













## **(U) PROS AND CONS FOR PUBLIC, PRIVATE, GOVERNMENT, OR COMBINATION OWNED CLASSIFIED NEUTRAL FACILITIES:**

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The appeal of multi-use classified space is apparent. As we reshape the national security workforce, we are thinking about the working environment it requires. This is part of the ODNI-led “Right, Trusted, Agile Workforce” initiative. We see the synergy gained when different entities are co-located and fully appreciate the transportation challenges in places like the Washington DC metro region where access to a geographically-desirable SCIF can be an advantage.

Among the challenges would be the prohibitive costs for security, if the government were to maintain a SCIF that is available for only periodic use by multiple users. Meeting security requirements for individual contracts/efforts for one agency could adversely affect co-use arrangements with other agencies. An example would be the government sponsor of such a facility needing to spend additional funds for the different levels of required physical and access protection for the SCIF or Compartmented Areas due to the different programs or Special Access Programs therein. Complicating matters is the possibility of other agencies’ IT systems used within that facility, which would represent a significant vulnerability if not mitigated with additional protective measures. IC elements’ budgets do not have the leeway to build and secure “neutral” or “common” SCIFs beyond what they require for their current use.

Additionally, there are multiple policy restrictions in place that would have to be surmounted. Construction of “neutral” or “common” SCIFs would conflict with multiple acquisition, space management, and information protection statutes and regulations. While the need for policy changes alone should not prevent the exploration of ideas, the extended time and costs required to change such policies and guidelines must be taken into account. We do not conclude such an alternative approach is needed at this time as current policies and procedures already maximize industrial SCIF reciprocity and co-utilization, while providing requisite security protection to sensitive compartmented information.

## **(U) ANY OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT THOSE WITHOUT OWNERSHIP OF A SCIF EFFECTIVE ACCESS TO A NEUTRAL SCIF**

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The IC and industry follow the FAR and NISPOM process for all requests for SCIF access and construction of new SCIFs. While we are sensitive to the demand signal from certain industry partners to revisit our SCIF policies, for the reasons enumerated previously, we do not propose making wholesale changes to current practices at this time. However, we stand ready to assist by further engaging with the IC Security Directors and the PTSEWG on this topic and its future possibilities.