The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585January 18, 2001
MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
UNDER SECRETARY FOR ENERGY, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND EMEGERGENCY OPERATIONS
FROM: BILL RICHARDSON /S/
SUBJECT: Response to Interim Assessment of Science and Security at DOE Laboratories In response to the interim assessment of science and security at the laboratories provided to me on January 11, 2001, by Dr. John Hamre (CEO, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Chair of Commission on Science and Security), I am directing the Under Secretary for National Security and the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment, to take the following actions:
1. Charter an Implementation Review Conference to assess the impacts of existing security and counterintelligence orders on the scientific and security environment at the laboratories.
- All affected parties (labs, field and headquarters) should participate in the review
- The conference will review existing and draft policies and procedures and provide recommendations for developing graded policies for the Tier I, II, and III laboratories
- The review will include an evaluation of orders on foreign visits and assignments, CRADA participation, e-mail monitoring procedures
- The review will make recommendations for clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the lab directors in approving foreign visits and assignments
- The review will be completed within six months
2. Suspend implementation of draft security or CI policies and procedures until the Implementation Review Conference has completed an assessment, which has been implemented through the Field Management Council.
3. Charter a Task Force to review Design-Basis Threat (DBT) and implementation of DBT in evaluating security at the national laboratories.
- DBT Task Force should include relevant interagency participants (e.g., DoD, NRC, and other Nuclear Steering Group Members) and DOE lab, field and headquarters representatives
- Task Force should assess implementation of current DBT at the labs and report findings within three months
- Task Force should provide an evaluation of and/or recommendations to the DBT within six months
4. Charter a Task Force to analyze "sensitive but unclassified" (SBU) information classifications
- Task Force should include representatives from lab, field, and headquarters
- Task Force will assess rationale for and implementation of SBU policies across the laboratory complex and impact of these policies on scientific exchange and security
- Report results within three months
5. Reinforce support for National Academy of Sciences review of polygraphs
- Encourage NAS to conduct the study in a timely manner and/or provide interim reports to DOE
I have directed these actions to strengthen the scientific and security environment at the DOE national laboratories. The Commission on Science and Security will complete its study by March 2002 and will provide regular updates to the Under Secretaries on its findings. I expect all affected parties (lab, field, and headquarters) to be fully involved in implementing these actions.