



**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE**
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

FOIA Cases: 18871A
40738B

7 June 2006

Mr. Steven Aftergood
Federation of American Scientists
1717 K Street, NW
Suite 209
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Aftergood:

This provides the final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 31 January 2001 for "a copy of all NSA Declassification Guidance memoranda and comparable documents concerning NSA declassification actions that have been issued by the Office of Policy from December 1999 up to present" and your follow-up request of 30 July 2001 (FOIA Case 40738) for "all NSA declassification actions that have been issued by the Office of Policy" since 31 January 2001. Copies of your two original requests are enclosed. As explained in our letter of 19 March 2004, in interpreting your request, we determined that only documents and portions of documents pertaining to declassification matters originating from the Office of Policy are responsive. Portions of documents that relate to procedures, classification decisions and general information not related to declassification issues have been marked as non-responsive. Your request has been processed under the FOIA and the remaining eight documents (21 pages) you requested are enclosed. Certain information, however, has been deleted from the enclosures.

Some of the information deleted from the documents was found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, as amended. This information meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Subparagraphs (b), (c), and (g) of Section 1.4 and remains classified CONFIDENTIAL as provided in Section 1.2 of the Executive Order. The information is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. Because the document is currently and properly classified, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the first exemption of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(1)).

In addition, this Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities. We have determined that such information exists in these documents. Accordingly, those portions are also

exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The specific statutes applicable in this case are Title 18 U.S. Code 798; Title 50 U.S. Code 403-1(i); and Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 402 note).

Since these deletions may be construed as a partial denial of your request, you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. Any person denied access to information may file an appeal to the NSA/CSS Freedom of Information Act Appeal Authority. The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of the initial denial letter. The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority (DC34), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road STE 6248, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes release of the information is required. The NSA/CSS Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 20 working days after receipt, absent any unusual circumstances.

The CIA has also asked that we protect information pursuant to 5 USC 552 (b)(3). Any appeal of the denial of CIA information should be directed to that agency.

Sincerely,



LOUIS F. GILES
Director of Policy

Encls:
a/s

Lerner, Rona L

DC323

From: Lerner, Rona L S54
 Sent: Monday, December 20, 1999 1:41 PM
 To: DECLASS (S54); REDACT (S54); Mangel, Robert Clare S54; Covert, Charles S542
 Subject: Joseph S54; [redacted] S542
 [redacted] typex (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Non - Responsive

[Large redacted area]

Non - Responsive

3. ~~(C)~~ Under LG-Cryptanalysis/Cryptographic Systems, the first entry is **British Cryptographic Systems**, with the first subheading of British Cipher Systems. One of the systems listed is TYPEX. The listing of TYPEX will be augmented to read:

TYPEX (US/UK collaboration on TYPEX during WWII has been declassified. See "US/UK COMSEC Collaboration" entry elsewhere in Local Guidance.)

Rona Lerner
 D/CH SC43
 972-2352 301-688-7785
 SAB 2 Suite 6884

[Large redacted area]

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Definitions:

(U) Special Identification Technique (SIT) - A collective term including Morse operator analysis, radio fingerprinting, and direction finding. GCHQ's term is Technical Aids.¹

(U) Advanced Identification Technique (AIT) - A technique of emitter identification involving analysis of unintentional variations in amplitude modulation and frequency modulation which occur in target emissions. Preferred term for "radio fingerprinting", "waveform analysis."²

(U) Emitter Location/Identification (ELT) - The process of locating or identifying an emitter through the use of one or a combination of the following techniques: direction finding, advanced identification techniques, unintentional frequency deviation. In British usage, preferred term is "technical aids."²

(U) Radio Fingerprinting (RFP) -, identify, and classify the unique characteristics the unique characteristics of individual radio transmitters by the study of oscillograms of their signals. Also called transmitter identification.¹

(U) Morse operator analysis (MOA) - The cataloging and identification of manual Morse operators their individual sending characteristics. Formerly referred to as TINA.¹

(U) Morse characteristics analysis (MOCA) - The study and cataloging of recorded manual Morse transmissions in order to identify individual Morse operators by their sending operator characteristics.²

(U) TINA - Former term for Morse operator analysis. Derived from the last four letters of the word "Serpentina", one name for undulator tape used in early methods of recording hand-send Morse transmissions.¹

(U) Direction Finding (DF) - The process determining the apparent azimuth of an emitter by the use of a direction finder.²

(U) Hull-to-Emitter Correlation (HULTEC) The association of ELINT intercepts to a specific ship, through analysis of all available parameters of the intercept and consideration of the elapsed time and possible distance traveled by the target ship since the signal was last intercepted.

(U) Unintentional Frequency Deviation (UFD) A technique of emitter identification involving analysis of unintentional phase variance of on-off keyed Morse code.

¹ Combined Glossary of Traffic Analytic Terminology, January 1958

² Glossary of Traffic Analytic Terminology, 10 February 1989

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Lerner, Rona L

DC323

From: Lerner, Rona L N5P5
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2000 1:16 PM
To: DECLASS (S54); REDACT (S54); [redacted] S542; Mengel, Robert Clare
Subject: S54; Covert, Charles Joseph S54; cypher policy board/[redacted]
Importance: Low

Non - Responsive

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
 Security Control Marking: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

1. (U) "Cypher Policy Board" will be added to the list below, which can be found in LG-Foreign Governments/International Organizations.

(U) **British Organizations and Committees** - GCHQ has approved the release of the names of the following organizations/committees in their own right and in connection with their U.S. equivalents. This does not constitute permission to release information regarding the expansion of the functions of these entities or any other details.

- LSIB - London Signals Intelligence Board
- LCSA - London Communications Security Agency
- BJSM - British Joint Service Mission
- LCSC - London Communications Security Committee
- SRAP - Speech Research Advisory Panel
- CCP - COMSEC Coordinating Panel
- CDAP - COMSEC Development Advisory Panel
- SSP - Speech Secrecy Panel
- CRP - Cryptographic Research Panel
- CSTSP - Callsign and Transmission Security Panel
- LSIC - London Signal Intelligence Committee
- BJIC - British Joint Intelligence Committee
- Cypher Policy Board

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[Source: 6/18/99 e-mail from [redacted] N5P6; 3/24/00 e-mail from [redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE NUMBER: 381-00, SIGINT Identification Techniques

(U) PUBLICATION DATE: 28 February 2000

(U) PROJECT/ACTIVITY NAME: SIGINT Identification Techniques

(U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: P06V

(U//~~FOUO~~) POC [redacted] DO CAO

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) PHONE: 963-3595s

(U//~~FOUO~~) DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: James J. Cain, A/Chief P06

SIGINT Identification Techniques DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE:

Description of Information	Classification/ Markings	Reason	Exemption	Remarks
1. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of Special Identification Techniques (SIT) as SIGINT tools when actual technique or target is not identified	----	----	----	SIT evolved into AIT, and later evolved into ELI.
a. Current (less than 25 years old)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
2. (U) Fact of	----	----	----	AIT evolved

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NSA/CSS's use of Advanced Identification Techniques (AIT) as SIGINT tools when actual technique or target is not identified				into ELI.
			(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36	
a. Current (less than 25 years old)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
3. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of Emitter Location/ Identification (ELI) as SIGINT tool when actual technique or target is not identified	----	----	----	Evolved from SIT and AIT.
a. Current (less than 25 years old)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	Term not in use prior to VJ Day
4. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of Direction Finding (DF) as a SIGINT SIT, AIT, and ELI when target is not revealed	----	----	----	----
[redacted]				
[redacted]				
		(b) (1) (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36		

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//MR~~

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

[redacted]				
a. Current (less than 25 years old)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
5. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of Morse Operator Analysis (MOA) as a SIGINT SIT or AIT when target is not revealed [redacted] [redacted]	----	----	----	Technique no longer in use.
		(b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36		
a. Current (less than 25 years old)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
6. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of Morse Operator Characteristics Analysis (MOCA) as a SIGINT SIT, AIT, or ELI when target is not revealed [redacted] [redacted]	----	----	----	Technique no longer in use

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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

a. Current (less than 25 years old)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
7. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of Voice Operator Analysis (VOA) as a SIGINT SIT when target is not revealed	----	----	----	Technique no longer in use.
	(b) (1) (b) (3) - 50 USC 403 (b) (3) - 18 USC 798 (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36			
a. Current (less than 25 years old)	----	----	----	----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
8. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of Radio Fingerprinting (RFP) as a SIGINT SIT or AIT when target is not revealed	----	----	----	----
a. Current (less than 25 years old)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----

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CONFIDENTIAL//MR

<p>11. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of Waveform Analysis as a SIGINT SIT or AIT when target is not revealed</p>	<p>-----</p>	<p>-----</p>	<p>-----</p>	<p>-----</p> <p>(b) (3) -P. L. 86-36</p>
<p>a. Current (less than 25 years old)</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>-----</p>
<p>b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>-----</p>
<p>c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>-----</p>
<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>
<p>12. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of Unintentional Frequency Deviation (UFD) as a SIGINT SIT or AIT when target is not revealed</p>	<p>-----</p>	<p>-----</p>	<p>-----</p>	<p>-----</p>
<p>a. Current (less than 25 years old)</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>-----</p>
<p>b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>-----</p>
<p>c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>-----</p>
<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>
<p>13. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of Special Emitter</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>-----</p>

(b) (1)
 (b) (3) -50 USC 403
 (b) (3) -18 USC 798
 (b) (3) -P. L. 86-36

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c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	----- (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
9. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS's use of TINA as a SIGINT SIT, AIT, or ELI when target is not revealed	-----	-----	-----	-----
	(b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36			
a. Current (less than 25 years old)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	-----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	-----
c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	-----
10. (U) Fact of NSA/CSS use of hull-to-emitter correlation (HULTEC) as a SIGINT AIT or ELI when target is not revealed	-----	-----	-----	-----
a. Current (less than 25 years old)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	-----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	-----
c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	-----

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Identification (SEI) as a SIGINT SIT or AIT when target is not revealed [redacted]				(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
[redacted]		(b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36		
a. Current (less than 25 years old)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	-----
b. 25 years old/older (post VJ Day)	UNCLASSIFIED	N/A	N/A	Term not in use prior to VJ Day
c. Prior to 14 Aug 45 (pre-VJ Day)	-----	-----	-----	-----

Definitions:

(U) Special Identification Technique (SIT) - A collective term including Morse operator analysis, radio fingerprinting, and direction finding. GCHQ's term is Technical Aids.

(U) Advanced Identification Technique (AIT) - A technique of emitter identification involving analysis of unintentional variations in amplitude modulation and frequency modulation which occur in target emissions. Preferred term for "radio fingerprinting", "waveform analysis."

(U) Emitter Location/Identification (ELT) - The process of locating or identifying an emitter through the use of one or a combination of the following techniques: direction finding, advanced identification techniques, unintentional frequency deviation. In British usage, preferred term is "technical aids." ²

(U) Radio Fingerprinting (RFP) -, identify, and classify the unique characteristics the unique characteristics of individual radio transmitters by the study of oscillograms of their signals. Also called transmitter identification. ¹

(U) Morse operator analysis (MOA) - The cataloging and identification of manual Morse operators by their individual sending characteristics. Formerly referred to an TINA. ¹

(U) Morse characteristics analysis (MOCA) - The study and cataloging of recorded manual Morse transmissions in order to identify individual Morse operators by their sending operator characteristics. ²

(U) TINA - Former term for Morse operator analysis. Derived from the last four letters of the word "Serpentina", one name for undulator tape used in early methods of recording hand-send Morse transmissions. ¹

(b) (3) - P. L. 86-36

(U) Direction Finding (DF) - The process determining the apparent azimuth of an emitter by the use of a direction finder.²

(U) Hull-to-Emitter Correlation (HULTEC) The association of ELINT intercepts to a specific ship, through analysis of all available parameters of the intercept and consideration of the elapsed time and possible distance traveled by the target ship since the signal was last intercepted.

(U) Unintentional Frequency Deviation (UFD) A technique of emitter identification involving analysis of unintentional phase variance of on-off keyed Morse code.

(U) Special Emitter Identification (SEI) In ELINT, the identification of specific individual emitters, systems, or platforms, through analysis of precisely measured external signal parameters or characteristics, for the purpose of maintaining continuity.²



(U) Page created July 06, 2000

(U) Page last modified: 08/15/00 07:19:17



[Back to N5P52 Main Page](#)



(U//~~FOUO~~) If you have any comments about the content of this page, send feedback to [redacted] N5P52 [redacted]@nsa, 963-4582s.

(U//~~FOUO~~) If you have any comments about this Web page, send feedback to [redacted] N5P52 [redacted]@nsa, 963-4582s.

(b) (3) - P. L. 86-36

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Lerner, Rona L (CIV-NSA) DC323

From: Lerner, Rona L DC323
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2001 8:21 AM
To: DECLASS (N5P5): REDACT SC4
Cc: [redacted] DC322
Subject: scrambler/COS VN/taiwan

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Security Control Marking: ~~COMINT~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

Non - Responsive

2) Scrambler is a method of protecting U.S. communications. Generic references to the communications security use of a scrambler system are releasable. [Source: 2/6/01 e-mail from [redacted] DC322 and 2/8/01 e-mail from [redacted]]

(U) The following is an amendment to the current entry in LG-Collection: (The addition is in maroon.)

~~(C/S)~~ **Targeting of Voice/Speech, Morse and Radioprinter -**

The fact of targeting of plaintext voice/speech, manual and automatic Morse and radioprinter through where the target country is not identified is releasable.

The fact of targeting enciphered communications is unclassified. [redacted]

Non - Responsive

[redacted]

Non - Responsive

[Sources: 9/2/99, 12/29/99 and 2/6/01 e-mails from [redacted] DC322.]

2. (U) The portion in maroon will be added to the entry below, which appears in LG-Historical Events, for clarification.

(U)

[redacted]

According to a 10 December 1992 CIA memo, the following information is not classified:

(b) (3)
OGA

- The appearance of CIA or CAS in the distribution line.
- References to CIA or CAS presence in Saigon for the period 1 January 1959 through 30 April 1975 and in Vientiane for the period 1 July 1965 through 9 August 1972. (Reference to CIA or CAS presence in any other location must be coordinated with CIA. In addition, any details regarding CIA or CAS activity in Saigon must be referred.)
- References to military units presumed to have been CIA entities. (Usually, such units are listed as the originator of the report.)

3. (U) The following will be added to LG-Locations under the **NSA Representatives** entry:

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The fact of an NSA representative to Taiwan is releasable [redacted]

Non - Responsive

Rona Lerner

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 403
(b) (3) - 18 USC 798
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

DC323
972-2352 301-688-7785
SAB 2 Suite 6884

Lerner, Rona L (CIV-NSA) DC323

From: Miller, Cole Lawrence (CON-NSA) DC324
Sent: Thursday, July 26, 2001 11:36 AM
To: Rona Lerner
Cc: [redacted] (CIV-NSA) DC322; [redacted] (CIV-NSA) DC322; Cole Miller
Subject: (U) WWII Guidance from CSE

(b) (1)
(b) (3) -50 USC 403
(b) (3) -18 USC 798
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

Rona,
The following is WWII guidance received from CSE. This completes outstanding question 12-00.

For the purposes of this guidance, Canadian WWII SIGINT information is defined as any records associated with the operations, foreign relationships and activities of the Canadian SIGINT organizations from 1939 to August 1945 (Joint Discrimination Unit, Operational Intelligence Centre, Royal Canadian Navy, Examination Unit, "W" and "Z" stations), and the establishment of the Communications Branch of the National Research Council (CBNRC) in the immediate post war period (1946).

Canadian SIGINT records from WWII can be declassified if they contain information on any of the following subjects:

- Text and decrypts of German and Japanese diplomatic and economic wireless transmissions.
- Locations and identities of operational "W" and "Z" stations in Canada during WWII regardless of location and status as a SIGINT site after the war. Ottawa (Leitrim), for example, was used as an intercept site during WWII and that fact is unclassified.
- Japanese and German military and commercial communications systems used during WWII
- Communications systems associated with French and Italian neutral shipping
- Coverage plans for interception of Japanese communications
- U Boat Tracking
- Liaison with Chinese Military Mission (in Ottawa)
- Organizational, administrative information and correspondence associated with the Joint Discrimination Unit, Operational Intelligence Centre (Royal Canadian Navy) and Examination Unit (this includes historical narratives on the development of these organizations)
- Names of staff associated with Examination Unit
- WT Intelligence (W/T "Y") including: German, French, Italian, Japanese W/T organization traffic, callsigns and procedures
- W/T Intelligence (W/T "Z") including: DF plotting, Radio Finger Printing and U Boat tracking
- Allied relationships during WWII (with Britain, United States, Australia and New Zealand) which relate to joint operations, conferences and meetings and other administrative matters.
- HYDRA equipment
- Telecommunications censorship and SIGINT in Canada during WWII
- Canadian wireless operations in Australia during WWII

[Large redacted area]

Non - Responsive

Lerner, Rona L (CIV-NSA) DC323

From: Lerner, Rona L (CIV-NSA) DC323
Sent: Monday, July 30, 2001 6:56 AM
To: DECLASS (N5P5): REDACT SC4
Cc: [redacted] (NSA) DC322
Subject: ~~(S)~~ WWII guidance from CSE

(b) (1)
(b) (3) -50 USC 403
(b) (3) -18 USC 798
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) The following will be added to LG-Historical Events and LG-Foreign Governments. Thanks to Cole for obtaining this guidance for us.

World War II (WWII) - CSE equities

(U) For the purposes of this guidance, Canadian WWII SIGINT information is defined as any record associated with the operations, foreign relationships and activities of the Canadian SIGINT organizations from 1939 to August 1945 (Joint Discrimination Unit, Operational Intelligence Centre, Royal Canadian Navy, Examination Unit, "W" and "Z" stations), and the establishment of the Communications Branch of the National Research Council (CBNRC) in the immediate post war period (1946). "W" stations were COMINT intercept sites; and "Z" stations were HFDF sites. CSE consulted with our other Second Party partners on the declassification of the information.

(U) Canadian SIGINT records from WWII can be declassified if they contain information on any of the following subjects:

- Text and decrypts of German and Japanese diplomatic and economic wireless transmissions.
- Locations and identities of operational "W" and "Z" stations in Canada during WWII. For example, the fact that Ottawa (Leitrim) was used as an intercept site during WWII is unclassified. The use of any site after WWII, including Leitrim, remains classified.
- Japanese and German military and commercial communications systems used during WWII
- Communications systems associated with French and Italian neutral shipping
- Coverage plans for interception of Japanese communications
- U Boat Tracking
- Liaison with Chinese Military Mission (in Ottawa)
- Organizational, administrative information and correspondence associated with the Joint Discrimination Unit, Operational Intelligence Centre (Royal Canadian Navy) and Examination Unit (this includes historical narratives on the development of these organizations)
- Names of staff associated with Examination Unit
- W/T Intelligence (W/T "Y") including: German, French, Italian, Japanese W/T organization traffic, call signs and procedures ("W/T" was the abbreviation used for "wireless telegraphy" and applied to the signals intercepted at W and Z stations.)
- W/T Intelligence (W/T "Z") including: DF plotting, Radio Finger Printing and U Boat tracking
- Allied relationships during WWII (with Britain, United States, Australia and New Zealand) which relate to joint operations, conferences and meetings and other administrative matters
- HYDRA equipment
- Telecommunications censorship and SIGINT in Canada during WWII
- During the war in the Pacific, a Canadian military unit called the "1 Canadian Special Wireless Group" was deployed to the Pacific Theater and conducted tactical SIGINT activities against the Japanese along with the Australian military in New Guinea. It was active from 1944 to 1945. The fact of Canadian wireless operations in Australia during WWII is unclassified.



Non - Responsive

Rona Lerner
DC323
972-2352 688-7786
SAB II, STE 6884

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Dated: 24 Feb 98
DECL ON: X1

Classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Lerner, Rona L (CIV-NSA) DC323

From: Miller, Cole Lawrence DC324
Sent: Tuesday, June 26, 2001 10:33 AM
To: Rona Lerner
Cc: [Redacted] DC322; [Redacted] DC322; Cole Miller
Subject: FW: (U) WWII declass / TICOM policy

Classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~

Rona,
The following responds in part to DC323 outstanding question #12-00. The CSE piece of this question remains pending.

DSD has provided the following WWII guidance. Note this guidance applies to the years 1939 through the end of 1945 only. Note also the specific exclusion cited in the post-WWII portion of their guidance that states we may NOT release the fact that the Australian government was dependent on British COMSEC services during WWII (and beyond).

The categories listed below may be released without the need for referral to DSD, provided the material relates exclusively to the events of WWII (1939-1945), up to 31 December 1945.

- * Text and decrypts that do not reveal cryptanalytic details of methods or processes;
- * SIGINT product developed from targeting, intercept and analysis of communications of all countries-belligerent and non-belligerent, provided that the material does not place at risk current cryptanalytic techniques.
- * COMSEC codes and cypher material providing broad general references to simple manual cryptosystems or methods including:
 - playfair codes;
 - di/tri/tetranomic or graphic substitution;
 - mondinome substitution;
 - grids system;
 - single /double transposition systems; and
 - one or two part codes
- * Australian - Central Bureau (CB)/Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL) - SIGINT operational site locations:
 - Mainland Australia
 - Pacific region - Allied HQ SWPA including forward and advanced Echelon units/USN - 7th Fleet, FRUMEL land based units;
 - Middle East theatre
- * Names of all Australian personnel (both military and civilian) employed in WWII Allied SIGINT organisation - conditional that disclosure:
 - would not cause embarrassment to the individual or his/her family; and
 - provides no indication of employment in the Australian SIGINT organisation post 1 January 1946
- * Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) material, unless it contains information not covered in the above categories.

Non - Responsive

Non - Responsive

Cole Miller, DC324 Contractor
2B8090, 963-4582, 301-688-6798
Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Dated: : : 24 Feb 98
DECL ON: X1

Classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~

Lerner, Rona L (CIV-NSA) DC323

From: Lerner, Rona L DC323
Sent: Tuesday, June 26, 2001 11:08 AM
To: REDACT SC4; DECLASS (N5P5)
Cc: [REDACTED] DC322
Subject: (S) DSD guidance

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Thanks to Cole for getting us the following guidance from the Australians. All of the information will be added to LG-Foreign Governments (entitled "DSD Equities") and the first section (on WWII) will also be included in LG-Historical Events (entitled "World War II (WWII) -DSD Equities") :

World War II (WWII) -

The categories listed below may be released without the need for referral to DSD, provided the material relates exclusively to the events of WWII (1939-1945), up to 31 December 1945.

- * Text and decrypts that do not reveal cryptanalytic details of methods or processes;
- * SIGINT product developed from targeting, intercept and analysis of communications of all countries-belligerent and non-belligerent, provided that the material does not place at risk current cryptanalytic techniques.
- * COMSEC codes and cipher material providing broad general references to simple manual cryptosystems or methods including:
 - PLAYFAIR codes;
 - di/tri/tetranomic or graphic substitution;
 - mondinome substitution;
 - grids system;
 - single /double transposition systems; and
 - one or two part codes.

(NOTE: The fact that the Australian government was dependent on British COMSEC services including codes and ciphers and related systems during WWII and beyond remains classified.)

- * Australian - Central Bureau (CB)/Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL) - SIGINT operational site locations:
 - Mainland Australia
 - Pacific region - Allied HQ SWPA (Southwest Pacific Area (theater)) including forward and advanced Echelon units/USN - 7th Fleet, FRUMEL land based units;
 - Middle East theater
- * Names of all Australian personnel (both military and civilian) employed in WWII Allied SIGINT organization - conditional that disclosure:
 - would not cause embarrassment to the individual or his/her family; and
 - provides no indication of employment in the Australian SIGINT organization post 1 January 1946
- * Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) material, unless it contains information not covered in the above categories.

Non - Responsive

Non - Responsive

Rona Lerner
DC323
972-2352 688-7786
SAB II, STE 6884

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Dated: 24 Feb 98
DECL ON: X1

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Lerner, Rona L (CIV-NSA) DC323

From: Lerner, Rona L DC323
Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2001 2:22 PM
To: DECLASS (N5P5); REDACT SC4
Cc: [redacted] DC322
Subject: ~~(S//SI)~~ bourbon & rattan [redacted] non-crypt budget

Classification: ~~TOPSECRET~~
Security Control Marking: ~~COMINT~~

Non - Responsive

1. (U) Thanks to Rupe and [redacted] for their research on RATTAN, allowing us to add the information in red to the entry below which appears in LG-Miscellaneous.

~~(S)~~ Project BOURBON - Beginning in 1943, the U.S. Army and Navy conducted a cryptanalytic effort against certain Soviet cryptosystems. In June 1945, ANCIB proposed to the British that they extend their wartime cooperation to the interception and exploitation of Soviet communications. They called the collaborative effort Project BOURBON ("RATTAN" was the predecessor name of BOURBON), which later evolved into the BRUSA Agreements after the war. The fact that the U.S. Army and Navy mounted a wartime effort called Project BOURBON against certain Soviet cryptosystems can be released. Most details beyond this statement, as well as the cooperation with the British in this effort, remain classified. Refer to the Classidoc (CLAS) database (Document ID number 2253) for further information.

Non - Responsive

3. (U) The entry below from LG-Miscellaneous will be amended to add the information in red.

(U) Budget/Finance/Manpower -

Non - Responsive

Individual purchase costs and resource information in contracts or other costing documents are releasable regardless of age.

Budget figures that are 25 years old or older for items of a non-cryptologic nature (desks, printers, supplies) are releasable. NOTE: This guidance pertains to AFSA as well as NSA and supercedes guidance contained in Circular 10-1.

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DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Dated: 24 Feb 98
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Classification: ~~TOPSECRET~~
Security Control Marking: ~~COMINT~~