quickly waived by the administration or allowed to
expire. Rather than condemn India for current tensions, the
blame for the political powder keg that has emerged in Asia
should be laid squarely at the feet of President Clinton. It
is his administration's inaction and refusal to enforce arms
control agreements that have allowed the fuse to grow so
short.
In November 1992, the United States learned that China had
transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The Bush
administration imposed sanctions for this violation but
Clinton waived them a little more than 14 months later.
Clearly, the sanctions did not have the desired effect:
Reports during the first half of 1995 indicated that M-11
missiles,
[[Page H3756]]
additional M-11 missile parts, as well as 5,000 ring magnets
for Pakistan nuclear enrichment programs were transferred
from China. Despite these clear violations, no sanctions were
imposed. And it gets worse.
Not to be outdone by its sworn foe, India aggressively
pursued similar technologies and obtained them, illicitly,
from Russia. From 1991 to 1995, Russian entities transferred
cryogenic liquid oxygen-hydrogen rocket engines and
technology to India. While sanctions were imposed by
President Bush in May 1992, the Clinton administration
allowed them to expire after only two years. And in June
1993, evidence surfaced that additional Russian enterprises
were involved in missile technology transfers to India. The
administration imposed sanctions in June 1993, and then
promptly waived them for a month, never following up on the
issue.
Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to aggressively pursue
technology transfers from China. In August 1996, the
capability to manufacture M-11 missile or missile components
was transferred from China to Pakistan. No sanctions. In
November 1996, a special industrial furnace and high-tech
diagnostic equipment were transferred from China to an
unprotected Pakistani nuclear facility. No sanctions. Also
during 1996, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency
issued a report stating that China had provided a
``tremendous variety'' of technology and assistance for
Pakistan's ballistic missile program and was the principal
supplier of nuclear equipment for Pakistan's program. Again,
the Clinton administration refused to impose sanctions.
Finally, in recent months we have learned that China may
have been responsible for the transfer of technology for
Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile. Flight
tested on April 6, 1998, the Ghauri missile has been widely
blamed as the impetus for India's decision to detonate five
nuclear weapons in tests earlier this month. Again, no
sanctions were imposed on China.
Retracing the history of these instances of proliferation,
it is obvious that Pakistan and India have been locked in an
arms race since the beginning of the decade. And the race has
been given repeated jump-starts by China and Russia, a clear
violation of a number of arms control agreements. Yet rather
than enforce these arms control agreements, the Clinton
administration has repeatedly acquiesced, fearing that the
imposition of sanctions could either strain relations with
China and Russia or potentially hurt U.S. commercial
interests in those countries.
Now the Clinton administration has announced a get-tough
policy, threatening to impose sanctions on India for testing
its nuclear weapons. But what about Russia and China, the two
nations that violated international arms agreements?
Shouldn't they also be subject to U.S. sanctions for their
role in this crisis? Sadly, the Clinton administration is
likely to ignore the proliferators and impose sanctions
solely on India. In the meantime, China and Russia will
continue their proliferation of missile and nuclear
technology to other nations, including rogue states such as
Iran, Iraq and Syria.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reported transfer by Administration's
Date of transfer or report China Possible violation response
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nov. 1992........................... M-11 missiles or MTCR; Arms Export sanctions imposed on
related equipment to Control Act; Export Aug. 24, 1993, for
Pakistan (The Administration Act. transfers of M-11
Administration did not related equipment (not
officially confirm missiles); waived on
reports that M-11 Nov. 1, 1994
missiles are in
Pakistan.).
Mid-1994 to mid-1995................ dozens or hundreds of MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions
missile guidance Nonproliferation Act;
systems and Arms Export Control
computerized machine Act; Export
tools to Iran. Administration Act.
2nd quarter of 1995................. parts for the M-11 MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions
missile to Pakistan. Control Act; Export
Administration Act.
Dec. 1994 to mid-1995............... 5,000 ring magnets for NPT; Export-Import Bank considered sanctions
an unsafeguarded Act; Nuclear under the Export-Import
nuclear enrichment Proliferation Bank Act; but announced
program in Pakistan. Prevention Act; Arms on May 10, 1996, that
Export Control Act. no sanctions would be
imposed
July 1995........................... more than 30 M-11 MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions
missiles stored in Control Act; Export
crates at Sargodha Air Administration Act.
Force Base in Pakistan.
Sept. 1995.......................... calutron NPT; Nuclear no sanctions
(electromagnetic Proliferation
isotope separation Prevention Act; Export-
system) for uranium Import Bank Act; Arms
enrichment to Iran. Export Control Act.
1995-1997........................... C-802 anti-ship cruise Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions
missiles and C-801 air- Nonproliferation Act.
launched cruise
missiles to Iran.
Before Feb. 1996.................... dual-use chemical Arms Export Control sanctions imposed on May
precursors and Act; Export 21, 1997
equipment to Iran's Administration Act.
chemical weapon
program.
Summer 1996......................... 400 tons of chemicals Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions
to Iran. Nonproliferation
Act;\1\ Arms Export
Control Act; Export
Administration Act.
Aug. 1996........................... plant to manufacture M- MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions
11 missiles or missile Control Act; Export
components in Pakistan. Administration Act.
Aug. 1996........................... gyroscopes, MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions
accelerometers, and Nonproliferation Act;
test equipment for Arms Export Control
missile guidance to Act; Export
Iran. Administration Act.
Sept. 1996.......................... special industrial NPT; Nuclear no sanctions
furnace and high-tech Proliferation
diagnostic equipment Prevention Act; Export-
to unsafeguarded Import Bank Act; Arms
nuclear facilities in Export Control Act.
Pakistan.
July-Dec. 1996...................... Director of Central MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions
Intelligence (DCI) Control Act; Export
reported ``tremendous Administration Act.
variety'' of
technology and
assistance for
Pakistan's ballistic
missile program.
July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions
``tremendous variety'' Nonproliferation Act;
of assistance for Arms Export Control
Iran's ballistic Act; Export
missile program. Administration Act.
July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported principal NPT; Nuclear no sanctions
supplies of nuclear Proliferation
equipment, material, Prevention Act; Export-
and technology for Import Bank Act; Arms
Pakistan's nuclear Export Administration
weapon program. Act.
July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported key NPT; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions
supplies of technology Nonproliferation Act;
for large nuclear Nuclear Proliferation
projects in Iran. Prevention Act; Export-
Import Bank Act; Arms
Export Administration
Act.
July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions
``considerable'' Nonproliferation Act;
chemical weapon- Arms Export Control
related transfers of Act; Export
production equipment Administration Act.
and technology to Iran.
Jan. 1997........................... dual-use biological BWC; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions
items to Iran. Nonproliferation Act;
Arms Export Control
Act; Export
Administration Act.
1997................................ chemical precursors, Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions
production equipment, Nonproliferation Act;
and production Arms Export Control
technology for Iran's Act; Export
chemical weapon Administration Act.
program, including a
plant for making glass-
lined equipment.
Sept. to Dec. 1997.................. China Great Wall MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions
Industry Corp. Nonproliferation Act;
provided telemetry Arms Export Control
equipment used in Act; Export
flight-tests to Iran Administration Act.
for its development of
the Shahab-3 and
Shahab-4 medium range
ballistic missiles.
Nov. 1997/April 1998................ may have transferred MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions
technology for Control Act; Export
Pakistan's Ghauri Administration Act.
medium-range ballistic
missile that was
flight-tested on April
6, 1998.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Additional provisions on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996.
ABWC--Biological Weapons Convention; MTCR--Missile Technology Control Regime; NPT--Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty.
Mr. Speaker, this CRS document, which I had prepared a year ago,
outlines approximately 17 cases where we caught the Chinese selling
technology illegally. This administration knew about it, and it is all
documented here. They imposed the required sanctions twice and waived
them each time. All of those or most of those transfers are documented
here.
Something else is on this chart, Mr. Speaker: White House
presidential visits. I could only complete it up through 1995, the
number of times that key people involved in this massive scheme were
able to get into the White House.
Now, I can tell my colleagues my constituents cannot ever get in the
White House. We cannot even get White House tour tickets which are
available for schools because we only allow four a year. These are
American schoolchildren.
Let me read you, Mr. Speaker. John Huang; he visited the White House
four times in March of 1993, four times in April of 1993, two times in
May, one time in June, one time in November, all in 1993.
Now my constituents cannot do that. Yet this White House opened the
floodgates to welcome selected people in who were a part of this
network, Mr. Speaker.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the House Clerks Office tonight to
give me the price of what it would take to put this document in the
Congressional Record. I am not going to put it in tonight until I get
the price. What is this document, Mr. Speaker? These
[[Page H3757]]
are the FBI wiretap transcripts of conversations between Chung and
Robert Lu, the FBI wire tapped transcripts that took place from May 6
of 1998 all the way through August of 98. In these transcripts in the
words of these key players in this process, the American people, Mr.
Speaker, for themselves can see what was going on and can read with
their own eyes about the discussions that were taking place.
Before I yield to my good friend, Mr. Speaker, I want to say what the
rallying cry of this Member, and I would ask for, if I could, a price
for that for the next day so I can decide whether or not to put it in
the Congressional Record, but I would tell the American people it is
available. It was given to me by Carl Cameron from Fox News. It is
running nationwide, and I would encourage every American person, every
colleague of mine, to read the transcripts contained in here of
conversations as documented by the FBI.
Mr. Speaker here is the real story:
If this administration has nothing to hide, they can do one very
simple thing: release the entire text of the memos sent by Louis Freeh
and his subordinate investigator to Janet Reno requesting that a
special prosecutor be named to handle this whole situation. If there is
no other question we need to ask as Americans, for the next year and a
half it is this one question because Louis Freeh, the head of the FBI,
and his top investigator recommended Janet Reno, but because of all
this data, and they have a lot more than I have shown my colleagues; in
fact, I have seen a lot more as a member of the Cox Committee that I
cannot put on here because it is classified. But they seen all of this
data, the other 99 percent we cannot show, and they made their
recommendations, and Janet Reno choose not to follow their
recommendations.
The American people are owed, owed an explanation as to why Janet
Reno choose not to follow the advice of her chief law enforcement agent
for this country. Every person in this country needs to send a card to
the White House, every Member of Congress needs to ask the question why
the White House will not release the FBI internal memos that Louie
Freeh and his assistant sent to ask for a fully completed investigation
of this network, of this operation, because that will tell us, Mr.
Speaker, whether or not there were motives behind the transfer of
technology that caused America's security harm, and that question needs
to be asked by everyone in this country.
Mr. Speaker, my hope is that all of our colleagues in this body and
the other body will have literally tens of thousands of letter writing
campaigns, post cards to the White House asking, and Janet Reno asking
one simple question.
This can be very confusing, and I do not expect the American public
or even our colleagues to understand every nuance of what is explained
here. It is very confusing, but they can ask one question:
Why will you not release the Louis Freeh memos to Janet Reno in
regard to the investigation of the connections between the PLA and the
Central Military Commission, the Chinese front companies, the financing
mechanisms including the donations of campaign funds to certain
individuals to see whether or not there really was a tie and a
connection in each of these cases?
{time} 2100
That question needs to be answered more than any other single
question that I can think of. Mr. Speaker, I would urge all of our
colleagues to make that their rallying cry over the next year and a
half.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague,
the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Hayworth).
Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I would be remiss at the outset of my
remarks if I did not publicly acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), who has been at the forefront
of explaining to the American people and many of his colleagues in
Congress the necessity, the imperative of a strategic missile defense,
who has been among the leaders in understanding a prospective missile
defense system, who has gone many times to the former Soviet Union, now
the Russian Republic, to establish dialogue with the members of the
Duma there, so, in the words of Dwight Eisenhower, once Americans and
Russians get together they can understand what is at stake here.
But more compellingly tonight, Mr. Speaker, our colleague at the
outset of his remarks framed the question most appropriately and
eloquently when he said, Mr. Speaker, this is a problem that does not
confront us as Republicans or Democrats; this is a security concern for
all Americans.
Indeed, as the gentleman points out, the inadequate, shallow and
incomplete responses of our former colleague from New Mexico, Mr.
Richardson, now the Secretary of Energy; as he points out the
misguided, to say the least, efforts, if you will, of former Energy
Secretary Hazel O'Leary; as he points out the curious selective
investigations by this Justice Department and Attorney General Reno, as
he offers, and, Mr. Speaker, I will move with my staff to make
available on my web site as well the China connection that my colleague
from Pennsylvania has remarkably put together and the time-line that he
also offers.
This is something that should concern every American, for what we
have seen, Mr. Speaker, is a quantum leap in technological prowess by
the Communist Chinese, with our know-how, with our expertise.
Indeed, I would just say to my friend from Pennsylvania, whatever
price it might cost to include those transcripts of the FBI wiretaps in
the Congressional Record, it is a small price to pay on behalf of the
American people to understand the width and breadth of this scandal.
``Scandal'' is an overused term, we have seen so many, and yet, again,
we have this remarkable, troubling, dangerous development in our
national security.
I have said before, Mr. Speaker, this is as if we are in an Allan
Drury novel come to life. But you cannot close the book on this. This
is a problem of incredible magnitude that goes to the security of every
family.
Mr. Speaker, as the President of the United States stood at the
podium just in front of the Speaker's Chair and in a State of the Union
message bragged that no American child went to sleep a target of
Russian missiles, how sad it is that now the Communist Chinese have the
technology and have aimed their missiles at America, to the extent that
we had the Chinese defense minister in defending a provocative action
against Taiwan say, ``Oh, we believe you,'' meaning the United States,
``value Los Angeles more than you do Taiwan.''
The bellicose nature of the threats and, more than rhetoric, the
reality of the technology transfer, is inexcusable, and we, not as
Republicans nor as Democrats, but as Americans, need to follow the lead
of my colleague from Pennsylvania and get to the bottom of this,
because it is an outrage.
As my colleague from Pennsylvania pointed out, it does not only
concern former Energy Secretary O'Leary; it does not only concern
Attorney General Reno; it does not only concern the spin offered by our
former colleague, current Energy Secretary Mr. Richardson; it goes all
the way to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
U.S. News & World Report put that document in, as shocking as that
was. I wonder, Mr. Speaker, how many of the American people have seen
the videotapes of the Communist Chinese leaders who contributed to the
Clinton-Gore campaign in 1996 in the Oval Office? People who are part
of these front groups.
Mr. Speaker, we do not have too many ducks on the lakes in Arizona,
but if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, Mr. Speaker, a
preponderance of the evidence seems to indicate that it is in fact a
duck. What we have here is a serious problem.
I would also note the outrageous and curious behavior of our so-
called National Security Adviser, Mr. Sandy Berger, a former lobbyist
for the Communist Chinese on trade issues. In April of 1996 we know for
certain that he was informed of the Chinese penetration of our labs in
Los Alamos, and apparently he did nothing.
Interestingly enough, Mr. Speaker, April of 1996, that was when Vice
President Gore went to Southern California for his campaign fund-
raiser, what he
[[Page H3758]]
first described as a community outreach event at the Buddhist temple in
Southern California.
The American people have simple questions that need to be answered.
Are we safe? Are those who took the oath of office to uphold and defend
the Constitution of the United States and thereby provide for the
common defense in fact being good stewards and good custodians of that
trust? As my colleague from Pennsylvania eloquently and substantively
explains tonight, that is a serious question for which there may be
troubling answers.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank my colleague for joining me. I
would like to stay here and engage the gentleman, but I am supposed to
do a TV shot, so, unfortunately, I have to yield back my time. But I
would like to thank the gentleman for coming over and joining me.
____________________
