The Cox Report inflammatorily accuses China of "stealing'' secret information on the most advanced thermonuclear warheads possessed by the United States, including the seven types of W-88, W-87, W-78, W-76, W-70, W-62 and W-56. It claims, "In the late 1970s, the PRC stole design information on the US W-70 warhead (enhanced radiation nuclear warhead, also known as the neutron bomb) from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. The PRC subsequently tested a neutron bomb in 1988.'' This is a groundless, vicious slander and a grave calumny on the Chinese people and Chinese scientists.

As everybody knows, since the 1950s, China has successfully overcome a series of difficult technological problems and mastered the nuclear weapon technology within a reasonably short time, by relying on its own forces, on its large number of talented scientists full of creative spirit, and on the energetic support of the people throughout the country. On October 16, 1964, China successfully conducted its first atom bomb test. On December 28, 1966, it mastered the principle of hydrogen (H) bomb technology, and on June 17, 1967, it successfully carried out its first H-bomb test. During this period, China also conducted missile nuclear weapon tests, initially forming its own nuclear self-defense and counter-attack strength. In the 1970s and 1980s, facing an ever-intensifying nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, which, like dark clouds, hung over the heads of all people in the world and directly threatened China's safety, China had no other choice but to continue to carry out research and development of nuclear weapons technology and improve its nuclear weapons systems, mastering in succession the neutron bomb design technology and the nuclear weapon miniaturization technology.

The neutron bomb seems quite mysterious to ordinary people. In fact, it is a special kind of H-bomb. Since China has already possessed atom bomb and H-bomb technologies, it is quite logical and natural for it to master the neutron bomb technology through its own efforts over a reasonable period of time.

The structure, size, weight, shape, power and circular error probability, as well as the service time, of seven US nuclear warheads, including the W-88, listed in the Cox Report, in fact, can be found in many open documents and on the Internet. They are not at all secret. On the Internet alone, more than 100 articles about the principle and structure of the neutron bomb have been found. People with general scientific knowledge understand that nuclear weapons cannot be developed simply by relying on such data. In a recent interview with The Washington Post, Harold M. Agnew, American nuclear weapons expert and former head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory of the United States, and Johnny S. Foster, former head of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, said, "Even data on the size, weight, shape and yield, although highly classified, do not represent a warhead's design in any real sense.'' Foster also said, "We showed them what's possible, and they probably learned that some time ago when the size and shape of the re-entry vehicle and its explosive yield were first made public.'' Since these data do not belong to nuclear weapon design secrets, the Cox Report's accusation of China using "stolen'' information to develop its own nuclear weapons is an out-and-out lie and a clumsy swindle.

The Cox Report bolsters its "guesses'' that China must have "stolen'' American nuclear technological secrets by asserting that the United States has conducted more than 1,000 nuclear tests, but China mastered advanced warhead technology by conducting only 45 tests. This suffices to show Cox and others have underestimated the creativity of the Chinese people and Chinese scientists. Even today, they still cling to this manifestation of racial discrimination.

The Cox Report subjectively surmises, "The PRC would, therefore, be especially interested in acquiring US thermonuclear weapons codes for any new weapons based on elements of stolen US design information.'' It continues, "The PRC has in fact acquired some US computer codes, including: the MCNPT code, the DOT3.5 code, and the NJOYC code.'' In fact, the three codes are standard ones extensively used worldwide for decades in nuclear reactor engineering design, nuclear reactor radiation shielding safety analysis and other fields of nuclear energy research. They are widely applied by many research institutes, universities and atomic energy engineering research and design institutes of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) member countries. They have nothing to do with the design of thermonuclear warhead.

In order to promote the development of China's nuclear power construction, in the early 1980s, China acquired gratis from the IAEA the DOT3.5 code for calculating nuclear reactor safety. In the middle and latter half of the 1980s, it acquired the MCNPT code for tackling the same problem and the NJOYC code for nuclear data research. Over many years, Chinese scientists have consistently and punctually fed back the problems found in the course of utilization and the results of calculation to the IAEA and various programming units. Obviously, Chinese scientists have made their own contributions to the improvement of the functions of these computer codes. As a responsible member of the IAEA over a long period, China has organized dozens of domestic universities and scientific research institutes to participate in this international cooperative research. The research results and computer software developed by Chinese scientists have been provided frequently to the IAEA to be shared by its member countries. The Cox Report, denying China's positive contributions to the global peaceful utilization of atomic energy, slanders China for "illegally'' acquiring computer software codes to develop its own nuclear weapons. This only exposes an ignorance of general scientific and technical knowledge.

The Cox Report also alleges China "stole'' the secrets of the nuclear explosion tests of miniature fusion and the anti-submarine microwave technology. This is sheer nonsense. People with even slight scientific and technical knowledge know that, as early as 1964, when China successfully exploded its first atom bomb, Wang Ganchang, noted Chinese physicist and academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), initially advanced the concept of laser-based nuclear fusion. He is considered as one of the earliest scientists in the world who independently put forward the concept. Following this, China began its systematic research on the technology of laser-based nuclear fusion. In 1973, one-beam laser was used to drive deuteron ice and a neutron was observed in the experiment. In 1974, a nuclear reaction took place through the use of one-beam laser on a drive target of deuteron polymer, and a D-D reaction to produce a neutron was observed. In 1986, China adopted the direct driving method to produce a neutron from a glass target capsule filled with D-T gas. Between 1990-92, through experimentation, thermonuclear fusion reaction was achieved through the method of indirect driving, and thermonuclear neutron was observed. In the mid-1970s, renowned Chinese theoretical physicist and CAS academician Yu Min and a batch of Chinese scientists under his leadership advanced the concept of achieving laser fusion through the method of the X-ray radiation for driving by shooting laser into a heavy metal shelled cavity through the entrance, and put forward the structural design of placing target pellets at the center of the columnar hollow cavity. Between the late 1970s and the 1980s, China manufactured its own laser device--Shen Guang (magical light)--for research into laser-based nuclear fusion. Later, it was found from the US declassified documents that Chinese and American scientists almost simultaneously advanced a similar concept in their respective research. This fully indicates that the law governing science exists objectively, and people all over the world can get hold of it sooner or later no matter what method is used. If Cox and others had seriously consulted experts for scientific knowledge, they would not have made such a silly mistake that only reveals their lack of general scientific knowledge.

With the ever-increasing global economic and scientific and technological exchanges and international cooperation, China has made much headway in its economic and scientific and technological exchanges, and cooperation with various countries. Against this major background, Chinese and American nuclear scientists have developed normal academic exchanges in many fields. At the invitation of the US side, Chinese research institutes and American national laboratories began exchanges and cooperation in the 1990s, with the scope of cooperation ranging from nuclear proliferation prevention to arms control and environmental protection. In July 1998, the two sides jointly held the Integrated Demonstration of Material Protection, Control and Accountability in Beijing. The publicity materials distributed by the US side at the demonstration meeting pointed out that, between the 1980s and the early 1990s, the laboratories of the US Department of Energy (DOE), after contacts with related Chinese research institutes, believed the two countries had many mutual interests and that advances in technical exchanges in these fields could contribute to greater understanding and trust between the two countries.

Cox and others, however, brazenly started the rumor: "PRC scientists have used their extensive laboratory-to-laboratory interactions with the United States to gain information from US scientists on common problems, solutions to nuclear weapons physics, and solutions to engineering problems.'' A further fabrication declared: "US scientists have passed information to the PRC in this way that is of benefit to the PRC's nuclear weapons program.'' In fact, the lab-to-lab exchange program was approved by the governments of the two countries, and the fields involved were strictly limited to the scope of nuclear proliferation prevention, arms control and environmental issues. Scientists and officials of the two countries participating in the lab-to-lab exchange program were all very serious and highly responsible. They were very clear of where their own country's security interests lay, and the responsibility they assumed for it. They would never have touched upon their own countries' nuclear weapon secrets on such occasion. Some American anti-China politicians' gratuitous accusation of the Sino-US lab-to-lab exchange program not only sully the dignity of Chinese scientists, but also damage the dignity of American scientists.

What deserves special mention is that US national laboratories exercised very strict secret protection and counter-intelligence policies on the visiting scholars carrying out the lab-to-lab exchange program. Dr John C. Browne, head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, said at a hearing of the US Congress Select Committee on the Sino-US lab-to-lab exchange program, "All foreign visits and assignments at the Laboratory are governed by DOE requirements. From these requirements, the Lab develops the protection methodology and procedures. Our methodology uses a multi-layer protection approach consisting of combinations of administrative and physical controls." Visiting scholars were not allowed to enter secure areas, and could only enter non-secure areas for work in the company of personages from the US side. Visiting scholars were not permitted to use secret computer networks either. It should be pointed out that all Chinese visiting scholars strictly followed the US side's secret protection requirements. The Cox Report cannot even cite a single example of violations of the secret protection requirements by any person from the Chinese side working in US nuclear weapon laboratories. This shows it was impossible for Chinese visiting scholars to acquire the so-called "nuclear weapon secret information''. As for American scientists and administrative personages who came to China under the lab-to-lab exchange program, the US side also had strict management policies. At the same hearing, Dr Browne testified, "Our policy is to provide 100 percent of our travelers to the PRC with a counter-intelligence threat awareness briefing including the latest information regarding the country as possible. Upon return, 100 percent of our travelers are de-briefed regarding their activities in the PRC with the information provided to all appropriate government agencies. We have also instituted a policy that requires more than one US traveler per trip to reduce opportunities for entrapment.'' In fact, the US management over delegations to China was stricter than what Dr Browne stated. The delegations' academic theses must have been subjected to strict examination. Before the end of each visit, the visiting delegations must have gone to the US Embassy in China to report on their activities in the country. The hotels where delegation members stayed must have been decided, in principle, by the US side at home. During their visits to China, delegation members should move collectively.

While cooking up the lie that China "stole'' America's most advanced nuclear weapon design secrets and developed its own nuclear weapons of a new generation on this basis, Cox and others said alarmingly, "A modernized PRC strategic nuclear ballistic missile force would pose a credible direct threat against the United States.''

As everybody knows, the Chinese Government has consistently proposed the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China, as a developing country, needs a peaceful international environment, so that it can concentrate efforts on economic development. Over the past few decades, the Chinese Government and people have always stood in the forefront of the struggle for complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, facing the direct threat of hegemonism to China's national security and state sovereignty, and under the circumstance that nuclear blackmail and nuclear monopoly still exist in the world, the Chinese people have no other choice except to conduct self-defense. It was under the circumstances of the nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail posed by the superpowers that China was forced to carry out the research and development of nuclear weapons. China is a peace-loving country. The very day when China successfully exploded its first atom bomb on October 16, 1964, the Chinese Government solemnly declared to the world that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. Over the past few decades, this stand of China has remained unchanged. The nuclear weapons that China was forced to develop are quite limited in power and are solely for the purpose of self-defense. Never did they in the past, nor do they at present, or will they in the future, pose any threat to peace-loving countries and peoples.