[Federal Register: October 10, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 197)]
[Notices]
[Page 63081-63082]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr10oc02-29]
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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
[Recommendation 2002-2]
Weapons Laboratory Support of the Defense Nuclear Complex
AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
ACTION: Notice, recommendation.
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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
2286a(a)(5) concerning weapons laboratory support of the defense
nuclear complex.
DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
recommendation are due on or before November 12, 2002.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L.
Thibadeau at the address above or telephone (202) 694-7000.
Dated: October 7, 2002.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
Background
In the past, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board)
has issued recommendations addressing the need for weapons laboratories
to support the safety of nuclear explosive operations at the Pantex
Plant. Specifically, Recommendation 93-6, Maintaining Access to Nuclear
Weapons Expertise in the Defense Nuclear Facilities Complex, addressed
preserving expertise in the defense nuclear facilities complex. Both
the Board and the Department of Energy (DOE) have devoted significant
resources to implementing this recommendation and to maintaining access
to the unique knowledge of individuals who were engaged for many years
in critical defense nuclear activities, such as weapons design and
testing. The continued support by such individuals is necessary to
avoid future safety problems in these and related activities, and to
maintain the safety of activities with existing weapons.
The Board is encouraged by the initiatives undertaken thus far to
ensure access to the capabilities and experience of such individuals
while they are still available. Activities such as those at the
Theoretical Institute for Thermonuclear and Nuclear Studies at Los
Alamos National Laboratory and the Intern Program at Sandia National
Laboratories provide excellent opportunities to introduce new personnel
to the weapons programs.
However, after visiting each of the weapons laboratories (Los
Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
Sandia National Laboratories) to discuss laboratory support for the
safety of nuclear explosive operations at the Pantex Plant, the Board
has become increasingly concerned that an additional problem regarding
technical expertise must be addressed. The weapons laboratories have
not taken adequate steps to ensure that experienced staff members who
can employ their specialized knowledge are readily available to the
defense nuclear complex, especially to operations at the Pantex Plant.
While some new talent is being developed, it will be years before these
new individuals can be shepherded adequately through the nuclear
weapons complex, inculcated with the unique knowledge gained through
years of dedicated weapons laboratory work, and mentored in those
skills required to maintain the stockpile safely. In the meantime,
highly experienced specialists responsible for individual weapon
programs are leaving the complex and delays in addressing safety issues
continue to occur.
Some of these delays were highlighted in a letter dated August 1,
2002, from the Board to the Acting Director of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, which addressed a specific safety improvement
at the Pantex Plant. In that letter, the Board emphasized the need to
designate a single person who would serve as the point of contact for
each weapon system at each appropriate weapons laboratory. That
individual should be empowered to integrate and coordinate for his or
her
[[Page 63082]]
laboratory all information needed to respond to questions concerning
the system under his or her purview and to provide the technical
support required by the defense nuclear complex with regard to that
system. The significant responsibilities assigned to these individuals
will require care in their selection. There should be an internal
process in place that provides for training and mentoring to ensure
that they fully understand their weapon system and can competently
judge how and when to draw on appropriate laboratory resources for the
support needed by the complex to ensure safety. DOE is not adequately
addressing this issue.
The example highlighted in the Board's August 2002 letter also
indicated the need for better coordination between points of contact.
In the example, both internal laboratory and inter-site communications
were necessary between personnel who had been developing a technical
application for several weapon programs and those responsible for one
of the weapon programs. Both lines of communication broke down. As part
of its actions to establish adequate points of contact, DOE will need
to address proper communications amongst groups working on cross-
platform projects, and to ensure that the appropriate resources are
prioritized to provide critical stockpile support.
In formulating its Recommendation 93-6, the Board recognized some
of the difficulties DOE would face in its stockpile stewardship
program. That recognition was implicit in the statement: "Although it
may be relatively straightforward to maintain these capabilities in the
near term, ensuring their availability 5 to 20 years in the future may
be very difficult." The Board is concerned that, without attention to
the near-term problems associated with supporting the stockpile, the
gains achieved in addressing Recommendation 93-6 are in danger of being
lost.
Further, since the size and scope of the nuclear weapons stockpile
have been reduced, and research and development leading to new weapons
has been restricted, it appears that there has been an increase in
"work-for-others" programs. The focus of the nuclear weapons
laboratories on the nuclear weapons complex as their number one
priority has waned. The Board was encouraged by the Secretary's
statement at DOE's October 2001 Quarterly Leadership Meeting that DOE's
"overarching mission is national security." However, it appears that
this message is still not being effectively implemented within DOE and
its weapons laboratories.
Recommendation
To address the above issues, the Board makes the following
recommendations to ensure safety in weapons programs:
1. That the Secretary of Energy update and reemphasize DOE policies
and Orders (e.g., DOE Order 5600.1, Management of the DOE Weapon
Program and Weapon Complex) as needed to ensure that the nuclear
weapons program is assigned the top priority among all activities at
the weapons laboratories.
2. That a process be developed to ensure the assignment of a senior
individual, as the point of contact for each weapon system under the
purview of each weapons laboratory. This process should include:
(a) Adequate selection criteria;
(b) Appropriate training and mentoring programs (as necessary) to
ensure that each individual selected is fully knowledgeable about the
weapon system assigned to him or her, as well as internal weapons
laboratory programs and procedures;
(c) Formal planning for succession of individuals when they retire
or are replaced; and
(d) Periodic dissemination of updated listings of points of contact
to the defense nuclear complex.
3. That the internal organizational structure, programs, and
procedures of the weapons laboratories be aligned to ensure that these
senior, technically competent individuals are empowered (i.e., given
the authority and the funding) to direct appropriate resources of their
laboratories to provide the support needed to ensure the safety of
operations in the nuclear complex related to the weapons under their
purview.
4. That DOE establish a position at each DOE site office with
responsibility for a nuclear weapons laboratory to ensure that
requirements of the defense nuclear complex for support by that
laboratory are tracked and met. These positions should be filled by
personnel with the appropriate competence and experience who have the
authority to resolve competing requirements for resources.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
Appendix--Transmittal Letter to the Secretary of Energy
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
October 3, 2002.
The Honorable Spencer Abraham,
Secretary of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC
20585-1000.
Dear Secretary Abraham: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board (Board) has been following the Department of Energy's (DOE)
efforts to provide appropriate technical support to its defense
nuclear facilities, particularly the Pantex Plant. The complexity
and uniqueness of the technical safety issues that arise in the
nuclear weapons complex require the concerted effort of a cadre of
highly competent individuals with expertise not generally available
in industry or academia. Most of the personnel with this training
and experience are employed at Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National
Laboratories.
The Board is concerned that the number of nuclear weapons
experts is declining and the focus of remaining experts is being
diverted to other areas. Action is required to change this trend and
to re-emphasize the primary role and obligation of the weapons
laboratories to support DOE's nuclear weapon-related activities,
including the formal training and development of new experts.
As a result, the Board on October 3, 2002, unanimously approved
Recommendation 2002-2, Weapons Laboratory Support of the Defense
Nuclear Complex, which is enclosed for your consideration. After
your receipt of this recommendation and as required by 42 U.S.C.
2286d(a), the Board will promptly make it available to the public.
The Board believes that the recommendation contains no information
that is classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this
recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2161-68, as amended, please
see that it is promptly placed on file in your regional public
reading rooms. The Board will also publish this recommendation in
the Federal Register.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. 02-25846 Filed 10-9-02; 8:45 am]
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