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Congressional Record: November 10, 1999 (Senate)
Page S14533-S14571



      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN:
  S. 1902. A bill to require disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act regarding certain persons and records of the Japanese
Imperial Army in a manner that does not impair any investigation or
prosecution conducted by the Department of Justice or certain
intelligence matters, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the

             Japanese Imperial Army Disclosure Act of 1999

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Japanese
Imperial Army Disclosure Act of 1999.
  This legislation will require the disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act classified records and documents in the possession of
the U.S. Government regarding chemical and biological experiments
carried out by Japan during the course of the Second World War.
  Let me preface my statement by making clear that none of the remarks
that I will make in discussing this legislation should be considered
anti-Japanese. I was proud to serve as the President of the Japan
Society of Northern California, and I have done everything I can to
foster, promote, and develop positive relations between Japan, the
United States, China, and other states of the region. The legislation I
introduce today is eagerly sought by a large number of Californians who
believe that there is an effort to keep information about possible
atrocities and experiments with poisonous gas and germ warfare from the
pubic record.
  One of my most important goals in the Senate is to see the
development of a Pacific Rim community that is peaceful and stable. I
have worked towards this end for over twenty years. I introduce this
legislation to try to heal wounds that still remain, particularly in
California's Chinese-American community.

  This legislation is needed because although the Second World War
ended over fifty years ago--and with it Japan's chemical and biological
weapons experimentation programs--many of the records and documents
regarding Japan's wartime activities remain classified and hidden in
U.S. Government archives and repositories. Even worse, according to
some scholars, some of these records are now being inadvertently
  For the many U.S. Army veteran's who were subject to these
experiments in POW camps, as well as the many Chinese and other Asian
civilians who were subjected to these experiments, the time has long
since passed for the full truth to come out.
  According to information which was revealed at the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, starting in 1931, when the so-
called "Mukden incident" provided Japan the pretext for the
occupation of Manchuria, the Japanese Imperial Army conducted numerous
biological and chemical warfare tests on Chinese civilians, Allied
POWs, and possibly Japanese civilians as well.
  Perhaps the most notorious of these experiments were carried out
under General Ishii Shiro, a Japanese Army surgeon, who, by the late
1930's had built a large installation in China with germ breeding
facilities, testing

[[Page S14542]]

grounds, prisons to hold the human test subjects, facilities to make
germ weapons, and a crematorium for the final disposal of the human
test victims. General Ishii's main factory operated under the code name
Unit 731.
  Based on the evidence revealed at the War Crimes trials, as well as
subsequent work by numerous scholars, there is little doubt that Japan
conducted these chemical and biological warfare experiments, and that
the Japanese Imperial Army attempted to use chemical and biological
weapons during the course of the war, included reports of use of plague
on the cities of Ningbo and Changde.
  And, as a 1980 article by John Powell in the Bulletin of Concerned
Asia Scholars found,

       Once the fact had been established that Ishii had used
     Chinese and others as laboratory tests subjects, it seemed a
     fair assumption that he also might have used American
     prisoners, possibly British, and perhaps even Japanese.

  Some of the records of these activities were revealed during the
Tokyo War Crimes trials, and others have since come to light under
Freedom of Information Act requests, but many other documents, which
were transferred to the U.S. military during the occupation of Japan,
have remained hidden for the past fifty years.
  And it is precisely for this reason that this legislation is needed:
The world is entitled to a full and compel record of what did
  Sheldon Harris, Professor of History Emeritus at California State
university Northridge wrote to me on October 7 of this year that:

       In my capacity as an academic Historian, I can testify to
     the difficulty researchers have in unearthing documents and
     personal testimony concerning these war crimes * * *. Here in
     the United States, despite the Freedom of Information Act,
     some archives remain closed to investigators * * *. Moreover,
     "sensitive documents--as defined by archivists and FOIA
     officers--are at the moment being destroyed.

  Professor Sheldon's letter goes on to discuss three examples of the
destruction of documents relating to chemical and biological warfare
experiments that he is aware of: At Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, at
Fort Detrick in Maryland, and at the Pentagon.
  This legislation establishes, within 60 days after the enactment of
the act, the Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency Working Group,
including representation by the Department of State and the Archivist
of the United States, to locate, identify, and recommend for
declassification all Japanese Imperial Army records of the United
  This Interagency Work Group, which will remain in existence for three
years, is to locate, identify, inventory, recommend for classification,
and make available to the public all classified Imperial Army records
of the United States. It is to do so in coordination with other
agencies, and to submit a report to Congress describing its activities.
  It is my belief that the establishment of such an Interagency Working
Group is the best way to make sure that the documents which need to be
declassified will be declassified, and that this process will occur in
an orderly and expeditious manner.
  This legislation also includes exceptions which would allow the
Interagency Working Group to deny release of records on the basis of:
1. Records which may unfairly invade an individual's privacy; 2.
Records which adversely affect the national security or intelligence
capabilities of the United States; 3. Records which might "seriously
or demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a
foreign government"; and, 4. Records which might contribute to the
development of chemical or biological capabilities.
  My purpose in introducing this legislation is to help those who were
victimized by these experiments and, with the adage "the truth shall
set you free" in mind, help build a more peaceful Asian-Pacific
community for the twenty-first century.
  First, the declassification and release of this material will help
the victims of chemical and biological warfare experimentation carried
out by the Japanese Army during the Second World War, as well as their
families and descendants, gain information about what occurred to them
fifty years ago. If old wounds are to heal, there must be a full
accounting of what happened.
  Second, and perhaps just as importantly, this legislation is intended
to create an environment of honest dialogue and discussion in the Asia-
Pacific region, so that the countries and people of the region can move
beyond the problems that have plagued us for the past century, and work
together to build a peaceful and prosperous Asian-Pacific community in
the next century.
  If the countries of Asia are to build a peaceful community it is
necessary that we deal fully, fairly, and honestly with the past. It is
only by doing so that we can avoid repeating the mistakes of the past
and build a more just world for the future.
  Indeed, as Rabbi Abraham Cooper has remarked, "Since the end of
World War II, professed neutral nations like Sweden and Switzerland
have had the courage to take a painful look back at their World War II
record; can Japan be allowed to do anything less?"
  I hope that my colleagues will join me in support of this
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the October 7 letter by
Professor Harris and an article outlining some of the scholarly
research on this issue: "Japan's Biological Weapons: 1930-1945," by
Robert Gromer, John Powell, and Burt Roling be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

                                            Granada Hills, CA,

                                                  October 7, 1999.
     Hon. Senator Dianne Feinstein,
     Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Feinstein: Several Asian American activists
     organizations in California, and organizations representing
     former Prisoners of War and Internees of the Japanese
     Imperial Army, have indicated to me that you are proposing to
     introduce legislation into the United States Senate that
     calls for full disclosure by the United States Government of
     records it possesses concerning war crimes committed by
     members of the Japanese Imperial Army. I endorse such
     legislation enthusiastically.
       My support for the full disclosure of American held records
     relating to the Japanese Imperial Army's wartime crimes
     against humanity is both personal and professional. I am
     aware of the terrible suffering members of the Imperial
     Japanese Army imposed upon innocent Asians, prisoners of war
     of various nationalists and civilian internees of Allied
     nations. These inhumane acts were condoned, if not ordered,
     by the highest authorities in both the civilian and military
     branches of the Japanese government. As a consequence,
     millions of persons were killed, maimed, tortured, or
     experienced acts of violence that included human experiments
     relating to biological and chemical warfare research. Many of
     these actions meet the definition of "war crimes" under
     both the Potsdam Declaration and the various Nuremberg War
     Crimes trials held in the post-war period.
       I am the author of "Factories of Death, Japanese
     Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-up"
     (Routlege: London and New York; hard cover edition 1994;
     paperback printings, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999). I discovered in
     the course of my research for this book, and scholarly
     articles that I published on the subject of Japanese
     biological and chemical warfare preparations, that members of
     the Japanese Imperial Army Medical Corps committed heinous
     war crimes. These included involuntary laboratory tests of
     various pathogens on humans--Chinese, Korean, other Asian
     nationalities, and Allied prisoners of war, including
     Americans. Barbarous acts encompassed live vivisections,
     amputations of body parts (frequently without the use of
     anesthesia), frost bite exposure to temperatures of 40-50
     degrees Fahrenheit below zero, injection of horse blood and
     other animal blood into humans, as well as other horrific
     experiments. When a test was completed, the human
     experimented was "sacrificed", the euphemism used by
     Japanese scientists as a substitute term for "killed."
       In my capacity as an academic Historian, I can testify to
     the difficulty researchers have in unearthing documents and
     personal testimony concerning these war crimes. I, and other
     researchers, have been denied access to military archives in
     Japan. These archives cover activities by the Imperial
     Japanese Army that occurred more than 50 years ago. The
     documents in question cannot conceivably contain information
     that would be considered of importance to "National
     Security" today. The various governments in Japan for the
     past half century have kept these archives firmly closed. The
     fear is that the information contained in the archives will
     embarrass previous governments.
       Here in the United States, despite the Freedom of
     Information Act, some archives remain closed to
     investigators. At best, the archivists in charge, or the
     Freedom of Information Officer at the archive in question,
     select what documents they will allow to become public. This
     is an unconscionable act of arrogance and a betrayal of the
     trust they have been given by the Congress and the

[[Page S14543]]

     President of the United States. Moreover, "sensitive"
     documents--as defined by archivists and FOIA officers--are at
     the moment being destroyed. Thus, historians and concerned
     citizens are being denied factual evidence that can shed some
     light on the terrible atrocities committed by Japanese
     militarists in the past.
       Three examples of this wanton destruction should be
     sufficiently illustrative of the dangers that exist, and
     should reinforce the obvious necessity for prompt passage of
     legislation you propose to introduce into the Congress:
       1. In 1991, the Librarian at Dugway Proving Grounds,
     Dugway, Utah, denied me access to the archives at the
     facility. It was only through the intervention of then U.S.
     Representative Wayne Owens, Dem., Utah, that I was given
     permission to visit the facility. I was not shown all the
     holdings relating to Japanese medical experiments, but the
     little I was permitted to examine revealed a great deal of
     information about medical war crimes. Sometimes after my
     visit, a person with intimate knowledge of Dugway's
     operations, informed me that "sensitive" documents were
     destroyed there as a direct result of my research in their
       2. I conducted much of my American research at Fort Detrick
     in Frederick, Md. The Public Information Officer there was
     extremely helpful to me. Two weeks ago I telephoned Detrick,
     was informed that the PIO had retired last May. I spoke with
     the new PIO, who told me that Detrick no longer would discuss
     past research activities, but would disclose information only
     on current projects. Later that day I telephoned the retired
     PIO at his home. He informed me that upon retiring he was
     told to "get rid of that stuff", meaning incriminating
     documents relating to Japanese medical war crimes. Detrick no
     longer is a viable research center for historians.
       3. Within the past 2 weeks, I was informed that the
     Pentagon, for "space reasons", decided to rid itself of all
     biological warfare documents in its holdings prior to 1949.
     The date is important, because all war crimes trials against
     accused Japanese war criminals were terminated by 1949. Thus,
     current Pentagon materials could not implicate alleged
     Japanese war criminals. Fortunately, a private research
     facility in Washington volunteered to retrieve the documents
     in question. This research facility now holds the documents,
     is currently cataloguing them (estimated completion time, at
     least twelve months), and is guarding the documents under
     "tight security."
       Your proposed legislation must be acted upon promptly. Many
     of the victims of Japanese war crimes are elderly. Some of
     the victims pass away daily. Their suffering should receive
     recognition and some compensation. Moreover, History is being
     cheated. As documents disappear, the story of war crimes
     committed in the War In The Pacific becomes increasingly
     difficult to describe. The end result will be a distorted
     picture of reality. As an Historian, I cannot accept this
     inevitability without vigorous protest.
       Please excuse the length of this letter. However, I do hope
     that some of the arguments I made in comments above will be
     of some assistance to you as you press for passage of the
     proposed legislation. I will be happy to be of any additional
     assistance to you, should you wish to call upon me for
     further information or documentation.
           Sincerely yours,

                                            Sheldon H. Harris,

                                    Professor of History emeritus,
     California State University, Northridge.

        [From the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Oct., 1981]

   Japan's Biological Weapons: 1930-1945--A Hidden Chapter in History

         (By Robert Gomer, John W. Powell and Bert V.A. Roling)

       When this story first reached the Bulletin, our reaction
     was horrified disbelief. I think all of us hoped that it was
     not true. Unfortunately, subsequent research shows that it is
     all too true. In order to verify the facts set forth here we
     enlisted the help of a number of distinguished scientists and
     historians, who are hereby thanked. It seems unnecessary to
     mention them by name; suffice it that the allegations set
     forth in this article seem to be true and there is a
     substantial file of documents in the Bulletin offices to back
     them up.
       What other comment need one really make? Any reader with a
     sense of justice and decency will be nauseated, not only by
     these atrocities, but equally so by the reaction of the U.S.
     Departments of War and State.
       The psychological climate engendered by war is horrible.
     The Japanese tortured and killed helpless prisoners in search
     of "a cheap and effective weapon." The Americans and
     British invented firestorms and the U.S. dropped two nuclear
     bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In such a climate it may
     have seemed reasonable not to bring the Japanese responsible
     for the biological "experiments" to justice, but it was and
     remains monstrous.
       By acquiring "at a fraction of the original cost" the
     "invaluable" results of the Japanese experiments, have we
     not put ourselves on the same level as the Japanese
     experimenters? Some politicians and generals like to speak of
     the harsh realities of the world in order to act both
     bestially and stupidly. The world clearly does contain harsh
     realities but somehow there is a sort of potential divine
     justice basic decency generally would have been the
     smartest course in the long run. Unfortunately there are
     few instances where it was actually taken.
       The spirit and psychological climate which made possible
     the horrors described in this article are not dead; in fact,
     they seem to be flourishing in the world. The torture
     chambers are busy in Latin America and elsewhere, and the
     United States provides economic and military aid to the
     torturers. The earth-and-people destroying was waged by the
     United States not long ago in Vietnam, the apparently similar
     war being waged by the Soviets in Afghanistan, the horrors of
     the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, and the contemplation with
     some equanimity of "limited" nuclear war by strategists
     here and in the Soviet Union display the spirit of General
     Ishii. If we are to survive as human beings, or more
     accurately, if we are to become fully human, that spirit must
     have no place among men.--Robert Gomer (professor of
     chemistry at the University of Chicago, and member of the
     Board of Directors of the Bulletin.)
       Long-secret documents, secured under the U.S. Freedom of
     Information Act, reveal details of one of the more gruesome
     chapters of the Pacific War; Japan's use of biological
     warfare against China and the Soviet Union. For years the
     Japanese and American governments succeeded in suppressing
     this story.
       Japan's desire to hide its attempts at "public health in
     reverse" is understandable. The American government's
     participation in the cover-up, it is now disclosed, stemmed
     from Washington's desire to secure exclusive possession of
     Japan's expertise in using germs as lethal weapons. The
     United States granted immunity from war crimes prosecution to
     the Japanese participants, and they in turn handed over their
     laboratory records to U.S. representatives from Camp Detrick
     (now Fort Detrick).
       The record shows that by the late 1930s Japan's biological
     warfare (BW) program was ready for testing. It was used with
     moderate success against Chinese troops and civilians and
     with unknown results against the Russians. By 1945 Japan had
     a huge stockpile of germs, vectors and delivery equipment
     unmatched by any other nation.
       Japan had gained this undisputed lead primarily because its
     scientists used humans as guinea pigs. It is estimated that
     at least 3,000 people were killed at the main biological
     warfare experimental station, code named Unit 731 and located
     a few miles from Harbin. They either succumbed during the
     experiments or were executed when they had become physical
     wrecks and were no longer fit for further germ tests [1, pp.
     19-21]. There is no estimate of total casualties but it is
     known that at least two other Japanese biological warfare
     installations--Unit 100 near Changchun and the Tama
     Detachment in Nanjing--engaged in similar human
       (End Notes at end of articles)
       This much of the story has been available for some years.
     What has not been known until very recently is that among the
     human guinea pigs were an undetermined number of American
     soldiers, captured during the early part of the war and
     confined in prisoner-of-war camps in Manchuria. Official U.S.
     reports reveal that Washington was aware of these facts when
     the decision was made to forego prosecution of the Japanese
     participants. These declassified "top secret" documents
     disclose the details and raise disturbing questions about the
     role of numerous highly placed American officials at the
       The first public indications that American prisoners of war
     were among the human victims appeared in the published
     summary of the Khabarovsk trial. A witness stated that a
     researcher was sent to the camps where U.S. prisoners were
     held to "study the immunity of Anglo-Saxons to infectious
     diseases" [1, p. 268]. The summary noted: "As early as
     1943, Minata, a researcher belonging to Detachment 731, was
     sent to prisoner of war camps to test the properties of the
     blood and immunity to contagious diseases of American
     soldiers" [1, p. 415].
       On June 7, 1947, Colonel Alva C. Carpenter, chief of
     General Douglas MacArthur's legal staff, in a top secret
     cable to Washington, expressed doubt about the reliability of
     early reports of Japanese biological warfare, including an
     allegation by the Japanese Communist Party that experiments
     had been performed "on captured Americans in Mukden and that
     simultaneously research on similar lines was conducted in
     Tokyo and Kyoto." On June 27, Carpenter again cabled
     Washington, stating that further information strengthened the
     charges and "warrants conclusion" that the Ishii group had
     violated the "rules of land warfare." He warned that the
     Soviets might bring up evidence of Japanese use of biological
     warfare against China and "other evidence on this subject
     which may have resulted from their independent investigation
     in Manchuria and in Japan." He added that "this expression
     of opinion" was not a recommendation that Ishii's group be
     charged with war crimes.
       Cecil F. Hubbert, a member of the State, War, Navy
     Coordinating Committee, in a July 15, 1947 memo, recommended
     that the story be covered up but warned that it might leak
     out if the Russian prosecutor brought the subject up during
     the Tokyo war crimes trials and added that the Soviets might
     have found out that "American prisoners of war were used for
     experimental purposes of a bw nature and that they lost their
     lives as a result of these experiments."

[[Page S14544]]

       In his book, The Pacific War Professor Ienaga Saburo added
     a few new details about Unit 731 and described fatal
     vivisection experiments at Kyushu Imperial University on
     downed American fliers [2, pp. 188-90].
       The biological warfare project began shortly after the
     Manchurian Incident in 1931, when Japan occupied China's
     Northeast provinces and when a Japanese Army surgeon, Ishii
     Shiro, persuaded his superiors that microbes could become an
     inexpensive weapon potentially capable of producing enormous
     casualties [1, pp. 105-107; 3]. Ishii, who finally rose to
     the rank of lieutenant-general, built a large, self-contained
     installation with sophisticated germ- and insect-breeding
     facilities, a prison for the human experimentees, testing
     grounds, an arsenal for makin germ bombs, an airfield, its
     own special planes and a crematorium for the human victims.
       When Soviet tanks crossed the Siberian-Manchurian border at
     midnight on August 8, 1945, Japan was less than a week away
     from unconditional surrender. In those few days of grace the
     Japanese destroyed their biological warfare installations in
     China, killed the remaining human experimentees ("It took 30
     hours to lay them in ashes [4]") and ship out most of their
     personnel and some of the more valuable equipment to South
     Korea [1, pp. 43, 125, 130-31]. Reports that some equipment
     was slipped into Japan are confirmed by American documents
     which reveal that slides, laboratory records and case
     histories of experiments over many years were successfully
     transported to Japan [4].
       A "top secret" cable from Tokyo to Washington on May 6,
     1947, described some of the information being secured:
       "Statements obtained from Japanese here confirm statements
     of ussr prisoners. . . Experiments on humans were . . .
     described by three Japanese and confirmed tacitly by Ishii;
     field trials against Chinese took place . . . scope of
     program indicated by report . . . that 400 kilograms [880
     lbs.] of dried anthrax organisms destroyed in August 1945. .
     . . Reluctant statements by Ishii indicate he had superiors
     (possibly general staff) who . . . authorized the program.
     Ishii states that if guaranteed immunity from "war crimes"
     in documentary form for himself, superiors and subordinates,
     he can describe program in detail. Ishii claims to have
     extensive theoretical high-level knowledge including
     strategic and tactical use of BW on defense and offense,
     backed by some research on best agents to employ by
     geographical areas of Far East, and the use of BW in cold
     climates" [5, 6].
       A top secret Tokyo headquarters "memorandum for the
     record" (also dated May 6), gave more details: "USSR
     interest in Japanese BW personnel arises from interrogations
     of two captured Japanese formerly associated with BW. Copies
     of these interrogations were given to U.S. Preliminary
     investigation[s] confirm authenticity of USSR interrogations
     and indicate Japanese activity in:
       a. Human experiments
       b. Field trials against Chinese
       c. Large scale program
       d. Research on BW by crop destruction
       e. Possible that Japanese General Staff knew and authorized
       f. Thought and research devoted to strategic and tactical
     use of BW.
       Data . . . on above topics are of great intelligence value
     to U.S. Dr. Fell, War Department representative, states that
     this new evidence was not known by U.S. [6].
       Certain low echelon Japanese are now working to assemble
     most of the necessary technical data. . . . Information to
     the present have [sic] been obtained by persuasion,
     exploitation of Japanese fear of USSR and Japanese desire to
     cooperate with U.S. Additional information . . . probably can
     be obtained by informing Japanese involved that information
     will be kept in intelligence channels and not employed for
     'war crimes' evidence.
       Documentary immunity from "war crimes" given to higher
     echelon personnel involved will result in exploiting twenty
     years experience of the director, former General Ishii, who
     can assure complete cooperation of his former subordinates,
     indicate the connection of the Japanese General Staff and
     provide the tactical and strategic information" [7].
       A report on December 12, 1947, by Dr. Edwin V. Hill, chief,
     Basic Sciences, Camp Detrick, Maryland, described some of the
     technical data secured from the Japanese during an official
     visit to Tokyo by Hill and Dr. Joseph Victor [8].
     Acknowledging the "wholehearted cooperation of Brig. Gen.
     Charles A. Willoughby," MacArthur's intelligence chief, Hill
     wrote that the objectives were to obtain additional material
     clarifying reports already submitted by the Japanese, "to
     examine human pathological material which had been
     transferred to Japan from BW installations," and "to obtain
     protocols necessary for understanding the significance of the
     pathological material."
       Hill and Victor interviewed a number of Japanese experts
     who were already assembling biological warfare archival
     material and writing reports for the United States. They
     checked the results of experiments with various specific
     human, animal and plant diseases, and investigated Ishii's
     system for spreading disease via aerosol from planes. Dr. Ota
     Kiyoshi described his anthrax experiments, including the
     number of people infected and the number who died Ishii
     reported on his experiments with botulism and brucellosis.
     Drs. Hayakawa Kiyoshi and Yamanouchi Yujiro gave Hill and
     Victor the results of other brucellosis tests, including the
     number of human casualties.
       Hill pointed out that the material was a financial bargain,
     was obtainable nowhere else, and concluded with a plea on
     behalf of Ishii and his colleagues:
       "Specific protocols were obtained from individual
     investigators. Their descriptions of experiments are detailed
     in separate reports. These protocols . . . indicate the
     extent of experimentation with infectious diseases in human
     and plant species.
       Evidence gathered . . . has greatly supplemented and
     amplified previous aspects of this field. It represents data
     which have been obtained by Japanese scientists at the
     expenditure of many millions of dollars and years of work.
     Information has accrued with respect to human susceptibility
     to those diseases as indicated by specific infectious doses
     of bacteria. Such information could not be obtained in our
     own laboratories because of scruples attached to human
     experimentation. These data were secured with a total outlay
     of Y [yen] 250,000 to date, a mere pittance by comparison
     with the actual cost of the studies.
       Furthermore, the pathological material which has been
     collected constitutes the only material evidence of the
     nature of these experiments. It is hoped that individuals who
     voluntarily contributed this information will be spared
     embarrassment because of it and that every effort will be
     taken to prevent this information from falling into other
       A memo by Dr. Edward Wetter and Mr. H.I. Stubblefield,
     dated July 1, 1947, for restricted circulation to military
     and State Department officials also described the nature and
     quantity of material which Ishii was beginning to supply, and
     noted some of the political issues involved [9]. They
     reported that Ishii and his colleagues were cooperating
     fully, were preparing voluminous reports, and had agreed to
     supply photographs of "selected examples of 8,000 slides
     of tissues from autopsies of humans and animals subjected
     to BW experiments." Human experiments, they pointed out,
     were better than animal experiments:
       "This Japanese information is the only known source of
     data from scientifically controlled experiments showing the
     direct effect of BW agents on man. In the past it has been
     necessary to evaluate the effects of BW agents on man from
     data obtained through animal experimentation. Such evaluation
     is inconclusive and far less complete than results obtained
     from certain types of human experimentation."
       Wetter and Stubblefield also stated that the Soviet Union
     was believed to be in possession of "only a small portion of
     this technical information" and that since "any 'war
     crimes' trial would completely reveal such data to all
     nations, it is felt that such publicity must be avoided in
     the interests of defense and national security of the U.S."
     They emphasized that the knowledge gained by the Japanese
     from their human experiments "will be of great value to the
     U.S. BW research program" and added: "The value to U.S. of
     Japanese BW data is of such importance to national security
     as to far outweigh the value accruing from war crimes
       A July 15 response to the Wetter-Stubblefield memo by Cecil
     F. Hubbert, a member of the State, War, Navy Coordinating
     Committee, agreed with its recommendations but warned of
     potential complications because "experiments on human beings
     . . . have been condemned as war crimes by the International
     Military Tribunal" in Germany and that the United States
     "is at present prosecuting leading German scientists and
     medical doctors at Nuremberg for offenses which included
     experiments on human beings which resulted in the suffering
     and death of most of those experimented upon" [10].
       Hubbert raised the possibility that the whole thing might
     leak out if the Soviets were to bring it up in cross-
     examining major Japanese war criminals at the Tokyo trial and
       "It should be kept in mind that there is a remote
     possibility that independent investigation conducted by the
     Soviets in the Mukden area may have disclosed evidence that
     American prisoners-of-war were used for experimental purposes
     of a BW nature and that they lost their lives as a result of
     these experiments."
       Despite these risks, Hubbert concurred with the Wetter-
     Stubblefield recommendation that the issue be kept secret and
     that the Japanese biological warfare personnel be given
     immunity in return for their cooperation. He suggested some
     changes for the final position paper, including the following
     casuistry: "The data on hand . . . does not appear
     sufficient at this time to constitute a basis for sustaining
     a war crimes charge against Ishii and/or his associates."
       Hubbert returned to the subject in a memorandum written
     jointly with E.F. Lyons, Jr., a member of the Plans and
     Policy Section of the War Crimes Branch. This top secret
     document stated, in part:
       "The Japanese BW group is the only known source of data
     from scientifically controlled experiments showing direct
     effects of BW agents on humans. In addition, considerable
     valuable data can be obtained from this group regarding BW
     experiments on animals and food crops. . . .
       Because of the vital importance of the Japanese BW
     information . . . the Working Group, State-War-Navy
     Coordinating Sub-

[[Page S14545]]

     committee for the Far East, are in agreement that the
     Japanese BW group should be informed that this Government
     would retain in intelligence channels all information given
     by the group on the subject of BW. This decision was made
     with full consideration of and in spite of the following:
       (a) That its practical effect is that this Government will
     not prosecute any members of the Japanese BW group for War
     Crimes of a BW nature.
       (b) That the Soviets may be independent investigation
     disclose evidence tending to establish or connect Japanese BW
     activities with a war crime, which evidence the Soviets may
     attempt to introduce at the International Military Trial now
     pending at Tokyo.
       (c) That there is a remote possibility that the evidence
     which may be disclosed by the Soviets would include evidence
     that American prisoners of war were used for experimental
     purposes by the Japanese BW group" [11].
       In the intervening years the evidence that captured
     American soldiers were among the human guinea pigs used by
     Ishii in his lethal germ experiments remained "closely
     held" in the top echelons of the U.S. government. A
     "confidential" March 13, 1956, Federal Bureau of
     Investigation internal memorandum, addressed to the
     "Director, FBI (105-12804)" from "SAC, WFO (105-1532)"
     stated in part:
       "Mr. James J. Kelleher, Jr., Office of Special Operations,
     DOD [Department of Defense], has volunteered further comments
     to the effect that American Military Forces after occupying
     Japan, determined that the Japanese actually did experiment
     with "BW" agents in Manchuria during 1943-44 using American
     prisoners as test victims. . . . Kelleher added that . . .
     information of the type in question is closely controlled and
     regarded as highly sensitive."
       It is perhaps not surprising that it has taken so long for
     the full story to be revealed. Over the years fragments have
     occasionally leaked out, but each time were met with
     denials, initially by the Japanese and later by the United
     States. During the Korean War when China accused the
     United States of employing updated versions of Japan's
     earlier biological warfare tactics, not only were the
     charges denied, but it was also claimed that there was no
     proof of the earlier Japanese actions.
       At the time of the Khabarovsk trial, the United States was
     pressing the Soviet Union to return thousands of Japanese
     prisoners held in Siberian labor camps since the end of World
     War II. When news of the trial reached Tokyo, it was
     dismissed as "propaganda." William J. Sebald, MacArthur's
     diplomatic chief, was quoted in a United Press story in the
     Nippon Times on December 29, 1949, as saying the story of the
     trial might just be fiction and that it obviously was a
     "smoke screen" to obscure the fact that the Soviets had
     refused to account for the missing Japanese prisoners.
       It is possible that some of Ishii's attacks went
     undetected, either because they were failures or because the
     resulting outbreaks of disease were attributed to natural
     causes by the Chinese. However, some were recognized.
     Official archives of the People's Republic of China list 11
     cities as subjected to biological warfare attacks, while the
     number of victims of artificially disseminated plague alone
     is placed at approximately 700 between 1940 and 1944 [12, p.
       A few of the Chinese allegations received international
     press coverage at the time. The Chinese Nationalists claimed
     that on October 27, 1940, plague was dropped on Ningbo, a
     city near Shanghai. The incident was not investigated in a
     scientific way, but the observed facts aroused suspicion.
     Something was seen to come out of a Japanese plane. Later,
     there was a heavy infestation of fleas and 99 people came
     down with bubonic plague, with all but one dying. Yet the
     rats in the city did not have plague, and traditionally,
     outbreaks of plague in the human population follow an
     epizootic in the rat population.
       In the next few years a number of other Japanese biological
     warfare attacks were alleged by the Chinese. Generally, they
     were based on similar cause and effect observations. One
     incident, however, was investigated with more care.
       On the morning of November 4, 1941, a Japanese plane
     circled low over Changde, a city in Hunan Province. Instead
     of the usual cargo of bombs, the plane dropped grains of
     wheat and rice, pieces of paper and cotton wadding, which
     fell in two streets in the city's East Gate District.
     During the next three weeks six people living on the two
     streets died, all with symptoms suggesting plague. Dr.
     Chen Wen-kwei, a former League of Nations plague expert in
     India, arrived with a medical team just as the last victim
     died. He performed the autopsy, found symptoms of plague
     which were confirmed by culture and animal tests. Again,
     there was no plague outbreak in the rat population [12,
     pp. 195-204].
       On March 31, 1942, the Nationalist government stated that a
     follow-up investigation by Dr. Robert K.S. Lim, Director of
     the Chinese Red Cross, and Dr. R. Politzer, internationally
     known epidemiologist and former member of the League of
     Nations Anti-Epidemic Commission, who was then on a wartime
     assignment to the Chinese government, had confirmed Chen's
       Western reaction to the Chinese charges was mixed. Harrison
     Forman of the New York Times, and Dr. Thomas Parran, Jr., the
     U.S. Surgeon-General, thought the Chinese had made a case.
     But U.S. Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss was uncertain in an
     April 11, 1942, cable to the State Department, while Dr.
     Theodor Rosebury, the well-known American bacteriologist,
     felt that failure to produce plague bacilli from cultures of
     the material dropped at Changde weakened the Chinese claim
     [13, pp. 109-10]. Chen's full report, in which he suggested
     that it was fleas that were infected rather than the other
     material, was not made readily available by the Nationalist
       Later disclosures of Japanese techniques would support
     Chen's reasoning: Fleas, after being fed on plague-infected
     rats, were swaddled in cotton and wrapped in paper, while
     grain was included in the mix in the hope that it would
     attract rats so that the fleas would find a new host to
     infect and thus start a "natural" epidemic.
       At the December 1949 Soviet trial at Khabarovsk evidence
     was produced supporting the Nationalist Chinese biological
     warfare charges [14]. Witnesses testified that films had been
     made of some tests, including the 1940 attack on Ningbo.
     Japanese witnesses and defendants confirmed other biological
     warfare attacks, such as the 1941 Changde incident. Military
     orders, railroad waybills for shipment of biological warfare
     supplies, gendarmerie instructions for sending prisoners to
     the laboratories, and other incriminating Japanese documents
     were introduced in evidence [1, pp. 19-20, 23-24].
       Describing the operation of Unit 731, the main biological
     warfare installation, located outside Harbin, the transcript
     summary stated: "Experts have calculated . . . that it was
     capable of breeding, in the course of one production cycle,
     lasting only a few days, no less than 30,000,000 billion
     microbes. . . . That explains why . . . bacteria quantities
     [are given] in kilograms, thus referring to the weight of
     the thick, creamy bacteria mass skimmed directly from the
     surface of the culture medium [1, pp. 13-14].
       Total bacteria production capacity at this one unit was
     eight tons per month [1, pp. 266-67].
       Euphemistically called a "water purification unit,"
     General Ishii's organization also worked on medical projects
     not directly related to biological warfare. In the Asian
     countries it overran, the Japanese Army conscripted local
     young women to entertain the troops. The medical difficulties
     resulting from this practice became acute. In an effort to
     solve the problem, Chinese women confined in the detachment's
     prison "were infected with syphillis with the object of
     investigating preventive means against this disease. [1, p.
       Another experiment disclosed at the Khabarovsk trial was
     the "freezing project." During extremely cold winter
     weather prisoners were led outdoors:
       "Their arms were bared and made to freeze with the help of
     an artificial current of air. This was done until their
     frozen arms, when struck with a short stick, emitted a sound
     resembling that which a board gives out when it is struck"
     [1, pp. 289, 21-22, 357-58].
       Once back inside, various procedures for thawing were
     tried. One account of Unit 731's prison, adjacent to the
     laboratories, described men and women with rotting hands from
     which the bones protruded--victims of the freezing tests. A
     documentary film was made of one of the experiments.
       Simulated field tests were carried out at Unit 731's Anta
     Station Proving Ground. Witnesses described experiments in
     which various infecting agents were used. Nishi Toshihide,
     Chief of the Training Division, testified:
       "In January 1945 . . . I saw experiments in inducing gas
     gangrene, conducted under the direction of the Chief of the
     2nd Division, Col. Ikari, and researcher Futaki. Ten
     prisoners . . . were tied facing stakes, five to ten metres
     apart. . . . The prisoners' heads were covered with metal
     helmets, and their bodies with screens . . . only the naked
     buttocks being exposed. At about 100 metres away a
     fragmentation bomb was exploded by electricity. . . . All ten
     men were wounded . . . and sent back to the prison. . . . I
     later asked Ikari and research Futaki what the results had
     been. They told me that all ten men had . . . died of gas
     gangrene." [1, pp. 289-90].
       Among the many wartime recollections published by Japanese
     exservicemen are a few by former members of Unit 731 [15].
     Akiyama Hiroshi told his story in two magazine articles and
     Kimura Bumpei, a former captain, has published his memoirs
     [16]. Sakaki Ryohei, a former major, has described how
     plague was spread by air-dropping rats and voles and has
     given details of the flea "nurseries" developed by Ishii
     for rapid production of millions of fleas [17].
       A more dramatic confirmation of Ishii's work was an hour-
     long Japanese television documentary produced by Yoshinaga
     Haruko and shown by the Tokyo Broadcasting System. A
     Washington Post dispatch on November 19, 1976, reported:
       "In the little-publicized television documentary on the
     germ warfare unit, Yoshinaga laid bare secrets closely held
     in Japan during and since the war. . . . [She] traveled
     throughout Japan to trace down 20 former members of the
     wartime unit. . . . Four of the men finally agreed to help,
     and the reporter found their testimony dovetailed with
     reports of war crime trials held in the Soviet Union."
       Some of those interviewed by Yoshinaga claimed that they
     had told their stories to American authorities. Eguchi said
     that he "was the second to be ordered to G.H.Q. [General
     Headquarters]" and "they took a

[[Page S14546]]

     record" of his testimony. Takahashi, an ex-surgeon and Army
     major, stated: "I went to the G.H.Q. twice in 1947.
     Investigators made me write reports on the condition that
     they will protect me from the Soviets." Kumamoto, an ex-
     flight engineer, said that after the war General Ishii went
     to America and "took his research data and begged for
     remission for us all" [4].
       Declassified position papers indicate a difference of
     opinion on how to deal with the question of immunity. The War
     Department favored acceding to Ishii's demands for immunity
     in documentary form. The State Department, however, cautioned
     against putting anything in writing which might later cause
     embarrassment, arguing that if the Japanese were told the
     information would be kept in classified intelligence channels
     that would be sufficient protection. In any event, a
     satisfactory arrangement apparently was worked out as none of
     the biological warfare personnel was subsequently charged
     with war crimes and the United States obtained full details
     of Japan's program.
       The Japanese experts who, Dr. Hill hoped, would "be spared
     embarrassment," not only used their human guinea pigs in
     experiments to determine lethal dosages but on occasion--in
     their pursuit of exact scientific information--made certain
     that the experimentees did not survive. A group would be
     brought down with a disease and, as the infection developed,
     individuals would be selected out of the group and killed.
     Autopsies were then performed, so that the progress of the
     disease could be ascertained at various time-frames.
       General Kitano Masaji and Dr. Kasahara Shiro revealed this
     practice in a report prepared for U.S. officials describing
     their work on hemorrhagic fever:
       "Subsequent cases were produced either by blood or blood-
     free extracts of liver, spleen or kidney derived from
     individuals sacrificed at various times during the course of
     the disease. Morphine was employed for this purpose" [18].
       Kitano and Dr. Kasahara Yukio described the "sacrificing"
     of a human experimentee when he apparently was recovering
     from an attack of tick encephalitis:
       "Mouse brain suspension . . . was injected . . . and
     produced symptoms after an incubation period of 7 days.
     Highest temperature was 39.8 deg. C. This subject was
     sacrificed when fever was subsiding, about the 12th day."
       Clearly, U.S. biological warfare experts learned a lot from
     their Japanese counterparts. While we do not yet know exactly
     how much this information advanced the American program, we
     have the Fort Detrick doctors' testimony that it was
     "invaluable." And it is known that some of the biological
     weapons developed later were at least similar to ones that
     had been part of the Japanese project. Infecting feathers
     with spore diseases was one of Ishii's achievements and
     feather bombs later became a weapon in America's biological
     warfare arsenal [19].
       Dr. Leroy D. Fothergill, long-time scientific advisor to
     the U.S. Army's Biological Laboratories at Fort Detrick, once
     speculated upon some of the possible spin-off effects of a
     biological warfare attack:
       "Everything that breathes in the exposed area has an
     opportunity to be exposed to the agent. This will involve
     vast numbers of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and
     insects. . . . Surveys have indicated surprising numbers of
     wild life inhabiting each square mile of countryside. It is
     possible that many species would be exposed to an agent for
     the first time in their evolutionary history . . . Would it
     create the basis for possible genetic evolution of
     microorganisms in new directions with changes in virulence of
     some species? Would it establish public health and
     environmental problems that are unique and beyond our present
     experience?" [20].
       Perhaps President Richard Nixon had some of these things in
     mind when, on November 25, 1969, he renounced the use of
     biological warfare, declaring:
       "Biological weapons have massive unpredictable and
     potentially uncontrollable consequences. They may produce
     global epidemics and impair the health of future generations.
     I have therefore decided that the U.S. shall renounce the use
     of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other
     methods of biological warfare" [21].
       Some research on defensive aspects was permitted by the
     ban. The line between defense and offense is admittedly a
     thin one. Nearly a year after the Nixon renunciation of
     biological warfare, Seymour Hersh wrote that the programs the
     Army wanted to continue "under defensive research included a
     significant effort to develop and produce virulent strains of
     new biological agents, then develop defenses against them.
     'This sounds very much like what we were doing before,' one
     official noted caustically" [22].
       There is a difference of opinion among observers as to
     whether the United States and other major powers have indeed
     given up on biological warfare. Some believe the issue is a
     matter of the past. However, its history has been so replete
     with deception that one cannot be sure. One thing seems
     certain: The story did not end with Japan's use of biological
     war fare against China; there are additional chapters to be
       Available documents do not reveal whether anyone knows the
     names of any of the thousands of Chinese Mongolians,
     Russians, "half-breeds" and Americans whose lives were
     prematurely ended by massive doses of plague, typhus,
     dysenteries, gas gangrene, typhoid, hemorrhagic fever,
     cholera, anthax, tularemia, smallpox, tsutsugamushi and
     glanders; or by such grotesqueries as being pumped full of
     horse blood; having their livers destroyed by prolonged
     exposure to X-rays or being subjected to vivisection.
       It is known, however, that because of the "national
     security" interests of the United States, General Ishii and
     many of the top members of Unit 731 lived out their full
     lives, suffering only the natural afflictions of old age. A
     few, General Kitano among them, enjoyed exceptional good
     health and at the time of writing were living in quiet
         General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied
                                                       Mar 27, 47.

                      Brief for the Chief of Staff

       1. This has to do with Russian requests for transfer of the
     former Japanese expert in Bacteriological Warfare.
       2. The United States has primary interest, has already
     interrogated this man and his information is held by the U.S.
     Chemical Corps classified as TOP SECRET.
       3. The Russian has made several attempts to get at this
     man. We have stalled. He now hopes to make his point by
     suddenly claiming the Japanese expert as a war criminal.
       4. Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that this not be done but
     concur in a SCAP controlled interrogation requiring expert
     assistance not available in FEC.
       5. This memorandum recommends:
       a. Radio to WD for two experts.
       b. Letter to USSR refusing to turn over Japanese expert.
       c. Check Note to International Prosecution Section
     initiating action on the JCS approved interrogations.

                                                   War Department,

                                    Classified Message Center,

                        CFE Tokyo Japan (Carpenter Legal Section).
       Reurad WAR 80671, 22nd June 47, held another conference
     with Tavenner of IPS who reports following.
       One on 27th October 1940 Japanese planes scattered
     quantities of wheat grain over Ningpo. Epidemic of bubonic
     plague broke out 29th October 40. Karazawai affidavit in para
     3 below confirms this as Ishii Detachment experiment. 97
     plague fatalities.
       2. Strong circumstantial evidence exists of use of bacteria
     warfare at Chuhsien, Kinghwa and Changteh. At Chuhsien
     Japanese planes scattered rice and wheat grains mixed with
     fleas on 4th October 1940. Bubonic plague appeared in same
     area on 12th November. Plague never occurred in Chuhsien
     before occurrence. Fleas were not properly examined to
     determine whether plague infected. At Kinghwa, located
     between Ningpo and Chupuien, 3 Japanese planes dropped a
     large quantity of small granules on 28th November 1940.
     Microscopic examination revealed presence of numerous gram-
     negative bacilli possessing * * *.

                           *   *   *   *   *

                             A Judge's View

                         (By Bert V.A. Roling)

       As one of the judges in the International Military Tribunal
     for the Far East, it is a bitter experience for me to be
     informed now that centrally ordered Japanese war criminality
     of the most disgusting kind was kept secret from the Court by
     the U.S. government. This Japanese war criminality consisted,
     in part, of using human beings, prisoners of war, Chinese as
     well as American, as "guinea pigs" in an endeavor to test
     the impact of specific biological warfare weapons. Research
     on and production of these weapons was not forbidden at that
     time. The Protocol of Geneva, 1925, forbade their use only in
     battle. But to use human beings for biological experiments,
     causing the death of at least 3,000 prisoners of war, was
     among the gravest war crimes.
       The first information about these Japanese atrocities
     became known through the trial at Khabarovsk, December 25 to
     30, 1949. I remember reading about it [1], and not believing
     its contents. I could not imagine that these things had
     happened, without the Court in Tokyo being informed.
     According to the book about the trial all the facts were
     transmitted to the chief prosecutor, Joseph B. Keenan. But
     some of the information was incorrect. The book mentions that
     the Military Tribunal was informed of the wicked experiements
     done by the Tama division in Nanking, and that it requested
     the American prosecution to submit more detailed proof [1, p.
     443]. Such Court procedures would not have been in conformity
     with Anglo-Saxon practice. It is more likely that the
     information was given to the chief prosecutor.
       A further feature of the Khabarovsk book is the strange
     character of the confessions made by the accused. Some are
     quoted as saying that they acted upon the special secret
     orders of the Japanese emperor [1, pp. 10, 519]. This was
     bound to cause doubts about its credibility. The emperor does
     not give orders to perform specific military acts. Everything
     that is ordered by the government and its officials is "in
     the name of the emperor." But his role is remarkable in that
     he may not make decisions; he has only to confirm decisions
     of the government. The "imperial will is decisive, but
     it derives wholly from the government and the small circle
     around the throne. Titus stresses the

[[Page S14547]]

     "ratification function" of the reached consensus [2, p.
     321]. It is clear that this imperial confirmation gives a
     decision an exceptional authority: the command of the
     emperor is obeyed. In fact, however, the emperor has a
     kind of loud-speaker function. He is heard, and obeyed,
     but he speaks only on the recommendation of the
       Very seldom does the emperor act in a personal manner. One
     such occasion was his criticism of the behavior of the
     Japanese army in Manchuria (the so-called Manchurian
     Incident). Another related to his role in connection with the
     capitulation at the end of World War II. Despite the atomic
     bombs and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the
     cabinet was divided and could not come to a decision because
     the military members refused to surrender. Their motivation:
     the existence of the imperial system was not sufficiently
     guaranteed. In a very exceptional move, the emperor was
     brought in to make the decision. He took the risk, and
     decided for immediate capitulation.
       Thus the emphasis on the personal secret involvement of the
     emperor in the Khabarovsk trial account make it appear
     untrustworthy. The whole setup could be perceived as a source
     of arguments in favor of indicting the emperor. I remember at
     that time, writing to show the danger of national postwar
     judgments which could easily be misused for political
     purposes, and giving the Khabarovsk trial as an example. I
     must state now that the Japanese misbehavior as described in
     the judgment, has been confirmed by the recently disclosed
     American documents.
       Immunity from prosecution was granted in exchange for
     Japanese scientific findings concerning biological weapons,
     based on disgusting criminal research on human beings. We
     learn from these documents that it was considered a bargain:
     almost for nothing, information was obtained that had cost
     millions of dollars and thousands of human lives. The
     American authorities were worrying only about the prospect of
     the human outcry in the United States, which surely would
     have taken place if the American people had been informed
     about this "deal."
       The security that surrounds the military makes it possible
     for military behavior to deviate considerably from the
     prevailing public standard, but it is a danger to society
     when such deviation takes place. It leads gradually to
     contempt for the military, as witness the public attitude in
     connection with military behavior in the Vietnam war. The
     kind of military behavior that occurred in connection with
     the Japanese biological weapon atrocities can only contribute
     further to this attitude.
       Respect for what the Nuremberg judgment called "the
     honorable profession of arms" is needed. Military power is
     still indispensable in our present world to provide for peace
     and security, so it is desirable for it to be held in high
     esteem. Power which is despised may become dangerous.
     Moreover, only if the military is regarded with respect, will
     it attract the personnel it should have.
       The same is true of diplomatic service, which needs
     national and international respect. This respect will
     disappear if the service indulges in subversive activities,
     as the U.S. diplomatic mission did in Iran. That diplomatic
     misbehavior in Iran led to developments--the hostage crisis--
     which were disastrous for the whole world.
       The documents which have come to light inform us also
     the use of biological weapons in the war against the Chinese
     people. The criminal warfare was not mentioned in the Tokyo
     indictment, and not discussed before the Military Tribunal.
     It was kept secret from the world. The immunity granted to
     the Japanese war criminals covered not only deadly research
     on living persons, but also the use of biological weapons
     against the Chinese. And all this so that the United States
     could obtain exclusive access to the information, gained at
     the cost of thousands of human lives.
       Knowledge about what kind of bargain was being struck in
     the biological weapons area may strengthen the perception of
     the repulsiveness of war. It may also show the danger of
     moral depravity, in peacetime, within the circles that have
     the instruments of military power in their hands.

                               end notes

       1. Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the
     Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing and Employing
     Bacteriological Weapons (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
     House, 1950), pp. 19-21. This volume is a summary of the
     transcript of the Soviet trial in Khabarovsk, Siberia, Dec.
     20-25, 1949, of 12 captured Japanese Army personnel charged
     with participation in the biological warfare program. For a
     later reference to the program see Outline History of Science
     and Technology in Japan, ("Nihon Kagaku Gijutsu-shi
     Taikei"), Vol. 25 (Medicine 2, 1967), pp. 309-10. This
     account states that the biological warfare program was
     organized in 1933 and that "for special research on
     bacteria, members of the epidemic-prevention section shall be
     sent to Manchuria." It also stated that little was known
     about the program after the war since all records were said
     to have been destroyed and that the only evidence was that
     produced at the Khabarovsk trial. It did add, however, that
     there were reports that General Ishii had avoided prosecution
     by turning over his materials to U.S. authorities. I have not
     seen this volume and am indebted to John Dower, of the
     University of Wisconsin, who supplied the citation.
       2. Ienaga Saburo, The Pacific War (New York: Pantheon,
       3. Although most U.S. documents and the Soviet trial
     summary give Ishii credit for originating the biological
     warfare program, it is possible that he was only the chosen
     instrument. There are references indicating interest in the
     program at higher levels. The "staff officer" of Ishii's
     Operations Division was Lieutenant Colonel Miyata, who in
     real life was Prince Takeda [1, p. 40]. Ishii's friend at
     court was Gen. Nagata Tetsuzan, long Japan's top military man
     [1, pp. 106, 295], while the orders establishing the two
     original units were reputedly issued by the Emperor [1, pp.
     10, 104, 413].
       4. "A Bruise--Terror of the 731 Corps," Tokyo
     Broadcasting System television documentary, produced by
     Yoshinaga Haruko, shown Nov. 2, 1976. It has also been
     screened in Europe but not in the United States. However, the
     Washington Post (Nov. 19, 1976) carried a lengthy news story
     describing the film. In an interview with Post reporter John
     Saar, Yoshinaga said five former members of the biological
     warfare unit told her they were promised complete protection
     in return for cooperation with U.S. authorities. "All the
     important documents were given to the United States," she
       5. This "top secret" cable [C-52423] also reveals that
     the first of the biological warfare experts to be sent from
     Washington to Japan had already arrived, referring to "Dr.
     Norbert H. Fell's letters via air courier to General Alden C.
     Waitt," who was then chief of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps.
       6. Cable from Washington to Tokyo on April 2, 1947, stating
     that Fell would leave for Japan on April 5. A cable from
     Tokyo to the War Department on June 30, 1947, warns that an
     "aggressive prosecution will adversely affect U.S.
     interests" and urges that Fell (presumably now returned to
     Washington) be shown recent cables because he is an expert
     and can appreciate the value of the Japanese bw material.
       7. Top secret Memorandum for the Record (May 6, 1947)
     indicated it was in response to "War Department Radio W-
     94446 & swncc 351/1 and was signed "rpm 26-6166".
       8. "Summary Report on B.W. Investigations." Dated Dec.
     12, 1947, and addressed to General Alden C. Waitt.
       9. Dated july 1, 1947, and titled, "Interrogation of
     Certain Japanese by Russian Prosecutor," this memo also
     lists some of the material already obtained, including a "60
     page report" covering experiments on humans and notes that
     other data confirms, supplements and complements U.S.
     research and "may suggest new fields for future research."
     Record Group No. 153, National Archives.
       10. This July 15, 1947, memo is addressed to Commander J.B.
     Cresap and signed "Cecil F. Hubbert, member working party
     (SWNCC 351/2/D)."
       11. Undated and titled "SFE 182/2," it was part of
     National Archives Record Group No. 153.
       12. "Report of the International Scientific Commission for
     the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare
     in Korea and China," Peking, 1952.
       13. Theodor Rosebury, Peace or Pestilence (New York:
     McGraw-Hill, 1949).
       14. In order to ascertain the Nationalist position on this
     issue after the passage of some 40 years, I checked with
     Taipei and am grateful to Lieutenant General Teng Shu-wei, of
     the Nationalist Defense Ministry's Medical Bureau, who
     searched the Taiwan archives. His report is in substantial
     agreement with the records of the People's Republic in
     Beijing, although less complete.
       15. Bungei Shunju, Aug. 1955; Jimbutsu Ohrai (July 10,
       16. "Terrible Modern Strategic War" by Kimura Bumpei. I
     have not seen this book and am relying upon a brief
     description of it contained in a March 31, 1959, letter from
     Tokyo attorney Morikawa Kinju to A.L. Wirin, chief counsel of
     the American Civil Liberties Union in Los Angeles.
       17. Sunday Mainichi, No. 1628 (Jan. 27, 1952).
       18. "Songo-Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever," report dated Nov.
     13, 1947, based on interview with General Kitano Masaji and
     Dr. Kasahara Shiro.
       19. "Feathers as Carriers of Biological Warfare Agents,"
     Biological Department, Chemical Corps So and C Divisions
     (Dec. 15, 1950).
       20. Leroy D. Fothergill, M.D., "Biological Warfare: Nature
     & Consequences," Texas State Journal of Medicine (Jan.
       21. New York Times (Nov. 26, 1969).
       22. Washington Post (Sept. 20, 1970).
       This article is based, in part, on an article by the author
     in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (P.O. Box W,
     Charlemont, MA 01339), 12:4, pp. 2-15.