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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
April 28, 1999

NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS:
Brooke Anderson/Stu Nagurka, 202/586-4940
Matthew Donoghue, 202/586-5806
matthew.donoghue@hq.doe.gov

"While I cannot comment on the specifics, I can confirm that classified nuclear weapons computer codes at Los Alamos were transferred to an unclassified computer system. This kind of egregious security breach is absolutely unacceptable, and we now have strong barriers in place that will prevent these kinds of transfers.

"As part of our ongoing efforts to strengthen counterintelligence and security at the labs, we have placed a strong emphasis on improving cyber security. On March 17, I announced an $8 million cyber security package to strengthen firewalls, develop additional intrusion detection devices, and fund rapid response teams to work with the FBI to detect and track cyber intruders.

"On April 2, I ordered a suspension of all classified computer operations at the nuclear weapons laboratories, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia. This stand-down was lifted two weeks later only after I was satisfied that computer security had been significantly strengthened.

"During the stand-down, we made it impossible to transfer information from the classified side to the unclassified side within a work area. We installed hardware barriers -- including the use of tamper-proof seals over hard drives -- to prevent the unauthorized information transfer. We instituted rigorous new procedures -- including requiring authorization from two people -- for transferring unclassified files from classified computers. We have applied stricter 'need to know' controls that govern which lab employees will be granted access to classified information and instituted automated means to monitor and enforce access controls and to deter and detect any violations. And by the end of this week, the labs are required to have in place automated monitoring programs that will scan for classified content in unclassified files and outgoing e-mail.

"The upgrades to cyber security are part of the overall counterintelligence and security plan that includes:

• More extensive security reviews -- including authorizing the use of polygraphs -- for DOE scientists working in sensitive programs;
• Background checks for all visitors from sensitive countries;
• Stricter document controls at the laboratories for all Secret and Top Secret documents that contain weapon design data;
• Counterintelligence professionals based at weapons labs;
• An increase in the counterintelligence budget by a factor of 15 since 1996 ($2.6 million in 1996 to $39.2 million in 2000)."

L-99-026

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