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Congressional Record: September 22, 1999 (Senate)
Page S11189-S11201

 
  NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000--CONFERENCE 
                                 REPORT

[...]

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to offer my views on this year's 
Defense authorization conference report. 

[...]  we have created 
a real muddle at the Department of Energy in the area of nuclear 
weapons and their management. We will have to come back in next year's 
Defense bill to fix it.
  There is one other issue that we will have to address next year. That 
is the issue of polygraphs. The section on counterintelligence 
polygraphs in the conference report is a slight improvement over the 
corresponding provision in the Senate-passed Defense bill. But there 
are still fundamental problems with what we are asking DOE to do. We 
are asking DOE to use polygraphs as a screening tool--the one 
application where the scientific validity of polygraphs is most 
suspect. I don't have a big problem with using some forms of polygraphs 
in the context of an investigation, where there is already evidence of 
wrongdoing. There is scientific support for that sort of polygraph 
test. But polygraphs as a screening tool have little or no track record 
in the scientific literature. We shouldn't be using them in the nuclear 
weapons complex. And the way that DOE has proposed to use polygraphs in 
its recent Federal Register notice goes beyond what we actually call 
for in this bill. I have taken a public position in opposition to this 
proposed DOE rule on polygraphs, because it is not based on sound 
science and does not represent reasoned decision making, in my view.
  I hope that DOE will rethink its proposed rule. This conference 
report, although it encourages the use of screening polygraphs, also 
gives DOE the flexibility to study the matter further. I hope that DOE 
will seek review from the National Academy of Sciences on the 
reliability of the types of polygraph screening it plans to implement. 
I also recommend that the DOE reconstitute and reconvene the Chiles 
Commission to study the rule's likely impact on the critical human 
resources needed to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear 
weapons stockpile. The Senate could, in my view, profit from such 
studies in revisiting this issue in next year's Defense bill.

[...]




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