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Congressional Record: June 7, 1999 (House)
Page H3752-H3758

                              {time}  2030
                           NATIONAL SECURITY

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Green of Wisconsin). Under the Speaker's 
announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Weldon) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the 
majority leader.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to talk to 
our colleagues about what I think is one of the gravest issues to face 
this Nation, certainly in the 13 years that I have had the honor of 
serving in this body.
  I come before our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the 
Republican Party but as someone who believes that national security 
issues rise above party politics. I am very proud of the fact, Mr. 
Speaker, that both times I ran for mayor of my hometown I was the 
nominee of both the Republican and the Democrat Parties. In fact I 
today enjoy significant support from Democrats back in my home district 
in Pennsylvania.
  In Congress, Mr. Speaker, I have taken great pride in working with 
Members of the other side on national security issues, and I have been 
the first to acknowledge that many of the struggles that we have won in 
this body against the White House involving national security were won 
only because we had the support of strong leadership on the Democrat 
side as well as the Republican side. I give those comments today, Mr. 
Speaker, because I want to focus on what is happening with the debate 
surrounding the Cox Commission of which I was a member and the 
resultant information that has been put forward to the American people 
about a matter that needs to be thoroughly investigated.
  Mr. Speaker, it is my contention that when the administration got a 
preliminary view of the Cox Committee report in early January, in fact 
we gave it to the administration sometime around January 2nd or 3rd, 
they got a chance to see a document that nine of us, Democrats and 
Republicans, had worked on together for 7 months in a very nonpartisan 
way. We did not care where problems had occurred, in which 
administrations they were in. If we saw evidence of our security being 
harmed or potentially harmed, we laid the facts basically where they 
were. We did not attempt to spin them or distort them or attempt to 
have them be other than what they in fact were. We did that because we 
wanted to have the integrity of our report kept intact once it was 
completed. No member of the Cox Committee released any information to 
the media. We swore to ourselves that we would not in fact jeopardize 
our findings. We gave it to the White House the first week of January 
and we asked for a very quick response to assist us in making that 
report available in a declassified version so the American people and 
our colleagues could read it and talk about it. As we all know, that 
took 5 months. But what gave me the first indication that this report 
was going to be spun politically was about a month later, in February. 
In fact it was February the 1st. Sandy Berger, the National Security 
Adviser to the White House, issued a statement that I have a copy of to 
selective members of the Washington media, responding to the 38 
recommendations that we made in our Cox Committee report that were 
still classified. Without asking any member of the Cox Commission, 
Sandy Berger released the White House's spin in response to those 
  Two days after he released that spin, I had the occasion of asking 
the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, in a closed 
National Security Committee hearing in front of 40 Members from both 
parties if he agreed as the head of the CIA with our findings that our 
security had been harmed. Now, Mr. Speaker, this was 2 days after Sandy 
Berger released public information about our still classified report. 
George Tenet said, ``Congressman, we at the CIA haven't finished 
reading the document yet.'' Which meant, Mr. Speaker, that the White 
House, before the CIA had even completed reading our report, was 
spinning it publicly to try to deflect attention away from the White 
House and any responsibility of this administration. That is not what 
the nine members of the Cox Committee did and that is not the approach 
we used. We did not spin anything. Yet that was my first inclination 
that this White House was not going to deal in an honorable way with 
the findings and the conclusions that we drew from our extensive 
research into the results of the transfer of technology both legally 
and illegally to China.
  Mr. Speaker, that spin continues today. Since the report was released 
some 2 weeks ago, the administration has sent Bill Richardson, a friend 
of mine whom I served with in this body, out a road show traveling 
around the country convincing the American people that the only issue 
in the Cox report is Chinese espionage, the stealing of our W-88 
nuclear warhead design, the stealing of our nuclear design technology. 
And the reason why the White House has wanted to spin the Cox 
Commission report in this way is because they can point to this stuff 
to having occurred before the Clinton administration took office. So 
what Richardson has been saying publicly, on national TV shows, on the 
talk shows on Sunday mornings is, ``Look, when this administration in 
1995 found out that China had stolen some of our designs, prior to us 
coming into office, we took aggressive steps to stop it. These problems 
didn't happen under the Clinton administration. They happened under 
previous administrations.''
  I am here tonight, Mr. Speaker, to challenge that notion and to offer 
to debate Secretary Richardson anytime anyplace in a public format on 
the issues that I am about to unveil. First of all, Mr. Speaker, even 
though the Cox Committee report did not just focus on the nuclear 
laboratories and their security, let us talk about the labs for a few 
moments, because if you listen to Secretary Bill Richardson traveling 
around the country, he would have us believe that the only problems 
with the labs were problems that started under previous administrations 
which he has now cleaned up. That is hogwash, Mr. Speaker. Let us look 
at the facts.
  Mr. Speaker, it was in 1993 and 1994 when Hazel O'Leary was appointed 
to be the Secretary of Energy by President Bill Clinton that she 
decided that the color-coded ID system used in our Department of Energy 
labs which said based upon the color of the chain and the ID that you 
wore around your neck, you would only be allowed access to certain 
parts of our laboratories. It was the way that we kept people out of 
illegally accessing information that they did not have the proper 
clearance for. When Hazel O'Leary came into office, this long 
established practice that had been under previous administrations, 
Republican and Democrat, was overturned because she thought that color-
coding was discriminatory. So what happened, Mr. Speaker, was in 1993 
and 1994, the Clinton administration did away with that identification 
process which made it almost impossible for the lab directors and 
others to know whether or not a person was in a correct area of a lab 
gathering information and access to data that they should not have had.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, if that was a good decision back in 1993 and 1994 
which maybe the President would say was the case, why then did this 
administration 2 weeks ago move to reinstate the policy that Hazel 
O'Leary did away with in 1993 and 1994? If it was good back in

[[Page H3753]]

1993 and 1994 and if the color-coded ID system was not necessary, why 
did they all of a sudden 2 weeks ago tell the labs, ``You're now going 
to put back into place a color-coded ID system'' at a tremendous cost 
to taxpayers. That was under this administration, Mr. Speaker.

  Number two, it was this administration and Hazel O'Leary who decided 
that FBI background checks, which had been the case under previous 
administrations, before people could gain access to our labs, that FBI 
background checks had to be done so that we could determine whether or 
not those people were spies or whether or not they were appropriately 
entitled to have access to classified information. Again it was 
Secretary O'Leary, Bill Clinton's appointee, who in 1993 and 1994 put a 
hold in at least two of our labs on FBI background checks, allowing 
scores of people to get access to our labs, not just Chinese or Asian 
nationals but a whole host of people because they were not being 
required to have FBI background checks.
  Number three, Mr. Speaker. It was in the 1993-1994 time frame when an 
employee of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory who had retired was 
accused of releasing sensitive and classified information in a public 
setting. The Oakland office of the Department of Energy did an 
investigation of that employee and they found out, and in fact accused 
him of violating the requirements of security at our labs. What did 
they do? They penalized that retiree by removing the access he had to 
classified information even as a retiree. They took the appropriate 
steps. What did Hazel O'Leary do, Mr. Speaker? When that removal of 
that retiree's classified status was undertaken and when he appealed 
it, all the way up to the Secretary's office, Secretary O'Leary 
overruled the Oakland office of the Department of Energy and reinstated 
the employee's classification status. Every employee in every 
laboratory in America saw the signal being sent by this administration, 
``We don't need color-coded IDs, we don't need to have FBI background 
checks, and when employees give out classified information, we're not 
going to consider that a major issue.''
  One more point, Mr. Speaker. And you do not hear Bill Richardson 
talking about these facts, but I am offering to debate him here 
tonight, anytime, anyplace. Mr. Richardson says that when this 
administration found out, in 1995, that the Chinese had stolen the 
designs to one of our most sophisticated warheads, the W-88 and the W-
87, that they immediately took action, they began a process of closing 
in on the security, and he said that began in 1995.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to call particular attention to my colleagues and 
to the American people this two-page spread that was in the July 31st, 
1995 issue of U.S. News and World Report entitled ``Shockwave'' 
documenting the annihilation and destruction that would be caused by a 
nuclear attack or a nuclear bomb going off. In this document, Mr. 
Speaker, is an illustration of the W-87 warhead. Mr. Speaker, in 1995, 
this was classified. Mr. Speaker, this administration, in 1995, leaked 
this document to U.S. News and World Report, giving the entire populace 
of the world, through U.S. News and World Report, access to the design 
of the W-87 nuclear warhead, the same year that Bill Richardson is 
saying they were putting the clamps on the control of our technology.
  But it does not stop there, Mr. Speaker. Because when this occurred, 
the Department of Energy began an internal investigation as to who 
would have leaked this design of this W-87 nuclear warhead, who would 
have given this information out to a national magazine. Mr. Speaker, I 
have the name of the person that was conducting that investigation, and 
I have been told that he was told to stop the investigation because 
they knew where it was going to lead to, that it was Hazel O'Leary 
herself who gave U.S. News and World Report the actual diagram of the 
W-87 nuclear warhead in 1995. Yet Secretary Richardson, on the Sunday 
morning news shows, is saying, ``We have taken the steps to close these 
  Mr. Speaker, I am today asking for a full investigation as to whether 
or not the Department of Energy did such an internal investigation and 
I want to know whether or not the individual who was overseeing this 
was told by his superiors not to pursue finding out who leaked this 
information in 1995. And, Mr. Speaker, if this administration was so 
intent on controlling access to these kinds of secrets, then they would 
surely be able to give us the answers to the questions I am posing 
tonight. Who did the investigation, and who did they find out leaked 
this particular diagram to U.S. News and World Report in 1995? It was 
not the Reagan administration, Mr. Speaker, and it was not the Bush 
administration. It was this administration.
  Mr. Speaker, the comments of Bill Richardson around the country are 
hollow, they are shallow, and they are nothing more than political 
rhetoric being spun to deflect attention away from one of the most 
gravest issues that has confronted this Nation in this century, and, 
that is, the overall loss of our technology, in many cases where we 
relaxed standards to allow people to take information or where we 
lowered the thresholds to give people information. Today we have the 
Secretary telling us that our labs are secure. I can tell you right 
now, Mr. Speaker, there are no controls on e-mails that are being sent 
out of our labs at this very moment. They will tell you they have a 
software system that looks for keywords, that if an e-mail is sent to 
Beijing or some other city and a keyword is in that e-mail, it raises a 
flag and that person then will be investigated. Raising a flag after 
the e-mail leaves the laboratory does us no good, Mr. Speaker.

                              {time}  2045

  So for Richardson to say that secure measures are in place today is 
wrong, it is factually wrong, it is not correct, and he needs to be 
honest with the American people.
  Secondarily, Mr. Speaker, we have just learned that later on this 
year China will be testing the newest version of their long-range ICBM 
missile with a range of 13,000 kilometers that can be launched from a 
submarine that has the potential for a MIRV or a multiple reentry 
capability. This rocket, this long-range ICBM, the JL-2, is beyond 
anything they have had in the past, and it is almost a replica of the 
trident class ICBMs that we have used in this Nation.
  We did not think China would have this capability until several years 
down the road. We now have word they will test that missile, that ICBM, 
this year.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a very serious issue. The American people need 
to understand what is happening to their country. They need to 
understand the blame game cannot stop by firing lower level employees 
who are only following directions. The blame game cannot stop by saying 
it was industries' fault. Industry was only abiding by the rules set by 
this government, and they cannot blame Chinese or Asian Americans, many 
of whom are some of our finest citizens. It was this government and 
this administration that failed the American people, and the American 
people need to see the factual information.
  With that in mind, Mr. Speaker, the following two charts are now 
available on my web site nationally:
  The first chart, Mr. Speaker, for the first time ever gives the 
complete linkage between those agencies and entities of the Peoples 
Liberation Army and the Central Military Commission of the PLA which 
are all indicated by the red boxes, and you cannot read them, our 
colleagues cannot read them, but you can get this off of our web site, 
and I have offered to give copies of this chart in a smaller form to 
every Member of Congress regardless of party.
  The red boxes indicate Chinese arms of the PLA. The green boxes, Mr. 
Speaker, which are again too small to read, are the financing entities 
that were established to finance the acquisition of technologies for 
the arms of the PLA and the Central Military Commission. They would 
identify the technology, and the green financing entities would then 
finance the purchase of that.
  How would they finance the purchase of it? Through the blue boxes or 
the front companies. Literally hundreds of front companies were 
established in this country, in Hong Kong, in Macao, all over the 
world, whose sole purpose it was, was to acquire western and American 

[[Page H3754]]

  Mr. Speaker, in this chart our colleagues and the American people can 
read for themselves who all of these players are and who all of these 
characters and all these organizations are, but there is something new 
here, Mr. Speaker:
  For the first time that I am aware of each of these boxes are 
interconnected with solid and dotted lines. The solid lines indicate 
direct working relationships between financing entities, PLA 
organizations and Chinese front companies. The dotted lines indicate 
working relationships.
  I am asking now to enter in the Record, Mr. Speaker, a document I 
entitled sources and references:

                         Sources and References

       (1a) Chan, Christine. ``More J&A Securities Staff 
     Quizzed.'' Hong Kong South China Morning Post, July 16, 1998: 
     p a11. Article in Hong Kong South China Morning Post which 
     cites corporation chairman Zhang Guoqing and corporation 
     president Yang Jun as under investigation in connection with 
     their activities at the People's Liberation Army-backed J&A 
       (1b) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company Ordinance 
     Increasing Share Capital and Creating Additional Shares. 
     Company Reference No. 433562. June 8, 1995. Various company 
     ordinances increasing capital, creating shares, and providing 
     board information for the J&A corporation signed by Zhang 
     Guoqing on behalf of the corporation.
       (1c) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. 1997 Brief: 
     Introduction to J&A Securities Limited. 1997. J&A Securities 
     Limited company brochure for 1997 which lists corporation 
     officer and board members.
       (1d) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company Ordinances 
     Appoint Directors and Officers and for Other Purposes. 
     Company Reference No. 433562. December 21, 1993 through 
     August 18, 1994. Various company ordinances changing the 
     name, appointing directors and officers, and providing board 
     information for the J&A corporation.
       (1e) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company ordinances 
     Appoint Directors and Officers and for Other Purposes. 
     Company Reference No. 433562. February 14, 1996 through July 
     18, 1997. Various company ordinances appointing directors and 
     providing board information.
       (1f) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Mortgage and 
     Charge Details. Company Reference No. 433562. April 1, 1998. 
     Documents that detail loans and other incomes from The China 
     State Bank, The Standard Chartered Bank. Documents also 
     certify relationships with additional companies.
       (2) Laris, Michael. ``Chinese Executive Defend Loral's 
     Role; Undue Missile Aid by U.S. Firm Denied,'' The Washington 
     Post. June 22, 1998: p a17. Article in The Washington Post 
     that identifies a Hong Kong businessman `Zhang' (Zhang 
     Quoqing) as the source of $300,000 given to Johnny Chung.
       (3) Rempel, William C.; et. al. ``Testimony Links Top China 
     Official, Funds For Clinton.'' The Los Angeles Times. April 
     4, 1999: p a1. Article in the Los Angeles Times that details 
     the link between a Chinese intelligence official, Johnny 
     Chung, $300,000 intended for the Clinton campaign.
       (4) ``General's Daughter In Probe.'' Agence France-Presse 
     Wire. Clips from a French Newswire with citations from the 
     South China Morning Post which cites the link between Liu 
     Chao Ying (Daughter of China's Top General and Aerospace 
     Official), Johnny Chung, and executives from Hong Kong and 
     Chinese companies.
       (5) Chin, Michelle. ``Lippo Fund to Focus on Chain 
     Stores.'' South China Morning Post. July 13, 1995: p 3. 
     Article that cites the directors of the Lippo Fund and lists 
     the China Aerospace International Holdings corp as partner in 
     the fund.
       (6) Pusat Data Business Indonesia. Conglomeration 
     Indonesia, 2nd edition. Jakarta, Indonesia. Pusat Data 
     Business Indonesia. 1995. Company and shareholder information 
     from a standard business reference work on nice conglomerates 
     run by individuals with links to the Chinese government.
       (7) Kelly, Michael. ``TRB: CITIC-VIP.'' The New Republic. 
     January 6, 1999. Article which links numerous high-profile 
     Chinese government operatives who met with Clinton through 
     Johnny Chung.
       (8) Liu, Melinda. ``The Portrait of a Hustler.'' Newsweek. 
     March 31, 1997: p 36. Article in Newsweek that cites Johnny 
     Chung's connection to the White House and the First Family.
       (9) Partial citation and timeline of activity at Marswell 
     Investments Limited. Document which describes the directors 
     and officers at various Hong Kong `Front' companies.
       (10) Translation Section of the U.S. Consulate General in 
     Hong Kong. `` `Princeling' Influence Within PLA Said 
     Growing.'' Hong Kong Guo Jih Pao. December 9, 1996. Serial: 
     HK3012054596. Article translated from Hong Kong newspaper by 
     FBIS which details the link between the PLA and CITIC.
       (11) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key 
     Player: Wang Jun.'' Www.washingtonpost.com. January 6, 1999. 
     Washington Post website profile on Wang Jun, chairman of an 
     arms trading company and White House coffee attendee.
       (12) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key 
     Player: Ng Lap Seng.'' Www.washingtonpost.com. January 6, 
     1999. Washington Post website profile on Ng Lap Seng, 
     chairman of a Chinese financial conglomerate and DNC doner.
       (13) Summary of documentation on China Aerospace 
     International Holdings Limited (CASIL). An analysis of CASIL 
     background and its involvement with the satellite business 
     and a citing of key figures.
       (14) Dun & Bradstreet. ``Ever-Victory System Engrg.'' 
     Worldbase. April 25, 1997: p. 48. Business citation that 
     establishes the link between Asia-Pacific Satellite and China 
     Aerospace International Holdings, Ltd.
       (15) The United States Department of State. ``Sasser Writes 
     Home About the Chinese Army.'' United States Department of 
     State. October 1, 1998. A report from the U.S. Ambassador to 
     China on the PLA and their plans to develop communications 
     networks with private companies.
       (16) Lim, Wah Dr., et. al., ``Independent Review Committee 
     Report on the LM-38B Launch Failure.'' Palo Alto, California. 
     Space Systems/Loral. May 10, 1996. A report initiated by the 
     Loral Company to evaluate the cause of failure for a Chinese 
     Space Launch Vehicle.
       (17) Diamond, John. ``U.S. Probes Hughes, Chinese General's 
     Son, in Satellite Export Deal.'' The Associated Press. July 
     3, 1998. AP wire article.
       (18) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key 
     Player: Maria Hsia.'' Www.washingtonpost.com January 6, 1999. 
     Washington Post website profile on Maria Hsia, Veteran 
     Democrat fund-raiser indicted on money laundering charges in 
     connection with an event attended by Vice President Gore.
       (19) Suro, Robert. ``Gore's Ties to Hsia Cast Shadow on 
     2000 Race.'' The Washington Post. February 23, 1998: p a1. A 
     Washington Post article that details the link between Maria 
     Hsia and Vice President Gore.
       (20) Reed Business Information Limited. ``The Bank of East 
     Asia Limited.'' The Bankers Almanac. Reed Business 
     Information Limited. 1998. Standard business reference 
     material on the Bank of East Asia including profile and 
     personnel information.
       (21) Sun, Lena H.; Pomfret, John. ``The Curious Cast of 
     Asian Donors.'' The Washington Post. January 27, 1997: p a1. 
     A Washington Post article on the Clinton connection to Asian 
       (22) China Charity Federation. ``Founders of China Charity 
     Federation and Permanent Members to the Executive 
     Council.'' January 6, 1999. Promotional 
     Materials that link the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
     Corporation to Silver Faith Holding.
       (23) Liang, Hsiao-chi and Ma, Chien-hsing. ``In a Major 
     Reversal of Fortune in Struggle for Supremacy, Marketplace 
     Wai Lands Himself in a Predicament.'' Hong Kong Yi Chou Kan. 
     February 20, 1998: pp 38-42. Article in Hong Kong newspaper 
     on CPC Officials and Triad links.
       (24) Op. Cit. Liu, Melinda.
       (25) The Hughes Corporation. ``China Programs Starting from 
     1/1/96.'' Hughes Network Systems. Internal company document 
     specifying programs in China.
       (26) Gerth, Jeff and Golden, Tim. ``China Set Cash to U.S. 
     Bank, With Suspicions Slow to Rise.'' The New York Times. May 
     12, 1999: p a1. New York Times article on money sent to the 
     United States from Chinese banks.

  Mr. Speaker, this 4-page document gives 28 specific unclassified 
documents or 26 unclassified documents that are studied on this chart 
that provide all the linkages so the American people in unclassified 
form can read how all of these link together for the first time ever, 
and I encourage everyone of our colleagues and every person across this 
country to turn on the web site, get access to this, and then get 
access to these unclassified documents, and I would say to our 
colleagues, ``If you can't locate them, I have a master copy of each of 
these documents in my office. In fact I have several master copies. I 
will give you copies of whatever one of these documents you can't 
  Now, as extensive as this is, Mr. Speaker, I can tell you this is 
only scratching the surface. In one of our House hearings one of our 
colleagues asked the FBI when they were doing the investigation of 
these linkages how much of what they know is now available in public 
form with all the reports, all the investigations, how much of what the 
FBI and the CIA knows is available to the public, and this was the 
  Less than 1 percent.
  So, as broad as this is, as documented as this is, we only know 
publicly less than 1 percent of what the FBI and the CIA know about the 
linkages between PLA front organizations, front companies and financing 
mechanisms, and the bottom line question has to be asked, Mr. Speaker, 
  What made this happen? What was the grease that caused these 
transactions to take place? What caused these proliferation controls to 
be lowered? What caused these accesses to take place?
  And that gets to my second chart, Mr. Speaker, which is the time 

[[Page H3755]]

 This chart, Mr. Speaker, for the first time that I know of gives a 
detailed analysis of what has happened in this country since 1993.
  Now my colleagues on the other side are going to say, ``Well, a 
minute, Kurt. You picked 1993. You are being partisan because that is 
when Clinton took office.''
  That is not the case, Mr. Speaker. I picked 1993 because two things 
  Up until 1993, Mr. Speaker, under Democrats and Republican Presidents 
alike, there was a process in place to control technology from Nations 
like America to be sent abroad to what we consider to be Tier 3 nations 
or nations that are not allowed or were not supposed to have very 
capable technology that could come back to hurt us. This process was 
called COCON. COCON was an international organization of allied 
nations, the U.S. and Japan, that met on a regular basis, and they 
decided collectively what kind of technology would be allowed to be 
sold and to which countries it could be sold to.
  In 1993, without pre-approval of any of the other countries, France, 
Great Britain, Japan or any of the other ones, this administration 
ended COCON, ended it, and the doors opened up.
  Now they put into place something called the Wassanar agreement which 
everyone has acknowledged is a total failure, yet COCON worked. In 1993 
COCON ended, and the floodgates opened.
  Something else happened in that year, Mr. Speaker. I would like to 
enter in the Record at this point in time, Mr. Speaker, a letter from 
the White House dated September 15, 1993, to Edward McCracken, Chief 
Executive Officer of Silicon Graphics from Bill Clinton. Mr. Speaker, 
every American needs to read this letter because this letter was sent 
by the President of the United States September 15, 1993, and who did 
he send it to? To one of his biggest contributors and one of those 
blocks of people who supported his candidacy, Edward McCracken, Chief 
Executive Officer, Silicon Graphics, Mountain View, California.

                                              The White House,

                                   Washington, September 15, 1993.
     Hon. Edward McCracken,
     Chief Executive Officer,
     Silicon Graphics, Mountain View, CA.
       Dear Edward: Thanks for taking the time to come by for 
     lunch on Wednesday. It was good to see you--and it was a 
     pleasure to get your insights.
       I wanted to bring you up to date on a topic we were not 
     able to discuss at lunch; the issue of export controls. As 
     you know, for some time the United States has imposed 
     stringent exports controls on many of our most competitive 
     exports. By some estimates, unnecessary export controls cost 
     U.S. companies $9 billion a year in lost sales. One reason I 
     ran for President was to tailor export controls to the 
     realities of a post-Cold War world.
       Let me be clear. We will continue to need strong controls 
     to combat the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction and dangerous conventional weapons, as well 
     as to send a strong signal to countries that support 
     international terrorism. But we also need to make long 
     overdue reforms to ensure that we do not unfairly and 
     unnecessarily burden our important commercial interests.
       In that regard, I wanted you to know that we hope to 
     announce some important reforms by September 30. As you may 
     know, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown has been leading a process 
     within the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (IPCC) to 
     examine how we might better promote U.S. exports. As part of 
     that process, the National Security Council has led an effort 
     to develop specific export control reforms. I hope to 
     announce those when the TPCC issues its report on September 
       We have not yet finalized all of these reforms, because I 
     want to be sure that they get a full interagency review. But 
     I am optimistic that the steps we take will help liberalize 
     controls on many of our most competitive exports, while 
     protecting our important national security concerns. Let me 
     give you a sense of the reform we are considering:
       Liberalize Computer and Telecommunications Controls. When 
     this Administration began, the U.S. controlled any computer 
     with a capacity above 12.9 MTOPs. My administration is in the 
     process of raising that level to 67 MTOPs for most free world 
     countries, relieving well over 13 billion of computer exports 
     each year from the need for a license. By September 30, I 
     hope to raise that level further--and also announce important 
     liberalizations for telecommunications exports to most free 
     world destinations.
       Reduce Processing Time. Delays in processing export control 
     licenses is a burden on business--and a legitimate gripe 
     against the Federal government. I hope to announce 
     significant reductions in the time it takes the government to 
     process export license applications.
       Expand Distribution Licenses. We hope to expand 
     significantly the availability of distribution licenses for 
     controlled computers so that exporters need not come back 
     repeatedly to the Federal government for a license.
       Eliminate Unnecessary Unilateral Controls. Controls imposed 
     only by the U.S. (and not by competitor countries) at times 
     can put our exporters at an unfair disadvantage as competitor 
     companies export like products freely. I expect to announce 
     that, by December 31, my administration will identify and 
     eliminate wherever possible unnecessary U.S. unilateral 
     export control policies.
       I expect that these reforms will help liberalize controls 
     on tens of billions of dollars worth of U.S. exports. It can 
     help unleash our companies to compete successfully in the 
     global market.
       These reforms fit into a broader framework. Soon we will 
     complete our review of nonproliferation and export control 
     policy, which will set guidelines for further steps we should 
     take. I am also currently engaged in seeking major reforms to 
     COCOM, which should lead to significant liberalization of 
     controls on computers, telecommunications and machine tools, 
     while establishing a more effective structure for addressing 
     the changing national security threats we will face in the 
     years ahead.
       Let me assure you that I am personally committed to 
     developing a more intelligent export control policy, one that 
     prevents dangerous technologies from falling into the wrong 
     hands without unfairly burdening American commerce. It is 
     important. It is the right thing to do. And many of these 
     changes are long overdue. I look forward to working with you 
     in building a new consensus around an effective exports 
     control policy that meets these objectives.
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  But what is the content of the letter, Mr. Speaker? The letter 
outlines the administration's plans to liberalize, liberalize the 
availability of technology to nations abroad.
  So here it is in black and white where the President is telling the 
CEO of Silicon Graphics this is what we are going to do for you over 
the next 6 years.
  Guess what, Mr. Speaker. They did it.
  What were some of the highlights? Let me read from the letter. Quote: 
Liberalize computer and telecommunication controls, reduce processing 
times, expand distribution licenses, eliminate unnecessary unilateral 
controls, and it goes into detail in describing.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, I am a free trader, and I believe in allowing our 
companies to compete. But what you had in 1993 was the wholesale 
opening of the flood gates. At the same time Hazel O'Leary is saying we 
do not have to worry about the people who work in our labs, they do not 
need color-coded IDs, they do not need to have FBI background checks, 
and when they give out classified information, we are going to ignore 
that and not worry about it. And, oh, by the way, US News, if you want 
this chart of the W-87, we will give it to you, and you can run it 
  Mr. Speaker, these stories need to be told across America.
  This time line from 1993 to 1999 shows every decision made by this 
administration that allowed a new technology to flow, in this case to 
China. It also shows activities of China in violation of arms control 
regimes. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I would ask at this time to insert 
Chronology of Chinese Weapons Related Transfers:

               [From the Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1998]

                Indignation Rings Shallow on Nuke Tests

                            (By Curt Weldon)

       Escalating tensions between India and Pakistan should come 
     as no surprise to the Clinton administration. Since the 
     president took office, there have been dozens of reported 
     transfers of sensitive military technology by Russia and 
     China--in direct violation of numerous international arms 
     control agreements--to a host of nations, including Pakistan 
     and India.
       Yet the Clinton administration has repeatedly chosen to 
     turn a blind eye to this proliferation of missile, chemical-
     biological and nuclear technology, consistently refusing to 
     impose sanctions on violators. And in those handful of 
     instances where sanctions were imposed, they usually were 
     either quickly waived by the administration or allowed to 
     expire. Rather than condemn India for current tensions, the 
     blame for the political powder keg that has emerged in Asia 
     should be laid squarely at the feet of President Clinton. It 
     is his administration's inaction and refusal to enforce arms 
     control agreements that have allowed the fuse to grow so 
        In November 1992, the United States learned that China had 
     transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The Bush 
     administration imposed sanctions for this violation but 
     Clinton waived them a little more than 14 months later. 
     Clearly, the sanctions did not have the desired effect: 
     Reports during the first half of 1995 indicated that M-11 

[[Page H3756]]

     additional M-11 missile parts, as well as 5,000 ring magnets 
     for Pakistan nuclear enrichment programs were transferred 
     from China. Despite these clear violations, no sanctions were 
     imposed. And it gets worse.
       Not to be outdone by its sworn foe, India aggressively 
     pursued similar technologies and obtained them, illicitly, 
     from Russia. From 1991 to 1995, Russian entities transferred 
     cryogenic liquid oxygen-hydrogen rocket engines and 
     technology to India. While sanctions were imposed by 
     President Bush in May 1992, the Clinton administration 
     allowed them to expire after only two years. And in June 
     1993, evidence surfaced that additional Russian enterprises 
     were involved in missile technology transfers to India. The 
     administration imposed sanctions in June 1993, and then 
     promptly waived them for a month, never following up on the 
       Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to aggressively pursue 
     technology transfers from China. In August 1996, the 
     capability to manufacture M-11 missile or missile components 
     was transferred from China to Pakistan. No sanctions. In 
     November 1996, a special industrial furnace and high-tech 
     diagnostic equipment were transferred from China to an 
     unprotected Pakistani nuclear facility. No sanctions. Also 
     during 1996, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     issued a report stating that China had provided a 
     ``tremendous variety'' of technology and assistance for 
     Pakistan's ballistic missile program and was the principal 
     supplier of nuclear equipment for Pakistan's program. Again, 
     the Clinton administration refused to impose sanctions.
       Finally, in recent months we have learned that China may 
     have been responsible for the transfer of technology for 
     Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile. Flight 
     tested on April 6, 1998, the Ghauri missile has been widely 
     blamed as the impetus for India's decision to detonate five 
     nuclear weapons in tests earlier this month. Again, no 
     sanctions were imposed on China.
       Retracing the history of these instances of proliferation, 
     it is obvious that Pakistan and India have been locked in an 
     arms race since the beginning of the decade. And the race has 
     been given repeated jump-starts by China and Russia, a clear 
     violation of a number of arms control agreements. Yet rather 
     than enforce these arms control agreements, the Clinton 
     administration has repeatedly acquiesced, fearing that the 
     imposition of sanctions could either strain relations with 
     China and Russia or potentially hurt U.S. commercial 
     interests in those countries.
       Now the Clinton administration has announced a get-tough 
     policy, threatening to impose sanctions on India for testing 
     its nuclear weapons. But what about Russia and China, the two 
     nations that violated international arms agreements? 
     Shouldn't they also be subject to U.S. sanctions for their 
     role in this crisis? Sadly, the Clinton administration is 
     likely to ignore the proliferators and impose sanctions 
     solely on India. In the meantime, China and Russia will 
     continue their proliferation of missile and nuclear 
     technology to other nations, including rogue states such as 
     Iran, Iraq and Syria.

                                        Reported transfer by                                Administration's
     Date of transfer or report                China              Possible violation            response
Nov. 1992...........................  M-11 missiles or         MTCR; Arms Export        sanctions imposed on
                                       related equipment to     Control Act; Export      Aug. 24, 1993, for
                                       Pakistan (The            Administration Act.      transfers of M-11
                                       Administration did not                            related equipment (not
                                       officially confirm                                missiles); waived on
                                       reports that M-11                                 Nov. 1, 1994
                                       missiles are in
Mid-1994 to mid-1995................  dozens or hundreds of    MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms     no sanctions
                                       missile guidance         Nonproliferation Act;
                                       systems and              Arms Export Control
                                       computerized machine     Act; Export
                                       tools to Iran.           Administration Act.
2nd quarter of 1995.................  parts for the M-11       MTCR; Arms Export        no sanctions
                                       missile to Pakistan.     Control Act; Export
                                                                Administration Act.
Dec. 1994 to mid-1995...............  5,000 ring magnets for   NPT; Export-Import Bank  considered sanctions
                                       an unsafeguarded         Act; Nuclear             under the Export-Import
                                       nuclear enrichment       Proliferation            Bank Act; but announced
                                       program in Pakistan.     Prevention Act; Arms     on May 10, 1996, that
                                                                Export Control Act.      no sanctions would be
July 1995...........................  more than 30 M-11        MTCR; Arms Export        no sanctions
                                       missiles stored in       Control Act; Export
                                       crates at Sargodha Air   Administration Act.
                                       Force Base in Pakistan.
Sept. 1995..........................  calutron                 NPT; Nuclear             no sanctions
                                       (electromagnetic         Proliferation
                                       isotope separation       Prevention Act; Export-
                                       system) for uranium      Import Bank Act; Arms
                                       enrichment to Iran.      Export Control Act.
1995-1997...........................  C-802 anti-ship cruise   Iran-Iraq Arms           no sanctions
                                       missiles and C-801 air-  Nonproliferation Act.
                                       launched cruise
                                       missiles to Iran.
Before Feb. 1996....................  dual-use chemical        Arms Export Control      sanctions imposed on May
                                       precursors and           Act; Export              21, 1997
                                       equipment to Iran's      Administration Act.
                                       chemical weapon
Summer 1996.........................  400 tons of chemicals    Iran-Iraq Arms           no sanctions
                                       to Iran.                 Nonproliferation
                                                                Act;\1\ Arms Export
                                                                Control Act; Export
                                                                Administration Act.
Aug. 1996...........................  plant to manufacture M-  MTCR; Arms Export        no sanctions
                                       11 missiles or missile   Control Act; Export
                                       components in Pakistan.  Administration Act.
Aug. 1996...........................  gyroscopes,              MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms     no sanctions
                                       accelerometers, and      Nonproliferation Act;
                                       test equipment for       Arms Export Control
                                       missile guidance to      Act; Export
                                       Iran.                    Administration Act.
Sept. 1996..........................  special industrial       NPT; Nuclear             no sanctions
                                       furnace and high-tech    Proliferation
                                       diagnostic equipment     Prevention Act; Export-
                                       to unsafeguarded         Import Bank Act; Arms
                                       nuclear facilities in    Export Control Act.
July-Dec. 1996......................  Director of Central      MTCR; Arms Export        no sanctions
                                       Intelligence (DCI)       Control Act; Export
                                       reported ``tremendous    Administration Act.
                                       variety'' of
                                       technology and
                                       assistance for
                                       Pakistan's ballistic
                                       missile program.
July-Dec. 1996......................  DCI reported             MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms     no sanctions
                                       ``tremendous variety''   Nonproliferation Act;
                                       of assistance for        Arms Export Control
                                       Iran's ballistic         Act; Export
                                       missile program.         Administration Act.
July-Dec. 1996......................  DCI reported principal   NPT; Nuclear             no sanctions
                                       supplies of nuclear      Proliferation
                                       equipment, material,     Prevention Act; Export-
                                       and technology for       Import Bank Act; Arms
                                       Pakistan's nuclear       Export Administration
                                       weapon program.          Act.
July-Dec. 1996......................  DCI reported key         NPT; Iran-Iraq Arms      no sanctions
                                       supplies of technology   Nonproliferation Act;
                                       for large nuclear        Nuclear Proliferation
                                       projects in Iran.        Prevention Act; Export-
                                                                Import Bank Act; Arms
                                                                Export Administration
July-Dec. 1996......................  DCI reported             Iran-Iraq Arms           no sanctions
                                       ``considerable''         Nonproliferation Act;
                                       chemical weapon-         Arms Export Control
                                       related transfers of     Act; Export
                                       production equipment     Administration Act.
                                       and technology to Iran.
Jan. 1997...........................  dual-use biological      BWC; Iran-Iraq Arms      no sanctions
                                       items to Iran.           Nonproliferation Act;
                                                                Arms Export Control
                                                                Act; Export
                                                                Administration Act.
1997................................  chemical precursors,     Iran-Iraq Arms           no sanctions
                                       production equipment,    Nonproliferation Act;
                                       and production           Arms Export Control
                                       technology for Iran's    Act; Export
                                       chemical weapon          Administration Act.
                                       program, including a
                                       plant for making glass-
                                       lined equipment.
Sept. to Dec. 1997..................  China Great Wall         MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms     no sanctions
                                       Industry Corp.           Nonproliferation Act;
                                       provided telemetry       Arms Export Control
                                       equipment used in        Act; Export
                                       flight-tests to Iran     Administration Act.
                                       for its development of
                                       the Shahab-3 and
                                       Shahab-4 medium range
                                       ballistic missiles.
Nov. 1997/April 1998................  may have transferred     MTCR; Arms Export        no sanctions
                                       technology for           Control Act; Export
                                       Pakistan's Ghauri        Administration Act.
                                       medium-range ballistic
                                       missile that was
                                       flight-tested on April
                                       6, 1998.
\1\ Additional provisions on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996.

 ABWC--Biological Weapons Convention; MTCR--Missile Technology Control Regime; NPT--Nuclear Nonproliferation

  Mr. Speaker, this CRS document, which I had prepared a year ago, 
outlines approximately 17 cases where we caught the Chinese selling 
technology illegally. This administration knew about it, and it is all 
documented here. They imposed the required sanctions twice and waived 
them each time. All of those or most of those transfers are documented 
  Something else is on this chart, Mr. Speaker: White House 
presidential visits. I could only complete it up through 1995, the 
number of times that key people involved in this massive scheme were 
able to get into the White House.
  Now, I can tell my colleagues my constituents cannot ever get in the 
White House. We cannot even get White House tour tickets which are 
available for schools because we only allow four a year. These are 
American schoolchildren.
  Let me read you, Mr. Speaker. John Huang; he visited the White House 
four times in March of 1993, four times in April of 1993, two times in 
May, one time in June, one time in November, all in 1993.
  Now my constituents cannot do that. Yet this White House opened the 
floodgates to welcome selected people in who were a part of this 
network, Mr. Speaker.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the House Clerks Office tonight to 
give me the price of what it would take to put this document in the 
Congressional Record. I am not going to put it in tonight until I get 
the price. What is this document, Mr. Speaker? These

[[Page H3757]]

are the FBI wiretap transcripts of conversations between Chung and 
Robert Lu, the FBI wire tapped transcripts that took place from May 6 
of 1998 all the way through August of 98. In these transcripts in the 
words of these key players in this process, the American people, Mr. 
Speaker, for themselves can see what was going on and can read with 
their own eyes about the discussions that were taking place.
  Before I yield to my good friend, Mr. Speaker, I want to say what the 
rallying cry of this Member, and I would ask for, if I could, a price 
for that for the next day so I can decide whether or not to put it in 
the Congressional Record, but I would tell the American people it is 
available. It was given to me by Carl Cameron from Fox News. It is 
running nationwide, and I would encourage every American person, every 
colleague of mine, to read the transcripts contained in here of 
conversations as documented by the FBI.
  Mr. Speaker here is the real story:
  If this administration has nothing to hide, they can do one very 
simple thing: release the entire text of the memos sent by Louis Freeh 
and his subordinate investigator to Janet Reno requesting that a 
special prosecutor be named to handle this whole situation. If there is 
no other question we need to ask as Americans, for the next year and a 
half it is this one question because Louis Freeh, the head of the FBI, 
and his top investigator recommended Janet Reno, but because of all 
this data, and they have a lot more than I have shown my colleagues; in 
fact, I have seen a lot more as a member of the Cox Committee that I 
cannot put on here because it is classified. But they seen all of this 
data, the other 99 percent we cannot show, and they made their 
recommendations, and Janet Reno choose not to follow their 
  The American people are owed, owed an explanation as to why Janet 
Reno choose not to follow the advice of her chief law enforcement agent 
for this country. Every person in this country needs to send a card to 
the White House, every Member of Congress needs to ask the question why 
the White House will not release the FBI internal memos that Louie 
Freeh and his assistant sent to ask for a fully completed investigation 
of this network, of this operation, because that will tell us, Mr. 
Speaker, whether or not there were motives behind the transfer of 
technology that caused America's security harm, and that question needs 
to be asked by everyone in this country.
  Mr. Speaker, my hope is that all of our colleagues in this body and 
the other body will have literally tens of thousands of letter writing 
campaigns, post cards to the White House asking, and Janet Reno asking 
one simple question.
  This can be very confusing, and I do not expect the American public 
or even our colleagues to understand every nuance of what is explained 
here. It is very confusing, but they can ask one question:
  Why will you not release the Louis Freeh memos to Janet Reno in 
regard to the investigation of the connections between the PLA and the 
Central Military Commission, the Chinese front companies, the financing 
mechanisms including the donations of campaign funds to certain 
individuals to see whether or not there really was a tie and a 
connection in each of these cases?

                              {time}  2100

  That question needs to be answered more than any other single 
question that I can think of. Mr. Speaker, I would urge all of our 
colleagues to make that their rallying cry over the next year and a 
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague, 
the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Hayworth).
  Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I would be remiss at the outset of my 
remarks if I did not publicly acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), who has been at the forefront 
of explaining to the American people and many of his colleagues in 
Congress the necessity, the imperative of a strategic missile defense, 
who has been among the leaders in understanding a prospective missile 
defense system, who has gone many times to the former Soviet Union, now 
the Russian Republic, to establish dialogue with the members of the 
Duma there, so, in the words of Dwight Eisenhower, once Americans and 
Russians get together they can understand what is at stake here.
  But more compellingly tonight, Mr. Speaker, our colleague at the 
outset of his remarks framed the question most appropriately and 
eloquently when he said, Mr. Speaker, this is a problem that does not 
confront us as Republicans or Democrats; this is a security concern for 
all Americans.
  Indeed, as the gentleman points out, the inadequate, shallow and 
incomplete responses of our former colleague from New Mexico, Mr. 
Richardson, now the Secretary of Energy; as he points out the 
misguided, to say the least, efforts, if you will, of former Energy 
Secretary Hazel O'Leary; as he points out the curious selective 
investigations by this Justice Department and Attorney General Reno, as 
he offers, and, Mr. Speaker, I will move with my staff to make 
available on my web site as well the China connection that my colleague 
from Pennsylvania has remarkably put together and the time-line that he 
also offers.
  This is something that should concern every American, for what we 
have seen, Mr. Speaker, is a quantum leap in technological prowess by 
the Communist Chinese, with our know-how, with our expertise.
  Indeed, I would just say to my friend from Pennsylvania, whatever 
price it might cost to include those transcripts of the FBI wiretaps in 
the Congressional Record, it is a small price to pay on behalf of the 
American people to understand the width and breadth of this scandal. 
``Scandal'' is an overused term, we have seen so many, and yet, again, 
we have this remarkable, troubling, dangerous development in our 
national security.
  I have said before, Mr. Speaker, this is as if we are in an Allan 
Drury novel come to life. But you cannot close the book on this. This 
is a problem of incredible magnitude that goes to the security of every 
  Mr. Speaker, as the President of the United States stood at the 
podium just in front of the Speaker's Chair and in a State of the Union 
message bragged that no American child went to sleep a target of 
Russian missiles, how sad it is that now the Communist Chinese have the 
technology and have aimed their missiles at America, to the extent that 
we had the Chinese defense minister in defending a provocative action 
against Taiwan say, ``Oh, we believe you,'' meaning the United States, 
``value Los Angeles more than you do Taiwan.''
  The bellicose nature of the threats and, more than rhetoric, the 
reality of the technology transfer, is inexcusable, and we, not as 
Republicans nor as Democrats, but as Americans, need to follow the lead 
of my colleague from Pennsylvania and get to the bottom of this, 
because it is an outrage.
  As my colleague from Pennsylvania pointed out, it does not only 
concern former Energy Secretary O'Leary; it does not only concern 
Attorney General Reno; it does not only concern the spin offered by our 
former colleague, current Energy Secretary Mr. Richardson; it goes all 
the way to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
  U.S. News & World Report put that document in, as shocking as that 
was. I wonder, Mr. Speaker, how many of the American people have seen 
the videotapes of the Communist Chinese leaders who contributed to the 
Clinton-Gore campaign in 1996 in the Oval Office? People who are part 
of these front groups.
  Mr. Speaker, we do not have too many ducks on the lakes in Arizona, 
but if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, Mr. Speaker, a 
preponderance of the evidence seems to indicate that it is in fact a 
duck. What we have here is a serious problem.
  I would also note the outrageous and curious behavior of our so-
called National Security Adviser, Mr. Sandy Berger, a former lobbyist 
for the Communist Chinese on trade issues. In April of 1996 we know for 
certain that he was informed of the Chinese penetration of our labs in 
Los Alamos, and apparently he did nothing.
  Interestingly enough, Mr. Speaker, April of 1996, that was when Vice 
President Gore went to Southern California for his campaign fund-
raiser, what he

[[Page H3758]]

first described as a community outreach event at the Buddhist temple in 
Southern California.
  The American people have simple questions that need to be answered. 
Are we safe? Are those who took the oath of office to uphold and defend 
the Constitution of the United States and thereby provide for the 
common defense in fact being good stewards and good custodians of that 
trust? As my colleague from Pennsylvania eloquently and substantively 
explains tonight, that is a serious question for which there may be 
troubling answers.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank my colleague for joining me. I 
would like to stay here and engage the gentleman, but I am supposed to 
do a TV shot, so, unfortunately, I have to yield back my time. But I 
would like to thank the gentleman for coming over and joining me.


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