Wednesday 21 April 1999
I should like to welcome you all to this Seminar the primary purpose of which is to seek your views on our continuing process of achieving greater openness in the Defence nuclear weapons area which was initiated in last year's Strategic Defence Review.
I should like to say a few words to get the Seminar under way and I shall then take a few minutes to respond to any questions you may have. I believe today's get-together offers us a unique opportunity to hear what you regard as essential to effect change: and I hope that by the end of this afternoon both you and we will leave with a feeling of mutual achievement. I should however make clear from the outset that you should not expect me, or any of the officials here, to make any revelationary statements or responses today. If we are achieve our stated objective, then from our point of view this occasion must be seen essentially as an information gathering exercise to enable us to respond to your requirements.
The Defence nuclear programme within the United Kingdom has been in existence now for over 50 years. During much of that time, we endured a Cold War between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, headed of course by the then Soviet Union. In that situation, the deterrence value of our nuclear forces was enhanced, and to an extent relied upon a degree of uncertainty in the minds of potential adversaries, over what our capabilities were. To this end, we applied a high level of security across the entire spectrum of our nuclear deterrent activities from the science and technology necessary to design and manufacture weapons through to operational information about the weapons themselves and of course the means to deliver them. I am sure we can all agree that this level of security was necessary at the time and to a great extent the same philosophy has as much relevance today as it did then. Then, we had to safeguard our ability to deter the aggressor: and to ensure that no information was made available which might directly or indirectly deny us that advantage. Today, we live in a quite different world though one where the threat still exists. There are also those with nuclear ambitions which could put at risk our stated aims to achieve ultimately a nuclear weapon free world. Similarly, therefore, we have to deny access to that information which could put at risk our commitment to arms control and non-proliferation.
That made considerable levels of security inevitable and I would say that notwithstanding the current crisis, peace and relative stability in Europe over the last 50 years or so more than justifies our position.
However, as I have said, the situation in which we find ourselves today is markedly different. And we can still preserve our defensive capabilities whilst at the same time releasing more nuclear related information into the public domain. This accords with our policy of greater openness which we have promoted since even before this Government took office. We have already taken significant steps to achieve greater transparency and it will not stop there. Shortly, for example, we are hoping to publish a draft Freedom of Information Bill. We believe it is quite wrong to classify information simply because it is convenient to do so: or if its release could lead to embarrassment. The Code of Practice on Access to Government Information specifies very clearly the circumstances in which we may legitimately withhold information on grounds of confidentiality. We recognise that there is a legitimate public interest in my Department's nuclear activities from the standpoint of what we have done in the past, what our policy now is, what the costs are, and, most importantly, what are the safety and environmental implications. After all, the Defence Budget is taxpayers' money and it is therefore not unreasonable that they be told how it is being used.
The Strategic Defence Review represented a major landmark in the process of greater openness. For example, we released information on our total operational nuclear stockpile, the numbers deployed on our TRIDENT submarines, on the holdings of fissile material and on the costs of the programmes which until then had been highly classified. Last month, George Robertson stated that we want to make sure that information which can be made available to those with an interest in policy, or to historians, is not unreasonably withheld. We also want to ensure that wherever possible the first rate scientists working in the nuclear area are able to take part in a much wider scientiflc dialogue and thereby share the fruits of their work.
That said, I am sure no one here is under any illusion that we will be able to release all the information in which you might be interested. Real constraints remain and again, I make no apology for that. First, some information must remain classified for very valid reasons such as physical security of our nuclear weapons or the need to ensure their deterrent effect. Secondly, we have a duty to protect information which might be of value to a proliferator wishing to develop his own nuclear weapons. Thirdly, we must respect certain international obligations. And finally quite bluntly, the quantity of information in our archives is vast while the resources available to us are limited. We simply will not be able to undertake a wholesale, retrospective exercise in releasing historical or technical documents.
But what we can do is to change, where appropriate, the classification guidance provided to reviewers of existing information and also to those classifying current information. This will enable more information to be released immediately and will make more straightforward the release of historic information. In this connection, the process of revising classification guidance is already under way.
From within my Department, it is often difficult to know precisely what information is needed or would most be of value to those outside with a legitimate interest in our nuclear activities. Hence this Seminar. To put its objective quite simply, ladies and gentlemen, I would like you to tell us what you believe the priorities to be for the release of information.
I believe we have invited a good cross-section of those with interests in the nuclear area to be here today. After my officials have described to you some aspects of the classification and review processes, I am sure you will have a fruitful discussion on just how we might prioritise our efforts to ensure that more information is available to the public. We will then seek to satisfy your aspirations. We may not be successful in every respect but I assure you that we shall try very hard. No one could be more committed to a policy of greater openness than the Government. No one could be more optimistic that we shall be able to dispel the perception of obsessive secrecy.
I trust that you will have a valuable and enjoyable seminar. And before I leave you, I shall be happy to try and answer any questions you may have.
GENERAL
Q1. Seminar is just window dressing?
A1. Far from it. I have already made clear its purpose and what we hope to gain from it. Today offers you all a golden opportunity to table your views and to influence our thinking. And on a broader front, let me assure you all that we remain committed to open Government.
Q2. Freedom of Information Act - when/difference?
A2. The Government is hoping to publish a draft Bill next month and this will be followed by a consultation period. The date on which an Act might enter into force is not yet clear. The difference is that it will put on statute the public's right to know.
Q3. Will those present today receive feedback on developments? If so, when?
A3. My officials will explain in more detail our plans for the future but we aim to maintain this dialogue in order to ensure that the end result is of mutual benefit.
Q4. When will the review of classiflcation guidance be completed?
A4. We hope to have the greater part of the revised guidance complete by the summer. Some of our proposals for declassification will need thereafter to be discussed with other Government Departments and with our Allies since we try to keep classification levels comparable. In any event, I expect that we will have completed the process by the end of the year.
Q5. Will the new classification guidance be released to us?
A5. To be useful to those applying classification and in particular to avoid erring too much on the side of caution, the guidance is necessarily very detailed and is in itself classified. However, you will be briefed this morning on the principles of classiflcation.
Q6. Given the facilities at Faslane and Coulport, why are the Scottish newspapers not represented here today?
A6. We were not looking for a particular regional distribution but for a group with an active and particular interest in the issues at stake. We think we have achieved it with this group. Scottish universities are represented.
Q7. How soon will we see real evidence that today has been worth our while?
A7. As I said, we are not planning a large scale release of historic information. Some of the changes in our practice might bear fruit only over the longer term. But there may be cases where we can respond to requests for information in the relatively short term. At this early stage, I do not consider that target response times are appropriate, but we will have to wait and see just how quickly we can respond to real queries.
Q8. Why can't we adopt the US policy on declassification announced in 1993?
A8. Quite simply it is not logistically possible. The amount of documents held in our archives is vast and we cannot afford the money needed to recruit and train sufficient document reviewers with knowledge of nuclear issues .
SPECIFIC RELATED ISSUES
TRIDENT SUBMARINES
Q9. Speech appears to concentrate on nuclear weapon issues - what about information related to the submarines?
A9. We have already given out a substantial amount of information about submarines - eg. in the SDR, we detailed operating costs, TRIDENT acquisition costs and information about our nuclear operational posture. It might be possible to be more forthcoming as a result of the declassification review. We would be interested to hear what information you might reasonably be interested in.
NUCLEAR TEST VETERANS
Q10. Will declassiflcation review result in release of material relevant to the claims of nuclear test veterans?
A10. As the Defence Minister with responsibilities for nuclear test veteran issues, I am not aware of any material which would substantiate the claims that their health problems can be attributed to participation in the UK's nuclear weapon test programme forty years ago.
I am aware of the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association's determination to keep their cause and their perceived injustices to the forefront by whatever means. This includes occasional misleading references to the "discovery" of documents either in this country or overseas which are said to prove there is a case to answer. I have to tell you that is not the case.
My Department's position is clear but if anyone is able to produce documentary evidence in support of the test veterans' case then clearly my officials will consider it.
NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS
Q11. Will you consider releasing information about accidents and incidents hitherto regarded as SECRET?
A11. Certainly this is a subject which we can consider and it might be possible to release details - if only to confirm that nuclear weapon safety remains our highest priority.
I should make clear that there has never been an accident involving a UK nuclear weapon which resulted in the release of any radioactive material into the environment.
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Q12. What about information concerning AWE Aldermaston's track record on environmental safety?
A.12. As you may be aware, AWE undertakes comprehensive environmental sampling annually in the areas around Aldermaston and Burghfleld. The results of these surveys have been made available to local authorities since the late 1980s. There is also regular consultation between AWE staff and the local authorities on issues of mutual concern. Transparency therefore is already well established. If, however, you have any specific concerns about information which you consider should be released, please advise my officials and the AWE representatives here today.
HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS
Q13. Can we expect to see the release of documents at some stage which substantiate past claims that the MOD was involved in human radiation experiments?
A13. I assume you are referring to erroneous allegations made just over two years ago [November 1996J.'This was of course before the present Government took office. However, it was made clear at the time that while the MOD had in the past carried out studies involving the use of radioactive materials on volunteers, there was no evidence whatsoever of its involvement in unethical activities.