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30 July 1997

The President
Through:
Mr. Samuel R. Berger
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Subject: Advisory Board Annual Report

The Security Policy Advisory Board was chartered by Presidential Decision Directive 29 of 16 September 1994. The Board provides a non-government, public interest perspective on actions required to streamline and improve Federal security policies and procedures.

Our frame of reference is the report of the Joint Security Commission (JSC), "Redefining Security," dated February 28, 1994. Part of our charter is to provide to the President, through the National Security Advisor, an annual report of our findings on implementing recommendations contained in the JSC report. Our emphasis is on the four key principles enumerated in PDD 29 that Security Policy (1) match the threat; (2) be consistent and enable us to allocate scarce resources efficiently; (3) result in fair and equitable treatment; and (4) provide the security we need at a price we can afford.

Overview

In the course of our first year of activity, we focused on personnel security issues, which (as the Joint Security Commission pointed out) make up the centerpiece of the Federal security system.

We held a series of four public meetings over the last year to discuss specific security issues and to solicit input from the public at large, and industry in particular. To encourage public participation, our meetings were advertised in the Federal Register and held in locations where there is a significant concentration of government contractors.

Additionally, we have monitored the activities of the Security Policy Board, the Security Policy Forum subset of that Board, and the attendant staff.

We have keyed our resulting observations and recommendations to specific observations and recommendations of the JSC report.

Observations

We are persuaded of the overall wisdom, viability, and necessity of many of the Joint Security Commission recommendations. There is important progress in achieving common investigative standards, reciprocal recognition of investigations, and common adjudicative standards. Further, we believe that the Security Policy Board concept is viable and that the Board members and staff are dedicated to improving security processes.

We find, however, that progress in several key areas has been slow and the personnel security process is still unduly arbitrary, bureaucratic, and cumbersome. In the course of our public meetings, we have found a consistent theme of frustration with the process, the delays and expense it imposes on industry (and thus on government programs), and the apparently unnecessary burdens it imposes on individuals and their employers. The end of the cold war and the introduction of some of the recommendations of the JSC do no appear to have greatly eased the burden on the public. Instead, in some ways the process is more intrusive than ever.

Of equal importance, the personnel security process can and should be far more efficient and cost-effective. We believe that priority attention to several areas could, in a fairly short period, provide not only significant cost savings, but also an improved, more responsive security system.

Specific Comments and Recommendations (keyed to JSC comments and Recommendations)

In our opinion, the following are five areas that, if given added priority attention, could produce rapid improvement and increased efficiency in the Federal Security process:

1. Strengthen common standards and reciprocity, both in investigations and adjudication.

JSC Report: "Our goal is to establish a security clearance standard, the application of which will be tracked in a Community-wide data base and will be fully transferable and valid among all government agencies."

Approval of the Single Scope Background Investigation and Adjudicative Standards is an important, albeit difficult, step toward genuine reciprocity and the attendant efficiencies. Still, there continue to be differences in the way investigations are conducted, and strong differences of opinion about the value of some investigative requirements. The process of arriving at common standards is highly contentious and greatly complicated by the lack of good research-based data regarding the cost- effectiveness of investigative techniques. Further research needs to be conducted to ensure those investigative requirements and practices are genuinely standard and serve the intended purpose of providing the right level, and only the right level, of risk management. To that end, initial efforts in this area are under way but will require continued senior encouragement and funding support.

2. Give priority to creating a central data base where investigatory history and clearance status can be readily accessed.

JSC Report: "The Commission recommends that a central Clearance Verification data base be developed and made available to industry and government. The data base should contain all collateral and SCI clearances. Sensitive clearance information should be encrypted or otherwise protected within the data base."

Progress on this recommendation is far too slow; satisfactory solutions are available to quickly address this need. Until this is done, there will continue to be unnecessary duplication of investigatory effort because one agency is not aware that another agency has conducted or is conducting an investigation. Not only does this cost money and cause clearance delays, but it also unnecessarily intrudes upon the privacy of the individual being investigated. A data base containing current clearance data (and accessible via Internet with appropriate security provisions) would save significant effort and money. The remaining issues should be quickly resolved between the Defense Investigative Service and the Office of Personnel Management so these two data bases can serve the entire community with required security and transparency.

3. Force efficiencies upon the demand for investigations.

JSC Report: "The Commission recommends that security clearances be requested only for personnel who require actual access to classified information or technology. For most of those who merely require facilities access, a position suitability determination based on the results of a National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI) should be the maximum allowed."

"The Commission recommends that fee-for-service mechanisms be instituted to fund clearance requests within DOD and the Intelligence Community."

Investigatory agencies are seriously constrained by shrinking resources in the face of a demand for investigations that is virtually uncontrolled. While there are policies with regard to when investigations are warranted, they frequently are ignored, and investigations continue to be conducted for individuals who require only access to a facility. The duties of such people vary from cutting the grass to installing telephones. We are aware of policies requiring full background investigations for individuals who have access to a building where classified work is performed, but who have no access to classified material. We are also aware of investigations being requested because an individual "might require a clearance in the future." Controls are needed to ensure that investigations are conducted only in response to valid requirements for clearances. Among these controls, we would reinforce the JSC recommendation that requesting agencies be caused to pay the costs of all investigations they request. The Security Policy Board should be tasked to develop an implementation strategy.

4. Establish standards for access to compartmented programs.

JSC Report: "The Commission recommends that: a) a single, consolidated policy and set of security standards be established for Secret Compartmented Access information, including all current SAPs, SCI, covert action, and the various bigot list programs; b) Standards contain some flexibility, but waivers down from compartmented access security measures be permitted only when there is no impact on reciprocity."

We have been able to detect little or no progress in this area. In the meantime, security officers for compartmented programs continued to be allowed to set their own arbitrary clearance standards, without regard to investigative or adjudicative standards, and often with no regard for reciprocity.

JSC Report: "The Commission recommends the establishment of a national level Security Policy Committee to provide structure and coherence to US Government security policy, practices, and procedures.... As a first step, the Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence immediately establish a committee to fulfill these functions for the Defense and Intelligence communities."

This recommendation led to the Security Policy Board. While we find the SPB, the Forum, and the SPB staff to be dedicated individuals working to improve the process, the Security Policy Board has not met as a body during the past year and has effectively delegated its responsibilities to the Security Forum, a committee of over two dozen agency representatives co-chaired by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Executive Director of the Community Management Staff. It is very difficult to make rapid decisions or take timely actions with such a cumbersome committee meeting periodically and, as might be anticipated, frequently assigning controversial issues to subcommittees for further study. In our view, the Security Policy Board needs to revitalize and prune itself, choose several issues for timely implementation, and increase the sense of urgency in implementing the results.

Larry D. Welch
Chairman
President's Security Policy Advisory Board

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