Wednesday 21 April 1999
A word about my background - I have spent the past 28 years in the nuclear weapons business within MOD, approximately two thirds of that time at Aldermaston and one third here in London. Hence I am one of those people who grew up in the introverted and obsessively secret culture that the Minister referred to. When I started work at Aldermaston I was not encouraged to even admit where I worked let alone what I did. Thankfully times are changing.
The aims of this seminar are two fold: Firstly to brief you on why we classify, what the mechanisms are we use and what progress we have made to date. Secondly the audience represents a cross section of those with an interest in nuclear information and we wish to seek your views on what you would like released into the public domain. This will influence our priorities such that our limited resources are used to maximum effect within the confines of what we still need to protect. We will not be revealing new hitherto classified information today- trying to declassify on the hoof in real time is fraught with difficulty. However we will carefully note what your wishes are and why.
Let me outline the rest of the agenda. I am going to say a few words on the principles of why we classify nuclear weapon information, discuss what has changed thereby indicating the broad areas where there is the greatest potential for more openness.
We will them cover the areas where declassification has already taken place or is under active consideration. Andrew Mathewson, the Deputy Director of Nuclear Policy will cover the operational issues and David Dearden, a scientist on my staff, will cover the technology.
After this we have an interlude from MOD speeches; firstly we have invited Professor John Simpson to talk on the requirements for nuclear information from an academic standpoint. Secondly we have invited Bryan Siebert, Director of the office of declassification in the US Department of Energy to outline their declassification initiatives in the nuclear weapon area. We have been closely watching the US declassification process which has moved a long way and we remain in awe of the resources that the US are able to devote to it. We cannot match the US resource commitment and that's partly the reason for the seminar, but I think you will find the US experience of interest as a benchmark.
Returning to the MOD speakers we will conclude the morning with the declassification process: Tony Wilson of my staff will outline the main tool we use in applying classification which is the classification guides and finally Tony Lonn from Records Management will cover our archives and the document review process.
The buffet lunch will be around 12.30 after which we will have an open forum which will an opportunity for you to express your views and if necessary to discuss some of the issues in greater depth.
Let start with explaining why we classify nuclear information. There are two pillars which form the basis of this. Firstly we need to protect the operational effectiveness of our nuclear forces. This is subdivided into two separate issues: one is about protecting the physical security of the weapons to prevent sabotage or theft. This results in sensitivity over where and how we store warheads, how we move them and what the detailed security arrangements are. Secondly we need to maintain the deterrence value of our nuclear forces and as the Minister said this has traditionally been achieved by creating uncertainty in the minds of potential aggressors over what our capability is in terms of numbers of weapons and their detailed performance. We are also sensitive about information which could reveal technical deficiencies in our weapons or information which could make the systems vulnerable to countermeasures.
The second pillar is all about preventing or restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do not want to inadvertently help others to either develop a nuclear capability for the first time nor do we want to help any threshold nuclear states to improve their nuclear capabilities. Indeed as signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty we are under international obligation to avoid this. The outcome is a sensitivity over nuclear warhead technical information- not just the applied science and details of current stockpile weapons but also some technical details of historical nuclear weapon systems. As an ex ample the details of how we moved from our first nuclear weapon, the Blue Danube bomb weighing several tons, to our second generation bomb of the late 1950s, the 20001b Red Beard bomb, could arguably be of greater value to a first time proliferator than details of the highly optimised miniature warheads in Trident.
In addition to proliferation concerns over nuclear weapons there are separate concerns over proliferation of ballistic missile technology which might have an impact on the releaseability of some historical information.
So what has changed? Well the principals of classification have not and the two pillars just outlined remain the only legitimate reasons for classifying nuclear information on the grounds of national security. However a number of factors listed on this viewgraph have changed the threshold at which we are sensitive.
There is of course a drive for greater openness both from external pressure but also from within as we recognise advantages in the new climate. This does not in itself affect the threshold at which we should still keep things classified but it does mean that we are more critically examining the need for it and we are starting to avoid some of the extremes of over classification which have occurred in the past.
The end of the Cold War has had a profound effect on our thresholds of sensitivity particularly over the need to retain uncertainty in our deterrence posture. Hence numbers of operational warheads and stockpiles of fissile material have been released.. Furthermore we do not feel the need to protect information about our capacity to build and refurbish nuclear warheads which will remove classification from a host of buildings and facilities.
With regard to facilities we have seen a growth in external regulation of our activities in which we quite rightly have to demonstrate that we do not put our people or the environment at risk. This introduces additional stimulus to release information on current and historical production and development operations.
The UK now has only a single nuclear weapon system- Trident. Its through life cycle is relatively benign and the warheads only see a small number of locations compared with previous systems which were deployed more ex, tensively. Furthermore the Trident system is very robust and is much less vulnerable to countermeasures than for example the Chevaline system that it replaced. These factors introduce new possibilities for further declassification.
The end of nuclear testing is a major step in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology. It will not prevent a first time proliferator from developing a large crude nuclear device but will severely inhibit his ability to make the necessary technological jumps to enable deployment on modern delivery systems whether they be aircraft or missiles. Some of the technical information we currently classify is of limited value without the ability to conduct nuclear tests and we will be weighing up the need to protect such information against the diminishing risk of anyone resuming regular nuclear testing. Furthermore the end of testing has requires us to rethink how we are going to retain the necessary skills to ensure the continued safety and serviceability of our own nuclear warheads. The future will be a much more scientific approach which will be facilitated by greater interactions between our weapon scientists and the wider UK and international science base.
The final point is the widespread availability of nuclear warhea d related information. The basic principles of how a nuclear weapon works are now well known and much of the fundamental and indeed applied science is readily available in the scientific literature. Whilst the nuclear warhead details need protection; until recently our classification guidance had elements of bolting doors on empty stables!
Its time for me to draw some conclusions from what I have said. I have explained the principles of classification and they remain sound today. However the interpretation of these principles into detailed guidance is judgmental and we have traditionally aired on the side of caution. Furthermore a host of external factors has served to reduce our sensitivity such that the process of declassification has begun but we can undoubtedly go further. You can all help in that process.