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Dear Review/producer:

An important and necessary book in understanding our nation's on-going battle in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan employing the military's most extraordinary espionage tactics

OPERATION DARK HEART: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan – and the Path to Victory follows the journey of Major Tony Shaffer (now Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer) – whose undercover operative name was Chris Stryker – as he faces the surreal, brutal realities of the Afghanistan conflict. He found though, upon returning from combat, that the horrors of war he experienced overseas might well pale in comparison to an even darker conspiracy he observed. It is a conspiracy to conceal the truth behind the greatest mass murder of the 21s century.

Shaffer witnessed first hand the chaos of war up close and its effects on the men and women who served and suffered in battle first during his time as part of espionage operations behind the scenes, and then when he went into the field to help the ground war in Afghanistan where he led the charge to block the insurgency of the Taliban. It was on the ground where Shaffer experienced the flawed policies that top officials relied on. Shaffer and his teams would spin their wheels in Afghanistan all the while knowing the war was winnable by simply crossing the border into Pakistan and crushing the insurgency that seemingly grew leaps and bounds by the day. Shaffer's well-crafted "Operation Dark Heart" was designed to infiltrate Pakistan and take out the bad guys. The brass knew it would work, but the idea of crossing into Pakistan was something top military officials and the Pentagon would not agree to.

This was not the first time Shaffer had dealt with this type of bureaucratic mind-set. He had participated years earlier in an aborted intelligence operative named "Able Danger." Those in the operative had identified many of the men who became the 19 hijackers of the 9/11 tragedy but failed to pursue them. When Shaffer went public and presented this information years later to the 9/11 Commission it did not sit well with his superiors and would cost him his job.

OPERATION DARK HEART reveals from the military spy's perspective what really went on and why and how things went so terribly wrong in the on-going Afghan conflict. Tony Shaffer is available for interviews. I look forward to your coverage.

Best regards,

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Operation Dark Heart
Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of
Afghanistan – and the Path to Victory
by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer
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A THOMAS DUNNE BOOK

Key Background Points & New Revelations In Operation Dark Heart:

- The Primary target of the 1999-era black operation known as ABLE DANGER was the penetration of the known al Qaeda computers in Kabul
- By 2000, Shaffer's team has targeted 2 of the 3 cells that were responsible for 9/11
- Shaffer turned over the info Able Danger had gathered but noting ever came of it
- Things start to fall apart for Able Danger when SOCOM (Southern Command) lawyers rule Able Danger cannot link US Muslims in the country legally to being spied on vis-à-vis President Reagan's ruling of Executive Order 12333 which allowed this
- By 2001 Able Danger was nixed and then 9/11 took place. Shaffer gives Able Danger info to Dr. Philip Zelikow with the 9/11 Commission. When the military becomes aware of this it starts Shaffer down the path to the end of his career
- As the military heads work toward ending Shaffer's career he is told there are complaints against him for running unsafe convoys and that he falsely claimed \$247 for phone calls and a seminar he attended
- What also burned at the heads of the DIA was that Shaffer was also awarded a Bronze Star
- Shaffer was named Director of Task Force Stratus Ivy (which later morphed into Able Danger) with US forces going after al Qaeda in Afghanistan as well as penetrating Iran and North Korea
- A group of intelligence officers identified the Taliban's resurgence's center and then were prevented from acting to stop the re-birth of the Taliban
- NSA and DIA Intelligence operatives identified the location of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's deputy, in late 2003 and were forced to pass the intelligence to the Pakistani Army who then permitted Zawahiri to escape in early 2004
- Details are revealed regarding a major pre-9/11 intelligence operation that could have stopped the 9/11 attacks had it been implemented
- In 2003, things started looking grim in Afghanistan, but it was 2004 that the US really started to lose there. DoD leadership ignored the first Taliban counteroffensive in 2003 as well as the intelligence that indicated the Taliban was rebuilding and planning to return to Afghanistan in 2004
- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld insisted in 2003 that the "Taliban were defeated" despite intelligence indicating the contrary, and implanted a policy of "wishful thinking"
- The Taliban's first attempt to take back ground in Afghanistan started in the fall of 2003 with a full blown force-on-force counteroffensive. The US Army defeated soundly the first attempt of the Taliban to re-take portions of Afghanistan in September 2003 in Operation Mountain Viper via terrific intelligence from Ray Moretti
- Intelligence information indicated in 2003 that a full-blown Taliban insurgency was being formed and if left unchecked, the Taliban would likely re-take whole regions of Afghanistan by late 2004

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- The Afghanistan Combined forces Commander, Lt. Gen. Barno, learned of the Taliban insurgency in October 2003 and chose to ignore the intelligence information. When Lt. Gen. Barno was briefed on an operation, focused on Wana, Pakistan, to prevent the Taliban resurgence, he decided to take no action. Instead, Barno insisted that the intelligence information be passed to the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) even after he was told that the ISI was corrupt and would not take any action against the Taliban or al Qaeda operatives suspected of being in safe havens in Pakistan. This resulted in the escape of Zawahiri from his suspected Wana, Pakistan, hideout
- The DoD was initially conducting cross border operations in 2003, but stopped later that year. This initially approved operation was designed to destroy the first of three known Taliban safe havens (the infamous "Al Qaeda Hotel" as it came to be known) in 2003 and was called Operation Dark Heart
- The only way the cross border operation would have worked would have been in Gen. Vines and Col. Olivero had agreed to bypass the CIA. Title 10 of the US Code allows this but gray area in Title 50 would hold up Shaffer's efforts
- A female operative of the Pakistani ISI was captured while she was supporting the Taliban in September 2003
- US Special Forces captured an Iranian intelligence operative and his brother who was a US citizen in a raid in Gardeyz, Afghanistan. The operative was attempting to use \$65 thousand dollars furnished by Iranian intelligence to ferment resistance and attacks against the US forces in Afghanistan
- Task Force 121 entered into the traditional mountain safe havens for the first time ever in Operation Winter Strike in November 2003
- In March 2003, a joint Special Operations task force preceded the US invasion forces into Iraq, going to suspected WMD sites to capture the site and any chemical weapons. While the operations were successful, no WMD were ever found
- There is a path to victory in Afghanistan – but we are not on it. We must install an Eisenhower type commander who leads combat forces both in Afghanistan and Pakistan if we are to win

HOW TO WIN IN AFGHANISTAN

- To win we have to emphasize the word “we.” The US must establish a truly combined forces command meaning winning is achieved only with Pakistan’s help. There has to be a Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary force for Af-Pak with a strong Allied Forces Commander having control over all military forces on both sides of the Af-Pak border
- Only by appointing a strong leader that is respected on both sides of the border can this plan work. This Allied leader has to be a cross between Ulysses S. Grant -- whose persistence would not let him lose no matter what -- and Dwight D. Eisenhower – whose brilliance was in being a master organizer, diplomat and politician who understood the concept of cooperation in organizing his allied forces to check pride at the door and aim against a common enemy
- Create an internal operational policy framework by taking a lesson from General Creighton Abram’s IDAD (Internal Defense and Development program) from the Vietnam War whose goal then was designed to eliminate the Vietcong in South Vietnam. The problem then – as now – was that the back door was not closed and an endless supply of insurgents. A modern IDAD would create a framework for local units to work in their region and also to coordinate them in an interlocking and synchronized way without regard to an international border
- Control the border – simple as that – but having full cooperation and communication to-and-from Afghanistan to Pakistan and back again is the only way this will work
- Focus on a program to reduce all violence in the lives on citizens – even government violence – and making sure everything is backed up by good intelligence and a clear understanding of the expected outcome in all cases
- Radically re-think our analytical approach wherein we need to comprehend and evaluate our adversary through their eyes not ours. We have to understand the enemy to defeat them. Why hasn’t anyone collected on the \$25 million bounty on bin Laden’s head? Because those who protect him and hide him have no concept of \$25 million. It means nothing to them. It is imperative to remember that we are not fighting an organized army. This is a group who have been seduced by the siren call of a faction of a religion that will kill anyone, even other devout followers, simply because they do not share the same radical view
- The US needs to change its logistical footprint which right now is far too large and tends to alienate the very people it is designed to help and protect. Western culture offends the local population. Identify what sticks out and angers host countries we’re trying to help such as the fact we do not need American fast food restaurant type set ups on our bases. In other words we do not need to build America in Afghanistan
- Much warfare can be waged at the basic level without money. However, the enemy cannot conduct operations against a modern military like that of the US without technology...and technology costs money, lots of it. We must target these technology necessities of our enemy and where the money comes from and goes to