[Congressional Record: March 24, 1999 (Senate)]
[Page S3240-S3241]
ALLEGATIONS OF SPYING AT LOS ALAMOS, SANDIA,
AND LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORIES
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, for decades Los Alamos, Sandia, and
Lawrence Livermore have attracted the greatest scientists in the world.
That has not changed with the end of the Cold War; the knowledge and
skills in those laboratories are unequaled in the world and the envy of
the world--for that reason, others will always try to gain that
information. The directors and scientists have, since the inceptions of
the laboratories, been cognizant of the fact that they are the target
of spying.
As we consider how to respond to these recent allegations--and some
steps have been taken including: the initiation of an aggressive
counter-intelligence program at the laboratories that has had its
funding increase substantially in the last 24 months and we have halted
a declassification initiative until its implementation can be
reviewed--we have to ensure that our actions do not undermine the
excellence of the laboratories.
Interactions with experts outside the laboratories and outside the
United States are critical to the pursuit of scientific knowledge and
underpin the vitality of the laboratories. Cutting off those
interactions will cause the capabilities at the laboratories to fade
with time until, at some point, no one would spy on our labs there
wouldn't be anything worthwhile in them.
I have been briefed by:
The Director of Central Intelligence;
The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Department of Energy officials, and others on the recent allegations
of spying by the Chinese at Los Alamos National Laboratory. I will
await the final report of the panel of experts appointed by the
Administration before I assess what damage has been done by this latest
episode, but some facts are evident.
We do know, without doubt, that China's intelligence program against
the United States has yielded some results--they have gained access to
classified nuclear weapons design information. However, we do not know
how much information they have gained or how much that information
benefited their nuclear weapons program.
I must also say that it is unclear how China gained that information.
The Chinese do target our nuclear weapons laboratories, but they also
target other potential sources of the same information including other
parts of the government, its contractors, and the military branches.
It is also unclear how useful information China may have gained,
about the W-88 in particular, is to China. The W-88 is extremely
advanced; the product of fifty years of our best scientific and
engineering know-how. In many ways, China's nuclear weapons program is
not capable of utilizing the W-88 design.
That is not reassuring when you look out over the coming decades, and
in any case, knowing where our years of work led our designers will
allow the Chinese to avoid some of the mistakes we made, but the
Chinese do not currently have warheads anything like the W-88.
Despite the fact that the Chinese capability today does not come
anywhere near matching ours, the Chinese nuclear weapons program is
threatening. China does share its nuclear weapons technology with
others along with its missile technology, and it continues to develop
more advanced nuclear weapons designs.
Chinese nuclear capabilities threaten its neighbors and limit the
opportunities to pursue broad arms control
[[Page S3241]]
agreements--for example, Russian negotiations on a START III treaty
will be strongly influenced by the growing Chinese capability on
Russia's eastern border, and India continues to develop more advanced
nuclear weapons partly in response to China's program.
I will say very little about the allegations against a specific
scientist at Los Alamos. However, given what we know about China's
intelligence program, it is not unreasonable to assume that scientists
at all three weapons labs have knowingly or unknowingly been approached
to provide classified information to China or its intermediaries. The
laboratories are cognizant of that threat. Frankly, I don't know if the
steps the laboratories, working with the Department of Energy and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, are taking are sufficient to prevent
espionage at our laboratories.
I have met with Director Freeh I, and he assures me that the FBI is
doing all it can in this regard. I am certain that, no matter what
steps we take, the Chinese and others will continue their efforts.
____________________