DOE/SO-70-0005 (Deleted Version)

Fifth Report on Inadvertent Releases of Restricted Data and
Formerly Restricted Data under Executive Order 12958
(Deleted Version)(U)

Report to:

The Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
The Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Classified and Controlled Information Review
Germantown, Maryland 20874

November 2001

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UNCLASSIFIED

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law (P.L.) 105-261) requires that the Secretary of Energy notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of inadvertent releases of Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) associated with records processed under Executive Order (E.O.) 12958.

As a result of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) examination of approximately two million additional pages of publicly available records accessioned by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the Department discovered an additional 175 documents containing 318 pages of RD and FRD which were inadvertently released:

Additional Pages Examined
Since Last Report:			2 million

Number of Documents 
with RD/FRD:				175

Number of Pages 
in the Documents:			3702

Number of Pages RD:			21

Number of Pages FRD:			297

The identified documents are in collections belonging to the Department of State and the Department of Defense (Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)). The documents were inadvertently declassified and made available to the public during the years from 1995 to 1998 by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and NARA.

No classified documents of the DOE or its predecessor organizations were found.

The documents contained RD and FRD information, including:

RD

• mass or dimensions of fissile materials, pits, or nuclear assembly systems
• high explosives for nuclear weapons / devices - mass, design, or operation
• boosting systems - operation, contribution to weapon performance, or design
• other nuclear weapon design, function, material uses or configurations, or nuclear test information revealing RD
• naval nuclear propulsion information

  FRD
  

• stockpile quantities
• storage locations and capacities
• costs of weapons or components
• yield
• delivery system accuracy
• utilization of nuclear weapons, including military plans, operational and targeting information or foreign utilization protected as FRD by agreement

A significant portion of the documents (168 of the 175) were improperly marked for classification level (e.g., Secret), classification category (e.g., RD), and/or automatic classification level downgrading. The improper markings occurred when the documents were originated, or at a later time during the lifetime of the documents. The improper marking of the documents for classification level, classification category and/or downgrading may have contributed to the inadvertent release of the documents.

NARA, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense have been advised that the specific documents contain RD and FRD. The 175 documents have been withdrawn from public access and protected in accordance with DOE requirements.

The inadvertently released nuclear weapons design information (RD) detailed in this report concerns the early generations of nuclear weapons that this country developed in the 1950s. Potential adversaries, emerging proliferant nations and terrorist groups aggressively target U.S. nuclear weapon information. Information regarding older nuclear weapons is of significant value since it is often technically less sophisticated. These designs would be most readily used by a would-be nuclear proliferant to obtain its first nuclear weapon.

The inadvertently released nuclear weapons utilization information (FRD) detailed in this report could assist potential adversaries in assessing the strengths of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Additionally, inadvertently released information on deployments of nuclear weapons outside of the U.S. may violate international agreements and harm diplomatic ties with foreign host nations.

The inadvertently released naval nuclear propulstion information (also RD) addressed in this report could assist adversaries in the development of nuclear propulsion systems for their submarines and surface ships.

DOE will be conducting an assessment of the damage to national security resulting from the inadvertent release of RD and FRD addressed in this report.

In accordance with P.L. 105-261, DOE has trained 1,631 individuals from other agencies to recognize RD and FRD information. This includes 160 individuals from the Department of State, 78 from the Department of the Air Force, 66 from the Department of the Navy, 277 from the Department of the Army, 34 from the Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense, 26 from the Department of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 77 from NARA. Additional training has been scheduled this year including refresher training.

DOE and NARA are working to better integrate their efforts to more quickly identify and safeguard documents potentially containing RD and FRD. Additionally, those file series that may contain RD and FRD are being removed from public access.

Details of the specific inadvertent releases are contained in the attached classified appendix.

[See the PDF Version of this Report for a tabulated breakdown of disclosures by agency, document date of origin, and type of information disclosed.]